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I should know why other people don't like the investments that I'm making, because it gives me something to underwrite.
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Welcome to Partner Path, a podcast that unpacks the venture capital and growth equity ecosystem from a junior perspective.
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Young entrepreneurs and investors have already had a massive impact on the industry, having started unicorns and launched billion-dollar funds.
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We discuss these success stories and more by sharing perspectives and advice from some of the industry's most prominent role models.
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This podcast expresses our views as of the date published and does not represent the views of and is not endorsed by any company for which we work.
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Before we get to the episode, Laura and I are excited to announce a partnership with Overlap.
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Today we are talking with Fenn Murphy, GP at Nebular.
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Fenn started his career as a founder and growth marketing leader before investing at frontline ventures for almost half a decade.
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Now Fenn runs an early stage fund Nebular that invests across the US and Europe.
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Welcome, Fenn.
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Oh, thanks so much for having me on, Laura.
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Thanks for coming.
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So let's kick off by sharing where you're from and maybe some key lessons or learnings from your time in Ireland.
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I lived in Ireland, I was born in Ireland, grew up there, went to university, studied mechanical engineering there, started a software company there, like worked at another software company there, worked at a venture fund there.
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So like the first like 28 years of my life, bar like a couple of stints in the US for like summer jobs, was based out of Ireland.
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And I think yeah, Irish people have a sort of like underdog mentality of like trying to go out and sort of like punch above your weight if you can.
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And I think that part of like we also have like
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quite a global mindset, and like there's a lot of like hilarious, like Ireland is like a very tiny country and was very poor up until like the early 90s, and like managed to sort of crack US foreign direct investment through a bunch of like tax schemes.
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But it's ended up working out really well.
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So like when I was growing up, Ireland went from being like quite poor to like right now being like quite rich, primarily off the back of like a lot of US tech companies being there.
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And so, like as I was graduating college, you had like people who were going to go work for Google and Facebook and LinkedIn and HubSpot.
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And so I think tech was just like much more in the ether for me growing up.
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And that was like part of the reason why when I was at college, I like wanted to start a software company, and like why when I got into venture, there like was an Irish venture capital ecosystem for me to even go work in.
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And even like getting the job in like we still weren't like the same degree as the US.
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Like when I was, I had like met VCs when I was running my company, but when it came to like taking a job in VC, I was like, oh, like what do is there like in the first day in my job at Frontline, I like turned to the managing partner and I was I said it's like so like what does one do as a venture capitalist?
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And he's like, contact all the interesting people you know and go meet them.
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And I was like, okay, that I mean that's that sounds great.
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I can do that, yeah.
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Yeah.
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But maybe let's first touch on your startup roles, the different types of roles you worked at after college, and then we'll hop in to venture.
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Because I'm sure that informed a lot of your decision making today.
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Aaron Powell So I started college in 2011, which was around like peak Facebook, like social network movie.
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Everyone was like, yeah, we want to start startups, like billion, million dollars isn't cool, billion dollars is cool.
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And like most like college kids at the time who like had a bit of like technical or startup interest, I was like, you know what, we really need a local social network because Facebook is too broad.
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And so that was obviously a complete disaster.
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And I ended up like we had a team of four, launched the product, it was terrible, didn't do anything.
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And then I kind of was like, okay, maybe startups, like I'll leave that be for a while.
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And it was only in like senior year of college.
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I had taken a year out to be in student government, and through that I'd been like working on a few different student services.
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One of those was a product we built with a couple of friends to like issue student ID cards into Apple Wallets or into via an SDK into a college app.
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And so the idea was like get access to the gym, get access to like the library, and just have your ID on your phone.
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And it was that that turned into my first startup because the college were like, hey, we'll pay you for this.
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A couple of other colleges were like, hey, that sounds like a great service.
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And so we sort of like accidentally started this as a company, which I now in retrospect it is a terrible idea.
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Like selling SaaS to universities is like literally the worst business ever.
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Like a nice to have, too.
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And like the customers are like IT administrators who like basically the only thing they worry about is risk because there's very little career upside when you work in the nonprofit.
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And so went through the process, like raised a tiny bit of money, thought we could raise more money, and then people were like, no.
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And then we were like, oh, let's get like a gigabrain take, and we'll be like, oh, we're gonna be the world's next digital identity business, and like started looking at like RFPs for like digital driver's licenses in Nebraska, and realized that like actually, like a couple of kids in Ireland trying to like sell digital identity were not gonna win out against like IBM and Saffron.
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And so we were trying to figure out what to do, like whether to pivot pivot.
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And I was I had become pretty friendly with the CEO of another Irish startup that he had been a very early Facebook employee.
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His CTO had been an early employee to come to Gawonga, which was like the UK's first fintech unicorn.
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And they were starting a fintech and had like just raised, like raised a seed rand and we're about to raise a really big Series A.
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And I kind of proposed to him, I was like, look, like he wanted to hire me.
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I was like, you can't hire me.
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Like, I have a team and a company.
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And then I was like, oh, you should just like buy my business.
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And he was like, Oh, okay.
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Like, let's see what that looks like.
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And so we went through the whole process and like me being like, My company is worth like millions of dollars because we have lots of
people.
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And in the end, he was like, Yeah, look, like we're not really interested in this like student software business, but like, yeah, sure, we'll take the whole team.
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And so we ended up doing like an acqui hire to join this consumer fintech in Ireland.
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Their whole thing was like, it was like a social layer on top of like the kind of like early deregulation of financial products in Europe.
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So, like the same deregulation that fueled Monzo and Revolute was like part of what this company was started around.
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We had like six months of like incredible times, like hiring a big team, growing really quickly.
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And it was just the retention in the product was terrible because of the way we had set up like the KYC systems.
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It was my like hot take is like most early fintech that was successful was like pure crime.
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Because like if you actually did the proper like KYC AML checks, like the user experience was horrific.
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And so we ended up like 12 months in, it just wasn't working out, and so I left, and so the rest of my team did, and we were trying to figure out what to do.
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I almost went and joined a startup based in Ireland called Pointy.
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And then as I was about to take the job, a mentor of mine was like, So what do you want to do after this next job?
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And I was like, Oh, I want to start a software company again.
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And he was like, Okay, well, like when do you want to do that?
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And I was like, Oh, like maybe like 18 months.
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And they're like, You can't really join a company with like the plan to leave in 18 months.
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Like, that's not really cool.
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And I was like, What uh really like I think this was like the nature of like having not had a real job ever.
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Yeah.
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So then he was like, but you know who like it it is totally cool if you join and then disappear to start a company after 18 months, venture capital.
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And I was like, Oh, okay.
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And very fortunately for me, there was a firm based in Dublin called Frontline Ventures.
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They were on their second seed fund.
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It was kind of like at the time, fund one was primarily UK and Ireland focused, like lead checks of precedence seeds, like focus on enterprise software.
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Their front two was like slightly bigger with like a little bit more of a focus on doing deals in Europe as well.
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And I joined when it was like four GPs and me, which was like great.
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I just kind of like pottered around and did all my various bits, like going and meeting all of the interesting people I knew.
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But yeah, it was a bit of a circuitous like seeing everything from like hiring your team, firing your team, seeing companies really work, seeing companies really not work, trying to sell a company, seeing what all that looked like.
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I was very fortunate in that I got to pack in a like enormous amount of both good and bad things into a short period of time, which is sort of what I recommend, like when people are coming out of college.
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It's like you want to have like the most high velocity experience possible.
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It doesn't actually matter if that's good or bad, like as long as it's fast.
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Because I think like when you're in that kind of early career building mode, like the more things that happen to you, just like the more and the more experiences you get to have, the faster you can kind of like jump a few steps ahead of other people.
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Obviously, ideally, if they're all good experiences, that is optimal.
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But actually, either direction, as long as it's happening quickly, I think can end up being like has been really good for my career.
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Just like even and honestly, even the bad stuff as a VC, where like I can talk to founders and I'll just be like, really shit building a company sometimes, isn't it?
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And one thing I've observed from people who like spend time in the adventure or startups is when they have like a bad experience, it like completely puts them off, and they're like, oh like that sucked.
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Like, I don't want to do that anymore.
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I think that if your goal is to be like truly great at something, you just kind of have to take those experiences along the way because they're like as important as the good ones to get to the sort of end destination.
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Now back to the episode.
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Maybe just chat about you obviously spent some time doing angel investing, writing personal checks before you started Nebular, which we'll get to.
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And just at a high level, what about that experience maybe pushed you to want to start Nebular?
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It's so it's funny.
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I when I was up front, like I was very lucky in like joining a firm with four partners and me, and then where one of those partners actually got like an insane job offer and ended up leaving like 14 months into the job.
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I had like a huge amount of attitude to like run at, drive, and push through like my own deals.
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Like I got to be a board observer on the first investment I made.
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Like how old were you?
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26, was I 25?
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I would have been, yeah, I would have been 25.
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And it was like the first board observer seat I got was like five months in.
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And like I had been hired to do like Irish B2B software, and like the first company I proposed was an African fintech business, which like I think my partners like that was kind of like a gonna be a continuation of a theme over four years at that firm.
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Um, but they they sort of let me run at things and like make a lot of mistakes, and like in terms of like angel investing, I did like the first angel investment I did was during COVID.
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Our partnership were like, like at the very beginning in like April, like Ireland was under complete lockdown, you weren't allowed to leave your apartment, everyone was sitting there.
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Like the rest of my partnership were like, Look, we're gonna like play it safe, we're not gonna do new deals, and me being the like tempestuous, like, fuck that, like, we should do new deals.
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Uh, the brother of a company I was on the board of was starting a company, and he ended up like I was like, we should have done this.
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And I was just like, fuck this, I'm gonna write a personal check, and the partners were like, Well, we're not doing it anyway, so yeah, whatever.
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And then I probably felt vindicate vindicated because bold start did the seeds like immediately after the pre-seed.
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See, we should have done it, which is like not a good attitude to have when you wrote a venture for a great markup, yeah,
yeah.
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And like venture for me, like angel investing alongside venture became ways for me to do things that like were outside the scope.
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So, like I did a couple of consumer investments, I did like a biotech investment.
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It was like, what's the stuff that I'm interested in that is outside the scope of my like day-to-day job as an investor?
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And I realized that like I'm a terrible consumer investor.
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There's a great way to like blow through like 15k and be like, okay, I probably shouldn't have done that.
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Yeah.
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Same with biotech.
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I was just like, okay, this is like not an area where I have like a particular edge.
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I sort of saw angel investing as a way of like broadening my the scope of like things that I like thought I could be good at.
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And now I realize with angel investing in particular, it's like purely about being in the right pool of people and making a lot of investments if you want to generate good returns, which is like a different type of thing to the firm I wanted to be able to build.
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Because while I was at Frontline, the thing I became good at was like we were trying to write lead checks, we were trying to get around 10% ownership.
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If I ended up getting to a deal at the same time as Sequoia, I was fucked because like they would be like the founder could be like, I really like you, but you're gonna get a quarter million dollars in the round and they're gonna take 2.1.
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And I'm like, well, I mean, that's still okay, but like I don't want that.
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And I had to develop a skill set of trying to find category, whether it was like categories, people, markets, where it was like a little bit ahead of like what other like traditional, like call it like tier one brand venture firms would go and pursue.
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And I thought like I like open source software in Norway, like a French data infrastructure business with like a kind of weird co-founding dynamic, like like a first-time like 17-year-old founder based in Ireland.
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Like, I I sort of always pursued this idea of like I should know why other people don't like the investments that I'm making, because it gives me something to underwrite.
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But that was like the skill set that I realized I was good at.
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I like wasn't good at like doing hot consumer deals, and I like wasn't good at being like, oh, the biotech guys, here this is really interesting.
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So yeah, it's kind of the like angel investing was like figuring out stuff not to do as opposed to figuring out like, oh, this is like what I really should be spending time on.
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Yeah.
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Well, back to your earlier point, I think it's helpful learnings, right, on both the negative and positive experiences, right?
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So maybe we just jump on to Nebular, you're writing precedence checks, just add more context on the investments you're looking to make, specifically in the first fund, any target themes you're interested in, especially for potential founders out there listening.
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Yeah, it's Nebula was like, I I had like the worst LP pitch you could ever possibly imagine when I started, because they were like, okay.
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I was like, okay, I've moved to America.
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And they were like, Well, okay, when?
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I was like, six months ago.
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And they were like, okay, can you live in America?
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I'm like, no, but I'm getting a visa.
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And they're like, and what are you doing?
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It's like, I'm raising a$25 million fund.
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Like, why are you doing that?
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It's like, I'm gonna write lead checks of pre-seed and seeds.
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I'm like, okay, great.
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What are you gonna invest in?
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I was like, I don't know.
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And I like this was part of this strategy of being like, look, I think like every venture firm needs to have a reason to exist.
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Like, if you don't, if you can't describe the reason why you exist, should exist, it's like, well, maybe some people can do it, but like I don't find it's very motivating.
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And I was like, I think the reason why I thought a new firm should exist is because of like the scale that's come into the industry.
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There's not a lot of incentive for people to spend the time to understand opportunities that are like outside the bubble of what is seen as like a classically like, yes, that is a good team, that is a good deal, that is a good market.
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And I was like, honestly, those things like they're just outside the bubble.
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And so I don't know what they are yet.
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Like, I find them by having conversations with people, talking to different founders, talking to operators, talking to technologists.
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And like sometimes I find them through the randomest ways.
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So like LPs were asking me, it's like, so what are you going to invest in?
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And I was like, I like I think the macro for like manufacturing software and like kind of healthcare IT, healthcare
back office software is really interesting right now.
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So like I think I'll probably do investments there.
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And they were like, What do you mean you think you'll probably?
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I was like, well, like I might not.
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Like, like I might not meet any, like I might not meet any interesting people.
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Yeah.
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And I think you always get this like flow of as a category starts to become more interesting, you start to get this flow of high-quality people, discover the reasons why it has become that way.
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And like an example of this is like now I'm like 15 investments into the fund.
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I've done like seven healthcare back office deals, and I've done one software selling it to large manufacturers.
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Because like, I was like, oh, actually, some of the tailwinds I thought were there in manufacturing are not.
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And actually, a lot of the tailwinds that I thought were behind healthcare back office, they were actually much stronger than I thought they were gonna be.
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And the types of founders and the quality of founders have ended up like really like kind of leaning into that.
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But now I'm like, healthcare back office is actually super oversaturated, and I don't know if I'll do any more deals there.
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And so I kind of take my approach to investing as like where can I find interesting people doing things that are like 12 to 18 months ahead of where the rest of the market thinks things are interesting.
00:18:38.559 --> 00:18:48.079
And I'll give you a good example of like, so about a year ago, I saw a YouTube video of a guy running Lama 2 on a Raspberry Pi, and I was like, that's really interesting.
00:18:48.319 --> 00:18:51.839
Like local LOMs on cheap consumer hardware.
00:18:52.000 --> 00:18:56.079
Like, I wonder what like are the other kind of tangents around that.
00:18:56.319 --> 00:19:11.680
And through that like thread, I ended up investing in like an AI companion teddy bear for kids to help with speech and language development, a AI, like a basically like orbital data center business, and a video processing business.
00:19:11.920 --> 00:19:24.559
Like all of them who were like in various sort of just from having conversations with people where it's like, yo, yeah, like edge becomes much more interesting than it did in cloud in this sort of like LLMAI era.
00:19:24.880 --> 00:19:28.319
But that's it's kind of always changing, always digging into new stuff.
00:19:28.400 --> 00:19:33.039
And like the fun strategy is do kind of like seven investments a year, right?
00:19:33.119 --> 00:19:40.480
Like 500k to 1.5 million tickets, be if I'm the only investor in the round, like I'm cool with that.
00:19:40.640 --> 00:19:42.160
I've done that multiple times now.
00:19:42.240 --> 00:19:56.720
Yeah, and it's like having the point of conviction, it being like, I think that what you're doing is going to be not like in three years' time, like if it's not interesting to everyone else for three years' time, they're screwed and I'm screwed because like I don't have a big enough fund.
00:19:57.119 --> 00:20:09.920
But if it's on that like right side of the curve in terms of where the market is going, that's how I think a C fund like mine, I ended up closer to$30 million, getting past the$25 million target.
00:20:10.240 --> 00:20:28.640
But that's how I think you like actually generate really interesting returns and are able to partner with vendors in a way where like you can build a much closer relationship with them because you're the person who believed in them or their market or their technology before necessarily everyone else was trying to pile into it.
00:20:28.880 --> 00:20:29.200
Yeah.
00:20:29.359 --> 00:20:39.599
And I think you're underselling yourself a little bit, obviously, on the fundraising side, which I think it'd be interesting to touch on, vibes are strong, and healthcare back office has been great.
00:20:39.839 --> 00:20:43.519
But say there was an LP listening to this conversation.
00:20:43.839 --> 00:20:53.119
How would you describe what you're trying to do as it relates to a fundraising pitch, aside from obviously just getting along with someone and clearly you have an incredible deal flow?
00:20:53.599 --> 00:21:17.839
I think like from the LP pitch, it was I I try to like demystify early stage venture to folks, where like a good example of this is like people would ask, it's like talk me through your sourcing strategy, and I would literally be like, Look, I know you want me to tell you that I have a magic box, and that my magic box produces 10 to 12 high quality investment opportunities a year, and that I'm the only person with access to the box.
00:21:18.000 --> 00:21:21.200
But it's like it's just not how early stage investing works.
00:21:21.680 --> 00:21:28.799
It's also why I don't believe seed investing is something, I don't believe it's something you can be good at for like more than 10, 15 years.
00:21:28.960 --> 00:21:41.200
I don't think it's something that scales particularly well because I think and it's also like one GP like joked with me, there were nobody becomes a seed investor by choice because the it just never gets easier.
00:21:41.359 --> 00:21:46.319
You are always trying to figure out where the interesting networks, where are the interesting markets.
00:21:46.400 --> 00:21:49.680
You were always spending a lot of time on calls that go absolutely nowhere.
00:21:49.920 --> 00:22:03.680
And I think for LPs, like maybe like the honesty of it was like refreshing, where I'm like, the reason this fund will be really successful is because I am at a Point in my career where my networks are extremely talent
dense.
00:22:03.839 --> 00:22:08.160
I'm at a point in my career where I'm incredibly motivated to make this thing work.
00:22:08.480 --> 00:22:12.559
And I'm at a point in my career where I just actually know enough.
00:22:12.720 --> 00:22:18.480
I've been through the boards of like companies being formed, companies being shut down, companies being acquired.
00:22:18.640 --> 00:22:29.599
I've seen enough things that I like feel competent that like if I'm gonna raise and deploy and return really amazing funds, it's going to be in the next 10-year period.
00:22:29.759 --> 00:22:36.400
And that's gonna be because of like hard work, having the right ideas, and like getting a little bit of luck.
00:22:36.640 --> 00:22:44.799
Like, I think that was like different to the like I have a magic AI bot that tells me who the next smart company is.
00:22:44.960 --> 00:22:45.119
Yeah.
00:22:45.359 --> 00:22:49.119
Because I think like often the marketing and venture gets like a little bit ahead of the skis.
00:22:49.359 --> 00:22:55.920
I like I do believe brand and like individual reputations of the investors that does compound.
00:22:56.079 --> 00:23:07.759
If you do an all-time great deal, as like many of the partners at Notable have done, that compounds because people then know you for that company and then other people come to you and your deal flow continues to get better.
00:23:08.000 --> 00:23:17.839
But outside of that, I think a lot of the like mechanical things venture funds do get in the way of like having smart people going and pursuing good investment opportunities.
00:23:18.160 --> 00:23:21.359
And that was the message that resonated with LPs.
00:23:21.599 --> 00:23:28.000
They're being like, I'm gonna write they were like, why don't you just write quarter million dollar checks alongside like all the great funds?
00:23:28.079 --> 00:23:33.039
And I was like, because then you're just gonna get correlated returns to like the rest of the venture market.
00:23:33.440 --> 00:23:36.319
And I think that's like, why would you want that?
00:23:36.480 --> 00:23:36.640
Yeah.
00:23:36.799 --> 00:23:39.279
I'm like, ideally like seven investments a year.
00:23:39.440 --> 00:23:41.839
I'm gonna try to end up somewhere between five and ten percent.
00:23:42.079 --> 00:23:45.119
Like, I'm gonna try to own between five and ten percent of these businesses.
00:23:45.279 --> 00:23:49.039
I'm gonna try to concentrate into three or four of the ones that I think are really good.
00:23:49.359 --> 00:23:52.480
And I'm not trying to return a three X fund.
00:23:52.640 --> 00:23:56.960
I think like returning three X on like a$30 million seed fund is a total waste of time.
00:23:57.039 --> 00:24:04.160
Yeah, if you're not shooting for like five to 10x, or at least that there is a possibility of that, like you're wasting your time.
00:24:04.319 --> 00:24:15.200
And the thing that nobody says that like I kind of embraced was I'm like, if you want to have a shot at those kind
of returns, you have to take on like a very real possibility that your fund will be bad.
00:24:15.599 --> 00:24:23.599
And that's just another thing about venture as well, where it's like, you know, you don't tell founders to like de-risk their businesses.
00:24:23.839 --> 00:24:25.680
It's like, oh, you should be taking a lot less risk.
00:24:25.759 --> 00:24:27.039
It's like move slower.
00:24:27.279 --> 00:24:31.440
Like literally, and I think so much of the venture industry doesn't have that.
00:24:31.759 --> 00:24:37.359
We don't practice what we preach when it comes to like building our own firms.
00:24:37.599 --> 00:24:45.200
We kind of and it's why I respect people that you know write billion dollar checks out of five billion dollar funds into individual companies.
00:24:45.359 --> 00:24:46.559
Because I'm like, you know what?
00:24:46.640 --> 00:24:53.200
Like that could go really badly, but at least we're supposed to be the most risk-on asset class.
00:24:53.440 --> 00:25:01.680
Like, well, maybe liquid crypto funds, but like, you know, in sort of traditional private equity, like venture is supposed to be where people are taking those big swings.
00:25:01.839 --> 00:25:12.000
And I think the comfort of the size of the industry and the ability to raise large funds takes away that incentive to like actually potentially risk the firm.
00:25:12.160 --> 00:25:19.359
And I think if you're doing something small and you're starting out, like willingness to take risk is just always an edge that you're going to have over anyone else.
00:25:19.680 --> 00:25:23.519
And I think something else that gives you an edge is like your global mindset and global footprint.
00:25:23.759 --> 00:25:30.799
So I'm curious how you think about investing globally being here in New York and like having access to those super early opportunities in Europe.
00:25:31.200 --> 00:25:37.039
When I was trying to figure out where to move to the US, I spent like a month in San Francisco and to be fair, late 2021.
00:25:37.119 --> 00:25:39.200
So it was like, yeah, apocalypse.
00:25:39.359 --> 00:25:44.799
And then I came here and it was like everyone's like, whoa, live in a Vita Loca, like New York was alive.
00:25:44.960 --> 00:25:49.440
And so I was like, okay, I want to live in New York, and then how does that make sense?
00:25:49.599 --> 00:25:57.279
Time zone-wise, city-wise, basically like anyone who is serious and ambitious comes through New York at least once a year.
00:25:57.599 --> 00:26:03.920
Founders also, I saw this in like in when I was in Europe investing in European companies.
00:26:04.079 --> 00:26:14.079
Like it was easier for me to win as an Irish venture capital fund, it was easier for me to win investments in Norway and Denmark than it was for like Norwegian or Danish funds.
00:26:14.240 --> 00:26:19.119
And like me trying to win investments in Ireland was actually quite hard with the best founders.
00:26:19.279 --> 00:26:27.119
And I think it's because like very ambitious people see their locality as like a local maximum.
00:26:27.279 --> 00:26:32.240
And so associating yourself with something else in that locality feels constraining.
00:26:32.480 --> 00:26:37.519
While the very best founders, and I think like ambition is often like the sort of rate limiting factor.
00:26:37.680 --> 00:26:40.799
So I associate like best with most ambitious.
00:26:40.960 --> 00:26:46.240
When they look at New York or San Francisco, they see a global maximum in terms of ambition.
00:26:46.559 --> 00:26:49.359
And so you have an advantage when you're trying to win.
00:26:49.759 --> 00:27:04.960
And like being on the ground and like having the networks and having invested in a whole bunch of different European companies, I see these founders come through and I'm able to kind of sense check them against the most like ambitious, insane founders that make it to the US.
00:27:05.119 --> 00:27:19.200
And I can sort of see through it's like, are these the people that have that drive and have that ambition, even though they maybe have not yet made the move, or maybe in certain circumstances, it may not even make sense for their particular business to end up making that move.
00:27:19.440 --> 00:27:26.880
But I part of the reason why, beyond like the sort of micro of like assessing companies, like being able to win, is my strategy.
00:27:26.960 --> 00:27:36.559
Again, this was like not super LP friendly, was like all US, all Europe, all pre-seed, all seed, broad stroke software business models.
00:27:36.799 --> 00:27:39.119
People were like, that's like impossible.
00:27:39.680 --> 00:27:40.799
Like, what are you talking about?
00:27:40.960 --> 00:27:42.960
Like, like, how do you cover that?
00:27:43.279 --> 00:27:48.880
And it let me like, when people ask cover, I'm like, I hate coverage so much.
00:27:49.119 --> 00:27:56.240
I think it's like the stupidest concept in venture, where it's like, oh, like, you know, we saw 90% of the deals that Sequoia did.
00:27:56.319 --> 00:27:58.880
And it's like, well, great, like, why didn't you do them?
00:27:59.039 --> 00:28:21.519
Like, yeah, that's the I think sometimes people get very because the outputs in venture are so far out and so uncertain, people sometimes over-optimize and obsess over the inputs because they're measurable, and coverage is something that's like immediately measurable and so makes people feel good that they're doing a good job.
00:28:21.680 --> 00:28:25.759
When like Ike joked with someone that was asking me, it's like, what would you look for in a partner?
00:28:25.920 --> 00:28:30.160
And I was like, someone who can like invest in insanely good companies.
00:28:30.400 --> 00:28:39.279
And I would draw it as like if you could roll out of bed one day a year, find the next Google, invest in the next Google, and then go back to sleep for 364 days.
00:28:39.519 --> 00:28:41.839
That's like you are the best investor in the world.
00:28:42.079 --> 00:28:54.640
Like all of the stuff, like podcasting, blogging, going to events, it's all just like to create the opportunity that we might be able to do that thing, like find that great company and invest in that great company.
00:28:55.119 --> 00:28:55.680
One day.
00:28:55.920 --> 00:28:56.480
One day.
00:28:56.640 --> 00:29:03.519
And that that to me is like having this like really wide range means that I just don't have to think about coverage.
00:29:03.759 --> 00:29:15.599
Because if I'm only looking at Ireland, I know there is only one truly great company, like one company that has the potential to be truly great each year that comes out of that ecosystem.
00:29:15.759 --> 00:29:20.240
So I'm like, shit, if I miss that one company, I'm completely fucked.
00:29:20.559 --> 00:29:28.640
While in my view of like, hey, I look at everything, I know there are enough good opportunities that like something will come my way.
00:29:28.880 --> 00:29:40.960
And I don't have to operate in the same like coverage-oriented mindset of like if you're like the New York fintech person, like, yeah, obviously you have to see everything because there's probably only going to be one good company a year.
00:29:41.200 --> 00:29:52.480
And I I don't know if that is conducive to like being the best investor over a long term, or at least like for some people it might be, but for me specifically, it wasn't.
00:29:52.799 --> 00:29:58.000
Well, I think what you said earlier around being a risk-on investor at the seed stage is is interesting.
00:29:58.160 --> 00:30:08.319
I think I saw a post recently where they define the difference between good and great venture funds and loss ratios, and typically great funds end up having higher loss ratios, right?
00:30:08.400 --> 00:30:13.359
But they rely on those 10x plus deals to return the fund and be a five or 10x fund.
00:30:13.440 --> 00:30:16.880
But double-clicking into your thoughts on seed investing as an asset class.
00:30:16.960 --> 00:30:24.079
I know you wrote a blog post titled This is the end of seed investing as we know it, and then obviously went on to start a seed fund.
00:30:24.400 --> 00:30:31.200
I'd love to get your thoughts on where you think seed investing will be in five and ten years, kind of pulling on the thread of that post.
00:30:31.279 --> 00:30:39.279
And as a quick download for the audience, it's outlining that you have to compete with multi-stage AUM giants as well as more flexible check riders, right?
00:30:39.440 --> 00:30:41.279
People that don't necessarily lead the round.
00:30:41.519 --> 00:30:45.440
So, with that dynamic, where do you think the seed investing asset class is going?
00:30:45.519 --> 00:30:48.240
And then why did you then gun and start a seed fund?
00:30:48.720 --> 00:31:00.000
Seed is the only place I think you can build a new brand in that has the potential to be considered one of the best firms in the world at what you do.
00:31:00.160 --> 00:31:07.519
I just think like the Series A market is like benchmark, these people with entrenched brands with the ability to get on board the best people.
00:31:07.680 --> 00:31:13.359
Like they're the attacking those moats just seems completely impossible.
00:31:13.519 --> 00:31:18.640
And I think like one of the things a lot of venture firms sometimes are missing is like what's the goal here?
00:31:18.799 --> 00:31:27.359
If the goal is just like make the GPs loads of money, like that can be fine, but it's like not motivating enough for me to like want to do something.
00:31:27.519 --> 00:31:27.759
Yeah.
00:31:27.920 --> 00:31:38.160
And so when I wrote that post, it was kind of an observation on is like seed is becoming very different and is becoming much more like complex and competitive.
00:31:38.400 --> 00:31:42.799
But the fundamental like building blocks of seed are always going to be the same.
00:31:42.880 --> 00:31:50.079
It's like nobody knows who this idea that like everyone knows who the good companies are is just like complete nonsense.
00:31:50.240 --> 00:31:50.480
Yeah.
00:31:50.640 --> 00:31:51.680
We have not proven that.
00:31:51.759 --> 00:31:59.440
Like the archetypes of great founders like come from everywhere, they have every type of background, they've been building every different type of company.
00:31:59.839 --> 00:32:12.480
And I think that that uncertainty and the lack of data, available data at seed, always makes it a place where there will be opportunities to actually build new firms with different perspectives.
00:32:12.720 --> 00:32:13.039
Yeah.
00:32:13.440 --> 00:32:17.839
And that was like for me, it's like, what's the goal of starting Nebula?
00:32:18.240 --> 00:32:23.119
And I was like, it's kind of what I was saying earlier about like if you're gonna do something, do it to be the best at it.
00:32:23.359 --> 00:32:28.880
Like, pick something that you believe there is a chance you can actually be the best at it.
00:32:29.039 --> 00:32:29.200
Yeah.
00:32:29.359 --> 00:32:32.720
My sister was like, why would you go to the Olympics if you're not trying to win a medal?
00:32:33.039 --> 00:32:36.799
Like, that kind of is the same thing for me with investing.
00:32:37.200 --> 00:32:44.319
I do believe, despite the challenges and the competitiveness, seed firms, if you're really good, you become super rich.
00:32:44.480 --> 00:32:51.839
And then, like, I just don't know if people are like that motivated to continue the grind of like talking to founders on Zoom five or six times a day.
00:32:52.079 --> 00:33:04.400
And that leaves me to be like the goal of Nebular is like, yeah, look, like in 10 to 15 years, I want people when they get asked the question, who do you think are the best seed firms in the world?
00:33:04.559 --> 00:33:08.400
That when they list like two or three names, like Nebula is one of those names.
00:33:08.640 --> 00:33:24.960
And I think that that is a like aspirational goal and a specific thing that you want to achieve that makes it
easier to like build a firm, align LPs, like recruit people over time because you actually want to be great at something.
00:33:25.119 --> 00:33:31.119
Not that everyone doesn't want to be great at something, but I think like if you want to be the best seed firm in the world, what does that mean?
00:33:31.200 --> 00:33:36.559
It's like you're not raising a Series A fund, you're not spinning up a bunch of Scout programs.
00:33:36.720 --> 00:33:49.119
From my perspective, you're not hiring a bunch of junior people because like anything that gets between at seed in particular, I think like anything that gets between the founder and the ultimate like investment decision maker ends up being friction.
00:33:49.359 --> 00:33:57.599
When you introduce that friction, you're suddenly competing on the same plane as the multi-stage funds and on the flexible check writers.
00:33:57.759 --> 00:34:06.160
You have to compete in the space between them, where it's like when you speak to anyone at the firm, you speak to an ultimate decision maker.
00:34:06.319 --> 00:34:06.640
Right.
00:34:06.880 --> 00:34:15.199
When you speak to anyone at the firm, like they're every investment they're making has to be meaningful.
00:34:15.440 --> 00:34:22.000
Like it's not like their career and your career as a founder have to be intertwined in that way.
00:34:22.159 --> 00:34:22.400
Yeah.
00:34:22.559 --> 00:34:31.519
And I think like that space in between is how you do things where other people, because of their structure, just actually like can't compete with you.
00:34:31.679 --> 00:34:39.760
And then you still need to be really good, but at least there's a space where, you know, like I say to founders, like literally, I'm not gonna help you that much.
00:34:39.920 --> 00:34:42.320
And people be like, What are you talking about?
00:34:42.400 --> 00:34:48.800
And I was like, Look, like if you want customer intros, if you want like a recruiting team in-house as venture firms that are gonna do that for you.
00:34:48.960 --> 00:35:03.039
I'm here because like I'm not gonna make that many investments a year, like night and day, I'm available to pick up the phone when you need capital, when you go fundraising, when you're involved in any sort of like part of that side of the business, I'm here to help and I'm here to be a sounding board for you.
00:35:03.199 --> 00:35:05.679
But like, you need to figure out how to acquire customers.
00:35:05.840 --> 00:35:09.920
You need to figure out how to build a hiring engine, you need to figure out how to set culture.
00:35:10.079 --> 00:35:14.159
No one telling you how to do those things is actually gonna help.
00:35:14.320 --> 00:35:22.320
I can introduce you to people who can be useful conversations, but if your business is gonna be successful, it's gonna be because of you.
00:35:22.480 --> 00:35:26.639
It's not gonna be because someone else gave you something in their hand.
00:35:26.960 --> 00:35:35.519
And that message, again, like, can
I ever outcompete Andreessen or Lightspeed on Orsecore and value add services?
00:35:35.760 --> 00:35:36.079
No.
00:35:36.400 --> 00:35:41.119
So I'm choosing to sit in a different part of the like product for founders.
00:35:41.280 --> 00:35:41.760
Right.
00:35:42.000 --> 00:35:46.559
And it's also like a type of founder you attract is different.
00:35:46.880 --> 00:35:53.280
My hunch is that like those types of founders have a higher likelihood of going on to actually be successful as well.
00:35:53.760 --> 00:35:54.159
Interesting.
00:35:54.320 --> 00:36:00.639
It's kind of dancing around this question that you think there will always be opportunity to create a nebula at the seed stage.
00:36:00.880 --> 00:36:20.719
And then also you mentioned during your LP pitch conversation that you think potentially that the next 10 or 15 years of your life and career are potentially the most fruitful from a seed opportunity, indicating it might be somewhat ephemeral, right, within a person's life when they might peak in their potential seed investing opportunity.
00:36:21.039 --> 00:36:25.679
How would you approach investing in a seed fund if you were an LP?
00:36:26.000 --> 00:36:27.280
What would you look for?
00:36:27.760 --> 00:36:34.079
I think you have to look for people that like really, really want it investing.
00:36:34.400 --> 00:36:36.079
It's very easy.
00:36:36.400 --> 00:36:49.840
It's not very easy, but like it is much easier to look good in the short term than it is to make investments that I think can potentially have you like be great in the long term.
00:36:50.000 --> 00:37:00.800
And that's like the hardest paradox, I think, in venture right now, especially like as more and more people at larger firms are not GPs and it becomes a more, you know, we're talking about partner path here.
00:37:00.960 --> 00:37:14.320
The incentive structure for you when you are not the ultimate economic decision maker or economic owner, there's always a flavor of how is the perception on me going to be as I make these investments.
00:37:14.400 --> 00:37:14.719
Yeah.
00:37:14.880 --> 00:37:26.800
If I'm an LP, I'm looking for people who are not trying to look good and like are not doing it because it's like a cool thing to do.
00:37:27.039 --> 00:37:32.800
It's like you have to like really love spending time with early stage founders.
00:37:33.039 --> 00:37:43.360
You have to really love like getting in the shit with them because like they're like, oh, you co-invested with Sequoia, you co-invested with the XYZ, whoever it happens to be.
00:37:43.840 --> 00:37:46.320
That's the stuff that will make you feel good.
00:37:46.400 --> 00:37:51.519
And I think it is very unlikely to generate like really great investment performance.
00:37:51.840 --> 00:37:53.199
Yeah, uncorrelated returns.
00:37:53.360 --> 00:37:53.599
Yeah.
00:37:53.760 --> 00:37:57.599
And it's funny how many pitch decks you'll see that in for funds, right?
00:37:57.760 --> 00:37:59.280
Is like,
oh, these are our co-investors.
00:37:59.599 --> 00:38:07.360
And it's like I kind of get it where like one LP that are a very large LP was like, yeah, look, like tell who led the series A's and the C brands that you did.
00:38:07.519 --> 00:38:14.239
And I'm like, like I can give you that list of people, but like why they're like honestly, that's the only thing we would care about.
00:38:14.559 --> 00:38:22.480
It's like that tells us that you're getting access before people who we believe are good investors.
00:38:22.639 --> 00:38:28.400
And if you can prove that out, then we're like rock and roll, like all on board.
00:38:28.480 --> 00:38:33.679
And yeah, you know, it's everyone, and I don't blame LPs for this, everyone is searching for signal.
00:38:33.920 --> 00:38:44.400
And I think the problem is like in everything in life, by the time the signals are obvious, you're like already too late, and that's the LP side of things.
00:38:44.480 --> 00:39:02.559
It's like, you know, you look at something like an Altos or like, you know, first round, obviously Uber worked quickly, but like, you know, first run with Roblox, like every firm had written off Roblox to zero, like for I think like seven years, and then it's a$40 billion public company.
00:39:02.639 --> 00:39:02.800
Yeah.
00:39:02.960 --> 00:39:06.800
And like Altos did the same, like like with coupon, like bought up into it.
00:39:06.960 --> 00:39:16.000
I think it's just an interesting one where people doing the things that will, whenever like now those firms are all like the most coveted firms to be in.
00:39:16.159 --> 00:39:18.800
It's like, oh my god, if I could be in Altos as an LP, it'd be amazing.
00:39:18.880 --> 00:39:21.199
If I could be in first rand, it would be amazing.
00:39:21.440 --> 00:39:28.239
But like now that the signal is there, is that like something that continues on for a very long period of time?
00:39:28.400 --> 00:39:29.280
I don't know.
00:39:29.519 --> 00:39:33.440
It's like a firm like Sequoia have managed to sustain it and do it for a really long time.
00:39:33.599 --> 00:39:44.559
But that that's the thing I kind of, if I'm putting myself in the LP mindset, why am I looking for signal in a space that is like inherently incredibly noisy?
00:39:44.639 --> 00:39:44.800
Yeah.
00:39:45.039 --> 00:39:54.559
And like what are the early signals that tell me more about the long-term durability as opposed to the early signals that tell me about like short-term spikes?
00:39:54.800 --> 00:39:55.360
Right, right.
00:39:55.519 --> 00:39:56.320
And vibes, of course.
00:39:56.559 --> 00:39:57.840
And vibes, of course, yeah, yeah, yeah.
00:39:58.000 --> 00:39:58.400
Yeah, yeah.
00:39:58.719 --> 00:39:59.039
Great.
00:39:59.119 --> 00:40:01.519
Well, let's wrap it up with a quick fire round, maybe.
00:40:01.679 --> 00:40:02.159
Let's see.
00:40:02.400 --> 00:40:04.079
Underhyped European tech city.
00:40:04.320 --> 00:40:05.039
Copenhagen.
00:40:05.280 --> 00:40:06.000
Copenhagen.
00:40:06.239 --> 00:40:08.400
Emerging tech trend for 2025.
00:40:09.679 --> 00:40:14.400
For 2025, oh, I should do something controversial here.
00:40:14.719 --> 00:40:24.239
I think like weirdly, quantum computing is gonna start to like actually get whether or not it will deliver on its promises.
00:40:24.639 --> 00:40:29.599
I think you're gonna see a lot more interest and activity in uh quantum computing.
00:40:29.920 --> 00:40:33.360
I don't know if it's that controversial, but certainly 2025 maybe it's controversial.
00:40:33.599 --> 00:40:33.920
Yeah, yeah.
00:40:34.159 --> 00:40:36.239
The hardest part about being a solo GP.
00:40:36.800 --> 00:40:47.920
Being a good investor is, I believe, having lots of bad ideas and being able to filter those bad ideas from becoming bad decisions.
00:40:48.400 --> 00:40:54.559
And if you don't have enough bad ideas, I think you're like not close enough to the edge of the risk curve.
00:40:54.880 --> 00:41:01.360
And I had investments at my old firm where like I brought deals to IC that my partners were like, absolutely not, like, we're not doing this.
00:41:01.519 --> 00:41:04.960
And I was like, Oh yeah, you know, actually, like fair enough.
00:41:05.039 --> 00:41:08.000
Yeah, and then we had other deals that the partners were like, we're not doing this.
00:41:08.079 --> 00:41:12.079
And I went like full nuclear and was like, no, like nobody's seeing it.
00:41:12.239 --> 00:41:13.039
Those were the best ones.
00:41:13.119 --> 00:41:14.880
And so that's the thing I sometimes worry about.
00:41:14.960 --> 00:41:31.039
You having that group of people that can tell you why your idea is bad, yeah, but triggering that like subconscious response in the like ones that you know are not good to be like, yeah, actually, fair enough, and the ones that you're like, no, there's something here.
00:41:31.199 --> 00:41:36.320
That I think is like the hardest thing when you're you don't have a partnership that you can have those kind of conversations with.
00:41:36.559 --> 00:41:36.800
Right.
00:41:37.039 --> 00:41:40.559
You have to be both that idea generator and the feedback loop.
00:41:40.639 --> 00:41:40.960
Yeah, yeah.
00:41:41.199 --> 00:41:53.360
Yeah, and nobody if if if they're not in your partnership, you can run ideas past people all you want, but like nobody will have the same level of like rigor and pushback as someone who's like open AI or anthropic?
00:41:53.920 --> 00:41:56.880
Right now, probably anthropic.
00:41:57.119 --> 00:42:00.960
Maybe the hot take is like potentially like neither.
00:42:01.360 --> 00:42:02.880
But that third option, yeah.
00:42:03.199 --> 00:42:15.519
Both of those businesses are if they're going to be successful based on like the current Transformers archite architecture, and if scaling laws continue, are going to be continue to be incredible sinks of capital.
00:42:15.760 --> 00:42:25.440
And I think there's like a it's very unlikely Anthropic doesn't, if that continues, doesn't effectively become a business unit of Amazon.
00:42:25.679 --> 00:42:29.039
And like likewise with OpenAI and Microsoft.
00:42:29.199 --> 00:42:29.440
Yeah.
00:42:29.679 --> 00:42:43.199
Because I I just don't know if there's enough private capital in the world to go up against Google's cash engine and Facebook's cash engine and like ultimately Microsoft and Amazon's cash engines.
00:42:43.280 --> 00:42:43.760
Yeah.
00:42:44.079 --> 00:42:49.039
It's it's just a a faster moving, incredibly capital-intensive business.
00:42:49.119 --> 00:42:58.000
And so if if it keeps going the way it is, I think the answer could potentially be Google, Microsoft, and it's like the question is Google, Amazon, or Microsoft.
00:42:58.320 --> 00:42:59.039
Right, right, right.
00:42:59.119 --> 00:42:59.440
Interesting.
00:42:59.679 --> 00:42:59.840
Great.
00:42:59.920 --> 00:43:02.800
Well, Finn, thanks so much for coming on and sharing your experiences.
00:43:03.599 --> 00:43:04.480
Oh no, thanks so much for all.
00:43:04.719 --> 00:43:05.360
This is great.