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Welcome to the Public Company Series podcast.
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I'm your host, Doug Chia.
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This podcast series is designed to give corporate directors, executives, and governance professionals the insights and tools they need to build boards that are agile, resilient, and prepared for the future.
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It's based on the book Board Structure and Composition, which is part of the public company series published by the New York Stock Exchange at JP Morgan.
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If you're finding these conversations useful, following the show is the easiest way to make sure new episodes show up on your feed.
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Our guests for today's episode are Steve Pakela and John Sinkular, both partners at Pay Governance.
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Steve and John authored the chapter of the book entitled Board Pay Evolution and Aligning Design with Shareholders.
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Steve and John, welcome to the show.
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Thank you, Doug.
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Thank you.
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I'll set the context for the discussion and then we'll get going.
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So over the last decade, director compensation hasn't surged.
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It's actually grown at about 2% annually, with a total median pay up about 19% from 2015 to 2023.
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At the same time, the job has become significantly more complex.
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Boards have had to navigate a global pandemic, geopolitical events, supply chain disruptions, climate change, and the next waves of technology.
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Artificial intelligence, of course, cybersecurity, digital privacy.
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So the underlying challenge that Steve and John addressed in their chapter of the book is how boards design director compensation programs that are competitive, aligned with shareholders, and still appropriate for a role that is still fundamentally not a full-time job.
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Put differently, boards are quietly asking more of directors without dramatically changing the economic model.
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In their chapter, Steve and John talk about how director compensation levels and structures have evolved over time, the increasing emphasis on equity compensation and shareholder alignment, the role of benchmarking and peer group comparisons in setting pay, and key governance features such as stock ownership guidelines, pay limits, and emerging best practices.
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So, with that, we'll dive into this.
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Looking in the big picture, one of the most striking takeaways from your chapter is this disconnect with board responsibilities having expanded dramatically, but board pay has only increased incrementally.
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And it looks like, you know, that's not an accident.
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It reflects a market that still looks at this job of the directorship as a prestige and service role, not some kind of like fully priced risk adjusted job.
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And so how do you look at this seeming disconnect, or maybe it's not a disconnect?
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It's not a linear relationship between the time that's spent on the board and this associated pay.
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I mean, when we looked at the S P 500 as well as other large companies, typically the the bulk of pay is in retainers, a mix of cash and equity to set it be set at a reasonable level and to reflect market competitive practices, reflecting the kind of skill set that the board is seeking ultimately with a group of individual directors that are working collectively to serve in that oversight fiduciary capacity.
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Your chapter notes that median total compensation for a corporate director is about is you know $310,000.
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That's a lot, and it's really still only a part-time job just despite all of the increased demands.
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Um and so you you know, you're saying that it's not really a pay set by kind of the number of hours.
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Um, but how much time does a director at your typical SP 500 company, assuming there's nothing, you know, special or no crisis going on, how much in an average in a in a typical year would would one spend as that as a corporate director?
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We've seen the average generally around 300 hours, but as you mentioned in those crisis periods, um that can spike up or in key leadership roles in times of uh transition, that can be much higher.
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And I think it is reflecting, it isn't definitely not a typical part-time job in terms of the pool of candidates that would be considered for this role.
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You know, oftentimes you're seeing uh retired executives or you know, currently active executives that are able to carve out a portion of their time.
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So it is balancing those various factors as we think about the part-time nature, recognizing that you know that directors are on call, you know, even though there are regular meetings throughout the year, but something comes up, there'll be special meetings.
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Um, but it really is striking that right balance of we think about you know, individually, you know, pay around $300,000 per director, you know, median number of non-employee directors near 10, that you might have total pay about $3.5 million collectively for that body.
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Uh, but thinking about the diverse skill set that you're getting in terms of background experience, um, responsibilities, what people bring to the table.
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And
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those challenges continue to increase, as you mentioned, since the global pandemic.
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And you more recently with what's happened with tariff policy and other you know geopolitical events.
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So it's important that that diverse skill set exists and it has a role to supplement what the management team already has in-house, as well as the outside advisors that they that support them.
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But it still looks like, you know, for directors, it's almost like there's standard pay out there.
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And we're not really looking at sensitivity in the type of company, uh, industry, um, size, you know, all of these factors that, you know, normally when there's like a job market for something, um, you know, there are a lot of factors involved in terms of why somebody is getting paid what at what company.
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Um and, you know, it might even be based on, okay, what level of experience and I'm coming into the job with?
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Am I a more senior or am I a more uh you know, kind of more like entry-level person, or have I done this a lot?
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Or yeah.
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And so uh, but but the directorship is clearly not that.
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You know, it's it's not like other jobs.
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So at some point, do we get do we get there where these are really differentiated in terms of the compensation kind of case by case by company or even case by case by director?
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There is differentiation in terms of the leadership roles that you have on the board itself, you know, whether it be a non-executive chairman or a lead director, and then the leaders of you know each individual committee in terms of those chair.
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Um, but I think it's a recognition, particularly when you look at the large companies, you know, typically recruiting, you know, non-employee directors that have significant experience.
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So there's not that typically a wide range that you might see in other traditional kinds of roles.
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And I think it also comes back to the fundamental responsibility of a non-employee director, is it really is that fiduciary responsibility, connecting, representing the shareholders, that broad shareholder base.
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And I think that informs a lot of what you see in terms of the directional pay framework that applies at these companies.
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And I think that's also, again, it's not intended to replace the talent that that is in-house as well as outside adviders, become even more important as you see the challenges of AI and other emerging technologies out there.
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Have you seen any evidence of kind of like the supply and demand phenomenon where, you know, say, okay, the rectorship is getting harder.
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There are fewer people out there who are actually qualified to do this.
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And you're gonna have to start paying people more because at some point, you know, people are gonna say, well, you know what, that's that you can't pay me enough to do that, or that that's not enough pay for what the job entails.
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Um, but I haven't really, I mean, there are people who have kind of theorized or predicted that, but I haven't really seen any evidence of that.
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But maybe I don't know if you have in terms of what the market dynamic looks like these days.
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I don't think we have seen that yet, Doug.
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I think there's still a good number of qualified candidates that are willing to sort of continue their business career sorting at public company uh directorships.
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That said, as we you know get into the age of AI and those skills um, you know, become increasingly in demand, it's not to say that it won't be more of a sort of an in-demand area that will require different pay for those levels of skills.
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In terms of you know, the level of pay, um we'll let's talk about kind of how those get established.
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And still largely today, it's benchmarking.
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Um, you know, in the book that you describe uh a pretty structured approach to setting pay, you say total pay is targeted to be competitive with the market median.
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Uh, comparisons are made to the company's pay peer group and maybe supplemented by a larger data set of comparably sized general industry companies.
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Um but the benchmarking, whether it's uh with director comp or executive comp has always been very controversial.
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And the argument is well, you know, if you it essentially creates a one-way ratcheting effect that may not have as much to do with kind of actual merit, if you will, and more about, okay, let's just see where the market is and we'll pick the middle or we'll pick the 70th fifth percentile or something like that.
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How do you respond, given that that still is largely the way people look at this?
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Yeah, I could see that point of view.
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Um, but I think our long-term studies would suggest that directors' compensation at the median has only increased at a 2-3% per year uh rate over a long period of time, over a decade.
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And so while that's a very interesting point and and might be more uh more of a strong point with executive pay, we don't see it with the directors.
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It's still just about two to three percent per year.
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Have you seen any kind
of like price sensitivity um where you know it actually might go down in some years or uh you know, in a in a recession or something, it just doesn't go up as much.
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Do you see any that kind of evidence?
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Yeah, there is some of that evidence.
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Um, one, you know, black swan events.
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So take the financial crisis in 2008.
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We actually saw some boards follow the lead of the management team to reduce on a temporary basis their retainers, and we saw that.
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We didn't see that so much during COVID, um, particularly because the recovery was fairly rapid.
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It's it started over the summer.
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So we really had sort of that March through July period where the market was down, there was a recession, but then the recovery happened prior to what I would say those decisions to consider reducing pay um came to play.
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So we do see that.
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Now, what we also see is situations where directors' compensation, most boards don't want to increase their pay each and every year.
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We point this out in the article.
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Yeah.
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It's more every two to three years.
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Yeah.
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And so they would target a little bit higher than the median, and then over time allow their pay to sort of come down toward the median.
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When that time comes where it's it's time to consider an increase, but the company's performance is low, or we're in a recession, we have seen plenty of instances where those directors would say, no, now is not the time to increase our pay.
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So their pay actually falls below the median for some period of time.
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Yeah.
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Yeah.
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And I I know there's always been kind of a, you know, two schools of thought here in terms of derising director pay.
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Some people say, well, just raise it a little bit every year, no matter what, because that, you know, somehow the time where you think it's time for a raise, and that year where you think, okay, that wouldn't be such a good look, seems to, you know, kind of collide a lot.
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So then it's like okay, we're never going to raise the pay because we always seem to have this optics issue.
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But if we raise it a little bit every year, so I mean, what is what is like the prevailing practice now?
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You know, I think it's to look at it look at their compensation every two years and adjust it periodically.
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That's every two to three years.
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Okay.
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And, you know, we we want to do it at a time where, you know, there's growth, and there's growth not only in in financial results, but only even in stock price.
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We want that alignment.
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But there are situations where where companies might say, hey, just now is not the right time to increase pay.
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And so, you know, the the this practice of taking a peer group and setting your director compensation at the median.
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Um, you know, if everybody does that, then you don't have a very dynamic um uh market for for directors.
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And I don't know in terms of when you talk to companies about that, um, is that basically the whole point?
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Or are there some times where the company is like, you know what, we want to pay at like 75th percentile because we need to, you know, we're we're not as recognized as some of our competitors, and there is a competition for good directors, and so we need to do something to attract people.
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There are situations where that occur.
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I've seen it when boards are considering a more substantial refresh, or they're trying to lure in a specific skill set that they that might be absent today at the board, where they would say we need to go above and beyond what our typical policy and framework is, and maybe target the fourth quartile because they feel that they need three or four new directors, and the the level of director and skill that they need are at companies that pay more.
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So I have seen that.
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Are there any kind of like more creative things that you've seen that that actually seem to make sense?
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Or is that you know, kind of there's very little experimentation in this field?
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There's not a whole lot that we see.
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The data sort of proves that.
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Um, one might say, well, why not?
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Why don't companies just use judgment?
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Why, yeah, why follow the benchmarking approach?
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It just leads to higher and higher pay.
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Yeah.
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Well, judgment lacks information.
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And so we think that the benchmarking approach does provide the information to make these informed decisions.
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And, you know, that sort of leads us to where we are today.
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And when we look at the rate of increase, it does seem like it has worked.
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It's it's only been an increase of 2% to 3%, very different than what we would see at the executive level.
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So then, in terms of the actual price sensitivity or uh performance sensitivity, that's where the equity versus cash comes in.
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And so in your chapter, you describe uh a clear shift in the mix of payment.
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You so you said the trend is the trend has been to deliver a greater portion in equity compensation, which provides direct economic alignment to the shareholders.
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And your stats show that equity is about uh 63% of total director compensation on average versus 59 in 2015.
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So it's it's moving up um to two-thirds.
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And so what's you know, what's driving this?
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Yeah, it I think fundamentally reflects the responsibility of the board.
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You know, it's the oversight of the the management team, you know, helping guide on the strategy, succession planning, and development, and representing the broader shareholder base.
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And so hence that direct tie through primarily equity is really driven over time, about two-thirds of the regular pay being derived or delivered in stock, which is typically full value stock.
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Again, that direct shareholder connection.
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And I think also recognizes we want to stay within reasonable levels.
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Again, underlying this is a non-employee director.
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So I think that reflects some of the differences you see because it's not a regular employee, it's not an executive.
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And it's like so having some of that differentiation, I think, further reinforces really really wearing that long-term shareholder hat is really ultimately what we see at the board of director level and recognizing there is some differences as you go.
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You know, we're our focus in the in the article is on the S P 500, but you look at startup companies, they may heavily emphasize stock and recruiting certain skills.
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But as we alluded to earlier, given that the base of companies we're looking at the S P 500, they tend to stay within a relatively narrow range of just recognizing the the various skill sets that they're hunting for.
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I would think the pressure, a lot of it is shareholder, you know, alignment with shareholder interests, right?
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Um, that's why you pay people in equity or some kind of equity-linked uh instruments.
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Um but a lot of investors say, well, you know, more equity would be better.
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That if you really want to fully align a director's incentive with the shareholders who are the ones who elect those directors, you would pay them 100% in stock.
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Um, and so you know, kind of their fortunes go where the the investors uh uh you know have their have their stake at risk.
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Um is that something that you know you see boards considering, or you know, yeah, you go you have a client that really believes that or or kind of says, well, that that's actually not it sounds good, it's not such a great idea.
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Yeah, many of the large companies have that embedded, that that level of flexibility, but it's through a choice.
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So typical pay structure would be approximately two-thirds through equity, one-third cash, but then individual directors have a voluntary election they can make to defer those cash retainers into stock units.
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So they could you know self-select, if you will, to be 100% equity just based on their personal situation.
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So really more of an individual choice, I think to balance that you know, kind of risk-reward trade-off as you think about the ultimate pay structure.
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Do you see these debates within the boardroom of this this kind of short-term, long-term argument of okay, if you're paying people 100% equity, then really they're just gonna be like stock watchers.
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Um, they're gonna be focused on the quarterly, uh, the quarterly ups and downs, and they're not really kind of long-term thinkers.
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Um, but if you pay them too much in cash, then they really don't have much of an interest or as much of an interest in actually caring about the stock price.
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But maybe that's the whole point.
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You know, we can go around and round on this, but I'm just wondering, you know, from your experience in boardrooms, what are the discussions like?
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Where are the nuances show up?
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Doug, what I see is these directors come in, they have a long-term mentality.
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Okay, they've been successful in their career, they have made it in their own career, and now they're asked to serve on a board.
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And so they bring that perspective, they bring the shareholder perspective.
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They know full well that they represent the shareholders.
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Um, they need to balance um the tension around what management believes and feels, but they also do a pretty good job at representing the shareholders.
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So, you know, I don't think um what we see is directors looking for extreme wealth creation.
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They've done that in their prior life in general, and so they want to be compensated fairly for uh their role and the time commitment.
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And I think that's right now a pretty successful model.
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As John
mentioned, if they believe that they want to sort of have a more risk-based model, they can defer their cash retainer into additional stock.
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And we do see that, but in not all cases.
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But I've often wondered, you know, just paying people in equity or equity link instruments, does that actually affect their behavior or how they do their job?
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It's it's back to the fundamental responsibility of the board.
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And so recognizing these are part time roles and to really serve in that fiduciary.
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Capacity.
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So we don't want in any way a misperception from our shareholder base that we're overpaying, that we're unduly creating a risk structured program.
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And that's why you typically don't see performance-based pay.
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And oftentimes with the larger companies not granting stock options, we really want that focus on the long-term shareholder perspective, recognizing typically the annual cycle for a director is it's an annual election each year.
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Even though we want them thinking about the very long term, they're still ultimately accountable to the shareholder base and making sure they're going through the strategy and being mindful of the various challenges that are afoot and thinking about succession planning.
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So we really want them devoid of the emotional damage, if you will, of having too much tied to the stock price, of having everything in um tied to that particular company's performance.
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You know, hence, I think the benefit of having a diverse group of board members who've worked at other companies and may still be active or operating on other boards.
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They bring different perspectives and they're diversified.
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So they can help guide us through the challenges that ultimately will present themselves and ultimately have that strong connection to the shareholder base.
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You write that the use of performance-based awards is nearly non-existent due to the desire to avoid any misperceptions between compensation and their duties.
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So why did boards move away from this so decisively?
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I know that, you know, over time, once upon a time, stock options was kind of, you know, a primary vehicle for executive comp, and then it moved away for various reasons.
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I mean, was director pay kind of driven by the same uh dynamics, or was that something different going on there?
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I do believe so, Doug.
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Um, as executives moved away, so did the directors.
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And so we do still see some options at the executive
level, but they've all but disappeared, except maybe for technology or or smaller companies that may still use stock options for directors.
00:24:09.759 --> 00:24:12.799
But mainly, you know, it's a full value share.
00:24:12.799 --> 00:24:17.440
I think the boards, um, as the executives have pulled away from options, so have the boards.
00:24:17.440 --> 00:24:20.240
So there's alignment uh issue there.
00:24:20.240 --> 00:24:26.400
And then all of a sudden, also is the concept of you know having to exercise the option.
00:24:26.400 --> 00:24:33.119
And so if the option then has a term that forces an exercise, you know, I think directors want to avoid that.
00:24:33.119 --> 00:24:36.319
And so there's the optics related to that as well.
00:24:36.880 --> 00:24:50.799
And then so full value or restricted stock units, that's kind of seen as not having as much risk of uh people trying to game things is that kind of the idea here?
00:24:51.200 --> 00:24:57.279
Yeah, and I think what we see is we see so many directors just hold on to this stock until they leave the board.
00:24:57.279 --> 00:24:57.599
Sure.
00:24:57.599 --> 00:25:06.799
Now, whether by design, you know, from a design perspective, we do see deferred units that are not liquidated until you know the director leaves the board.
00:25:06.799 --> 00:25:09.359
And that could be sort of their career as a director.
00:25:09.359 --> 00:25:09.599
Yeah.
00:25:09.599 --> 00:25:10.960
We like those designs.
00:25:10.960 --> 00:25:18.640
Other cases, you know, it might be restricted stock or restricted stock units that vests upon in uh the lapse of one year.
00:25:18.640 --> 00:25:21.759
Well, that doesn't mean that those directors are selling the shares.
00:25:21.759 --> 00:25:25.119
They also tend to hold that stock for a very long time.
00:25:25.119 --> 00:25:36.240
So that's a little bit different of a scenario than you would when you consider a stock option that that term is defined and there needs to be an action at that point in time.
00:25:36.240 --> 00:25:39.200
So, and that might not come at the best time for the company.
00:25:39.200 --> 00:25:51.440
If it's a recession or they're just not doing well, or maybe just the optics around the stock ran up, and then the directors are exercising, you know, that might not look good either if the stock were to come back down.
00:25:51.839 --> 00:26:04.799
And then people kind of point, uh, they make assumptions or they, you know, they make assertions about, oh, how convenient they're exercising at this time, um, where it really has nothing to do with that.
00:26:04.799 --> 00:26:11.200
So why not have performance related?
00:26:11.200 --> 00:26:16.160
I mean, uh, you know, you talked about the misconception of the optics or something like that.
00:26:16.160 --> 00:26:27.119
But I guess it does go back to this if you really want to align them with shareholder um value or shareholder interest, because that's who they represent.
00:26:27.119 --> 00:26:43.440
Shouldn't there be some kind of um you know incentive for them to look at performance and not just performance, not not just kind of the passage of time, which I guess is the criticism of just giving them full value shares.
00:26:43.440 --> 00:26:47.039
You know, you're just paying them to hold on to it.
00:26:47.039 --> 00:26:54.799
And it really, you know, wouldn't it be better to have some kind of like some targets or something really on the line here?
00:26:54.799 --> 00:27:02.559
Um yeah, I mean, what's the is there like a mix of thinking out there uh on that?
00:27:02.880 --> 00:27:03.519
Yeah, there is.
00:27:03.519 --> 00:27:22.000
And so if you think about directors having a very long-term view, the accumulation of shares, and to to John's point, this is now you know two-thirds of the mix, that accumulation of shares is performance-based over the long term, if we think about a company's stock price increasing at or above the rate of the market.
00:27:22.000 --> 00:27:28.079
So that's that's sort of a performance-based reward that in in that um sense.
00:27:28.079 --> 00:27:38.559
However, if the notion would be, well, why don't we give a director performance shares with explicit performance targets similar to the executive?
00:27:38.559 --> 00:27:45.839
You know, I think the the thought is that these directors um they need to approve the performance goals for the executives.
00:27:45.839 --> 00:27:52.799
And so it sort of keeps them clean of self-dealing, if you would, around the goal setting process.
00:27:52.799 --> 00:27:59.200
Are they setting goals that might be too easy because their own compensation is based on that, those goals?
00:27:59.200 --> 00:28:04.559
They need to represent the shareholder and to meet the shareholder's expectation around growth.
00:28:04.880 --> 00:28:05.200
Yeah.
00:28:05.200 --> 00:28:29.839
So I think, I mean, I think you're pointing out this is a very thought-out part of the oversight role of the board in terms of, okay, yeah, if you're overseeing someone's performance and the performance is based on targets that you are setting, then you should be kind of held at like almost like this neutral level of compensation.
00:28:29.839 --> 00:28:43.839
So you're not, you know, essentially, yeah, you're not kind of working together with the executives to game the system, which would definitely be the accusation if if things started to go like too well for people.
00:28:43.839 --> 00:28:44.880
That's right.
00:28:44.880 --> 00:28:52.480
Now you talked about directors holding on to what they've been granted in terms of equity instruments.
00:28:52.480 --> 00:29:05.599
Um you say that in the book, you say there's near universal use of stock ownership guidelines, ensuring ongoing alignment of directors' economic interests with shareholders.
00:29:05.599 --> 00:29:28.319
Um so and we're looking at typically three to five times their annual retainer, and that's often, you know, the policy is well, you
know, you don't have to have that on day one, but we give you a couple years, maybe five years to get to that threshold, but then you have to stay there.
00:29:28.319 --> 00:29:45.039
Um what again is this is this more signaling to the marketplace, or does this actually you know have some kind of uh an effect from a an incentive setting point of view?
00:29:45.599 --> 00:29:46.319
It's really both.
00:29:46.319 --> 00:30:00.799
I think it again reinforces most of the pay, approximately two-thirds of the SP 500 is coming through equity, and the expectation is to accumulate, hold on to that, you know, a minimum portion of that stock over time.
00:30:00.799 --> 00:30:18.799
You know, a lot of directors as Steve alluded to will actually you know may not sell any share um during their their tenure on the board, but it it's providing some level of flexibility for each director, but recognizing there's a meaningful level of minimum ownership that our longer serving directors will have.
00:30:18.799 --> 00:30:28.640
And then you think about collectively with you know 10 directors, you know, joining at various points in time, uh, that that that collective level of ownership will be meaningful.
00:30:28.640 --> 00:30:32.960
And again, back to that direct alignment to the shareholder base that they're representing.
00:30:33.440 --> 00:30:42.319
Ownership guidelines, they they definitely have good optics, at least when they, you know, when when they have a significant level.
00:30:42.319 --> 00:30:46.480
But I guess, you know, a lot of people will say, well, look at look at the stock ownership guidelines.
00:30:46.480 --> 00:30:51.119
They actually aren't that significant in terms of what people are required to hold on to.
00:30:51.119 --> 00:31:09.440
And most of the ownership that they're gonna have is stock that's granted to them by the company, you know, maybe uh up front, sometimes there's a big there's a there's a kind of a uh an onboarding grant, and then over, you know, over the course of years.
00:31:09.440 --> 00:31:13.680
So yeah, getting there in five years isn't that hard because they're just gonna give it to you.
00:31:13.680 --> 00:31:39.200
Um and some investors would say, you know, the key uh, you know, a key factor to look at when you're trying to evaluate whether you, you know, trust a board or have faith in a board is if the board members open up their own wallets and buy additional stock to get to that uh stock ownership um threshold.
00:31:39.200 --> 00:31:45.200
Is this a problem that, or is this like a problem that doesn't really exist that doesn't need to be solved?
00:31:45.519 --> 00:31:50.319
Amongst the larger companies, you know, generally we'd say it's it's not really a problem that needs to be solved.
00:31:50.319 --> 00:32:03.359
And then it's again recognizing what we're striving that independent uh group of directors to represent and you know, individually and collectively, you know, through the design of the pay program and to make sure it is meaningful.
00:32:03.359 --> 00:32:06.960
I mean, again, back to these are our part-time roles.
00:32:06.960 --> 00:32:11.920
Um, we don't want any misperception of you know encouraging undue risk.
00:32:11.920 --> 00:32:14.880
You know, some directors will choose to individually buy stock.
00:32:14.880 --> 00:32:18.559
You know, it's that could be a personal choice, but it's not mandated.
00:32:18.559 --> 00:32:28.240
And ultimately to make sure it's it's viewed as reasonable, because our ultimate uh stakeholder in this is the shareholder base, particularly that long-term shareholder.
00:32:28.240 --> 00:32:31.839
And so making sure our directors operate that way.
00:32:32.319 --> 00:32:38.880
You note that some directors decide to retain all of the equity compensation provided.
00:32:38.880 --> 00:32:44.640
And, you know, obviously not everyone can do that, but what is the idea behind that?
00:32:44.640 --> 00:32:50.240
Is that just kind of like tax-driven, or is that, you know, what yeah, what's going on there?
00:32:50.799 --> 00:32:52.400
There there could be various factors.
00:32:52.400 --> 00:32:54.720
I mean, it comes down to you know, personal choice.
00:32:54.720 --> 00:33:03.599
I know we've seen several examples that you know, executive at their prior, you know, job, you know, maybe they were a CEO and they never sold a share when they were CEO.
00:33:03.599 --> 00:33:16.319
And they and they just bring that mindset now as they've joined this other board and just you know, from their personal view, avoid you know, any misperception out there if there's a a Form 4 or something filed when they've sold stock.
00:33:16.640 --> 00:33:31.279
Now, in terms of director pay limits, uh, you say there's been a significant increase driven by lawsuits asserting that directors awarded themselves excessive compensation.
00:33:31.279 --> 00:33:42.160
Um, and now nearly 70% of companies have established meaningful director pay limits with a median value of $750,000.
00:33:42.160 --> 00:33:46.400
And that the $750 being the cap.
00:33:46.400 --> 00:34:07.839
Um but you know, when we look at $310,000 being the kind of median pay um and $750 being uh the you know the median limit, is that really a meaningful limit?
00:34:07.839 --> 00:34:10.559
Um, you know, does this actually constrain anything?
00:34:10.559 --> 00:34:15.760
Because some people would say, like, look, okay, yeah, you have a limit, but there's no you're you're never gonna get to that limit.
00:34:15.760 --> 00:34:17.440
So is this even a real limit?
00:34:17.840 --> 00:34:19.119
That's by design, Doug.
00:34:19.119 --> 00:34:19.519
Yeah.
00:34:19.519 --> 00:34:27.199
It's really meant to um provide the board flexibility, but to have a level of cap that it doesn't get out of control.
00:34:27.199 --> 00:34:40.480
But there are situations, maybe the board is going through a strategic review or a leadership change where special committees are introduced and these
committees might run for three or six or maybe even 12 months.
00:34:40.480 --> 00:34:45.440
There are times when those special committees are compensated due to the extra workload.
00:34:45.440 --> 00:34:58.960
And so these caps are meant to accommodate and allow a board to be paid for that extra workload, or possibly new directors that come on board are provided an initial equity grant.
00:34:58.960 --> 00:35:05.280
That's a situation as well where you wouldn't want that equity grant to trigger any type of excess pay.
00:35:05.280 --> 00:35:14.559
So the cap is designed to be high, to be flexible, but to also provide some level of certainty that compensation isn't unlimited.
00:35:14.880 --> 00:35:23.440
And you so so just there, you brought up um, you know, pay for like special committee work and these kind of things.
00:35:23.440 --> 00:35:27.760
I mean, that's an interesting one that I guess doesn't get talked about that often.
00:35:27.760 --> 00:35:39.199
Um, tell me a little bit about how that works in terms of special committees or special assignments and how you know whether people get paid extra or not for these.
00:35:39.599 --> 00:35:48.639
Yeah, I think if uh if a special committee is developed and they meet a handful of times, we we typically don't see extra compensation for that.
00:35:48.639 --> 00:35:59.199
It's when that that level of commitment and workload becomes um meaningful, you know, and that definition is defined by every company.
00:35:59.199 --> 00:36:11.840
But you know, if they're gonna have to meet several times, um, maybe they're interviewing candidates to be the new CEO, and there's interviews, there's second interviews, there's two or three candidates, you know, it starts to add up.
00:36:11.840 --> 00:36:15.360
They then meet as a group, you know, to make their decisions.
00:36:15.360 --> 00:36:22.800
That's when the extra compensation um is introduced, but it's not significant in many cases.
00:36:22.800 --> 00:36:25.760
It's in many cases $50,000 or less.
00:36:25.760 --> 00:36:37.599
There have been certainly instances based on maybe the timing of a transaction committee that goes 12 or even 18 months where it's more significant, but it typically isn't all that significant.
00:36:38.000 --> 00:36:47.360
To your point, in terms of okay, median pay for a director is 310, uh, medium cap is 750.
00:36:47.360 --> 00:37:18.159
It sounds like the cap is very, very high, but there are going to be instant, or there could be instances where you have someone on the board, maybe even the independent chair, uh having to serve on a lot of special committees, especially if the company does a lot of transactions, and typically the same, you know, the same types of directors uh are the ones who ask to serve on those transaction committees because they have the transactional background.
00:37:18.159 --> 00:37:32.079
And then so at some point it could get up, you know, it could go from 310 to 750, um, you know, based on just circumstances that people aren't really thinking about up front.
00:37:32.400 --> 00:37:33.679
I think that's fair.
00:37:33.679 --> 00:37:41.280
Um, I think you're going to see the 310 more often approach 400 or maybe 450 than the 750.
00:37:41.280 --> 00:38:02.320
I think the 750, again, is really to sort of provide the flexibility in that one-off situation where something unique happened and we're going to either need to pay somebody with a skill set up front, or there's you know, a pretty significant crisis going on where directors are asked to do much, much more and we need to pay them.
00:38:02.320 --> 00:38:07.360
I think most companies have the 750, but they don't get close to paying it.
00:38:07.360 --> 00:38:08.079
Yeah.
00:38:08.400 --> 00:38:12.800
And the intent is to not revisit that uh director pay limit each year.
00:38:12.800 --> 00:38:18.719
That may be re-reviewed every five or so years, even though the because it's embedded in a shareholder-approved plan.
00:38:18.719 --> 00:38:18.880
Yeah.
00:38:18.880 --> 00:38:19.840
Typically, yeah, exactly.
00:38:19.840 --> 00:38:22.639
So the intent is not to run close to that.
00:38:22.639 --> 00:38:25.280
Um, in any way, we don't do not want to exceed it.
00:38:25.280 --> 00:38:32.719
So I think we want to make sure we have a little bit of cushion there, recognizing we're not going to shareholders every year to you know review that kind of a limit.
00:38:33.039 --> 00:38:42.400
But I guess the limits, uh, you know, you said nearly 70% of companies uh have this kind of a lived or some kind of a limit.
00:38:42.400 --> 00:38:50.400
Um now some of this was driven by uh kind of the result of litigation, right?
00:38:50.400 --> 00:38:52.480
Uh litigation settlements.
00:38:52.480 --> 00:38:58.239
Um I think um, you know, uh meta or Facebook probably being the most prominent one.
00:38:58.239 --> 00:39:15.599
Is that when you saw, you know, a lot was a lot of this kind of driven by the litigation that, oh, okay, now that there's been this case out there, we should probably it would be wise to implement something the next time we put our plan up for approval or something like that.
00:39:15.599 --> 00:39:18.559
Is that is that kind of the trigger?
00:39:19.039 --> 00:39:20.000
I would agree with that.
00:39:20.000 --> 00:39:29.760
Yeah, it became a best practice, and and many companies followed that practice as a sort of a safety um provision, if you would, to prevent that litigation.
00:39:30.239 --> 00:39:36.880
Let's move on to perks and other compensation that's not as visible.
00:39:36.880 --> 00:39:48.800
You know, up till now we've been talking about the cash component and the equity component, and obviously that that is what makes up the the vast uh you know the the the bulk.
00:39:48.800 --> 00:39:50.960
Um, but there is other stuff.
00:39:50.960 --> 00:39:57.360
Um you know, in the proxy statement, there is the all-other comp column in the table.
00:39:57.360 --> 00:40:00.880
Um,
sometimes it's nothing, sometimes it's zero.
00:40:00.880 --> 00:40:04.320
Um, but you do see other things from time to time.
00:40:04.320 --> 00:40:13.840
And so what are the most common uh you know other other types of comp that that would show up for a company?
00:40:14.239 --> 00:40:16.159
Yeah, typically it is limited.
00:40:16.159 --> 00:40:24.159
There are some companies that their directors may use their products or services, and that can be reported as all other compensation.
00:40:24.159 --> 00:40:30.800
In some cases, you know, some companies may have some charitable matching programs that could fit under that column.
00:40:30.800 --> 00:40:36.320
Uh there may be other special situations, but typically it's a relatively small amount.
00:40:36.320 --> 00:40:47.840
Um, and then there, if to the extent that it's meaningful, you'll see footnote explanations, but it's it's in no way intended to represent what executives may receive in quote unquote traditional perquisites.
00:40:47.840 --> 00:41:00.159
You know, again, recognizing the really the role of the non-employee director of really trying to keep a relatively straightforward, clean, if you will, pay program through primarily equity with a portion in regular cash.
00:41:00.639 --> 00:41:10.239
And there have been a few proposals out there recently uh for shareholder approval of director compensation.
00:41:10.239 --> 00:41:19.440
So we have executive say on pay and thinking is well, okay, we're gonna approve executive pay.
00:41:19.440 --> 00:41:23.280
Shouldn't we also be approving director pay?
00:41:23.280 --> 00:41:37.599
Um is this something that you're telling boards, hey, you should be keeping an eye on this, this might catch on, or you know, what how how are you seeing people react to this?
00:41:38.079 --> 00:41:47.519
Well, there's certainly plenty of companies in or countries in Europe that have exactly that, an advisory or even uh, you know, a meaningful vote on director pay.
00:41:47.519 --> 00:41:49.760
Um, we don't see it here in the United States.
00:41:49.760 --> 00:41:52.239
I haven't really even heard of it too much.
00:41:52.239 --> 00:42:02.320
We're actually in a deregulatory environment now with the current administration, and you know, there is some talk within the SEC of even taking that um in terms of disclosure further.
00:42:02.320 --> 00:42:07.840
So I don't really see it a whole lot um or that discussed a whole lot.
00:42:07.840 --> 00:42:15.599
But really, when you think back to what we've been talking about, is sort of the simplicity of the director pay design.
00:42:15.599 --> 00:42:19.440
The level of increase has been very modest at 2-3%.
00:42:19.440 --> 00:42:23.360
There's compression between the 25th and 75th.
00:42:23.360 --> 00:42:33.440
There's just not a whole lot of creativity or uniqueness within director pay to really suggest that shareholders should approve it at this point in time.
00:42:33.840 --> 00:42:38.239
So looking ahead in the chapter, and this came out a little while ago.
00:42:38.239 --> 00:42:45.440
So we you say we anticipate that director compensation will continue to increase less than 5% annually.
00:42:45.440 --> 00:42:51.039
Pay delivery structure will generally continue to emphasize equity.
00:42:51.039 --> 00:42:59.679
Um, pretty sounds like pretty steady as she goes type of outlook.
00:42:59.679 --> 00:43:06.559
Um, any kind of nuance within that that you want to talk about of what we can expect?
00:43:07.039 --> 00:43:09.360
I think it's just around the specific skills.
00:43:09.360 --> 00:43:15.280
As business changes and those skills are in demand to the extent that there's a shortage.
00:43:15.280 --> 00:43:29.199
And I think that the easiest to think about is just the whole AI and its impact on companies, having that skill set on the board, whether there is the supply there to meet the demand, will really drive any type of differentiation in pay.
00:43:29.440 --> 00:43:29.760
Yeah.
00:43:30.000 --> 00:43:38.960
If we see that that supply dries up and the demand is significant, then I think you're gonna have to see some type of extra compensation to lure that talent in.
00:43:39.280 --> 00:43:40.320
That's interesting.
00:43:40.320 --> 00:43:50.960
Um, because yeah, up until now, all directors get paid the same, um, except for people with leadership positions who are appointed once they get in.
00:43:50.960 --> 00:44:05.599
Um, but it's never been like, oh, okay, this um the financial audit committee financial expert, uh We gotta, you know, we gotta attract people because they're in short supply.
00:44:05.599 --> 00:44:11.199
And so um we gotta kind of, yeah, uh there's variable pay out there.
00:44:11.199 --> 00:44:14.719
Um and so AI might be that.
00:44:14.719 --> 00:44:31.280
Um, you know, I've also heard things saying that, you know, the the way boards use AI and kind of AI proficiency might be a driver or or affect somehow affect the director compensation uh environment.
00:44:31.280 --> 00:44:36.480
Um what about differentiate other kind of differentiation?
00:44:36.480 --> 00:44:41.199
Um, you know, I don't see a lot of it across industry.
00:44:41.199 --> 00:44:51.679
There's some, but do you think there'll be kind of more segmentation uh on executive comp or director comp for different industries?
00:44:52.320 --> 00:44:54.719
I don't think you're going to see it, Doug.
00:44:54.719 --> 00:44:57.760
I think right now boards are fairly diverse.
00:44:57.760 --> 00:45:08.800
So while each company um likes to have some directors that have familiarity and experience in the industry, some directors come without that experience.
00:45:08.800 --> 00:45:12.079
Um, and I think they value that perspective of diversity.
00:45:12.079 --> 00:45:17.440
You know, we're not we're not from your industry, but here's how we would handle this problem um elsewhere.
00:45:17.440 --> 00:45:21.519
And so, you know, I think that's the way you're gonna see it going
forward.
00:45:22.079 --> 00:45:49.519
I think that that highlights a critical aspect of what Steve alluded to of really that diversity of the skills, the background that you have of the individuals that are on the board, and that'll continue to evolve, you know, with AI, the cyber risk, other things, and recognizing what's happening real time in the management teams and making sure they have those skill sets in-house and supplementing it with outside advisors and ultimately see where that fits with the board of directors?
00:45:49.519 --> 00:45:58.480
You know, will they, as Steve alluded to, will that be more pressure to actually have experts within the board itself that have that responsibility and skill set?
00:45:58.480 --> 00:46:01.280
And that is something that we'll definitely keep our pulse on.
00:46:01.760 --> 00:46:11.280
What is one misconception about director comp out there that you would love to correct for, you know, that you keep hearing over and over again?
00:46:11.280 --> 00:46:14.159
And it's like, no, it's actually not that.
00:46:14.719 --> 00:46:25.440
So I don't think these directors are overcompensated for the wisdom, the skills, the experience they bring to the table and dealing with significant business issues.
00:46:25.440 --> 00:46:27.440
Um, that's very hard to find.
00:46:27.440 --> 00:46:29.679
Um, their time is worth a lot.
00:46:29.679 --> 00:46:32.000
They're not in it for wealth creation.
00:46:32.000 --> 00:46:35.920
That was likely the situation they were in when they were an executive at a company.
00:46:35.920 --> 00:46:46.159
And so they're sort of lending their expertise to companies, and they're gonna get paid an amount that's sort of supports the contributions that they make.
00:46:46.159 --> 00:46:47.440
It's not significant.
00:46:47.440 --> 00:46:57.119
There's very little differentiation among companies and board pay as expressed through the um the compression that we see at pay levels.
00:46:57.119 --> 00:47:10.639
We're not gonna see a whole lot of performance-based comp because these directors need to sort of provide independence and they need to approve executive comp plans that are challenging, challenging, and appeal to the shareholders.
00:47:10.639 --> 00:47:15.599
So they they can't have that self-interest um sort of impacting their decisions.
00:47:15.599 --> 00:47:18.880
So, you know, I think you're gonna see more of the same going forward.
00:47:18.880 --> 00:47:24.079
As we mentioned in the article, we're not gonna see significant spikes in director's comp.
00:47:24.079 --> 00:47:32.480
I think it sort of just moves forward as it has been at a two to three, maybe four percent clip at some point, but probably not a whole lot more.
00:47:32.880 --> 00:47:47.920
And so yeah, I I think fundamentally the the misconception is that these people get paid a ton of money to show up four times a year and kind of pick which donuts they like and uh fall asleep at meetings.
00:47:47.920 --> 00:47:53.920
And you know, that's you know, that that is the the pejorative view.
00:47:53.920 --> 00:48:05.599
Um and but uh but you know, but I think yeah, we all know it's not like that, and the compensation is the way it is for reasons and for good reasons.
00:48:06.000 --> 00:48:13.360
Yeah, and I think um what what's probably not as transparent other than to directors and executives is the directors do show up for a couple of days.
00:48:13.360 --> 00:48:26.559
They're gonna have committee meetings, they're going to have a board meeting, they're gonna have a board dinner where they discuss important business matters, they're going to have a lot of direct interaction with the executive team, with the executive succession bench.
00:48:26.559 --> 00:48:32.559
They're gonna meet the younger leaders in the in the organization to fully understand the strength of that bench.
00:48:32.559 --> 00:48:49.760
And so when you take sort of that multi-day meeting perspective and then, you know, lap on the preparation that they need to do, there's sometimes pre-calls uh with management or advisors or even um you know, among the directors themselves to prepare for those meetings.
00:48:49.760 --> 00:48:55.519
You know, I think there's pretty good alignment today within what they're contributing and what they're being paid.
00:48:55.840 --> 00:49:14.559
Yeah, there are there are definitely, I mean, there's travel time, there's prep time, um, and then there's kind of the unseen meeting time, like you were saying, board dinners, and and sometimes they show up at uh they're asked to come and speak at a company town hall or something like that.
00:49:14.559 --> 00:49:41.119
So um in terms of just advice uh for uh boards and the uh committees that are setting the pay, you know, what are things that you're suggesting these days that uh, you know, maybe there should be some tweaks or or or yeah, what kind of changes are you seeing people make the most out there right now?
00:49:41.760 --> 00:49:44.320
You know, I think um there's not a whole lot to change.
00:49:44.320 --> 00:49:47.360
I would I would sort of focus on a couple of principles.
00:49:47.360 --> 00:49:49.280
One, make informed decisions.
00:49:49.280 --> 00:49:53.840
So continue to do the benchmarking, even though it might be viewed as ratcheting up pay.
00:49:53.840 --> 00:49:58.719
I think the the experience that we've seen over the past decade would suggest otherwise.
00:49:58.719 --> 00:50:02.559
Um focus on a long-term stock retention.
00:50:02.559 --> 00:50:04.480
I think we see that naturally.
00:50:04.480 --> 00:50:13.119
We don't see a whole lot of churn and selling by directors, but you know, more more paths to hold that stock until you leave the board.
00:50:13.119 --> 00:50:19.280
And and the deferral feature really is a nice feature to accomplish that from a tax perspective.
00:50:19.519 --> 00:50:19.920
Yeah.
00:50:20.400 --> 00:50:25.679
And then um, you know, overall make sure that the pay is aligned with what you're asking those directors to do.
00:50:25.679 --> 00:50:33.119
If there's something that pops up that requires, you know, an increase in recognition, then be flexible enough to make that decision.
00:50:33.440 --> 00:50:35.119
John, any final thoughts?
00:50:35.119 --> 00:50:41.519
As Steve alluded to, it really is critical to be thoughtful as you think about the the board of director pay.
00:50:41.519 --> 00:50:44.320
In no way do we want misperceptions externally.
00:50:44.320 --> 00:50:48.800
And I think that's really why it is a lot of the biases kind of stay the course.
00:50:48.800 --> 00:50:57.119
You know, it's kind of a regular case as we look at it, recognizing uh one of their key responsibilities is oversight of the executives and their pay.
00:50:57.119 --> 00:51:02.159
And that's where you have the say on pay advisory vote for executive pay practices.
00:51:02.159 --> 00:51:03.840
So keep that focus there.
00:51:03.840 --> 00:51:12.000
Make sure we're really it's a it's a clean, very different type of pay structure intentionally for the non-employee directors, and we would expect that to continue.
00:51:12.320 --> 00:51:14.880
Okay, well, that's a great place to wrap up.
00:51:14.880 --> 00:51:18.079
So, Steve and John, thanks so much for joining me today.
00:51:18.079 --> 00:51:24.719
This is uh, I think an area that needs to, you know, people need to understand better because it is very different than executive comp.
00:51:24.719 --> 00:51:26.079
Thank you, Doug.
00:51:26.079 --> 00:51:27.360
Thank you for having us.
00:51:27.360 --> 00:51:33.280
So that concludes this episode of the Public Company Series podcast powered by Onboard.
00:51:33.280 --> 00:51:41.519
I'd like to thank Steve Pakella and John Sinkler of Pay Governance again for sharing their insights on director compensation.
00:51:41.519 --> 00:52:00.079
And I encourage you to read the chapter of the book that they wrote entitled Board Pay Evolution and Aligning Design with Shareholders, which you can find in the book Board Structure and Composition, part of the public company series published by the New York Stock Exchange and JP Morgan.
00:52:00.079 --> 00:52:06.880
You can read and download the entire book at nyse.com slash PCS.
00:52:06.880 --> 00:52:13.280
For additional resources and all of our episodes, visit publiccompanyseries.com.
00:52:13.280 --> 00:52:20.000
And don't forget to subscribe to receive all new episodes of the Public Company Series podcast.
00:52:20.000 --> 00:52:22.559
And please rate us and leave us a review.
00:52:22.559 --> 00:52:24.880
I'm Doug Chia, and we'll see you next time.