Trascrizione completa di Why Emergency Alerts Fail: Craig Fugate on Public Warning Mistakes - Alerting Authority Rewind

00:05:10.399 --> 00:05:15.680 Can you wake people up in the middle of the night when they need to be woke up that they need to do something? 00:05:15.920 --> 00:05:23.839 And um we've seen time and time again where emergency managers have issued notifications. 00:05:24.000 --> 00:05:30.800 They didn't issue warnings, they thought they were issuing warnings, but I don't consider an opt-in system a warning system. 00:05:31.600 --> 00:05:48.000 Now, I'm not saying they're not good tools, but I think too many people don't understand that if only a small percentage of the population has opted in and I have to send a warning out where people need to act now, that system by its very nature is going to fail. 00:05:48.240 --> 00:05:53.680 The other thing is it doesn't utilize some of the features that the warning systems do. 00:05:53.839 --> 00:06:00.160 An example, I think a lot of emergency managers don't understand that wireless emergency alerts are not the same thing as text messaging. 00:06:00.720 --> 00:06:09.360 Text messaging is a process by which it goes through the cell system and goes out individually and causes a load when you're sending out thousands to hundreds of thousands. 00:06:09.680 --> 00:06:18.959 Wii a messages are actually taking advantage of the ability of cellular towers to broadcast with no bandwidth limitation to any device that can receive it. 00:06:19.199 --> 00:06:26.319 So rather than having a know a number to contact and contact that number, uh a WIA message is a broadcast. 00:06:26.639 --> 00:06:31.680 So I I always kind of roll back, and I've been challenging emergency managers. 00:06:31.759 --> 00:06:39.839 I think we talk about a profession as you know, we prepare, we respond, we recover, we mitigate somewhere in there, they throw in resilience. 00:06:40.000 --> 00:06:41.519 I'm like, that's nice, that's process. 00:06:41.600 --> 00:06:42.879 What do you actually do? 00:06:43.199 --> 00:07:07.120 And the one thing I think most emergency managers need to recognize, and it's a key responsibility, is to build and be able to implement a community-wide warning system that works 24 hours a day, seven days a week, not tied to personnel, that it's got to operate on the worst day with the least experienced person in the middle of the night, and you've got minutes. 00:07:07.360 --> 00:07:15.279 Unlike notifications and other things, I think any warning that takes more than 15 minutes to originate, generate, and put out is probably not in time. 00:07:16.160 --> 00:07:21.199 Because when you look at why you're issuing the warning, I need people to do something right now. 00:07:21.519 --> 00:07:34.560 If it's a chemical spill and I need them to shelter in place or evacuate, if it's a tornado warning, if it's a flash flood warning, people don't have a half hour to get the message. 00:07:34.879 --> 00:07:38.079 And again, Jeanette, this is some of the work you've been doing. 00:07:38.240 --> 00:07:49.279 We have a very compressed time

frame to put all this into an actionable message that is limited by the technology for the duration of how many characters I can send, how long the message can be. 00:07:49.519 --> 00:07:53.439 And I need to be clear that when people get that, they received it. 00:07:53.519 --> 00:07:54.240 That's number one. 00:07:54.319 --> 00:07:56.079 But two, they understood it. 00:07:56.319 --> 00:08:00.079 And three, they knew what to do to change their outcome. 00:08:00.800 --> 00:08:16.879 And I think too many emergency managers start with the technology and forget um, you first have to detect, and fortunately for the for the US, the weather service does a pretty good job of our detections and issuing warnings for flash floods, for tornadoes, and other extreme weather. 00:08:17.120 --> 00:08:26.560 But you also have the chemical emergencies, the active shooters, the technology events that uh aren't going to originate from the National Weather Service. 00:08:26.720 --> 00:08:31.120 So I always go back and tell people the first thing is you got to detect an event has occurred. 00:08:31.519 --> 00:08:36.799 That, number two, there's something people need to do immediately to change that outcome. 00:08:37.120 --> 00:08:57.440 Three, putting that into a message, and again, for a lot of people sitting down and writing a message that is what, two minutes in length, 300 plus characters, um, you're not writing literature, but you've got to get it done quickly and make sure you've got all the key elements in there, then you've got to transmit it. 00:08:58.159 --> 00:09:06.960 And our two primary warning systems are the emergency alert system, which is radio television, satellite, and those systems, and wireless emergency alerts, which are cell phones. 00:09:07.039 --> 00:09:08.159 And these are two separate systems. 00:09:08.320 --> 00:09:12.799 And what a lot of emergency managers don't know, they can be separately issued. 00:09:13.120 --> 00:09:19.120 Because one of the advantages we had is it can be geofenced to specific areas by cell towers. 00:09:19.519 --> 00:09:22.799 But whatever method I use, I need to transmit that. 00:09:23.039 --> 00:09:25.039 People then need to receive it. 00:09:25.360 --> 00:09:27.440 This was the other advantage of cell phones. 00:09:27.679 --> 00:09:39.279 The way they were built and designed, it's an opt-out program, meaning when your new cell phone comes, it's going to receive wireless emergency alerts and go off if one's issued for the area you're in. 00:09:39.440 --> 00:09:42.240 You don't have to register it, it doesn't track you. 00:09:42.320 --> 00:09:44.000 It's totally anonymous to your phone. 00:09:44.159 --> 00:09:49.120 It's just if that signal is broadcast by that cell tower and you're in range, you're going to get it. 00:09:50.080 --> 00:09:51.759 You can opt out of it. 00:09:51.840 --> 00:09:54.480 Uh, everything except for a presidential message. 00:09:54.639 --> 00:09:58.720 That's one of the rules the FCC and FEMA were able to get in there. 00:09:58.960 --> 00:10:03.759 You got to you can opt out from the other messages, but you cannot opt out from presidential. 00:10:03.840 --> 00:10:09.919 So if you don't do anything, you're going to get a wireless emergency alert with a new cell phone if you're in an area where it's set off. 00:10:10.720 --> 00:10:13.759 But now that I've received it, did I understand it? 00:10:14.000 --> 00:10:18.240 Did I understand it applied to me and that it's an immediate call to action? 00:10:18.320 --> 00:10:19.440 I don't have time to delay. 00:10:19.519 --> 00:10:25.759 I don't have time to, you know, go out and get on the internet and start researching and looking for other things and calling my friends and say, hey, I got this warning. 00:10:25.840 --> 00:10:26.960 It's a flash floor warning. 00:10:27.039 --> 00:10:28.639 What do you think we ought to be doing? 00:10:28.879 --> 00:10:31.919 Um, the time to act is usually in minutes. 00:10:32.879 --> 00:10:35.919 And that's the process, detection. 00:10:36.159 --> 00:10:37.600 Then you have to make a decision. 00:10:37.679 --> 00:10:42.559 This is something that I need people to do something different, and it's time of essence. 00:10:42.639 --> 00:10:45.200 This isn't something I can wait and do a press conference for. 00:10:45.440 --> 00:10:53.200 I have to determine what that action is, and then I have to compose it in a message that is very compressed by the medium that I'm using. 00:10:53.440 --> 00:11:11.200 Then I have to send that message into the integrated public alert and warning system and determine whether I am doing the full activation of both EAS and the wireless emergency alerts, or I'm doing something very specific that I'm only going to use wireless emergency alerts because it's a very specific location. 00:11:11.279 --> 00:11:17.840 And we'll see this a lot with wildfires and flash floods, where a countywide warning may be inappropriate for a very specific area. 00:11:18.080 --> 00:11:19.759 Now that has to go through. 00:11:25.519 --> 00:11:28.720 Turned out you can't break down if you never set it off. 00:11:28.879 --> 00:11:30.240 And that's where we see the problem. 00:11:30.399 --> 00:11:37.519 They're not using the warning system of the IPOL system of the EAS and the WIA. 00:11:38.080 --> 00:11:41.200 They're using a notification system that people have to opt in. 00:11:41.360 --> 00:11:46.879 Often because they use it more frequently, it's more user-friendly to them because they're using it every day. 00:11:47.200 --> 00:11:51.759 It does not carry, I think, to a lot of people the same risk if they make a mistake. 00:11:52.960 --> 00:11:55.360 And they send out a notification. 00:11:55.600 --> 00:12:08.960 And we've seen too often that it wasn't received by a majority of people, or based upon the technology they were using, they received it days after the event because the system overloaded trying to process that many notifications. 00:12:10.879

--> 00:12:13.919 So you know, I'll I look at this and I'm going, why? 00:12:14.080 --> 00:12:25.279 And I I've come to this conclusion that emergency managers, unfortunately, are so afraid of making a mistake with setting off an EAS or a WIA message that they are mic shy. 00:12:26.639 --> 00:12:43.360 And so, even though the situation calls for it, and in retrospect, you see it, you have states like California, which you're from, that had to take the additional step the legislature now requiring that EAS and WIAs have to be activated if you're evacuating for a wildfire. 00:12:43.440 --> 00:12:45.759 The notification systems are not considered sufficient. 00:12:45.840 --> 00:12:46.559 Now, think about that. 00:12:46.639 --> 00:12:54.399 The legislatures are having to tell emergency managers how to do what is a fundamental responsibility of emergency management, which is issue warnings to the public. 00:12:54.879 --> 00:13:04.399 So I've come to the conclusion that we really need to be talking about emergency management for what we do, not the phases, not the process. 00:13:04.559 --> 00:13:12.240 And really emphasize the one universal thing that all emergency managers must be able to do is issue a warning to their community in a timely manner. 00:13:12.559 --> 00:13:20.639 Not just certain people, not just when that's you know they're staffed, but 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 00:13:20.720 --> 00:13:23.519 And if you can't do that, I have a real question. 00:13:23.759 --> 00:13:26.000 Can you consider yourself an emergency management agency? 00:13:26.159 --> 00:13:35.679 You know, one of the things I find fascinating, nothing in the CEM or the accreditation program for certifying uh emergency management programs really get to this issue. 00:13:36.000 --> 00:13:38.000 Can the community issue a warning? 00:13:38.240 --> 00:13:46.559 The closest we've seen is to the weather service program um recognizing communities that have taken these steps. 00:13:46.879 --> 00:13:50.399 But even that, I think, is a minimal standard. 00:13:50.559 --> 00:13:58.639 Uh so yeah, a lot of emergency managers aren't happy when I when I walk out into their state association meeting and basically say, if you can't issue a warning, why are you in this room? 00:13:58.720 --> 00:14:00.639 Are you just doing grants administration? 00:14:02.720 --> 00:14:03.360 I just want to be able to do that. 00:14:03.600 --> 00:14:05.279 You raise such stupid point. 00:14:05.840 --> 00:14:10.000 And it it it like we have conversations with different alerting authorities. 00:14:10.159 --> 00:14:13.440 We travel around the United States and we're talking. 00:14:13.759 --> 00:14:20.480 And whenever there is a failure of any kind, the first thing that they generally point to, well, it's it's a technological issue. 00:14:20.639 --> 00:14:22.240 It's a technology issue. 00:14:22.480 --> 00:14:29.600 And for me, I have yet to see uh a real technological issue as in how they're describing it.

00:14:29.679 --> 00:14:39.840 It's a people issue, it's a training issue, it's a lack of confidence issue, it's a you just didn't do it type of issue versus that technology. 00:14:40.000 --> 00:14:54.639 Um and so I appreciate you again focusing on that, where it's it really comes down to emergency managers out there needing to, as we say, you know, have confidence built upon competence to be able to do their job. 00:14:56.960 --> 00:14:57.200 Right. 00:14:57.440 --> 00:15:08.320 And Eddie, I mean, we've talked a lot about this, uh Craig, the the lack of training that's been available through FEMA independent study courses and other programs. 00:15:08.639 --> 00:15:18.639 Um I mean, there's been a focus within the public information officer programs, the external affairs, you know, the crisis communications, but that's not alert and warning. 00:15:18.720 --> 00:15:21.519 That's a very different style of communication. 00:15:21.679 --> 00:15:32.480 That um, yeah, we know that Emacs requires agencies to have some sort of a plan, but um, you know, in terms of training, it's been extremely limited. 00:15:32.720 --> 00:15:35.840 I have you have do you have thoughts about that? 00:15:36.320 --> 00:15:43.440 Yeah, I mean, they do once a month testing, um, and that's usually the one person who's not around when you actually have to set the system off. 00:15:44.000 --> 00:15:54.159 Um, they don't do realistic training, and they don't sit there and uh really test staff on here's a scenario, generate the message. 00:15:54.320 --> 00:16:12.799 Now, Jeanette, you've worked with uh the FEMA team at iPalls and with Ben Ayers to really come up with some tool sets to help you wrap those messages, uh, but you're still uh very few people sit down, and again, this is one of the things that you don't do once a month and are proficient. 00:16:13.279 --> 00:16:20.639 Um, I started out as a county emergency manager as we were transitioning from the emergency broadcast system to the emergency alert system. 00:16:21.120 --> 00:16:30.080 So when I needed to notify people locally, um, I found that the emergency broadcast system was, you know, yeah, I could get into it, but it took time. 00:16:30.240 --> 00:16:44.559 We had a cable override system, which was uh a real joy to use because you used a touch tone phone, you couldn't see anything, and you were listening to audio prompts to know you got in there, and then you could do an audio message, and then you were supposed to come out. 00:16:44.720 --> 00:16:52.240 I had to use one during a chemical emergency and it locked up on me in the middle of a World Series playoff game, and I couldn't unlock the system. 00:16:52.720 --> 00:16:59.440 Um, so I've been on the other end when you've got a warning going out and the technology failed. 00:16:59.759 --> 00:17:14.480 Uh operator error, and you now have more people mad because their World Series game is being disrupted, not uh, you know, acknowledging the fact that there was a part of the community that was under uh shelter in place due to a chemical emergency. 00:17:14.720 --> 00:17:20.160 Uh so I've been there when stuff didn't go well and got yelled at by a lot of people. 00:17:20.400 --> 00:17:23.839 Um I've also had to use technologies because we didn't have good tools. 00:17:23.920 --> 00:17:27.039 I remember the old Motorola stored voice pagers. 00:17:27.200 --> 00:17:34.640 I put them in all the hospitals and nursing homes so I could get tornado warnings out to them because uh a lot of them didn't even have no other radio. 00:17:34.880 --> 00:17:37.359 And um I could use this for all kinds of things. 00:17:37.440 --> 00:17:39.359 I heavily leveraged NOAA radios. 00:17:39.440 --> 00:17:50.079 We bought a lot in Florida, um, and again, because we could do civil emergency messages over no other radio, which is a part, it's all integrated into back into the iPall system. 00:17:50.640 --> 00:17:54.079 But again, I've been there when we didn't have EAS. 00:17:54.480 --> 00:18:02.880 Um I was at FEMA when we implemented WIA, and I can remember going to New York City where we rolled it out there and in um DC. 00:18:03.200 --> 00:18:11.440 And the cell companies were extremely concerned, very reluctant and hard to push out uh because they thought this was going to be a huge issue. 00:18:11.680 --> 00:18:14.480 It turned out to be a relatively easy rollout. 00:18:14.559 --> 00:18:24.160 In fact, you started seeing more demand signal, and the I think the infrastructure got built out even faster than they the cellular, the major carriers could say. 00:18:24.640 --> 00:18:34.640 Um there's some things that run on the Wii system that weren't the original attempt, but probably get most people's attention, and that you know, such things as amber alerts for missing children. 00:18:34.799 --> 00:18:41.519 And I can remember there was a big you know screaming, hollering about California setting one off statewide for an abduction. 00:18:41.599 --> 00:18:44.880 It turned out it was an abduction and the and the child was recovered in Oregon. 00:18:45.359 --> 00:18:48.880 And after people got that information, they kind of backed off of that. 00:18:49.039 --> 00:19:00.160 But um, you know, I've had I I've been here when uh you know, we got a uh uh a Wii a notification, EAS notification in early morning hours in Florida. 00:19:00.319 --> 00:19:01.839 Um, and everybody was mad. 00:19:01.920 --> 00:19:04.480 And I'm thinking, it went off, and I got it. 00:19:04.640 --> 00:19:05.440 This is good. 00:19:05.680 --> 00:19:07.920 In fact, people got woke up and were cranky about it. 00:19:08.000 --> 00:19:09.759 I'm like, yeah, I get it. 00:19:10.000 --> 00:19:21.920 We've had nuclear attack warnings go out, and um, so I hear all that, and uh to a certain degree, I'm like, I get it, but if you want a perfect system, it will never get set off. 00:19:22.400 --> 00:19:26.880 Um there will be problems, we can work on those, part of that is

training. 00:19:27.759 --> 00:19:43.599 But if you go back to the original uh concept of why do emergency managers exist, I think warning their public of immediate threats is one of our key responsibilities. 00:19:44.079 --> 00:19:46.880 But for a lot of jurisdictions, it's not a core competency. 00:19:50.160 --> 00:19:50.559 Yeah. 00:19:51.279 --> 00:19:53.279 I I think that you're right. 00:19:53.359 --> 00:20:10.559 You know, we've seen this as we've we've gone across the country doing training and um have really uh looked into what kind of training existed before we rolled out the message design dashboard across the United States with Bent Your Solutions helping to provide that training. 00:20:10.720 --> 00:20:29.200 And there literally was no training available to help emergency managers to understand the science behind the social science behind how people respond to alerts and warnings, effective message design, um, and thinking about how all of the pieces fit together across, including technology. 00:20:29.359 --> 00:20:32.559 Um, and it's a is a it was a real limitation. 00:20:32.640 --> 00:20:39.359 I think we've we've improved now that we have some standard courses that we can deliver. 00:20:39.519 --> 00:20:54.720 Um, but yeah, as a as a key competency, it's a real surprise to me that it's um it's not something that is done as well as it could be, given the emphasis on how how incredibly public it is. 00:20:54.880 --> 00:20:58.400 When something goes wrong, that is when people definitely notice. 00:20:58.559 --> 00:21:00.799 And a lot of times it's when they don't send anything. 00:21:01.119 --> 00:21:08.799 Yeah, I mean, I had CBS approach me and they were wanting to interview me about how the warning systems had failed in so many of these events. 00:21:09.039 --> 00:21:13.599 Um, but when they actually did the interview, the story had changed. 00:21:13.759 --> 00:21:18.880 What they found was the technology wasn't what was failing, it was the failure to issue the warning. 00:21:19.359 --> 00:21:21.200 And um, and they said, why? 00:21:21.359 --> 00:21:40.400 And I'm like, the best I can come up with are people are mic shy, they're afraid of making mistakes, they're more comfortable with systems they use every day, and their default is it's safer to send out a notification over a system um that if something goes wrong, it's only gonna get to a certain percentage of my population. 00:21:40.720 --> 00:21:43.920 Problem with that is that's kind of not warning people. 00:21:44.240 --> 00:21:55.200 And um, and I think that, you know, I I I try to tell people look, there's no way that you're gonna be doing this over a career and not have things go south. 00:21:55.279 --> 00:21:59.839 And people yell at you and and you hear the threats, we're gonna fire people, you know, that's the easy answer for politics. 00:22:02.000 --> 00:22:21.359 But this goes back to you cannot put in a technological solution and then expect it to work well if you haven't trained the operators on using it and making sure they're comfortable with it, that they do the testing and the safeguards are built in to prevent the false messages. 00:22:21.440 --> 00:22:28.480 But the bias must always be to the warning goes out, not that we're going to make a mistake, you know, we're trying to eliminate making mistakes. 00:22:28.559 --> 00:22:30.240 And you only get that through repetition. 00:22:30.400 --> 00:22:34.400 The other thing is who's actually going to be issuing this warning? 00:22:34.640 --> 00:22:57.359 And I think this is something we we used to have a concept, and this goes back to civil defense, but we used to have a concept of what we call county warning points and city warning points, where we had the old Hootenhaller NAWA system as a primary call ring down system to reach those locations who would then send the warnings out through their community and over the emergency alert system. 00:22:57.920 --> 00:23:01.440 And the majority of those were not in emergency management shops. 00:23:01.519 --> 00:23:06.640 They were in the 24-hour uh dispatch centers, the public safety answering points. 00:23:06.799 --> 00:23:18.480 And I think that's the other thing that I see missing is we usually have a disconnect between the emergency management shop over here, responsible for issuing warnings, yet there's nobody there 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 00:23:18.799 --> 00:23:26.960 And often that other agency is also very reluctant to be issuing warnings without somebody giving them permission. 00:23:27.119 --> 00:23:39.039 And I've seen this where in a spent outdoor warning system setting off the AS, where by the time it gets to somebody who can make a decision, if you can find them, you've already lost 15 to 20 minutes. 00:23:39.279 --> 00:23:44.000 And even then there may be hesitancy to issue the warning because they want more information. 00:23:44.240 --> 00:23:55.519 And you've seen this where the systems are built, they have a plan, but the person that decides to issue the warning was not available or was unreachable during the event, which fails the basic test. 00:23:55.680 --> 00:23:58.160 Can you issue the warning 24 hours a day, seven days a week? 00:23:58.240 --> 00:24:01.359 This is not an eight to five Monday through Friday job. 00:24:01.599 --> 00:24:23.200 So that goes back to are we incorporating the concept of our county warning points into our warning system, realizing that may be a separate agency and not under the control of the emergency management shop, but is their staffed with the ability to do it, but only if they are trained and they're enabled to issue those warnings? 00:24:23.440 --> 00:24:29.680 If it again takes you, you know, yeah, I've run into this where I've seen them like, well, we can do this remotely. 00:24:29.759 --> 00:24:31.119 I'm like, well, who can do it remotely? 00:24:31.200 --> 00:24:32.079 Well, there's like three people. 00:24:32.400 --> 00:24:37.359 Well, are

all three people on staff duty rosters so you know they're at all the time? 00:24:37.519 --> 00:24:37.759 No. 00:24:37.839 --> 00:24:42.000 Then how do you know all three are gonna even one of them's gonna be available? 00:24:42.559 --> 00:24:46.240 Um so again, it's it's a very fundamental thing. 00:24:46.319 --> 00:24:50.640 I think we've gotten away from so much of this as we've seen. 00:24:50.720 --> 00:24:59.440 I mean, I think people confuse a lot of our technologies with resiliency and disasters, as we saw with the cloud problems uh last week. 00:24:59.680 --> 00:25:07.039 Um you know, there's technology is a tool, but people issue warnings. 00:25:07.440 --> 00:25:14.960 And if you haven't trained them and they aren't enabled to issue the warnings in a timely manner, it's not a technology issue, it's a people issue. 00:25:15.119 --> 00:25:19.440 And to me, that's a basic failure of local emergency managers. 00:25:21.119 --> 00:25:27.039 So, would you sum up your primary recommendation as people need to get trained? 00:25:28.559 --> 00:25:30.000 Training is a piece of it. 00:25:30.079 --> 00:25:43.920 I think they really need to go back and take a system approach and design their warning system, knowing that they have a mix of tools that they need to have a decision tree of when do I send out a notification. 00:25:44.000 --> 00:25:45.839 That may be good for a broken water main. 00:25:46.240 --> 00:25:55.519 No sense setting off Wheel or the emergency alert system for something that is only impacting a smaller area and is more of what I would call emergency public information. 00:25:55.680 --> 00:25:58.799 It's four-year information, so you can adjust to it. 00:25:59.119 --> 00:26:02.319 Versus, I'm an active shooter in a downtown area. 00:26:02.559 --> 00:26:06.480 I have a wildfire that's crossing into a neighborhood. 00:26:06.720 --> 00:26:16.640 I have a flash flood warning uh that's imminent now, life-threatening flooding, where I need to get the largest number of people as quickly as I can. 00:26:16.880 --> 00:26:27.599 And again, it goes back to having that centralized point where all that comes in and not thinking that the weather service is always going to trigger this because some of these events are not going to come from the weather service. 00:26:28.240 --> 00:26:39.039 And having that 24-hour point in your community that can receive warnings, has the ability to make decisions about what level of tools they should use. 00:26:39.279 --> 00:26:43.119 And the bias should always be if in doubt, set everything off. 00:26:43.359 --> 00:26:47.680 I'd rather have people mad at me because I woke them up than they never woke up. 00:26:48.559 --> 00:26:51.759 And then that's where your training comes in. 00:26:51.839 --> 00:27:01.119 Because once you have your system and you identify who's going to set this off and under what conditions and all of that, now I got to train people against that. 00:27:01.440 --> 00:27:09.440 Then I need to exercise against that, and I need to understand that uh this is 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 00:27:09.839 --> 00:27:15.200 And so it cannot just be for your key folks during the day. 00:27:15.519 --> 00:27:16.880 And it certainly can't be this. 00:27:16.960 --> 00:27:26.160 I was actually doing an exercise in a community and I asked them to I generate a scenario where they're gonna have to activate the iPall system, EAS and WIA. 00:27:26.720 --> 00:27:28.400 I said, well, and they said, okay, we did that. 00:27:28.480 --> 00:27:29.519 I said, no, no, no. 00:27:29.759 --> 00:27:37.680 I want you to generate your message and actually show me mechanically how don't set it off, but I want you to go sit at the console and show me what tell me how you're gonna do this. 00:27:37.839 --> 00:27:39.759 They said, we'll have to get the manual. 00:27:43.359 --> 00:27:46.960 I'm like, excuse me? 00:27:47.839 --> 00:27:49.279 Well, we have to get the manual. 00:27:49.680 --> 00:27:58.799 I'm like, well, you just told me that there's like four of you that can do this if you're not here, but you're now telling me while you're here, you gotta go get the manual to do this. 00:28:00.160 --> 00:28:02.400 Um I'm so you guys are really scaring me. 00:28:02.480 --> 00:28:06.160 I hope this is just a practical joke on your exercise simulator. 00:28:06.480 --> 00:28:07.680 Because this is the real deal. 00:28:07.759 --> 00:28:11.759 We got we might as well stop and get down to some basics. 00:28:12.240 --> 00:28:13.279 I appreciate that. 00:28:13.359 --> 00:28:17.759 And that's one thing that we address all the time is stop just checking the box. 00:28:17.920 --> 00:28:23.759 And we've seen it in so many exercises where they it would trigger an IPAUS-related warning. 00:28:23.920 --> 00:28:27.359 And they're like, okay, we checked the box, we're we've now done it. 00:28:27.519 --> 00:28:30.720 And it's always like, stop, no, like actually go through it. 00:28:30.880 --> 00:28:31.920 How would you write it? 00:28:32.079 --> 00:28:33.680 How would you put it in the system? 00:28:33.839 --> 00:28:39.119 Do you even remember your password to log in to your origination software? 00:28:39.440 --> 00:28:45.200 And whenever you stop them in that, I I will say some of them absolutely do know how to do it. 00:28:45.359 --> 00:28:49.519 But there are those that, at just as you said, have to say, well, let me go to the manual. 00:28:50.160 --> 00:29:03.759 Yeah, I mean, it's again, this is not an indictment against every program, but there's too many out there that they cannot issue a warning in a timely manner. 00:29:04.400 --> 00:29:08.640 Um, and that's I think the crux of the issue. 00:29:08.799 --> 00:29:11.759 And again, I've seen all kinds of levels. 00:29:11.920 --> 00:29:26.640 I mean, one of the things I'm glad that iPols began doing was let's now put in different scenarios so people aren't writing a test script for a test message, but actually make them start

writing scripts for different scenarios because an active shooter is a lot different than a flash flood. 00:29:27.680 --> 00:29:46.720 And getting people comfortable sitting down and not knowing what the scenario is before they have to run the test, so that they're not pre-planning everything or pulling down the everything they to get ready and going, okay, we're doing the test, and your scenario for today is you got a flash flood at this location. 00:29:46.960 --> 00:29:56.640 Issue the message so that they're used to this idea that it's not a canned every day, they do it the same way all the time. 00:29:56.880 --> 00:30:14.480 You know the next one may be okay, this one will be an active shooter uh in a downtown area, and you're only doing a Wii alert for the geographical area that law enforcement wants people to evacuate, you know, and give them different types of scenarios so it's not just the same test message. 00:30:14.559 --> 00:30:18.720 You know, do the tornado warning, um, do the chemical spill. 00:30:19.359 --> 00:30:27.359 Do the things that make them think through creating the message and then issuing the message. 00:30:27.519 --> 00:30:38.480 Because I think this is where you know a lot of the things that Jeanette is seeing is even when they can mechanically set the system off, the message is so poorly scripted that it is causing more problems. 00:30:38.640 --> 00:30:46.880 I think one of the better ones I saw was when the state issued a statewide EAS that the 911 system was down, except they never said what state it was. 00:30:47.279 --> 00:31:02.160 So all the adjoining states suddenly were getting bombarded with not when there's our 911 system down, to the point where one of the adjacent states actually had to send out a message to crew override the other message that it doesn't apply to this state. 00:31:02.319 --> 00:31:07.039 I mean, you you would think that if you're putting it out there, you would include your location in your state. 00:31:07.119 --> 00:31:10.559 But you know, Jeanette's found that in many cases that's one of the things they missed. 00:31:10.880 --> 00:31:13.680 So then people get it and go, Who's this for? 00:31:13.920 --> 00:31:14.079 Right. 00:31:14.319 --> 00:31:20.160 You know, and especially if it's something that's happening, that's breaking, that they weren't expecting. 00:31:20.640 --> 00:31:23.119 And, you know, there's a lot of good books. 00:31:23.200 --> 00:31:27.519 Um I think one that you know was written with by Amanda Ripley called The Unthinkable. 00:31:27.599 --> 00:31:30.559 And she calls this process, you know, the social science, they call it milling. 00:31:30.799 --> 00:31:40.079 If people aren't preconditioned for the event and they get something they don't expect, they're not going to react unless there's something in the message that prompts them to. 00:31:40.319 --> 00:31:47.119 So they'll start looking for other information or other sources to confirm, and that's time they don't have. 00:31:47.519 --> 00:32:00.240 And so that's why that you've got a short window to get their attention, make sure they understand it applies to them, what the action is they need to take, and they understand it and it applies to them. 00:32:00.400 --> 00:32:11.759 Um, that's not something that a lot of people are comfortable writing in a limited number of characters or a limited number amount of audio unless they're practice at it. 00:32:12.000 --> 00:32:23.839 And I think that's again, you know, part of the training is the equipment, but I think more training needs to be spent on actually crafting the message and understanding that we have notifications, we have alerts, and we have warnings. 00:32:24.559 --> 00:32:33.759 And they're different, they're not the same, although the technology people talk about alerting warnings, and I'm like, an alert just means I'm telling you something's happening, but I don't have any specific actions for you. 00:32:33.920 --> 00:32:35.599 It's like an asteroid's about to hit. 00:32:35.759 --> 00:32:38.799 There's not much you could do, but I'll tell you there's an asteroid happening. 00:32:38.960 --> 00:32:48.400 Um, this was similar to the debate, if you remember, after 9-11, why uh there was, you know, why wasn't the alert emergency alert system issued for the terrorist attacks? 00:32:48.480 --> 00:32:51.359 And the question was, what action did you want people to take? 00:32:52.640 --> 00:32:54.160 There was nothing specific. 00:32:54.240 --> 00:33:03.839 I mean, it'd be one thing if you had more aircraft inbound or if you had a bomb threat somewhere, but just doing a national EAS to go, we're under attack, everybody already knew that. 00:33:04.079 --> 00:33:05.200 That's an alert. 00:33:05.359 --> 00:33:13.359 It's not inappropriate, but it doesn't require the emergency alert system or the you know WIA system going off. 00:33:13.680 --> 00:33:17.440 Um, most of the time, use your notification software and have a press conference. 00:33:17.519 --> 00:33:19.200 And notifications fall in the same category. 00:33:19.279 --> 00:33:24.079 That broken water means probably more of an inconvenience versus an emergency. 00:33:24.240 --> 00:33:35.759 Um, but I think there's this hierarchy that people need to understand that um it's a very high level to get to a warning, but I should never hesitate if I think I need to issue the warning to get there. 00:33:40.720 --> 00:33:41.680 This is thank you. 00:33:41.920 --> 00:33:42.400 This is awesome. 00:33:42.480 --> 00:33:42.640 Thank you. 00:33:42.799 --> 00:33:44.240 Jeanette, anything else? 00:33:45.599 --> 00:33:50.720 Oh, I have so many questions, but I don't want to keep you too much longer because I don't want to take up your time. 00:33:50.880 --> 00:33:56.240 Um, this has just been really it, these are the things that we talk about all the time. 00:33:56.480 --> 00:34:04.319 So I appreciate you spending the time with us and and sharing and um hearing it from

you really makes a difference. 00:34:04.400 --> 00:34:06.880 So thank you for sharing your expertise. 00:34:07.279 --> 00:34:08.880 Well, and my pleasure. 00:34:09.280 --> 00:34:11.840 Our and again, our target audience with this program. 00:34:12.000 --> 00:34:22.639 I mean, we're not, I mean, great if uh we want the public to hear it, but it's really for emergency managers and alerting authorities, those that have, you know, the the button pushers, right? 00:34:22.800 --> 00:34:28.719 The people who are responsible for overcoming that fear and actually hitting that button. 00:34:28.960 --> 00:34:35.280 And so the experiences that we draw from are going to be real experiences, different situations. 00:34:35.760 --> 00:34:40.639 And for them to be able to hear this from you, I think is powerful. 00:34:40.719 --> 00:34:50.239 Um, especially because as iPause was being fully developed, you weren't just a witness to it, you were a player in the development of it. 00:34:50.639 --> 00:34:53.519 And it helps us with understanding. 00:34:55.039 --> 00:34:56.880 So no, just thank you. 00:34:57.199 --> 00:34:58.079 Thank you. 00:34:58.480 --> 00:34:59.599 Huge appreciation. 00:34:59.760 --> 00:35:04.559 And hopefully we'll see you at maybe at IAEM or some other event in the future. 00:35:04.719 --> 00:35:05.199 All right. 00:35:05.280 --> 00:35:07.519 Well, I hope we do cross paths. 00:35:08.639 --> 00:35:13.119 Only if Ben Air drags me there, but no, I don't I don't go to many of those conferences. 00:35:13.280 --> 00:35:18.800 Although I speak to the states because they're more fun, but I told I was in New Mexico, I told them the very same thing. 00:35:18.960 --> 00:35:22.239 If you can't warn, you can't evacuate and you can't shelter. 00:35:22.320 --> 00:35:24.320 How do you call yourself emergency managers? 00:35:24.639 --> 00:35:25.360 Yeah, yeah. 00:35:25.440 --> 00:35:29.840 I'm wait, I'm waiting to see the t-shirt with that, with that on there. 00:35:30.400 --> 00:35:33.280 From crazy guys, that that line. 00:35:34.159 --> 00:35:36.400 If you can't warn, what are you? 00:35:36.960 --> 00:35:46.800 Yeah, it it's it, but it again, I think when you guys are doing the training, one of the things you really need to hammer is the public doesn't get what emergency management is when you start talking about process. 00:35:46.880 --> 00:35:48.960 You say we prepare, we respond, recover, mitigate. 00:35:49.119 --> 00:35:49.760 What the hell does that mean? 00:35:50.079 --> 00:35:51.280 We issue the warnings. 00:35:51.440 --> 00:35:52.880 People understand that. 00:35:54.000 --> 00:36:01.599 And yeah, people get mad when the bad, you know, when it you know it goes out accidentally and you know, everybody sets their hair on fire. 00:36:01.920 --> 00:36:03.920 Me, I'm always kind of like, well, damn, the thing worked. 00:36:04.000 --> 00:36:05.519 I'm pretty impressed with that. 00:36:05.679 --> 00:36:13.280 But um the thing I try to remind people is they're complaining, they're breathing, they have a pulse, they're alive. 00:36:14.639 --> 00:36:18.320 It's when you didn't issue it and we lost life that could have been prevented. 00:36:18.559 --> 00:36:20.639 That's unacceptable. 00:36:22.000 --> 00:36:22.880 Absolutely. 00:36:23.119 --> 00:36:25.840 And excuses don't save lives. 00:36:26.960 --> 00:36:27.119 Right. 00:36:27.440 --> 00:36:28.559 You know, it's that action. 00:36:28.880 --> 00:36:30.800 So we will let you go. 00:36:31.039 --> 00:36:32.320 Thank you so much. 00:36:32.800 --> 00:36:39.519 And we look forward to hopefully having you back on in the future, and we can tell you all the improvements that people are making. 00:36:40.320 --> 00:36:41.280 Excellent! 00:36:41.519 --> 00:36:41.679 Okay. 00:36:42.320 --> 00:36:43.840 All right, thank you for it, Craig. 00:36:43.920 --> 00:36:44.719 Thanks again.