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Welcome everyone.
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Thank you for joining us for another episode of the Seventh Circuit Roundup Podcast.
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I'm Kyne Hudson and joined by my colleagues from Barzon Thornburg's Appeals and Critical Motions group, Mark Cranley and Laura Langenecker.
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Thank you again for listening.
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So today we have three more Seventh Circuit cases from the month of August.
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And let's uh let's start with uh you, Mark.
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What do you have for us though?
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Oh, I have local politics, which is always a fun and exciting uh area.
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Um local politics that heated up and kind of went nasty.
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And now we determine whether there's a constitutional overlay to the nastiness.
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My case is March versus Grand Chute, a town in uh Wisconsin, uh town of about, I looked it up, about 20,000 people.
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It looks like a lovely place.
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Um, but yeah, there was some uh bad blood uh between a town administrator and a new group of uh members of the town board of supervisors who uh oversee uh town government.
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Um it's a Chief Justice Brennan, in opinion.
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And what happened was uh the plaintiff, Mr.
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March, Mr.
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James March, was a longtime uh town administrator and had worked uh in that role uh as the highest non-elected official in the town for many, many years.
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Um the defendants, uh other than the town itself, are members of the uh Board of Supervisors who voted uh to remove Mr.
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March from that position, and in particular uh uh Ronald Wolfe, who is uh one of the supervisors who plays a large role in the narrative.
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Uh I love how uh Judge Brennan uh set this case up uh very narratively.
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There's a lot of factual history, but he breaks it down into what he calls chapters, uh kind of recognizing the uh very narrative uh nature of what happened here.
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Uh I agree, Mark.
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I thought that was great.
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I I was uh ready to listen to the the real podcast.
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That certainly sounds pretty.
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I mean, this is uh you can do it.
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There's a lot of jobs around here.
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So I don't want to know that's absolutely right.
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You could see like a Netflix, a made-for-Netflix movie uh based on on this.
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Um our story starts with something uh a little bit mundane, and that's it's local taxes.
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Um Wisconsin has a procedure that allows the assessment of what are called special assessments, meaning targeted taxes.
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Maybe somebody who is you know receiving a certain extra benefit and needs to pay for it.
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Um and Mr.
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Wolf, who I previously mentioned, uh happened to have a more than a few of these special assessments and uh did not take kindly to them, as you might imagine.
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He was not alone in this, as there were other residents of the town who um had issues with the town's application of special assessments and formed a coalition, and they're in uh lies the rub.
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Uh this coalition termed themselves the Doomed Dozen.
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Um, it sounds like a like a hockey line or a football defense.
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Um but the Doomed Dozen um uh became active in opposing uh the special assessments and eventually got into electoral politics um and managed to get uh by by October of 2021, started in the teams and roles into the early 2020s.
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But by October of 2021, they had four of the five seats on the board of supervisors.
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So they take control.
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Um and uh almost immediately at that point, conflict arises between Mr.
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March and Mr.
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Wolf.
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And the dune dozen uh I'm gonna have to say that many times, so I'm getting used to that.
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Um, the first there were several issues that that that arose, but the first real uh hot spot was a dispute about uh Mr.
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Wolf's residency and whether he was really living within uh Grand Chute or whether he had a residence outside of it.
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It's wild how much that issue has come up in local politics all over the country in the last few years.
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Uh one of the uh doom dozen supervisors uh filed a complaint um and the state started investigating.
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Uh this investigation went on for months.
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Uh there was eventually a search warrant uh served uh by the state.
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Uh it was it was secret until that point, but obviously everybody knew.
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But at the time there was a search warrant served at uh Mr.
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Wolf's house.
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Uh naturally the Doom Dozen starts to wonder how the heck an investigation got started.
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And uh they started making some uh inquiries, uh thinking this was you know just a political stunt to besmirch the Mr.
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Wolf and the Dirty Dozen.
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Um they found out at this point
Load full transcript
that Mr.
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March had and other town employees had talked to the investigators.
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They didn't really know what was said.
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Um eventually at board meetings and elsewhere, um, Mr.
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Wolf's heard to say that you know we should get rid of March.
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It's time for him to go, those types of things.
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And he is fired uh in the spring of 2023.
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Uh he sues.
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Uh he claims that he was retaliated against for the fact that he spoke um to the state investigators, and also uh because of his political affiliation is not with the dirty dozen.
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It's his faction came in that he is opposed to, uh, and they retaliated against him for that.
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But then the surprise hits, and the state actually files charges against Mr.
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Wolf, and those charges have nothing to do with residency.
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Uh the charges are that a company he ran got a uh no-bid uh contract uh to provide services to the town at the time that Mr.
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Wolf was on the board of supervisors.
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Um lo and behold, discovery both in the criminal case and in the lawsuit also shows that when it comes to that um investigation, Mr.
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March didn't just talk to investigators.
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He was regularly in communication with the investigator, provided all kinds of information, um, and had uh more than a few text messages with the investigators and the other member of the board of supervisors who was not in the dirty dozen and others where he was providing information, but but more importantly, uh besmirching uh the dirty dozen and Mr.
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Wolf uh particularly.
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Oh, sorry, the Doom Dozen.
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That's I want to call it either the League of Doom or the Dirty Dozen.
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It's kind of a mix.
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Um you gotta have a colorful name, right?
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It helps.
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Um so this comes out they and the allegation then is that he was fired uh in retaliation for his speech or for his status as an opponent of the dirty of the Doom Dozen, which became much more apparent after these text messages.
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Uh but what's the significance of the text messages, Mark?
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Like, because those were found after the termination happened, right?
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Well, it raises an important legal question.
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It's like, how much does it matter that it wouldn't have been known at the time, which we we grapple with the here a little bit?
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Um that's that's the big well, I want to say the big teaching in the case, but it's a big, it's more of an issue spot than anything.
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Um but let me set the table on our retaliation law.
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Um the the key Supreme Court cases are are Elrod and Brantey, and so this is called the Elrod Branty doctrine.
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Um generally you can't fire someone for uh political affiliation.
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However, those two cases in the late 70s and early 80s uh respectively said that look, there are certain government officials who are so high up in the chain of command that they have to have some connection uh with the the leadership.
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The example I always use when I talk about this these are policymakers.
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So somebody, maybe not an elected official, but so akin or connected to the elected officials that you really have to have somebody rowing the the boat in the same direction.
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I mean, I think the what the thing I think of is the chief of staff.
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So like the mayor, president, chief of staff.
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You can't have somebody of the opposite political party or opposite political interests in that position because it's just so sensitive and and uh you really need somebody that's that's in the same topic.
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Well, and in some ways it vindicates the foundations of electoral politics, right?
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Like it's part of the whole point of electing a new person is that the new person changes personnel.
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Like that's just part of the that's the whole idea.
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They can bring in people who are gonna effectuate their agenda.
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Exactly.
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Even if they're if they can't do that, then they're just a figurehead, they're not able to do anything.
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Yep.
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So the the question then is that that's established Supreme Court law that a policymaker, you know, if you if you're a Republican swept into office, you can fire a Democrat uh who is at the policymaker level, and vice versa.
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Um the Seventh Circuit, not the Supreme Court, but the Seventh Circuit has looked at retaliatory free speech uh under um you know the methodology for retaliatory uh firings in the free speech context and said Supreme Court hasn't gotten there yet, but this concept of policymaker applies in the free speech context as well, with uh some limitations.
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Um, you know, that that we have to show, well, I I don't want to get too far because this is a qualified immunity case, so we're gonna talk a lot about how well settled the wall is.
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But the the the courts as a generally there has to be some connection to the policymakers' role.
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So if you have a policymaker, let's say the chief of staff or a mayor of a of a medium-sized city, and they make uh uh a statement online or wherever else uh about something completely unconnected, uh maybe something in the national political arena, something like that, uh that may be outside the the scope of the protection, but if they you know their speech within um within the ambit of of the policymakers' role um is going to get protection under the uh Elrod uh ranty uh policymaker protection.
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So they could be fired for that.
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Um so we and that's I that's currently unsettled, right, Mark?
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Because the like the notion of exactly how far this goes, because there is some sense to saying if you are sufficiently high up the chain, everything you say is connected to your job.
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Right?
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Like you you say that you like the sports team from the competing uh municipality, right?
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Like that's a good enough reason to fire you.
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You're causing us headache, political headaches.
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I can fire you for that reason.
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If someone lower down the chain, it it may be uh you may be able to find things outside the end of it.
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The court indicates that that is that is cloudy.
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In fact, it's cloudy whether the the out the policymaker standard applies at all.
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Supreme Court hasn't said so.
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Uh Judge Brennan correctly says there's really we're really looking at two uh issues here.
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Uh there's there's two ways of looking at this.
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One's, you know, they he's raised a patronage claim, so that's straight up Elrod Brandy, policymaker, but he's also raised uh uh retaliatory speech argument, and that's the more cloudy uh in uh that the court's opinion concededly says cloudy and somewhat inconsistent uh policymaker law under the uh free speech.
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Uh so and just and just to clarify for listeners, uh the plaintiff's claim is straightforward, right?
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He his his theory is very straightforward.
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I spoke, you terminated me, that's retaliation, end of story.
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Yeah, and it's the defendants who are invoking these except these extremely complicated exceptions to that very simple, straightforward approach.
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Which gets really interesting because we're talking about qualified immunity.
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So, right, the defendants raise the policymaker defense and then argue we're entitled to policy fied immunity because our policy maker defense
because our defense is so confusing and complicated, and they had so many moving parts, right?
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And so there are two the the seventh circuit says there are two flavors of this defense.
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One is the traditional political affiliation, you're allowed to fire people because of their political affiliations, so long as they're a policymaker.
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And then there is what the Seventh Circuit confusingly calls the policymaker corollary, which is politically disloyal speech, but what exactly does that mean?
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And how far and how it is.
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Exactly.
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Exactly.
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Right.
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And uh there's some post hoc justification going on here, right?
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Um, not only in terms of the text messages that they didn't know about at the time, but but it's it's kind of interesting to hear the court work through what the inquiry actually is, right?
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Is it is it what the the firing officials knew at the time, or can they bring in all this other stuff that they later find out about that that makes it turn out that perhaps their decision was more justified than it first appeared?
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Yeah, absolutely.
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The the the court says, look, this is a qualified immunity case, it just has that ring.
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Uh not my words, not Judge Brennan's.
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Um and you know, I don't think that's wrong uh when you get into, especially when you get into the case law, and we don't we don't have enough time to go through case by case.
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But he the uh the judge points out, uh the court points out three different, you know, big landmarks in the in the case that really show that this is a qualified immunity situation.
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And I I just want to stop for a second and think how difficult, again, I'm thinking in practical terms, how difficult this must have been to explain, if you're Mr.
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March's counsel, that yeah, you we claimed, and I'm sure they had a Rule 11 basis to do it, that we were retaliating against them more than a rule 11.
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They had a case that you just fired for political reasons.
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Uh, but they have this defense over here, and then they can say their defense is not really clearly established.
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So our defense upon a defense, and now you don't have a case, that's a tough sell.
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Uh I I I I don't envy the uh the attorney who had to explain that to a layperson.
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But the three the three things that are that led to qualified immunity is it's cloudy as to uh the causation question.
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Um it's um cloudy as to how political partisan speech must be.
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And then the question Laura was just pointing out that with the subjective, subjective, does it matter that they didn't know about the uh the the text and how bad uh in colloquial terms the uh discussions between Mr.
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March and the investigators and others really was.
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Um on the uh I always try and point out lessons for uh people practicing these areas if I find one.
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And Judge Brennan really puts a big red flag on the issue of causation.
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Uh and I mean that in the sense of um both.
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We have those two different policymaker uh trains of thought, the Lrod, Brandy, and then the uh uh regular uh speech retaliation seventh circuit uh the policymaker corollary.
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The correlary.
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Yeah, exactly.
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The flag that that uh Judge Brennan throws up is that both of those uh doctrines require that the only reason the person is fired is because they are political patronage or because of their uh under the corollary, because of their speech.
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If you plead both, you're undermining your position, perhaps fatally so, because you're saying there might have been another reason as well.
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You were disloyal in your speech, and you're also the wrong political affiliation.
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Can't have both, possibly.
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The court raises that as an undetermined issue uh uh under and enough to raise a qualified immunity defense, but uh one of the many things people criticize qualified immunity for is that it doesn't allow for development of the law.
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And this opinion is not definitive as to whether this is a fatal approach or not.
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I mean, you can make some arguments about alternative pleading and things like that.
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Uh, and maybe that maybe the two doctrines merge together at some level.
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Uh, but but if you're practicing this area, think long and hard about whether you want to go to both corollary and El Rod Bruni, or make pick your quizon at the outset.
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Um, the other, the second is that it is really unclear how partisan uh or political the speech really has to be.
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Uh, this is uh in the corollary, and Kyan raised this earlier that you know, is it about the hockey team for the next town over?
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I'm thinking Wisconsin, so I'm going hockey.
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Uh, or you know, is it how much tied to the actual duties has to be?
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This is uh particularly unsettled.
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There's not a case that that really um
settles this, including this case.
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Uh the court does the qualified immunity thing and says, look at how messy this doctrine is.
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That's enough for qualified immunity.
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But there is a case that says, as Chief Judge Brennan points out, there is a case from the Seventh Circuit that says what doesn't count, and that is abuses of power, right?
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That that is correct.
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So why does this case not fall within that exception to the exception?
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I'm not sure I'm following it.
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Well, the his theory, and this is what I this is the the difficult part of it I had with uh Chief Judge Brennan's analysis.
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Uh and and Chief Judge Brennan does note that maybe the case that establishes that, uh case called Vargas Harrison, um, which in turn derives from an earlier case called Marshall versus Porting Plan Commission, says speech critical of a superior's abuse of office is not protective, it's not uh firable.
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Yeah.
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It's that falls outside of the exception, right?
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Um, which makes sense, right?
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You can understand why it's like a whistleblower type concept.
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Correct, exactly.
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Because the idea on some level, and and drawing that line is sometimes difficult, right?
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Some it's one person's abuse of office is another person's policy choice, sir.
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Well, I mean, for instance, right here, right, where the the counterclaim was for basically malicious prosecution or abuse of process.
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Exactly.
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Right, exactly.
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So we have an exception to the policymaker exception with a corollary, with an exception to that corollary.
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Exactly.
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But here, and and Chief Judge Brendan points this out the March's theory is all the defendants knew is that I spoke to the police.
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A jury could conclude that they thought that I was speaking to the police to tell the police about crimes they were committing.
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Exactly.
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That speech should serve the basis of a retaliation claim.
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Absolutely.
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And is and the Seventh Circuit is held, therefore, can't uh be the basis of the policymaker exception or the policymaker defense, right?
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So why doesn't that go to a jury?
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Is it just because all of this is so complicated that qualified immunity's gotta apply somehow?
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Well, I really I don't
know.
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Maybe that's maybe that's the reason.
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I don't know.
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I I you know I I I really think that's kind of where we're where the case is pointing.
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Is that there's just so much uh murk here uh and uncertainty that if we're putting ourselves in the uh shoes of a rational uh uh decision maker, and I suggest that perhaps somebody who calls themselves a doom dozen may fall outside that that terminology um wouldn't rational decision maker really know if they fell into that abusive process exception to the corollary?
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I mean, it is it is murky at best.
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And I think you're you're kind of taking us to the last point.
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There's almost a perfect segue into that, which is does it really matter uh whether they knew or not uh that um he had made comments beyond just answering investigators' questions and and uh comments that were uh colorful was probably minimizing it.
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Um I think at one point he said that Wolf was completely incompetent and incapable of running town government.
00:20:28.000 --> 00:20:34.000
Uh and interestingly enough, this has never been resolved in the in the context of retaliation.
00:20:34.160 --> 00:20:36.079
Do you do do they actually need to know?
00:20:36.240 --> 00:20:48.799
Uh you would think so, because we're we're talking a lot of the retaliation, retaliatory speech and retaliatory uh the Elrod uh branding uh Bronte chain is all about causalization.
00:20:48.880 --> 00:20:51.119
Was this what led to the decision making?
00:20:51.279 --> 00:20:54.000
So you could see that subjective would really matter.
00:20:54.400 --> 00:20:59.920
But as Judge Brandon points out, there's also that that's that's kind of a different part of the analysis.
00:21:00.079 --> 00:21:02.880
And we had to start with, is the speech protected?
00:21:03.039 --> 00:21:08.480
So what really matters is what what was this, you know, what was the speech, which is more of an objective standard.
00:21:08.720 --> 00:21:11.839
It doesn't matter you know what they knew and when they knew it.
00:21:11.920 --> 00:21:18.319
That you can put that into the causation analysis, but uh, you know, other cases suggest that those two things plead together.
00:21:18.480 --> 00:21:31.359
And the court said, um, you know, that's obviously uh an unsettled, important area law that a decision maker would really need to know about in determining whether they could fire into qualified immunity applies.
00:21:32.319 --> 00:21:37.839
Perhaps uh a little bit frustratingly, court doesn't take a position.
00:21:38.000 --> 00:21:42.799
Um interestingly enough, and you know, doesn't have to.
00:21:42.880 --> 00:21:48.880
I'm not I'm not saying they had to or that it's a failure of the opinion, but it's an interesting, it's a really interesting legal question.
00:21:48.960 --> 00:21:54.160
If if any of our listeners are are law students looking for a note uh to work on this, great.
00:21:54.640 --> 00:21:57.119
This is a great, great, great question.
00:21:57.359 --> 00:22:16.559
And the way and it is uh I Love the way that uh Chief Judge Brennan puts the qualified immunity analysis because he places the reader in the position of you can imagine a a frazzled government lawyer trying to advise the board like, Am I I want to fire this guy, am I allowed to fire this guy?
00:22:16.640 --> 00:22:16.799
Yeah.
00:22:16.960 --> 00:22:21.519
And this and this poor lawyer is reading all of these cases that says, I I I don't know.
00:22:21.680 --> 00:22:22.960
I don't know if you can fire it.
00:22:24.799 --> 00:22:24.960
Yes.
00:22:25.359 --> 00:22:29.279
And uh and I think I so what you said, Mark, is exactly right.
00:22:29.440 --> 00:22:36.960
I think the the it seems to me the key, one of the two issues is subjective versus objective, right?
00:22:37.279 --> 00:22:54.000
And a Chief Judge Brennan is saying the defendants here could have reasonably taken the position that what matters is not what they currently know about his speech, but objectively what he told the police, and maybe what he told the police wasn't protected.
00:22:54.960 --> 00:22:57.279
And so therefore, I'm allowed to fire him.
00:22:57.440 --> 00:23:00.400
They could have, they, they, they could have reasonably concluded that.
00:23:00.720 --> 00:23:18.799
Especially at the time of the investigation, the only thing that was being that people thought was being investigated was a residency issue, which really wouldn't uh I don't I don't know that that would be protected under I mean it would be a much different case than what we find out in the subjective case where there's a lot right scenes.
00:23:19.359 --> 00:23:21.359
I mean that's I don't know, so that's confusing, right?
00:23:21.440 --> 00:23:30.640
Because if if it were clear, like if he had told the police, uh they had simply asked them, does this guy live outside of the district?
00:23:30.880 --> 00:23:33.599
And he said, Yes, he does.
00:23:33.759 --> 00:23:34.079
Yeah.
00:23:34.240 --> 00:23:36.000
Like that's isn't that protective speech?
00:23:36.160 --> 00:23:36.640
I I don't know.
00:23:36.720 --> 00:23:37.519
That's an interesting gap.
00:23:38.960 --> 00:23:40.880
That's just an answer to a it's a whistleblower.
00:23:41.039 --> 00:23:42.720
He's just responding to a cop to a police.
00:23:43.039 --> 00:23:48.720
And this is also what I find a little bit odd about the it's hard for me to understand.
00:23:49.759 --> 00:23:58.559
If you actually, if a jury took the most damaging inferences, they really took all of the most damaging inferences, right?
00:23:58.720 --> 00:24:16.079
That objectively this really was like he just was asked by a police officer or by an investigator, yeah, right, questions about the crime, which is a reasonable thing to infer that that's what the
investigator was asking him, then he's just assisting an investigator with an investigation.
00:24:16.240 --> 00:24:21.599
That's ordinal ordinary whistleblowing, which according to the Seventh Circuit, doesn't fall within the exception.
00:24:21.759 --> 00:24:22.079
Yeah.
00:24:22.240 --> 00:24:34.000
So it's hard for me to see how, why, why a jury couldn't find facts sufficient to establish the objective piece, or why they couldn't find sufficient facts to establish the subjective piece.
00:24:34.319 --> 00:24:40.000
Because, I mean, it seems to be, this is where I think Chief Judge Brandon's opinion could be criticized.
00:24:40.240 --> 00:24:51.440
He seems to be applying qualified immunity not to the not just to the legal question, but to what the defendants could have reasonably concluded is a factual matter.
00:24:52.079 --> 00:24:52.400
Right.
00:24:52.559 --> 00:24:57.920
And that that's a jury question, and that's not a that's not a qualified immunity question, right?
00:24:58.400 --> 00:25:06.480
Because couldn't a jury conclude that at the time they fired him, they thought that he was talking to police, assisting them with an investigation.
00:25:06.799 --> 00:25:09.039
I mean, his answer to the question is very vague.
00:25:10.559 --> 00:25:12.400
I talked to them about their investigation.
00:25:12.480 --> 00:25:14.319
Yes, I did talk to him about the rescue.
00:25:14.640 --> 00:25:17.359
If he had gone further, he would have probably been fired.
00:25:17.440 --> 00:25:27.039
Uh, but if he had gone further and said, like like he said, that then I told him you don't live here and I have reason to believe whatever, however you're gonna phrase it, um, that's that's a very rational inference.
00:25:27.119 --> 00:25:32.240
But of course he didn't say that because he he knew what the result was very likely that he would be the two.
00:25:32.880 --> 00:25:35.119
It's analogous to the Title VII inquiry, right?
00:25:35.279 --> 00:25:38.079
I mean it it's it's it's asking, is this pretextual?
00:25:38.400 --> 00:25:44.240
Are they using the facts that I cooperated with this investigation as a pretext to get rid of me, which they wanted to do anyway, right?
00:25:44.640 --> 00:25:46.720
Yeah, very clearly wanted to do anyway.
00:25:46.880 --> 00:25:47.200
Yeah.
00:25:47.680 --> 00:25:56.480
So I think that the key part is Chief Judge Brennan says, it's true they knew he was speaking as part of a criminal investigation, but on its own, that's not sufficient.
00:25:56.640 --> 00:26:02.240
He says they didn't know the purpose of the investigation and were prevented from investigating further.
00:26:03.440 --> 00:26:16.480
So when, and then he says, quote, when town staff would not tell them what the investigation was about, they relied on the limited information they did have, none of which would lead a reasonable official to believe March's speech only recorded criminal behavior.
00:26:16.799 --> 00:26:19.839
What I don't understand is, isn't that a jury question?
00:26:20.799 --> 00:26:21.839
Isn't that a jury question?
00:26:21.920 --> 00:26:23.759
Why is that a qualified immunity question?
00:26:24.160 --> 00:26:34.319
Like that's a like I get that a jury could conclude for sure, but especially when the record's very clear that when the charges came out and it dealt with the no-bid contract, everyone was surprised by it.
00:26:34.400 --> 00:26:37.519
And like it was apparently a local political bomb on that.
00:26:38.000 --> 00:26:38.319
Exactly.
00:26:38.480 --> 00:26:54.480
And so I I do worry that you could take this opinion and suggest that if you are a like if you're a mayor, if you're an elected official, and all you know is that one of your employees spoke to the FBI, you can fire them.
00:26:54.640 --> 00:26:55.759
Yeah, potentially, yeah.
00:26:56.000 --> 00:27:04.799
Because maybe they were just complaining about your politics to the FBI, in which case, like that seems to be the upshot of the decision, at least that you're entitled to Q.
00:27:05.200 --> 00:27:06.160
It's a fair reading, right?
00:27:06.720 --> 00:27:07.680
Um Right.
00:27:07.839 --> 00:27:16.400
So uh so all of the uh corrupt elected officials in the Seventh Circuit maybe uh may want to uh they they can uh flex their flex their muscles a little bit.
00:27:16.480 --> 00:27:27.440
And it is true, as as uh Chief Judge Grant points out that uh the it's not even obvious that the whistleblower exception even really is correct.
00:27:27.599 --> 00:27:27.759
Yeah.
00:27:28.000 --> 00:27:30.079
And I I want to underscore it, folks.
00:27:30.880 --> 00:27:40.880
All of this, everything that you're talking about, is based on two Supreme Court cases that are very far removed from this case, this context.
00:27:41.039 --> 00:27:46.640
Like the Seventh Circuit has been building all of these doctrinal pieces over the last 50 years or so.
00:27:46.960 --> 00:27:47.119
Exactly.
00:27:47.519 --> 00:27:53.200
The Supreme Court has not opined, and so there really is a lot of uncertainty in this entire area.
00:27:53.519 --> 00:28:01.359
I mean, it's a logical extension, but you would think the Supreme Court would have weighed in on this at some point, especially because it's it comes up all the time.
00:28:01.759 --> 00:28:12.240
And I I think that's I mean, he doesn't explicitly do so, but I think Judge Brennan is certainly inviting that here when he's uh somewhat critical of of the Seventh Circuit's own precedent in this area.
00:28:12.400 --> 00:28:18.160
But then I think one could fairly criticize this case as not not adding any clarity to the mix, right?
00:28:18.319 --> 00:28:18.880
Necessarily.
00:28:19.279 --> 00:28:19.519
Yes.
00:28:19.759 --> 00:28:23.440
So certainly we would benefit some higher authorities too.
00:28:23.599 --> 00:28:24.240
Yeah, and down.
00:28:24.480 --> 00:28:25.039
Yes.
00:28:25.279 --> 00:28:26.480
Um, yes.
00:28:26.720 --> 00:28:35.920
And well, and I think it's worth noting at the very
end, uh, Chief Joseph Bryant says he at least in one, he says that we haven't clearly held about the whistleblower exception.
00:28:36.079 --> 00:28:36.160
Right.
00:28:36.319 --> 00:28:38.400
And that suggests that maybe he thinks that's wrong.
00:28:38.480 --> 00:28:38.640
Yeah.
00:28:38.799 --> 00:28:40.480
That what the whistleblower exception is wrong.
00:28:40.640 --> 00:28:42.079
And why else, right?
00:28:42.400 --> 00:28:42.559
Right.
00:28:42.720 --> 00:28:44.880
And I this is uh this is an excellent opinion.
00:28:45.039 --> 00:28:47.119
It's already 38 pages long.
00:28:47.440 --> 00:28:52.480
But I I would have I would have loved even more about what is all of this based on?
00:28:52.559 --> 00:28:53.119
Yeah, right.
00:28:53.200 --> 00:28:53.359
Yeah.
00:28:53.519 --> 00:28:58.559
Like the whole the first point is well, like First Amendment retaliation law.
00:28:58.720 --> 00:29:00.400
Okay, like that makes sense.
00:29:00.559 --> 00:29:02.880
I speak, I'm retaliated for my speech.
00:29:02.960 --> 00:29:04.400
That violates my freedom of speech.
00:29:04.559 --> 00:29:06.720
Okay, that first step makes sense.
00:29:06.960 --> 00:29:20.799
And then there's this sort of basically policy-driven exception because we have to, but it's not purely policy-driven, as we talked about, it's vindicating other constitutional interests and democratic control of policy.
00:29:20.960 --> 00:29:23.359
And then exactly.
00:29:23.519 --> 00:29:33.119
And then the poor Seventh Circuit has had to develop all of these very complicated rules to vindicate how to make these make these principles work together.
00:29:33.279 --> 00:29:42.799
Um, and I think if that's sort of how you understand things, then a judge could feel more comfortable by just saying, yeah, I think whistleblowers need to be able to whistleblow.
00:29:43.200 --> 00:29:46.400
It is results in which it can criticize, right?
00:29:46.480 --> 00:29:47.279
It's exactly right.
00:29:48.799 --> 00:29:48.880
Right.
00:29:49.359 --> 00:29:52.319
There's not really any other source of law for the court to be applying.
00:29:52.559 --> 00:29:53.920
So excellent, excellent.
00:29:54.079 --> 00:29:54.799
I love this decision.
00:29:54.880 --> 00:29:56.480
I love this whole area of law.
00:29:56.720 --> 00:30:00.559
The the the policymaker corollary is great, plus we got some QI.
00:30:00.720 --> 00:30:10.720
And I mean the facts are just next, uh Laura, I do you have something equally as scintillating for us?
00:30:11.440 --> 00:30:12.079
Even more so.
00:30:12.319 --> 00:30:23.759
Oh, fantastic, fabulous situation to the drama of an insurance coverage dispute, which I know is why our listeners tune in.
00:30:29.920 --> 00:30:31.039
No, that's okay.
00:30:31.279 --> 00:30:33.119
Uh let me let me start.
00:30:33.279 --> 00:30:38.000
So uh Laura, do you have something equally as scintillating for us?
00:30:38.319 --> 00:30:39.119
You know I do.
00:30:39.599 --> 00:30:51.680
I I have brought uh I'm going to bring us from the drama of the small town political dispute to the equally or perhaps even more scintillating drama of an insurance coverage dispute.
00:30:52.160 --> 00:30:52.400
Fantastic.
00:30:52.640 --> 00:30:57.519
I know that that is why our listeners tune in to the podcast uh every month.
00:30:57.680 --> 00:31:05.039
So I without further ado, I will bring us into consolidated chassis management versus Northland insurance.
00:31:05.279 --> 00:31:16.000
Uh, this is a case out of the northern district of Illinois, and it is arising out of a traffic accident involving at least one passenger car and a semi-truck.
00:31:16.480 --> 00:31:27.599
And after the accident, one of the drivers sued the semis driver and also sued the semis owner and the chassis controlling company.
00:31:27.680 --> 00:31:49.119
Now, when I read this in the opinion, there's a helpful explanatory footnote, but I also did some Googling myself because I admit that I was not familiar, and our listeners may not be either, with uh how these uh chassis controlling companies work in the grand scheme of interstate commerce and distribution of goods, right?
00:31:49.359 --> 00:31:50.480
So just very briefly.
00:31:50.720 --> 00:31:51.599
Lay it on me, Laura.
00:31:51.680 --> 00:31:52.319
Yeah, I'm ready.
00:31:52.400 --> 00:31:53.279
Learn something new in the case.
00:31:53.440 --> 00:32:14.400
I didn't know this, but uh a semi-truck, it consists of the cab, which is the part that you can sit in and drive, the trailer itself, which is the box that you put uh your goods in, and the chassis, which is the wheels, then the frame that the trailer sits on that you attach to the three separate components that can be modular.
00:32:15.279 --> 00:32:15.680
Modular.
00:32:15.839 --> 00:32:16.000
Okay.
00:32:16.640 --> 00:32:18.160
So it's kind of like a shipping container.
00:32:18.319 --> 00:32:19.279
This is what I'm just thinking of, right?
00:32:19.440 --> 00:32:19.599
Yeah.
00:32:19.839 --> 00:32:29.359
Um but so what these chassis controlling companies do is they situate themselves with uh many chassis at some sort of distribution yard, right?
00:32:29.680 --> 00:32:40.240
And they situate themselves near shipping pubs, and then uh you can get the chassis, you can put your trailer on there and hook it up to a cab, and then off you go down the road.
00:32:40.480 --> 00:32:45.920
So there are companies that own and control just these chassis and then lease them to the trucking company.
00:32:46.000 --> 00:32:47.839
So that's what we've got going on here, right?
00:32:48.160 --> 00:32:48.400
Okay.
00:32:49.119 --> 00:33:03.920
Um now, because likely because of a series of contractual relationships between the driver, the owner, and the chassis company, these all of these defendants were insured through Northland, the same insurance company, right?
00:33:04.079 --> 00:33:13.440
Typically uh we would see either the driver or the owner would have a policy, and then the contracts
would require uh that the other parties be named as an additional insured on that policy.
00:33:13.599 --> 00:33:14.000
Makes sense.
00:33:14.079 --> 00:33:14.240
Right.
00:33:15.039 --> 00:33:19.839
Um so that policy had a$1 million limit for damages.
00:33:20.000 --> 00:33:29.440
And I think uh anyone who does any work in the tort sphere is gonna think to themselves, boy, that seems uh worryingly low for an accident of this nature, right?
00:33:30.000 --> 00:33:33.039
There's no mention, in the opinion, of an excess policy.
00:33:33.119 --> 00:33:36.559
So I'm thinking maybe that the one million dollars is about what we have here.
00:33:37.519 --> 00:33:57.039
Um and typically, or as is typical with policies like this, there were provisions in the policy that required insureds to cooperate with the insurance company and to back up a little bit, empowered the insurance company to control the defense, appoint defense counsel and manage the defense for the insured, right?
00:33:57.119 --> 00:33:59.920
It's a what's called a duty to defend policy.
00:34:00.559 --> 00:34:06.400
So the insurance company has both the right and the duty to defend the insured and to control that defense.
00:34:06.880 --> 00:34:18.559
The policy also required the insureds not to incur any costs or um basically uh commit themselves to pay any sums of money without the insurance company's consent.
00:34:18.800 --> 00:34:30.079
That means not only that the insured can't settle the case themselves, um, but they also can't go out and hire, typically anyway, their own their own counsel uh to manage the case for them.
00:34:30.159 --> 00:34:33.599
They have to rely on the counsel that the insurance company appoints for them.
00:34:34.159 --> 00:34:40.079
So what happens though when an insured wants to hire their own counsel?
00:34:40.239 --> 00:34:40.880
That's what happened here.
00:34:40.960 --> 00:34:52.320
The chassis companies, uh, who we'll refer to as consolidated, they wanted their own counsel um because they wanted to make an argument that was somewhat in tension with their co-defendants, right?
00:34:52.400 --> 00:34:58.159
They wanted to blame the accident on the negligence of the driver and the owner.
00:34:58.480 --> 00:35:06.800
And so they said, okay, we're entitled to our own independent counsel because we have interests that are adverse to these other defendants.
00:35:07.119 --> 00:35:14.079
I will say though, and it is an important note, the insurance company had not just hired one attorney to jointly defend all of these defendants.
00:35:14.239 --> 00:35:15.280
They don't do that, right?
00:35:15.360 --> 00:35:19.920
They they actually appoint diff different firms or hire different firms to defend each defendant.
00:35:20.559 --> 00:35:26.320
It's just that consolidated didn't like the attorney that Northland selected for them and wanted to select their own counsel.
00:35:26.400 --> 00:35:31.360
There, I would assume that there's at least some backstory here
that we're not privy to that that might be quite interesting.
00:35:33.119 --> 00:35:36.400
But but consolidated was just bound and determined they wanted to have their own lawyer.
00:35:37.599 --> 00:35:44.960
One of the questions I had when I read this case was that that's initially that point makes sense that they all have their own lawyers.
00:35:45.119 --> 00:35:52.719
Um, but how significant is that in light of the fact that the insurance company is claiming the right to control the defense?
00:35:52.960 --> 00:36:00.400
So the insurance comp, I mean, yeah, the lawyers are doing the work, but the insurance company, it says, is calling all of the shots for all three of them.
00:36:00.719 --> 00:36:15.440
So yes, the lawyers are you know doing their own thing, but at the end of the day, if the insurance company is making calls for all three of them, how can the insurance company make calls for all three defendants when the defendants have their own contradictory defenses?
00:36:15.760 --> 00:36:18.719
I mean, as policyholder counsel, Kyant, I completely agree with you.
00:36:18.800 --> 00:36:20.000
I think this is a serious problem.
00:36:20.320 --> 00:36:21.039
Ha, excellent.
00:36:21.199 --> 00:36:24.079
I knew that my intuition was leading me correctly.
00:36:24.239 --> 00:36:24.639
Very good.
00:36:24.800 --> 00:36:25.119
Okay.
00:36:25.440 --> 00:36:30.079
And I this was this was likely, and and I don't even think we need to say likely.
00:36:30.159 --> 00:36:32.400
This was clearly part of Consolidated's concern, right?
00:36:32.480 --> 00:36:44.719
They're saying, okay, you know, I we understand there are three nominally three separate firms here, but behind the curtain, the insurance company's pulling all the strings, and and we're not going to really get a fair shake because we want to blame all of this on our code offense, right?
00:36:45.119 --> 00:36:51.840
So And the actual concern here, right, is we could end up facing a judgment greater than the million.
00:36:52.159 --> 00:36:52.320
Right.
00:36:52.480 --> 00:36:54.159
That's the real concern, right?
00:36:54.239 --> 00:36:56.159
Like we do get there eventually, right?
00:36:56.239 --> 00:37:05.920
There's the concern about a judgment in excessive policy limits, but really there's also a concern, too, about about a liability judgment, even one that's fully paid that they may not have to face, right?
00:37:06.079 --> 00:37:09.440
Because there is, you know, a stigma often attached to a liability judgment.
00:37:09.519 --> 00:37:15.440
There are other adverse consequences that can attach to a liability judgment if they were to get one against themselves, right?
00:37:15.599 --> 00:37:15.840
I see.
00:37:16.400 --> 00:37:20.400
They may be concerned about some of those sort of downstream um issues as well.
00:37:20.639 --> 00:37:21.360
Okay, that makes sense.
00:37:21.440 --> 00:37:21.920
That makes sense.
00:37:22.079 --> 00:37:22.320
Okay.
00:37:22.960 --> 00:37:33.039
So there
are circumstances, as you might imagine, in which an insured is entitled to select and retain its own independent council and to bill the insurance company for that council.
00:37:33.360 --> 00:37:39.199
Because, of course, Consolidated is totally free to hire its own lawyer if it wants to pay for it, right?
00:37:39.360 --> 00:37:48.800
What it what it can't do absent certain uh circumstances that it it's arguing are present here is hire that independent council and then require Northland to uh to pay the bill.
00:37:49.039 --> 00:37:55.039
Couldn't could it hire its own counsel and still be entitled to the indemnification from the insurance policy?
00:37:55.280 --> 00:37:57.760
Or would it lose even its coverage too?
00:37:58.320 --> 00:37:59.519
So that's a good question.
00:37:59.760 --> 00:38:03.599
Typically it's the it's the attorney fees that are at the issue here, right?
00:38:03.679 --> 00:38:05.599
And indemnification is kind of a separate point.
00:38:05.840 --> 00:38:26.880
Okay, so can so at least likely, I know the opinion doesn't address it, but just for listeners who are not insurance pros, likely in a situation like this, if you really did if this was really important to you, you could hire your own lawyer and still have the coverage, and that way you're still controlling your own defense and you don't necessarily lose your coverage just because you're deciding to take over the defense.
00:38:27.199 --> 00:38:29.360
Indemnity would not necessarily be affected.
00:38:29.440 --> 00:38:34.239
I think it would certainly not be outside the role of possibility to see an insurance company.
00:38:36.400 --> 00:38:37.280
Yeah, yeah, yes.
00:38:37.679 --> 00:38:44.800
I I think as policy holder constable, I think you would have a very strong argument though that indemnity is not affected by by selecting and paying more.
00:38:45.039 --> 00:38:45.840
Or two different duties.
00:38:46.880 --> 00:38:53.760
A lot of the times, though, I mean, as we're familiar, uh the attorney fees can be as much or more of a ball gain than the liability issue, too.
00:38:53.920 --> 00:38:56.320
So um, so this can be a really important piece.
00:38:56.400 --> 00:39:01.920
Um and the other part of this obviously is the time value of money.
00:39:02.079 --> 00:39:11.760
If you are paying all those bills up front and then waiting, you know, potentially years while you litigate the issue for the insurance company to reimburse those bills, that's a sunk cost, right, for you as a business.
00:39:11.920 --> 00:39:13.679
So it's this is this is serious.
00:39:13.840 --> 00:39:25.039
Um and that's why eventually we'll see Consolidated filed its own lawsuit against the insurance company, trying to move this issue along and get payment for those fees more quickly.
00:39:26.320 --> 00:39:41.519
So, as I said, there are circumstances in which there's a conflict of interest between uh the insured and the insurance company that is so serious that the insured is entitled to
hire its own independent counsel and bill the insurance company for it.
00:39:41.679 --> 00:39:50.880
So consolidated sided two such conflicts that it identified here, that it claimed entitled it to that independent counsel at Northland's expense.
00:39:51.039 --> 00:40:05.920
The first one was Northland's reservation of rights, in which it stated that if it later determined that consolidated was not an insured under the policy, it intended to disclaim coverage and recoup all of the defense costs that it had previously paid.
00:40:06.000 --> 00:40:09.679
Now that's a concerning rights reservation letter to receive, right?
00:40:09.760 --> 00:40:19.519
If you're an insured, Northland probably had gone into this with the assumption that it was certainly an additional insured as per its contracts, right?
00:40:19.599 --> 00:40:22.400
So it was pretty dismayed to receive this letter.
00:40:22.800 --> 00:40:26.159
The other conflict that consolidated uh cited here.
00:40:26.400 --> 00:40:29.119
But is that is that kind of letter how how common is that?
00:40:29.360 --> 00:40:29.679
Pretty common.
00:40:29.840 --> 00:40:31.440
Yeah, that sounds pretty common, I mean.
00:40:31.519 --> 00:40:32.639
Like that sounds pretty common.
00:40:32.960 --> 00:40:38.079
It's it's very I I got the sense that the Seventh Circuit is thinking, guys.
00:40:38.960 --> 00:40:41.199
You always get those reservation of rights letters.
00:40:41.280 --> 00:40:47.199
It can't be the case that that that give that creates this with this supposed to be unusual exception, right?
00:40:47.440 --> 00:40:52.880
And and Nortland was it was defending here under it was doing what's called defending under a reservation of rights, right?
00:40:53.280 --> 00:41:06.639
It had hired defense counsel to defend consolidated, but it it had, of course, sent this letter to kind of cover itself and and reserve its reserve its rights to to argue these coverage defenses later, um, depending on the results of its investigation.
00:41:07.599 --> 00:41:17.119
So the second conflict that Northland identified was that, or that consolidated identified, was Northland's defense of the driver and owner, which we alluded to, right?
00:41:17.199 --> 00:41:19.360
Their interests not fully aligned with consolidated.
00:41:19.599 --> 00:41:22.960
There were some different uh arguments there with respect to liability.
00:41:24.159 --> 00:41:30.880
So upon receiving this communication from Consolidated, Northland said, All right, this isn't worth it to us.
00:41:30.960 --> 00:41:35.199
We're gonna withdraw our reservation of rights, and we'll just we'll just defend.
00:41:35.599 --> 00:41:38.239
So, you know, you don't have to worry about that conflict anymore.
00:41:38.559 --> 00:41:39.760
No problem, right?
00:41:40.000 --> 00:41:41.920
Consolidated said, no, no, no.
00:41:42.159 --> 00:41:45.360
Now what our concern is And then by the way, this is a great strategy.
00:41:45.519 --> 00:41:52.719
Sometimes maybe you maybe you say, hey, your reservation of rights creates a conflict, and then you pressure the insurance company to drop the reservation of rights.
00:41:54.880 --> 00:41:55.679
Yeah, exactly.
00:41:56.960 --> 00:42:03.679
Oh man, we're gonna have to put that, we'll put that in all the social media for this uh for this episode.
00:42:03.840 --> 00:42:04.480
That was good.
00:42:04.639 --> 00:42:05.360
Oh, that was good.
00:42:05.599 --> 00:42:05.840
Love it.
00:42:06.000 --> 00:42:06.480
Love it.
00:42:07.119 --> 00:42:08.559
Okay, so I right?
00:42:08.800 --> 00:42:12.400
I mean, that's I like that's a good teaching teaching moment for uh young lawyers.
00:42:12.800 --> 00:42:15.039
In some sense, it's a positive result from the insured, right?
00:42:15.119 --> 00:42:22.079
Because they now don't have to worry about these coverage defenses um anymore, and they don't have to worry about potential recruitment down the road.
00:42:22.320 --> 00:42:27.519
But what they don't have is their own council, which it turns out is what Consolidated was really concerned about here.
00:42:28.079 --> 00:42:38.639
Um so at that point, Consolidated said, well, actually, we have another conflict, and that is our concern that the damages can exceed the policy limits, kind as you were talking about earlier.
00:42:38.880 --> 00:42:42.719
Um Northland basically said, look, you know, we don't think that's a conflict.
00:42:42.880 --> 00:42:45.760
We're not gonna reimburse your independent council fees.
00:42:46.000 --> 00:42:52.079
Now, those fees, I was a little bit surprised to see, only amounting to about$115,000, it said, in the opinion.
00:42:52.239 --> 00:43:14.960
Um so, you know, we're not necessarily talking about a really massive case here, but we're coming to the interesting piece of this, and that is that consolidated when it sued Northland um in an effort to get uh its council fees paid, it requested a declaratory judgment, it brought a breach of contract claim, and it brought a claim under section 155.
00:43:15.039 --> 00:43:28.639
This is an Illinois law that authorizes a payment of attorneys' fees and penalties and penalties for quote vexatious and unreasonable conduct by an insurer.
00:43:28.880 --> 00:43:29.199
Right.
00:43:29.760 --> 00:43:37.199
So this is this is how consolidated kind of can access more than just its$115,000 in damages.
00:43:37.599 --> 00:43:44.559
It can then also get its coverage counsel fees for this lawsuit and these statutory penalties, which can really add up.
00:43:46.239 --> 00:43:53.119
The district court granted summary judgment for consolidated on its uh both the declaratory and the breach of contract claims.
00:43:53.199 --> 00:43:58.400
Uh it said, look, consolidated's right, it's entitled to its own choice of independent counsel based on these conflicts.
00:43:59.280 --> 00:44:04.400
But I don't think that this rises to that level of vexatious and unreasonable conduct.
00:44:04.719 --> 00:44:09.519
So uh we're
gonna fine for Northland on the Section 155 plan.
00:44:09.840 --> 00:44:12.880
And then we had a cross appeal and we were at the Seventh Circuit.
00:44:14.880 --> 00:44:25.920
The court, uh, upon looking at this dispute went the other way, which I do hate to see uh as policy holder counsel, the insurer ended up prevailing in this appeal.
00:44:26.320 --> 00:44:53.519
But here's what the court said as to why Illinois law provides that when a policy gives the insurer the right and the duty to defend, only a serious and actual conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured, not necessarily the insured and the co-insureds, right, will require payment for independent counsel.
00:44:54.159 --> 00:44:54.800
Right.
00:44:55.199 --> 00:44:58.079
So there's a couple of pieces to this.
00:44:58.559 --> 00:45:06.719
If the insurer's own interest would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense, so what does that mean?
00:45:06.960 --> 00:45:15.760
It means that the insurer has some kind of coverage defense that they intend to maybe assert later that they're going to rely upon.
00:45:16.159 --> 00:45:22.880
And they may try to influence the defense of the underlying action in such a way to set themselves up to win that coverage.
00:45:23.599 --> 00:45:27.199
A classic example would be negligent versus intentional torts, right?
00:45:27.599 --> 00:45:30.639
Plaintiff brings a case for negligent and intentional torts.
00:45:30.960 --> 00:45:39.039
And if they the plaintiff wins, the underlying plaintiff wins on the negligence claim only, then the insurer has to pay.
00:45:39.280 --> 00:45:50.400
But if the plaintiff wins a resounding victory and wins on both negligent and the intentional tort, then the insurer might be able to say, ah, there's an exclusion for intentional conduct.
00:45:50.480 --> 00:45:54.800
Um, because we did such a bad job defending you, we don't have to pay anything.
00:45:55.119 --> 00:45:59.199
And that's that's exactly the example that Judge Brunning gives, in the opinion, right?
00:45:59.280 --> 00:46:00.960
Um and it's a very good one, right?
00:46:01.039 --> 00:46:05.360
Because these policies do typically cover negligence only and they have exclusions for intentional conduct.
00:46:05.440 --> 00:46:12.000
They say we're not going to cover you, obviously, if you're if you intentionally run your semi-truck into someone's car, that's that's not covered.
00:46:12.159 --> 00:46:22.559
Um so so right, that is that is the kind of the classic example of a situation in which the insurer might say, Oh, okay, you know, if we manipulate this a little bit, then we don't have to pay anything.
00:46:23.039 --> 00:46:32.079
So, in a circumstance when that's possible, the court says, that's the kind of situation where we would see a requirement for independent counsel.
00:46:32.239 --> 00:46:34.000
Now, how do we tell if that's an issue?
00:46:34.159 --> 00:46:36.400
Well, we look at the allegations in the underlying complaint.
00:46:36.480 --> 00:46:43.679
And this is this is typical for so many inquiries in the world of insurance coverage, the underlying complaint and the allegations therein that really control, right?
00:46:44.159 --> 00:46:56.320
So here in this case, the court said, that's just not, we're just not seeing allegations in the underlying complaint that give rise to that kind of conflict between consolidated and northland, right?
00:46:56.719 --> 00:47:07.519
Now, Northland or consolidated is pointing there saying, look, you know, we have, we may not have these uh conflicts directly with the insurance company, but we set definitely have them with our co-defendants.
00:47:07.679 --> 00:47:08.559
What about those?
00:47:08.800 --> 00:47:10.800
According to the court, that's just not enough.
00:47:10.880 --> 00:47:19.199
Unless the insurer has some sort of incentive to favor one party over another, there's just not they're not the kind of conflict here that would require any.
00:47:19.519 --> 00:47:22.159
And unless someone were polling from the same million dollar pot.
00:47:22.400 --> 00:47:28.320
So it's not, doesn't really matter to the insurer whose whose percentage is what of that million.
00:47:28.719 --> 00:47:28.960
Right.
00:47:29.440 --> 00:47:34.400
That's exactly how the yeah, that's exactly how the court disposed of north of uh consolidated's other argument, right?
00:47:34.480 --> 00:47:45.599
They said, you know, look, this your point about the policy limits is is true, of course, but all of the defendants are incentivized equally to make their best argument, of course, which is the plaintiff's comparative fault.
00:47:46.079 --> 00:47:46.400
Right.
00:47:46.719 --> 00:47:54.880
So they're all aligned on on what their best defense is, and the finger pointing at co-defendants is really kind of a secondary piece to that.
00:47:55.199 --> 00:47:56.960
So here's my question, Laura.
00:47:57.599 --> 00:48:34.320
Uh if you had a situation, and it's not clear because most of what is the opinion discusses is taken from the complaint rather than further factual development, but if you had a situation where the chassis company's liability was basically only vicarious, and it were crystal clear that all of the actual fault were the driver, their best argument would be to point the finger at their code defendant and say, even if you think that a tort happened here, they are absolutely at fault and don't blame us, right?
00:48:34.639 --> 00:48:46.639
That is that would clearly be in your interest as the chassis company, but the insurance company would have no interest in paying a dime for that because it doesn't affect the amount of money that the insurance company has to pay.
00:48:46.880 --> 00:48:47.920
Am I missing something?
00:48:48.079 --> 00:48:49.840
Or is that like I don't think you are.
00:48:49.920 --> 00:48:55.519
I think what I would certainly argue if I were counsel for the insured in that case is that's different.
00:48:55.599
--> 00:49:00.000
And that's what distinguishes this case from the circumstance that we have an issue, right?
00:49:00.159 --> 00:49:04.159
There we have um what the court identified here.
00:49:04.320 --> 00:49:12.480
They said, look, a conflict between insureds is not enough on its own unless the insurer has an incentive to favor one party over another, right?
00:49:12.880 --> 00:49:28.239
And if they do have that incentive, right, if one party has, for instance, a much stronger defense or something like that, then then that would be the kind of situation where where we we would be able to argue, I think, um, notwithstanding this opinion, that there would still be an entitlement to independent counseling.
00:49:28.480 --> 00:49:49.440
So yes, I think the the two sentences that I really keyed in on where he uh the opinion says here, nothing in the pleadings, first of all, pleadings, which gives me a little bit of park run, indicates, nor does consolidated argue that its best or primary defense was to blame Mitt Vest and Lambert for the accident.
00:49:50.079 --> 00:49:50.400
Okay.
00:49:51.119 --> 00:49:59.840
So that suggests in the future, maybe you could put something in the pleadings that indicates that basically you are intend to blame your codefendants.
00:50:00.000 --> 00:50:14.159
But then but then the hard part is the next sentence where he says, even if its best defense had been to argue its co-defendant's negligence, there is no indication that its co-defendant's best defense was to argue its negligence.
00:50:14.800 --> 00:50:16.800
It's hard for me to see why that would matter.
00:50:17.280 --> 00:50:24.880
So there was a precedent case, and Judge Brennan talked about this in the opinion, um, that consolidated was really kind of hanging its hat on here.
00:50:24.960 --> 00:50:44.400
It was an Illinois uh case in which there was such an uh a straightforward juxtaposition of contrary interest between two co-defendants that the the Illinois court found there was an entitlement to uh independent counsel in that case, right?
00:50:44.559 --> 00:50:46.880
And it's it's for the reason that you describe, right?
00:50:47.039 --> 00:50:50.559
Where there's just this total 90 degree adversity.
00:50:51.199 --> 00:50:54.719
And that that's just not what uh what the court was seeing here in this case.
00:50:54.960 --> 00:51:03.280
And I think, too, a background fact that made its way into it into the opinion is that ultimately in the underlying action, Northwind settled this whole case within the policy that you're gonna do.
00:51:03.440 --> 00:51:03.679
Exactly.
00:51:03.840 --> 00:51:05.840
Oh yeah like that, I completely agree.
00:51:06.559 --> 00:51:09.280
That is obviously driving a lot of this, right?
00:51:09.440 --> 00:51:11.360
It's like, look, they did a good job.
00:51:11.440 --> 00:51:12.800
Yeah, they did a good job, right?
00:51:13.519 --> 00:51:18.000
Certainly appearance of propriety is not going to be getting uh a victory under them.
00:51:18.400 --> 00:51:21.599
But a tricky, a tricky fact to to kind of contend with, right?
00:51:21.760 --> 00:51:25.199
Because it's easy for the court to look at that and say, well, what did you mean your own lawyers for?
00:51:25.360 --> 00:51:25.519
Right.
00:51:25.679 --> 00:51:37.360
I love too the point that both of the attorneys appeared on behalf of Consolidated in the underlying action, both the attorneys that had hired and the insurance company's attorneys, which must have been a very strange experience for all counselors.
00:51:37.519 --> 00:51:41.280
Yeah, for and for the the poor judge, who's like, who, who, who, who is talking for who?
00:51:41.679 --> 00:51:42.320
A lot of lawyers.
00:51:42.480 --> 00:51:42.800
Yes.
00:51:42.960 --> 00:51:55.760
And so the I guess the the is the practical upshot, if you're in this kind of situation, that and you think, man, I I really might like to blame my co-defendants for this tort.
00:51:55.840 --> 00:52:02.559
And I'm afraid that the insurance company is maybe not going to make that argument at all, or if they do, it'll be half-hearted.
00:52:02.880 --> 00:52:12.400
That in the pleadings, you need to indicate your insistence on that.
00:52:12.880 --> 00:52:15.599
I guess it would be an affirmative defense normally, right?
00:52:15.760 --> 00:52:22.079
I mean, here, interestingly, they they raised a cross claim, and Chief Judge Brennan says, but everybody does that.
00:52:23.440 --> 00:52:24.719
You know, who cares about that?
00:52:24.880 --> 00:52:33.440
Um, but I is that, I guess, is that what you the sort of thing that you would need to do in order to set up your argument that you're entitled to your own counsel?
00:52:33.760 --> 00:52:44.239
I think certainly that would be helpful the more that you can spell out the the problems, right, that that give rise to your need for independent counsel, of course, the stronger your claim is going to be.
00:52:44.559 --> 00:52:53.840
I think as coverage counsel in a circumstance like this, though, I would want to avoid litigating this if at all possible and work instead with the insurance company.
00:52:54.159 --> 00:53:06.239
Because I do wonder, right, that what what were the differences, for example, in the costs between uh the council that uh chassis or consolidated hired and the council that Northland hired for them, right?
00:53:06.320 --> 00:53:12.559
Could this not have been worked out perhaps uh in advance of litigation with some skillful negotiation?
00:53:12.960 --> 00:53:28.559
That that's a great point, Laura, especially because so much of the, at least the way Chief Judge Brandon tells the story, it's about the identity of counsel rather than if you're the insured and you say, look, I need you to make this argument.
00:53:28.880 --> 00:53:35.360
And then if the insurance company says, no, we're not going to make that argument, that's a very different story than I want you to make this argument.
00:53:35.519 --> 00:53:38.159
Okay, we'll have the counsel that we hired make that argument.
00:53:38.239 --> 00:53:40.639
That sounds good, and we'll let you look at the brief before we file it.
00:53:40.719 --> 00:53:44.960
Like, okay, like then you've gotten 95% of what you were actually looking for.
00:53:45.360 --> 00:53:50.400
And a lot of times you the the client will pay that delta between the insurance, well, the insurance.
00:53:50.480 --> 00:53:53.119
I mean, and this could have been part of the solution too.
00:53:53.280 --> 00:54:09.679
And and I think in in practice, the although hired by and nominally controlled by the insurance companies, often counsel work very closely with the insured that they're representing and have ethical duties to the insured uh rather than to the insurance company.
00:54:10.239 --> 00:54:11.519
Uh that that's a good point.
00:54:11.679 --> 00:54:23.679
So in your experience, Laura, would you say that uh if you had a situation like this, insurance company was paying for everyone's own lawyers, and the council, the actual client, talks to their lawyer and says, Hey, I want you to include this argument.
00:54:23.840 --> 00:54:30.239
Like, there's a good chance that they will include that argument because their client is telling them, yeah, I mean to include that argument, right?
00:54:30.559 --> 00:54:31.679
Yes, certainly so.
00:54:31.760 --> 00:54:38.559
I and and there are ethical, like I said, there are ethical duties that an attorney has to a client, regardless whether an insurance company is paying the bill or not.
00:54:38.639 --> 00:54:38.719
Right.
00:54:38.800 --> 00:54:40.320
And those are those are very serious.
00:54:40.400 --> 00:54:41.280
And right.
00:54:41.360 --> 00:54:47.039
So I mean you would feel comfortable as an attorney saying, okay, my client, my actual client, told me that I should make this argument.
00:54:47.119 --> 00:54:51.760
So I'm gonna make this argument even if I think maybe the insurance company would won't be happy about it.
00:54:52.079 --> 00:55:05.920
In practice, what's happening often is that the insurance company is being kept apprised of the defense and but not necessarily taking a very active hand in controlling it in the same way that the insured as the interest client is doing.
00:55:06.159 --> 00:55:06.320
Yeah.
00:55:06.400 --> 00:55:09.360
And I think that that's not always, but that's that's the more the two lines.
00:55:09.599 --> 00:55:13.920
And that reality could be driving a lot of what Chief Death Brennan is saying here, right?
00:55:14.000 --> 00:55:21.920
Like, look, guys, it's only in the most extreme situation where you're really gonna have that much of a problem because we can trust the lawyers to do an adequate job.
00:55:22.159 --> 00:55:24.079
So uh we can only hope.
00:55:24.239 --> 00:55:25.679
We can only we can only hope.
00:55:26.000 --> 00:55:26.480
Excellent.
00:55:26.639 --> 00:55:27.039
All right.
00:55:27.119 --> 00:55:48.800
Well, speaking of lawyers doing an adequate job, or uh, we're gonna talk next, very briefly, about a uh a case called Public Interest Legal Foundation versus Wolf, uh, which was a decision that was issued on August 19th and uh the uh by uh Judge Sykes, um, joined by Chief Judge Brennan and Judge Easterbrook.
00:55:49.360 --> 00:55:54.079
Um, and uh with actually a uh concurrence from uh Chief Judge Brennan.
00:55:54.159 --> 00:55:56.559
So we're getting a lot of uh Chief Judge Brennan today.
00:55:56.800 --> 00:56:00.960
Um so uh but the this case, the facts very straightforward.
00:56:01.199 --> 00:56:15.920
So the Public Interest Legal Foundation is a uh public interest group, as its name indicates, uh, that does, among other things, uh likes to get information about voting and voting rules and voter registration and that sort of thing.
00:56:16.159 --> 00:56:19.760
And when they get that information, Kyle, what what did what do they do with it?
00:56:20.079 --> 00:56:24.320
They not I I I'm not I'm not here to talk about that.
00:56:24.480 --> 00:56:25.280
I'm not here to talk about that.
00:56:25.920 --> 00:56:27.280
I'm not here to talk about that, Laura.
00:56:27.360 --> 00:56:30.480
We try to try to try to keep things streamlined for for our listeners.
00:56:30.719 --> 00:56:38.159
I like I like the precedent set that we can now say, I'm not here to exactly yes, exactly.
00:56:38.320 --> 00:56:47.119
So the the key thing is um they and then when they make requests for information and they don't get it, very often they sue.
00:56:47.280 --> 00:56:52.559
They they uh like to sue under uh federal and state uh public records laws.
00:56:52.800 --> 00:57:04.079
So uh here this case involved a request that they made to the Wisconsin Elections Commission for a copy of the state's voter registration list.
00:57:05.199 --> 00:57:13.599
And uh in in short, the uh Wisconsin said, okay, we will we will two things.
00:57:13.760 --> 00:57:19.119
One, we'll give we'll get you the list, uh, but we're gonna redact voters' birth information.
00:57:19.360 --> 00:57:20.880
And uh we're gonna charge you.
00:57:21.280 --> 00:57:24.079
I mean, it's a voter registration list, it's a long list.
00:57:24.480 --> 00:57:30.719
Uh and uh uh the fee, depending on exactly how many pages it is, it could be up to a maximum.
00:57:30.800 --> 00:57:34.639
There's a state statutory cap of twelve thousand five hundred dollars.
00:57:34.880 --> 00:57:39.280
And uh they thought, uh, because this is lengthy, it's probably gonna be about twelve thousand five hundred.
00:57:39.360 --> 00:57:40.159
It'll hit the cap.
00:57:41.280 --> 00:57:48.079
Um, so you might wonder if you are a listener, well, why is there a lawsuit?
00:57:48.239 --> 00:57:52.559
Sounds like the Public Interest Legal Foundation asked for the list.
00:57:52.800 --> 00:57:54.719
The state said, okay, we'll give you the list.
00:57:54.880 --> 00:58:00.719
It'll cost you$12,500, which is approximately one day of litigation costs.
00:58:00.880 -->
00:58:02.960
So what's uh what's the deal?
00:58:03.199 --> 00:58:06.079
Um but uh the foundation said no.
00:58:06.559 --> 00:58:08.800
No, not acceptable.
00:58:08.960 --> 00:58:12.079
Uh I reject your uh I reject your offer.
00:58:12.400 --> 00:58:24.960
And uh the reason is uh the they said the state's justification for redacting and charging us this fee is state law.
00:58:25.440 --> 00:58:54.559
And Wisconsin, they said, it's not allowed to apply state law because of the National Voter Registration Act, which requires states to make available for public inspection and photocopying at a reasonable cost, at a reasonable cost, underscore, underscore, underscore, um, all records pertaining to programs uh and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring accuracy of uh lists of voters.
00:58:54.800 --> 00:59:02.320
Um so they said, we have a right under federal law, and uh you can't charge us this fee under state law.
00:59:02.480 --> 00:59:07.119
Maybe you can charge us a fee under federal law, maybe it will be different, maybe it'll be higher, who knows?
00:59:07.360 --> 00:59:22.000
Um the yes, so uh and then Wisconsin in response says, uh-uh, we are exempt from the National Voter Registration Act um because we permit same-day polling registration.
00:59:22.639 --> 00:59:31.199
Um and the act specifically exempts states to do same-day polling registration, uh polling place registration.
00:59:31.360 --> 00:59:37.039
Uh Wisconsin and a few other states uh are uh fall under that exception.
00:59:37.920 --> 00:59:44.480
So again, if you're a listener, you might be wondering okay, why how did this produce a Seventh Circuit opinion?
00:59:44.639 --> 00:59:45.599
Why is there a lawsuit?
00:59:46.239 --> 01:00:00.800
The reason is, and it is very evident, that the entire purpose of all of this was to set up the public interest legal foundation's uh lawsuit, which is that exemption is unconstitutional.
01:00:01.760 --> 01:00:05.119
Okay, now what is the theory of unconstitutionality?
01:00:05.920 --> 01:00:07.280
Um there are two.
01:00:07.599 --> 01:00:18.880
One is uh not worth talking about because it's just not even and Judge Sykes just kind of uh discards it, and I am going to do the same thing and not poor our listeners with it.
01:00:19.039 --> 01:00:22.000
The main theory is as follows.
01:00:22.960 --> 01:00:26.000
Please take a deep breath because it's some moving parts.
01:00:26.320 --> 01:00:44.159
So in essence, the Public Interest Legal Foundation says Congress has violated each state's sacred right to equal sovereignty by exempting Wisconsin from the National Voter Registration Act.
01:00:44.320 --> 01:00:55.280
Um, and uh for support for that theory, the this Public Interest Legal Foundation cites the Supreme Court's decision in a case called Shelby County.
01:00:56.079 --> 01:00:58.800
And may I just stop you for one moment?
01:00:59.199 --> 01:01:00.559
Please, Laura, please.
01:01:00.880 --> 01:01:17.039
When I was a younger person taking election law in law school, and I studied the case of Shelby County versus, it never in a million years would have occurred to me that it could have been used to make this argument.
01:01:17.119 --> 01:01:18.800
So I must take my hat off.
01:01:19.119 --> 01:01:20.079
But it could be creativity.
01:01:20.400 --> 01:01:20.639
Exactly.
01:01:20.719 --> 01:01:24.639
So this is what this is the beauty of the law.
01:01:24.880 --> 01:01:37.760
You imagine yourself, you walk into the county recorder's office, or you or I not maybe the state, you know, the state auditor's office or something, whoever keeps these, the state election board, and you say, I would like your voter registration list.
01:01:37.840 --> 01:01:40.079
And they said that'll be twelve thousand five hundred dollars, please.
01:01:40.159 --> 01:01:46.880
And you say, Ah contraire, or perhaps I can introduce you to the famous case of Shelby County versus Holder.
01:01:47.199 --> 01:01:51.119
Right, which entitles me to not pay.
01:01:52.400 --> 01:01:52.719
Exactly.
01:01:53.039 --> 01:01:53.360
Exactly.
01:01:53.519 --> 01:01:55.119
That's the beauty, that's the beauty of the law.
01:01:55.199 --> 01:01:57.920
Like that, if that doesn't make you proud to be a lawyer, I don't know what does.
01:01:58.079 --> 01:02:02.400
So uh so the there are a couple issues with this rate.
01:02:03.039 --> 01:02:20.000
Um, and I'm going to uh actually start with uh Chief Judge Brennan's concurrence because that he focuses on Article III standing, which uh Judge Sykes says they satisfy, but Chief Judge Brent, so and logically that's the place to start.
01:02:20.079 --> 01:02:22.960
So I feel like Chief Judge Brennan's a special guest at this episode.
01:02:23.199 --> 01:02:23.760
He is, he is.
01:02:23.840 --> 01:02:25.519
I'm I'm very glad to have him on.
01:02:25.760 --> 01:02:33.840
Uh the the and Chief Judge Brennan, and this is a recurring topic, he has written a lot on this Article III standing issue.
01:02:34.000 --> 01:02:36.239
I love his opinions on this issue, very, very important.
01:02:36.320 --> 01:02:41.920
And he is absolutely correct to identify this as a cutting-edge issue that the Supreme Court is going to need to address.
01:02:42.079 --> 01:03:04.480
And that issue is how does informational injuries work, how do informational injuries work after the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in TransUnion versus Ramirez and Spokeo, um, the Supreme Court's most recent, some of the Supreme Court's most recent standing cases finding no Article III standing.
01:03:05.440 --> 01:03:17.119
So uh Chief Judge Brennan says, uh, well, it's not clear to me that they have standing, because first of all, they are getting the documents.
01:03:17.519 --> 01:03:19.920
The the state told them that they could get the documents.
01:03:20.480 --> 01:03:27.039
Um and so what are is the uh information that you're not that you're not getting?
01:03:28.159 --> 01:03:45.760
Um and then the even with
the payment, he says, uh the it's not clear that's even under, even if you are correct that the National Voter Registration Act applies, that you're not gonna have to pay uh even any amount of money.
01:03:46.000 --> 01:03:50.880
And then Chief Judge Brennan says, also, you haven't paid any money.
01:03:51.199 --> 01:03:55.440
So how is there a pocketbook injury if you actually haven't paid the money?
01:03:55.599 --> 01:03:58.639
And by the way, that's why Judge Sykes finds standing.
01:03:58.719 --> 01:04:01.840
She says, Well, the state was gonna charge them$12,000.
01:04:02.159 --> 01:04:03.280
That's pocketbook.
01:04:03.440 --> 01:04:04.960
That is good enough.
01:04:05.199 --> 01:04:21.199
Um and uh, and the real reason, I think, that uh Chief Judge Brennan wrote this concurrence was to identify the other problem that is less clearly raising raising here, it wasn't here, um, but is very significant.
01:04:21.360 --> 01:04:33.440
And that is the possibility that informational injury is not alone sufficient, but that there has to be, quote, downstream consequences of the absence of information.
01:04:34.079 --> 01:04:49.119
So uh, and the key language the Chief Judge Brennan emphasizes is the Supreme Court statement in TransUnion that, quote, an asserted informational injury that causes no adverse effects cannot satisfy Article III.
01:04:50.159 --> 01:04:59.199
Uh so the, and as Chief Judge Brennan points out, the circuits have split over whether this adds a new requirement for informational injuries.
01:04:59.280 --> 01:05:10.159
Um, and this is very significant, very, very significant, because as Mark knows, there are it is not uncommon to have litigation over access to information.
01:05:10.320 --> 01:05:12.559
Public records requests, litigation happens all the time.
01:05:13.440 --> 01:05:17.519
Um it is quite common in state court, but happens in federal court as well.
01:05:17.760 --> 01:05:43.679
And it will make it would make things much more difficult for plaintiffs in those cases if they needed to show not only that they were actually entitled to the information as under the merits of the public information law, um, and not only that they want the information, which traditionally was enough to establish Article III standing, but that if they don't get the information, there is some further negative consequence.
01:05:44.159 --> 01:05:54.159
And Chief Judge Brennan, at least, would say, and that further negative consequence can't be it is difficult for you to further the mission of your organization, because otherwise that's circular.
01:05:54.239 --> 01:05:59.599
That's the problem that what we call the Haven's Realty problem that the Supreme Court sort of uh recently addressed.
01:06:00.079 --> 01:06:10.639
For example, if one's organization existed this is fomenting litigation, and one uh stated that one could not continue fomenting such litigation without access to this critical government information.
01:06:11.119 --> 01:06:11.840
Exactly, correct.
01:06:12.000 --> 01:06:15.360
Particularly if the litigation is about access to information.
01:06:15.679 --> 01:06:17.360
That's the real perfect circle.
01:06:17.599 --> 01:06:17.840
Correct.
01:06:18.079 --> 01:06:18.559
Exactly.
01:06:18.800 --> 01:06:19.280
Exactly.
01:06:19.519 --> 01:06:29.199
Um and uh in the other, the other key case, as Jube Judge Brennan points out, is the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hippocratic Medicine, uh, where again it rejected standing.
01:06:29.360 --> 01:06:36.320
And that further makes it unclear how does this informational standing piece fit into organizational standing?
01:06:36.400 --> 01:06:42.480
And almost every informational standing case is brought by some public interest organization.
01:06:42.719 --> 01:06:49.199
Um, and so that the really, really and what this is what I love about the concurrence.
01:06:49.360 --> 01:06:53.760
Chief Judge Brennan just says, this is a this area of law is a mess.
01:06:53.920 --> 01:06:55.679
We really need some clarity on this.
01:06:56.000 --> 01:06:59.920
And as I like to emphasize to folks, this is Article III standing.
01:07:00.079 --> 01:07:00.880
This is jurisdictional.
01:07:01.039 --> 01:07:04.079
No, like there's no option, courts have to address it.
01:07:04.239 --> 01:07:09.119
And if you're a defendant and you forget to make this argument, you can make it on appeal, and they still have to address it.
01:07:09.199 --> 01:07:09.920
You can't forfeit it.
01:07:10.079 --> 01:07:13.519
Or no one can make it, and the court can just address it as Monte.
01:07:13.760 --> 01:07:15.360
And indeed, it's required to do so.
01:07:15.599 --> 01:07:15.840
Exactly.
01:07:16.719 --> 01:07:18.719
Article III arguments are the ones that arise have all right.
01:07:21.039 --> 01:07:21.519
Exactly.
01:07:22.960 --> 01:07:23.440
Bingo.
01:07:23.840 --> 01:07:24.239
Exactly.
01:07:24.480 --> 01:07:26.559
So uh so that's that's the first piece of this.
01:07:26.639 --> 01:07:34.000
So this case uh raises the court does not address, the court does not resolve, but raises some difficult questions about Article III standing.
01:07:34.239 --> 01:07:36.159
And then so that's the first piece.
01:07:36.960 --> 01:07:46.480
Second piece, what Judge Sykes calls uh correctly, in accordance with the case law, but unfortunately prudential standing.
01:07:46.880 --> 01:07:51.199
Uh I hate that term because it's very confusing and is misleading.
01:07:51.360 --> 01:07:56.880
Article three standing is fundamentally about are you actually injured concretely?
01:07:57.039 --> 01:07:59.119
It's about the facts in the world.
01:08:00.320 --> 01:08:02.800
Prudential standing is really a merits question.
01:08:02.880 --> 01:08:04.159
It's not jurisdictional.
01:08:04.320 --> 01:08:12.079
And it's the that question is are you entitled to assert the rights that you are asserting?
01:08:12.559 --> 01:08:20.239
So the uh my I think the easiest to understand example
of this uh is uh in a Fourth Amendment case.
01:08:20.399 --> 01:08:24.640
So if you're a criminal defendant, of course you have Article III standing, you're the defendant.
01:08:24.880 --> 01:08:28.720
You you very much have an interest in avoiding conviction.
01:08:29.039 --> 01:08:36.479
But there's a whole series of cases that say although you have Article III standing in a sense, there's a real case.
01:08:36.800 --> 01:08:41.920
Sometimes you don't have the right to assert other people's privacy interests, right?
01:08:42.000 --> 01:08:50.960
So if the police search someone else's apartment to get evidence against you, you can't complain about it, even if that was unlawful.
01:08:51.119 --> 01:09:02.960
Obviously, in a sense, you have an interest, it would help your defense to exclude the evidence, but you're not entitled, it's not your right that's being you don't have the interest that matters for the purpose of standing.
01:09:03.439 --> 01:09:03.760
Exactly.
01:09:03.840 --> 01:09:04.399
Yes, exactly.
01:09:04.560 --> 01:09:06.640
So, and again, that's a merits point.
01:09:06.800 --> 01:09:12.960
So if if the government, if the other party in that case, doesn't raise the issue, then it's forfeited.
01:09:13.039 --> 01:09:19.039
So, unlike Article III standing, which is jurisdictional, this is not so uh listeners.
01:09:19.199 --> 01:09:22.880
Uh I I know we have uh many, many intelligent listeners.
01:09:22.960 --> 01:09:33.920
I bet they can anticipate uh what Judge Sykes is going to say, which is uh this argument about equal state sovereignty, those are state's rights.
01:09:34.399 --> 01:09:38.800
What are what does that have to do with you, Public Interest Legal Foundation?
01:09:38.880 --> 01:09:39.760
You're not a state.
01:09:39.920 --> 01:09:41.359
Uh, what are you talking about?
01:09:42.159 --> 01:09:50.640
Um and uh Judge Sykes says, uh this raises some, but I and this is what I I I really like about this this opinion.
01:09:50.800 --> 01:10:01.760
Uh she says, uh, as a general matter, a party must assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.
01:10:02.000 --> 01:10:05.359
Um Public Interest Legal Foundation is not a state.
01:10:05.520 --> 01:10:08.159
It is asserting the other state's rights.
01:10:08.319 --> 01:10:16.239
By the way, not Wisconsin's rights, but the rights of Indiana, which is treated unfavorably because Indiana is subject to the National Border Registration Act.
01:10:16.479 --> 01:10:23.840
Um but then Judge Sykes correctly notes: quote, a general rule requiring a party to assert his own interests is just that.
01:10:24.000 --> 01:10:31.920
A general rule in a claim rooted in principles of federalism may implicate individual rights that aren't immediately apparent, unquote.
01:10:32.000 --> 01:10:33.520
Um, and that's clearly true.
01:10:33.600 --> 01:10:36.560
There are lots of federalism cases where that's the case.
01:10:36.720 --> 01:10:40.800
Uh uh limitations on Congress's power is a classic example.
01:10:40.960 --> 01:10:44.640
Of course, that's a, in a sense, that's a federalism uh issue.
01:10:44.880 --> 01:10:49.039
Uh many arguments about, say, extraterritoriality, right?
01:10:49.199 --> 01:10:55.760
The ability of one state to project its policies in another state, in a sense, that's a federalism uh issue, federalism problem.
01:10:56.000 --> 01:11:02.640
But of course, individual plaintiff individual plaintiffs are invariably uh the challengers in those kinds of cases.
01:11:03.119 --> 01:11:19.520
Um and uh that said, that said, uh the Judge Sykes says, uh, the cases though, where uh courts have allowed federalism principles, federalism rules to be invoked by individuals.
01:11:19.680 --> 01:11:30.640
And she cites uh a case called Bond and um a case called INS versus Chata, uh, which is not about federalism, but was about the legislative veto, so separation of powers.
01:11:30.960 --> 01:11:37.199
And uh she says in both Bond and CHADA, the challenger's constitutional interests were clear.
01:11:37.439 --> 01:11:40.800
The statutes in question were being used to prosecute or deport them.
01:11:41.039 --> 01:11:43.520
And then she says, this case, though, is different.
01:11:43.680 --> 01:11:47.520
The foundation has raised federalism principles offensively.
01:11:47.760 --> 01:11:55.119
It seeks to invalidate the Voter Registrations Act's exemption provision enforce Wisconsin's compliance with the act's public disclosure requirements.
01:11:55.359 --> 01:11:59.920
And so this is sort of an offensive versus defensive uh argument.
01:12:00.399 --> 01:12:04.000
Uh and ultimately, Judge Sykes doesn't resolve whether that matters.
01:12:04.159 --> 01:12:13.279
I mean, she's clearly suggesting that it potentially could matter, and that's important for litigants, particularly those who represent uh governmental defendants, to keep in mind.
01:12:13.439 --> 01:12:39.199
Um, to be honest, I am a little bit skeptical of this because the offensive versus defensive distinction is oftentimes slippery, because uh whether you are raising it in a defense, literally in a defensive posture as a defendant in an enforcement proceeding, or you are seeking an injunction preventing the law from being enforced against you, which is in a sense offensively, you're the plaintiff.
01:12:39.359 --> 01:12:43.039
I mean, there is a hair's breadth of difference between those two situations.
01:12:43.439 --> 01:12:45.840
Um, now here it is different.
01:12:45.920 --> 01:12:49.279
It is purely offensive because the plaintiff is not a regulated entity.
01:12:49.439 --> 01:12:51.279
Wisconsin's not doing anything to it.
01:12:51.439 --> 01:12:54.000
Um, so argue maybe that's a difference.
01:12:54.079 --> 01:13:00.479
Again, it's hard to understand why that would matter for prudential standing purposes, either you can enforce the right or you can't.
01:13:00.800 --> 01:13:08.000
Um and uh the broader area of law around prudential standing is very complicated and very unsettled.
01:13:08.079 --> 01:13:10.239
It's really on a sort of case-by-case basis.
01:13:10.319 --> 01:13:18.239
Um, and sometimes the underlying thrust of the court's reasoning tends to be well, someone needs to be able to enforce these rights.
01:13:18.319 --> 01:13:23.119
And do we think the rights holder is in the kind of position where it's going to, right?
01:13:23.359 --> 01:13:37.279
And sometimes, and arguably, I think perhaps this is what the Public Interest Legal Foundation would say, federalism is one of those things that it's not just about the rights of the states, it's ultimately about the rights of the citizens, right?
01:13:37.359 --> 01:13:42.239
And that's an argument that the Supreme Court has made, certainly, in the separation of powers context, right?
01:13:42.399 --> 01:13:49.359
The separation of powers exists not just to protect the ego of the president, but ultimately to protect the freedoms of Americans, right?
01:13:49.439 --> 01:13:59.520
And so that's why individuals are allowed to uh invoke separation of powers concerns uh to both as defendants and as plaintiffs.
01:13:59.680 --> 01:14:06.399
Uh so instead, uh, and I think it's interesting that Judge Sykes even mentioned that because that is very complicated, that prudential standing question.
01:14:06.560 --> 01:14:09.520
And then she says, but on the merits, this is very easy.
01:14:09.920 --> 01:14:14.800
So she raises that very complicated issue and then says, but uh, we don't need to get there because this is very easy.
01:14:14.960 --> 01:14:18.399
Uh basically, this has absolutely nothing to do with Shelby County.
01:14:18.560 --> 01:14:27.600
Um and the the first thing is she says this exemption is the opposite of Shelby County.
01:14:27.680 --> 01:14:37.439
In Shelby County, Congress said some states are subject to much more onerous restrictions than others, and it lifted that restriction.
01:14:37.760 --> 01:14:39.680
Here, this is an exemption.
01:14:39.760 --> 01:14:41.520
It's treating Wisconsin better.
01:14:41.680 --> 01:14:45.600
So why does that like why does that violate anyone's constitutional rights?
01:14:45.840 --> 01:14:59.119
And it is difficult, uh certainly, at least from an optical perspective, to be in the position of making an argument that uh state sovereignty requires Wisconsin to be more stringently regulated by the federal government.
01:14:59.520 --> 01:14:59.920
Exactly.
01:15:00.079 --> 01:15:00.399
Exactly.
01:15:00.560 --> 01:15:05.359
Now, uh Judge Sykes did not put this in terms of the leveling up versus leveling down issue.
01:15:05.520 --> 01:15:07.359
I just want to point that out for listeners.
01:15:07.439 --> 01:15:16.880
That's really, I think, at least this argument that she makes, that it's really a leveling up, leveling down issue, um, which doesn't go to the existence of a violation, but to remedy, right?
01:15:17.039 --> 01:15:19.199
And this is something you see again and again and again.
01:15:19.359 --> 01:15:29.439
And particularly for our law student and law clerk listeners, I think it's worth mentioning uh because once you start seeing it, you can see sort of connections between cases that otherwise uh seem very different.
01:15:29.600 --> 01:15:39.439
And that issue is there are many, many, many rules in the law, constitutional rules, particularly, that essentially say certain kinds of differential treatment are not allowed.
01:15:39.600 --> 01:15:41.760
You're not allowed to treat people differently because of their race.
01:15:41.840 --> 01:15:45.840
You're not allowed to treat people differently because of what they say, their speech.
01:15:46.239 --> 01:15:52.560
And uh the courts very frequently are confronted with a statute that does do that.
01:15:52.720 --> 01:15:56.079
And so the question is, what is the appropriate remedy?
01:15:56.239 --> 01:16:08.319
And very often the plaintiff will be in a position where they say, I want you to impose a the same restriction you impose on these other people on this guy, right?
01:16:08.560 --> 01:16:16.319
Um and the court has to decide, okay, well, do I give the plaintiff what they want, or do I just say these restrictions don't apply to anybody, right?
01:16:16.560 --> 01:16:20.000
Um it reminds me of being a parent of my toddler.
01:16:21.119 --> 01:16:24.640
And they say this isn't fair, I just take the toy away from both of them, right?
01:16:24.720 --> 01:16:27.520
Um and so that the courts are confronted with exactly that question.
01:16:28.640 --> 01:16:30.000
You're all deregulated, exactly.
01:16:30.079 --> 01:16:31.439
You all have to, right?
01:16:31.600 --> 01:16:34.720
And that's honestly, that's what the Public Interest Legal Foundation is saying, right?
01:16:34.880 --> 01:16:40.159
Like the correct approach is to say the National Voter Registration Act has to apply to everyone, and that's only fair.
01:16:40.479 --> 01:16:41.600
Because state sovereignty.
01:16:41.840 --> 01:16:42.640
Because Indiana.
01:16:42.800 --> 01:16:47.680
It's not fair that Indiana has to provide me with uh unredacted versions of its voter registration list.
01:16:47.840 --> 01:16:48.720
Wisconsin should too.
01:16:48.960 --> 01:16:50.479
It's the rationale that's a problem.
01:16:52.640 --> 01:16:55.920
That's I feel like that's where they just run into the brick wall of legal reality.
01:16:56.319 --> 01:16:56.640
Exactly.
01:16:56.720 --> 01:17:10.239
Well, and and honestly, the thing that I uh and and this is really finally, uh Judge Sykes gets to what I think is the most obvious problem with this argument, which is this differential treatment is entirely sensible.
01:17:10.479 --> 01:17:13.119
It's completely consistent, it's not arbitrary, right?
01:17:13.199 --> 01:17:15.439
It's completely consistent with the National Voter Registration Act.
01:17:15.520 --> 01:17:18.960
The whole point of the act is to make it easy for people to register.
01:17:19.199 --> 01:17:29.359
And the act says, look, if you make it as easy as possible to register, namely same-day polling place registration, then we're not gonna bother you with complying with all of these other requirements.
01:17:29.520 --> 01:17:30.159
That's good enough.
01:17:30.319 --> 01:17:31.680
Now, if you don't want to, that's fine.
01:17:31.760 --> 01:17:33.119
Then you have to do these other things.
01:17:33.359 --> 01:17:39.119
And the Justice Department attorney at oral argument, the oral argument uh for this case is really worthless and for many reasons.
01:17:39.279 --> 01:17:47.199
But one is that he he does a really good job of just unpacking, you know, what the purpose of the statute was and and why it it makes sense to do it this way.
01:17:47.359 --> 01:17:50.239
And and does so, I think, in a way that that's really compelling.
01:17:50.319 --> 01:17:53.680
I think after he spoke, it would have been hard for the court to go a different way on this.
01:17:53.760 --> 01:17:55.359
He he just really made a great case for it.
01:17:55.600 --> 01:18:11.840
Well, and and what I I do love that Judge Sykes could have written a two-page opinion that basically said, look, this is obviously sensible, end of story, but she did a great job issue spotting and identifying lots of very interesting legal issues along the way.
01:18:12.079 --> 01:18:14.800
Definitely uh worth a read.
01:18:14.960 --> 01:18:18.960
And I would also encourage uh our listeners to think about leveling up, leveling down.
01:18:19.119 --> 01:18:21.279
Imagine toddlers fighting over a toy.
01:18:21.439 --> 01:18:25.600
Uh really not any honestly, being a parent is great practice for being a judge.
01:18:25.680 --> 01:18:29.279
You gotta toddler fighting over a toy, attorney is fighting over an issue.
01:18:29.600 --> 01:18:29.840
Exactly.
01:18:30.319 --> 01:18:31.840
Certainly, some of our good inside thoughts.
01:18:32.000 --> 01:18:32.079
Yes.
01:18:32.800 --> 01:18:34.159
Oh, yes, are stoked.
01:18:34.479 --> 01:18:34.880
Absolutely.
01:18:35.039 --> 01:18:35.359
Absolutely.
01:18:35.520 --> 01:18:37.600
Well, thank you all uh for listening.
01:18:37.680 --> 01:18:39.920
Uh please rate and review the podcast.
01:18:40.000 --> 01:18:45.279
Uh write us in to uh you all know our emails are on the Barnes and Hornberg websites.
01:18:45.359 --> 01:18:48.560
Uh please let us know if there are any cases or issues you'd like us to address.
01:18:48.720 --> 01:18:53.039
Um, and until next time, this is the Seventh Circuit Roundup Podcast.