Trascrizione completa di #23 Soviet Union - How the 1991 August Coup launched modern Russia

already um one of the BBC correspondents in Moscow. 00:02:18.639 --> 00:02:26.400 So I I I basically moved to Moscow in 1990, and and that's the background to how I was um able to cover the coup a year later or the coup attempt. 00:02:26.800 --> 00:02:28.400 There's a there's a Cold War story for you. 00:02:28.719 --> 00:02:29.199 That is amazing. 00:02:29.360 --> 00:02:33.680 So sorry, prior to 1990, did the BBC have correspondence in Russia? 00:02:34.159 --> 00:02:34.400 Yes. 00:02:34.479 --> 00:02:40.960 I mean the BBC's had correspondence in a permanent correspondent in in Moscow, actually going back to the 1950s. 00:02:41.120 --> 00:02:49.199 Um so a long tradition, but obviously reporting from Russia uh from the Soviet Union gradually became more and more exciting. 00:02:49.360 --> 00:02:53.439 You know, the possibility of things you could do went uh uh uh uh up and up and up. 00:02:53.599 --> 00:03:05.199 So that, you know, you know, while in the in the 50s and 60s and 70s and the and even early 80s, you know, correspondents in Moscow were very, very tightly controlled, they couldn't travel around, uh or certainly not with prior permission. 00:03:05.680 --> 00:03:15.759 You know, and uh and it what what's particularly interesting actually, if we come on to 1991 now, um 1991 was an incredibly exciting year, even before all that. 00:03:15.840 --> 00:03:18.400 It was like you know, the peak of this kind of thing. 00:03:18.560 --> 00:03:32.560 Basically, that you know, i if we go to the beginning of 1991 to January 1991, uh I I had a very exciting time because gradually the you know the the Soviet Union had this system of things called closed towns. 00:03:32.719 --> 00:03:40.719 In most of them, foreigners were not allowed to go to without very special permission, and in some cases, even Russians were not allowed to go to without special permission. 00:03:40.879 --> 00:03:48.879 One of the final tranches of closed towns, which were opened, were opened at the very beginning of 1991. 00:03:48.960 --> 00:04:01.439 So, for example, in January 1991, I uh went on a reporting trip to this place called Kaliningrad, which is the very, very furthest west part of the entire Soviet Union. 00:04:01.599 --> 00:04:11.919 It's actually so far west that it's separated from the rest of um the uh the Soviet Union and now Russia, um, but because it used to be until the Second World War uh a part of Germany. 00:04:12.080 --> 00:04:14.400 So that was a very much a closed town. 00:04:14.560 --> 00:04:30.079 And I was called back from that trip uh because of the attack by hardliners um i in Lithuania, which we now see in the in subsequently, it was the first harbinger of the coup that would come in August. 00:04:30.480 --> 00:04:38.959 Now, just back me being the fun police on the podcast, and David here being a Westerner, I've I've grown up and uh um in the Eastern bloc myself. 00:04:39.120 --> 00:04:42.879 So I just want to distinguish here that we're still talking

about Soviet Union. 00:04:42.959 --> 00:04:56.560 So I know Westerners use the word Russia and Soviet Union interchangeably, but I think especially since the war in Ukraine, it's become all the more important to really distinguish uh what was Soviet Union and when Russia started, which is sort of what we're talking about today, right? 00:04:56.639 --> 00:05:00.399 That's the real event, the birth of modern Russia is the coup. 00:05:00.480 --> 00:05:01.519 That's something we can debate. 00:05:01.680 --> 00:05:04.720 We've seen the headlines and the stories, and you can watch documentaries. 00:05:04.879 --> 00:05:10.319 What was it like as a Westerner in the Soviet Union in 1990? 00:05:10.480 --> 00:05:12.319 So the Berlin Wall has fallen. 00:05:12.560 --> 00:05:19.279 Soviet Union still exists, it's still a sovereign, massive, biggest country in the world, gigantic army. 00:05:19.519 --> 00:05:26.079 But as a as a Western citizen arriving in Moscow, for someone who's spoken the language for so long, what was it like? 00:05:26.399 --> 00:05:28.959 Well, I mean, in a word, it was incredibly exciting. 00:05:29.120 --> 00:05:31.120 All these restrictions were coming off. 00:05:31.199 --> 00:05:41.040 Uh so we we suddenly had the ability to travel all across this, you know, this gigantic, you know, uh country with its 11, 12 time zones. 00:05:41.199 --> 00:05:45.920 I went to Siberia, I went all over the place in the first year that I was there. 00:05:46.079 --> 00:06:06.240 So there was that, and also just you know, there were huge cues at newspaper kiosks because suddenly, with this policy of, you know, Gorbachev's policy of glassiness, suddenly all these things, all these chapters of history that could never be mentioned before, uh stories about these could now appear in print for the first time. 00:06:06.480 --> 00:06:19.839 So in this period, in the very late 80s, the very beginning of the 90s, people were literally, you know, magazines, newspapers were were flying off the kiosk, you know, flying out of the kiosks, you know, like hot cakes, because all this stuff that people hadn't been able to read, they could read. 00:06:19.920 --> 00:06:21.519 So that's on the one side. 00:06:21.680 --> 00:06:30.560 But on the other side, of course, economically, glassness openness was one of the two twin legs of Gorbachev's policy. 00:06:30.639 --> 00:06:42.319 The other one was this thing called Pyristroika Restructuring, which was basically all about, you know, if you like, greater um economic freedom, a kind of loosening of the economic restrictions of communism. 00:06:42.480 --> 00:06:44.800 That was the you know the basic idea of that. 00:06:44.959 --> 00:06:51.360 And, you know, that that had things, some things that were incredibly good for ordinary Russians and were also very exciting. 00:06:51.439 --> 00:06:52.319 I mean, cafes. 00:06:52.399 --> 00:07:03.439 I mean, just imagine, you know, to have until the late 80s, you know, the number of restaurants in any town was minuscule. 00:07:03.680 --> 00:07:11.040 All the restaurants would have been state restaurants, you know, a very limited menu, very limited amounts of things in in the shops. 00:07:11.199 --> 00:07:15.680 And then suddenly you could have private cafes, a few private shops. 00:07:15.839 --> 00:07:17.759 So this was exciting for everybody. 00:07:18.000 --> 00:07:24.319 But at the same time, an economic disintegration, of course, was starting, much higher prices. 00:07:24.399 --> 00:07:28.720 You know, you could get these kinds of things if you could afford them, and people on state salaries. 00:07:28.879 --> 00:07:38.720 So suddenly you've got this kind of bifurcation, if you like, of the population between people who could take advantage of these economic reforms and people who couldn't. 00:07:38.800 --> 00:07:47.519 And obviously the people who couldn't were mainly people, you know, on state salaries, which, you know, were extremely small, you know, as soon as prices had been freed. 00:07:47.680 --> 00:08:00.800 So, you know, one of the most famous things and characteristic things of these years, you know, is, you know, let's say incredibly distinguished professors at universities being forced to eke out their income in the evenings as taxi drivers. 00:08:00.959 --> 00:08:09.279 So, you know, in those days you didn't bother to actually call a taxi, you simply stood by the side of the road, put up your arm, and instantly any car would stop. 00:08:09.439 --> 00:08:19.040 As you ask us foreigners, we could begin to live, we could integrate, we could begin to integrate into Russian life in a way that hadn't been possible before. 00:08:19.279 --> 00:08:31.199 So, you know, when I first arrived, and for my predecessors, you know, the fairly small foreign community in Moscow, entirely kind of shopped at separate shops, you know, that Russians weren't allowed into. 00:08:31.439 --> 00:08:35.759 You know, we were certainly required to live in certain flats. 00:08:35.840 --> 00:08:37.840 We couldn't just go and rent a flat. 00:08:37.919 --> 00:08:39.600 That wouldn't have been allowed for a foreigner. 00:08:39.759 --> 00:08:47.840 I had to get a flat, for example, you know, through a special state organization which serviced only foreigners. 00:08:48.320 --> 00:08:50.799 Was that one of those that already had the microphones in it? 00:08:51.200 --> 00:08:58.639 Well, we did spend a certain amount of time looking for, yeah, we did kind of like uh uh look behind all the pictures and so on, but it was quite hard to work out. 00:08:58.799 --> 00:08:59.759 But but of course that's true. 00:08:59.840 --> 00:09:03.039 And of and and of course I take it you know for for for granted. 00:09:03.200 --> 00:09:12.000 You know, I I had a uh a driver supplied to me again by the state agency, which was the state agency looking after uh the the diplomatic uh uh core. 00:09:12.159 --> 00:09:17.519 Uh I had a cleaner, which also I I couldn't again

hire myself, had to come from there. 00:09:17.600 --> 00:09:19.440 And w were they reporting on me sometimes? 00:09:19.600 --> 00:09:21.440 Well, I'd be very surprised if they weren't. 00:09:21.919 --> 00:09:22.240 Yeah. 00:09:22.639 --> 00:09:25.120 Um you just mentioned cafes before. 00:09:25.279 --> 00:09:26.799 I want to mention hot dog stands. 00:09:26.879 --> 00:09:28.399 I thought you were going to mention hot dog stands. 00:09:28.720 --> 00:09:37.519 Well, McDonald's, of course, I mean, that was one of the, you know, the arrival of McDonald's in Moscow, of course, was one of the gigantic uh uh uh things of those years. 00:09:37.919 --> 00:09:47.519 We recently did an episode on on uh Evgeny Brigoshi and his rise, who comes exactly from that era and who started off with a hot dog stand. 00:09:47.600 --> 00:09:51.120 We spoke to Mark Aliotti about that fantastic Putschcast episode. 00:09:51.279 --> 00:09:57.279 Check that out for more context of the wild years of the end of the perestroika in the early 90s. 00:09:58.000 --> 00:10:06.639 It sounds fascinating and really um hard to comprehend for a kid who grew up in Australia where all of these things are just uh a very commonplace. 00:10:07.679 --> 00:10:15.840 I think the question I have though is if you're in Russia and you're kind of at the wrong end of the economic spectrum at this time, is there still a like an era of optimism? 00:10:16.000 --> 00:10:17.200 Is there a lot to look forward to? 00:10:17.360 --> 00:10:18.879 Are you excited by what's going on? 00:10:19.120 --> 00:10:24.960 Or are you considering I mean I I think that's a really interesting question. 00:10:25.279 --> 00:10:51.600 And um I think for a lot of people i a tipping point was exactly maybe beginning to be reached at this point, between all the original hopes uh i you know engendered by uh Gorbachev's reforms and uh people really beginning to despair about whether it would actually lead them to a better life or not. 00:10:51.840 --> 00:10:56.240 I think in retrospect, people exaggerate this now. 00:10:56.639 --> 00:11:10.879 My memory of the time and m not only my memory as a foreigner, but even indeed my you know memory from all the Russians, you know, that I knew then, is that a lot of people were still very optimistic, actually. 00:11:11.120 --> 00:11:14.720 We can see in people's reactions to the coup how clear that is. 00:11:14.799 --> 00:11:20.799 And then we cut you know, if we come on to the kind of leading characters uh of this, the juxtaposition is very clear. 00:11:20.960 --> 00:11:37.279 So it in a way you you have uh uh Gorbachev, the you know, the president, the the leader of the Communist Party, um treading this ever, ever narrower line in the middle. 00:11:37.360 --> 00:11:51.279 Uh so on one side you you've got the people who would go on to lead the uh the coup attempt, and obviously a certain amount of public opinion behind them, who thought the reforms had gone much too far and wanted to go back.

00:11:51.440 --> 00:11:58.240 And on the other side, the the people that thought Gorbachev wasn't going fast enough and everything should be much faster towards reform. 00:11:58.399 --> 00:12:02.240 And obviously, their leader was Boris Yeltsin. 00:12:02.399 --> 00:12:05.519 And this is where we start to get to you know the distinction. 00:12:05.600 --> 00:12:26.080 This admittedly quite hard to understand uh distinction between the Soviet Union and Russia, which in the end is although, although you know, by miles the largest, was technically at that point only one of 15 what we call constituent republics parts of the Soviet Union. 00:12:26.240 --> 00:12:42.720 And so increasingly, although he came from a Communist Party background completely himself, Boris Yeltsin put himself and had already, you know, very clearly by 1991, put himself at the head of the uh of the reformers and and his power base was Russia. 00:12:42.879 --> 00:12:55.840 So increasingly we're talking about Yeltsin wanting to go further and faster as leader of Russia against Gorbachev wanting to stay in the middle or not go as fast as the leader of the Soviet Union. 00:12:56.080 --> 00:13:02.559 Uh what's behind Gorbachev's motivation for keeping the Soviet Union to a degree unified? 00:13:03.679 --> 00:13:09.360 Gorbachev obviously d is is a gigantic historical figure. 00:13:09.600 --> 00:13:17.600 You know, we don't know probably eventually, but certainly at that point the Soviet Union communism, you know, would never have if he hadn't set all that path going. 00:13:17.840 --> 00:13:20.799 Of course, uh everything that that happened wouldn't have happened. 00:13:20.960 --> 00:13:28.159 But in many ways, actually, w with retrospect, I think he was quite, in some ways, quite a limited character. 00:13:28.240 --> 00:13:35.039 There was a lim there was a limit to you know the the the the breadth uh of his of his vision. 00:13:35.200 --> 00:13:39.200 He set the ball rolling, the you know, the snowball, if you like, and it was unstoppable. 00:13:39.279 --> 00:13:43.360 And and he just didn't see the logic, you know, that it was unstoppable. 00:13:43.600 --> 00:14:07.279 And you know, he, you know, if we go back a couple of years, you know, to to the fall of the Berlin Wall, to the end of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, he allowed that to happen and you know, somehow believed that that communism could end, freedom could come to nations in Eastern Europe, and somehow that that wouldn't affect the Soviet Union. 00:14:07.440 --> 00:14:11.600 You know, in in retrospect, how can we see that that is anything but naive? 00:14:11.759 --> 00:14:26.399 And and and as we come on in this story, you know, we we'll see that even after the the the failure of the coup, but when Gorbachev c came back, again, you know, he he he didn't understand the whole gravity of the situation. 00:14:26.559 --> 00:14:37.600 He didn't really himself, even he's at the absolute center of events, and and Gorbachev

himself didn't really understand uh how serious what the whole thing meant. 00:14:38.480 --> 00:14:45.120 There's always this discussion when when when studying the Soviet Union, who was the last true communist, right? 00:14:45.200 --> 00:14:50.639 That's that's like any book um fascinated with is always like who was the last one? 00:14:51.440 --> 00:14:55.120 And it's always said Khrushchev was sort of the last communist after him. 00:14:55.200 --> 00:15:04.639 It was just about you know, holding the place together, saving the silverware, and just repeating old slogans all over again until people got tired of them. 00:15:04.799 --> 00:15:19.279 But but reading a bit about Gorbachev, maybe he wasn't communist, but I think he was certainly a socialist, and I think he was probably one of the last authentic socialists because also for context, he was the second most powerful man in the world. 00:15:19.759 --> 00:15:22.559 But unlike others, he had nothing in his own pocket. 00:15:22.799 --> 00:15:24.159 This is really important for the coup. 00:15:24.240 --> 00:15:35.679 It's not like other dictators, especially in the third world, who've got Swiss bank accounts and and and you know suitcases full of US dollar bills and stored away and and expensive artwork. 00:15:36.000 --> 00:15:44.799 He was at the heart of it a real simple man who was just trusting people, and he was probably naive, like you said. 00:15:44.960 --> 00:15:46.000 Do you agree with that? 00:15:46.399 --> 00:16:00.159 I totally do agree with that, but I I I would just question, and I think, you know, we've become in the last few decades, you know, we've become used to the idea of you know dictators who are obviously filthy rich as well. 00:16:00.320 --> 00:16:12.799 We've got used to the idea, you know, that unbridled power m must also mean unlimited uh wealth, and that's certainly what we think of, you know, in all the investigations into Putin's personal wealth and so on. 00:16:13.039 --> 00:16:24.240 But in an earlier period, I don't actually think, and particularly in a communist context, I I don't think that Gorbachev was particularly unusual in that sense. 00:16:24.320 --> 00:16:29.440 You know, you say Gorbachev a a simple man, you know, not in it for lining his pockets. 00:16:29.600 --> 00:16:37.759 You know, his predecessors, you know, what was Leni Brezhnev, you know, who ruled, you know, from the 60s, you know, to the to the early 80s. 00:16:37.840 --> 00:16:38.879 Was he filthy rich? 00:16:38.960 --> 00:16:39.840 I don't think so. 00:16:40.080 --> 00:16:47.519 That wasn't the tradition of communist of communist leaders, um, neither in the Soviet Union nor in Eastern Europe. 00:16:47.679 --> 00:16:55.519 But but but on your on your wider point, uh yes, I mean, uh uh the he he called himself more a socialist than a communist. 00:16:55.600 --> 00:16:57.679 I I don't really totally know what the difference was. 00:16:57.759 --> 00:17:03.360 You know, the th that was certainly

the term that people like him preferred um by that period. 00:17:03.440 --> 00:17:07.359 But he was, of course, still the head of the Communist Party, which is still called the Communist Party. 00:17:07.519 --> 00:17:21.680 But yes, he believed, and believed, I think, you know, you know, all the way through his life, you know, in you know, e even afterwards, that some version of of reformed socialism could have been found. 00:17:21.759 --> 00:17:24.799 And and and you know, many, many people would say that was just a delusion. 00:17:25.359 --> 00:17:30.240 A little bit about the the mechanics of what's going on now in uh in August of 1991. 00:17:30.559 --> 00:17:35.440 As uh Oliver mentioned, it's summertime, not many people are hanging around Moscow. 00:17:35.599 --> 00:17:45.279 Uh Gorbachev himself is at his summer house on the Crimean Peninsula, um, which I have read he was a little bit shy about because I think it was a pretty serious holiday house. 00:17:45.680 --> 00:17:49.279 But um what is going down at this point in time? 00:17:49.440 --> 00:17:53.039 Where where are the uh the main players in the coup? 00:17:53.519 --> 00:17:56.960 And uh I guess what is it that triggers this event? 00:17:57.119 --> 00:17:59.599 What what are the lead-up uh activities? 00:18:00.240 --> 00:18:16.400 What we've discovered s since, but that very few people um knew at the time, is that this coup attempt, you know, had been being to some degree planned and thought of by hardliners in the leadership, you know, for a for at least a year beforehand. 00:18:16.559 --> 00:18:40.960 You know, we we know now it appears, you know, that the the main person, you know, the the the coup attempt was fronted by eight people of you know communist uh leaders of and functionaries, including the defence minister, including the interior minister, uh uh including the vice president, uh, you know, and crucially including the head of the KGB, the secret police, Vladimir Khrushchev. 00:18:41.200 --> 00:18:46.480 And then now it really much appears that he was, you know, the the the ringleader of the whole thing. 00:18:46.799 --> 00:18:48.240 There's a treaty looming, isn't it? 00:18:48.559 --> 00:18:49.680 Yes, exactly, exactly. 00:18:49.920 --> 00:18:54.400 So d Gorbachev i is on holiday in in his holiday home, his state holiday home. 00:18:54.559 --> 00:19:09.200 Well, I should say not a private holiday home, in in um uh i i in in for this place called foros in in the Crimea, but he is due to come back um i i i in late August to Moscow to sign the treaty. 00:19:09.440 --> 00:19:16.000 So it was it was meant to be a new way of configuring the Soviet Union. 00:19:16.160 --> 00:19:52.160 So th th this followed a kind of referendum uh earlier in the year that Gorbachev had conducted, where basically, well, to be honest, a lot of republics didn't take part, but the republics that did take part, um, and this was, you know, if you like, a kind of you know, quite a kind of apparent PR triumph for Gorbachev, said they wanted a union uh you know, Soviet Union to remain, but you know, in a slightly looser form, in which it would be kind of reconfirmed that all the um various constituent republics of it would would be so on a voluntary basis. 00:19:52.319 --> 00:19:58.720 As seen by hardliners, it it was very, very much a loosening of the existing Soviet Union. 00:19:58.960 --> 00:20:09.519 That referendum, Gorbachev's last straw, maybe early in the year, where over 70%, the ones who took part, agreed that the Soviet Union should continue. 00:20:09.759 --> 00:20:21.519 However, you've mentioned uh you've mentioned the other critical character here, Boris Yeltsin, who for years now has been torpedoing any sort of union work that Gorbachev was doing. 00:20:21.680 --> 00:20:30.640 Um maybe let's talk about that because I think it even has to do I think it even has to do with the title you mentioned before president of the Soviet Union. 00:20:30.720 --> 00:20:32.160 That was a very new title. 00:20:32.319 --> 00:20:37.599 Like he was always the general secretary of the party, and even communist systems had his very long names. 00:20:37.759 --> 00:20:44.319 And they landed on this pragmatic term, which had to do already with the Soviet Union breaking apart, didn't it? 00:20:44.799 --> 00:20:46.000 Yeah, you're absolutely right. 00:20:46.079 --> 00:21:11.279 So so using the actual term, I mean, there was previously um uh in in the communist system, there was a head of state uh uh before who was separate from the Secretary General of the Communist Party, but this new uh kind of directly, you know, this kind of uh use of an actual Western term, in, you know, in in in Russian also uh they said for the first time president, president, which they'd never said before. 00:21:11.440 --> 00:21:18.319 So absolutely, you know, th that role was a creation of Gorbachev and and he was and he was the first one. 00:21:18.480 --> 00:21:35.200 And what happened then in the summer, right just two months before the coup uh attempt in June 1991, is that there were separate elections just in Russia, in the Russian Republic, and Yeltsin became the first president of Russia. 00:21:35.359 --> 00:21:41.279 So we've got first president of Russia versus first president of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev. 00:21:41.759 --> 00:21:55.759 Now, this is the really fascinating part about this tool, David, because for anyone listening and who followed our episodes in the past, usually you have someone in power and someone through challenges, either covertly or overtly. 00:21:56.240 --> 00:21:59.759 This one is so fascinating because what now looks like the challenge. 00:22:00.319 --> 00:22:01.839 Wasn't actually the challenger. 00:22:02.000 --> 00:22:10.559 So yes, he was boycotting like Yeltsin was boycotting anything Gorbachev did and was a rival from day one, as I understand it. 00:22:11.359 --> 00:22:20.160 But he wasn't actually part of the so-called group of eight of the

people trying to oust Gorbachev or force him to do things he didn't want to do. 00:22:20.240 --> 00:22:20.720 Is that correct? 00:22:21.039 --> 00:22:24.240 Well, absolutely, because he was on exactly the diametrically opposite side. 00:22:24.559 --> 00:22:24.799 Yeah. 00:22:25.039 --> 00:22:26.720 Can you can you give us more context? 00:22:26.799 --> 00:22:30.720 And also we'd love to learn if you've met any of those leaders in person. 00:22:30.880 --> 00:22:33.200 What's what was your experience back then? 00:22:33.759 --> 00:22:37.519 I interviewed Gorbachev only uh only afterwards, actually. 00:22:37.680 --> 00:22:41.839 I mean, I'd uh I'd seen these people in action, obviously, a great deal. 00:22:41.920 --> 00:22:51.519 I'd I actually followed you know Yeltsin's you know election campaign in June 1991, so I was kind of right next to him as he kind of uh you know pressed the flesh on the campaign trail. 00:22:51.599 --> 00:23:06.880 And of course that was very interesting as well, because uh Gorbachev, in a way, was the very first Soviet leader who to some degree you know went out and did walkabouts and you know communicated directly more with the public. 00:23:07.039 --> 00:23:10.640 But you know, he was still comparatively uh uh uh uh stiff. 00:23:10.799 --> 00:23:20.160 So in terms of all the kind of glad-handing and all that kind of thing, you know, Yeltsin was, you know, way, way surpassing him in in that kind of thing. 00:23:20.400 --> 00:23:27.759 They they were poles apart, you know, the coup leaders uh as they became on the one side, you know, really, really representing, you know, the past. 00:23:28.079 --> 00:23:35.519 And and so you met Yeltsin while he was actively demolishing the Soviet Union by running elections. 00:23:35.680 --> 00:23:36.799 Like get this in your head. 00:23:37.200 --> 00:23:42.960 So he had himself elected president of Russia while there was still a president of the Soviet Union. 00:23:43.279 --> 00:23:43.359 Yeah. 00:23:43.519 --> 00:23:50.079 Like not even bothering with a different title, like not even calling himself Premier or state chancellor or something like this. 00:23:50.559 --> 00:23:52.640 It's a pretty open challenge, isn't it? 00:23:52.880 --> 00:23:52.960 Yeah. 00:23:54.000 --> 00:23:55.519 Is that is it the the man he is? 00:23:55.680 --> 00:24:06.160 Uh I mean, of course he was, you know, he was you know, he was an extraordinary character, very, very kind of bluff, very, very headstrong, you know, very very unpredictable. 00:24:06.240 --> 00:24:10.880 And and and that's why, you know, he was, you know, he was obviously immensely popular. 00:24:10.960 --> 00:24:21.759 Uh and and and that's why he could become, you know, the the the the head of resistance when after the coup began, you know, that's how he could become head of the resistance um to the coup. 00:24:21.839 --> 00:24:32.720 But but again, very important to stress, you know, he he had been, Yeltsin himself had been, you know, the the com a Communist Party first secretary of a of a of a province. 00:24:32.880 --> 00:24:38.559 You know, he'd come up the absolute standard Communist Party line himself, and then he broke away. 00:24:38.720 --> 00:24:52.559 But you know, but I should also say that the logic of the time then was that republics, you know, Gorbachev was not uh against all the the republics electing their own leaders. 00:24:52.720 --> 00:24:57.119 In in in theory, that was part of the logic of Gorbachev's own reforms. 00:24:57.279 --> 00:25:02.000 But obviously Yeltsin then took advantage of that and and pushed further and further. 00:25:02.079 --> 00:25:10.720 And we've got to say, you know, that here we are saying, isn't this amazing, you know, the challenges that that Yeltsin was was putting up to Gorbachev. 00:25:10.960 --> 00:25:23.920 But but already on the logic of Gorbachev's reforms, if we look at, you know, some of these other republics, particularly the Western republics, you know, most notably the Baltic ones, you know, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, they'd already pushed this process even further. 00:25:24.160 --> 00:25:26.799 They'd also elected the their own leaders. 00:25:26.880 --> 00:25:29.839 They'd elected, you know, even more radical leaders. 00:25:30.240 --> 00:25:32.079 I've got to cross-promote again, sorry. 00:25:32.240 --> 00:25:36.160 So we talked about the the Yevgeny Brigozhin episode. 00:25:36.240 --> 00:25:41.200 We also did a um an episode with Tom Deval, uh, an old colleague of yours, more or less, I think. 00:25:43.440 --> 00:25:44.000 I know Tommy. 00:25:44.559 --> 00:25:50.079 Also British, also learned Russian in school and fascinated with the country, and an expert on the Caucasus. 00:25:50.640 --> 00:26:22.000 And uh he talked to us about the breakaway region called Chechnya, which uh was one step too far for Russia, and and he explained the context that Yeltsin was obviously pushing for cessation, really, and you know, breaking away from the Soviet Union and and telling all other leaders take as much liberty, independence as you can get until it came back to bite him, when then the next level of republics down, the Chechians broke away. 00:26:22.160 --> 00:26:30.880 But he also spoke about an episode where Dudaev, the Chechen leader, was hiding him in a car and driving him out of Estonia or something like this. 00:26:30.960 --> 00:26:35.039 And an incredible anecdote, how Yeltsin actually had to flee from there. 00:26:35.119 --> 00:26:38.079 So, and I don't know, do you have memories like that, stories? 00:26:38.240 --> 00:26:40.640 Because it was such a turbulent time. 00:26:40.720 --> 00:26:43.119 Like it was so we can't imagine at these things. 00:26:43.440 --> 00:26:45.279 Yeah, it was totally turbulent, of course, you're right. 00:26:45.359 --> 00:26:56.240 And and I I also met Dudayev, the um uh you know, the Chechen leader, and and I and I, you know, obviously the whole place was completely a wash, uh wash with arms.

00:26:56.400 --> 00:27:12.079 Um uh, you know, and what I you know, what I remember is uh Dudayev saying to me, Um uh Allah created men in many different positions and and and statuses uh in life. 00:27:12.160 --> 00:27:17.279 Uh but this, he said, as he uh brandished a revolver, makes us all equal in the end. 00:27:17.599 --> 00:27:29.200 Obviously, all these wars, little wars, if you like, you know, not little people in the middle of them, but but uh i i in strategic terms, were already beginning to break out all around the peripheries. 00:27:29.440 --> 00:27:48.160 All these different nationalities and uh and ethnicities and and national feuds and national conflicts, which, you know, because of the repressive nature of the Soviet Union had been held in check for 70 years, but uh all all these all these feuds hadn't been forgotten, and and then they all just kind of burst out again. 00:27:48.559 --> 00:27:51.359 It's a particularly charged situation, I guess. 00:27:51.440 --> 00:27:54.000 Um you describe it as being very delicately poised. 00:27:54.079 --> 00:27:58.160 We've got uh 15 different states um of the Soviet Republic. 00:27:58.400 --> 00:28:03.680 And now we've got eight people um who uh plotting a coup. 00:28:03.920 --> 00:28:06.559 Those eight individuals, what are their objectives? 00:28:06.720 --> 00:28:08.880 What is it that they are setting out to achieve? 00:28:08.960 --> 00:28:10.480 What do they see as the problem? 00:28:11.119 --> 00:28:19.920 Well, they see the problem as th the the the Soviet Union they fear is about to break up and and and and communism is about to come to an end, to put it simply. 00:28:20.400 --> 00:28:29.519 But on a you know, and and this of course has been go it had been going on for years already, or or ever since Gorbachev uh you know came to power in 1985. 00:28:29.759 --> 00:28:47.519 That there had been you know the the this whole wing of the Communist Party that we called rather bizarrely in our reports in those days, we used to call conservatives, um you know, meaning you know, if you like, more hard line, more rigid, you know, more more old-fashioned communists. 00:28:47.599 --> 00:28:56.000 So so this, of course, in the end, you put it very simply, that the the coup attempt of of of 1991 was their final throw of the dice. 00:28:56.240 --> 00:29:10.799 But y you know, if you ask on a on another level what was their actual intention, what what you know it m more than saying very simply, you know, put it crudely, that they either simply wanted to stop the cock or turn the cock back, i i i i it's extremely hard to say. 00:29:10.880 --> 00:29:20.960 And then I I think, you know, the the in the end the fuzziness or uncertainty of of uh of their intentions or their plans was laid bare w within those three days. 00:29:21.359 --> 00:29:28.240 I I think that's one of the things that comes out in this story that's really, really interesting is that they uh they set off as a group of eight. 00:29:28.400

--> 00:29:37.680 Um but it appears that their ultimate objective or their um kind of personal reasons for being there and and doing this aren't particularly well aligned. 00:29:37.759 --> 00:29:44.799 Uh and and they're not that well unified, and that kind of becomes pretty obvious as as the events uh unfold. 00:29:45.039 --> 00:29:53.599 Um and of course the the great irony is that um this coup basically accelerated the thing that they were trying to prevent in the first place. 00:29:54.559 --> 00:29:58.400 I mean, absolutely, one you know, one 100% that's exactly what happened. 00:29:58.640 --> 00:30:03.359 The two reasons I would say um, you know, why it failed. 00:30:03.759 --> 00:30:20.240 One, of course, was the resistance that that that coalesced around Boris Yeltsin, you know, and around the the the Russian Parliament and his supporters, and if you like, their failure to t to have taken him out in um i b before the whole thing started. 00:30:20.400 --> 00:30:27.200 Uh and number two, which is very closely linked to that and is almost part of it, is simply their failure of nerve. 00:30:27.440 --> 00:30:29.839 A massive failure of nerve. 00:30:30.000 --> 00:30:40.160 Any fool could have told you that if you're going to uh mount a coup attempt, you know, then the a a kind of hardline coup attempt, you know, then the main focus of resistance would be Boris Yeltsin. 00:30:40.400 --> 00:30:52.960 So, you know, again, if we if we go into all the historical research that was done afterwards, you know, it appears that they that they did consider having attempt, you know, attempting to take him prisoner in some way um beforehand, but but didn't. 00:30:53.119 --> 00:30:56.160 So already failure of nerve number one. 00:30:56.319 --> 00:31:16.640 But then the first day of the coup, Monday, Monday the 19th of August, the whole thing began, you know, very, very first thing in the morning, the first announcement at, you know, at six o'clock in the morning, um, you know, in the afternoon, uh uh extraordinarily in itself, um the coup leaders held this press conference. 00:31:16.799 --> 00:31:23.839 Well, I mean, even press conferences, you know, were comparatively new things, hadn't been around for more than two or three years, you know, in in in the Soviet Union. 00:31:23.920 --> 00:31:31.359 And and uh and the press conference, it's obviously televised live, was the most unbelievable event. 00:31:31.440 --> 00:31:48.960 You know, because for one thing, um the the supposed head of the coup, Gennady Yanaev, you know, the the vice president who then called himself, you know, the the the acting president while he said that Gorbachev uh was incapacitated, Yanayev's hands were visibly shaking. 00:31:49.359 --> 00:32:06.400 And, you know, the thing that Russians talked about more than anything else is that one of the TV news presenters asked, you know, directly at the coup leader sitting on sitting uh uh on the panel above, you do realize, don't you, that this

is a coup? 00:32:07.519 --> 00:32:22.160 And uh, you know, even to be asking to be asking that question and uh uh and for that then to go out on live TV in itself almost indicated that the coup was doomed to failure. 00:32:23.039 --> 00:32:32.240 I think it just uh shows the disconnect of those old men to the state the country was in. 00:32:32.880 --> 00:32:38.960 First of all, having they learned a lesson because the reason why the Berlin Wall fell is a press conference gone wrong, right? 00:32:39.279 --> 00:32:45.680 So that was literally a press conference, wrong statement was read out, and then the wall came down. 00:32:45.920 --> 00:32:50.559 So you might want to prepare and have your communications uh aligned and in order. 00:32:50.799 --> 00:33:05.039 But then to to to not be aware that this now liberated journalists who were you know working under tight state control for so many years, plus I assume there was foreign journalists in the the audience as well. 00:33:05.279 --> 00:33:11.359 Certainly that they won't be asked questions like this to not anticipate that is is beyond me. 00:33:11.599 --> 00:33:12.640 That's just yeah. 00:33:13.440 --> 00:33:14.240 Were you there in the room? 00:33:14.400 --> 00:33:16.240 Were you there in the room, or do you know someone who was? 00:33:16.480 --> 00:33:40.000 No, I mean I spent uh the the entire period of the coup, the the the three days, well not quite quite three days, but but certainly more than more than you know 48 hours from the you know immediately after the coup was um uh uh from the first morning, uh uh the the morning of the nineteenth, you know, through until the the the middle uh afternoon of uh uh of Wednesday the 21st when the whole thing you know was collapsing. 00:33:40.079 --> 00:33:47.920 I I I basically never left the you know this the centre of events or the physical centre of events, the you know, the White House, the the the Russian parliament. 00:33:48.000 --> 00:33:59.279 I you know, I went straight there on the morning of of um uh of the 19th and stayed and and and stayed there, you know, you know, barely sleeping uh you know, for 48 hours until until the thing crumbled. 00:33:59.440 --> 00:34:06.480 So, you know, th there's huge numbers of things that subsequently became very famous or were even famous at the time, you know, that that I never saw. 00:34:06.559 --> 00:34:20.960 Uh because uh I I I never I I went out a bit at uh in in in the evening, you know, because all kinds of fires were were built, bonfires, people stayed up all night, you know, um uh uh uh around the building, you know, demonstrators started to to gather. 00:34:21.119 --> 00:34:23.199 But I never went very far uh from the building. 00:34:23.280 --> 00:34:30.880 And that's partly for reasons of communication, you know, in talking about way, way before the age of of mobile phones, you know, or anything at all like that. 00:34:31.039 --> 00:34:49.519 They were only, you know, or or ordinary old-fashioned phones, you know, and I had established myself in in one office within this building, which was the office of um uh a Russian MP, although he wasn't obviously uh there at that point, but I just kind of, you know, if you like, you know, along with other people, uh, you know, took over this office. 00:34:49.679 --> 00:35:01.199 I had a phone, and obviously there were all kinds of different statuses of phones then, but this was a kind of phone from which um I could call the BBC office, you know, where my uh colleagues were. 00:35:01.360 --> 00:35:14.960 That line to London we kept open for 48 hours, because there was talk all the time about the possibility of of cutting all communications with the outside, you know, with the outside world, you know, by the coup leaders, and we were afraid of that. 00:35:15.119 --> 00:35:24.079 I could never leave that phone for very long because you know I thought once the phone's put down, it the the line may never ever be re-established. 00:35:24.559 --> 00:35:24.960 Yeah. 00:35:25.199 --> 00:35:29.920 Well, and the building you're talking about isn't none other than the White House. 00:35:30.320 --> 00:35:31.440 That's how we started the podcast. 00:35:31.519 --> 00:35:40.000 So not the White House in Washington, the White House in Moscow, which is the the counterpart to the Kremlin almost. 00:35:40.079 --> 00:35:45.920 So that's that's the parliamentary element of the Russian Republic, not the Soviet Union, correct? 00:35:46.239 --> 00:35:47.920 Yeah, no, that's though that's exactly right. 00:35:48.000 --> 00:35:50.639 And that's why it was increasingly becoming a kind of power center. 00:35:50.800 --> 00:35:54.079 You know, it was obviously you know, very, very different kind of building. 00:35:54.159 --> 00:36:01.679 I mean, the you know, obviously the the the Kremlin's a kind of huge great medieval fortress full of full of churches and cathedrals. 00:36:02.079 --> 00:36:04.480 David, this is the most live putchcast we've ever had. 00:36:04.639 --> 00:36:13.599 Look, our guest Tim is walking through the BBC studios as we talk to to reenact what happened in 1991 when he was at the White House in Russia. 00:36:14.320 --> 00:36:14.639 There we are. 00:36:14.719 --> 00:36:15.119 Sorry about that. 00:36:15.280 --> 00:36:16.880 Incredibly lucky to have Tim win us. 00:36:17.199 --> 00:36:20.559 Gorbachev is officially incapacitated. 00:36:21.199 --> 00:36:23.519 That that is the word, that's what the public are told, right? 00:36:23.679 --> 00:36:24.079 But what happened? 00:36:25.119 --> 00:36:26.159 I don't think anyone believes that. 00:36:27.199 --> 00:36:28.880 I'm not sure if anyone believed that even then. 00:36:28.960 --> 00:36:30.719 But but anyway, that was what they said. 00:36:31.199 --> 00:36:36.079 He was still a fairly young man compared to what previous leaders, so you know, uh, he wasn't in his mid-80s. 00:36:36.239 --> 00:36:38.960 Um but then what happens next is classic coup.

00:36:39.039 --> 00:36:45.119 Like this is usually what happens, which is similar to what we heard with um, you know, Ulbricht and Honega. 00:36:45.519 --> 00:36:53.199 So phones get disconnected, the black limos rock up, um, Gorbachev sits in his office, doesn't know what's going on, but doesn't let people in. 00:36:53.360 --> 00:37:00.159 How much did people know at the time, and what do we know now, Tim of what happened at the very outset? 00:37:01.679 --> 00:37:02.639 We knew nothing. 00:37:02.719 --> 00:37:05.760 And and uh, you know, uh uh they woke me up. 00:37:05.840 --> 00:37:08.639 You know, the first thing they said is, you know, how is Gorbachev? 00:37:08.800 --> 00:37:10.320 Is it true he's been taken ill? 00:37:10.559 --> 00:37:12.000 We hear he's been taken ill. 00:37:12.239 --> 00:37:16.800 I mean, it you know, that that's really the kind of cart cart before the horse. 00:37:16.880 --> 00:37:28.960 I mean uh because they just received, you know, a you know, news agency wire, you know, r with the very, very first proclamation of the coup that, you know, that that came at six o'clock in the morning. 00:37:29.119 --> 00:37:31.199 I hadn't even heard it, of course, I was asleep. 00:37:31.360 --> 00:37:34.000 Um who wouldn't be at six o'clock on a Monday morning? 00:37:34.159 --> 00:37:36.880 Um in in the normal way of in the normal way of things. 00:37:36.960 --> 00:37:39.519 And of course, I had no idea what these people in London were talking about. 00:37:39.679 --> 00:37:44.400 I said, you know, uh I'm sure, you know, w w what why would why would there be a problem over Gorbachev's health? 00:37:44.480 --> 00:37:45.760 I've got no idea what you're talking about. 00:37:45.920 --> 00:37:55.760 So, you know, in the kind of way of correspondence, you know, who who'd been asleep, of course, uh uh in the middle of the night, I I basically had to say, you know, can I call you back in five minutes or ten minutes? 00:37:55.840 --> 00:37:58.000 You know, when I found out myself what the hell's going on. 00:37:58.159 --> 00:38:04.320 You know, I then switched on the you know the TV, you know, the and the radio, just the ordinary Soviet radio. 00:38:04.400 --> 00:38:25.920 And and hey presto, I heard the the um you know the announcement, you know, of the coup, which said, um, you know, the president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, you know, has been taken um uh uh uh uh as being incapacitated, uh uh therefore an emergency, uh an emergency committee has been formed temporarily uh to run the country. 00:38:26.159 --> 00:38:31.760 So obviously, as soon as I heard that, I I of course I realised it was a coup, or a coup attempt at least. 00:38:31.920 --> 00:38:58.400 Um and uh you know, and then of course, you know, the extraordinary thing that happened immediately after that, that again, if you had any doubt that something was a coup or that something really, really weird was happening, is that apart from that announcement, all of the normal programs on Soviet TV um w were stopped, and they simply went over to showing ballet, to showing um Swan Lake, which is what you know traditionally Soviet TV has always done, you know, in in in moments of of not really knowing what they went were meant to be saying. 00:38:58.960 --> 00:39:03.840 So that wasn't the first time that Swan Lake was just put back to back on uh on full broadcast. 00:39:04.960 --> 00:39:06.960 It wasn't the first time, no, although it was the first time. 00:39:07.280 --> 00:39:08.719 It was the first time in my experience. 00:39:09.119 --> 00:39:10.800 It's just a fair signal that something's up. 00:39:11.119 --> 00:39:12.000 Yes, exactly. 00:39:12.559 --> 00:39:15.360 So that already confirms what you said before. 00:39:15.519 --> 00:39:22.960 If if we have to revert to you know Tchaikovsky to to communicate, then it just means there wasn't really a plan, was there? 00:39:23.119 --> 00:39:30.719 Like so you've mentioned they didn't consider removing Yeltsin or making sure he's incapacitated. 00:39:30.960 --> 00:39:35.360 Well where is Boris Yeltsin at this point in time as this happens? 00:39:35.519 --> 00:39:35.679 Probably. 00:39:36.159 --> 00:39:40.480 Boris Yeltsin, when this happens, is at, you know, is also with his data. 00:39:40.559 --> 00:39:43.599 I mean, at his at his summer house just outside Moscow. 00:39:43.840 --> 00:39:53.519 So basically he then himself uh hot foots it in, uh uh, you know, drives in extremely fast, you know, to his power base, the Russian Parliament. 00:39:53.679 --> 00:40:17.039 And and and I realize, I mean, I briefly, so on that Monday morning, I briefly myself, you know, went to the ordinary BBC at BBC office, but you know, I realised, you know, I I that you know there were three of us, three radio correspondents, you know, the other two were working from the office, and of course, you know, they needed to do that because you know, so much material and stuff is coming in, and you know, they're closest to be able to kind of um broadcast from there. 00:40:17.119 --> 00:40:19.840 But th there was no point in three of us all being in there. 00:40:20.000 --> 00:40:30.400 So I I immediately headed out um, you know, to to to the White House because I just had this automatic I didn't know for a fact that you know that something, you know, that's where things would be happening. 00:40:30.480 --> 00:40:38.800 You know, we we had no means of knowing, but it you know, it just absolutely stood to reason that if there were going to be any any opposition to the coup, that's where it would start. 00:40:39.840 --> 00:40:53.360 I did read somewhere that people had been dispatched to basically get Boris Yelten before he m made it into the White House, um, and their orders were sort of unclear, they didn't know quite what they were meant to do, and he drove straight past them. 00:40:53.599 --> 00:40:54.880 Is there any truth to that one? 00:40:55.519 --> 00:41:00.480 Well, that's you know, th

that you know, that certainly is one of the versions that that came out came out afterwards. 00:41:00.559 --> 00:41:05.519 But I mean, y yes, I mean, but I just come back again, you know, fa fa failure of nerve. 00:41:05.599 --> 00:41:12.559 You know, are you really saying, you know, that the the the the people that ran all the security services of the country, who were the who were the coup leaders? 00:41:12.880 --> 00:41:16.559 Are you really saying that they couldn't have nabbed Yeltsin beforehand if they'd wanted to? 00:41:16.719 --> 00:41:17.920 You know, surely they could. 00:41:18.320 --> 00:41:18.559 Yeah. 00:41:18.719 --> 00:41:32.559 There's a few examples of kind of subordinates uh either not knowing what they're meant to do, or um I guess rising to the occasion and and doing what they feel is the right thing to do rather than what they were told to do, which is uh in a lot of cases the opposite. 00:41:33.039 --> 00:41:52.239 You know, after the after the coup attempt started, w when you know forces were then brought by the um you know coup leaders into Moscow, tanks and so on, to, you know, to to supposedly surround you know the White House, and that's the point at which you know the Russian White House, and that's the point, of course, at which we thought an attack was coming. 00:41:52.320 --> 00:41:53.280 I mean two things happened. 00:41:53.519 --> 00:42:03.440 Some units and one particularly famous unit um uh defected, if you like, and w went over uh you know to the side, you know, to the side of Yeltsin. 00:42:03.760 --> 00:42:05.840 So so that's one thing that happened. 00:42:06.079 --> 00:42:09.440 Um so that if you like is kind of you know is mutiny. 00:42:09.679 --> 00:42:11.519 Um is that one of the tank crews? 00:42:11.599 --> 00:42:11.840 Is that the same thing? 00:42:12.000 --> 00:42:15.039 Yes, that's called the Taman Division, yes, that became very very famous. 00:42:15.360 --> 00:42:36.719 You know, the attack that we were expecting, particularly on the second day on the building, which was we were all told would come from this this group called Alpha, this kind of special ops, you know, elite special ops division, you know, that we were told would basically storm the the building from from the roof. 00:42:36.800 --> 00:42:47.199 Uh, you know, and we were told at one point, you know, would would start by actually putting gas down through um, you know, the ventilation shafts um i in the building. 00:42:47.519 --> 00:42:56.000 You know, the order it subsequently that you know that never happened, and the order it subsequently emerged, you know, to t to alpha was never given. 00:42:56.480 --> 00:42:57.039 Yeah. 00:42:58.079 --> 00:42:58.239 Right. 00:42:58.480 --> 00:43:01.599 So they didn't re reject or um ignore an order. 00:43:02.000 --> 00:43:03.679 They were never told to do that in the first place. 00:43:03.760 --> 00:43:09.840 Aaron Ross Powell Well, I say a bit of both, you know, so some some mutiny, but but but the main orders were never given to the loyal troops anyway. 00:43:10.320 --> 00:43:10.639 Yeah. 00:43:11.440 --> 00:43:16.480 So for for context again, for people who are not too much into the topic, unlike us, we're obviously obsessed with it. 00:43:17.039 --> 00:43:17.360 A little bit. 00:43:17.519 --> 00:43:24.719 Um and I just want to recommend, I'm not sure if you know it, but um a book by Robert Service, I think fellow Englishman, uh, the August The August Coup. 00:43:24.880 --> 00:43:25.199 Yes, yes. 00:43:25.519 --> 00:43:30.400 Um so I uh that was my main research um source for for today. 00:43:30.559 --> 00:43:45.679 And he he goes through it minute by minute almost what happens in Gorbachev's Dacher, who said what, how Gorbachev reacted, and um our listeners can probably revert back to that book to find out minute by minute what happened, according to um to Robert Service. 00:43:46.000 --> 00:43:48.960 But for me, the communication is um important. 00:43:49.039 --> 00:43:59.199 And again, we're on YouTube now, so please switch to YouTube now if you want to, because you might see some images that we show now of the actual famous scenes from the coup. 00:43:59.440 --> 00:44:01.440 We just It's the White House. 00:44:01.679 --> 00:44:04.800 I also just pictured that map of Moscow before. 00:44:04.960 --> 00:44:08.880 So here's Tim Hue at the BBC office on Monday morning. 00:44:09.039 --> 00:44:10.559 Here's Yeltsin at his dacha. 00:44:10.800 --> 00:44:12.559 Both wake up, find out. 00:44:12.639 --> 00:44:13.840 Is history happening? 00:44:14.159 --> 00:44:19.519 Tim hails one of those black taxis to the Russian parliament. 00:44:19.679 --> 00:44:21.440 And Yeltsin does the same thing. 00:44:21.519 --> 00:44:23.360 You probably cross paths along the way. 00:44:23.440 --> 00:44:24.880 You get there at the same time. 00:44:25.119 --> 00:44:32.400 Simultaneously, armored vehicles come in, tanks come in, and I I assume you know the radio announcements were happening. 00:44:32.559 --> 00:44:35.760 They were surrounding the building, they were taking control. 00:44:36.320 --> 00:44:39.199 But what was Yeltsin's message? 00:44:39.440 --> 00:44:49.920 Because officially, and you said every Soviet citizen with a few brains knew this was a curve, that clearly it wasn't just an unhealthy man who needed to go on personal leave. 00:44:50.159 --> 00:44:51.280 What was his message? 00:44:51.440 --> 00:44:58.159 Did he come out as Gorbachev's protector in the side, I'm here to support the existing system? 00:44:58.400 --> 00:45:07.920 Or did Yeltsin come out and say, this is the final proof and a pudding that the Soviet Union has done because it's an autocratic system? 00:45:08.079 --> 00:45:17.039 Because again, the putschists were the head of the KGB, you said, the defense minister, so people really holding immense power still at that time. 00:45:17.199 --> 00:45:20.400 So what was his communication to the people and to the media? 00:45:20.800 -->

00:45:24.480 Well the whole thing was incredibly short. 00:45:24.719 --> 00:45:32.559 I mean, you know, we we we we've now had, you know, you know, more than three decades, you know, uh since then to to to discuss it, to think about it. 00:45:32.719 --> 00:45:36.719 The thing lasted, you know, less than three days. 00:45:36.880 --> 00:45:43.039 The thing lasted for it came completely out of the blue as far as you know most people were concerned. 00:45:43.280 --> 00:45:46.400 Everything was unexpected, everything was done on on the hoof. 00:45:46.480 --> 00:45:48.000 There's no other way it could be done. 00:45:48.159 --> 00:45:58.000 So I I don't think you can be expecting Yeltsin on the morning of the coup, you know, completely out of the uh out of the blue, you know, to be pondering the entire future of the country. 00:45:58.159 --> 00:46:13.119 Yeltsin famously stood on uh a tank, you know, one of the tanks, you know, that had that had mutinied, that had defected, that had gone over to his side, you know, and what he said was, you know, do not obey the orders of the coup leader, of the coup leaders. 00:46:13.199 --> 00:46:18.000 You know, the coup is illegal, it is a coup, you know, do not obey, do not obey their orders. 00:46:18.159 --> 00:46:26.880 I think you know that that's as much, you know, that's the clearest, most direct thing you could be expecting i i in those circumstances. 00:46:27.039 --> 00:46:30.239 He he wasn't carving out a vision for the future of the country. 00:46:30.719 --> 00:46:33.760 Yeah, so he's not standing there kind of professing a strategy. 00:46:33.840 --> 00:46:36.159 Um it's really who's had time to do that. 00:46:36.400 --> 00:46:39.599 I think you're just not I think you're not seeing the the you know, there's a suddenness of all this. 00:46:39.679 --> 00:46:40.960 Who's had time for a strategy? 00:46:41.119 --> 00:46:51.119 You know, we're talking now, you know, di uh you know, 12, 1.30 in the morning, you know, the the the the whole the whole world, you know, is astonished. 00:46:51.360 --> 00:46:53.199 Nobody can believe this is happening. 00:46:53.760 --> 00:46:56.639 The people at the center of it have got no idea what's happening next. 00:46:56.719 --> 00:47:02.800 It's not it's not a time for strategy, it's a time for you know just resisting however and as best you can. 00:47:03.119 --> 00:47:09.039 And that's why it's important to speak to eyewitnesses like Tim, because he brings that back to us because we we have the benefit of time, right? 00:47:09.119 --> 00:47:16.239 And we've seen all the documentaries and read the books, but you were there and it was just all done uh like yeah, just winged it, really? 00:47:16.639 --> 00:47:16.960 Let's win it. 00:47:17.679 --> 00:47:18.320 That's exactly it. 00:47:18.480 --> 00:47:19.119 That's exactly it. 00:47:19.519 --> 00:47:26.639 On the tank, if I remember correctly, and again we're bringing that on the screen, he didn't wave the Soviet flag, he waved the Russian flag, and that was iconic then. 00:47:27.119 --> 00:47:28.719 Absolutely, absolutely, yes, of course. 00:47:28.880 --> 00:47:32.639 Uh and and this was the Russian parliament, and he was the president of Russia. 00:47:33.119 --> 00:47:40.639 Yeltsin had by this point, and and and for you know quite a long time before, had absolutely no love of Gorbachev whatsoever. 00:47:40.960 --> 00:47:58.239 You know, in you know, when people mount a coup, you know, the the the very first, which is plainly i i is in normal terms an illegal thing to do, the the the first thing that anybody on the other side resisting it does in i i i in in any almost any situation in any country is to appeal to legality. 00:47:58.639 --> 00:48:00.400 That's the first thing that happens. 00:48:00.559 --> 00:48:14.639 So so of course, in in the context of the the statements that he made in those two days while the coup w was still progressing, the the the Yeltsin was calling for a return to the legal order. 00:48:14.960 --> 00:48:25.039 The legal order in a country in which he was uh the the the president of of Russia and uh uh at a level above that, Gorbachev was the leader of the Soviet Union. 00:48:25.119 --> 00:48:31.440 The return to legality meant the return of Gorbachev and and and the defeat of the coup. 00:48:31.599 --> 00:48:42.400 So in a way, Yeltsin's gigantic r rivalry, if you like, for the two days of the coup or three days of the coup, was was put on hold. 00:48:42.719 --> 00:48:57.679 But obviously, as soon as, you know, if we then go ahead again to after the coup attempt was defeated and Gorbachev came back to Moscow, obviously, you know, in one sense, we have to say Yeltsin, by his resistance, had saved Gorbachev. 00:48:58.079 --> 00:49:02.800 But but the minute Gorbachev came back, of course, the whole rivalry broke out again. 00:49:02.960 --> 00:49:19.360 And with with the tables hugely turned, this is what you just said before about, of course, the coup accelerating the very things that it aimed to stop, in the course of those three days, the the relative standings of Gorbachev and Yeltsin were totally changed, 180 degrees. 00:49:19.440 --> 00:49:38.320 So you know, whereas before, to some degree, of course, Yeltsin had been the the the junior of of of the two, uh by the time the thing was over, uh uh Gorbachev came back a very, very much diminished figure, and Yeltsin, by by contrast, uh a a hugely elevated one, if you like. 00:49:38.639 --> 00:49:40.320 Yeah, at his mercy almost, right? 00:49:40.400 --> 00:49:42.559 So Gorbachev was at his mercy afterwards. 00:49:42.719 --> 00:49:48.800 Um but I find that that's a fascinating moment where where this absolutely shifts because um Yeltsin could have gone the other way. 00:49:48.880 --> 00:49:58.960 Yeltsin could have just sat back and let those old Soviets fight it out among themselves and then let them tear themselves apart and then step in when it's all in ruins. 00:49:59.119 --> 00:50:02.800

But he did take leadership at the right time and said the right things. 00:50:03.199 --> 00:50:04.400 I mean, I don't agree with that at all. 00:50:04.480 --> 00:50:07.199 I d I don't think for a minute that Yeltsin could have could have sat back. 00:50:07.360 --> 00:50:11.519 I mean, you th this this was this was a mortal danger to Yeltsin and everything that Yeltsin stood for. 00:50:11.679 --> 00:50:28.719 If this had succeeded, sure they didn't manage to nab him, you know, before he or or or take him take him before he came in, you know, the the the on the Sunday night before, he would have been absolutely in the firing line, as it were, uh um, you know, metaphorically speaking, you know, had the coup succeeded, had the coup succeeded, Yeltsin would have been over. 00:50:29.440 --> 00:50:31.519 Everything that Yeltsin stood for would have been over. 00:50:31.599 --> 00:50:32.880 There's no way he could sit back. 00:50:33.519 --> 00:50:35.519 There's some motivation there that explains it. 00:50:35.760 --> 00:50:37.920 It's almost poetic, the the whole thing. 00:50:38.079 --> 00:50:39.920 Um, the the way that it plays out. 00:50:40.079 --> 00:50:42.559 It's um uh what you you couldn't script it? 00:50:42.800 --> 00:50:45.039 One of the aspects that we haven't talked about yet, Tim. 00:50:45.280 --> 00:50:50.480 Um and I I guess your insights from kind of ground level um and being there are just extraordinary. 00:50:50.960 --> 00:50:58.320 But taking a broader view, um what were foreign interests and foreign powers doing while this unfolded over three days? 00:50:58.480 --> 00:51:03.519 Um were they trying to get in there and influence an outcome, or was everybody just kind of shocked? 00:51:04.559 --> 00:51:06.079 I think everybody's just totally shocked. 00:51:06.320 --> 00:51:10.400 I think everybody is, you know, I can only just keep using this word again and again, scrambling. 00:51:10.639 --> 00:51:11.920 Everybody was scrambling. 00:51:12.079 --> 00:51:14.159 This is a very, very short period of time. 00:51:14.639 --> 00:51:16.239 Because nowadays nowadays we're used to it, right? 00:51:16.400 --> 00:51:21.280 When the when the when the coup occurs, within hours, especially Western governments take a stand, right? 00:51:21.360 --> 00:51:21.440 Yeah. 00:51:21.519 --> 00:51:21.840 So they're not. 00:51:22.079 --> 00:51:22.800 Of course they condemned it. 00:51:22.880 --> 00:51:24.079 They all condemned it, but one more could say. 00:51:24.480 --> 00:51:24.719 They did. 00:51:25.119 --> 00:51:25.280 Okay. 00:51:25.440 --> 00:51:30.480 So that so that at the time they're uh they sided with Gorbachev? 00:51:31.039 --> 00:51:33.440 No one probably knew really how who Yeltsin was. 00:51:34.000 --> 00:51:35.360 Everyone knew who Yeltsin was. 00:51:35.440 --> 00:51:36.639 He was a gigantic figure already. 00:51:37.199 --> 00:51:38.559 Did he have an international portfolio? 00:51:38.960 --> 00:51:39.920 Massive international presence. 00:51:40.719

--> 00:51:41.440 At that time already. 00:51:41.760 --> 00:51:42.000 Of course. 00:51:42.320 --> 00:51:42.719 Wow. 00:51:43.119 --> 00:51:43.280 Okay. 00:51:43.679 --> 00:51:44.159 That's a good idea. 00:51:44.400 --> 00:51:46.639 But I come back to legality. 00:51:46.880 --> 00:51:51.679 You know, Gorbachev was the elected leader of the country. 00:51:51.920 --> 00:51:52.079 Yeah. 00:51:52.320 --> 00:51:52.480 Yeah. 00:51:52.800 --> 00:52:00.079 Of course, of course, you know, no one's going to in in that circumstance, uh as world leaders always do, you know, you condemn a coup. 00:52:00.159 --> 00:52:02.639 You you you demand a return to legal norms. 00:52:02.960 --> 00:52:04.719 Legal norms was Gorbachev. 00:52:05.440 --> 00:52:05.599 Yeah. 00:52:05.840 --> 00:52:06.000 Okay. 00:52:06.239 --> 00:52:06.639 Fair enough. 00:52:06.960 --> 00:52:07.679 That does make sense. 00:52:08.079 --> 00:52:13.920 Um we had a chat before, and this is cliche, and it's probably not politically correct, but it's so fascinating for many people. 00:52:14.480 --> 00:52:15.760 It's written in a lot of places. 00:52:16.079 --> 00:52:16.320 Yeah. 00:52:16.559 --> 00:52:23.920 Um throughout not just those three days, but in general at the time in in Russian Soviet politics, what role did alcohol play? 00:52:24.239 --> 00:52:25.360 What you observed? 00:52:26.880 --> 00:52:29.920 You don't want to drag the conversation down to the gutter, but tell us what it is. 00:52:31.519 --> 00:52:40.159 I mean, Yanayev, we come back to Yanaev Ganadi Yanayev, you know, the the the leader of the coup attempt, uh, you know, th the the vice president. 00:52:40.559 --> 00:52:46.239 Um you know, we come back to his trembling hands at the the press conference on the on the Monday afternoon. 00:52:46.719 --> 00:52:48.719 Um yes, he'd been drinking. 00:52:48.960 --> 00:52:50.559 He said himself afterwards he'd been drinking. 00:52:50.639 --> 00:53:00.239 But I mean that was nothing compared to how much the the Prime Minister, who who was also one of the eight, you know, Pavlov, you know, he he just you know he just drank all the way through. 00:53:01.280 --> 00:53:02.159 For three days. 00:53:02.400 --> 00:53:02.719 Mm-hmm. 00:53:03.199 --> 00:53:04.320 Well, I mean, more or less. 00:53:04.480 --> 00:53:07.039 I mean, you know, so we so so we gather afterwards. 00:53:07.119 --> 00:53:11.280 I mean, that's why he was barely barely seen, even though he's meant to be one of, you know, one of the Kuigi as well. 00:53:11.360 --> 00:53:12.639 He was barely, he, you know. 00:53:14.239 --> 00:53:19.119 You know, certainly incapacitated almost all the way through by by by drink, it appeared afterwards. 00:53:19.599 --> 00:53:19.760 Yeah. 00:53:20.000 --> 00:53:22.400 And and Yeltsin is obviously notorious for it too. 00:53:22.559 --> 00:53:26.480 Apparently, after 12 o'clock it was hard to have a sober conversation with him. 00:53:26.639 --> 00:53:28.239 But was he still in his prime at that time? 00:53:28.800 --> 00:53:36.400 Yes, I mean I think you know, I mean, I mean, obviously, y you know, there are different periods of Yeltsin, and uh, you know, we we now again, all this is retrospect. 00:53:36.559 --> 00:53:53.760 You know, we now get used to thinking of of Yeltsin, you know, after obviously he did become, you know, the the the the the undisputed leader of the country um after the fall war of of of already independent Russia, after the after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and you know, then leader throughout you know almost all of the nineties. 00:53:53.920 --> 00:53:57.840 In 1991, Yeltsin was in his you know in his prime. 00:53:58.320 --> 00:54:04.239 He was a big, uh forceful, um d energetic guy. 00:54:04.800 --> 00:54:09.360 So didn't really respect the old authorities and challenged Gorbachev many, many times before. 00:54:09.599 --> 00:54:12.320 Um so it was very quick. 00:54:12.480 --> 00:54:13.760 People were scrambling. 00:54:13.920 --> 00:54:15.280 How did it all wrap up? 00:54:15.519 --> 00:54:16.400 You were there? 00:54:16.880 --> 00:54:19.599 Did um the troops just pack up and leave? 00:54:19.840 --> 00:54:28.559 Because there's some dramatic footage uh on the internet on YouTube that you can still revisit nowadays with tanks trying to break out overnight and smashing through barricades. 00:54:28.719 --> 00:54:31.599 But that so how did it come to a peaceful end? 00:54:31.679 --> 00:54:35.920 Did did someone actually get injured or or killed during this coup or was it a bloodless coup? 00:54:36.480 --> 00:54:51.360 No, three three I mean y you know, you can say given the gravity of the whole thing, you know, it's extraordinary um, you know, how how how few casualties there were, but three young men um were killed. 00:54:51.519 --> 00:54:56.159 They were killed i in the early hours of of of the Wednesday, the 21st. 00:54:56.320 --> 00:55:00.719 And then within hours of that, effectively, the whole thing ended. 00:55:00.800 --> 00:55:06.960 So it didn't it it kind of fizzled out, it it it crumbled in this very, very strange kind of way. 00:55:07.039 --> 00:55:12.320 And I came back yet again to this, you know, thing extraordinary thing about you know the lack of nerve. 00:55:12.639 --> 00:55:21.840 The attack, you know, which we'd expected us who were inside the building had expected, you know, for both of the previous two nights, and and above all, we'd expected it on the second night. 00:55:21.920 --> 00:55:27.199 The second night, if you like, was when you know people inside the building were were most scared. 00:55:27.360 --> 00:56:12.079 Um, we discovered this afterwards, just uh or uh only later in the day, what happened was extraordinarily that uh some of the um coup leaders uh got on a plane, went to um Crimea, w where they themselves had basically uh imprisoned Gorbachev in his holiday home, and uh started to bargain with him, to uh to to argue with him, you know, on on what kind of basis, what on earth they

thought they were doing, what on earth they thought, you know, that that that they would say to him, you know, why on earth he would agree to talk to them, is, you know, to this day to me completely uh uh unclear. 00:56:12.320 --> 00:56:15.920 But of course what actually happened was that he refused to see them. 00:56:16.079 --> 00:56:24.320 You know, they basically uh uh b w waited, if you like, in the in in the porch of the building where he was, and and and Gorbachev wouldn't see them. 00:56:24.400 --> 00:56:43.599 Even more surreally, at almost exactly the same time, uh another plane set off from Moscow to Crimea with Yeltsin's lieutenants, people who opposed the coup, who also came uh to talk to Gorbachev, and basically to invite you know Gorbachev to come back. 00:56:43.760 --> 00:56:49.679 And and of course they were the ones that Gorbachev was prepared to talk to, and and the coup leaders he absolutely uh wasn't. 00:56:49.840 --> 00:56:59.679 So that's why, you know, extremely, extremely late, you know, that day, Gorbachev got on a plane um and came back to to Moscow. 00:56:59.840 --> 00:57:27.519 And, you know, then you have these kind of extraordinary, you know, scenes, you know, of Gorbachev, you know, landing uh uh uh again at Moscow Airport, uh freed as it were, you know, deeply suntanned, as anybody would be who just spent uh, you know, uh time in the Crimea in August, open neck shirt, you know, which of course he kn never never normally had, uh looking, you know, after all this extraordinary drama of the previous three days, extraordinarily uh relaxed. 00:57:28.239 --> 00:57:48.480 And that's when you know we then got this extraordinary uh mismatch for the whole of the following few days, because uh i it was only after the coup uh failed that uh the streets of Moscow really started to fill with people. 00:57:49.119 --> 00:58:09.440 It was only in the scenes that unfolded in the following few days, the end of the week, the Thursday, the Friday, the Saturday of that week, when you're not talking about the tens of thousands of people, you know, who who who gathered round the protesters who gathered round while the coup was still going on. 00:58:09.599 --> 00:58:17.039 You're now talking about hundreds of thousands of people who certainly didn't turn out to actually protect the White House when it was actually happening. 00:58:17.199 --> 00:58:18.800 The population didn't come out. 00:58:19.039 --> 00:58:23.360 The population came out afterwards, after it after it had been defeated. 00:58:23.519 --> 00:58:53.679 And then we started to see, you know, the these extraordinary scenes of which the most uh, if you like, symbolic, extraordinary of all was the um the toppling of the statue of of the um of the founder of the Soviet um secret police, Felixum uh Zerzinski, you know, who had this enormous uh statue um you know outside the the Lubyanka prison in the centre, you know, the KGB prison in the centre of in the centre of Moscow. 00:58:53.760 --> 00:58:56.400 And that statue was toppled. 00:58:56.639 --> 00:59:07.119 And again, you know, we're used now to the whole idea of statues being toppled, of statues being toppled in the Soviet Union, you know, of Saddim Hussein's, you know, uh statue being toppled, all this kind of stuff. 00:59:07.280 --> 00:59:09.679 But statues were never toppled in the Soviet Union. 00:59:09.760 --> 00:59:13.199 That was unknown if for this kind of thing to happen. 00:59:13.280 --> 00:59:30.079 And and no one had ever said that they were, you know, it was the most clearest statement of of how far psychology, people's psychology had moved on, and massively accelerated incredibly fast, exactly like what you said before, in the in the course of those three days. 00:59:30.239 --> 00:59:33.519 That was the moment, that was the moment that we saw it was all over. 00:59:33.599 --> 00:59:34.719 Not not before. 00:59:35.599 --> 00:59:38.159 Uh just a point on the practicality of journalism. 00:59:38.400 --> 00:59:42.960 How did such a big population in this country receive all this news? 00:59:43.039 --> 00:59:46.000 How how how does that sort of work over that period of time? 00:59:47.039 --> 00:59:52.000 In general, there's only, of course, official official broadcasts. 00:59:52.159 --> 00:59:58.800 Um but uh again, uh extraordinarily, they allowed all kinds of chinks to appear. 00:59:58.960 --> 01:00:00.400 Why did they have a press conference? 01:00:00.559 --> 01:00:04.400 Why did they allow anybody to ask any question they wanted at the press conference? 01:00:04.639 --> 01:00:20.239 You know, w w wh why did why did the evening news on on the first evening on the Monday night itself carry the the state official news, why did it carry uh a a tiny, a small amount of footage of Yeltsin standing on the tank? 01:00:20.480 --> 01:00:20.960 Extraordinary. 01:00:21.280 --> 01:00:21.440 Yeah. 01:00:21.599 --> 01:00:26.639 And and these little snippets were enough basically for people to to to fill in the gaps and understand what was happening. 01:00:27.039 --> 01:00:32.719 And and for for 70 years, Soviet citizens have learned to communicate away from the official channels as well, I guess. 01:00:33.119 --> 01:00:33.440 That's right. 01:00:33.840 --> 01:00:37.679 Um and um Gorbachev had to swallow his pride, right? 01:00:37.920 --> 01:00:51.280 Are there scenes when Yeltsin obviously set himself up as the liberator and as the the winner of all this, where Gorbachev, in public in front of cameras, had to basically thank him and shake hands, even though he was his fiercest opponent. 01:00:51.519 --> 01:00:52.400 That did that happen? 01:00:52.880 --> 01:01:07.920 There was one extremely um famous scene which happened two or three days a few days later, um, which was where Gorbachev came to address the the Russian parliament. 01:01:08.079 --> 01:01:22.960 I mean, obviously we we're talking about the White House again now, obviously it wasn't-it wasn't acting as

a parliament, you know, in in the in the days in the in the actual coup when I was there, but obviously then it subsequently the following uh the following week, obviously it re-established its itself as an actual debating chamber, as an actual parliament. 01:01:23.199 --> 01:01:26.000 Yeltsin presided over that parliament as president of Russia. 01:01:26.079 --> 01:01:47.760 He uh he invited Gorbachev, and um a report had been made uh about the the Communist Party's involvement in the coup, which Gorbachev said he'd just received but hadn't had time to read, uh, uh although he was kind of cutching it, you know, as he was on the kind of podium of the parliament. 01:01:47.920 --> 01:02:03.840 And and in this very famous scene, you know, Yeltsin, who we must remember again, you know, is considerably taller than uh than um than Gorbachev, you know, physical physically, um, stands over him, uh, and Gorbachev says, Oh, I've got I've just received this report, I'll read it later. 01:02:03.920 --> 01:02:07.519 And Yeltsin goes, No, read it now, read it. 01:02:08.719 --> 01:02:12.320 And this was an extraordinarily kind of humiliating, you know, moment. 01:02:12.480 --> 01:02:18.639 I mean, just to kind of use, you know, use the imperative in that way, read it to the guy who is the president of the country. 01:02:18.800 --> 01:02:25.519 Um, you know, and and that was the moment that kind of crystallized the kind of change in relationship between them, who was now top dog. 01:02:25.920 --> 01:02:28.159 What I learned today, they're such different characters. 01:02:28.320 --> 01:02:30.880 Like Yeltsin is this sledgehammer. 01:02:31.360 --> 01:02:36.079 Um, you're perfectly made for that time in Russian Soviet history kind of guy. 01:02:36.239 --> 01:02:44.719 And and and Gorbachev's this idealist, slightly detached from reality sort of thinker. 01:02:44.800 --> 01:02:44.880 Yeah. 01:02:45.199 --> 01:02:47.440 Yeah, but who didn't think anything through either. 01:02:47.760 --> 01:02:48.559 That was part of the problem. 01:02:50.239 --> 01:02:52.320 Um fascinating, Tim. 01:02:52.480 --> 01:02:56.400 And then let's just wrap up that important piece of Russian history. 01:02:56.559 --> 01:02:57.519 The coups ended. 01:02:57.679 --> 01:03:03.840 Gorbachev was humiliated, the West didn't know what was going on, and obviously trying to pick a new friend. 01:03:04.000 --> 01:03:06.880 Um, everyone by then could probably see where this is going. 01:03:07.039 --> 01:03:15.039 The Russians also got their troops out of many of the Eastern Bloc countries, so it it it really the sphere of influence got much smaller. 01:03:15.119 --> 01:03:22.719 It was still a nuclear power, but then by Christmas, that same year, four months later, it was all over. 01:03:23.280 --> 01:03:24.239 That's absolutely right. 01:03:24.400 --> 01:03:32.239 So basically, you know, again, as you as you said, uh the whole thing accelerated the processes it was meant to avoid. 01:03:32.480 --> 01:03:41.840 So, yes, you know, by the end of that year, just over, you know, four months um four months later, the the the Soviet Union w was was was completely over. 01:03:42.079 --> 01:03:58.639 Basically, the leaders of three of the biggest republics, so Yeltsin for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, uh uh met together and basically they decided the Soviet Union was over, that they were going to they were going to dissolve it. 01:03:58.719 --> 01:04:03.360 Obviously, we know several other republics out the Baltics, you know, already had had no interest in it. 01:04:03.599 --> 01:04:18.159 Out in the east, in the you know, Central Asia and so on, th those places, still run by very hard, hard-lined communist leaders, you know, would un undoubtedly have have wanted to preserve it, preserve both communism and the Soviet Union, but but they weren't they weren't given the chance. 01:04:18.239 --> 01:04:24.159 I mean, once you know Ukraine and Russia and Belarus have decided that it's over, um it's uh it's over. 01:04:24.480 --> 01:05:05.440 But you know, I think there's one other really important thing to point out of all the things to me uh that that happened in in those four months, uh, to show in a way that the world to some degree you know didn't understand, is uh that um Ukraine voted um uh for independence and uh uh President Bush uh came to uh Kiev, to the Ukrainian capital, at the beginning of that winter and uh gave a speech in in reaction to what was going on uh in which he talked about suicidal nationalism. 01:05:06.320 --> 01:05:08.960 In other words, you know what does that mean? 01:05:09.199 --> 01:05:24.320 That that means that America at that point was extremely dubious, uh worried about the breakup of of the Soviet Union and and nationalism in its constituent republics. 01:05:24.480 --> 01:05:29.840 Well, y you know, if we think about that now, that's you know, that's seems completely weird. 01:05:30.000 --> 01:05:35.519 Seems completely the opposite of what you would expect um the the United States uh to be saying. 01:05:35.840 --> 01:05:43.840 But, you know, already, you know, we've got to remember the Soviet Union, um uh a nuclear power. 01:05:44.079 --> 01:05:52.719 You know, d do do we want nuclear powers to br you know, even ones who've been our a adversaries for uh for for generations, do we want them to break up? 01:05:54.239 --> 01:05:59.679 And not know who's c in control and having to call a number of people, because obviously it was you know Kazakhstan. 01:06:00.239 --> 01:06:03.280 Ukraine there was the weapons weren't just on Russian territory. 01:06:03.679 --> 01:06:03.920 That's right. 01:06:04.239 --> 01:06:11.519 I mean that that obviously subsequently, you know, that that um that that speech by Bush became known as the Chikin Kiev speech. 01:06:11.760 --> 01:06:25.440 But um but uh uh um you know so obviously he was you know obviously m mocked for having done that even then, but but but that's nevertheless the kind of

attitude that you know that some people in America were taking. 01:06:25.920 --> 01:06:26.320 Yeah. 01:06:26.639 --> 01:06:27.360 Incredible. 01:06:27.599 --> 01:06:29.039 I want to thank you again. 01:06:29.199 --> 01:06:31.920 Um do you have one last question for our guest, David? 01:06:32.320 --> 01:06:38.960 Uh no, I know, just uh sort of reflecting on the interview though, and it's uh it's been uh really, really insightful. 01:06:39.119 --> 01:06:49.039 Um I think the um um the the point that you made about the fact that we we look at this through kind of a historic lens and you know it's really well documented, it's really well understood. 01:06:49.199 --> 01:06:52.559 You think about it in terms of the strategy and who was trying to achieve what. 01:06:52.719 --> 01:06:58.559 But when it came down to it, this was kind of three days of mayhem and nobody had planned too much particularly well. 01:06:58.800 --> 01:07:09.039 Um and it was people really making it up as it went along, but um it kind of broke open the situation that was there in the Soviet Republic and Russia. 01:07:09.199 --> 01:07:17.199 Um and the consequence was this enormous um instrumental change uh in uh in our history. 01:07:17.360 --> 01:07:20.000 And uh yeah, it's a it's just a really fascinating story. 01:07:20.159 --> 01:07:22.960 So your perspective on it's a really, really interesting thing to think of. 01:07:23.280 --> 01:07:24.400 It's different to a historian. 01:07:24.480 --> 01:07:26.000 Um you're you're a bit of both, actually. 01:07:26.079 --> 01:07:46.559 But and just you know, I was gluted to be back then when it happened, and because it was such a busy time, you know, Yugoslavia started falling apart, uh Saddam Hussein destructed the entire world, and America was clearly focused on that, and the last thing on their mind was having regional conflicts all around the Eastern Bloc, which, like you said earlier, little conflicts were breaking out on the periphery of the of the Soviet Union. 01:07:46.800 --> 01:07:49.679 But for us it was in living in the Eastern Bloc. 01:07:50.000 --> 01:07:52.719 It was not set in stone what we know now. 01:07:52.960 --> 01:07:59.360 Like if the coup would have succeeded, if they would have had to act together, the history could have been very different. 01:07:59.519 --> 01:08:10.320 They could have reclaimed territories, they could have threatened the West and and that at the time was still on the brink because it's happened a few times that you think something is set in stone, but it's actually not. 01:08:10.559 --> 01:08:12.079 It comes down to drunk individuals. 01:08:12.719 --> 01:08:13.599 It's bizarre. 01:08:14.239 --> 01:08:16.239 My memory is much more naive than yours. 01:08:16.319 --> 01:08:17.920 I I I was a child at school. 01:08:18.000 --> 01:08:21.840 Uh I remember the the world map on the wall of the classroom. 01:08:22.000 --> 01:08:28.159 Um, and in 1991, the USSR was this giant pink mass at the top of the map, right? 01:08:28.399 --> 01:08:36.159 Um and uh towards the end of the year, I remember the teacher trying to explain to us what the CIS was, um, and nobody really understood that. 01:08:36.479 --> 01:08:38.159 The Commonwealth of Independent States. 01:08:38.399 --> 01:08:38.880 Exactly. 01:08:38.960 --> 01:08:51.279 And then and then we went away for the summer holidays, uh, which is kind of uh December, January, came back to school the next year, and there was a new map, and there's a whole bunch of new countries that we had to learn the capitals and the flags of. 01:08:51.840 --> 01:08:53.359 And it's like, what has happened here? 01:08:53.520 --> 01:08:54.800 And you've just explained it for me too. 01:08:54.960 --> 01:08:55.119 Thank you. 01:08:55.279 --> 01:08:58.399 Yeah, geography teachers were struggling to keep up in those days. 01:08:58.560 --> 01:08:59.199 Yeah. 01:09:00.000 --> 01:09:00.960 Yeah, that's right. 01:09:01.039 --> 01:09:06.800 I mean, you know, you you you live through history, it a lot of it only makes sense afterwards. 01:09:07.520 --> 01:09:10.880 And we want to thank you again for for sharing. 01:09:11.039 --> 01:09:16.239 And to our viewers and listeners for watching, subscribing, downloading, and telling the world about it. 01:09:16.319 --> 01:09:17.199 This is Putschcast. 01:09:17.279 --> 01:09:18.960 I'm Oliver Stavid. 01:09:19.119 --> 01:09:22.319 And uh yeah, check out putcast.com for more coups. 01:09:22.399 --> 01:09:27.840 If you've got any suggestions, anything you want to learn about, send us an email, putcast at gmail.com. 01:09:27.920 --> 01:09:32.880 And if you're if you're an eyewitness, if you lived through a coup or a revolution, please let us know. 01:09:33.119 --> 01:09:34.960 Any Tim's always welcome. 01:09:35.119 --> 01:09:35.600 Thank you. 01:09:35.840 --> 01:09:37.199 Uh, very, very nice to be with you. 01:09:37.279 --> 01:09:38.000 Thank you.