TRASCRIZIONE 🔗
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patron mug. Sign up now at Patreon dot dot NetRocks
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dot com. Hello and welcome back to dot net rocks.
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I'm Carl Franklin and I'm Richard Campbell, and we're here
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again for your dot net and all things, you know,
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geek pleasure. I think so, Uh, Richard, how's it going
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over there in Vancouver?
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Well, if we get our time shifting right and nothing
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weird happens and the creek don't rise, I should have
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published episode one thousand of run As Radio yesterday.
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Congratulations, thanks man, big milestone a lot of shows. Yeah
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it is. And do you want to talk about dev intersection?
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Can we talk about that now? Yeah?
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Yeah, we can talk about dev intersection and you know,
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all all the things come together well, and we're calling
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it the we're sort of bouncing between the names because
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there's a lot of emphasis on cloud development, so sort
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of Azure community development you know stuff as well as
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there's two other adjacent shows attached to it. But if
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you know dev inter Section, you know what to expect.
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The usual troublemakers including you and me, but also the
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next Gen AI show, so lots of co piloting and
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lots of real jenitor of AI, you know, smart folks,
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the science people so forth, building cool things. And our
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friend Michelle Busta Monte has started up a cybersecurity conference
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adjacent to the other two. So yeah, three shows in one.
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I got news about that one. Yeah, I'm doing two
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talks at Michelle's security conference. Oh wow.
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One of them is secure your Blazer Server Applications nice important,
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and the other one is a live security this week.
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Oh cool, I'm gonna do it on stage Channel show.
Load full transcript
Yeah,
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we don't actually have the time yet, but we think
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it might be in the evening, you know sometime.
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Yeah, it's a logical time to do it, right. Well,
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if you working your butt off that week is aren't
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you doing a session with Maddie as well on Yes
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Purifying Never Hanks.
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I'm really going to town this week. Crazy, I'm not
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only doing a Blazer workshop one day, but yeah, Maddie
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Montaguella and I and Jeff Fritz will be there too,
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are going to aspirify the dot NetRocks dot com website.
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Cool live in front.
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Of your face.
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There's nothing better than a Brownfield action man like actually
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taking existing code and applying new standards to it and
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not having a catch fire.
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And honest to god, like, I don't really know what
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to expect because this isn't something that's in my wheelhouse,
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you know, So.
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It's going to be a no, you're on the ride.
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Yeah, I'm on the ride. It's going to be a
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learning experience for me and hopefully, you know, the it
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will show.
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Learn experience for everybody who's there.
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It will show in the results. And then a couple
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of other talks to Yeah, I'm going to be working
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working hard. All right, let's start off with better no framework,
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roll the music, all right? What do you got? Do
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you know what lotty animations are?
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No?
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I didn't either until today, well until I found this, Yeah,
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lottifiles dot com. These are free, lightweight animations, but I
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guess they require a player, right, and so they look
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like animated gifts to me, and I don't really understand
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the difference yet. But However, I did find this Lotty
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player which is in a part of the mud Blazer
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extra package. So it's a Blazer Lotti player that makes
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it easy to integrate high quality Lotty animations into your
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Blazer applications. And it's a simple new get package and
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it's you know, very easy to do. I just don't
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know enough about Lottie to really care about it, but
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somebody does, because this is, you know, this is kind
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of an up and coming thing that's interesting. Yeah.
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Cool, another format.
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Another format, Yeah, exactly. So that's what I got today.
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Know it, learn it, love it. Who's talking to us?
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Richard grabbed a commenta of a show nineteen fifty five
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which you did at Build not that long ago, of course,
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published in June, somewhat after the show, where we talked
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to our friend Nicole Forrestkrenn, who hadn't seen in a while,
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one of the you know, Devop's goddesses. She ran Dora
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for the longest time and really was the person, I think,
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more than anyone, who put the numbers to what it
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meant to be a high performing team, like what the
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difference was when you organized into rapid iterating ways, integrated
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to and so Forth said, here's the performance different differences
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that these teams get across the large numbers of organizations.
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So she kind of took the you know, anecdotal side
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of DevOps away and gave it a real science rigger.
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And we've talked about this concept of frictionless development, about
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what happens when you can code quickly and have this
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infrastructure around you to know what's going on, and that
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included using the contemporary AI technologies, although that was you know,
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in May, and here we are in August September, where
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of course things have.
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Changed again light years away.
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Yeah, it keeps moving so fast. And so this comment
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comes from Neil Tiberwalla who says, thanks for the great episode.
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On one of the projects I'm working on, we are
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also struggling to see how llms fit into DevOps. However,
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are surprised to hear you all talking about multiple agents
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merge conflicts. It seems like this is really a non
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issue since the AI could just delete their work and
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start over and redo the whole task. It's just some
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computation not but otherwise not lost human programmer time. That
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is the motivation for a merged process. Yeah, there's also
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a cost in tokens. But I'm with you. Yeah, And
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as you said on the show, a new paradigm requires
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new ways of thinking. Definitely, software che all that is
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changing again, and I'm not unhappy about it. It's interesting
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to talk to folks and to experience all the different approaches.
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So Neil, thank you so much for your comment. And
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a copy of music Coby is on its way to you.
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And if you'd like a copy of music Koba, I
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write a comment on the website at don Arocks dot
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com or on the facebooks. We publish every show there,
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and if you comment there and I read it on
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the show, I'll send you a copy of music Goba.
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Music to code by I remember that, Yeah, that thing
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I started a long time ago to help you focus
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during development. Well now there's twenty two tracks, and if
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you don't want to send in a comment and get
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a free copy of it, you can go to music
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too coode by dot net and you can download the
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entire collection in MP three, flack or wave format.
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Nice.
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All right, So this being showed nineteen one hundred and sixty,
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let's talk about what happened in nineteen sixty six. There's
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you know this is one of those years, right that
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people remember space exploration, Soviet Lunar nine spacecraft, and I'm
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sure we'll talk more about that. The nineteen sixty six
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FIFA World Cup held in England. The host nation won
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its first championship by defeating West Germany in the final.
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The Cultural Revolution in China Mao Jeidong right, so significant
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social and political upheaval. The Vietnam War. The US announced
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a substantial increase in troops in Vietnam. Civil rights Sammy Young,
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junior civil rights activist, was murdered in Alabama, highlighting the
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ongoing
struggle for civil rights. The New York City Transits Strike,
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a wildcat strike by public transportation workers, began January second
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and lasted until January thirteenth. But my favorite category, music
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and culture. The Beach Boys Pet Sounds was released, which
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totally reshaped pop music. John Lennon sparked outrage with his
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comment that the band was more popular than Jesus.
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Yeah not smart.
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I shouldn't have said it, and I'm sorry. And The
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flint Stones aired its series finale on April first, And
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there's of course a lot more of it. What do
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you want to tell us about technology?
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In space Richard, You know, ninety six six is not
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a huge here on the space side, just because it's
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the end of the Gemini program and just before the
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Apollo program really ramps up. Although there's lots of Cold
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War stuff going on, lots of reconnaissance satellites and so forth.
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But I would point out that Surveyor won launches and
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lands on the Moon successfully for the first time, one
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of the very first soft landings on the Moon ever.
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Wow.
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And also they start doing mapping of the Moon with
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the prospect for landing with an orbit called the lou
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Or orbiter. And it's a time before CCDs and so forth,
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so taking pictures and sending them back is not a
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simple thing in nineteen sixty six, So yeah, it's not
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the most exciting year sings. They'll get hairy from here
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as the Apollo program really gets rocking along. But at
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this but on that year they still did a few
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important things and it wouldn't be You're not wrong that
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the Soviets had the Luna twelve mission, which also took
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photos of the Moon, although admittedly after the Americans got them.
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But let's talk about important stuff, like nineteen sixty six
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is the year the cool whip is invented, all right,
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nothing like an edible oil product.
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Yeah, edible oil. Cardiovascular dream come true.
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--> 00:09:46.399
Listen, palm oil is well, let's be clear, not your friend.
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Not your friend.
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On the computer side, Helid Packard's very first computer, the
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HP twenty one sixteen A, which is a funny number
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for your first one. It was actually an acquired computer.
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They bought a comp called Data Systems who made a
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thing called the DSi one thousand, although they had never shipped.
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They bought the company back in sixty four finished it up.
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It was all integrated circuits, which is very novel of
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the time, and magnetic core memory because they're still a
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couple of years away from digital ram being a thing.
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This is a sixteen bit mini computer with a ten
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megahertz clock. It comes with four K words sixteen bit words,
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but you could externally expand it that's more coarse up
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to eight k and if you wanted to go to
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a big old sixteen you need an external box for it.
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Wow.
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Weighed about two hundred and thirty pounds and cost about
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twenty thousand dollars when it first shipped in nineteen sixty six.
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And finally, yeah, very relevant for the time. In nineteen
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sixty six, a scientist be the name of Joseph Wisenbaum
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working at MIT, released a piece of software called Eliza.
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That was so fascinating to me.
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There Rogerian chatter bought, as they called it at the time,
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ran on an IBM seventy foot ninety four. Whisenbaum talked
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about it doing language transformations, which is interesting to think
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about sixty years later.
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All right, so the real story is that the term
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artificial intelligence was being bounced around, and he knew that
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these were just programs, and to prove it, he wanted
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to say, you know, this might seem like a human,
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but it's just looking for keywords and spinning out wrote
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answers and actually not even answers, answering questions with.
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Questions questions, the Rogerian approach.
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Yeah, yeah, so if you say, you know, I hate
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my brother or whatever, it would say, tell me more
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about your family. But he did it as a goof really, yes,
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he did. He did it to show how ridiculous it was,
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how ridiculous.
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And people spent hours with it.
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It's true. Yeah, I have witnessed it.
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Yeah, they did run it through a Turing test. And
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it failed. Of course, not that the Turing test is
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particularly meaningful, but this is in the early days of it,
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but it was one of the they later on to
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come on to define this idea called the Eliza effect,
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which is this a tendency for humans to overvalue language
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interactions as especially intelligent answer promatively. You know, language is
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a pretty profound thing in this sort of sentient space, right,
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so we're kind of wired to respond to that for
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better or worse. But hi, golly, aren't we battling these
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same problems right now?
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Oh, one hundred thousand times more.
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Yeah. Now we call it chat GPT psychosis.
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It really is too, isn't it. I mean, it's very serious.
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I'm not going to say who it is, but somebody
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that you and I both know what. You know. He
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was trying to talk to his mother about AI or whatever,
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and to impress her he basically spit out a document.
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He went to chat GPT and spit out a document,
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you know, in minutes, and she was amazed by it.
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And I said to him, I said, did you check
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the facts? Heause, no, no, I didn't. It was actually
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an application. It was like something that you would send
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to somebody to apply for something, right, and it had
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all sorts of facts and did you check it? Because
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you know, the thing does get stuff wrong. He goes
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fabricate stuff whole cloth.
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Yeah, and he.
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Didn't even think about it.
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Right.
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It's like, you know, and this is an intelligent because
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the computer is always right, right. This is an intelligent
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person that you and I both know, and you know,
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just forgetting to fact check. Yeah, yeah, yep, scary all right.
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End of Soapbox nineteen sixty six, you know, sixty years ago.
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All right, Shall we introduce our guest, Michael Levan. Michael
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translates technical complexity into practical value. He's a seasoned engineer, consultant, trainer,
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and content creator in the Kubernetes, security, DevOps and platform
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engineering space, spending his time working with startups and enterprises
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around the globe. Michael is also a Microsoft MVP in
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the Azure space, in AWS community builder three times, a
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four times published author, a podcast host, an international public speaker,
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CNCF ambassador, and he was part of the Kubernetes version
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one point two eight and version one point three to
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one release team. Welcome to the.
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Show, Michael, Thank you so much for having me now,
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I have the friendly reminder that I need to cut
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down my bio a little bit.
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Actually it's quite impressive and I wouldn't leave anything out.
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And he's knocked out a couple of run answers with
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me over the years too.
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Yep. Yeah, but your first time on this show.
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Yeah, yeah, thank you guys so much for having me
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really appreciate it and worries.
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Well, you know, part of DevOps is dev so oddly enough,
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you do you do have your hand in that space
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as well?
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Yeah, no, absolutely, I mean, ironically enough, I feel like
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I kind of live in two worlds. I do a
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lot of you know, the devopsy cloud based stuff, but
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I would say probably as a consultant, half of my
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a year or so is spent doing a lot of
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back end software engineering. So I've been doing a lot
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of Python lately. Before that, I was doing a lot
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of Go in my free time, you know, outside of
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client work. I'm diving deeper and deeper into Rust. So
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I'm definitely in
all the worlds ironically enough, so.
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All the worlds. Yeah, it's good to be a polyglot, right,
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to exercise the different languages and sort of see how
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the various sides live, although I just went through a
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process where we took a sample ap of an MVP
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and regenerated in six languages in a matter of days.
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It's like, here's what it looks like in Swift, Here's
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what it looks like in Rust. Like, I mean, you're
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don't even wonder what language even means anymore.
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The irony of it is, I've been thinking about this
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a lot, is that I wonder if we'll reach a
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point where like natural language will be the language.
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Yeah, you know.
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I wonder if we'll hit a time where it's like, yeah,
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you know, I want to write a memory, you know,
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sensitive application, and then you have two choices. You say, well,
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you can go with you know, this language, which is
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maybe Go, or you go with this language, which is
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maybe you Russ. And then you say, okay, this is
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what I wanted to do, and then it goes and
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it does it. I don't know, maybe we reach a
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point where it's like, you know, everything's just bytecode and
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we just kind of don't see it. It's all natural language.
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Yeah, well, if you never look at the code, what
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do you care what it was generated?
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Unless it's job ASCRIPT, then I would protest, Yeah, do care? Hardily.
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You know, mostly it's about understanding what's going on. I
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was thinking about cucumber the other day. Remember this testing
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lie where you're supposed to sort of write natural language tests,
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and it's kind of you know, we've always tried, you know,
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what is specifications or requirements, but natural language that describes code,
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that is ultimately our measure for how we provided a
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solution which it seemed to be moving further up there.
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And it's not like any of this stuff doesn't take
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a lot of skill to do.
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Well.
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Yeah, you know, it's you know, this is not a
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trivial practice, but certainly evolving without it.
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So Michael has DevOps I don't know changed in the
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last three years. For you, what's been the most significant
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change in DevOps in the last few years.
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I think, you know, the obvious answer is AI, right,
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But I think conceptually, like I always look at it
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in two different ways. I look at it in the
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positions and like what you're doing in your day to
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day at your job. And then I also look at
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it from a like underlying technology perspective. And I always
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say this to everybody, like, if you have good fundamental knowledge,
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like you know, if you have a decent fundamental knowledge
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and you know, the computer science and stuff, right, so
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like data structures, standard algorithms, all that fun stuff. And
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then if you have a good base of you know,
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standard IT networking systems, how all that works. The irony
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is ninety percent of what you're doing is kind of
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staying the same, and you're just sprinkling different abstractions and
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different tools on top of it. I often think about
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like service measures as well in the realm of kubernetes.
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You know, they bring your network observability, your traffic routing,
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your MTLs, encryption between service and service, all that stuff
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we had already. We just now have this layer of
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abstraction that this program that sits on top of a
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service versus embedding you know, TLS code within your application code.
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So point being is I think a lot of it
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is still the same. I think what's just changing is
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like the different tools that we're putting top on top
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of Okay, cloud based environment systems all that.
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Certainly the human aspect of DevOps, which is you know, people,
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processes and tools. I guess the thing that Richard likes
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to talk about all the time, the people stuff. Has
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that changed because of AI
or are the people skills
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still there and required.
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Oh one hundred percent still required? Totally, totally. I think
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that with bringing an AI into DevOps and anything right
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like software engineering, maybe we could say security as well,
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but I don't think it's it's there yet, but a
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lot of it is around, like DevOps and software engineering.
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And in my opinion, I think I need to work
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harder now using an LLM uh than I did before,
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and I think that the level of effort is just
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changed a little bit as the human operator. So like before,
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for example, maybe I'm sitting there looking at a line
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of code for an hour saying to myself, like what
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is going on here? And then I finally found it
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and I say, hooray, I have fixed all my life's problems.
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Now now I'm.
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Where can I get me some of that?
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Now I'm generating, you know, this part of my application
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with an LM. But now I'm looking through the whole
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thing and I'm saying, this isn't right. I'm going to
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change this, this isn't right. I had a scenario the
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other day where I wanted to build on an MVP
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of something and I built it and I used claud
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code and I was running it, and I'm like, why
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am I result? Why are my results the same across
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every system that I test this on? And I looked
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at it turns out Claude cod I didn't ask it
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to do this. By the way, claud Code created a
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bunch of mock data within it and with a bunch
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of print statements, so like I literally had to go
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in and refactor everything because it was just all fake
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data that was getting printed out to me on the terminal.
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So like I had to spend probably more time fixing
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that than I would if I just wrote it myself.
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So yes, I think the Humanator, the Humanator, the human.
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That was my nickname in high school.
389
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It's nice.
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I think that piece
is actually probably more important now
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than ever, to be honest.
392
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Yeah, And unfortunately this is another one of those shows
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where we're talking about AI. But you know that we
394
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catch some flak for that and our listeners like it
395
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when we just get back to real development. But but
396
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you can't deny that. You know things are changing, and
397
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this is one of those things we've been saying this
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a bunch that you have to you now have to
399
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think of yourself if you're going to embrace these tools.
400
00:21:30.799 --> 00:21:32.839
You have to think of yourself as sort of a
401
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manager of lower level engineers and fact checker, right or
402
00:21:38.839 --> 00:21:43.039
or code checker, you know, code reviewer. If that's the
403
00:21:43.119 --> 00:21:46.720
role that you're taking, you know, and hearing we have
404
00:21:46.759 --> 00:21:49.319
a situation where it's even taking longer because of that
405
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than if you did it yourself.
406
00:21:51.160 --> 00:21:54.160
Yeah, I mean, and we aren't you know, like having
407
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these layer of layers of abstraction isn't new, right, Like
408
00:21:57.880 --> 00:22:01.240
in the beginning, if you wanted to test something out,
409
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you had to write your own compiler and you had
410
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to write your own editor just to run this thing.
411
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And now I pop open VS code and you know,
412
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I run my high level programming language and I and
413
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it's good to go. So like there was a time
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I'm sure where everybody was like, oh, we're gonna humans
415
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are going to go away, and we're going to lose
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all of our knowledge because you know, we're not writing
417
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our own editors to run this application anymore. So it's
418
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we've seen this countless at times, you know, through the
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last sixty five years of software engineer.
420
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Also, I think that there's a an expertise that gradually
421
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grows when you're interacting with these things so that you
422
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know how to interact with them. The problem is that
423
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they change so quickly and change so often that it's
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hard to know. You know. We we live with a
425
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single compiler, a single ide for years and we finally
426
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get it figured out, and then they make a switch,
427
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and then we have to figure something out. But it
428
00:22:54.720 --> 00:22:59.200
takes years. Now these things, who knows, they could have
429
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changed in the back while you were taking a nap
430
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or drinking coffee, and and the way that you interact
431
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with it to be most productive has changed. Totally awesome.
432
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Yeah, yeah, but you know, it's all part of the
433
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evolution of things too.
434
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Right.
435
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I'm I got concerns. I do have problems with the
436
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hype cycle. But what I like about DevOps is it
437
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is in the product, right. It is a set of
438
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disciplines that make a better team. It's another one of
439
00:23:27.359 --> 00:23:29.720
those terms that's kind of fading away in the sense
440
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that this is just what a high functioning team looks like.
441
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That everybody's pulling towards the same goal of delivering solutions
442
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to customers that we care about, both its creation and
443
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its deployment and its operations and the telemetry and how
444
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that feeds back to making a better product. The fact
445
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that the tooling shuffles around underneath us par for the course, right,
446
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you could hope these things are only going to get better.
447
00:23:51.440 --> 00:23:53.440
Yeah, And I think you know to that point, a
448
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couple of years ago, five six years ago, maybe if
449
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you went and you wanted to do a talk on
450
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DevOps at a conference, I mean, that was the thing, right,
451
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like every conference shows, right, Yeah, that was it.
452
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That was it.
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Now you know it's different because to your point, Richard,
454
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it's just all kind of there in the background. It's
455
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just everybody's just kind of doing the thing.
456
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Uh.
457
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You know, we we're we're seeing it very similar with Kubernetes.
458
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Like Kubernetes from a container orchestration perspective, that's just the
459
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thing that you run it on. It's not it's not
460
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the hot sexy topic anymore, but the stuff that you're
461
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building on top of it is.
462
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Uh.
463
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And I'm sure you know I will go through that
464
00:24:32.279 --> 00:24:35.720
same thing. The one thing that I will say though,
465
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is when you're not programming day to day, you get
466
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rusty quick.
467
00:24:44.000 --> 00:24:44.519
Oh sure.
468
00:24:45.119 --> 00:24:48.880
So if you're constantly using you know, whatever your favorite
469
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m is to generate your code for you, you may
470
00:24:51.759 --> 00:24:54.279
be able to like, of course, still look at it,
471
00:24:54.839 --> 00:24:57.319
you know, figure figure out this is breaking here. I
472
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got to put some air handling over there. Blah blah blah.
473
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But like if you're just staring at a blank ide,
474
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you may have some trouble after a while, like getting
475
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something out on paper, so to speak.
476
00:25:09.559 --> 00:25:12.039
Sure humans are better at editing than they are to
477
00:25:12.119 --> 00:25:15.799
creating out a whole cloth anyway, yea, And Heaven help
478
00:25:15.839 --> 00:25:18.319
you if you try and build a CICD pipeline from
479
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scratch and YAML on a blank screen. I'm sorry. I
480
00:25:21.200 --> 00:25:24.200
cut and paste it all and then I go through
481
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it and try and understand what I just paste it
482
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in and make the tweaks accordingly, like we build on
483
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the shoulders of giants.
484
00:25:31.319 --> 00:25:33.559
It's the same for writing pros or poetry. Is that
485
00:25:33.720 --> 00:25:38.519
totally You don't write, you brainstorm and then edit. Writing
486
00:25:38.559 --> 00:25:39.960
isn't about writing, it's about editing.
487
00:25:41.039 --> 00:25:43.680
Yea, and all these things are the same. I'm just
488
00:25:43.720 --> 00:25:47.240
realizing we talked about in the earlier versions of Visual
489
00:25:47.240 --> 00:25:50.039
Studio how hard it was to build out the tooling,
490
00:25:50.119 --> 00:25:52.880
all the bits and pieces you need to actually automate
491
00:25:52.880 --> 00:25:55.880
the deployment pipeline. Today it's almost like we have an
492
00:25:55.880 --> 00:25:59.160
abundance of riches, like you're gonna get hub action this
493
00:26:00.160 --> 00:26:03.880
as you're devopsing this, yes or terrorforming this, like you
494
00:26:03.880 --> 00:26:04.960
have a lot of choices.
495
00:26:05.119 --> 00:26:07.559
I remember when customers would hire app Phenex to create
496
00:26:07.599 --> 00:26:11.359
a CICD pipeline as a you know, a consultancy because
497
00:26:11.400 --> 00:26:12.880
they didn't really know how to do it. And now
498
00:26:12.920 --> 00:26:14.359
it's just click click click boom boom.
499
00:26:14.400 --> 00:26:16.240
Well, and it was kind of a one off thing too,
500
00:26:16.359 --> 00:26:18.279
Like why would you want to get good at this?
501
00:26:18.440 --> 00:26:23.519
Although let's be clear you should, although today, like you said,
502
00:26:23.559 --> 00:26:25.920
it's just a set of checkboxes, Like the real crazy
503
00:26:25.920 --> 00:26:28.079
part is that you didn't. I still feel like the
504
00:26:28.160 --> 00:26:32.039
automated tests aren't great, although I gotta say looking at
505
00:26:32.039 --> 00:26:34.640
the prompt magicians, the guys that are really good at
506
00:26:34.680 --> 00:26:40.160
using these tools, they they are generating tests as part
507
00:26:40.200 --> 00:26:43.559
of the code and iterating on the test, passing with
508
00:26:43.720 --> 00:26:47.839
the code using the tools. Like arguably, if you do
509
00:26:47.880 --> 00:26:50.160
a good job with this, like you're doing that, you're
510
00:26:50.200 --> 00:26:53.279
you're insisting that these tools do the ideal case you
511
00:26:53.400 --> 00:26:55.079
never even measured up to yourself.
512
00:26:56.160 --> 00:26:56.960
It is very true.
513
00:26:57.319 --> 00:26:59.839
There's nothing like nothing like one hundred percent code coverage
514
00:27:00.119 --> 00:27:01.440
when you don't have to do.
515
00:27:01.400 --> 00:27:05.279
It and it's all about the templates, right. It's like,
516
00:27:05.400 --> 00:27:07.640
you know, do I have to write my one hundred
517
00:27:07.720 --> 00:27:10.920
thousandth unit test or mock test or integration test or
518
00:27:10.960 --> 00:27:13.960
functional test. No, it would be really great if I
519
00:27:13.960 --> 00:27:17.039
could just offload that to my AI friend, whichever one
520
00:27:17.079 --> 00:27:17.880
I decided to go with.
521
00:27:18.079 --> 00:27:19.640
You know, the one that I really struggle with is
522
00:27:19.640 --> 00:27:22.240
good telemetry. It's easy to collect a lot of data,
523
00:27:22.559 --> 00:27:24.759
it's hard to collect the data that really tells you
524
00:27:25.000 --> 00:27:27.240
what's going right and what's going wrong m hm.
525
00:27:27.400 --> 00:27:29.880
And particularly know how to make sense of it.
526
00:27:30.119 --> 00:27:33.960
Yeah, we're clearly getting some sense of messages coming back here.
527
00:27:34.119 --> 00:27:35.839
We have reams and reams of data coming in and
528
00:27:35.839 --> 00:27:38.640
we're paying for all that. But are we learning anything
529
00:27:38.720 --> 00:27:41.200
about how people are using our app or are they
530
00:27:41.440 --> 00:27:42.960
what their frustrations are?
531
00:27:43.039 --> 00:27:43.119
Like?
532
00:27:43.240 --> 00:27:45.200
I think this takes a lot of thought.
533
00:27:45.759 --> 00:27:47.920
Yeah. Are you still seeing the same problems in twenty
534
00:27:47.960 --> 00:27:50.960
twenty five with DevOps that you were three or four
535
00:27:51.039 --> 00:27:51.799
years ago? Yeah?
536
00:27:51.799 --> 00:27:53.680
I
mean I feel like I'm seeing the same problems
537
00:27:53.680 --> 00:27:58.680
that I saw, you know, fifteen years ago. I think
538
00:27:59.160 --> 00:28:02.880
so many of the the fundamental problems don't change all
539
00:28:02.920 --> 00:28:07.319
that much because the fundamental problems are honestly typically people problems,
540
00:28:07.599 --> 00:28:10.119
right It's you know, I think that's just how it
541
00:28:10.160 --> 00:28:12.519
always is, which is why I you know, a lot
542
00:28:12.519 --> 00:28:14.920
of people are nervous right now because you know, they think, hey,
543
00:28:15.000 --> 00:28:17.079
I'm going to take jobs in this now, blah blah blah.
544
00:28:17.079 --> 00:28:22.319
But that fundamental thing doesn't change, you know, until the
545
00:28:23.559 --> 00:28:27.039
terminator like universe is fully in play here. I think
546
00:28:27.079 --> 00:28:29.960
we're all all right. But you know, in terms of
547
00:28:30.000 --> 00:28:33.200
like DevOps as a whole, I think the biggest things
548
00:28:33.240 --> 00:28:38.079
honestly right now, phinops is a huge one that everybody's
549
00:28:38.079 --> 00:28:40.000
trying to figure out, like the whole idea around cost
550
00:28:40.079 --> 00:28:45.599
optimization and with that performance optimization and resource optimization. Things
551
00:28:45.599 --> 00:28:48.240
are moving, I mean, and I know we always say this, right,
552
00:28:48.279 --> 00:28:51.079
but it feels more so now that things are moving,
553
00:28:51.079 --> 00:28:55.480
you know, quote faster than ever. And with that, there's
554
00:28:55.599 --> 00:28:59.119
just four more resources being used. And now we're seeing
555
00:28:59.599 --> 00:29:02.440
a lot of of like actual like cost optimization or
556
00:29:02.480 --> 00:29:06.240
finops engineers or whatever the title is getting hired in
557
00:29:06.400 --> 00:29:10.599
organizations specifically to do this job. And that's very interesting.
558
00:29:10.640 --> 00:29:12.960
So I'm definitely seeing a lot of that. But in
559
00:29:13.039 --> 00:29:16.200
terms of you know, the general what DevOps is doing.
560
00:29:17.680 --> 00:29:20.119
I don't think much of it has changed recently. I
561
00:29:20.200 --> 00:29:22.440
think the I don't know if you would call this
562
00:29:22.559 --> 00:29:24.960
a DevOps change per se, but the whole idea around
563
00:29:25.039 --> 00:29:28.200
platform engineering, I think really what they're trying to do
564
00:29:28.240 --> 00:29:32.480
with that is, say, I have engineers that are managing
565
00:29:32.519 --> 00:29:37.240
and building and maintaining this particular tool that we're utilizing
566
00:29:37.359 --> 00:29:41.119
internally like a product. Right, So they're putting their customer
567
00:29:41.160 --> 00:29:44.720
service hats on because you know, their internal engineers are
568
00:29:44.799 --> 00:29:49.079
the customers of the platform. You know, they're building it
569
00:29:49.119 --> 00:29:52.359
in a way where they're thinking more about architecture than
570
00:29:52.400 --> 00:29:54.920
they are about let me go write the code, and
571
00:29:54.920 --> 00:29:56.799
then they're building this thing for use to be able
572
00:29:56.839 --> 00:30:00.640
to move faster inside. Now, we've always kind of had
573
00:30:00.680 --> 00:30:03.839
tools like that, or you know, rather engineers that would
574
00:30:03.839 --> 00:30:06.279
build stuff like that. You know, when I had a
575
00:30:06.400 --> 00:30:09.640
senior Principal Infrastructure engineer title years ago, when I was
576
00:30:09.680 --> 00:30:13.839
building out little automation tools in Python, which would maybe
577
00:30:13.920 --> 00:30:17.480
look like you know, platform engineering today. But I would
578
00:30:17.480 --> 00:30:20.960
say that's probably the biggest shift that I've seen recently
579
00:30:21.000 --> 00:30:22.000
in this space overall.
580
00:30:22.279 --> 00:30:24.400
Sure, it seems like a good place to take a break,
581
00:30:24.480 --> 00:30:27.000
So we'll be right back after these very important messages
582
00:30:27.039 --> 00:30:31.039
stick around. Did you know that you can work with
583
00:30:31.200 --> 00:30:37.039
AWS directly from your ide AWS provides toolkits for visual studio,
584
00:30:37.359 --> 00:30:41.319
visual Studio, code, and jet brains rider Learn more at
585
00:30:41.359 --> 00:30:50.519
AWS dot Amazon dot com, slash net slash tools. Now
586
00:30:50.519 --> 00:30:52.960
we're back. It's dot NetRocks. I'm Carl Franklin. That's my
587
00:30:53.000 --> 00:30:56.519
friend Richard Campbell, Hey, and this is our friend Michael Levan,
588
00:30:56.839 --> 00:31:01.160
And we're talking about DevOps in twenty twenty five. Because
589
00:31:01.200 --> 00:31:03.680
you know, some things have changed, but some things have not.
590
00:31:05.279 --> 00:31:09.400
Uh. Security, I'm just going to drop that bomb out there,
591
00:31:09.440 --> 00:31:13.440
because yeah, you know it's the battle a. It's way
592
00:31:13.480 --> 00:31:15.880
more difficult these days. The black hat's gotten way smarter.
593
00:31:16.039 --> 00:31:18.279
Oh god, it's got to be part of the equation.
594
00:31:18.759 --> 00:31:21.119
A lot of this generated software people are not putting
595
00:31:21.200 --> 00:31:23.720
enough consideration in. They're much less. Not that they did
596
00:31:23.880 --> 00:31:26.000
but when they were writing it all by hand. But
597
00:31:26.200 --> 00:31:27.920
how do you see a fitting in the pipeline, Like
598
00:31:27.960 --> 00:31:30.400
what's the culture like when to make this work? Well,
599
00:31:30.640 --> 00:31:31.160
I like to.
600
00:31:31.119 --> 00:31:34.519
Look at it from the software side and then from
601
00:31:34.599 --> 00:31:39.119
the networking side. So from a software from an application perspective,
602
00:31:40.000 --> 00:31:42.960
how you're securing your application, whether you're going with you
know,
603
00:31:43.480 --> 00:31:46.039
your standard app set stuff like your SaaS stuff and
604
00:31:46.079 --> 00:31:50.000
your SCA stuff, what libraries you're using, you know, are
605
00:31:50.039 --> 00:31:53.440
you encrypting traffic? What does the code quality actually look like?
606
00:31:53.799 --> 00:31:57.000
So that's one piece of it. But from a DevOps perspective,
607
00:31:57.279 --> 00:32:01.640
ironically enough, I feel like the majority of security issues
608
00:32:01.720 --> 00:32:05.119
are around networking. So you know, if there are any
609
00:32:05.279 --> 00:32:09.200
network admins or network engineers listening, you know, the whole
610
00:32:09.240 --> 00:32:12.200
idea around what does ingress look like, what does egress
611
00:32:12.240 --> 00:32:15.640
look like? How are services talking to each other? So like,
612
00:32:15.680 --> 00:32:19.559
for example, in the realm of Kubernetes, are you using
613
00:32:19.559 --> 00:32:22.119
a service mesh? Are you encrypting the traffic going back
614
00:32:22.160 --> 00:32:24.759
and forth at the L seven layer? Are you doing
615
00:32:25.039 --> 00:32:27.440
pod to pod encryption? Are you, you know, encrypting at
616
00:32:27.440 --> 00:32:30.839
the L three and the L four layer within your cluster? So,
617
00:32:30.920 --> 00:32:33.559
and that's just an example, of course, but like I
618
00:32:33.559 --> 00:32:36.960
think that's honestly, in my opinion, the biggest part of
619
00:32:36.960 --> 00:32:41.240
it is what traffic is coming in, what traffic is leaving,
620
00:32:41.599 --> 00:32:46.799
and perhaps even most importantly in the world of containerization,
621
00:32:47.720 --> 00:32:51.279
how are these containers, are these pods talking to each other,
622
00:32:51.759 --> 00:32:54.440
and how does the traffic look. Is this pods supposed
623
00:32:54.440 --> 00:32:57.160
to be talking to that pod or that container? Are
624
00:32:57.200 --> 00:32:59.960
these services supposed to be calling out to this database?
625
00:33:00.359 --> 00:33:03.519
And I would say, honestly, that's a majority of the
626
00:33:03.559 --> 00:33:06.720
security issues in the realm of debops and platform engineering.
627
00:33:07.240 --> 00:33:09.039
The other big thing is and this is I think
628
00:33:09.079 --> 00:33:12.640
just across any realm of it. I think one of
629
00:33:12.680 --> 00:33:15.400
the red hat reports that I read maybe last year
630
00:33:15.480 --> 00:33:18.480
or the year before, it was like seventy four seventy
631
00:33:18.480 --> 00:33:21.680
six percent of security issues are due to misconfigurations. Yea,
632
00:33:22.160 --> 00:33:23.599
and that's just everywhere.
633
00:33:23.720 --> 00:33:26.440
And then I'm patch servers, you know, throwing on my
634
00:33:26.519 --> 00:33:29.119
run ass hat, like for honest the goodness, I think
635
00:33:29.160 --> 00:33:33.759
we're actually making headway on on SQL injection these days,
636
00:33:34.279 --> 00:33:36.240
so that it's I think it's a third now. It
637
00:33:36.319 --> 00:33:41.559
used to be first forever. But it's like, you know, misconfiguration.
638
00:33:41.720 --> 00:33:43.720
You haven't secured the thing properly in the first place,
639
00:33:44.200 --> 00:33:46.519
and you didn't get the patch donet a time. Like
640
00:33:46.519 --> 00:33:50.519
we've had huge discussions on run ass about what's higher risk,
641
00:33:50.640 --> 00:33:54.039
deploying a bad patch or not deploying the patch as
642
00:33:54.119 --> 00:33:56.759
quickly as possible. And it seems like that sort of
643
00:33:56.759 --> 00:33:59.279
flip that I'd rather the outage because I deployed the
644
00:33:59.279 --> 00:34:03.119
patch fat than the exploit that comes from not getting
645
00:34:03.119 --> 00:34:05.319
that patch out there quickly, which is crazy, but it
646
00:34:05.319 --> 00:34:06.559
seems to be the new reality.
647
00:34:06.640 --> 00:34:09.639
So it seems to me that you've got two sort
648
00:34:09.639 --> 00:34:12.280
of realms of security when it comes to DevOps. You
649
00:34:12.320 --> 00:34:16.440
have the configuration of the topography itself, and once that's
650
00:34:16.480 --> 00:34:19.360
done and everything is secure and working, now you have
651
00:34:19.440 --> 00:34:22.599
a continuous job, which is you need a software bill
652
00:34:22.639 --> 00:34:24.760
of materials. You need to know what devices you have,
653
00:34:24.880 --> 00:34:28.679
what their versions are, and update them every chance you get.
654
00:34:28.960 --> 00:34:30.920
So you need to keep on top of that, and
655
00:34:30.960 --> 00:34:34.280
on top of that the software, the libraries and dependencies
656
00:34:34.320 --> 00:34:37.719
that you're on. You need the graph of dependencies so
657
00:34:37.760 --> 00:34:41.039
that and you have to watch the news. So if
658
00:34:41.079 --> 00:34:43.119
there's an exploit in one of those things, you need
659
00:34:43.159 --> 00:34:45.920
to know that, and you need to you know, if
660
00:34:45.960 --> 00:34:48.920
it's hardware, you either have to patch it right away.
661
00:34:49.400 --> 00:34:52.440
Sometimes the only thing you can do is take it
662
00:34:52.480 --> 00:34:56.400
off the network because there's no patch available and you're vulnerable.
663
00:34:56.519 --> 00:34:59.519
Worst case scenario. Yeah yeah, but hopefully you're going to
664
00:34:59.559 --> 00:35:03.400
security Microsoft and you're watching the CVE stream, like exactly,
665
00:35:03.400 --> 00:35:07.239
that's probably the first place to look, Michael, are you
666
00:35:07.280 --> 00:35:09.760
big on things like the actual API management? Like that
667
00:35:09.920 --> 00:35:12.239
saved my bacon a couple of times now just using
668
00:35:12.280 --> 00:35:15.880
those tools, Yeah, to show I know who uses my APIs,
669
00:35:15.960 --> 00:35:19.320
I can set thresholds per user. So when somebody got
670
00:35:19.360 --> 00:35:24.239
exploited and started doing mass extraction of data, the API
671
00:35:24.320 --> 00:35:27.159
limits kicked in and kicked up a bunch of warnings.
672
00:35:27.400 --> 00:35:29.599
You know, they had legit credentials. Everything looked fun. It's
673
00:35:29.599 --> 00:35:31.679
just the traffic was out of shape because it was
674
00:35:31.920 --> 00:35:32.559
an exploit.
675
00:35:32.639 --> 00:35:34.599
Yeah, one hundred percent. And I think tools like that
676
00:35:35.280 --> 00:35:38.559
we all need to be looking at constantly because the
677
00:35:38.920 --> 00:35:41.760
problem is, well it's not even a problem, it's just
678
00:35:41.760 --> 00:35:44.119
something that maybe we all still have to get used to,
679
00:35:44.320 --> 00:35:48.639
is that there are way more endpoints now and way
680
00:35:48.639 --> 00:35:52.840
more layers to networking than there were before. You know,
681
00:35:52.920 --> 00:35:55.400
to take because we're talking about DevOps, right, take the
682
00:35:55.639 --> 00:35:58.719
Kubernetes example again, Like there was a time where you
683
00:35:58.800 --> 00:36:01.800
just had this monolithic app and like there was a
684
00:36:02.159 --> 00:36:05.719
server and there was one entry point, right, and everything
685
00:36:05.840 --> 00:36:09.280
was there and it was all good. Now they're just
686
00:36:09.400 --> 00:36:13.280
multiple layers, like you know, you're looking at the Kubernetes cluster.
687
00:36:13.400 --> 00:36:16.079
You have your host networking layers like your virtual machines
688
00:36:16.079 --> 00:36:18.800
and stuff and everything running it. And then you have
689
00:36:19.079 --> 00:36:22.159
the container networks, the pod networks. That's another layer that
690
00:36:22.199 --> 00:36:25.000
you have to manage. Then you have your Kubernetes services,
691
00:36:25.280 --> 00:36:27.880
which are another networking layer, and that's where you know
692
00:36:28.199 --> 00:36:31.320
your security centric cni's and your service match like histio
693
00:36:31.360 --> 00:36:32.079
and stuff will come.
694
00:36:32.039 --> 00:36:35.320
To Gee, I wonder why we have configurations problem, Michael,
695
00:36:35.360 --> 00:36:39.239
I'm confused. I'm on my seventeenth layer and I feel
696
00:36:39.280 --> 00:36:40.000
really good.
697
00:36:40.239 --> 00:36:45.159
Well, and that's that's honestly the Again, it's not a problem.
698
00:36:45.199 --> 00:36:48.519
It's just something that we all have to really get
699
00:36:48.599 --> 00:36:52.199
used to because as where you can call it decoupled
700
00:36:52.199 --> 00:36:55.920
applications or your micro services or whatever whatever phrasing you
701
00:36:55.960 --> 00:36:59.199
want to call it, everything is split up now and
702
00:36:59.280 --> 00:37:01.199
everything is taught to each other. It's not just in
703
00:37:01.239 --> 00:37:05.199
one box anymore. And because of that, you now have
704
00:37:05.440 --> 00:37:09.159
not only multiple layers, but a lot of east west traffic,
705
00:37:09.239 --> 00:37:12.000
a lot of north south traffic. Like everything is talking
706
00:37:12.039 --> 00:37:15.920
to everything inside of a cluster, but then also outside.
707
00:37:15.960 --> 00:37:19.119
Maybe it's hitting a public endpoint, maybe it's hitting a database.
708
00:37:19.559 --> 00:37:22.760
There's a lot of traffic going back and forth, and
709
00:37:22.800 --> 00:37:26.000
that's why I think, you know, outside of the software
710
00:37:26.000 --> 00:37:29.719
engineering security stuff, I certainly hope AppSec gets more and
711
00:37:29.719 --> 00:37:32.239
more popular, especially with AI right now. It needs to.
712
00:37:32.960 --> 00:37:36.159
But aside from that, from a purely DevOps perspective, and
713
00:37:36.360 --> 00:37:39.800
I think the majority of it is networking. Like you
714
00:37:39.840 --> 00:37:42.039
have your patches, of course, and you want to be
715
00:37:42.039 --> 00:37:45.360
able to update your APIs like from a you know,
716
00:37:45.440 --> 00:37:48.199
let's say like you're utilizing a specific API within an
717
00:37:48.199 --> 00:37:51.480
application running. You're not managing that application, but you want
718
00:37:51.519 --> 00:37:53.800
to be able to upgrade those versions. That's one thing.
719
00:37:53.840 --> 00:37:56.960
But yeah, I mean I'm going off on a tangent here,
720
00:37:57.000 --> 00:37:58.920
but a big part of it is networking, honestly.
721
00:37:59.079 --> 00:38:01.599
Yeah, I arties like why haven't I set up an
722
00:38:01.599 --> 00:38:05.440
agent that's watching the CVE stream from Microsoft and just
723
00:38:05.519 --> 00:38:08.800
evaluating against every project that I've got they exist, Yeah,
724
00:38:08.840 --> 00:38:11.440
I appresume they do. It's this is non dirigional line idea.
725
00:38:11.559 --> 00:38:13.519
Well, the MCP stuff, but it's.
726
00:38:13.400 --> 00:38:16.039
A great idea. M M Yeah, you don't necessarily want
727
00:38:16.039 --> 00:38:18.960
to give it the ability to update your firmware, but no,
728
00:38:19.360 --> 00:38:22.039
but certainly I just want to heads up right a
729
00:38:22.159 --> 00:38:24.840
heads up because would be good. Yeah, just reading all
730
00:38:24.880 --> 00:38:27.719
those things like reading a CVE is painful. What right,
731
00:38:28.719 --> 00:38:32.119
They're not fun to read. But before you can get
732
00:38:32.119 --> 00:38:34.719
that list effectively, you need to have software building.
733
00:38:34.480 --> 00:38:37.239
Materials are at the other side of this, right, Yeah.
734
00:38:37.280 --> 00:38:41.000
So are you seeing s BOMs slowly creeping into the
735
00:38:41.039 --> 00:38:45.320
culture or still no? I mean last time I checked
736
00:38:45.400 --> 00:38:49.320
that there's not not everybody's doing those. Yeah.
737
00:38:49.519 --> 00:38:53.599
I don't think as much like it. It hasn't grown
738
00:38:54.039 --> 00:38:57.559
in the same way as
like your general security practices,
739
00:38:57.639 --> 00:39:00.559
like for example, like policy as code, you know, making
740
00:39:00.639 --> 00:39:03.880
sure that you're following all the best practices and you're
741
00:39:03.960 --> 00:39:07.679
using something like open Policy Agent or or you know,
742
00:39:07.840 --> 00:39:10.960
Kaiburno or one of the other policy as code tools.
743
00:39:11.320 --> 00:39:13.760
I think stuff like that we're seeing more so, but
744
00:39:14.920 --> 00:39:17.239
things like s BOM, things like you know, your your
745
00:39:17.360 --> 00:39:21.719
overarching cybersecurity pieces. I don't you know what it is.
746
00:39:21.760 --> 00:39:23.679
I just don't think it's like it's not like a
747
00:39:23.719 --> 00:39:25.280
hot topic, you know what I mean.
748
00:39:25.320 --> 00:39:27.559
It is it's very preventative, but like it.
749
00:39:27.519 --> 00:39:29.519
Doesn't sound good, you know what I mean, And people
750
00:39:29.559 --> 00:39:31.000
are like, ah, you know, we don't have to worry
751
00:39:31.039 --> 00:39:33.400
about that. Because it's not you know, a top five
752
00:39:33.519 --> 00:39:35.719
thing in the realm of cloud native or whatever, and
753
00:39:36.199 --> 00:39:38.800
that's just that those are the hype cycles and all
754
00:39:38.840 --> 00:39:39.559
that fun stuff.
755
00:39:39.599 --> 00:39:43.039
So well, sbom got more love when log for Jay
756
00:39:43.159 --> 00:39:46.519
got exploited. How bit exposed are we? Right? Like how
757
00:39:46.519 --> 00:39:49.079
many of these things only get dealt with after something's
758
00:39:49.079 --> 00:39:49.679
on fire?
759
00:39:50.000 --> 00:39:53.880
Right, And that's the general security unfortunately, is that it's
760
00:39:54.000 --> 00:39:58.000
really important when things go bad and richer to your
761
00:39:58.000 --> 00:40:00.159
point of like you know, hey, I want to set
762
00:40:00.199 --> 00:40:02.079
up an agent to be able to listen for, you know,
763
00:40:02.119 --> 00:40:04.920
any TVs that are coming in or whatever. Then you
764
00:40:05.840 --> 00:40:08.840
then you got another security issue, right, is what the
765
00:40:08.920 --> 00:40:10.679
agent telling you accurate?
766
00:40:10.800 --> 00:40:10.880
Right?
767
00:40:11.000 --> 00:40:11.800
Yeah? Even correct?
768
00:40:11.840 --> 00:40:12.239
And then.
769
00:40:13.639 --> 00:40:17.039
Yeah, around and around. Well, but this is you know,
770
00:40:17.840 --> 00:40:20.119
who puts on the tinfoil hat in your organization?
771
00:40:20.320 --> 00:40:20.480
Right?
772
00:40:20.639 --> 00:40:22.800
Like where We're lucky, there's somebody wears it all the
773
00:40:22.800 --> 00:40:25.360
time and they like it, which is rare. Uh, And
774
00:40:25.400 --> 00:40:28.920
that's a strange person. And I you know, I'm very
775
00:40:28.960 --> 00:40:32.000
aware that there in a few places like Okay, one
776
00:40:32.159 --> 00:40:34.199
some month, I'm going to put the hat on and
777
00:40:34.239 --> 00:40:36.880
like today I'm the security guy, I look a little
778
00:40:36.960 --> 00:40:39.840
more nervous and I'm angry all the time, you know,
779
00:40:39.920 --> 00:40:42.440
but you know, and you put your foot often you
780
00:40:42.480 --> 00:40:45.360
find yourself focusing on preventative work, right, and maybe that's
781
00:40:45.400 --> 00:40:46.519
the time when you build that thing.
782
00:40:46.639 --> 00:40:50.280
The tinfoil hat guys are generally focused on conspiracies, but
783
00:40:50.400 --> 00:40:54.960
fortunately for them, you know, hacks and exploits are conspiracies
784
00:40:54.960 --> 00:40:55.480
against you.
785
00:40:57.039 --> 00:41:01.639
Is it still a conspiracy if it's really happening, Because
786
00:41:01.639 --> 00:41:03.880
you're looking at the logs and just watching them hammer
787
00:41:03.920 --> 00:41:06.039
away at you, it's like, is this a conspiracy or
788
00:41:06.039 --> 00:41:07.079
it's just a log file?
789
00:41:07.280 --> 00:41:10.440
Like, I'm pretty sure the tinfoil hat guys think people
790
00:41:10.440 --> 00:41:12.880
are inherently evil and then they get proof of it
791
00:41:12.960 --> 00:41:15.880
and it makes them happy to reinforces their tinfoil hatness.
792
00:41:16.159 --> 00:41:19.280
Yeah, it just but if nobody's looking, then you find
793
00:41:19.280 --> 00:41:19.960
out the hard way.
794
00:41:20.119 --> 00:41:23.480
Yeah sure, yeah, Like I'm greeing with you, Richard. I
795
00:41:23.480 --> 00:41:25.480
think you got to put those guys to work.
796
00:41:25.519 --> 00:41:28.199
And I've included a link to the gethup repository of
797
00:41:28.199 --> 00:41:30.079
the s bomb tools that Microsoft put together.
798
00:41:30.280 --> 00:41:30.519
Cool.
799
00:41:30.800 --> 00:41:34.320
Oddly enough, I think it was around the time of CrowdStrike.
800
00:41:34.440 --> 00:41:39.000
I don't know one of those you know, conspiracy another
801
00:41:39.039 --> 00:41:43.400
one gees, how could that have happened. It was earlier
802
00:41:43.400 --> 00:41:45.239
than that. Maybe it was it was one of the
803
00:41:45.280 --> 00:41:48.000
other like supply chain acts, like there's been a few.
804
00:41:48.679 --> 00:41:52.320
It's just you know, it's frightening. But it's of course
805
00:41:52.440 --> 00:41:54.320
this is not actually a security show. This is just
806
00:41:54.320 --> 00:41:57.119
how do we include this in our overall life cycle
807
00:41:57.159 --> 00:42:00.639
of making software that it does get going And you know,
808
00:42:00.719 --> 00:42:02.480
again it's in some ways it's like we're going to
809
00:42:02.519 --> 00:42:04.559
be the better version of ourselves because we're writing this
810
00:42:04.599 --> 00:42:07.360
as a prompt for tools, for these tools to actually
811
00:42:07.440 --> 00:42:10.840
try and implement it right up until it gets hard
812
00:42:11.119 --> 00:42:13.000
and it's like, no, you actually now have to work
813
00:42:13.000 --> 00:42:15.360
on this just because you found a CV that might
814
00:42:15.360 --> 00:42:17.400
be relevant and it relates to a UNK code that
815
00:42:17.519 --> 00:42:19.320
is deployed in your organization. Now you got to figure
816
00:42:19.320 --> 00:42:20.000
out what to do.
817
00:42:20.599 --> 00:42:24.000
Yeah, And I think a big thing is it's really
818
00:42:24.039 --> 00:42:29.039
hard for organizations, specifically management to like specify an ROI
819
00:42:29.119 --> 00:42:33.159
on we're going to take the week or whatever it'll
820
00:42:33.199 --> 00:42:36.639
take to make this application a little bit more secure,
821
00:42:36.639 --> 00:42:39.760
and no, sorry, we have something something deadlined. Sorry, something
822
00:42:39.800 --> 00:42:41.639
something needs to be out this week at the end
823
00:42:41.679 --> 00:42:42.119
of the quarter.
824
00:42:42.239 --> 00:42:44.320
When you're also avoiding the big thing, which is that
825
00:42:44.599 --> 00:42:47.719
the consequences to the company getting exploited never seem to
826
00:42:47.760 --> 00:42:51.239
be that significant either. You know, you if you engage
827
00:42:51.239 --> 00:42:53.800
your PR crisis team, you do your make help us
828
00:42:53.840 --> 00:42:55.880
on TV if you if you're a large enough scover
829
00:42:55.960 --> 00:42:58.599
that thing. All of the customers that got exploited, you
830
00:42:58.639 --> 00:43:00.639
sign them up to some kind of monitor during service
831
00:43:00.679 --> 00:43:04.039
and say sorry, and then you go on with your day.
832
00:43:04.599 --> 00:43:04.840
Yeah.
833
00:43:05.039 --> 00:43:08.519
And I've even heard, like quite literally, I've heard we
834
00:43:08.599 --> 00:43:09.320
don't want to know.
835
00:43:09.639 --> 00:43:11.679
Yeah, yeah, because he represents liability.
836
00:43:11.719 --> 00:43:15.519
Yeah. If I don't know, if you knew, you know,
837
00:43:15.599 --> 00:43:16.679
it's gonna blame me. Yeah.
838
00:43:16.719 --> 00:43:19.880
Yeah, it's so. And I'm not a big on willful ignorance,
839
00:43:19.920 --> 00:43:28.719
but holy man, right, like come on, yeah, and again
840
00:43:28.760 --> 00:43:30.599
it so the side effective the run last time of
841
00:43:30.679 --> 00:43:33.639
dealing with real security guys where quit a job because
842
00:43:33.639 --> 00:43:36.199
they refused to deal with it and then when it
843
00:43:36.239 --> 00:43:38.440
went down big time, they got sa panted.
844
00:43:38.360 --> 00:43:43.159
Right right, yep. Yeah, it's not a uh, it's actually
845
00:43:43.239 --> 00:43:47.800
not an uncommon thing. I mean it's very Yeah. Security
846
00:43:48.119 --> 00:43:51.519
is securing your application in general, securing your your DevOps
847
00:43:51.519 --> 00:43:54.800
piece of the puzzle. I mean, it's for for everybody listening.
848
00:43:54.920 --> 00:43:56.880
If you're wondering like, oh, do I have to go
849
00:43:56.920 --> 00:44:01.400
and dive into security full time? Or you know, what
850
00:44:01.400 --> 00:44:04.679
do I gotta do here? Really, it's just when you're
851
00:44:04.719 --> 00:44:09.199
designing your your pipeline, or you're designing your Kubernetus cluster,
852
00:44:09.280 --> 00:44:13.159
you're designing your application stack, whatever it is, just take
853
00:44:13.199 --> 00:44:16.559
the extra five to ten minutes to think it through,
854
00:44:16.880 --> 00:44:19.199
you know, and a lot of it again, it's it's
855
00:44:19.239 --> 00:44:24.239
so many just simple misconfigurations. Oopsies. I left root access
856
00:44:24.239 --> 00:44:26.599
on these r back permissions when I was testing something
857
00:44:26.599 --> 00:44:28.639
and I forgot they were there. I mean that's probably
858
00:44:28.679 --> 00:44:32.440
like in the top three things that happened, right, you know, Yeah.
859
00:44:32.400 --> 00:44:35.679
Yeah, deployed with it with the dbug still on, and
860
00:44:35.719 --> 00:44:38.079
people can stap in back black hat stap in it
861
00:44:38.079 --> 00:44:40.320
and take advantage of it. Liketh, it's it, Yeah, well
862
00:44:40.440 --> 00:44:42.119
were I'm not clever enough to think of these things.
863
00:44:42.159 --> 00:44:43.519
All I have is the case studies.
864
00:44:45.599 --> 00:44:49.760
Yeah, it's really, honestly, so much of it, especially especially
865
00:44:49.840 --> 00:44:53.679
from a DevOps perspective, is just yeah, take the extra
866
00:44:53.920 --> 00:44:56.639
you know, breathing through your nose and out through your
867
00:44:56.679 --> 00:45:00.840
mouth and just say okay, does does the look okay?
868
00:45:01.519 --> 00:45:04.800
And honestly, if you if you just take that couple
869
00:45:04.880 --> 00:45:09.880
of minutes, I can guarantee that you're gonna find some stuff.
870
00:45:09.920 --> 00:45:11.760
And you're like, oh, this would have been bad.
871
00:45:12.000 --> 00:45:15.280
Yeah, well that's the standard cycle of development too. You know,
872
00:45:16.119 --> 00:45:19.800
when I'm developing, I always when I'm done, okay, there,
873
00:45:20.079 --> 00:45:22.440
I get up and I walk away for fifteen to
874
00:45:22.599 --> 00:45:25.000
twenty minutes, and I come back and I go through
875
00:45:25.000 --> 00:45:28.000
it again and just you know, take a deep breath
876
00:45:28.000 --> 00:45:30.800
to think. But you know, now now you have to
877
00:45:30.800 --> 00:45:36.119
think about it from the perspective of security, you know,
878
00:45:36.400 --> 00:45:38.920
and everything else, not just development.
879
00:45:39.920 --> 00:45:41.960
And that's that's tough for a lot of teams, right,
880
00:45:42.039 --> 00:45:45.159
especially for DevOps teams, because honestly, I think that the
881
00:45:45.199 --> 00:45:48.119
biggest problem is I've spoken to a lot of people,
882
00:45:48.119 --> 00:45:49.440
and a lot of people are like, yeah, I wish
883
00:45:49.440 --> 00:45:51.480
we could do this, but we don't
have the time.
884
00:45:51.559 --> 00:45:53.079
Yeah I wish we could do this, but we got
885
00:45:53.119 --> 00:45:54.639
to get this done tomorrow. Yeh, I wish we could.
886
00:45:54.880 --> 00:45:57.199
And that that's it's always what it is. So sometimes
887
00:45:57.280 --> 00:46:00.400
you have to manage up as well. Again, and it's
888
00:46:00.840 --> 00:46:04.719
it's never a technology problem. It's it's always a people thing,
889
00:46:05.079 --> 00:46:07.760
not even a problem, right, It's just you need to
890
00:46:07.760 --> 00:46:09.199
be able to and this is going to be different
891
00:46:09.199 --> 00:46:12.599
across every organization. You need to be able to think
892
00:46:12.599 --> 00:46:17.800
about what your manager, how your manager receives information, and
893
00:46:18.599 --> 00:46:21.079
mold what you want to tell them in a way
894
00:46:21.119 --> 00:46:24.239
that gets them to understand, ooh, this is important, we
895
00:46:24.280 --> 00:46:27.840
need the extra day because usually a manager can find
896
00:46:27.880 --> 00:46:30.519
the extra day or the extra couple of hours as
897
00:46:30.559 --> 00:46:33.440
long as you present the information in a way that
898
00:46:33.920 --> 00:46:36.159
they can digest it and it's important to them. If
899
00:46:36.199 --> 00:46:39.400
you're frantically running around and saying, oh, this thing needs
900
00:46:39.400 --> 00:46:41.079
to be done because of this and that and technical
901
00:46:41.159 --> 00:46:44.159
jargon here and technical jargon there, chances are a manager's
902
00:46:44.199 --> 00:46:46.360
going to say, yep, just another person that you know
903
00:46:46.599 --> 00:46:49.079
just wants extra time to do this thing and to put,
904
00:46:49.119 --> 00:46:51.480
you know, a couple of extra sprinkles on top. I've
905
00:46:51.480 --> 00:46:54.880
seen this a thousand times in my career. But if
906
00:46:54.880 --> 00:46:57.280
you're the person that goes to your manager and explains
907
00:46:57.280 --> 00:47:00.159
it in a way that makes them realize just how
908
00:47:00.199 --> 00:47:02.320
important it is, and hopefully you know your manager well
909
00:47:02.440 --> 00:47:05.039
enough to know how to do that, If you don't learn,
910
00:47:05.400 --> 00:47:08.400
then your outcome is going to be very different. So really,
911
00:47:08.480 --> 00:47:11.719
I mean implementing all the security implementations can be as
912
00:47:11.719 --> 00:47:16.119
simple as just understanding what the other person needs to
913
00:47:16.119 --> 00:47:19.440
be able to hear to make it an effective decision.
914
00:47:19.519 --> 00:47:22.519
You know, one thing we haven't talked about is social
915
00:47:22.599 --> 00:47:28.079
engineering from outside forces into you know, the staff on
916
00:47:28.159 --> 00:47:32.119
the edge of the of the organization, you know, clicking
917
00:47:32.159 --> 00:47:35.079
on emails and all of that stuff, and then somebody
918
00:47:35.079 --> 00:47:38.360
getting control of your network inside. I mean, the way
919
00:47:38.400 --> 00:47:41.679
to prepare for that isn't necessarily with technology, but education
920
00:47:41.960 --> 00:47:45.599
of your staff. And I wonder how how often that
921
00:47:45.679 --> 00:47:49.119
creeps up in your line of work.
922
00:47:49.360 --> 00:47:53.239
I would say not as much as like, if you're
923
00:47:53.280 --> 00:47:55.480
on the help desk or you're you know, in the
924
00:47:55.480 --> 00:47:58.519
cisadmin space or something right now, you're probably going to
925
00:47:58.599 --> 00:48:01.480
see that a lot more. The only time that I
926
00:48:01.559 --> 00:48:04.559
personally see it is like if I accidentally click on
927
00:48:04.840 --> 00:48:09.880
a phishing scan, which I'm human like, sometimes things look legit,
928
00:48:09.960 --> 00:48:12.519
you know, and I'm like, oh, this was one of
929
00:48:12.519 --> 00:48:14.599
those no before tests or something like that.
930
00:48:15.679 --> 00:48:20.199
But I guess, like the standard backup practices protect against ransomware, right,
931
00:48:20.280 --> 00:48:23.519
so if something does happen, what do you do? And
932
00:48:23.599 --> 00:48:27.320
you could spend an ordinate amount of money on protecting
933
00:48:27.320 --> 00:48:29.920
yourself with multiple backups and off site and all of
934
00:48:29.960 --> 00:48:33.199
this stuff. How do you how do you prepare for
935
00:48:33.239 --> 00:48:35.400
the or do you even prepare for ransomware? Are you
936
00:48:35.599 --> 00:48:38.400
just like, now, if that happens, we're screud.
937
00:48:38.000 --> 00:48:41.960
Should you prepare for it? Absolutely? Like taking the backup example.
938
00:48:42.639 --> 00:48:45.320
Last week, I actually with a client, I did a
939
00:48:45.599 --> 00:48:48.840
dr strategy test where we were on the call for
940
00:48:48.880 --> 00:48:51.679
about three hours and we blew a database away and
941
00:48:51.719 --> 00:48:53.840
we tested to make sure that things were going to
942
00:48:53.920 --> 00:48:57.239
work as expected to luckily you know we you know,
943
00:48:57.280 --> 00:48:59.880
they test recoveries. They don't just back things up and
944
00:49:00.039 --> 00:49:00.719
hope for the best.
945
00:49:01.199 --> 00:49:03.639
Now, you don't have backups unless you test.
946
00:49:03.440 --> 00:49:06.679
Them exactly, that's it. So things like that, I mean, yeah,
947
00:49:06.719 --> 00:49:10.760
like you can absolutely sit there and prepare for But again,
948
00:49:12.239 --> 00:49:15.239
it's one of those things where you want to do it,
949
00:49:15.320 --> 00:49:18.599
and you can do it from a technology perspective. It
950
00:49:18.679 --> 00:49:21.440
is there and it's readily available, but now you have
951
00:49:21.519 --> 00:49:25.400
to go in convince your manager that you need to
952
00:49:25.400 --> 00:49:27.280
take to three to four hours to go and test
953
00:49:27.320
--> 00:49:29.760
this thing and confirm that it's going to work as expected.
954
00:49:30.280 --> 00:49:33.239
Ironically enough, in the realm of DevOps and in the
955
00:49:33.280 --> 00:49:36.599
realm of a lot of engineering. When you get to
956
00:49:36.639 --> 00:49:39.840
the senior at to principal level and you're the one
957
00:49:39.840 --> 00:49:42.760
that's supposed to be making these decisions and calling these
958
00:49:42.800 --> 00:49:46.400
things out, your job is a lot more sales than
959
00:49:46.440 --> 00:49:49.199
it is engineering. You have to go and sell this
960
00:49:49.360 --> 00:49:51.840
idea and you can do it, and the technology is
961
00:49:51.880 --> 00:49:55.000
there and there is trust me, there are twenty vendors
962
00:49:55.000 --> 00:49:57.840
as we speak that want to sell you their solution
963
00:49:58.000 --> 00:49:59.719
that can do this thing, and they can do it
964
00:50:00.239 --> 00:50:03.199
very very well. Now you've got to go sell that
965
00:50:03.320 --> 00:50:05.119
idea to upper management.
966
00:50:05.239 --> 00:50:06.920
Well, the best way to do that is put a
967
00:50:06.960 --> 00:50:10.840
dollar figure around it, Like if we got ransomwared, what
968
00:50:10.880 --> 00:50:12.840
would it be worth to you to get all this
969
00:50:12.960 --> 00:50:15.400
data back? You know? And they're going to know that.
970
00:50:15.519 --> 00:50:18.760
So ten million dollars, twenty million, thirty, one hundred million
971
00:50:18.800 --> 00:50:21.480
dollars like those aren't out of the out of the
972
00:50:21.519 --> 00:50:24.280
realm of the ransoms that we've seen paid totally. And
973
00:50:24.920 --> 00:50:27.960
so you convince the management with dollar figures, what is
974
00:50:28.000 --> 00:50:29.880
the risk if we don't do this? Yeah?
975
00:50:29.920 --> 00:50:30.719
A thousand percent?
976
00:50:30.840 --> 00:50:34.000
Always yeah, And it's always good to bring this numbers
977
00:50:34.039 --> 00:50:38.079
to the CFO and bring scary headlines to the CEO.
978
00:50:40.480 --> 00:50:40.840
That's it.
979
00:50:41.119 --> 00:50:43.800
Yep, yep, yeah, and you just you really just got
980
00:50:43.840 --> 00:50:45.719
to be able to sell the idea of like what
981
00:50:45.800 --> 00:50:49.239
can happen. And for your manager it could be those
982
00:50:49.320 --> 00:50:53.079
dollar figures. For another manager, it could be, well, if
983
00:50:53.119 --> 00:50:56.119
this happens, we're going to have to hire a consulting
984
00:50:56.159 --> 00:50:58.800
firm and we're going to pay them five hundred thousand
985
00:50:58.840 --> 00:51:01.280
dollars to do this, Or could be we need well,
986
00:51:02.000 --> 00:51:04.920
we're going to have compliance issues, right, and we're gonna
987
00:51:05.000 --> 00:51:06.840
you know, we're going to mess up and we're not
988
00:51:06.880 --> 00:51:08.880
going to be able to get our High Trust serve
989
00:51:09.079 --> 00:51:11.599
or our SoC two compliance or whatever it is. So
990
00:51:11.639 --> 00:51:13.440
you just got to figure out what's important.
991
00:51:13.519 --> 00:51:15.559
Could end up in an audit, you know, if your
992
00:51:15.760 --> 00:51:19.519
financial services he gets hairy.
993
00:51:19.360 --> 00:51:22.280
And it's something as simple as how much would it
994
00:51:22.320 --> 00:51:26.679
cost us per day to not have our data exactly right?
995
00:51:26.840 --> 00:51:30.599
To be offline in one day would cost x amount? Right,
996
00:51:30.639 --> 00:51:34.039
And now you're so you're more likely to pay the
997
00:51:34.119 --> 00:51:35.760
ransom to get your data back.
998
00:51:35.880 --> 00:51:38.039
Accept it. Often when you pay the ransom, you don't
999
00:51:38.039 --> 00:51:38.760
get your data back.
1000
00:51:38.840 --> 00:51:41.480
Yeah, that's true. You know, there's no guaranteed failure rate is.
1001
00:51:41.840 --> 00:51:44.960
Failure rate's pretty high you know, we have taken that
1002
00:51:45.079 --> 00:51:49.159
story where we're a certain security person actually had to
1003
00:51:49.320 --> 00:51:58.159
fix the decryptor when decrypt files larger than two gigs. Yeah,
1004
00:51:59.239 --> 00:52:01.400
and the reality and we've done this show and run
1005
00:52:01.440 --> 00:52:05.440
as as well. It's a year minimum. You know, you're
1006
00:52:05.440 --> 00:52:07.199
going to have people involved, You're going to be cleaning
1007
00:52:07.239 --> 00:52:09.599
up messes like it's just nothing's fast. It takes a
1008
00:52:09.639 --> 00:52:11.599
long time. And it takes the same amount of time
1009
00:52:11.599 --> 00:52:13.800
where you paid, where you paid the ransom or you did.
1010
00:52:13.880 --> 00:52:18.679
I've heard of companies doing testing their staff by sending
1011
00:52:18.760 --> 00:52:23.480
out phishing emails, you know, and seeing if they actually
1012
00:52:23.639 --> 00:52:25.880
click on them, and you know, when they get there,
1013
00:52:25.960 --> 00:52:28.440
you say, congratulations, you just ransom.
1014
00:52:28.960 --> 00:52:30.639
You just signed up for additional training.
1015
00:52:31.320 --> 00:52:33.639
Yeah, exactly, And a lot of them.
1016
00:52:33.480 --> 00:52:37.039
Are actually pretty good. Like you know, the old method,
1017
00:52:37.079 --> 00:52:39.719
for example, used to be, you know, hover over the
1018
00:52:40.559 --> 00:52:42.599
email and make sure that the domain doesn't have like
1019
00:52:42.639 --> 00:52:43.280
a zero.
1020
00:52:43.199 --> 00:52:44.639
Instead of an ozer exactly.
1021
00:52:45.519 --> 00:52:49.039
And now it's you know, everything's legit and you're like, yep,
1022
00:52:49.119 --> 00:52:51.159
this is a legit email and you click it and
1023
00:52:51.199 --> 00:52:53.000
it's like oop, sorry, so.
1024
00:52:53.360 --> 00:52:56.400
Yeah now and the well, now you get into the
1025
00:52:56.440 --> 00:52:58.800
other out level of this, which is that be more
1026
00:52:58.800 --> 00:53:02.079
careful next time? Is not a strategy now that we
1027
00:53:02.119 --> 00:53:03.679
actually have got a.
1028
00:53:03.360 --> 00:53:06.840
Lot Another big one is you know, here, copy this
1029
00:53:07.000 --> 00:53:12.000
file off my USB stick right oops. So in the
1030
00:53:12.079 --> 00:53:14.920
studio here, I have customers that come and go with
1031
00:53:15.000 --> 00:53:18.079
their own data all the time, and I have a
1032
00:53:18.119 --> 00:53:21.400
machine that is not on the Internet, that that has
1033
00:53:21.559 --> 00:53:23.639
you know, malware bytes and all that stuff on it.
1034
00:53:24.519 --> 00:53:26.840
So I get the latest updates, I unplug it from
1035
00:53:26.880 --> 00:53:29.239
the Internet, stick the thing and run a scan on it,
1036
00:53:29.320 --> 00:53:31.639
and if it's okay, I feel comfortable enough that I
1037
00:53:31.639 --> 00:53:34.760
can put it in my real computer, right right. Yeah.
1038
00:53:35.039 --> 00:53:39.119
So cynical, Yeah, I wish I didn't have to be,
1039
00:53:39.199 --> 00:53:40.320
but yeah yeah.
1040
00:53:40.360 --> 00:53:42.440
But is this the pain point these days? Really just
1041
00:53:42.480 --> 00:53:44.480
think it's the security side of things when it comes
1042
00:53:44.480 --> 00:53:48.440
to software, Like I feel like a lot of the
1043
00:53:49.159 --> 00:53:51.840
a lot of stuff has been well automated deployments automated
1044
00:53:51.880 --> 00:53:54.679
now like that part works, Continuous deployment like that, that
1045
00:53:54.760 --> 00:53:56.639
seems to work pretty well. If you put in the time,
1046
00:53:56.679 --> 00:53:59.480
you can get your results. Total testing still seems to
1047
00:53:59.480 --> 00:54:03.559
be a strugg but that's evolving. But actually having a
1048
00:54:03.599 --> 00:54:06.880
sense of the security quality of your app, I don't
1049
00:54:06.920 --> 00:54:09.159
have good measures man like that. You only find that
1050
00:54:09.199 --> 00:54:10.719
out in the field, it seems.
1051
00:54:10.559 --> 00:54:13.280
Yeah, And I think to that point, the biggest thing
1052
00:54:13.360 --> 00:54:15.440
right now, going back to what I was saying before,
1053
00:54:16.440 --> 00:54:20.119
is the networking aspect, like where are my packets going?
1054
00:54:21.280 --> 00:54:24.760
There's so many different layers now, yeah, east west traffic,
1055
00:54:24.800 --> 00:54:27.199
north south traffic, so many different layers that it's like,
1056
00:54:27.840 --> 00:54:30.400
where is this going? And do I know where it's
1057
00:54:30.480 --> 00:54:32.880
going and what it's doing and who can hit it?
1058
00:54:32.920 --> 00:54:36.360
Did it really need to go there right right doing
1059
00:54:36.559 --> 00:54:37.639
unnecessary things?
1060
00:54:37.760 --> 00:54:42.679
And I guarantee, I guarantee that can fix ninety percent
1061
00:54:43.440 --> 00:54:45.440
of the security issues that you see in like a
1062
00:54:45.519 --> 00:54:49.800
devop slash platform engineering environment right now where there's a
1063
00:54:49.800 --> 00:54:52.679
lot of you know, Kubernetes and there's a lot of cloud.
1064
00:54:52.519 --> 00:54:55.880
But it speaks to whitelisting, allow no traffic except the
1065
00:54:55.920 --> 00:54:59.119
paths I've specified, and I don't see very many folks working.
1066
00:54:58.920 --> 00:55:02.800
That way totally the defense and depth, but you know,
1067
00:55:02.880 --> 00:55:06.159
it's it's all that stuff. It's least privilege right, like
1068
00:55:06.760 --> 00:55:12.239
block everything and then open up as necessary. The problem
1069
00:55:12.320 --> 00:55:14.920
is again that's that's that takes a lot of time
1070
00:55:15.199 --> 00:55:17.920
and people are like, hey, I got you know something
1071
00:55:18.000 --> 00:55:24.079
something deadline, that's it. That's it, yep, yep, yeah, and
1072
00:55:24.119 --> 00:55:27.960
it's it's it's wild to see even even like let's
1073
00:55:27.960 --> 00:55:31.599
say you're setting up different metrics toolings, right like maybe
1074
00:55:31.599 --> 00:55:35.400
you're you're setting up Jaeger, you're setting up Prometheus, and
1075
00:55:35.440 --> 00:55:38.719
you're you're collecting you know, end to end app metrics,
1076
00:55:38.760 --> 00:55:43.199
you're collecting standard server metrics. Whatever you're collecting. Go look
1077
00:55:43.239 --> 00:55:47.599
at those sometime and see what's talking to what from
1078
00:55:47.639 --> 00:55:50.559
a networking perspective, and your mind is going to be blown.
1079
00:55:51.840 --> 00:55:55.119
You know, it's not not even controlling it, just monitoring it.
1080
00:55:55.199 --> 00:55:55.960
You just look at it.
1081
00:55:56.000 --> 00:55:57.840
You'll be surprised even.
1082
00:55:57.599 --> 00:55:59.400
Like every once in a while, you know, I'll I'll
1083
00:55:59.719 --> 00:56:03.280
open up this this fancy new tool called wire shark.
1084
00:56:04.079 --> 00:56:08.199
Yeah crazy, and I'll look at what's talking to what,
1085
00:56:08.360 --> 00:56:09.679
and I'm like, I don't even know.
1086
00:56:09.639 --> 00:56:10.199
What this is.
1087
00:56:10.440 --> 00:56:13.320
Although I'm minutely wire sharks better at marking updata now
1088
00:56:13.360 --> 00:56:15.480
than it's ever been before. The problem with wire sharks
1089
00:56:15.519 --> 00:56:17.239
you turned that on one. Okay, there's a lot of stuff.
1090
00:56:17.320 --> 00:56:19.480
I have no idea what it means. It's overwhelming.
1091
00:56:19.559 --> 00:56:23.599
Yeah, yeah, it's all fun.
1092
00:56:25.119 --> 00:56:29.639
Until somebody loses an eye exactly, sure enough. So Michael,
1093
00:56:29.679 --> 00:56:32.679
what's in your inbox? What's coming up for you? What's next?
1094
00:56:32.880 --> 00:56:36.960
So really still focused in the Kubernetes realm, I'm going
1095
00:56:37.039 --> 00:56:40.719
to be focusing more and more on the networking aspects
1096
00:56:40.840 --> 00:56:46.639
of things, Securing networks, observing networks, making sure that proper
1097
00:56:46.679 --> 00:56:49.480
traffic routing is going where it's supposed to go. Is
1098
00:56:49.519 --> 00:56:51.119
this thing is supposed to be talking to this thing?
1099
00:56:51.960 --> 00:56:54.159
And then also in the realm of AI, you know,
1100
00:56:54.639 --> 00:56:58.840
looking at various agents, how are these agents talking to
1101
00:56:58.920 --> 00:57:02.000
one another? How are you talking to agents? Really everything
1102
00:57:02.119 --> 00:57:06.800
around the Kubernetes networking security realm, and then of course
1103
00:57:06.880 --> 00:57:11.519
just overall platform engineering, making sure that what tools are
1104
00:57:11.519 --> 00:57:15.559
implemented are necessary, which I call in my head just
1105
00:57:15.880 --> 00:57:18.360
proper architecture. I think what's next for me is just
1106
00:57:18.440 --> 00:57:19.519
proper architecture.
1107
00:57:20.960 --> 00:57:24.719
That's good, good, Okay, Well, thanks for hanging out with
1108
00:57:24.800 --> 00:57:25.360
us for an hour.
1109
00:57:25.400 --> 00:57:26.119
We learned a lot.
1110
00:57:26.239 --> 00:57:29.920
I know I did anyway, and thanks again.
1111
00:57:29.719 --> 00:57:30.760
Thank you so much for having me.
1112
00:57:30.880 --> 00:57:33.280
You bet, and we'll talk to you next time on
1113
00:57:33.440 --> 00:57:56.000
dot net rocks. Dot net Rocks is brought to you
1114
00:57:56.039 --> 00:58:00.960
by Franklin's Net and produced by Pop Studios Service audio,
1115
00:58:01.079 --> 00:58:05.519
video and post production facility located physically in New London, Connecticut,
1116
00:58:05.760 --> 00:58:10.559
and of course in the cloud online at PWOP dot com.
1117
00:58:10.760 --> 00:58:12.880
Visit our website at d O T N E t
1118
00:58:13.119 --> 00:58:17.159
R O c k S dot com for RSS feeds, downloads,
1119
00:58:17.280 --> 00:58:20.960
mobile apps, comments, and access to the full archives going
1120
00:58:21.000 --> 00:58:24.400
back to show number one, recorded in September two thousand
1121
00:58:24.440 --> 00:58:27.079
and two. And make sure you check out our sponsors.
1122
00:58:27.239 --> 00:58:30.239
They keep us in business. Now go write some code.
1123
00:58:30.599 --> 00:58:34.000
See you next time. You got javans
1124
00:58:36.159 --> 00:58:40.840
And