תעתיק 🔗
WEBVTT
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By listening to the sound of a rotating hard drive, the way the heads moved across the platter, they could recreate what some of the data was.
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So my gosh, that's interesting.
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You are listening to the audit presented by IT Audit Labs.
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I am your co-host and producer, Joshua Schmidt.
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Today we have the usual suspects, Eric Brown, Nick Mellum coming from Texas, as well as Eric Osterberg we have in the studio today.
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Eric Osterberg works with uh Gray Duck Locks.
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And then we have done some work with you recently around AI projects.
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Um one of the things that I wanted to bring up today and get into uh after we do a little bit of a lock picking demo here is to talk about uh hugging face and local LMs.
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Um we've been going hard here.
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Eric's been doing a lot of work on cloud code.
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I know Nick's been dabbling, and so have I.
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So would love to talk about the future of hardware and local LMs.
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So without further ado, Eric, give us just a little background about yourself, um, what you're working on right now, and and bring us up to speed.
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Yeah, for the past 24 months or so, I've I'm an early adopter, um, just in general, whether it be uh drones or 3D printing or what you know, whatever the latest trend is.
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I I like to I'm a full-time learner and um I've been using AI extensively, and um we've Eric and I have known each other for for decades now.
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I think so.
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It's been a while, uh, in in the InfoSec community.
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Um we we got connected and discussed, you know, some of the AI projects, and so I came to IT Audit Labs here to help out on a few of those projects.
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But yeah, right now I'm uh doing a lot of I guess vibe coding, you'd call it, or vibrating is watching next episode.
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Vibrators.
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Um I've been focused on the locksmithing business uh a fair amount, um, trying to ensure that my identity verification processes when I when I do locksmithing are a little bit smoother, that I don't put any of my customers' data at risk, but that I have it there, you know, to survive any audit requirements.
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Um, and then trying to automate the the workflow.
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Yeah, a lot of effort goes into quoting, making a key to a car.
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Um, people don't realize the complexity that's in a in a modern automobile.
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Um, you know, they're they're rolling computers these days.
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If you're driving a current model car, you might have 35, 40 different computers in that thing.
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And Eric, you're a pilot too, aren't you?
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I am a pilot.
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I've not flown a lot lately, but you and I need to get out there.
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Absolutely.
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Yeah.
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The hundred dollar hamburger is now what, a thousand dollar hamburger or more?
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Gas prices, it's ridiculous.
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Insurance prices.
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Yeah.
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Have you ever made a key for an airplane?
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Uh my own airplane.
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Nice.
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Okay.
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Yeah, you had a Cessna, right?
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Yeah, Cessna, a 1980-172.
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Oh, nice.
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So just get an early adopter of a glass panel, put uh Garmin stack in there before WAS was a thing.
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And let's do a little bit of a demo here.
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I mean, a lot of the time you spent at the office today, I know this is something that Eric Brown is also very passionate about and has been exciting and asking me to get on the podcast now for for quite some time.
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So today we're finally doing uh a little bit of a lockpicking demo, or maybe get some new folks interested in this this hobby, which seems synonymous with cybersecurity experts.
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Yeah, there's a lot of crossover.
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Yeah.
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Why is that?
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We like to break into stuff, I guess.
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It's a nefarious activity in all of us.
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I see a puzzle, and can I get in there?
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Can you get in?
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Eric came into our office, found a lot of puzzles.
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I think we did we we have um not not key access to the to the main space.
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We have um digital access with a card.
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So Eric's like, yeah, you know, I'll be there at like you know eight o'clock or whatever.
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And I think I'd kind of forgotten exactly what time he was coming.
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Next thing I know, he's standing in front of office because he got through the puzzle.
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After calling you, of course, and getting permission.
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Of course.
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And and you I think basically said, if you can do it, go for it.
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Go for it.
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That sounds about right.
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Load full transcript
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So you've you've 3D printed some of these uh you can do with your hands instead of having to use a tool.
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Um, I actually got a little bit of time with you before we started today and and was successful a couple of times.
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Have you tried this yet, Eric?
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I have not.
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Do you want one?
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He's got one.
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Okay, yeah.
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Yeah.
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So yeah, for game night, I brought this particular demo of a lock and tried to describe lock picking.
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And um, you know, great, great model work.
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Appreciate the person who designed this, but I found I was actually I printed another one, so I'd have more than one for our show.
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And I've I found this model.
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Again, I should have let me interrupt.
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Just for our audio listeners, we're looking at 3D printed locksmithing um, I guess, puzzles, right?
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Yeah, yeah, yeah.
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And they're kind of gray.
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They got some red keys.
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We have some different pins here that you can insert and kind of create different combinations just for our audio.
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Yep, audio only listeners.
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It's a replica lock cylinder that is uh bigger than your fist.
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Uh, so you can actually pick the lock by sticking your fingers inside the keyway.
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Yeah.
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And and maybe just a quick level set on lock picking.
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The premise is you you have a key that you put into a lock, and and that key has ridges on it, and those ridges are raising pins to different heights in the lock.
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And when the heights are at the right level, they move the pins out of the way, and then you can freely turn the lock.
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And Eric, I know you can talk a lot about this, and there's different kinds of uh of locks that make it a lot more difficult to pick.
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But like if somebody were to go down to Home Depot and get the typical master lock with the blue ribbon around the bottom, are those relatively easy to get into?
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Uh, the padlocks, yes.
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Yeah.
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There's fewer pins, tolerances are so so.
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Um yeah, I think you did a pretty good description there, right?
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Cool.
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So traditional cylinder, uh, as you described, there's a key cut with particular depths.
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There's a matching set of pins in an inline row in in the lock that raises you and insert the key all the way.
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And uh, if you've got the right combination, then that uh stack of pins all line up with what we call the shear line, and that allows the plug to rotate inside of the of the lock body.
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Um so to pick a lock, what we're doing is we're taking advantage of the imperfections in the milling out of the of those stack of pins that that are lined up there.
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It's nearly impossible to get everything in atom for atom perfect row.
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You know, you're you're always gonna have the the drill profiles are gonna be just a little bit off center.
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And if you if you apply torsion uh to the face of the lock where the lock plug is, uh you can manipulate the pins and feel for which pin is gonna bind before another.
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Um and and that'll it will bind before another because you you can't really make a perfect row of drilling.
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So with a little bit of torsion on the lock cylinder, if you manipulate each pin, you'll find that one drags more than another.
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And if you manipulate it up just enough, you'll feel that friction change.
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And you essentially want to find the pin that's binding first, right?
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You you push up the binding pin.
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Um, you can kind of play with it with your finger.
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You want it to drop back down.
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If if it sticks also, then you know that you've got it stuck above the shear line.
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So if you're if you're pushing the pin that's binding to the point where when you let go, it still falls, you'll eventually drive the upper pin in the stack above the shear line and you can move on to the next pin that's binding.
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That's cool.
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I don't know if that no, that was for one of the listeners.
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That was amazing.
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Yeah.
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But this this particular model that you have allows you to get kind of simplified on that that concept and has four pins that are sitting in in kind of a into the uh what's it called?
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The tor the torsion.
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The key way.
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The key way, yeah.
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And maybe show that that thing there, because it's got a side cutout, the the red, the one with the red key in it.
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Yeah.
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You got another model here that's more of a traditional lock and key.
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It looks backwards there.
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It looks like the delay, that's
why it was backwards a minute ago.
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Yeah.
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There it is with the side profile.
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In a traditional lock picking here, you'd put some rotational tension with a tension tool on here, and you'd use another tool to reach in the lock and manipulate this stack of pins.
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Got it.
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Yeah.
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Josh got it.
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Nice.
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I'm gonna need this file to print it.
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Yeah.
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Maybe we could share that in the show notes today.
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Sure.
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Or maybe you could tell people where to find it if they're interested to have a 3D printer.
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Well, I'm using Bamboo Labs.
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I've got uh Carbon X1C, and um, in the Bamboo Labs software uh on the home tab, you can just search for Lockpick.
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Can we talk 3D printing for a second?
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Sure.
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So you have the like this has very fine lines in it, right?
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Uh and what's that type of printer called?
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Where it prints on top of itself?
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Uh FDM printing.
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And you're gonna make me remember that acronym.
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Filament something, something.
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It's okay.
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Um one of our 10 listeners or Google.
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Fused deposit modeling.
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Oh, nice.
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There we go.
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Okay.
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Deposition.
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I wouldn't have guessed that one.
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Fused deposition.
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So it kind of layers on itself.
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I I I I heard they were printing houses that way with concrete and and that type of thing, right?
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Yeah.
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But uh so that's one type, and then you have another resin type where it's kind of like dipped in the resin or something.
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Yep.
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So on on you have um like a plate or surface and you're using a like a video projector essentially to project an image out of that plate.
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It's using UV light, and the um printer's full of a fluid that uh the fuses when it's exposed to the UV light.
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So uh you you're projecting a picture while you slowly raise up.
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It's almost imagine a movie being shined on a screen that's that's sort of causing the liquid inside to fuse at those points where it made contact with the light.
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Um the models come out fairly sticky, and so you need to give them a wash uh and then set them under UV light or set them outside for an hour, and then then they'll cure more solid.
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Um because it's a video projection, um, just that that process, it it can be a much higher resolution.
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Yeah.
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Um and they're the the resolution on all these are getting better every year.
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Yeah, the the accuracy of the of the 3D printers itself.
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Their their ability to move to a coordinate and stop at an exact point, uh, is it's just phenomenal.
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They're and you can 3D print 3D printer.
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I think my first 3D printer was um the the idea was that you need vitamins.
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Those are the circuits and wires and and bearings and things like that.
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You'd you'd use vitamins, you'd feed vitamins into uh an existing 3D printer, and uh that that's how a new 3D printer was born.
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That's cool.
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Um I went to a local maker space and um printed the components for my 3D printer and uh assembled the vitamins and again being an early adopter there.
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Uh Joseph Prusso was still in high school at the time.
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Um some folks may know his name.
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He's well known in the in the rep rep community.
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Oh um Josh forgot to get him on the podcast.
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Yep.
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Well, Pro Prusso, isn't that one of the that's the one of the bigger printers that people use that you can print like you were talking about, printing your own printer.
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Yeah.
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Yep.
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So uh Joseph Proofsa would be uh at home at his parents or grandmother's place, and uh in the middle of the night for him, you know, it'd be my evening, but in the middle of the night for him, he'd be chatting on IRC and we could discuss how the print went or what would make a print better, or wouldn't it be nice if we had.
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And um early on he was a great you know, CAD person.
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So if you the in the early days of 3D printing, most of us didn't know CAD, but we liked assembling stuff.
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We could if we could borrow a printer, we could make stuff and and bolt stuff together.
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Uh learning the CAD skill is where it really got cool.
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Um you know, right now, if if you're just starting a 3D printing, you see something online like this lock we're looking at, and decide that you want one, you can get a 3D printer, take it home, download
the file, and you know, boom, you've got this thing.
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But it is so much more powerful when you imagine, wouldn't it be great if I had and could sit down with the software app and and draw it up and and then send it to the printer.
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That to me, that's very related to um AI as well.
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I think now you could probably have an idea that you want.
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If you can describe it to an AI agent, these large language models will generate the file for you.
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Now you can send that to your printer.
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So if you're a Star Trek fan, we're moving closer and closer to that idea of a replicator.
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Ah, nice.
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So now I know what I'm doing this weekend.
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Now you're printing.
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I have uh bamboo labs also.
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It's uh Eric probably knows it's a P1S, I think.
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Yep.
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Uh yeah, so but it's not uh I haven't been using it very much in the past, you know, few months, but now I've got a project for this weekend to work with uh Claude to think up something cool.
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Yep, fire it up.
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And Eric, are you seeing now in the lock picking industry being able to print keys to to maybe get through a certain lock?
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I have heard of that.
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I have not I've not attempted that myself.
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Uh uh a very high-quality lock is gonna have tolerances that are greater than that of most 3D printers.
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Oh, okay.
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But I say most 3D printers and most high-quality locks, there's always the middle ground there.
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If you have a um we shouldn't name names and quit you know, pick on them, but let's say something manufactured in a country starting with C that's in the blister pack at your local hardware store and costs less than 35 bucks, odds are the talents are really quite low.
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And sure, you take that to a 3D printer and make yourself a key.
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Right.
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I'll give you an example.
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If you want to open any luggage lock that's compatible with the TSA's plan, uh years ago, somebody took a picture of a TSA officer's keyring, made a couple measurements, and went, hey, I can replicate all those keys and and published a set of keys.
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So, you know, TSA 001 through TSA 014, uh just download and print it, and there you go.
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There you go.
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Wow.
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And of caution, anybody who has typical security or I would say lower security locks, if you have your keys exposed, if you leave them on the uh the the table at uh Chipotle, you guys had Chipotle for lunch, right?
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Um, leave your keys out on the table, um a quick photo and and you're done for.
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We're gonna share this comment real quick.
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Are we close to seeing AI-powered robotic lock picks that can decode a lock in seconds just by analyzing the acoustic or haptic feedback of the of the pins?
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That's interesting.
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We are well past that.
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Are we?
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Can you give us a little bit more context there?
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A little bit more uh what's going on?
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Sure.
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Um we have micro cameras that are the cameras essentially the size of the key.
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So you you just basically are shooting a video as you put your key into the lock.
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And certain locks have been designed in a way where if if you could be small and be inside and look in a particular direction, you can actually see in in particular.
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I'm talking about those keys that allow you to re-key them yourselves.
00:16:12.799 --> 00:16:39.759
You may have one, I think both Schlag and uh QuickSet have this where you you you put in the key that works right now, and then you insert another tool, uh rotate the lock to a certain position, allows you to pull out your old key and then put in the new key that you want to be the key for your house, and then you pull out that special pin and and reset the lock, and now the lock's been re-keyed without hiring a locksmith.
00:16:39.759 --> 00:16:40.639
It it's good to go.
00:16:40.639 --> 00:16:47.200
Well, the the design of that has a bunch of serrated uh columns essentially.
00:16:47.200 --> 00:16:52.320
When you're when you're inserting the tool, you're separating the serrated columns so you can you can realign the points.
00:16:52.320 --> 00:16:55.360
When you insert the new key, that that's how everything kind of lines up.
00:16:55.360 --> 00:17:09.279
Anyhow, there's um there's now an app and a camera where you just slide that into the lock, and then I can go back to my machine and say, cut my one of these five three five one threes and uh you know I've I've got the new key.
00:17:10.960 --> 00:17:34.720
With with that vibration question and and kind of continuing on with what Eric was talking about, I I had read somewhere maybe a couple of years ago that they were able to pick up the vibration off of the glass using like a la laser from far away and be able to reinterpret what the conversation was from the sound waves that resonated on the glass.
00:17:34.720 --> 00:17:49.519
And then I think maybe it was two years ago, I saw that by listening to the sound of a rotating hard
drive, the way the heads moved across the platter, they could recreate what some of the data was.
00:17:49.519 --> 00:17:51.680
So that that's interesting.
00:17:52.000 --> 00:18:12.319
That reminds me of that Operation Ghost Murmur where they found the guy in Iran, the pilot using AI to listen for his heartbeat, and they probably had his personal heartbeat signature on some uh kind of uh of a info sheet and compared it to what they were listening to in the environment in front of them.
00:18:12.720 --> 00:18:15.680
But yeah, uh you've probably seen the mapping with Wi-Fi also.
00:18:15.680 --> 00:18:16.240
Yeah.
00:18:16.240 --> 00:18:17.200
Another one.
00:18:17.200 --> 00:18:19.200
There's quite a few things like that.
00:18:19.200 --> 00:18:21.119
I I don't know how practical it is.
00:18:21.119 --> 00:18:23.440
I I don't fear that a whole lot.
00:18:24.240 --> 00:18:24.960
What's Eric?
00:18:24.960 --> 00:18:33.039
So one of the things that maybe you've seen that's kind of crazy when you get called out to say, you know, like, oh hey, I can't get into whatever, and they call you out.
00:18:33.039 --> 00:18:38.640
You've you've had to show up and there's some weirdness going on or something interesting.
00:18:38.640 --> 00:18:42.240
Yeah.
00:18:42.240 --> 00:18:46.799
Eric, didn't you tell me that for game night we were going to break into somebody's car?
00:18:46.799 --> 00:18:48.240
A volunteer's car.
00:18:48.240 --> 00:18:48.559
Right.
00:18:48.559 --> 00:18:49.039
Right?
00:18:49.039 --> 00:18:49.759
We're gonna do that.
00:18:49.759 --> 00:18:50.160
Sure.
00:18:50.160 --> 00:18:51.839
Are you volunteering now?
00:18:51.839 --> 00:18:59.759
That's a cool story that that you know, I think most people don't know the capabilities of what a locksmith can do.
00:18:59.759 --> 00:19:05.359
And you can get into just about anything with the right tools and equipment, right?
00:19:05.599 --> 00:19:05.759
Sure.
00:19:05.759 --> 00:19:07.920
And there's different specialties as well.
00:19:07.920 --> 00:19:09.920
So I I specialize in automotive.
00:19:09.920 --> 00:19:14.160
Um, I've got friends that are in the commercial lock and safe sort of business.
00:19:14.160 --> 00:19:16.000
Safes are another good example.
00:19:16.000 --> 00:19:19.200
You you mentioned the robotic, you know, can you open a lock?
00:19:19.200 --> 00:19:21.920
There, there's a device called the soft drill.
00:19:21.920 --> 00:19:24.400
Everybody's Googling for that one as well.
00:19:24.400 --> 00:19:28.880
Those are um are very rare to find now.
00:19:28.880 --> 00:19:31.599
The manufacturer basically said I sold enough of these.
00:19:31.599 --> 00:19:40.640
I think uh certain agencies of our government that may or may not have three or four letter acronyms uh kind of controlled that because they're very good.
00:19:40.640 --> 00:19:47.519
Safe manipulation uh is is a skill that you can learn, and so can robots.
00:19:47.519 --> 00:19:56.160
And so the soft drill can open a
safe much, much faster than um than most people need to be able to open a safe.
00:19:56.160 --> 00:20:00.160
Uh if you're a locksmith, of course, you're making money if you fix price to open a safe, right?
00:20:00.160 --> 00:20:05.279
You'd you'd rather be gone in 15 minutes and make a boatload of money than attach a machine and wait 13 hours.
00:20:05.279 --> 00:20:09.279
But um there's a TL2000 dialer.
00:20:09.279 --> 00:20:12.160
Most of the safe people that I know are are using that.
00:20:12.160 --> 00:20:18.799
That literally just manipulates every combination until it senses the lock is open and it stops.
00:20:18.799 --> 00:20:26.559
Um but for electronic safes, you most of the electronics are inside the safe, just the battery and the keypad is on the outside.
00:20:26.559 --> 00:20:30.160
There are devices on the market that will plug into the keypad bus.
00:20:30.160 --> 00:20:35.119
And uh, you know, five, four, three, two, one, she's open.
00:20:35.519 --> 00:20:41.279
Looks like peep people are making uh these uh soft drill brushes by using a uh electronic toothbrush.
00:20:41.279 --> 00:20:42.160
Different thing.
00:20:42.160 --> 00:20:42.880
Totally different thing.
00:20:42.880 --> 00:20:43.359
Okay.
00:20:43.359 --> 00:20:46.720
It looks like this is a lockpicking mechanism, though, yeah.
00:20:46.960 --> 00:20:47.200
Yeah, yeah.
00:20:47.200 --> 00:20:58.559
The the soft drill has a um a microphone and a uh servo with feedback that attaches to the dial on the safe.
00:20:58.559 --> 00:21:14.000
And it it will swing the dial around, listening to the acoustics, and can detect when components within the lock are bumping other components within the lock that allows it to decipher how things are aligned.
00:21:14.000 --> 00:21:21.599
If you know how things are aligned and where where the contact points are, uh it very quickly knows, like, okay, here's the combination.
00:21:21.920 --> 00:21:24.160
I gotta I gotta start hold that thought, Eric.
00:21:24.160 --> 00:21:25.119
I gotta share this comment.
00:21:25.119 --> 00:21:30.160
This is my this is why my door has uh porticules and draw bars installing a drawbridge next year.
00:21:30.160 --> 00:21:31.759
That's from Faye 9915.
00:21:32.480 --> 00:21:34.079
Faye's a regular listener, I think.
00:21:34.319 --> 00:21:36.319
Yeah, we'll get to all your questions, but Eric, you had to do it.
00:21:36.480 --> 00:21:37.039
Yeah, no, I did.
00:21:37.039 --> 00:21:38.960
So with Eric Hotel Safe, right?
00:21:38.960 --> 00:21:50.480
Like you go into the hotel and I think there's a Darknet Diaries episode where the guy um was a poker player and um they they got his laptop and installed some stuff on it and what have you.
00:21:50.480 --> 00:21:54.559
But it how do those is that just an illusion of safety?
00:21:54.799 --> 00:22:02.799
Uh yeah, if if that a lot of the safes in hotels are You know, bulk manufactured, another country starting with C.
00:22:02.799 --> 00:22:04.720
Maybe that other one, same one.
00:22:04.720 --> 00:22:08.000
Uh many of these are opened with just a uh a magnet.
00:22:08.000 --> 00:22:11.920
You know, there's there's an electromagnet inside of it to release the lock.
00:22:11.920 --> 00:22:12.960
Carry a big fish.
00:22:12.960 --> 00:22:14.000
You can go fishing.
00:22:14.000 --> 00:22:17.759
You can you can do magnet fishing.
00:22:17.759 --> 00:22:19.039
The lake fishing.
00:22:19.039 --> 00:22:21.680
You just drag a large magnet behind your boat.
00:22:22.160 --> 00:22:25.839
You go like go over a bridge and drop it down on the rope and yeah.
00:22:26.240 --> 00:22:26.799
Yeah, totally.
00:22:26.799 --> 00:22:35.839
But you could you can pick up all the the safes and the firearms and the every other piece of metal that's discarded in the middle of the night over a bridge.
00:22:35.839 --> 00:22:37.599
Have you guys done this?
00:22:38.079 --> 00:22:39.920
Eric's acting like he hasn't done it before.
00:22:39.920 --> 00:22:42.480
That's the kind of fishing that might be might be interesting.
00:22:42.880 --> 00:22:44.720
We may have to do an expedition this summer, Eric.
00:22:44.720 --> 00:22:58.799
I uh now I've scuba dived, and when when I was scuba diving uh in in rivers, like this is you know back in high school, they would say if you see a um bag underwater, do not open the bag.
00:22:58.799 --> 00:23:02.480
Um because you're not you're probably not gonna like what you find.
00:23:02.480 --> 00:23:04.000
We we found a bag.
00:23:04.000 --> 00:23:06.319
We did not adhere to the guidelines.
00:23:06.319 --> 00:23:10.160
We opened the bag and it was just full of sand from a construction thing.
00:23:10.160 --> 00:23:10.799
Uh okay.
00:23:10.960 --> 00:23:11.920
Sandbag.
00:23:11.920 --> 00:23:15.359
We got another question here if that the that's okay.
00:23:15.359 --> 00:23:17.839
Um this is again from Joshua Morgan Goldstein.
00:23:17.839 --> 00:23:27.519
Comparing something like a minimalist Volvo to a high performance Porsche, who is winning the digital arms race against the uh against relay attacks and the key cloning, or are they both wide open to the exploits?
00:23:27.920 --> 00:23:30.480
Volvo's ahead, I would I would say.
00:23:30.480 --> 00:23:37.039
Um and I would say European vehicles in general are far ahead of domestic vehicles.
00:23:37.039 --> 00:23:39.119
Why why is that?
00:23:39.119 --> 00:23:56.640
Yeah, so uh typical key for a domestic or Asian vehicle, there's a serial number burned into the key, and during a programming session, we tell the car, okay, now I want you to trust this key, and uh the process is done.
00:23:56.640 --> 00:24:06.640
In a typical European vehicle, we have public-private key encryption and challenge response algorithms going on between multiple computers in the vehicle.
00:24:06.640 --> 00:24:13.680
Your key contains a private key burned into the the chip itself at the factory.
00:24:13.680 --> 00:24:24.319
And um, if if I as a cyber security auto
locksmith open up the computers and get in there, I can extract the public key.
00:24:24.319 --> 00:24:26.880
Uh gee, what am I gonna do with that now?
00:24:26.880 --> 00:24:31.200
I mean it I I I I call it public key, but it's a little different, right?
00:24:31.200 --> 00:24:34.000
You've we've got an asymmetric key pair.
00:24:34.000 --> 00:24:43.680
Um but there's a lot of brute force cyber work necessary in order to come up with the matching key that's gonna make those handshakes work between those modules.
00:24:43.680 --> 00:24:49.359
So when you make a key to your uh we'll give Audi some credit here.
00:24:49.359 --> 00:24:59.200
When you go to Audi and order a key for the $600, they are just putting the order in the assembly line and you know, out comes a blank key.
00:24:59.200 --> 00:25:05.359
They write the codes that they knew when they built the car and its key and they send it to you in a huge profit margin.
00:25:05.359 --> 00:25:10.720
When I get the call to make a key to your Audi, you don't want to watch.
00:25:10.720 --> 00:25:12.400
It's like making sausage.
00:25:12.400 --> 00:25:14.720
Just look the other way, I'll be done in four hours.
00:25:14.720 --> 00:25:25.920
Um we're gonna open up those computers, peel back the metal on the cans for for for some of the more difficult ones, uh, desolder certain integrated circuits.
00:25:25.920 --> 00:25:34.480
We're gonna do the things we need to do to get uh MCUs or EE proms to dump their goodies.
00:25:34.480 --> 00:25:36.799
Those goodies are gonna go up into the cloud.
00:25:36.799 --> 00:25:46.400
I have subscriptions for products that also came from a company man manufactured it in a country with starts with C or R.
00:25:46.400 --> 00:25:47.920
They're very good at their work too.
00:25:47.920 --> 00:26:02.000
Um we're essentially reverse engineering the security mechanisms on the hardware and then brute forcing those keys in order to come up with the secret in your key.
00:26:02.559 --> 00:26:11.759
It seems that the Volkswagen group actually owns Audi Porsche and other brands like Lamborghini and Bentley.
00:26:11.759 --> 00:26:12.400
Yeah.
00:26:12.400 --> 00:26:17.680
So if you're getting a Lamborghini, it's the same thing as a Volkswagen.
00:26:17.680 --> 00:26:18.480
Same thing.
00:26:18.960 --> 00:26:24.480
Some of these cars that you might call exotic cars, the ones you expect to have the best security.
00:26:24.480 --> 00:26:25.680
Yeah.
00:26:25.680 --> 00:26:30.319
It's they put all the money in the in the paint and the polish and the delivery.
00:26:30.640 --> 00:26:31.119
Nice.
00:26:31.119 --> 00:26:35.200
So, Eric, you're telling me my F-150 key is pretty easy to clone?
00:26:35.839 --> 00:26:41.279
Until 2021, when Ford totally uh changed how they go about things.
00:26:41.279 --> 00:26:44.319
Um I have a 2021 Ford F-150.
00:26:44.319 --> 00:26:52.000
The um electrical system was modeled after the Mach E, and the Mach E was designed to sort of compete with the Tesla.
00:26:52.000 --> 00:26:56.480
That was the beginning of uh self-driving and you know, much more modern architecture.
00:26:56.480 --> 00:27:04.799
So the the process requires factory tools and um a VSP, uh vehicle security professional certification from NASA.
00:27:04.799 --> 00:27:12.799
Uh Ford restricts access to those functions to folks that are vetted with uh licensing insurance and and so on.
00:27:12.799 --> 00:27:16.319
And then in 2025, it gets even more interesting.
00:27:16.319 --> 00:27:19.200
They introduced encryption between all the modules.
00:27:19.200 --> 00:27:22.000
And so um I have a self-driving vehicle.
00:27:22.000 --> 00:27:30.160
I I bought the Ford for the Blue Crews and the ability to do self-driving, but um didn't like the idea of paying the subscription fee.
00:27:30.160 --> 00:27:37.680
And there were new features that weren't available for my older vehicle, so I've got a comma AI and I run blue pilot software.
00:27:37.680 --> 00:27:38.640
That's a whole plug.
00:27:38.640 --> 00:27:40.880
But yeah, I've heard of that.
00:27:40.880 --> 00:27:42.480
I've heard of that.
00:27:43.279 --> 00:27:45.519
Who's the guy that started comma AI?
00:27:46.079 --> 00:27:50.160
Uh I can picture him and I'll walk right up to him at DEF CON and say, hey, how's it going?
00:27:50.160 --> 00:27:52.799
Yeah, but I cannot remember his name right offhand.
00:27:53.119 --> 00:27:56.799
Didn't Musk try to hire him or something, or he worked over there for a little bit?
00:27:56.799 --> 00:27:58.480
George Hotz or that's what it is.
00:27:58.480 --> 00:27:58.880
Yeah.
00:27:58.880 --> 00:28:00.160
Yeah, GeoHotz.
00:28:00.160 --> 00:28:00.960
Yes, John.
00:28:00.960 --> 00:28:02.880
So how do you like the comma AI?
00:28:02.880 --> 00:28:05.759
Because you just plug that into the bus, right?
00:28:06.000 --> 00:28:08.400
Yeah, it works on a number of vehicles.
00:28:08.400 --> 00:28:10.480
Um, so check it out.
00:28:10.480 --> 00:28:12.480
You don't have to have a Ford F-150.
00:28:12.480 --> 00:28:16.720
Um and and primarily he's doing hardware sales, right?
00:28:16.720 --> 00:28:19.039
And then promoting the idea of software development.
00:28:19.039 --> 00:28:26.960
Um there is open pilot, which is the the generic uh driving module for does things a little differently.
00:28:26.960 --> 00:28:30.400
So we've got blue pilot, a fork of that code.
00:28:30.400 --> 00:28:37.200
Uh, but yeah, the the wonderful thing about it um is that it will plot a course through whatever it sees.
00:28:37.200 --> 00:28:46.400
If if your truck ends up in a cornfield and you kind of want to go that way, um you can turn on cruise control and keep driving through the cornfield.
00:28:46.400 --> 00:28:50.000
Set your speed and you know, pay attention to the road, right?
00:28:50.000 --> 00:28:53.279
If you look off the road, the thing will uh refuse to drive for you.
00:28:53.279 --> 00:28:55.839
Um But but there's probably hacks around there.
00:28:56.079 --> 00:29:18.079
A buddy of mine's an airline pilot, and he he said that there's some some some of his other pilots that, you know, they're they're home-based in say Minnesota, but they live way far away, like way up north somewhere, and they've got to commute from way up north wherever they live down to MSP for you know their you know, their shift.
00:29:18.079 --> 00:29:22.720
And sometimes they'll come back, you know, late at night or whatever, and then need to go home.
00:29:22.720 --> 00:29:29.119
They have this comma AI system, and like they're sleeping on the way home.
00:29:29.119 --> 00:29:34.319
And I mean, this is hearsay through hearsay, but yeah, it's uh it's interesting.
00:29:35.039 --> 00:29:37.200
There's a there's another whole talk there, I'm sure.
00:29:37.200 --> 00:29:37.599
Yes.
00:29:37.599 --> 00:29:39.279
There are separate teams.
00:29:39.279 --> 00:29:42.799
There's a camera that watches the driver, and then there's the camera that watches the road.
00:29:42.799 --> 00:29:50.640
In fact, multiple cameras watching the road, but the camera that watches the driver, it is open source, you could theoretically manipulate that.
00:29:50.640 --> 00:29:59.839
Um they have a practice of monitoring for all forks, and the hardware is designed by default to pull from your GitHub repo.
00:29:59.839 --> 00:30:01.200
Give it a URL.
00:30:01.200 --> 00:30:15.119
There are some safety mechanisms in there, and if you attempt to bypass the safety mechanisms, the community will attempt to bypass you because that's not good for safety in general.
00:30:15.119 --> 00:30:21.680
And the last thing any of us want are regulators deciding that they know best for us.
00:30:22.559 --> 00:30:25.119
We had tinfoil hat coming on here, guys.
00:30:25.119 --> 00:30:25.759
Here we go.
00:30:25.759 --> 00:30:26.720
Here we go.
00:30:26.720 --> 00:30:41.920
Uh I mean, this has been kind of brewing in the background, but it looks like there's just been some legislation passed driven by the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, requires automakers to install advanced impaired driving prevention technology in all new passenger vehicles.
00:30:41.920 --> 00:30:55.519
The mandate directs the NHTSA to finalize rules require built-in passive monitoring systems such as cameras and sensors to detect driver impairment fatigue and distraction with the authority to limit and prevent vehicle uh operation.
00:30:55.519 --> 00:30:58.319
So uh I've been seeing this a lot on YouTube.
00:30:58.319 --> 00:31:02.640
There's been a lot of commentary on this, and in most of it negative, as you can imagine.
00:31:02.640 --> 00:31:04.240
Where do you guys kind of fall?
00:31:04.240 --> 00:31:06.079
I I kind of see both sides, right?
00:31:06.079 --> 00:31:08.799
No one wants to be we want to we want to be free, right?
00:31:08.799 --> 00:31:17.599
We want to be able to get into our car and we don't want to get shut down because we didn't get very good sleep that night or we had a cold or something like that, not be able to go where we want to go.
00:31:17.599 --> 00:31:22.960
But also, we've all seen these terrible drivers on the road that have no business being behind the wheel.
00:31:22.960 --> 00:31:25.599
And it would be great to take them off the road.
00:31:25.599 --> 00:31:28.160
So uh where do you guys fall on this one?
00:31:28.160 --> 00:31:29.759
Kind of as the intersection.
00:31:29.759 --> 00:31:32.480
Maybe this is our our transition to AI, right?
00:31:32.799 --> 00:31:35.519
Or or gun control or any other uh topic.
00:31:35.519 --> 00:31:37.279
Don't get us into that.
00:31:37.279 --> 00:31:39.440
I eyes expanding in the room.
00:31:40.079 --> 00:31:44.160
I think I think a lot of people are just getting a piece of electrical tape to go over the camera.
00:31:45.680 --> 00:31:47.599
It will stop driving at that point.
00:31:47.599 --> 00:31:51.200
Um you're for it or are you against it?
00:31:51.359 --> 00:31:52.880
That's that's kind of what I'm looking for here.
00:31:53.200 --> 00:31:53.680
Yes.
00:31:53.680 --> 00:31:54.640
Exactly.
00:31:54.640 --> 00:31:56.079
Yes.
00:31:56.079 --> 00:32:06.880
I I think that uh taking advantage of where technology has led us is is a great thing in general.
00:32:06.880 --> 00:32:13.039
Um I I think like a lot of laws, they're great when they apply to everybody but me.
00:32:13.039 --> 00:32:16.559
Rules for thee and not for me, huh?
00:32:16.559 --> 00:32:17.119
Yeah.
00:32:17.119 --> 00:32:19.200
So I don't know, right?
00:32:19.200 --> 00:32:21.200
I'm I I'm a libertarian.
00:32:21.200 --> 00:32:24.000
I I definitely support our freedoms.
00:32:24.000 --> 00:32:26.880
I don't have to even mention Second Amendment or anything else.
00:32:26.880 --> 00:32:27.920
I've said enough.
00:32:27.920 --> 00:32:32.400
Um I think that uh the technology is incredible.
00:32:34.640 --> 00:32:38.000
And I think it's walking on eggshells.
00:32:38.000 --> 00:32:39.920
I think it's I think it's a good idea for most.
00:32:41.039 --> 00:32:42.640
Nick, do you want to weigh in on this, Mr.
00:32:42.640 --> 00:32:43.039
Marine?
00:32:43.359 --> 00:32:45.839
Let's make it heckable and then I'm cool with it.
00:32:45.839 --> 00:32:53.599
No, I kind of go both ways too, honestly, because you know, if somebody's impaired driving, I certainly don't want them on the road if I'm on out there with my family, right?
00:32:53.599 --> 00:32:55.839
So that's the the logical thinking.
00:32:55.839 --> 00:33:02.559
But I certainly don't want my space, you know, invaded if I'm getting in the truck to run across the street to the grocery store.
00:33:02.559 --> 00:33:05.759
So I guess overall, if I had to pick, I'd say I'm against it.
00:33:06.079 --> 00:33:06.160
Yeah.
00:33:06.480 --> 00:33:08.319
Eric Brown, you got some thoughts on this.
00:33:08.319 --> 00:33:09.440
I I've been curious.
00:33:09.920 --> 00:33:10.480
I do.
00:33:10.480 --> 00:33:12.960
Um what were they?
00:33:12.960 --> 00:33:14.960
I was distracted by the headphones here.
00:33:14.960 --> 00:33:16.720
About about being monitored in your vehicle.
00:33:16.720 --> 00:33:17.359
Oh, yeah.
00:33:17.359 --> 00:33:19.200
Well, so okay.
00:33:19.200 --> 00:33:41.359
I uh we've got a client that some of the people in the organization are refusing to take phishing training and they are still clicking on phishing emails, but then when they're told about it, they're like, oh yeah, I I clicked on it on purpose because it was, you know, I whatever, right?
00:33:41.359 --> 00:33:42.240
It's some excuse.
00:33:42.240 --> 00:33:43.759
And it's like just owning it, huh?
00:33:43.759 --> 00:34:07.920
Yeah, just so you know, when you have people like that that, you know, with that mentality in the public space, I I would want some sort of guidelines and structure so that, you know, I know somebody just didn't homebrew something in their garage and now they're ripping down the road at 110 and like, oh whoops, I forgot, you know, to put this on.
00:34:07.920 --> 00:34:18.079
It's, you know, I I kind of go to the aviation community that has been using autopilot for decades and it works really well.
00:34:18.079 --> 00:34:26.079
And and there's been refinements with terrain avoidance over the years and air traffic control, and it's gotten better and better.
00:34:26.079 --> 00:34:33.599
But you know, you you really could not fly in instrument meteorological conditions without autopilot.
00:34:33.599 --> 00:34:40.880
Like it's strictly it's simply safer like to to fly with with autopilot, because you can get spatial disorientation.
00:34:40.880 --> 00:34:54.079
You know, if you're if you're flying in the clouds and you're getting you know buffeted around from um weather and you've got rain or snow or whatever coming in, um there's a lot of environmental distractions.
00:34:54.079 --> 00:35:07.119
And if you're trying to fly the plane or you're getting bounced around and you know, trying to figure out where the horizon is, and your vestibular system is telling you you're in a turn, but you're really not.
00:35:07.119 --> 00:35:08.719
So you're you're straightening that out.
00:35:08.719 --> 00:35:13.360
You know, it's just it it's what happened with JFK Um Jr.
00:35:13.360 --> 00:35:17.840
up in the Cape, you know, where he where he kind of who was not instrument rated.
00:35:17.840 --> 00:35:27.519
So he he he probably wasn't aware of all of these things that can happen, but you you really want to be on the instrument system and and you want to be relying on the plane to to fly itself.
00:35:27.519 --> 00:35:30.400
And you know, we've been doing this for years in in aviation.
00:35:30.400 --> 00:35:32.480
So I would love to see it on the roads.
00:35:32.480 --> 00:35:37.840
The experience that I I have with it is it's a better driver than most.
00:35:37.840 --> 00:35:38.800
It's safer.
00:35:38.880 --> 00:35:45.679
Aaron Powell That's a little different than uh being monitored, right, in your vehicle, like having a having a self-driving car or an automated driver.
00:35:46.159 --> 00:35:48.159
I think it's because that's where we're at level two today.
00:35:48.159 --> 00:35:54.159
But when we get to like level, what is it, four where we don't, you know, that you don't need the monitoring because the system's better than you are.
00:35:54.639 --> 00:36:02.079
Um that's actually a question in the chat about um when are we going to get to level five?
00:36:02.639 --> 00:36:05.519
I hope it's Eric, how far away are we from level five?
00:36:06.159 --> 00:36:06.800
Ten years.
00:36:06.800 --> 00:36:11.840
Early adapters six, general population fifteen?
00:36:12.159 --> 00:36:14.400
It it the technology is probably close.
00:36:14.400 --> 00:36:15.840
It's just all the regulations.
00:36:15.840 --> 00:36:19.119
And then there's that conversation of who's responsible if something goes wrong.
00:36:19.360 --> 00:36:19.519
Yeah.
00:36:19.519 --> 00:36:21.199
The the litigious side of it.
00:36:21.199 --> 00:36:26.320
And then when we're gonna get into smart contracts and all of that sort of stuff, which is just a different conversation.
00:36:26.320 --> 00:36:30.800
But I I don't know, is the technology six and then the legislation's 10?
00:36:31.679 --> 00:36:35.679
Yeah, I'm I'm I can't predict what legislation's gonna be up to.
00:36:35.679 --> 00:36:44.320
I I was thinking we can pivot right to privacy and talk about AI here as well, the private cloud.
00:36:44.320 --> 00:36:46.800
Yeah.
00:36:47.039 --> 00:36:49.519
Do we want to cut this one in do a double episode?
00:36:49.519 --> 00:36:50.559
Double it up.
00:36:50.559 --> 00:36:51.599
Let's keep going.
00:36:51.840 --> 00:36:56.400
I think when we're talking about the the monitoring of drivers, right?
00:36:56.400 --> 00:37:03.119
If if that is totally a local thing and that data is my data, it's not going anywhere.
00:37:03.119 --> 00:37:06.000
It's just my cars keeping me safe.
00:37:06.000 --> 00:37:11.360
And I have the option to override, you know, like that.
00:37:11.360 --> 00:37:13.119
It's a safety feature that's built in.
00:37:13.119 --> 00:37:13.760
We all have it.
00:37:13.760 --> 00:37:23.280
And when the thing says you're not safe to drive, um, if I can go on the record saying I think I was safe to drive, I'm more cool with it if it's totally local.
00:37:23.280 --> 00:37:26.719
But I already do not like the telemetry that's in a lot of vehicles.
00:37:26.960 --> 00:37:29.440
You're saying, and that's a sober, that's a sober take.
00:37:29.679 --> 00:37:37.760
Yeah, I mean, you're your cars today are are sharing a lot of data with the manufacturer because manufacturers are selling that data.
00:37:37.760 --> 00:37:38.320
Sure.
00:37:38.320 --> 00:37:42.079
Um, you know, how many of us are Google customers?
00:37:42.079 --> 00:37:47.840
Uh and and I say that because you know, if you're not paying them, you're the you're the product, not the
customer.
00:37:47.840 --> 00:37:53.679
I I I love the things that are built into my phone and integrated in my car, which is nice as well.
00:37:53.679 --> 00:37:58.159
You know, I had this uh had this appointment to come here for for the podcast, right?
00:37:58.159 --> 00:38:01.199
I I got in my truck and it knew where I wanted to go.
00:38:01.199 --> 00:38:08.079
I just kind of hit the button and then turned on reverse control in my driveway and and it was a fun, safe drive.
00:38:08.079 --> 00:38:16.800
But um Google knows where I'm going and follows everybody else around, and that data's useful, so that I I took the best route.
00:38:16.800 --> 00:38:19.840
If there was a traffic jam somewhere, we we went around it.
00:38:19.840 --> 00:38:22.239
So it's it's the love-hate thing.
00:38:22.239 --> 00:38:24.400
Um, and I'm rambling on a little bit, right?
00:38:24.400 --> 00:38:30.480
But I I don't like that car manufacturers are keeping tabs to the extent that they are.
00:38:30.480 --> 00:38:37.360
Um, that when you buy a car now uh buried in that mountain of paperwork, it's worse than closing out a house.
00:38:37.360 --> 00:38:39.119
And and I've done both recently.
00:38:39.119 --> 00:38:46.000
Um it there there's a license agreement with your car, and you don't necessarily own the software.
00:38:46.000 --> 00:38:52.880
And if you turn off the telematics, you've just ended your warranty after 45 days and and some other interesting things like that.
00:38:53.039 --> 00:38:54.559
So I don't like that.
00:38:54.719 --> 00:38:55.360
I don't like that.
00:38:55.360 --> 00:38:56.880
So you could ride a bike.
00:38:57.920 --> 00:39:00.079
Or I could buy an old used car for now.
00:39:00.079 --> 00:39:01.360
What kind of bike do you have?
00:39:01.360 --> 00:39:02.159
I don't have a bike.
00:39:02.159 --> 00:39:05.679
Yeah, you might get the telemetry to your bike uh motor.
00:39:06.000 --> 00:39:08.719
Do you want to pedal yourself or are you gonna hit the go button?
00:39:08.719 --> 00:39:09.679
The go button.
00:39:09.679 --> 00:39:09.920
Okay.
00:39:10.159 --> 00:39:11.599
It's like plow schwab.
00:39:11.599 --> 00:39:15.199
If I put my tinfoil hat back on, uh, you will own nothing and you will be happy.
00:39:15.519 --> 00:39:19.760
I I did have a locksmith question for you around the European cars you were saying.
00:39:19.760 --> 00:39:27.440
Every time I walk into Costco, and Costco's getting ridiculous now, which is a whole nother thing, but every time you go in there, you're getting accosted by these people.
00:39:27.440 --> 00:39:35.920
Like it's either phone or I think last weekend I I went in there and like they're they're trying to like, you know, can can we clone your key or make a copy of your key?
00:39:35.920 --> 00:39:41.679
And uh you can barely walk past them and they're like, you know, they're trying to flag you now, which is ridiculous.
00:39:41.679 --> 00:39:46.719
But um, how are they doing that with the if if people have European cars?
00:39:46.800 --> 00:39:48.880
Aaron Ross Powell They they don't actually work for Costco.
00:39:48.880 --> 00:39:54.000
They're they're just a third-party vendor that that finds their locations convenient to work in.
00:39:54.000 --> 00:39:55.920
I'm gonna have to go to Sam's Club, I guess.
00:39:55.920 --> 00:40:05.599
Those folks have access to I mean they've got insurance, they've they've got training, I mean, they're able to get access to some of the same tools.
00:40:05.599 --> 00:40:06.079
I see.
00:40:06.079 --> 00:40:08.400
I don't think they're on quite the same level.
00:40:08.400 --> 00:40:21.440
Very few of the folks standing around in uh Costco are cybersecurity guys who play with microcontrollers that understand, you know, public-private key encryption and what the process is.
00:40:21.440 --> 00:40:25.599
They're I don't want to know somebody, but no, they're just following the colour.
00:40:25.599 --> 00:40:26.719
Yeah.
00:40:26.719 --> 00:40:31.679
Yeah, the majority are opening the app and logging in and clicking next and next and next.
00:40:32.079 --> 00:40:35.519
And you can cut your own keys now at Home Depot, I saw, right?
00:40:35.519 --> 00:40:40.480
Like you just walk up to the machine, you put your old one in, and the whole robotic process does it.
00:40:40.639 --> 00:40:40.960
Yeah.
00:40:40.960 --> 00:40:42.400
Let's get in there.
00:40:42.400 --> 00:40:47.519
Take a picture, it determines what the cuts are and runs the machine.
00:40:47.519 --> 00:40:50.000
My machines are that way now as as well.
00:40:50.000 --> 00:40:58.159
I take high-resolution pictures of keys, uh, goes up to a database and says, okay, what should this key have been?
00:40:58.159 --> 00:41:07.039
Um and then sends it to the key cutter, which is basically a C and C machine that that cuts with absolute precision, you know, built for that.
00:41:07.039 --> 00:41:08.480
It's it's kind of cool.
00:41:08.480 --> 00:41:10.559
Um, I've I've worked on brand new vehicles.
00:41:10.559 --> 00:41:15.599
Someone's getting the third key because their you know, kid is also going to be the user of the brand new car.
00:41:15.599 --> 00:41:29.440
And um I can actually tell from with my scanning equipment if the manufacturer had a fresh blade when they cut their you know, never used key, or whether you know, maybe they had cut 500 keys and they were just about to replace the blade.
00:41:29.440 --> 00:41:41.840
Um these are keys that I, you know, the but the owner of the vehicle didn't realize that they had a key inside their key for the mechanical lock, or that you pop the cap off to get to the to the keyhole.
00:41:42.079 --> 00:41:45.199
For for game night Eric uh in uh what are we coming up on?
00:41:45.199 --> 00:41:46.000
August here?
00:41:46.000 --> 00:41:46.239
Yep.
00:41:46.239 --> 00:41:48.800
I think it's August 1st, maybe the first Wednesday of the month.
00:41:48.800 --> 00:41:50.480
I think we got to get into somebody's car.
00:41:50.480 --> 00:41:51.519
We'll we'll pick a volunteer.
00:41:51.519 --> 00:41:52.239
Is it gonna be Cam?
00:41:52.239 --> 00:41:53.039
Who's it gonna be?
00:41:53.039 --> 00:41:54.000
I think it's gotta be Eric.
00:41:54.000 --> 00:41:54.639
It's gotta be Eric.
00:41:55.360 --> 00:41:55.920
August 5th.
00:41:56.159 --> 00:41:56.800
August 5th.
00:41:57.280 --> 00:41:58.960
Tesla gets a little more interesting.
00:41:58.960 --> 00:42:01.039
But I now do stock the cards.
00:42:01.039 --> 00:42:02.880
But uh you'll do your own duplicating.
00:42:02.880 --> 00:42:05.360
I can just hand you the card, I believe, and you do the rest of it.
00:42:05.360 --> 00:42:06.159
Interesting.
00:42:06.320 --> 00:42:06.639
Okay.
00:42:06.639 --> 00:42:08.800
We're gonna we're getting into somebody's car.
00:42:09.280 --> 00:42:10.000
I won't be here.
00:42:10.000 --> 00:42:11.119
Okay.
00:42:11.119 --> 00:42:13.199
You guys gonna have to find another person.
00:42:13.199 --> 00:42:14.880
Grey duck lock picking.
00:42:14.880 --> 00:42:16.320
Grey duck locksmithing?
00:42:16.320 --> 00:42:16.960
Or what is it?
00:42:16.960 --> 00:42:18.239
Which what's the name of it?
00:42:18.239 --> 00:42:19.440
Uh Grey Duck Locks.
00:42:19.440 --> 00:42:22.400
All right, gray duck locks for Grey Duck Security LLC.
00:42:22.400 --> 00:42:24.320
Duck Duck Grey Duck Corporation.
00:42:24.320 --> 00:42:24.719
Yep.
00:42:24.719 --> 00:42:28.960
You know it's not uh, you know, you know it's Minnesota because it's not Duck Duck Goose, right?
00:42:29.199 --> 00:42:29.679
That was the idea.
00:42:29.679 --> 00:42:36.320
I was getting a little older, a little more gray hair, and uh trying to come up with a company name, but I wanted to scream Minnesota Company.
00:42:36.320 --> 00:42:36.719
Sure.
00:42:36.719 --> 00:42:48.480
Not the guys hanging out in Costco, not the call center in New York that's you know dispatching to a guy who downloaded an app and wants to play locksmith this weekend because you know, saw a YouTube video on it.
00:42:48.480 --> 00:42:51.280
Um Minnesota, we called this pop.
00:42:51.280 --> 00:42:52.960
Soda.
00:42:53.760 --> 00:42:54.239
Soda.
00:42:54.239 --> 00:43:00.079
Eric, if somebody wanted to get a really good lock, um what's a good brand?
00:43:00.079 --> 00:43:01.599
Is it like an ambloy?
00:43:01.599 --> 00:43:03.760
What what would you recommend?
00:43:04.079 --> 00:43:10.239
Uh Asa, Abloy, Kaba, all of these are pretty much the same company now.
00:43:10.239 --> 00:43:19.119
Um multi-lock, medico, you know, CA commercial locksmith professional for the best locks.
00:43:19.119 --> 00:43:22.480
You you've got grade one, grade two, and grade three locks.
00:43:22.480 --> 00:43:28.480
The stuff we find at the traditional hardware store, I'd call that a grade three or three and a half.
00:43:28.480 --> 00:43:32.079
Or the the packaging is more resistant than the lock itself.
00:43:32.079 --> 00:43:33.599
Where's the opening that thing?
00:43:33.840 -->
00:43:35.199
Where do I get the grade one?
00:43:35.440 --> 00:43:38.400
Uh grade one you'd get from a professional distributor.
00:43:38.400 --> 00:43:51.679
Now, with today's distribution, if you know what you're shopping for, you know, I'm sure somebody on Amazon will send it to you, or wholesalers are happy to create a new account for you in the hopes of all your future business.
00:43:51.679 --> 00:43:54.800
Um you you can get the hardware in a lot of places.
00:43:54.800 --> 00:44:01.519
Um yeah, see a professional where it's not that expensive to work with somebody who knows what they're doing.
00:44:01.519 --> 00:44:10.079
You know, if you try to repair things yourself, often it costs you more than if you hired the guy who has the jiffy tool that does it in three minutes.
00:44:10.079 --> 00:44:15.840
You didn't need to spend 90 minutes packing your door frame up only to find it doesn't fit.
00:44:15.840 --> 00:44:16.800
You're here.
00:44:17.119 --> 00:44:18.719
Well, thanks for joining us today, Eric.
00:44:18.719 --> 00:44:21.119
It's been really fun talking about locksmithing.
00:44:21.119 --> 00:44:23.920
We got a lot of lock talk happening here today.
00:44:24.239 --> 00:44:24.960
Lock talk, right?
00:44:24.960 --> 00:44:26.079
Yeah, lock it down.
00:44:26.320 --> 00:44:26.480
Yeah.
00:44:26.880 --> 00:44:31.760
I wanted to extend a minute and go to AI for the we're out of time on this one.
00:44:31.760 --> 00:44:32.320
Okay.
00:44:32.639 --> 00:44:39.679
But uh, we're gonna have to have you back because I do want to do AI on-prem, um, large language models and local LMs too.
00:44:39.679 --> 00:44:42.239
So we'll have to schedule to come back sometime soon.
00:44:42.239 --> 00:44:44.719
But uh that wraps us up for today.
00:44:44.719 --> 00:44:47.280
My name is Joshua Schmidt, your co-host and producer.
00:44:47.280 --> 00:44:49.119
You've been listening to the Audit podcast.
00:44:49.119 --> 00:44:50.559
Please like, share, and subscribe.
00:44:50.559 --> 00:44:52.559
You can find us wherever you get your podcasts.
00:44:52.559 --> 00:44:57.920
We are now streaming with video uh on Spotify and as well as Apple here pretty soon.
00:44:57.920 --> 00:45:02.960
We've been joined by the usual suspects, Eric Brown, managing director of IT Auto Labs, and Nick Mellum.
00:45:02.960 --> 00:45:04.559
And our guest today was Eric Osterberg.
00:45:04.559 --> 00:45:04.880
Dr.
00:45:04.880 --> 00:45:05.119
Nick.
00:45:05.119 --> 00:45:05.599
Dr.
00:45:05.599 --> 00:45:06.320
Nick, yes.
00:45:06.320 --> 00:45:09.760
Eric Osterberg is Grey Luck, Gray Duck Lock.
00:45:09.760 --> 00:45:11.519
And you can find him on Google.
00:45:11.519 --> 00:45:15.840
Just uh search Eric Osterberg on LinkedIn or Google and you can find Grey Duck Lock.
00:45:15.840 --> 00:45:18.800
You've been listening to the audit presented by IT Audit Labs.
00:45:18.800 --> 00:45:20.079
We'll see you in the next one.
00:45:20.639 --> 00:45:24.400
You have been listening to the audit presented by IT Audit Labs.
00:45:24.400 --> 00:45:33.119
We are experts at assessing risk and compliance while providing administrative and technical controls to improve our clients' data security.
00:45:33.119 --> 00:45:45.920
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00:45:45.920 --> 00:45:50.239
Thanks to our devoted listeners and followers, as well as our producer, Joshua J.
00:45:50.239 --> 00:45:54.480
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