תעתיק 🔗
WEBVTT
1
00:00:01.520 --> 00:00:06.160
Welcome to FEDSOC Forums, a Federalist Society podcast. I'm Elizabeth Lattery,
2
00:00:06.320 --> 00:00:09.839
vice president of Practice Groups. Be sure to subscribe wherever
3
00:00:09.880 --> 00:00:13.400
you get your podcasts so you won't miss an episode. Now,
4
00:00:13.439 --> 00:00:15.240
please enjoy today's conversation.
5
00:00:16.879 --> 00:00:21.160
Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to FEDSOC Forums. My name
6
00:00:21.199 --> 00:00:24.440
is Maxwell Myram and I am an attorney at Kramer
7
00:00:24.480 --> 00:00:29.079
Moltop LLP in Waukeshaw, Wisconsin. I previously served as the
8
00:00:29.120 --> 00:00:32.640
student liaison to the Federalist Society's Federalism and Separation of
9
00:00:32.679 --> 00:00:37.039
Powers Practice Group. As a reminder, all opinions expressed are
10
00:00:37.119 --> 00:00:40.320
those of our speakers and not of the Federalist Society.
11
00:00:40.840 --> 00:00:45.079
As a federal society takes no positions. Today's program is
12
00:00:45.079 --> 00:00:49.799
titled from Pork Producers to Suncore, Extra Territoriality and our
13
00:00:49.880 --> 00:00:53.960
Constitutional Structure. We're very pleased to welcome an excellent group
14
00:00:54.000 --> 00:00:58.600
of panelists. Professor Michael Grieva is a professor of Law
15
00:00:58.600 --> 00:01:03.479
at antonin Scalia Laws at George Mason University. Professor Daniel
16
00:01:03.560 --> 00:01:07.799
Rodriguez is the Harold Washington Professor of Law at Northwestern
17
00:01:07.879 --> 00:01:12.599
University's Pritzker School of Law. Oh Skinner is the executive
18
00:01:12.640 --> 00:01:17.040
director of the Alliance for Consumers. Michael Williams is the
19
00:01:17.079 --> 00:01:21.079
Solicitor General for the State of West Virginia. Our moderator,
20
00:01:21.120 --> 00:01:24.480
the Honorable Jennifer Perkins, is a judge on the Arizona
21
00:01:24.560 --> 00:01:29.159
Court of Appeals Division One. For more information about our speakers,
22
00:01:29.200 --> 00:01:33.640
including their full bios, please visit fedsok dot org. One
23
00:01:33.680 --> 00:01:36.239
note for our audience before we begin. If you have
24
00:01:36.280 --> 00:01:39.239
any questions throughout the webinar that pertain to the topic
25
00:01:39.239 --> 00:01:42.480
at hand, please submit them through Zoom's Q and a
26
00:01:42.560 --> 00:01:46.159
feature located at the bottom of your screen, not the chat,
27
00:01:46.319 --> 00:01:48.280
so that we'll be able to access them later in
28
00:01:48.319 --> 00:01:51.480
the program. With that note, I will turn things over
29
00:01:51.519 --> 00:01:54.599
to our moderator to start the conversation. Judge Perkins, thank
30
00:01:54.599 --> 00:01:56.000
you so much for joining us today.
31
00:01:57.400 --> 00:02:00.000
Great Thank you, Max, Thank you to the Federals Societ,
32
00:02:00.319 --> 00:02:02.799
and thank you to our panel and audience for joining
33
00:02:02.840 --> 00:02:07.480
us today. We confront today what's arguably a straightforward question,
34
00:02:07.799 --> 00:02:10.960
how far can a single state reach beyond its own
35
00:02:11.039 --> 00:02:16.639
borders in governing. Two cases frame that consideration, and honestly,
36
00:02:16.680 --> 00:02:20.520
I cannot do justice to their complexities, particularly vote breakdowns
37
00:02:20.599 --> 00:02:23.520
in the pork producer's case. But here's my attempt at
38
00:02:23.520 --> 00:02:26.199
a quick overview to frame the discussion. So National Pork
39
00:02:26.240 --> 00:02:29.360
Producers Council versus Ross, the Supreme Court decided in twenty
40
00:02:29.400 --> 00:02:34.639
twenty three. California voters had passed Proposition twelve in twenty eighteen,
41
00:02:35.000 --> 00:02:37.960
which bars the in state sale of pork from breeding
42
00:02:38.039 --> 00:02:42.919
pigs confined quote in a cruel manner. This restriction applied
43
00:02:43.000 --> 00:02:45.919
no matter where in the country the pig was actually raised.
44
00:02:46.599 --> 00:02:49.479
Because California imports nearly all of its pork, the practical
45
00:02:49.520 --> 00:02:52.879
effect was that farmers in Iowa, Minnesota, and North Carolina
46
00:02:52.960 --> 00:02:55.840
or Indiana had to change how they operate if they
47
00:02:55.919 --> 00:03:00.000
wanted access to the California market. The pork producers challenge
48
00:03:00.120 --> 00:03:03.120
the law under the dormant Commerce clause. They conceded the
49
00:03:03.159 --> 00:03:06.759
law was not discriminatory because it treated in state and
50
00:03:06.800 --> 00:03:10.159
out of state producers alike, but instead leaned on what
51
00:03:10.199 --> 00:03:14.719
it called an extra territoriality doctrine that the Constitution contains
52
00:03:14.759 --> 00:03:18.879
an almost automatic rule against state laws whose practical effect
53
00:03:18.960 --> 00:03:23.400
is to control commerce beyond the state's borders. The Supreme
54
00:03:23.400 --> 00:03:27.159
Court rejected that argument in terms of the near automatic
55
00:03:27.240 --> 00:03:31.039
rule unanimously. Beyond that point of agreement, the court was
56
00:03:31.159 --> 00:03:35.120
quite fractured, largely over whether and how judges should weigh
57
00:03:35.199 --> 00:03:39.479
a law's local benefits against its interstate burdens. A bare
58
00:03:39.599 --> 00:03:43.479
majority did uphold Proposition twelve, and the major division that
59
00:03:43.520 --> 00:03:45.879
emerged was over whether the court is even equipped to
60
00:03:45.919 --> 00:03:50.280
balance the law's in state non economic benefits with its
61
00:03:50.319 --> 00:03:54.240
out of state economic burdens. So, for our purposes, port
62
00:03:54.240 --> 00:03:58.599
producers left open this question. If the dormant commerce clause
63
00:03:58.719 --> 00:04:01.240
is not the source of a lem, is there a
64
00:04:01.280 --> 00:04:04.159
limit at all? And if so, where does
Load full transcript
such limit live?
65
00:04:05.560 --> 00:04:08.680
That brings us to the second case, Suncor Energy versus
66
00:04:08.680 --> 00:04:12.159
Boulder County, which is set for oral argument on October fifth. A.
67
00:04:12.240 --> 00:04:16.120
Colorado County and its local governments sued energy companies relying
68
00:04:16.160 --> 00:04:20.240
on Colorado's state law using theories of public nuisance, trespass,
69
00:04:20.279 --> 00:04:24.040
and consumer protection. The suit seeks damages for harms the
70
00:04:24.040 --> 00:04:28.759
planeffs attribute to global climate change, the energy companies argue.
71
00:04:29.120 --> 00:04:33.040
The defendants argue that whatever the label that these claims
72
00:04:33.079 --> 00:04:36.160
are wearing, the suit is really an attempt to regulate
73
00:04:36.199 --> 00:04:38.959
the production and sale of fossil fuels across the country.
74
00:04:38.959 --> 00:04:41.839
And around the world through the tort law of one state.
75
00:04:42.560 --> 00:04:45.879
They contend in part that federal law preempts the claims,
76
00:04:45.959 --> 00:04:50.079
but importantly for our discussion and purposes, companies argue that
77
00:04:50.120 --> 00:04:53.839
the structure of the Constitution and its allocation of authority
78
00:04:53.879 --> 00:04:58.319
over interstate and foreign commerce bars these suits. The local
79
00:04:58.399 --> 00:05:00.959
governments would say that this is a tr additional exercise
80
00:05:01.000 --> 00:05:04.639
of state police power ordinary torton consumer protection law, and
81
00:05:04.680 --> 00:05:07.839
so Colorado retains the sovereign authority to open its own
82
00:05:07.920 --> 00:05:08.959
courthouse doors.
83
00:05:09.600 --> 00:05:11.519
There's also an interesting jurisdictional question.
84
00:05:11.560 --> 00:05:13.079
I don't know if we're going to spend much time
85
00:05:13.079 --> 00:05:17.480
on today, but I'll just note that so pork Producers
86
00:05:17.839 --> 00:05:22.000
tells us where the limit on extra territorial regulation is not,
87
00:05:22.879 --> 00:05:26.480
and Suncore is asking whether it exists somewhere else in
88
00:05:26.519 --> 00:05:30.240
a particular clause. The constitutional structure, the relationship between Congress,
89
00:05:30.279 --> 00:05:33.160
the courts, and the states. And we have the experts
90
00:05:33.240 --> 00:05:36.360
already introduce you today to help us work through some
91
00:05:36.639 --> 00:05:40.199
both theory and practical answers to this question. So I
92
00:05:40.240 --> 00:05:47.120
believe we're going to turn first to Professor Michael Grieves.
93
00:05:45.160 --> 00:05:48.600
In line in the alphabet. Thanks such Forkinson, Thanks to
94
00:05:48.839 --> 00:05:53.399
all the participants, and I've been tasked with explaining that
95
00:05:53.879 --> 00:05:56.160
or arguing that there are limits to what states can
96
00:05:56.199 --> 00:05:59.439
do to each other, and that those limits are grounded
97
00:05:59.480 --> 00:06:06.000
in the structure of the Constitution and general horizontal federalistener principles.
98
00:06:06.680 --> 00:06:09.480
And I'm happy to do that because I believe it,
99
00:06:09.519 --> 00:06:15.079
and especially because everybody already agrees with that, and everybody
100
00:06:15.240 --> 00:06:19.319
also agrees that territory. Territoriality is a big piece of
101
00:06:19.360 --> 00:06:21.319
the constitutional order.
102
00:06:21.839 --> 00:06:22.000
Right.
103
00:06:22.040 --> 00:06:24.439
So if you look at the justice score, such as
104
00:06:25.519 --> 00:06:30.759
the opinion in National Producers, even that decision, so for
105
00:06:30.800 --> 00:06:34.519
recite stolidany, this is a union of equal sovereign states,
106
00:06:35.279 --> 00:06:41.319
territorial states organized on principles of non distermination, non aggression,
107
00:06:41.759 --> 00:06:45.720
a certain amount of comedy. I'd be happy to expound
108
00:06:45.759 --> 00:06:48.560
on that, but we'll get around to it lay there.
109
00:06:48.680 --> 00:06:51.839
But I'm going to start there. The trouble is that
110
00:06:52.040 --> 00:06:54.800
once you said that, you haven't said very much.
111
00:06:55.600 --> 00:06:55.759
Right.
112
00:06:56.199 --> 00:07:02.959
So territoriality extra territoriality is easy and clean and tear
113
00:07:03.199 --> 00:07:07.839
in some cases, New York cannot set tax the sale
114
00:07:07.959 --> 00:07:13.439
off cigarettes in Virginia among Virginia's citizens. That's easy. That's
115
00:07:13.560 --> 00:07:19.319
not the US but frequently territorial claims conflict, and then
116
00:07:19.360 --> 00:07:22.680
you have to sort out whose law governance those kinds
117
00:07:22.720 --> 00:07:27.000
of transactions, and that can be very hard in Suncors
118
00:07:27.040 --> 00:07:29.800
a case like that. So in order to decide those
119
00:07:29.839 --> 00:07:33.560
kinds of questions, you need a baseline choice, right, and
120
00:07:33.839 --> 00:07:37.120
then you need a theory, you need rules of the road,
121
00:07:37.759 --> 00:07:39.639
and you have to explain how all of that is
122
00:07:39.680 --> 00:07:43.399
constitutionally grounded or why the rules you choose to base on,
123
00:07:43.560 --> 00:07:49.920
you choose against which to measure state activities is constitutionally
124
00:07:49.920 --> 00:07:54.199
grounded or at least better than the alternatives. That's what
125
00:07:54.319 --> 00:07:59.199
has me a little nervous about, or very nervous actually
126
00:07:59.240 --> 00:08:04.079
about the Sun Court case, because this Supreme Court isn't
127
00:08:04.120 --> 00:08:06.079
fond of imposing rules in.
128
00:08:05.959 --> 00:08:07.399
This area at all.
129
00:08:08.120 --> 00:08:13.759
Right, it has read textual horizontal federalism provisions out of
130
00:08:13.800 --> 00:08:19.519
the Constitution defant them. That's how all these territoriality claims
131
00:08:19.600 --> 00:08:24.319
all migrated into the dormant coners class. It usually so
132
00:08:24.560 --> 00:08:28.600
it treats horizontal federalism as stood of constitutional orphan.
133
00:08:29.480 --> 00:08:30.959
It usually punts.
134
00:08:30.560 --> 00:08:34.080
These cases come from state courts discretionary, so they can
135
00:08:34.240 --> 00:08:38.840
punt in extreme in truly extreme cases, they slam on
136
00:08:38.879 --> 00:08:41.399
the brakes and say, no, wait a minute, they have
137
00:08:41.480 --> 00:08:43.639
to be limits, except we're not going to tell you
138
00:08:44.080 --> 00:08:47.519
exactly what they are. Right, the treatment of the pike
139
00:08:47.759 --> 00:08:51.559
balancing test in PCC, in the pipe producer, in the
140
00:08:51.720 --> 00:08:55.759
producers cases like that, And they say, and I want
141
00:08:55.799 --> 00:08:59.360
to conclude on that basic And they consistently say, look,
142
00:09:00.240 --> 00:09:02.480
these sorting rules are a matter for Congress.
143
00:09:03.000 --> 00:09:04.200
It's a political task.
144
00:09:04.399 --> 00:09:06.960
We don't want to go near that and make these
145
00:09:07.039 --> 00:09:09.039
value laden decisions.
146
00:09:09.159 --> 00:09:09.919
That strain of.
147
00:09:09.960 --> 00:09:14.799
Thought runs through the entire court produces decision and endless
148
00:09:14.840 --> 00:09:18.639
other cases. Right, And the Supreme Court has a sort
149
00:09:18.639 --> 00:09:22.559
of company in doctrine called displacement, which says that so
150
00:09:22.639 --> 00:09:26.200
long as Congress says peep about anything in this particular case,
151
00:09:26.240 --> 00:09:29.559
the clean area all federal common law that the Court
152
00:09:29.600 --> 00:09:33.159
once upon a time deployed federal common law of nuisances
153
00:09:33.200 --> 00:09:35.559
out of the picture. And the Supreme good does that
154
00:09:35.639 --> 00:09:41.679
even when it knows that no Congressional response will be forecoming.
155
00:09:42.360 --> 00:09:46.000
And so you operate. And then the way for various
156
00:09:46.039 --> 00:09:49.600
reasons that stand offishness on the part of the Court
157
00:09:49.720 --> 00:09:53.399
on federalism questions of this nature wasn't a big Deal
158
00:09:53.559 --> 00:09:56.399
during the New Deal era. It's a big problem now
159
00:09:56.799 --> 00:10:00.759
because of all the polarized states, of polarized Congress and
160
00:10:00.840 --> 00:10:03.919
so on so forth. The Supreme Court, if you look
161
00:10:04.200 --> 00:10:06.360
back over the history, back to all the way to
162
00:10:06.440 --> 00:10:12.000
Massachusetts for CPA as in many ways sparked the carbon wars.
163
00:10:12.559 --> 00:10:13.559
And a little fester.
164
00:10:14.200 --> 00:10:17.440
And so now it has basically forced this Sank four
165
00:10:17.519 --> 00:10:21.120
case on its own doorstep. I'm not making a plea
166
00:10:21.240 --> 00:10:23.519
that this has gone far enough in the Supreme Court
167
00:10:23.559 --> 00:10:26.679
should stop it. I will not argue or point out
168
00:10:26.720 --> 00:10:33.480
that this stand officialer's extreme deference to Congress, extreme suspicion
169
00:10:33.519 --> 00:10:37.240
of anything that smacks like doctrine or federal common law
170
00:10:37.759 --> 00:10:42.279
is a constitutional error. Right. The founders didn't believe in
171
00:10:42.360 --> 00:10:47.759
that kind of the congressional privacy. Why they built a
172
00:10:47.840 --> 00:10:55.440
Congress that's deliberately designed to be slow and to the ornery.
173
00:10:56.240 --> 00:11:00.120
They complimented that with a separation of powers multiple veto
174
00:11:01.120 --> 00:11:03.799
and there are good reasons to organize the system that way.
175
00:11:04.759 --> 00:11:08.159
They turn into the abilities if you deal with conflicts
176
00:11:08.159 --> 00:11:11.480
that sort of go to the part of the union
177
00:11:11.879 --> 00:11:16.200
in hinterstate conflicts or like that. And so the Constitution
178
00:11:16.320 --> 00:11:20.360
reflects that that's why there's original Supreme Court jurisdiction over
179
00:11:20.600 --> 00:11:25.600
state disputes. That's why for certain arrangements like state compacts,
180
00:11:25.960 --> 00:11:31.759
the founders reverse the normal superacy face arrangement and said, no,
181
00:11:32.120 --> 00:11:34.279
everything in the states, do anything they want to do
182
00:11:34.679 --> 00:11:38.600
in that venue requires congressional consent. And above all, they
183
00:11:38.639 --> 00:11:42.440
made a whole bunch of plauses, the privileges, immunities, class
184
00:11:42.519 --> 00:11:46.519
new boss and so forth, self enforcing right, the import
185
00:11:46.559 --> 00:11:52.000
export clause. The intuition behind that is you cannot wait
186
00:11:52.039 --> 00:11:56.559
for colors to come around and organize as universe. Color
187
00:11:56.679 --> 00:12:00.279
can barely decide what is to be federal and what
188
00:12:00.440 --> 00:12:04.480
is to be state. That's why they are endless preaption disputes. Right,
189
00:12:04.919 --> 00:12:08.519
it cannot decide what belongs to which state, and even
190
00:12:08.559 --> 00:12:11.080
if it were, it would decide that on the basis
191
00:12:11.080 --> 00:12:17.600
of sort of political convenience, constitutional propriety, and so the
192
00:12:17.639 --> 00:12:21.120
basic intuition, which it's lost in this litigation, it seems
193
00:12:21.159 --> 00:12:24.240
to me, is that horizontal federalism is to a very
194
00:12:24.320 --> 00:12:30.480
large extent committed institutionally constitutionally committed to the federal courts.
195
00:12:31.080 --> 00:12:35.440
That's poorly articulated in the sun for cases and in
196
00:12:35.480 --> 00:12:39.240
the briefs. But until the lesson sinks in, I think
197
00:12:39.960 --> 00:12:43.840
you can't on the territoriality if they expect much more
198
00:12:44.320 --> 00:12:47.879
from the Supreme Court than one of these. This has
199
00:12:47.919 --> 00:12:51.080
gone far enough, pronounces thanks.
200
00:12:51.480 --> 00:12:54.159
Well, I guess I'm going next.
201
00:12:56.399 --> 00:12:59.440
Jump right in thinks So there's certainly a lot I
202
00:12:59.440 --> 00:13:03.679
agree with Professor grievous presentation point, although we don't share
203
00:13:03.720 --> 00:13:04.799
the same nervousness.
204
00:13:05.000 --> 00:13:06.120
I want to make three points.
205
00:13:06.120 --> 00:13:09.919
One is it's very important to characterize what's actually happening
206
00:13:09.960 --> 00:13:11.679
at the state level here, and I want to suggest
207
00:13:11.720 --> 00:13:15.480
there's nothing particularly remarkable about it. I don't, by any
208
00:13:15.480 --> 00:13:18.000
means mean to suggest it's not remarkable in terms of
209
00:13:18.000 --> 00:13:20.519
its impact on public policy. Could stay a lot about
210
00:13:20.559 --> 00:13:24.360
that matter of state action. Second, what petitioners are asking
211
00:13:24.399 --> 00:13:26.120
to do, what some core energy is asking the Court
212
00:13:26.159 --> 00:13:28.480
to do, is really quite to extend, not just to
213
00:13:28.519 --> 00:13:32.600
protect and acknowledge horizontal federalism, to extend a variety of doctrines,
214
00:13:32.639 --> 00:13:35.080
and we'll see whether they work. And three, I want
215
00:13:35.080 --> 00:13:37.279
to and maybe this is the full crim of the disagreement,
216
00:13:37.600 --> 00:13:40.480
the suggestion what I hear at Professor Greevy arguing is
217
00:13:40.480 --> 00:13:44.720
that Congress's disabilities, which of course are part structurally embedded
218
00:13:44.919 --> 00:13:47.679
or not an excuse or a justification for the court
219
00:13:47.720 --> 00:13:48.159
stepping in.
220
00:13:48.200 --> 00:13:50.200
I'll get to that part last, and we'll probably talk.
221
00:13:50.080 --> 00:13:52.399
About it in the Q and A climate change in
222
00:13:52.480 --> 00:13:56.039
the regulation of greenhouse gases is relatively new, but the
223
00:13:56.159 --> 00:13:58.639
use of the police power by states in the way
224
00:13:58.639 --> 00:14:01.039
that they're using them is not new. And again it's
225
00:14:01.039 --> 00:14:03.600
important to characterize what's happening here. With all due respect
226
00:14:03.639 --> 00:14:06.639
to Judge Perkins' formulation of the question, and I wrote
227
00:14:06.639 --> 00:14:09.759
it down, how far can the state reach beyond its borders?
228
00:14:10.039 --> 00:14:13.080
Is not an an instance in which Colorado is reaching
229
00:14:13.080 --> 00:14:15.879
beyond its borders and passing a law that has truly
230
00:14:16.080 --> 00:14:19.000
extra territorial effects. We know from what Court has said,
231
00:14:19.240 --> 00:14:21.080
and I do believe we know from our principles of
232
00:14:21.120 --> 00:14:24.559
horizontal federalism it's absolutely remotan for a state to pass
233
00:14:24.600
--> 00:14:29.639
a law that specifically has the reach extra territorial.
234
00:14:30.080 --> 00:14:31.960
Court and Aulette, I probably.
235
00:14:31.759 --> 00:14:34.039
Mispronounced the name of the case, made that point clear
236
00:14:34.080 --> 00:14:37.559
in the context of environmental regulation. There the imposition of
237
00:14:37.600 --> 00:14:40.919
the law was limiting discharges from one state on another.
238
00:14:41.360 --> 00:14:44.159
The most you can say about Colorado's law and it's
239
00:14:44.159 --> 00:14:47.720
saying a lot is that it has some extra territorial effects.
240
00:14:47.840 --> 00:14:50.919
It has effects that might not might, but certainly will
241
00:14:51.000 --> 00:14:55.080
expand beyond Colorado. That is not new. From the origins
242
00:14:55.080 --> 00:14:58.000
of our constitutional republic. We had instances of state and
243
00:14:58.120 --> 00:15:02.200
local governments imposing regular and not only regulations, but using
244
00:15:02.279 --> 00:15:05.039
their tort and property law of doctrines, nuisance doctrines, and
245
00:15:05.080 --> 00:15:08.240
the like, not unlike what Colorado courts are being asked
246
00:15:08.240 --> 00:15:10.919
to do here that has an impact on a particular
247
00:15:11.039 --> 00:15:15.639
business company an organization that does business in other states,
248
00:15:15.759 --> 00:15:19.200
And the gist of the local regulation is to or
249
00:15:19.360 --> 00:15:22.600
local nuisance action is to have effects that go beyond
250
00:15:22.600 --> 00:15:25.080
the state. We can call them extra territorial. And as
251
00:15:25.080 --> 00:15:27.799
the Court said in the National Court Producer's case, just
252
00:15:27.840 --> 00:15:30.519
the fact that a law has extratorial effects is not
253
00:15:30.759 --> 00:15:34.240
enough to raise constitutional problem. Police power is not unlimited.
254
00:15:34.399 --> 00:15:37.279
There are external limits, of course, come not only from
255
00:15:37.440 --> 00:15:39.799
individual rights at the state and the federal level. But
256
00:15:39.840 --> 00:15:44.080
as Professor brig points out, principles of horizontal there are
257
00:15:44.320 --> 00:15:47.159
expectations that there will be some internal limits, although those
258
00:15:47.159 --> 00:15:51.080
can be quite slippery. Expectations of reasonableness and other doctrines
259
00:15:51.120 --> 00:15:54.200
that are hardwired into state law, although again that's going
260
00:15:54.240 --> 00:15:56.759
to be dealt with by and large by state common
261
00:15:56.840 --> 00:16:00.360
law and state statutory law. As it is here, of
262
00:16:00.360 --> 00:16:03.200
whether there's proximate causation, whether or not this truly is
263
00:16:03.240 --> 00:16:06.320
a nuisance are settled at the state level. What the
264
00:16:06.399 --> 00:16:09.399
Court is being asked to do, in some core, i'd
265
00:16:09.399 --> 00:16:11.960
suggest as a bridge too far, but leave the normative
266
00:16:11.960 --> 00:16:14.960
part and just focus on the description is to extend
267
00:16:14.960 --> 00:16:18.480
particular doctrines, not to overrule national coort producers, but to
268
00:16:18.519 --> 00:16:21.840
take language from as Judge Perkins told us, this miasma
269
00:16:22.039 --> 00:16:25.399
of various opinions and develop a principle that a law
270
00:16:25.440 --> 00:16:28.960
that has extra territorial impact, even though it doesn't have
271
00:16:29.039 --> 00:16:33.519
extraterritorial reach, goes too far. Maybe even more seriously than that,
272
00:16:33.600 --> 00:16:37.440
it asks the Supreme Court to flip the traditional presumption
273
00:16:37.960 --> 00:16:41.720
that we see common in not only preemption analysis but
274
00:16:41.840 --> 00:16:47.080
in federalism doctrine. Most generally consider Gregory versus Ashcroft cases
275
00:16:47.120 --> 00:16:49.720
involving the Tenth Amendment and the like, which puts a
276
00:16:49.720 --> 00:16:52.120
thumb on the scale in favor of state sovereignty and
277
00:16:52.159 --> 00:16:55.879
state discretion, and instance says, no, we should understand there
278
00:16:55.879 --> 00:16:59.000
to be a presumption in favor of preemption and to
279
00:16:59.279 --> 00:17:02.840
in matters could have national reach and national scope. So
280
00:17:03.000 --> 00:17:08.319
that's than basically extending dormant commerce clause kind of reasoning
281
00:17:08.680 --> 00:17:11.319
to which would really extend the scope of national court
282
00:17:11.400 --> 00:17:15.799
producers to say that if a law has extra territorial effects,
283
00:17:16.119 --> 00:17:19.440
that it runs a foul horizontal federalism softer than that,
284
00:17:19.720 --> 00:17:22.079
But it ain't all that song, because it basically says
285
00:17:22.200 --> 00:17:25.319
that unless there's clear evidence that Congress has put its
286
00:17:25.359 --> 00:17:30.319
imprimature on state decision making, including state common law decision making,
287
00:17:30.640 --> 00:17:33.519
there shall not be room from states and local governments
288
00:17:33.599 --> 00:17:33.839
to it.
289
00:17:34.599 --> 00:17:36.480
And that's problematic. And that brings me to the.
290
00:17:36.480 --> 00:17:39.359
Last introductory point I want to make, which is really
291
00:17:39.640 --> 00:17:43.319
it represents maybe a fundamental disagreement between Professor Grivet and
292
00:17:43.400 --> 00:17:47.039
myself on this point, and that is disabilities of Congress.
293
00:17:47.079 --> 00:17:50.160
Notwithstanding this is an area in which Congress could solve
294
00:17:50.200 --> 00:17:52.880
this problem, the fact that it's very difficult to solve
295
00:17:52.920 --> 00:17:57.920
this problem because polarization within Congress, deep divisions between Democrats
296
00:17:57.920 --> 00:18:02.160
and Republicans, public opinion, and all is largely beside the
297
00:18:02.200 --> 00:18:05.799
point the Framers. Not
only did the Framers understand, but
298
00:18:05.880 --> 00:18:09.759
the early Supreme Court, in the blockbuster of federalism cases
299
00:18:10.000 --> 00:18:13.160
that we now take as if not sacricing, as sort
300
00:18:13.160 --> 00:18:16.799
of part of our fundamentals in federalism and jurisprudence, whether
301
00:18:16.799 --> 00:18:19.640
you're talking about McCulloch versus Merrill, and Gibbons versus Ocden,
302
00:18:19.680 --> 00:18:22.119
the big Commerce clause cases before we even get to
303
00:18:22.160 --> 00:18:26.319
the dormant Commerce Clause, basically said in Dicta and in
304
00:18:26.400 --> 00:18:30.640
holding that these judgments about the scope of national authority
305
00:18:30.880 --> 00:18:34.200
are judgments that are fundamentally to be made by Congress
306
00:18:34.759 --> 00:18:38.359
under a congressional choice, congressional choice that can be manifest
307
00:18:38.519 --> 00:18:43.079
in direct preemption. And I think no one denies in
308
00:18:43.160 --> 00:18:45.599
any end of this of this case, the Congress could
309
00:18:45.640 --> 00:18:48.759
settle this issue by passing national law or extend the
310
00:18:48.799 --> 00:18:51.160
scope of the Clean Air Act or anything like that.
311
00:18:51.440 --> 00:18:55.000
But the absence of that, to have an expectation of
312
00:18:55.039 --> 00:18:58.519
the Supreme Court to settle these issues is highly problematic.
313
00:18:58.759 --> 00:19:01.079
This is not a case that's a former Commerce clause case,
314
00:19:01.119 --> 00:19:03.880
to be sure, but for the same sorts of reasons
315
00:19:03.920 --> 00:19:08.559
that Justice Thomas articulated in National Pork Producers and in
316
00:19:08.640 --> 00:19:13.440
other cases, his concern based on originalism and constracial structure
317
00:19:13.720 --> 00:19:17.519
about the Supreme Courts ruling the roost in matters of
318
00:19:17.599 --> 00:19:20.799
determining Dalmer commerce clause issues. I think the same problems
319
00:19:21.000 --> 00:19:24.000
exist here, and so my prediction is actually the Court
320
00:19:24.079 --> 00:19:28.319
will not develop a general principle and that essentially extends
321
00:19:28.400 --> 00:19:30.759
the scope in the reach of some of these earlier
322
00:19:30.799 --> 00:19:35.759
commerce federalism decisions to reach this particular decision of Colorado courts.
323
00:19:36.319 --> 00:19:37.039
I'll stop there.
324
00:19:38.240 --> 00:19:41.160
Great, thank you, professor, mister Skinner. I think you probably
325
00:19:41.200 --> 00:19:42.839
have one or two things you'd like to share.
326
00:19:43.920 --> 00:19:46.440
Yeah, I think for most people who are not deeply
327
00:19:46.640 --> 00:19:49.240
inmessaged in this, I think is really helpful to zoom
328
00:19:49.400 --> 00:19:53.319
out in some bas part Producers seems clean because what
329
00:19:53.359 --> 00:19:56.000
you're seeing is and the Professor to be did a
330
00:19:56.039 --> 00:19:59.039
really nice shatw of flagginess. You're seeing a polarization of
331
00:19:59.079 --> 00:20:01.799
this at the state level more and more in our country,
332
00:20:02.240 --> 00:20:06.920
and you're seeing a response to unexpected I would say
333
00:20:06.960 --> 00:20:11.119
losses of federal authority by the left is to push
334
00:20:11.200 --> 00:20:15.839
ever greater on trying to accomplish ideological goals through extra
335
00:20:15.960 --> 00:20:19.160
territorial laws. And one thing that often gets lost in
336
00:20:19.200 --> 00:20:22.599
pork Producers is it was equal as to pork raised
337
00:20:22.640 --> 00:20:25.319
in California or out but they raise almost no pork
338
00:20:25.319 --> 00:20:28.599
in California. So they're functionally passing a law that affects
339
00:20:28.680 --> 00:20:31.400
eighty or ninety percent of the product is outside the state.
340
00:20:32.160 --> 00:20:35.960
And you're seeing this ever more where there's states passing
341
00:20:35.960 --> 00:20:38.680
climate superfund laws that look a lot like taxing cigarettes
342
00:20:38.720 --> 00:20:41.640
that are sold in Virginia to Virginian's right to use
343
00:20:41.720 --> 00:20:45.720
Professor Rodriguez as example. And you saw recently in California
344
00:20:45.720 --> 00:20:48.680
where they attempted to through the California or Resource Board
345
00:20:49.279 --> 00:20:53.400
as a rule and then force a horizontal agreement between
346
00:20:53.440 --> 00:20:55.640
trucking producers that if you wanted to operate a trucking
347
00:20:55.640 --> 00:20:58.559
fleet in the state of California for long bawl trucks,
348
00:20:58.839 --> 00:21:02.200
you needed them to be zero mission, and the producers
349
00:21:02.200 --> 00:21:04.759
of internal combustion long bold truck engines had to agree
350
00:21:04.759 --> 00:21:07.240
to stop making them by a date certain in the future. Well,
351
00:21:07.279 --> 00:21:09.920
if no one's making the engines because California has made
352
00:21:09.960 --> 00:21:13.440
you stop making them, then everyone will lose access to them.
353
00:21:13.440 --> 00:21:16.319
Not because of a traditional I'm governing what happens in
354
00:21:16.359 --> 00:21:19.519
my state, but because California is actively attempting to control
355
00:21:19.559 --> 00:21:22.599
it by saying you can't make them for anybody.
356
00:21:23.400 --> 00:21:25.079
And so I think one thing.
357
00:21:25.000 --> 00:21:27.279
That everyone needs to grasp is that this is going
358
00:21:27.319 --> 00:21:28.759
to be the front line is for the next ten
359
00:21:28.839 --> 00:21:32.519
years in many respects of how policy fights will be made,
360
00:21:32.839 --> 00:21:35.119
and there will be a spectrum, right. I think Professor
361
00:21:35.200 --> 00:21:36.839
Grieve is doing a good job of flagging that, and
362
00:21:36.960 --> 00:21:39.160
Fesser Rodriguez in some respects. So the thing that fall
363
00:21:39.240 --> 00:21:42.960
closer to a
traditional exercise of local authority and things
364
00:21:43.000 --> 00:21:45.359
that look like taxing cigarettes sold.
365
00:21:45.200 --> 00:21:47.680
In Virginia to Virginians.
366
00:21:46.880 --> 00:21:49.160
Because you don't like that when you live in Vermont, right,
367
00:21:49.720 --> 00:21:51.960
And so when you start from that, this is a
368
00:21:52.000 --> 00:21:54.200
crucial question that it's going to get fleshed out.
369
00:21:54.799 --> 00:21:56.079
It's going to get flashed out.
370
00:21:56.000 --> 00:21:57.960
Because you're going to see people come back to the
371
00:21:58.039 --> 00:22:01.039
till again and again in an attempt to government national
372
00:22:01.039 --> 00:22:03.039
economy from state laws.
373
00:22:03.400 --> 00:22:05.880
And I think that the answer.
374
00:22:05.480 --> 00:22:08.559
Of Congress could just pass the uniform law that trables
375
00:22:08.599 --> 00:22:12.079
all the states equally, is a really sad outcome because
376
00:22:12.279 --> 00:22:14.400
we are supposed to have a federal system for a reason.
377
00:22:14.960 --> 00:22:19.279
And I think secondarily we should go back to the
378
00:22:19.319 --> 00:22:23.079
port Producer's case, because I think reading that case fresh
379
00:22:23.599 --> 00:22:27.359
helps an understanding. The case is very clear that there
380
00:22:27.440 --> 00:22:31.319
is no right or principle in the Constitution that pans
381
00:22:31.359 --> 00:22:34.079
these kinds of things from the dorma commerce clause, and
382
00:22:34.759 --> 00:22:38.200
it pushes people to stop trying to weigh the local
383
00:22:38.240 --> 00:22:42.160
benefits versus the extra territorial burdens, because as Justice Colia
384
00:22:42.200 --> 00:22:44.119
said that it's like measuring how much to these feathers
385
00:22:44.119 --> 00:22:46.519
wave versus how bright is that sunshine? Right to mangle
386
00:22:46.519 --> 00:22:50.160
the analogy, and I think what you're seeing is a
387
00:22:50.200 --> 00:22:52.920
court that asks for help. I think if you read
388
00:22:53.000 --> 00:22:55.279
Justice Corsuch's opinion, if you read a lot of the
389
00:22:55.359 --> 00:22:57.279
things Professor Grieves said, if you read some of the
390
00:22:57.279 --> 00:22:59.880
footnotes in there, including the site to a Michael Reagan paper,
391
00:23:00.240 --> 00:23:04.720
if you look at the Kavanaugh can decide in they're
392
00:23:04.759 --> 00:23:08.000
asking people to think scharter about what the limits would be,
393
00:23:08.160 --> 00:23:11.000
where they would reside, and how this is supposed to work,
394
00:23:11.079 --> 00:23:13.359
because these are questions that are going to come up
395
00:23:13.359 --> 00:23:16.359
ever more frequently, and so separating the rest of this,
396
00:23:16.480 --> 00:23:19.039
I think the thing that's the most interesting about Suncore
397
00:23:19.279 --> 00:23:22.680
is that it's the first time we've seen hard work
398
00:23:22.799 --> 00:23:26.480
being done to start to flesh out where the astra
399
00:23:26.559 --> 00:23:30.279
chriitoriality limit lies. Because once you start to think about
400
00:23:30.279 --> 00:23:33.119
where it comes from, the thing that we all agree
401
00:23:33.160 --> 00:23:35.599
on but don't know where it resides, then you can
402
00:23:35.680 --> 00:23:37.759
start to ask questions about how would you measure it,
403
00:23:38.039 --> 00:23:40.319
what are the meats and bounds of it, What do
404
00:23:40.359 --> 00:23:42.599
you think about in terms of what is permissible and
405
00:23:42.599 --> 00:23:45.160
it is not permissible? And I think that there's three
406
00:23:45.160 --> 00:23:47.880
briefs in particular that it just really struck me. Michael's
407
00:23:47.880 --> 00:23:50.279
Brief and from Western dingus Free, but the State of
408
00:23:50.279 --> 00:23:53.160
Tennessee wrote a great brief, and a group called Stay
409
00:23:53.160 --> 00:23:55.359
of our States through Michael McGinley who used to be
410
00:23:55.519 --> 00:23:58.920
as the White House. And then Brief if by consumers research.
411
00:23:59.319 --> 00:24:01.119
These are briefs that look, they go all the way
412
00:24:01.119 --> 00:24:03.559
back and they start looking at cases like discular exchange.
413
00:24:03.599 --> 00:24:06.440
They start looking at the founding, the era, understanding of
414
00:24:06.559 --> 00:24:11.200
sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction, and they each talk in different language.
415
00:24:11.359 --> 00:24:13.319
I think one of the grace talks about territial jurisdiction
416
00:24:13.359 --> 00:24:15.839
and everyone talks about territorial sovereignty, and other talks about
417
00:24:15.839 --> 00:24:18.519
equal sovereignty It's the first time I've ever seen work
418
00:24:18.599 --> 00:24:21.519
outside of an academic paper. This starts to really dig
419
00:24:21.599 --> 00:24:25.319
into what is supposed to be the limit between states
420
00:24:25.359 --> 00:24:29.279
in our constitutional structure. And I think that it starts
421
00:24:29.279 --> 00:24:32.839
to ask the better the questions about why do you
422
00:24:32.920 --> 00:24:34.319
see the privileges in the unity's clause?
423
00:24:34.359 --> 00:24:35.920
Why do you see the expert in for a clause?
424
00:24:36.319 --> 00:24:39.880
A lot of these clauses seem to be reflective of
425
00:24:39.960 --> 00:24:42.599
a core understanding that the states were the sovereigns that
426
00:24:42.680 --> 00:24:46.160
created the country, and they delegated a lot of authority up,
427
00:24:46.519 --> 00:24:49.359
but they didn't delegate a lot of authority side to side,
428
00:24:49.680 --> 00:24:51.720
and they put in some core there was a core
429
00:24:51.839 --> 00:24:55.720
understanding that never disappeared that you can't regulate in another state,
430
00:24:56.079 --> 00:25:00.279
and that there would be regulatory of reaches it would
431
00:25:00.279 --> 00:25:03.640
be
deemed too much or too far or too abusive.
432
00:25:04.119 --> 00:25:07.359
And I think when you look at pork producers and
433
00:25:07.400 --> 00:25:09.599
then you look at the sun or briefing and you
434
00:25:09.640 --> 00:25:12.400
look at the arc in between pork producer comes out,
435
00:25:12.480 --> 00:25:14.839
you start to see a lot more states reaching a
436
00:25:14.920 --> 00:25:17.240
lot more aggressively across the state lines in a way
437
00:25:17.240 --> 00:25:20.680
where their politicians and others are touting this as their
438
00:25:20.759 --> 00:25:25.039
way of accomplishing regulation of others, and then you end
439
00:25:25.119 --> 00:25:27.319
up with Suncore, which has briefing it for the first
440
00:25:27.319 --> 00:25:30.319
time to me at least probably not Muster Grieva starts
441
00:25:30.319 --> 00:25:31.920
to set out some of the things that he talked
442
00:25:31.920 --> 00:25:34.240
about with his Upside Down Constitution book, which is, you've
443
00:25:34.279 --> 00:25:36.200
got this concept of there has to be a limit,
444
00:25:36.279 --> 00:25:39.680
and the limit's really important, and so I think everyone
445
00:25:39.720 --> 00:25:42.440
should look at this topic in that light and should
446
00:25:42.440 --> 00:25:45.119
be grateful for Suncore to the extent that it is
447
00:25:45.240 --> 00:25:48.319
drawing out a lot more deep thinking on this topic
448
00:25:48.680 --> 00:25:51.039
that was asked for by the court and the fork
449
00:25:51.079 --> 00:25:54.599
producer's tase. And the last thing I would end with,
450
00:25:54.720 --> 00:25:56.240
because I want to be able to have some time
451
00:25:56.279 --> 00:25:59.720
for questions, is I personally don't want to live in
452
00:25:59.759 --> 00:26:02.960
gap newsance of America, whereas he's determining every single thing
453
00:26:03.000 --> 00:26:05.799
that happens, even for a person in Plano, Texas. But
454
00:26:05.880 --> 00:26:09.359
I think all of us should be very nervous about
455
00:26:09.400 --> 00:26:13.039
that reality. The one thing that you can see from
456
00:26:13.079 --> 00:26:15.880
a lot of people's beliefs about voting and other things
457
00:26:15.960 --> 00:26:18.680
is like my vote doesn't matter, or there's a deep
458
00:26:18.680 --> 00:26:21.160
state in Washington that controls how things happen, and I
459
00:26:21.200 --> 00:26:24.400
had a lot of critiques of that, but fundamentally, if
460
00:26:24.440 --> 00:26:30.440
we have a system where California or Vermont or Colorado
461
00:26:30.759 --> 00:26:36.359
is passing laws or using lawsuits to accomplish nationwide read
462
00:26:37.200 --> 00:26:40.000
then people will go to the ballot box in Arkansas.
463
00:26:40.400 --> 00:26:42.400
They will vote for their elected representatives.
464
00:26:42.960 --> 00:26:45.440
They will then wonder why when they go into stores,
465
00:26:45.559 --> 00:26:47.319
or they go to the buyo product, or they go
466
00:26:47.400 --> 00:26:51.079
somewhere to do something, everything that is available resembles what
467
00:26:51.200 --> 00:26:55.200
California would have voted for. They will start to lose
468
00:26:55.279 --> 00:26:59.359
trust in the democratic system because fundamentally, some people talk
469
00:26:59.400 --> 00:27:01.799
about the Gary Hey clause in the extra church reality space,
470
00:27:02.160 --> 00:27:04.119
the one thing we should have as a system where
471
00:27:04.480 --> 00:27:07.359
the laws that are affecting you are written by people
472
00:27:07.359 --> 00:27:08.319
that you've voted for.
473
00:27:08.640 --> 00:27:11.039
You may not have won when you voted, but you've
474
00:27:11.039 --> 00:27:12.160
believes voted for them.
475
00:27:12.240 --> 00:27:16.200
And if California and Vermont are able in Colorado are
476
00:27:16.240 --> 00:27:20.400
able to write nationwide rules ban internal combustion engines for
477
00:27:20.480 --> 00:27:24.119
long ball trucks, tax the use of products in other
478
00:27:24.160 --> 00:27:27.279
states by people who are not from their state, you're
479
00:27:27.279 --> 00:27:28.519
going to start to see that A lot of people
480
00:27:28.519 --> 00:27:32.440
believe that their system's not working, they go to the
481
00:27:32.440 --> 00:27:35.160
ballot box, they vote for things, and their life changes
482
00:27:35.640 --> 00:27:37.279
not as a result of the people that they've elected,
483
00:27:37.319 --> 00:27:39.279
but as a result of people that were elected across
484
00:27:39.279 --> 00:27:42.319
the country. And I think that is exactly what we'll
485
00:27:42.400 --> 00:27:45.599
underline an overall belief in our democratic system. And so
486
00:27:45.640 --> 00:27:48.079
I think if you really like our democratic system and
487
00:27:48.119 --> 00:27:51.400
our constitution, you need to see all of this as
488
00:27:51.440 --> 00:27:54.680
a threat to our constitutional order and you start to
489
00:27:55.039 --> 00:28:01.119
hope for some clear guardrails step forth with an understanding
490
00:28:01.160 --> 00:28:05.359
from the founding of what was and wasn't available between states,
491
00:28:05.720 --> 00:28:08.519
because if we don't get those kind of guardrails, this
492
00:28:08.599 --> 00:28:11.240
is going to continue to spin out of control very quickly.
493
00:28:11.720 --> 00:28:14.440
And one thing that is being discussed more and more
494
00:28:14.960 --> 00:28:17.240
is whether you're going to start to see conservative states
495
00:28:17.240 --> 00:28:21.480
teeing up rules and regulations that are specifically designed to
496
00:28:21.839 --> 00:28:25.200
impose these same kinds of penalties on more liberal states,
497
00:28:25.200 --> 00:28:25.960
and it will start to.
498
00:28:25.880 --> 00:28:28.920
Create a very chaotic effect. And this falls everywhere.
499
00:28:28.920 --> 00:28:31.160
It's in the pork producers and you saw a lawsuit
500
00:28:31.240 -->
00:28:33.480
over Colorado's regulations of AI.
501
00:28:34.000 --> 00:28:35.559
You're just going to see this pop up.
502
00:28:35.440 --> 00:28:38.359
More and more and getting a handle on it through
503
00:28:39.079 --> 00:28:41.920
guidance from the court, even if it moves slowly, is
504
00:28:42.079 --> 00:28:45.000
really crucial because it's going to become a topic that
505
00:28:45.279 --> 00:28:47.440
is in the news and eating courts.
506
00:28:47.119 --> 00:28:47.640
More and more.
507
00:28:49.039 --> 00:28:49.440
Thank you.
508
00:28:49.640 --> 00:28:53.160
Oh and we'll turn to mister Williams here for our
509
00:28:53.240 --> 00:28:56.400
last round of introductory remarks. I will just remind everyone
510
00:28:56.440 --> 00:28:59.359
we're accepting questions through the Q and A function, and
511
00:28:59.440 --> 00:29:01.519
thank you. We have a robust response to Q and
512
00:29:01.559 --> 00:29:03.839
A function already. We will jump into those once we
513
00:29:03.920 --> 00:29:05.960
finish with the introductory remarks.
514
00:29:05.960 --> 00:29:06.240
Thank you.
515
00:29:07.079 --> 00:29:09.079
I've got to say I love seeing Professor Adler in
516
00:29:09.119 --> 00:29:11.359
the QAA because it's like feeling like he's here with us.
517
00:29:11.400 --> 00:29:13.519
He has good views that I always love hearing.
518
00:29:13.680 --> 00:29:15.240
In any event, I wanted to talk a little bit
519
00:29:15.240 --> 00:29:17.319
about sort of some of the practical consequences from the
520
00:29:17.359 --> 00:29:20.200
state perspective here. I do find it interesting and I'm
521
00:29:20.240 --> 00:29:23.839
happy to hear Professor Rodriguez in particular talk about placing
522
00:29:24.000 --> 00:29:27.119
the thumb on the scale in favor of state sovereignty,
523
00:29:27.240 --> 00:29:30.400
state discretion, state sovereignty being maybe.
524
00:29:30.200 --> 00:29:31.920
The most important part of the job that I do here.
525
00:29:31.920 --> 00:29:34.480
We're always pushing for those notions, but I think what
526
00:29:34.519 --> 00:29:36.680
we've realized in this sort of upside down world is
527
00:29:36.720 --> 00:29:39.519
that state sovereignty and state discretion fall away if we
528
00:29:39.559 --> 00:29:43.319
allow one state to effectively attack another through operation.
529
00:29:42.960 --> 00:29:44.720
Of its extra territorial laws.
530
00:29:45.000 --> 00:29:49.039
So fundamentally, what we're concerned about in these cases, be
531
00:29:49.079 --> 00:29:50.799
it Suncore and the Towart space, or in the New
532
00:29:50.880 --> 00:29:53.279
York super Fund context and sort of a more traditional
533
00:29:53.640 --> 00:29:58.440
statutory regulatory space, is that all of them ignore the
534
00:29:58.480 --> 00:30:03.160
fundamental right to equal state sovereignty. And so we really
535
00:30:03.319 --> 00:30:06.440
are worried about a situation in which states are allowed
536
00:30:06.480 --> 00:30:08.680
to lash out against one another through the sorts of
537
00:30:09.000 --> 00:30:12.200
retalitatory mechanisms. Maybe that Oh was mentioning there at the end,
538
00:30:12.759 --> 00:30:15.839
or just create an economic balkanization that we don't think
539
00:30:15.920 --> 00:30:19.480
was ever contemplated by our constitutional structure. And that sort
540
00:30:19.519 --> 00:30:21.880
of balkanization that's sort of a ack on one another
541
00:30:22.400 --> 00:30:25.359
that's obviously much closer toward the Articles of Confederation that.
542
00:30:25.519 --> 00:30:27.119
Sort of prompted our constitutional scheme.
543
00:30:27.200 --> 00:30:30.119
Right they were, there was an economic stratification that was
544
00:30:30.160 --> 00:30:33.240
beginning to happen that was creating a lot of concern
545
00:30:33.480 --> 00:30:36.000
among star Framers that then led them to come together
546
00:30:36.079 --> 00:30:39.119
to create this balance of power that I think has
547
00:30:39.160 --> 00:30:41.920
worked out pretty well for us so far. So from
548
00:30:41.920 --> 00:30:45.200
a state perspective, we really see the arguments for preemption
549
00:30:45.279 --> 00:30:49.079
in this space, maybe seemingly facially contradictory, but as really
550
00:30:49.200 --> 00:30:53.559
vindicating the argument for state power because it preserves our
551
00:30:53.640 --> 00:30:56.960
state power, our state authority, our state sovereignty to operate
552
00:30:57.000 --> 00:31:00.000
within our own borders. And as far as we're concerned,
553
00:31:00.119 --> 00:31:03.160
sort of the laboratories of democracy don't function correctly if
554
00:31:03.200 --> 00:31:06.000
there's not, to some degree some walls around those laboratories.
555
00:31:06.079 --> 00:31:08.000
Right Again, I think it's.
556
00:31:07.880 --> 00:31:11.640
For us essentially an equal sovereignty doctrine that is baked
557
00:31:11.640 --> 00:31:14.079
into the scheme of our constitution, but is really just
558
00:31:14.200 --> 00:31:18.720
vindicating those same powerful sovereign in or substance. And it's
559
00:31:18.839 --> 00:31:20.799
especially the case, I think, when it comes to issues
560
00:31:20.839 --> 00:31:25.559
like climate change, because they are fundamentally interstate questions. And
561
00:31:25.599 --> 00:31:28.519
I think maybe that's the key distinction between a case
562
00:31:28.599 --> 00:31:31.599
like suncre and a case like pork producers, is that
563
00:31:31.880 --> 00:31:34.400
at least in pork producers, you have someone who has
564
00:31:34.440 --> 00:31:37.039
made a deliberative choice to enter the market. Right so
565
00:31:37.079 --> 00:31:39.240
it's California can at least look at the choice to
566
00:31:39.319 --> 00:31:42.160
enter the market and say I'm going to regulate that choice.
567
00:31:42.200 --> 00:31:45.519
You're making a decision to subject to yourself to my regulation.
568
00:31:46.000 --> 00:31:49.799
We can talk about whether you
leverage an economic market power.
569
00:31:50.079 --> 00:31:52.640
Makes that sort of a more complicated decision than it
570
00:31:52.720 --> 00:31:55.240
might first appear, but there's at least that sort of
571
00:31:55.720 --> 00:31:59.200
assumption of a choice. I think what's challenging about the
572
00:31:59.279 --> 00:32:02.839
climate change, of course, is that there is no choice.
573
00:32:02.839 --> 00:32:06.000
It's inherently at their state issue. So you have a
574
00:32:06.039 --> 00:32:08.759
coal producer or an oil and gas producer in West Virginia,
575
00:32:08.799 --> 00:32:11.519
where we are a state that actually has passed laws
576
00:32:11.640 --> 00:32:15.160
expressly declaring that we favor those sorts of traditional energy
577
00:32:15.160 --> 00:32:17.519
sources that we say we want to support not just
578
00:32:17.519 --> 00:32:20.559
spread or lawful, but encourage the production of those sorts
579
00:32:20.559 --> 00:32:25.079
of traditional energy sources. Those same producers then get nail
580
00:32:25.559 --> 00:32:28.759
by New York for hundreds of billions of dollars of liability,
581
00:32:29.039 --> 00:32:33.240
and that necessarily is a regulatory decision, right, It's going
582
00:32:33.279 --> 00:32:36.519
to affect the decisions that those producers are making here
583
00:32:36.519 --> 00:32:38.720
in West Virginia in a place where we want to
584
00:32:38.799 --> 00:32:41.839
encourage it. They're going to be motivated to curtail their
585
00:32:42.440 --> 00:32:45.000
activities in our state because of what New York is doing.
586
00:32:45.720 --> 00:32:49.480
We see that as obviously deeply problematic. It's just not
587
00:32:49.559 --> 00:32:52.240
a situation in which we want one state to be
588
00:32:52.279 --> 00:32:56.319
able to leverage into another state not just their market power,
589
00:32:56.319 --> 00:32:59.839
but their express regulatory authority to control what other bides
590
00:33:00.160 --> 00:33:03.519
lawful conduct, and from our perspective, the effects of the same,
591
00:33:03.559 --> 00:33:06.359
whether it's through an express statute like what you see
592
00:33:06.359 --> 00:33:08.759
in New York, or again a tort lawsuit like the
593
00:33:08.759 --> 00:33:12.079
one that Colorado has encouraged. I also do think that
594
00:33:12.279 --> 00:33:14.880
this discussion about whether Congress could step in or couldn't
595
00:33:14.880 --> 00:33:17.279
step in, or whether it's likely that they're going to
596
00:33:17.400 --> 00:33:20.000
or not, I think is somewhat beside the point. I
597
00:33:20.000 --> 00:33:23.200
think that frankly, we often hear arguments when it comes
598
00:33:23.200 --> 00:33:26.039
to who gets to make the right decision about Congress's
599
00:33:26.440 --> 00:33:29.039
inability to do much of anything lately in Congress, we
600
00:33:29.079 --> 00:33:31.640
would love to see a legislative solution from them. There
601
00:33:31.680 --> 00:33:34.839
actually are proposed legislative solutions on the table, But when
602
00:33:34.880 --> 00:33:37.359
it comes to what the Constitution actually allows you to do,
603
00:33:37.599 --> 00:33:41.319
and whether there are inherently interstate problems that the Constitution
604
00:33:41.599 --> 00:33:45.640
necessarily contemplates will be addressed through the only interstate mechanism
605
00:33:45.680 --> 00:33:48.160
that we have, which is the federal government. That's a
606
00:33:48.279 --> 00:33:53.000
question that's wholly separate apart from congressional power and congressional authority.
607
00:33:53.440 --> 00:33:55.880
So I think it's maybe an interesting thought exercise to
608
00:33:55.920 --> 00:33:58.519
think about whether Congress can step in. But just like
609
00:33:58.559 --> 00:34:01.400
in West Virginia, be Eba, when people were saying, EPA,
610
00:34:01.440 --> 00:34:03.480
you need to step in to solve all these big
611
00:34:03.559 --> 00:34:05.880
climate change problems because Congress is never going to do it.
612
00:34:05.920 --> 00:34:08.239
We didn't find that a compelling argument now and I
613
00:34:08.239 --> 00:34:09.920
don't find it, or excuse me, we didn't find a
614
00:34:09.960 --> 00:34:12.360
compelling argement, then we certainly don't find it a compelling argument.
615
00:34:13.280 --> 00:34:16.480
So at bottom, from the state's perspective, it's a practical
616
00:34:16.519 --> 00:34:20.199
recognition that we cannot perform our functions if we're attacking
617
00:34:20.280 --> 00:34:24.840
one another, and if there are certain inherently interstate problems that,
618
00:34:25.000 --> 00:34:26.960
as much as we hate to admit it, the federal
619
00:34:27.000 --> 00:34:29.440
government actually does need to confront those problems itself.
620
00:34:30.000 --> 00:34:32.639
That's all for me, great thank you to everyone.
621
00:34:32.639 --> 00:34:36.639
With the introductory remarks, I'm going to move into questions,
622
00:34:36.760 --> 00:34:38.960
one of my own to start in questions from the audience,
623
00:34:39.000 --> 00:34:41.519
which I hope you will all use as your venue
624
00:34:41.519 --> 00:34:43.559
to respond to one another to the extent that you
625
00:34:43.599 --> 00:34:44.840
have responsive remarks.
626
00:34:45.199 --> 00:34:45.840
And just at the.
627
00:34:45.760 --> 00:34:49.079
Outset of question I'm wondering about, we're speaking about the
628
00:34:49.079 --> 00:34:52.480
structure of the Constitution itself as the limiting principle or
629
00:34:52.559 --> 00:34:56.920
the guiding of limits. But I don't see anyone pointing
630
00:34:57.000 --> 00:35:01.840
to a particular text anchoring that limiting prens. Perhaps, Professor Grave,
631
00:35:01.920 --> 00:35:04.639
perhaps I know always you've done some thinking in this space,
632
00:35:04.679 --> 00:35:07.719
But are we in danger of getting into a penumbra
633
00:35:08.199 --> 00:35:11.239
kind of an argument in this space if
we're relying
634
00:35:11.280 --> 00:35:12.280
on structure alone.
635
00:35:13.440 --> 00:35:15.719
I'll go first, just because I'll be really fast. The
636
00:35:15.719 --> 00:35:17.719
professor just thought about this more than I have.
637
00:35:18.280 --> 00:35:19.239
The one thing I'll.
638
00:35:19.000 --> 00:35:21.119
Say is if you look at this at the briefing
639
00:35:21.119 --> 00:35:23.519
in like the Save our State's Free, they do a
640
00:35:23.559 --> 00:35:27.239
really good job of explaining that unlike most things, it
641
00:35:27.320 --> 00:35:31.000
looks here like you had existing rights of sovereign nations
642
00:35:31.079 --> 00:35:33.920
that then joining together to make the Constitution. And so
643
00:35:33.960 --> 00:35:36.639
then the question becomes a lot of what did the
644
00:35:36.679 --> 00:35:40.480
Constitution take from them and where did it send it,
645
00:35:41.159 --> 00:35:44.320
which is very different than questions of did the Constitution
646
00:35:44.559 --> 00:35:47.519
create a certain right or did the Constitution create a
647
00:35:47.519 --> 00:35:51.559
certain thing. And I think that the explanation and a
648
00:35:51.599 --> 00:35:54.760
lot of that briefing was very compelling to me that
649
00:35:54.840 --> 00:35:57.440
you're not looking at different parts of the Constitution to
650
00:35:57.519 --> 00:36:01.559
stitch together a penumbre. You were looking at a lot
651
00:36:01.599 --> 00:36:04.480
of different parts of the Constitution to confirm whether something
652
00:36:04.480 --> 00:36:09.599
that always existed before was taken away or not. And
653
00:36:09.679 --> 00:36:12.280
I thought that was a very compelling framing. But the
654
00:36:12.280 --> 00:36:14.519
professor just thought about this any much deeper level, So
655
00:36:14.559 --> 00:36:15.920
I'm really curious how he thinks of it.
656
00:36:17.039 --> 00:36:19.599
Yeah, look, the way let me think about it is this.
657
00:36:20.599 --> 00:36:24.519
The first step is to realize clause boundedness. In this
658
00:36:24.840 --> 00:36:27.480
I don't want to forget about the text. That's not
659
00:36:27.639 --> 00:36:32.320
my argument or free floating pennumberal structures. The point is
660
00:36:33.320 --> 00:36:36.679
you try to fok the entire structure on a single
661
00:36:36.800 --> 00:36:42.280
clause and your toast right just this cafemouse opinion in
662
00:36:43.039 --> 00:36:45.960
pork producers as well, maybe not the dormant commerce clause,
663
00:36:45.960 --> 00:36:48.280
but maybe it's a lot of claws by the privilege
664
00:36:48.360 --> 00:36:51.960
is immuniately to the input export clause. You go through
665
00:36:51.960 --> 00:36:55.280
the little options, none of them solve your problem at all,
666
00:36:56.079 --> 00:36:59.440
And six weeks later, they decided similar case also having
667
00:36:59.480 --> 00:37:02.760
to do with that sub territoriality. The Mallory case were
668
00:37:02.920 --> 00:37:07.119
just as Alto says WHOA, I'm nervous about this because
669
00:37:07.280 --> 00:37:09.400
there have to be some limits, and I would not
670
00:37:09.519 --> 00:37:13.480
place them in the dupasts, but in the in the
671
00:37:13.480 --> 00:37:16.079
dormant commerce gas that's the same dormant commerce toss that
672
00:37:16.159 --> 00:37:19.760
went by the boards six weeks earlier. Right, So that
673
00:37:19.800 --> 00:37:22.880
way lies pradition. That doesn't solve anything. What you have
674
00:37:22.960 --> 00:37:26.159
to do is stay close to the text and come
675
00:37:26.239 --> 00:37:30.400
up with a sort of blackie structural sort of account
676
00:37:30.440 --> 00:37:33.400
of the document that makes all the clauses fit as
677
00:37:33.440 --> 00:37:36.519
well as they will, and that is not alps the enterprise.
678
00:37:36.599 --> 00:37:40.039
That can in fact be done. I concede readily that
679
00:37:40.039 --> 00:37:42.840
that the form of that argument, in the course of
680
00:37:42.880 --> 00:37:47.599
the same court litigation has undergone various permutations. That's fine.
681
00:37:48.000 --> 00:37:50.800
It shows up in sort of various permutations in the briefs.
682
00:37:51.119 --> 00:37:54.079
That's also fine. But I think it's directionally right.
683
00:37:55.280 --> 00:37:58.639
I don't the Professor Grieves description in depiction, which I
684
00:37:58.679 --> 00:38:01.440
don't think is hyperbolic, the kind of the vacillation of
685
00:38:01.440 --> 00:38:03.320
the court or the pivoting and then go off and
686
00:38:03.320 --> 00:38:08.320
back and forth suggests the futility of developing doctrine, not
687
00:38:08.400 --> 00:38:13.000
the futility of protecting federalism, protecting the values of horizontal federalism,
688
00:38:13.079 --> 00:38:17.000
but the futility of using extant constiutional doctrine, whether it's
689
00:38:17.000 --> 00:38:20.800
grounded in text, or it's grounded original meaning, or a
690
00:38:20.800 --> 00:38:24.360
combination of constitutional rules. And it's not just a critique
691
00:38:24.400 --> 00:38:26.599
I mentioned Justice Thomas of the use of the Dormer
692
00:38:26.639 --> 00:38:30.800
commerce clause. There's a broader critique of the utility of
693
00:38:31.239 --> 00:38:36.119
constitutional doctrine, particularly constitutional doctrine grounded in original understanding or texts,
694
00:38:36.719 --> 00:38:40.360
in deploying it in order to limit actions in the states.
695
00:38:40.480 --> 00:38:42.840
And again, I want to reiterate a point I mean before,
696
00:38:43.119 --> 00:38:45.360
let's be clear that the law is not a law
697
00:38:45.360 --> 00:38:49.639
that has clear extra territorial reach or scope. They're not
698
00:38:49.800 --> 00:38:52.360
reaching out in this particular. And again, I'm not minimizing
699
00:38:52.480 --> 00:38:56.599
the impact of Colorado's law, but Colorado's use of nuisance
700
00:38:56.679 --> 00:39:01.760
law is to
impose additional costs on defendants, serious and impactful,
701
00:39:01.840 --> 00:39:04.159
to be sure, but not as in an instance of
702
00:39:04.199 --> 00:39:06.719
what the framer is truly worried about. So I agree
703
00:39:06.719 --> 00:39:10.280
with mister Skinner's characterization of the briefs has taken us
704
00:39:10.320 --> 00:39:13.960
back to first principles. Absolutely. But most of the examples
705
00:39:13.960 --> 00:39:17.599
of the analogies and the episodes in American conscinutional history
706
00:39:17.800 --> 00:39:21.400
that are mentioned in those briefs are grotesque examples of
707
00:39:21.400 --> 00:39:25.840
the states in fact imposing laws that would fundamentally disarmed
708
00:39:25.840 --> 00:39:30.480
states and attack states and undermine their sovereignty. That's a
709
00:39:30.519 --> 00:39:33.599
second or third order effect of Colorado's nuisance law here.
710
00:39:33.840 --> 00:39:35.519
But the impact of the nuisance law is not in
711
00:39:35.559 --> 00:39:38.039
another state. The impact of the nuisance law is on
712
00:39:38.119 --> 00:39:42.559
corporations doing business and others. And that's again a fundamental difference.
713
00:39:42.599 --> 00:39:45.880
And I'll just say that is not unknown in American history.
714
00:39:45.920 --> 00:39:48.599
The use of the police power in the early part
715
00:39:48.639 --> 00:39:52.320
of the nineteenth century that would have extra territorial impact
716
00:39:52.320 --> 00:39:55.000
on other businesses was part and parcel of the police
717
00:39:55.000 --> 00:39:56.920
power as conceived and implemented.
718
00:39:56.960 --> 00:39:58.280
The framers well understood that.
719
00:40:00.400 --> 00:40:03.840
So briefly respond to that. Look, the plot here is important.
720
00:40:03.920 --> 00:40:09.199
I think between sort of hard constitutional rules on the
721
00:40:09.280 --> 00:40:14.280
one hand, and anything goes okay, there is a third option.
722
00:40:14.559 --> 00:40:17.199
So if you look at health, there are lots of
723
00:40:17.239 --> 00:40:21.280
moving pieces. Yet the Supreme Court has a displacement theory
724
00:40:21.679 --> 00:40:25.159
that sort of displaces federal common law, federal doctrine that
725
00:40:25.320 --> 00:40:30.599
is exceedingly generous, okay, which effectively says, so long as
726
00:40:30.639 --> 00:40:33.400
all that Congress has opened its mouth, what are we
727
00:40:33.559 --> 00:40:36.880
federal courts, we with our federal law are out of
728
00:40:36.920 --> 00:40:37.400
the picture.
729
00:40:38.039 --> 00:40:38.559
And at the.
730
00:40:38.559 --> 00:40:42.719
Same time then you say, WHOA no, And so I
731
00:40:42.760 --> 00:40:46.239
get it, Professor Rodiguez that the risk is you're displacing
732
00:40:46.239 --> 00:40:48.679
Congress you don't want to do. At the same time
733
00:40:49.039 --> 00:40:51.119
they want to say the supercuot wants to say, oh,
734
00:40:51.400 --> 00:40:54.880
we want to protect these poor pedophil states against federal preemption.
735
00:40:55.639 --> 00:40:57.559
I also don't understand that concern.
736
00:40:57.679 --> 00:40:59.280
Although I'm not a big draggory event.
737
00:41:01.000 --> 00:41:04.639
What you get when you put these two things together
738
00:41:05.360 --> 00:41:11.559
is you have maximized the centrifugal forces of federalism and
739
00:41:11.639 --> 00:41:16.599
let nobody in control off or with the institutional capacity
740
00:41:16.719 --> 00:41:18.760
to introduce to tackle these broadlets.
741
00:41:19.320 --> 00:41:19.480
Right.
742
00:41:19.800 --> 00:41:24.840
The alternative to a hard constitutional rule on territorialism or whatever,
743
00:41:25.440 --> 00:41:30.079
right and any just about anything goes of really extreme
744
00:41:30.159 --> 00:41:34.519
examples is background rules, which is what we used to have.
745
00:41:35.480 --> 00:41:39.280
Right so and from the very early days take Macogue.
746
00:41:39.480 --> 00:41:42.000
The rule is not states.
747
00:41:41.599 --> 00:41:45.079
Cannot tax the Bank of the United States or federal
748
00:41:45.280 --> 00:41:47.119
or encumber federal instruments.
749
00:41:47.280 --> 00:41:48.320
That's not the teaching.
750
00:41:48.400 --> 00:41:53.199
It says they cannot do that without Congressional consent. If
751
00:41:53.199 --> 00:41:56.360
Congress wants to permit that, that's fine. If Congress wants
752
00:41:56.400 --> 00:42:00.400
to permit states to discriminate, that's fine, so long as
753
00:42:00.440 --> 00:42:04.880
it speaks relatively clearly right. You can think of a
754
00:42:04.960 --> 00:42:09.039
similar rule in the national provincess case. My own favorite
755
00:42:09.079 --> 00:42:14.519
would be and the control of harmful products at the
756
00:42:14.519 --> 00:42:17.599
point of import and so forth, products that have an
757
00:42:17.599 --> 00:42:21.840
effect in state, that's fine, that's the police power. The
758
00:42:21.960 --> 00:42:26.000
control of how those kinds of things are produced elsewhere
759
00:42:26.639 --> 00:42:30.159
in other states is not the police power. There's not
760
00:42:30.320 --> 00:42:33.519
even that's not even a legitimate state interest. So there's
761
00:42:33.559 --> 00:42:37.519
your line. If Congress then wants to change that background rule,
762
00:42:38.119 --> 00:42:41.719
that is perfectly within its commerce powers. And so so
763
00:42:42.079 --> 00:42:45.199
there are ways of thinking through the institutional mechanisms here
764
00:42:45.599 --> 00:42:50.199
and organizing horizontal federalism and a halfway sensible fashion. And
765
00:42:50.320 --> 00:42:53.079
maybe the real problem here is in the Supreme Courts
766
00:42:53.679 --> 00:42:58.440
AP decision Right to the American Electric Right, which it
767
00:42:58.599 --> 00:43:01.159
was the case to articulate this displacement with the year,
768
00:43:01.239 --> 00:43:03.880
it's that, Oh, come to think
of it, state law
769
00:43:04.159 --> 00:43:06.639
on the address, let them go with that, and so
770
00:43:07.039 --> 00:43:09.159
you insteadivize these kinds of cases.
771
00:43:10.440 --> 00:43:12.440
One thing that I think is interesting here is that
772
00:43:13.039 --> 00:43:15.760
if you zoom in on any particular case and Pres Rodriguez,
773
00:43:15.800 --> 00:43:18.039
he's trying Excessian Quartey splaining why what Colorado is doing
774
00:43:18.119 --> 00:43:21.840
is beneficent, I think you will lose the discussion because
775
00:43:22.480 --> 00:43:24.559
while he while you will want to be freeing the
776
00:43:24.639 --> 00:43:27.719
Colorado law, there is one thing. The super fund laws
777
00:43:27.719 --> 00:43:30.400
look a lot more like taxing cigarette sales in other places.
778
00:43:30.480 --> 00:43:34.039
Right the port producer's tease starts to look if you
779
00:43:34.119 --> 00:43:35.920
look at them on it enough of a spectrum. It
780
00:43:36.039 --> 00:43:40.039
calls for some set of discussion of what is okay
781
00:43:40.079 --> 00:43:42.119
and what isn't. And I think Prester Grieve is doing
782
00:43:42.159 --> 00:43:44.920
a really good job of flagging. I've made a discussion
783
00:43:44.920 --> 00:43:48.679
of where of the burden falls starts to be a
784
00:43:48.760 --> 00:43:53.519
much more more fruitful discussion because there will be things
785
00:43:53.679 --> 00:43:57.000
that feel extra territorial, but they are really policing the importation.
786
00:43:57.159 --> 00:43:57.360
Right.
787
00:43:57.920 --> 00:44:00.199
Then there will be things like where California, say is,
788
00:44:00.239 --> 00:44:01.880
if you want to sell a truck in my state,
789
00:44:02.280 --> 00:44:05.320
you have to agree to stop producing a different kind
790
00:44:05.320 --> 00:44:08.159
of truck anywhere in the country. Right, this starts to
791
00:44:08.199 --> 00:44:10.239
feel like, well, I think that starts to be the
792
00:44:10.400 --> 00:44:13.639
production of things elsewhere to the professor's point, right. And
793
00:44:13.719 --> 00:44:15.840
I think that when you start to run the data
794
00:44:15.880 --> 00:44:18.719
set bigger, you start to getting much more interesting series
795
00:44:18.760 --> 00:44:21.719
of questions than if you try to defend one law
796
00:44:22.320 --> 00:44:25.679
or one lawsuit because you like it, and I think
797
00:44:25.800 --> 00:44:28.280
you have to run enough of the data points to say,
798
00:44:28.679 --> 00:44:31.519
how does this play out when you tweak the law
799
00:44:31.880 --> 00:44:34.760
and turn it into attacks. What happens when you're governing
800
00:44:35.039 --> 00:44:37.079
the production of something and not just the importation. If
801
00:44:37.119 --> 00:44:39.800
Fort Preatus was about putting a sticker on the pork
802
00:44:39.840 --> 00:44:42.039
shops before they came into the state, I think it
803
00:44:42.079 --> 00:44:44.440
starts to look very different then when it says your
804
00:44:44.559 --> 00:44:48.119
farm in Iowa better look like this exact thing, and
805
00:44:48.159 --> 00:44:50.679
I'm going to send inspectors to Iowa to make sure
806
00:44:50.800 --> 00:44:54.760
right those things matter, and the rules of the principles,
807
00:44:54.760 --> 00:44:55.960
the background standards.
808
00:44:56.400 --> 00:44:58.760
I think we all should want more of that.
809
00:44:59.480 --> 00:45:02.400
Because the other thing I'll say is that it's a
810
00:45:02.760 --> 00:45:04.679
if you just think about playing. I feel like a
811
00:45:04.679 --> 00:45:06.599
lot of people in this space only talk about climate,
812
00:45:07.119 --> 00:45:09.199
and it frustrates me because they're like, well, you could
813
00:45:09.199 --> 00:45:11.880
just have the Congress past a law that governs climate,
814
00:45:12.199 --> 00:45:13.199
and then Bob's your uncle.
815
00:45:13.280 --> 00:45:14.079
The problem solved.
816
00:45:14.239 --> 00:45:15.880
And I'm the kind of person who, because I care
817
00:45:15.920 --> 00:45:17.800
about all these products, I start thinking, well, that doesn't
818
00:45:17.800 --> 00:45:19.880
do anything about pork, and that doesn't do anything about
819
00:45:19.880 --> 00:45:22.800
AI regulation, and that doesn't do anything about this kind
820
00:45:22.840 --> 00:45:24.760
of a rule, because at the end of the day,
821
00:45:25.079 --> 00:45:27.119
you don't necessarily want to play this game of whacka
822
00:45:27.159 --> 00:45:30.119
whole where the only solution is Congress passes uniform rules
823
00:45:30.119 --> 00:45:33.119
about every single industry that becomes a flashpoint in any
824
00:45:33.159 --> 00:45:34.840
sort of discussion as between states.
825
00:45:35.320 --> 00:45:37.360
And so I think Professor bu is doing a good
826
00:45:37.400 --> 00:45:37.920
job with flagging.
827
00:45:38.000 --> 00:45:39.880
We should be having a discussion about where we want
828
00:45:39.920 --> 00:45:43.159
to measure, on what parameters we want to measure these things,
829
00:45:43.440 --> 00:45:45.719
because once you agree on that, then you can start
830
00:45:45.719 --> 00:45:50.519
to have cases distinguish on those parameters. Ver's just I
831
00:45:50.639 --> 00:45:53.719
like this rule or that's the traditional police power I
832
00:45:53.719 --> 00:45:54.400
think you have to have.
833
00:45:54.760 --> 00:45:57.199
It'd be good to start getting a test. It looks
834
00:45:57.239 --> 00:45:57.679
a lot.
835
00:45:57.519 --> 00:46:00.280
More like Professor Grius tests and a lot less like
836
00:46:00.320 --> 00:46:03.000
b is this sunshine is so bright as those feathers
837
00:46:03.039 --> 00:46:03.400
are light.
838
00:46:04.119 --> 00:46:05.199
I just clearly want it.
839
00:46:05.599 --> 00:46:08.920
Okay, there's nothing in what I said that suggests some
840
00:46:09.119 --> 00:46:11.400
love of what Colorado is doing in this regard, and
841
00:46:11.480 --> 00:46:13.760
certainly nothing that suggests that we should have a hall
842
00:46:13.880 --> 00:46:15.719
pass for climate change lication.
843
00:46:15.840 --> 00:46:16.119
That's not.
844
00:46:16.280 --> 00:46:18.400
That's certainly not, because I agree with you should be
845
00:46:18.440 --> 00:46:20.480
a general rule that applies across those ranges.
846
00:46:21.880 --> 00:46:25.159
So I just wanted to when you zoom it out
847
00:46:25.199 --> 00:46:28.559
from one case, it becomes a much more fruitful conversation
848
00:46:29.159 --> 00:46:32.760
because Colorado's case might be closer to one end of
849
00:46:32.760 --> 00:46:35.280
the spectrum versus the other, and then we're just discussing,
850
00:46:35.320 --> 00:46:36.400
like where on the spectrum.
851
00:46:36.400 --> 00:46:39.000
But I think discussing what the spectrum is that really productive.
852
00:46:39.039 --> 00:46:41.679
Then I'd like to try to bring in at least
853
00:46:41.679 --> 00:46:43.599
one or two of the audience questions that we haven't
854
00:46:43.639 --> 00:46:46.280
gotten to yet. And I think your point about additional
855
00:46:46.400 --> 00:46:49.559
data sets brings us to one of our questions asked
856
00:46:49.599 --> 00:46:52.719
by a tax lawyer who noted that this issue is
857
00:46:52.719 --> 00:46:55.320
ever present in the allocation and a portion meant of
858
00:46:55.519 --> 00:46:59.159
income for state and local tax purposes. Supreme Court has
859
00:46:59.159 --> 00:47:02.199
a line of cases will more recently wayfair but we're
860
00:47:02.239 --> 00:47:05.480
not discussing those So do any folks here on our
861
00:47:05.519 --> 00:47:09.039
Panol have thoughts on are the litigants ignoring those principles
862
00:47:09.079 --> 00:47:13.239
or are those principles present in the tax area distinguishable
863
00:47:13.320 --> 00:47:16.079
somehow from what we are talking about here today.
864
00:47:17.599 --> 00:47:19.760
I'll just say we are using those cases. I guess
865
00:47:19.760 --> 00:47:22.719
we're not talking about them today, but they're certainly relevant.
866
00:47:23.280 --> 00:47:25.119
And I'm not sure if this is exactly right in
867
00:47:25.119 --> 00:47:28.280
the wheelhouse of the questioners question, but franchise tax board
868
00:47:28.320 --> 00:47:31.079
actually is probably the best particulation of this idea that
869
00:47:31.440 --> 00:47:34.280
you don't have to have a very specific constitutional provision
870
00:47:34.280 --> 00:47:36.760
that says there shall be no extra territorial law in
871
00:47:36.920 --> 00:47:39.679
order to understand that these principles are embedded into the constitution.
872
00:47:39.840 --> 00:47:42.199
So tax space has a lot to offer to us.
873
00:47:42.199 --> 00:47:44.559
And I think if you go read the briefs, you'll
874
00:47:44.559 --> 00:47:47.880
see many references to those same concepts because they are
875
00:47:47.960 --> 00:47:51.519
the most obvious
crossboarder attack on what other But I
876
00:47:51.519 --> 00:47:54.400
think if we're pretending that a crossborder tax is distinct
877
00:47:54.760 --> 00:47:57.039
from a levee or a fine that a state is
878
00:47:57.079 --> 00:47:59.400
imposing on one state from another, I.
879
00:47:59.400 --> 00:48:02.880
Think that's nice. That's exactly why those cases apply can
880
00:48:02.880 --> 00:48:05.519
I make a plug for some of my friends. There's
881
00:48:05.559 --> 00:48:09.039
a terrific lawry review article Michigan Law Review. It's called
882
00:48:09.119 --> 00:48:15.440
Bounded extra Territoriality. It's written by tax professors about.
883
00:48:15.119 --> 00:48:16.519
The NPCC case.
884
00:48:17.320 --> 00:48:21.159
And they the basic rule, the background rule that government
885
00:48:21.199 --> 00:48:24.239
state tax law. It's different in some respects from the
886
00:48:24.320 --> 00:48:28.239
regulatory stuff, but this in this regard, they say, it's
887
00:48:28.320 --> 00:48:32.960
parallel or might well be tax lawyers. So if the
888
00:48:33.000 --> 00:48:39.039
courts apply an internal consistency test to state taxes, right,
889
00:48:39.199 --> 00:48:43.639
so what would happen if every state did this or
890
00:48:43.719 --> 00:48:48.079
impose this tax? Would that be okay? And if the
891
00:48:48.079 --> 00:48:50.960
answer to that is a short version. If the answer
892
00:48:51.000 --> 00:48:54.440
to that is null, then the tax is unconstitutional. And
893
00:48:54.480 --> 00:48:57.320
they defend that in some detail, and there's a lot
894
00:48:57.320 --> 00:49:01.840
of Supreme Court law that fits that. And then they say, look,
895
00:49:02.039 --> 00:49:06.400
let's look at the National Producer's case in that light
896
00:49:06.519 --> 00:49:09.840
and other commerce clause cases in that light and applied
897
00:49:09.880 --> 00:49:14.079
the same and chaining consistency test to those kinds of things.
898
00:49:14.320 --> 00:49:17.760
And that's your true test of extra or led at
899
00:49:17.840 --> 00:49:18.920
least as a first cup.
900
00:49:19.119 --> 00:49:20.519
So yeah, these things hang.
901
00:49:20.480 --> 00:49:24.960
Together, all right, And so I will bring in Professor
902
00:49:24.960 --> 00:49:27.920
Adler is very present in the questions, and so we'll
903
00:49:28.039 --> 00:49:29.719
try to get at least a couple of those in there.
904
00:49:29.719 --> 00:49:31.719
But I'll start with one for you, mister Williams.
905
00:49:31.719 --> 00:49:35.800
Aren't concerns about one state reaching out to regulate actors
906
00:49:35.880 --> 00:49:39.119
in another state best handled under the due process clause
907
00:49:39.239 --> 00:49:43.159
rather than preemption? And is that question even contained within
908
00:49:43.199 --> 00:49:44.760
the questions presented in Suncore?
909
00:49:44.800 --> 00:49:47.079
Do you have any thoughts about that due process?
910
00:49:47.840 --> 00:49:50.119
Well, I'll take the
easier part first. Is it in
911
00:49:50.159 --> 00:49:51.000
the question presented?
912
00:49:51.119 --> 00:49:54.760
Yes, Suncore talks about seteral law large, and I actually
913
00:49:54.760 --> 00:49:57.840
think you read how the briefings played out, they've actually
914
00:49:57.880 --> 00:50:00.880
taken advantage of that well written cube to pivot a
915
00:50:00.920 --> 00:50:03.119
little bit. They started with more of a focus on
916
00:50:03.920 --> 00:50:06.400
pure federal common law, and they pivoted more to this
917
00:50:06.480 --> 00:50:09.039
structural constitutional argument that I think is maybe a more
918
00:50:09.039 --> 00:50:12.039
palatable approach for the current CORE composition. But as to
919
00:50:12.119 --> 00:50:14.800
due process itself, yeah, I think actually it could be
920
00:50:14.840 --> 00:50:16.800
a hook. I don't know that the two are necessarily
921
00:50:17.079 --> 00:50:20.079
mutually exclusive, and we actually we say exactly that in
922
00:50:20.119 --> 00:50:23.119
a footnote in the breed. We do process clause actually
923
00:50:23.199 --> 00:50:25.440
is one of the many clauses that we cite as
924
00:50:25.440 --> 00:50:29.280
a potential basis for this principle of Again, I don't
925
00:50:29.280 --> 00:50:31.519
know that I would call it reemption per se when
926
00:50:31.519 --> 00:50:34.679
we're talking about structural constitutialism and the assignment of authority,
927
00:50:35.039 --> 00:50:37.880
but due process is certainly one aspect of that, that
928
00:50:38.320 --> 00:50:42.000
sort of authority source that one might point to and
929
00:50:42.039 --> 00:50:43.920
try to find those concepts in our constitution.
930
00:50:44.079 --> 00:50:49.199
Absolutely, although it's not at the risp of arguing with
931
00:50:49.280 --> 00:50:56.119
myself or with Michael Williams, but it's not terribly sharp criterion, right,
932
00:50:56.199 --> 00:51:00.679
because then why is it that all these asbestos cases,
933
00:51:01.920 --> 00:51:08.800
product liability cases, the opioid settlement, the tobacco settlement. Why
934
00:51:08.920 --> 00:51:13.000
isn't all of that sort of the violation or dus problem?
935
00:51:13.519 --> 00:51:16.440
And it turns out the Supreme Court has been exceptionally
936
00:51:16.480 --> 00:51:23.159
and exceedingly sutinarian about this right because it right. So
937
00:51:23.400 --> 00:51:26.920
if you want to focus on any problem there, it
938
00:51:27.000 --> 00:51:30.519
seems to me the lack of a direct physical mixtures
939
00:51:30.719 --> 00:51:33.519
there's not even an in state sale of year, right,
940
00:51:33.800 --> 00:51:36.559
that has to be the distinguishing criterion subroke me.
941
00:51:36.679 --> 00:51:40.239
Right, I think that's exactly right. That's why we focus
942
00:51:40.280 --> 00:51:43.360
on the climate space. It's because it's the most obvious
943
00:51:43.679 --> 00:51:45.920
example of someone who has not made any sort of
944
00:51:45.960 --> 00:51:48.480
deliberate choice, and if you want to use the language
945
00:51:48.480 --> 00:51:51.119
of personal jurisdiction that hasn't purposely availed themselves of the
946
00:51:51.159 --> 00:51:53.679
relevant markets, it makes it that much a clear question.
947
00:51:54.480 --> 00:51:57.840
Yeah, I think there's almost zero chance the Supreme Court
948
00:51:57.880 --> 00:52:00.840
will in validate this on due process, which is why
949
00:52:00.880 --> 00:52:03.440
I think the arguments for due process and commerce class
950
00:52:03.440 --> 00:52:06.719
I have a very white touch, knowing with Derek Canary,
951
00:52:06.719 --> 00:52:08.920
I'm going to make no beholder prediction about how the
952
00:52:08.920 --> 00:52:11.199
Supreme Courts can decide this gig, but I'm going to
953
00:52:11.199 --> 00:52:12.840
predict it They're not going to decide it on due process.
954
00:52:12.920 --> 00:52:13.199
Corrects.
955
00:52:14.559 --> 00:52:16.000
Well, you're still my thunder there.
956
00:52:15.800 --> 00:52:17.599
We've only got a couple of minutes left, and I
957
00:52:17.639 --> 00:52:19.320
was going to ask if anyone wanted to make any
958
00:52:19.360 --> 00:52:21.679
predictions or jump in with final thoughts.
959
00:52:21.719 --> 00:52:22.960
We do still have a number of.
960
00:52:22.920 --> 00:52:26.079
Questions, but actually I think with the exception of some
961
00:52:26.199 --> 00:52:29.760
specific subject areas, all of them get to this question.
962
00:52:29.800 --> 00:52:32.639
We've been discussing about what is the right framing of
963
00:52:32.679 --> 00:52:35.159
the issue and how broad should we be looking at it,
964
00:52:35.199 --> 00:52:37.440
and whether the Supreme Court will jump in. But in
965
00:52:37.480 --> 00:52:39.880
our last two and a half three minutes. If any
966
00:52:39.960 --> 00:52:42.199
of the panelists would like to give a final thirty
967
00:52:42.239 --> 00:52:44.280
second thought, here's your opportunity.
968
00:52:44.360 --> 00:52:46.079
If you'd like to include a prediction. We would love
969
00:52:46.119 --> 00:52:46.519
to hear that.
970
00:52:48.119 --> 00:52:50.119
Well, I'll just say that we haven't talked about it,
971
00:52:50.119 --> 00:52:52.559
nor should we. There's so much interesting stuff not about this.
972
00:52:52.679 --> 00:52:55.519
But Professor Adams Softco Colorado and I have an Amikas
973
00:52:55.559 --> 00:52:58.800
free arguing that the court shouldn't grant jurisdiction becau it's
974
00:52:58.800 --> 00:53:02.599
not a final judgment, so we'll probably lose that argument,
975
00:53:02.880 --> 00:53:05.559
but I hope they don't even consider the case as
976
00:53:05.599 --> 00:53:09.239
to the merits five or six different opinions of my.
977
00:53:11.119 --> 00:53:11.679
Big messy.
978
00:53:11.679 --> 00:53:15.119
The opinion for anybody who's joined in on this zoom
979
00:53:15.159 --> 00:53:17.920
I would say wal you should really hope for
is
980
00:53:17.920 --> 00:53:22.159
that you get some actual explication post or producers by
981
00:53:22.159 --> 00:53:25.719
at least some of the justices of a roadmap for
982
00:53:25.760 --> 00:53:27.000
the future in this area.
983
00:53:27.440 --> 00:53:30.639
There's enough briefing, and there's enough reason.
984
00:53:31.199 --> 00:53:33.440
I think there is at least one brief put in
985
00:53:33.480 --> 00:53:35.280
that made the point that these questions are going to
986
00:53:35.360 --> 00:53:37.440
keep coming up to the court, and so better for
987
00:53:37.480 --> 00:53:40.119
them to provide some certainty on some of these questions. Now,
988
00:53:40.480 --> 00:53:42.599
I don't have any I don't think anybody should be
989
00:53:42.639 --> 00:53:45.960
dreaming that there's a five justice decision that is puts
990
00:53:45.960 --> 00:53:48.119
out of treatise that will make Professor Greeve and I
991
00:53:48.199 --> 00:53:50.760
very happy about all the details in this zone. But
992
00:53:50.840 --> 00:53:53.280
we should all want some of the justices to write
993
00:53:53.320 --> 00:53:56.400
on this topic, because this question will come up again
994
00:53:56.519 --> 00:53:59.320
and again, and this is a good chance, with the
995
00:53:59.360 --> 00:54:02.679
amount of brief and envitation, to start to get some
996
00:54:03.000 --> 00:54:05.920
explanation of what the future looks like on this extra
997
00:54:05.960 --> 00:54:09.639
territoriality question. I guess I'll just say, because I'm litigating
998
00:54:09.639 --> 00:54:11.239
one of those cases that we think might make its
999
00:54:11.280 --> 00:54:14.119
way up there, I think it would be helpful at
1000
00:54:14.239 --> 00:54:16.840
least for the Court to remind us that there is
1001
00:54:16.880 --> 00:54:21.000
in fact still an existent extraterritoriality doctrine post port producers,
1002
00:54:21.039 --> 00:54:24.960
because New York and Vermont are expressly arguing that there
1003
00:54:25.079 --> 00:54:28.559
is no viable extra territoriality doctrine left, and that to
1004
00:54:28.599 --> 00:54:31.800
the extent that what we're arguing any kind of constitutional argument,
1005
00:54:31.840 --> 00:54:34.199
it's really just a doorbit commerce clause argument in disguise,
1006
00:54:34.280 --> 00:54:37.480
and that those basically your dead postport producers. And I
1007
00:54:37.480 --> 00:54:40.480
think that's a pretty gross overstatement. I maybe even gamble
1008
00:54:40.559 --> 00:54:43.320
that all of you agree with that, so even that
1009
00:54:43.400 --> 00:54:45.800
step would be a step in the right direction.
1010
00:54:45.960 --> 00:54:47.800
Just a reminder that these are all still at least
1011
00:54:47.840 --> 00:54:48.480
live issues.
1012
00:54:49.559 --> 00:54:52.440
I want to thank our panelists for sharing your expertise
1013
00:54:52.440 --> 00:54:56.079
and opinions on this important issue. If our audience is
1014
00:54:56.119 --> 00:54:59.760
interested in learning more about all of the Federal Society's programming,
1015
00:55:00.159 --> 00:55:02.400
please visit their website at fedsoc dot org.
1016
00:55:02.920 --> 00:55:04.239
And with that, we are a jorine.
1017
00:55:04.719 --> 00:55:08.519
Thanks for listening to FEDSOC Forums, a Federalist Society podcast.
1018
00:55:08.880 --> 00:55:11.440
Be sure to subscribe wherever you get your podcasts so
1019
00:55:11.480 --> 00:55:14.440
you won't miss an episode. To learn more, visit our
1020
00:55:14.440 --> 00:55:16.320
website fedsoc dot org.