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Brian Drake: This episode of the Unredacted Podcast is brought to you by Dragonforge Consulting. Dragonforge provides boutique consulting services for federal and commercial clients looking to expand their business in a turbulent time. Learn more by visiting their website at www.dragon-forge.net. That's www.dragon the character forge.net. Hey everybody, Brian Drake here. Thought ⁓ we could give you a special treat. ⁓ now that we fully wrapped up the From Tragedy ⁓ to Transformation ⁓ series, we had some ⁓ additional interviews from some folks that were really interesting, and one of those folks is Jeff Fowler. ⁓ Jeff Fowler was the editor for The Wire, and we weren't able to really fit a lot of what he had to share with the podcast. He has a very prominent role in the series because he opens it up with his 9-11 story and of course closes the series with the with the final thought. So th his contribution was very impactful, but we wanted to have give his story a little more fulsome treatment because the story of the wire was very, very interesting. It just didn't fit ⁓ with the rest of the narratives we were getting with other folks. So ⁓ What we ⁓ did here is we clipped together ⁓ what you would hear every time we would interview folks for the series. It's so you can kind of get a little behind the scenes and see how we structured the interviews and the types of things that we were teasing out in the course of the questions. So I hope you found it interesting. ⁓ let us know and please send us your ⁓ questions and comments ⁓ either you can rate, review, subscribe in the podcast, or you can send us an email at questions at unredactedpodcast.com. Thank you. We can stop any time. Yeah, I say just I want to take a break, whatever it is. Yeah, no. Yeah, I don't remember how much we I previewed this for you. So ⁓ it's a clip show. So it's not like a traditional interview where ⁓ Ye where like you're gonna weave things together. Yeah, so it's not like I'm asking a question, you give me an answer, then we have a discussion. I will do that at some point in time for some of these other things, but not for this one. So because we're telling this mosaic story of like here's everybody's kind of perspective at this time. And when I introduce the speaker, I want to use their voice. So for you I need your first name, last name, and the title. title you wanna use for the podcast. So you could say, you know, editor in chief of the wire, you could say whatever you want to say, you senior executive, whatever you want to say. Fair enough. ⁓ probably probably the you know, chief of the wire. ⁓ although your period runs from sort of nine eleven forward. Yes. And I did I was chief of C as Operations Center. I was down at the White House doing the Homeland Security start up and then back to the DI front office for a bit before becoming chief of the wire. So we'll talk about to pick kinda what you want to do. And you can say in the course of the podcast, well at that time
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I was blah right. And then context is important. Are you con Comfortable. Very. Okay. So I'm gonna move this a little bit. So yeah, adjusting equipment to you. You don't want to adjust to equipment. Okay. That should be good. And I I will I am I swear to god I'm listening the whole time, but I do have to watch the levels and make adjustments, ⁓ just pen depending on inflection and so forth. Okay. Feel good? Feel great. Alright, so we're gonna get a couple of ⁓ butterflies out. So you're gonna do your first name, last name, and the title you wanna use. All right, so Jeffrey Fowler, Jeff. and for the particular period in question I was chief of the wire. Perfect. Okay. That's gives me a lot. So what ends up happening is in the course of it's like Jeff Fowler and then talk about this thing. Right. Right. So now I don't have to say it was Joe Vervaler again or some other commentator. Okay. It's all good. Cool. So that's the funny, silly thing we get to do and now we get a little more serious. All right. So ⁓ yeah, where were you on nine eleven? Well at that time I was running CIA's Operations Center, ⁓ and so I remember nine eleven. Very well. ⁓ the plane the first plane struck the tower and I was right down the hall to the director's staff meeting. The director of course was downtown at the time, so I interrupted the ⁓ deputy director, John McLaughlin. ⁓ and I remember saying John, CNN is reporting a plane had struck the World Trade Center, ⁓ the building's on fire, heavily damaged, it looks pretty bad. And then it went from there. And y okay, yeah. So what went on from there? Like your day got busy real fast. It sure did, yeah, absolutely. ⁓ you know, it was interesting because we had the building fire at the agency ⁓ a few months before. and it was in that experience that we realized we needed to have a a particular location on site but out of the building that we could relocate to. ⁓ and so that building fire gave us a chance to in essence practice ⁓ what we would do in a crisis. It was a good thing because of course we had the nine eleven crisis. prices a handful of months later. I and we went straight to our ⁓ remote location ⁓ and got everything up and running there as well. Wow. So how long was that day for you? Well I don't think I got home until about one or two in the morning ⁓ that day. My wife also worked at the agency ⁓ and she told me that it was a ⁓ a horrible time getting everybody off the compound. And of course by the time I left there were no cars there at all. There were no sorry, there was no what? There were no cars at the compound ⁓ at all, because everyone of course had left. But she had spent several hours trying to get off the compound. Well wow, because there's just traffic. Because of all of the traffic trying to evacuate the the facility, yeah. What was the atmosphere like that day, the day after? What w how how are people thinking? Well, I mean it was it was one of surprise initially, right? Just as as you would think,
and then confusion, ⁓ lack of information available, ⁓ and then determination, ⁓ focus on actually trying to understand what was going on and responding appropriately. Of course everyone was was shocked ⁓ and saddened by the loss. ⁓ but the agency being what it is, it it rises to the occasion, and so that's what we did. And So how long did you stay in the op center? I mean, that would have been a nerve center for a nice, nice long time. How long were you there? ⁓ in terms of the the the time for ⁓ while I was chief of the Operation Center, it was about two years or so. I think I was hired in the summer of ninety nine because it was just prior to the whole Y two K ⁓ type of experience. I was initially hired as deputy, the chief left, I was elevated to chief, ⁓ and then I stayed in that role until It was early in twenty tw ⁓ yeah ⁓ two thousand and two, pardon me. and that's when I went down to the White House. Yeah, and how did you feel at this period of time? Well, resolved really. it was interesting the day of it was ⁓ an experience like none other, really. Certainly you understood your role and and what you had to do. ⁓ we didn't know ⁓ where the fourth plane was heading. I it could just as easily have been heading ⁓ to CIA as to the White House, as to the Capitol building, ⁓ or what have you. ⁓ but everyone stood their post and did what they needed to do. And in the months that followed ⁓ there was a lot of ⁓ focus really, is the best way to describe it, on getting that mission done. ⁓ the agency completely reorganized around the counterterrorism threat. ⁓ and ⁓ we played our role. How quickly did that happen? ⁓ that happened very quickly. ⁓ within a month ⁓ people ⁓ whole whole divisions, whole you know units ⁓ were realigned. ⁓ and so you you know, you don't focus on this anymore and now you focus on counterterrorism. So How did that impact you in your career? So you you've had a great career, but and we're not gonna spoil it for anybody, we'll get there as as we move along. but so here you are coming off the off center. You said you went to the White House. Mm-hmm. How did your kind of career trajectory, the way you thought about your career, how did that start to change after all this? Well, it certainly it it it certainly made one think about the importance of what you're doing. You know before that you understood, ⁓ certainly what you did, but now the nation was at war. I and there was a a renewed focus on national security. I in terms of my own career I went from there and actually my first stint at the White House was helping stand up the Department of Homeland Security, which was of course a direct result ⁓ of that attack. ⁓ and then from there it was back to the agency after a couple of years of rotational assignment, ⁓ landing in the DI front office for a little bit, the analytic arm of the organization, while they figured out know what's next for Jeff. ⁓ and in my case it was the ⁓ role of chief of the C the senior executive intelligence brief, ⁓ and with that the transformation of that to wire World Intelligence Review. Interesting. So when you're in the White House and you were ⁓ looking at this thing they said, hey we gotta do this Homeland Security thing, what was that ⁓ What was experience like? What were they thinking about? First of all, Tom Ridge is a prince. He was a wonderful man, sort of the right person in the right place in the right time, serving as Homeland Security Advisor, and then, of course, the first ⁓ secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. I had a chance to work very closely with him in the startup of that organization. I was there in some of the early consultations for the establishment of the DNI. And the IRTPA. We did a very early version of what ultimately became TTIC. It was ⁓ designed as a sort of a situation room but focused on counterterrorism sorts of issues. So ⁓ again, there was ⁓ sort of the the combination of sort of bureaucracy, which is to say, well geez, how do we organize against this particular task? And also the sort of the the moment and it was sort of a recognition of the need to actually accomplish things. ⁓ so t tell me something about Tom's leadership style. He was ⁓ how did he go about this? He was quietly assured, I suppose I would say. ⁓ he was ⁓ a prince of a man. ⁓ came of course ⁓ from governor of Pennsylvania. In fact we often refer to him as the governor, he said Governor Ridge, you know. ⁓ because of course early on you weren't quite certain what the right right ⁓ title would be. but he ⁓ he, you know, focused on the task, ⁓ he you know, rallied the resources needed, ⁓ he responded to the direction of the president ⁓ in establishing this organization. So you know, I'm I'm personally very grateful that I had the opportunity to work with him. I didn't get to work with him directly, but he joined Deloitte after I was there as an advisor and he said something interesting. He said I I want to be called government Governor Ridge, not Secretary Ridge, because and I th I find this funny 'cause given what you're describing, 'cause it is a Herculean task to get the bureaucracy organized, but he said, I want to be called governor because I worked really hard to become governor. Yeah, yeah. No, that makes that makes total sense. I mean he ⁓ as I said, he was a man that was sort of pulled out of a role that he really worked hard for, the the governorship, ⁓ and then thrust into a very difficult role as well, the establishment of this department, which if you recall was sort of this merging together of disparate elements ⁓ from around the federal government. ⁓ and I mean there are things like well how do you bring organization together, where are you going to physically locate and those sorts of things. They still wrestle with that. They do. They do. ⁓ it was I think the Nebraska Avenue complex was where we ended up initially. I I remember lots of conversations about ⁓ sort of technology and and you know, bringing
technology into the space and security setback from the roads, ⁓ these sorts of things. That's ⁓ it was like a boys' school or a monastery or something? I think it was a boys' school, yeah. ⁓ and ⁓ it it it had horrible lunch facilities. I th I think there was a a subway was the only thing that was available on the campus. That's funny. It's funny, yeah. I I went there a number of times and yeah, the it's in what used to be a basketball court, I think. Yep. And which also was prior a church and so that's been converted several times. And then in the senior executive offices they had fireplaces that didn't work. But they had fireplaces and mantles and everything. Like it clearly was a a domicile. No, absolutely. And you it's funny you mentioned the ⁓ the basketball court I recall I did not play because my sh my shots are awful. ⁓ but Governor Ridge would play basketball, ⁓ sometimes with the staff. That's neat. So that's very cool. So you come off of that ⁓ experience back to the agency and describe for us ⁓ kind of there was an initiative for change. What did that feel like? What did that feel like to be a part of that? Like what what was going on in the air? You know, it's it it's funny that you say that because while there was an initiative or a change initiative underway, ⁓ i at least from my vantage, that wasn't really the focus, right? So it was in the context context is important here, it was ⁓ the in the context of the establishment of the DNI. and The agency, ⁓ my words, nobody else's, ⁓ the agency had essentially lost its way. If it wasn't central to the functioning of the intelligence community, because of course the oversight of the intelligence community was lifted and and established within the DNI, if it wasn't central to the intelligence community, what was it? ⁓ and so our effort was about of making us essential, right? Not just central, but essential to the intelligence community and essential to the national security decision maker with information and intelligence that would inform their thinking and and ultimately decisions that they would make. So that was really the focus, ⁓ at least for me, ⁓ and in with with the whole wire experience to see become wire. I don't want to put words in your mouth, so just tell me if this is close, but did the did it I like how you put this. It was central, but now it needed to be essential. So did you feel like it was an existential crisis to the agency? ⁓ very much so. Really? Yeah, no, I I I think the organization no one would would say it at the time, but I think that there was a sort of a a lost way ⁓ that was sort of felt by a lot of people. You recall maybe At the time there was the debate over the role of Chiefs of Station ⁓ and who they reported to and whether they were in fact responsible to the director at CIA or were they responsible to the Director of National Intelligence as ⁓ DNI representatives, if you will. and the agency won that battle, certainly. But there was an ⁓ there was
also a concern about or among the sort of the analytic cadre. Well, you know, who are we? Are we a national ⁓ asset or we a national intelligence service? ⁓ and the agency sort of was grappling with that whole experience and and you'll recall also the the movement in air quotes of the ⁓ PDB from the agency to the DNI, the President's Daily Brief. while most of it was still done by the agency, it was sort of nominally under the authority and the control and the direction of the the DNI. So there was a lot of ⁓ I think you s you said it right when you said an existential crisis. There was a lot of concern and churn about who we are and and what we were, and in the establishment of wire the the initial pitch was giving the agency its voice back. Right. Establishing the voice for the institution. All right, let's let's this is really important. All right, so tell us about what existed prior to that. So the agency is known for doing the president's daily briefing, the customer, the national security council, and so forth. No, I mean there was ⁓ there were several intelligence publications and several mechanisms for intelligence to re to be delivered to customers. There was the PDB, that was the preeminent vehicle for delivering to the president and the president's sort of top advisors, basically, the the cabinet ⁓ level officials and the national security establishment. There was also the the publication just below the PDV was called the SEEB, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. Before that it was the National Intelligence Daily or Digest, depending upon who you ask at the time. And a whole series of of things before that. And ⁓ there were also ⁓ each office would produce its own intelligence reporting. and disseminate intelligence, oftentimes through office level briefers to ⁓ the NSC senior directors and ⁓ directors and staff and and folks, for example, over in the Department of State as well. So there were a lot of different conduits. And actually that became one of the challenges too, which was that there were elements of the organization that were talking as components ⁓ instead of the institutional as a whole providing its analytic assessment. So customers wouldn't know whether A we were getting the view of the intelligence community or the CIA or just a particular component of the CIA. Interesting. So on the from the customer's perspective, it was a nearly fractured view of intelligence because you could get some ⁓ we have warring tribes on all sorts of issues in the in the IC. ⁓ very much so. I I think one of the biggest challenges was the ⁓ ⁓ the the synthesis of information and intelligence needed to take place ⁓ at the customer's level as opposed to beforehand, ⁓ which is where it really should happen, right? I mean you want to give customers the the the full sense of the intelligence information that's out there and the sense of the community or the sense of the institution but you you I think want to ensure that when a customer is reading something, they understand exactly what it is that they're reading, particularly if it's ⁓ an analytic judgment or an opinion. Is it Joe Schmoe or is this is this the view of CIA or the view of the community? Right. Interesting. So again the agency's known for customer centricity. And putting the customer first. Is that fair to say? ⁓ no. Okay. No. No, I don't think it's fair to say at all. Well, I mean I I I hope it is now. ⁓ but back then, no. I I think there was a degree of desire to support in particular the first customer, the the the president. But I think that there is my agency is is known for a a degree of ⁓ sort of haughty arrogance ⁓ and what we say is important because it's us who ⁓ or we who are saying it. so I don't think that there was a a ⁓ particular focus on the the needs of the customer at least not ⁓ sort of equally across the entire institution. Right. How was feedback collected at this time? ⁓ several different ways, but primarily it was the individual, right? So if there was a a PDB briefer ⁓ who was delivering a briefing, ⁓ and that briefing, by the way, ⁓ most folks think of a briefing as ⁓ sort of an oral presentation. ⁓ some customers just like to read. I and so we would deliver a a book to them and they would sit there quietly and read and grunt, you know, mm or ⁓ what have you. ⁓ and others would would take their their briefing orally. ⁓ in some cases they would ask questions ⁓ were not So there was interaction. But the the primary the primary response or the primary insight in terms of the ⁓ the the the customer's sort of consumption of a piece of intelligence would be the briefer looking at the customer and taking down notes. Well they they read that with interest. ⁓ they they questioned the analytic line here. ⁓ they asked for a follow-up. And that would be how that that information ⁓ would come back. How is something like that quantified? Well it's not really. it was was actually one of the things that was ⁓ sort of a a point of pride for me when we went to wire and we went online where we actually had Real honest to goodness metrics, how long people dwelled on a particular piece of content, how much they consumed, what was the market penetration, did we reach you know, customers at the NSC? Was this piece primarily of interest to ⁓ a DOD marketplace or or what have you? ⁓ so and metrics matter. Incredibly, right? So intelligence doesn't work without feedback. Not well, certainly. Right. When you think about the the business of it, e like stepping back from the analytic line, collectors, you gotta tell collectors, hey, this was helpful, this was not helpful. And where does that come from? Either the analyst saying what I asked you, you didn't answer, or a customer told me that was helpful. Very different way. ⁓ th and this is just through the learnings of this whole experience doing this podcast, but collector feedback was believed to be by the part of collectors only from the analyst. They didn't see a
customer. But if you said something like the president told me this piece of SIGINT was a What? The President? That's incredible, right? No, that's exactly right. It was if in fact if ⁓ I I don't recall the particular sort of grading structure but ⁓ a I would remember ⁓ I can remember that if a T D was used and a particular intelligence report it would be scored a certain way. If it was used ⁓ as a piece for President's Daily Brief item it would be scored a different way. And if it was something that the consumer actually commented on ⁓ it was scored i an even different way. Right, right. Okay. So you inherit this job. N so did you get was this a voluntole job, like hey, you're gonna go do this thing? Yeah, this was a voluntole job. I mean, I had ⁓ prior to going down to the White House, I had ⁓ ⁓ been generally viewed as ⁓ a ⁓ you know up and coming. We had cat ratings at the time. if you were a cat one or a cat two, you were generally thought to be sort of a water walker or above water walking. And that's what I was ⁓ when I went down there. But as is very, very common for our people on detail, when you're out of sight, away from the flagpole for a bit of time, people forget about you. ⁓ and so when I came back they didn't really know what to do with me. ⁓ they weren't quite certain, you know, who is this Jeff Fowler and what does he what does he actually deliver and what can I put him on? ⁓ and so ⁓ they put me on the task of the day, which was to essentially reinvigorate the SEEB. Now getting that context, right? The establishment of the DNI, the movement of the PDB, so the SEEB was the sort of the the voice to be for the institution, the for CIA. And there was a view among senior leadership that the ⁓ that the product was not doing particularly well. ⁓ its content ⁓ wasn't good, it's ⁓ in terms of it's both its its scope and its quality that the mechanisms for getting information to customers were not particularly good. At that time the SEEB was a very restricted product ⁓ and ⁓ sort of a by name ⁓ code word sort of delivery ⁓ mechanism. so it was not widely available. ⁓ and the institution, of course, as I said before, was going through this sort of existential crisis in terms of well how do we become essential to ⁓ this customer s ⁓ set that is out there. So they turned to me and they said, Jeff, go fix the seeb. That was that was a direction, literally, it was it was go fix the seeb. Okay. I'll go do that. No other direction. ⁓ how do you like that? When you get ⁓ tasking like that it gives you I mean, that's a lot of runaway. Well it was. I actually I liked it very much. It was it was ⁓ extraordinarily broad latitude. Of course what came with it was a bear fair bit of risk sort of professional risk ⁓ at the time. But it was an opportunity and and that's what I wanted, ⁓ was an opportunity to create change. You know, we I talk a lot about the whole wire experience and it's really the the last yard, right? Yeah. So it's it's making the last yard into the end zone. You can do everything right up until that last yard. But if you don't get that last yard right, you don't score. And so that was the that was the focus on on ⁓ the opportunity. So you come into this job, big wide latitude, lots of nandy you start? What do you start with? Well we had a we had a a regular daily publication to ⁓ to continue to get out. And so my colleague and I I'm not certain of cover status of these various folks so I'll just use first name ⁓ for them my colleague Casey ⁓ and I ⁓ worked the the process that existed already for getting intelligence out the door through this ⁓ through this publication. ⁓ and we explored other means of doing so. And so we came up with the notion of ⁓ a changed product line. ⁓ we decided to cast off things that we didn't think worked well. ⁓ within the organization ⁓ of the the seeb and adopted sort of new structures and all the while we pulled together sort of our thoughts for well we could do this but we could do this other thing too. And the other thing was going online because that wasn't the mandate. That wasn't the the the guidance. Nobody said Jeff Casey ⁓ build us a a website, go online. But what we did of course was transform the SEB to the wire hard copy. ⁓ and then we also had the wire website, ⁓ which was the sort of the modality for creating even bigger transformation within the agency. And the reason why it was hard copy was for control, ⁓ access control. Well initially ⁓ it was hard copy because of the sort of the heritage of the seeb, which itself was was hard copy. So we we moved to a hard copy and we also moved to this online dissemination. Now the agency had been doing online dissemination prior to that. But here is the interesting thing, right? So there was something called CIA online at the time, ⁓ which was a mechanism that rode on the sort of the classified internet, the J Wix backbone. And it provided all of our content. But it didn't provide it in a particularly user-friendly fashion. ⁓ I mean, mind you, this was about two thousand and six time frame and and CIA Odline, CIA Source, these were these were ⁓ earlier efforts ⁓ at making content available. Well we created wire, we created with a very CNN.com sort of feel, right? Graphics, images. ⁓ easy access to content. We found that when we compared, so I said earlier metrics matter. When we compared user base, we realized that the earlier efforts ⁓ to make CIA's content available online were averaging about 750 users a day. After a hundred days, WIRE was ⁓ averaging more than twenty five hundred users. a day. Right? So we we recognized very early that we had something of a hit and the the the sort of the numbers skyrocketed and the the metrics that were available to us as a function of of making content available that way showed that we were getting enormous market penetration ⁓ and that ⁓ content was being consumed at all levels of the ⁓ of the various organizations. Wow. With tremendous amount of
growth. So in the early days, were there a lot of bells and whistles to the wire or was it just a a listing of No well, I mean it was always graphical, but not nearly the sort of the the bells and whistles of of today and over the years. ⁓ early on it was a ⁓ Think of it as a a website like a a CNN.com with ⁓ a graphical thumbnail that would be the visual hook, ⁓ if you will, ⁓ as well as of course the title and ⁓ short prices ⁓ with respect to what the what the particular item might be. We grew that ⁓ particularly by linking other content. And here I should should mention so we we certainly linked sources, so a user could come to an article and then also go look at the sources online ⁓ as well, which was important. But we also brought in other things like links to ⁓ a writer's feed and and unclassified content. And I had people ask me at the time, well why do we want to provide that, don't we we want to provide just our intelligence? And and the answer that I gave to them at the time was, no, you need to think of these online presentations as sort of Rome. All roads lead to Rome and Rome leads with its roads to all locations. I and so we wanted to create a place that users would come to because they knew they could get content there and they could use that as a launching point for any place else. Right? So we established ⁓ a a mechanism that allowed not just customers of CIA content, but customers of other content to come to the wire to see CIA's content and then go back out to somebody else's content. So were these ⁓ like RSS feeds or they what were they? They ⁓ it was a combination, right? So it was ⁓ you know fairly traditional HTML in terms of the individual items ⁓ that were presented. In some cases it was PDFs even and it was RSS feeds from other locations ⁓ that we would pull in ⁓ for ⁓ graphical ⁓ or for ⁓ you know sort of listing if you will ⁓ where did you draw your inspiration for these things? I mean at the I mean as I I'm again talking to folks and like at the time ⁓ it was if you had a web page it was literally here's the page, maybe a title, and usually we just have the agency seal, whole long list of articles with links. Yeah, so ⁓ so ⁓ the private sector. is the is the sh is the short answer. And so the intelligence community is really good at a lot of things. ⁓ one of the things it's not particularly good at ⁓ is staying abreast with the sort of the ⁓ advances in technology ⁓ in private industry. No, it's making is making enormous efforts in that area and strides ⁓ in that area. But it's fair to say that ⁓ we copied what was being done in private industry, and in news organizations and we just we just brought that in. We happened to bring it in very quickly, right? So that was ⁓ that was sort of a a great leap forward for us. ⁓ it did create ⁓ some churn and some mayhem ⁓ among ⁓ among some of our folks. you know, the the notion of ⁓ analysts having to produce thumbnails so that went along with their their pieces was a new level of work, ⁓ for example. ⁓ and they didn't like that. ⁓ but a graphical presentation required ⁓ sort of enhanced ⁓ graphical content being available. ⁓ and we found out through metrics, in fact, it was very interesting. ⁓ The the graphical thumbnail, the level of interest of the graphical thumbnail directly correlated to the level of consumption of a particular item. So these things, one drove the other. And we also got metrics, it was really wonderful insights that showed that the the presentation, the style. So style matters, presentation matters. The the style and presentation of Wire directly contributed to the perception of the quality of the content. So it wasn't just this is a great piece because it's written well or it's argued well or it's sourced well. It was also this is a grace pe great piece because it is presented well in the the framework that was that was Wire. Great chefs say you eat with your eyes. Presentation. Presentation matters. Presentation matters. Yeah. The other thing I should mention is that we changed the the nature of what it meant to present a piece of content. And if you think about that, when you're delivered a hard copy, it's a it's a snapshot in time, it's a essentially a picture, right? But by going online and linking to related content, for example, you you in fact created not just a a picture, but like a movie, right? There were a whole series of frames, both before, you know, ⁓ in time, depth of the the content that was available. So it was this notion of creating a more comprehensive intelligence picture ⁓ for folks. And it was that was the mode really because of the modality. You've mentioned this a couple of times, but ⁓ you built the system to metricize activity. Is that fair to say? Yeah, well I mean ⁓ that was one of the that was certainly one of the advantages. So the initial I think the initial objective was ⁓ transform the experience. Right, so transform the experience from this written publication that's a once-a-day thing to an all-the-time provision of intelligence. And you think about that for a moment, you know, the role of the intelligence community is to inform decision making. Well, decision making occurs all the time, right? Not just once a day when the intelligence product happens to show up on somebody's desk. So we wanted to make that intelligence available all the time and easily available, and we wanted to make it more expensive. So this notion of linked content and depth and and breadth of ⁓ information. ⁓ we wanted to make it easily accessible, so robust search capabilities. ⁓ so it was it was about that. It was about, again, the essentialness of the the content to the customer. The metrics were a benefit that sort of came along the way. Not not an afterthought, ⁓ but along the way. It was it was the tool actually that helped us win a number of bureaucratic battles internally ⁓ with respect to the the ⁓ the effort. But I wouldn't say that metrics were the the sort of the start,
right? They were sort of phase two. Interesting. But you used those metrics to great effect, it sounds like. Yes. it was interesting, in fact. There were there were a lot of sort of battles, if you will. There this was a sort of war, a campaign. and there were every level of the organization need to be ⁓ needed to be sort of overcome or brought along. and the metrics always provided ⁓ sort of us the ⁓ sort of the ammunition to actually succeed. I could say, well, you know, we're we're making ⁓ greater penetration, greater market penetration. I can tell you who's actually looking at content. I can ⁓ show you ⁓ the the the dwell time on particular pieces, ⁓ I can show you this is the sort of the range of ⁓ the range of things that are out there. Nobody else could. And so it was pretty easy to win an argument with respect to the the value of the the effort. It was harder ⁓ for folks to understand what to use the metrics for ⁓ and how to inform their thinking the the intelligence producers upstream. But we were able to effectively use it to show that we were in fact making that last yard into the end zone ⁓ and content was getting to the customers. Could you see things like customer interest trends? Like obviously this is a time where terrorism is a big thing would be very following, but like would you have been able to say things like ⁓ if you produce a product that's on X topic, people read it. Sure. You were able to do that. ⁓ you were able to assess n the the numbers of people who actually read particular pieces. ⁓ you could do thematically of course we tagged everything, right? And so metadata is also extremely important. But you could, you know, easily say terrorism was a top ⁓ sort of source of information. We didn't even see ⁓ globally when people would access the content. There was a twenty four hour cycle. I mean most of it was East Coast based, of course, ⁓ because that's the the primary customer set. But there were folks all across the world who were accessing the content. ⁓ and that was that was valuable too because that provided insight for when we wanted to publish items. Right? So If you know, if SOCOM, for example, actually PACOM would be a better example. So when PACOM ⁓ might be on six hours, seven, eight hours after the sort of the east coast of the United States, ⁓ it was actually worthwhile publishing something that was SOCOM related or PACOM pardon me, related ⁓ during the day rather than waiting for it to be the next day. So we would get content out there published when ready is what it was called at the time, yeah. That's very novel. At that right, we we think that's very interesting. 'Cause in this area we do think very much on our time. East East Coast Tower. Everyone reads the newspaper and well, you when we used to read newspapers. in the morning, drink your coffee. Intel same cycle. That no, that's a that's exactly right. So again, you know, there there was sort of the there was a conscious effort to make certain that our content was deep and broad and available ⁓ and particularly available when ⁓ a a customer set would be interested. So it's not surprising, for example, that we would see items on, say, ⁓ East Asia ⁓ show up on the wire mm maybe about midday, you know, East Coast time. Well why is that? Well, because the primary customer set interested in that content would be, you know, sort of waking up, doing their morning briefs and ⁓ and what have you. And so we would cycle. We actually even ⁓ ultimately moved to a deployed workforce where we had some of our officers deployed abroad ⁓ about every six hours around the globe. ⁓ so that we could then continue to facilitate the production and dissemination of that content. And so we didn't have to have people working ⁓ twenty four hours here on the East Coast. You could actually have them working normal daylight hours in Europe and in Hawaii or in Hong Kong or in you know, somewhere in Europe or in Africa, for example. You used to use a phrase to describe that. What what was the phrase? See now you're thinking about something that I'm ⁓ the what the the sun never sets. Right. So the sun never sets on the wire. ⁓ I said that ⁓ it was extremely important to to r recognize that there is an innate value in the stone. ⁓ that is ⁓ a a a diamond or any gemstone. What makes it particularly valuable is it's how well it's cut. ⁓ because that's where the sparkle of the luminescence and and what have you comes from. ⁓ and I use that example or that analogy, pardon me, to describe why we were so particular about when we did something on the wire. I mean I I I'm I I don't joke when I say we had debates down to the pica, ⁓ or the pixel, you know, where something should be, ⁓ how it ⁓ how it should be organized. color schema, how that was perceived by people, these sorts of things. But the details matter. The details matter. They do. And you could metricize that. That's wild. Well you could again remember what I said earlier with actual metrics that demonstrated that there was a greater appreciation of value of a piece ⁓ as a function of the modality with which it was made available. And so wire in fact was not just a mechanism for making its content available, ⁓ but it was a mechanism for ⁓ delivering ⁓ a ⁓ greater value, if you will, to to customers, one that they attributed back to the piece, back to the institution. And remember, this is all about establishing for CIA its own voice. Yeah, sort of it's its ⁓ importance in in terms of ⁓ essentiality ⁓ for for customers. So I was I was very pleased with that wire experience. We succeeded. And I want to add a little bit more here. Yeah please you not just at the agency but ⁓ DIA source? ⁓ across the across the community. Yeah. We did, yeah. ⁓ with somebody that my my tagline should be transforming intelligence dissemination one agency at a time for the last twenty years ⁓ or so. So yeah, actually we did the Globe at ⁓ at NGA, we did TEMPO at Department of State, we wire was
the source for the initial effort at NCTC for the current, ⁓ and wire actually ultimately became the source for the renewal of current. When I was finishing up my career, I was ⁓ detailed over to the DNI, to the National Counter Terrorism Center, and we did a renewal of current ⁓ there as well. So yeah, the WIRE experience was one that I served as sort of a a an important one for the agency, but really important for the community because it transformed the the the means by which content was made available to customers and and metricized it as as you have mentioned before. And it was from WIRE that the whole PDB iPad experience ⁓ was born as well. you know, we I remember sitting in a conference room one day and looking around for something to do and I said, you know, in a year we're going to have all of our content available on on tablets. ⁓ and sure enough, a year later, ⁓ we were able to demonstrate that you could take the content and make it available on tablets as sort of a modality for delivery to to customers. We did that internally, we did that supporting the senior leadership, we we expanded it to a handful of ⁓ customers for the P D P initially and then of course that took off. ⁓ many, many stories around the the iPad experience in the Pentagon. Yeah. ⁓ I'm sure. ⁓ my goodness. So much. I'll I'll just we'll go off we'll go off script for a bit. Sure. ⁓ we had we had a customer we give 'cause it was it's CIA's program, and so we had the iPads were given to everybody and we had our own publication software we're given and the customers are busy, got it, understand? But ⁓ we had one of these customers 'cause it had this a sheath on it, right? So it would protect it, right? Wouldn't scratch the glass. This particular customer had a stack of papers, the iPad had been delivered, but this was a reader, it was not a person that took a world briefing. And this customer put a hot cup of coffee on that glass and it shattered. Oops. That's the value of intelligence in this particular case. So you know, so it's interesting though the the iPad experience is important as a as a an exemplar that's worth exploring for just a moment. It's because ⁓ it was so alien to a lot of folks. And and certainly in the intelligence community. I mean you don't walk into the building with your cell phones or or what have you. Imagine, you know, ⁓ getting approval to walk in with iPads. We had to to ⁓ steal the phrase from Steve Jobs, we had to think different ⁓ with the with those devices. ⁓ and we realized that it wasn't the connectivity that was important about them. It was the modality, it was the the ability to hold a device in your hand that ⁓ gave the intelligence institutions ⁓ a way of delivering content more more facily. So ⁓ instead of for example describing ⁓ the terminal corkscrew maneuver of an exos missile or something, you know, ⁓ as it's going after a a ship. You could actually create a 3D interactive ⁓ that would demonstrate that. Or you could show video or audio file. So it it it absolutely opened up the the world for ⁓ provision of intelligence. But in order to do that, what we did is said, well we have this iPad and it's really the form factor That matters here. So really truly, we took these early devices and we took them apart. ⁓ and we took out the Wi-Fi and we took out the Bluetooth and we took out the cameras and we took out the microphones and then slapped them back together again. And we actually had to hack the software in such a fashion that allowed us to update it, because of course things need to be updated for for security purposes. So we we took all of security's concerns on board and created this this mechanism that truly transformed the way we could provide intelligence. The wire experience was like that as well. By going online, it allowed us to do things that you just couldn't do with pieces of paper. You could like I said, you could have these interactives. ⁓ you could have video, you could have audio. ⁓ we could understand down to the second ⁓ how users would act and interact with pieces of content. ⁓ and we can't go into any great length here, but ⁓ it also was an important counterintelligence tool. Absolutely. ⁓ comments too, right? You could comment on articles? You could. Now that's changed more recently and I I can't say as I'm ⁓ understanding the the the the rationale behind the com or the the change, but we thought it very important to allow both public and private comments because the notion was ⁓ not just the provision of a piece of content, but the establishment of a dialogue. We wanted people to dialogue with respect to particular pieces. It did take some getting used to from some of our ⁓ some of our producers. I remember a phone call from a an IRA team chief who was concerned about a public comment on one of their analysts ⁓ pieces that was critical. and I said I said, Well what are you gonna do about this, Jeff? And I said nothing. You know, they've they have commented about the the the caliber of the the analysis in the bees. So comment back. Defend your analysis. Yeah. It's right, isn't it? So as a briefer, I came to appreciate that There's an envelope of trust and privy because that customer is gonna share some they'll react to a piece of intelligence and they're gonna share a piece of insights. They'll say, ⁓ man, I can't make this decision because of this. Or I'm gonna have to change this program because of this, whatever it is. And violating that envelope was a hard thing to navigate when you wrote feedback back to writers. ⁓ so this piece of it is interesting to me about being able to allow people to comment back and forth. So was there friction between what you were doing, I I'll say algorithmically, but not so much, right? It's just clicks and counts. But you were ⁓ digitizing that paper based experience, and I wouldn't say you're puncturing the envelope, but you are providing a little more detail than people were comfortable with, I would think.
But you you tell me. Yeah, so That's a great question, because early on there were two concerns, right? There was a concern from the customer, ⁓ how much information are you gathering with respect to ⁓ my interaction with this content? ⁓ and there was a concern from the institution that the role of the briefers would change so much that we would lose that personal interaction. ⁓ and in in order ⁓ we overcame both, right? So in the case of the customer, what we focused on was making the experience as similar to their their everyday life ⁓ so their workday life and their everyday life became the same. So they could you know they were used to interacting with it the back in the day, as you said, people would sit with their coffee, they would read their newspaper. These days it's you know you pick up your phone and you you scroll online, ⁓ or you might sit at your computer and and visit a website. Well it was no different. So they very quickly moved from any concern about the the insight. ⁓ and we made it clear to them as well that d dwell time an o on an article doesn't necessarily mean that you were ⁓ particularly focused on that article. you could just as easily have clicked on the article and then your phone rang and you were on the phone for half an hour before you turn back to the article or or whatnot. So delivering a degree of plausible deniability, right? So there was there was insight that was greater than we might otherwise have, but there was also some deniability, ⁓ for the ⁓ for the the the user. in the case of the briefers, ⁓ what we found was that the customer actually valued the the form factor, whether it was the P D B or whether it was the wire online, they valued the form factor ⁓ so much so that they actually engaged more with the briefers than they had previously. Right. So it became a it became a win, you know, all the way around. Wow, that's fascinating. So cool. All right. What's your favorite wire story? Well, I don't know that I have one favorite wire story because that was a long assignment. That was a that was a a seven year love affair, if you will, right? So and that's a long time for a a senior officer to stay ⁓ in any one place. I think one of the things that I valued though was that we adopted an approach to everything that we did, sort of the wire family if you d if you will. We adopted an approach which was we're not gonna be afraid to fail. Right. We're going to lean forward. We're going to try things. So for there were some f some famous failures, if you will. We at one time had Wire T V all ready ⁓ to go for wire. ⁓ and these were going to be video sort of you know almost like podcasts, right? But you know, video blogs where there was ⁓ an interview format with with analysts with respect to a particular piece of content or or subject matter or what have you. ⁓ and making that available online. That was shut down ⁓ by the the seventh floor. They weren't ready for it then. They are ready for it now, actually if you go online, if you have access to the system, you see some of these ⁓ sorts of things. Sometimes you can arrive too early, but it's still worth the pursuit, right? the the the opportunity to sort of think creatively, think differently. It was important to pull together the the the group of people who were committed to trying things new and driving forward. So that was that was a an important kind of ⁓ memory, ⁓ certainly. ⁓ there were There were amusing things that you would find I and some not so amusing ⁓ an amusing thing is one of the most read pieces in in early wire history was a piece on Jordan, ⁓ because in part the thumbnail ⁓ that was associated with was the Queen of Jordan. and you know, she's very ⁓ attractive ⁓ and capable woman certainly, but a lot of people claim Clicked on that. The the sort of the interesting challenge, we actually got to the place where we would ⁓ have videos, for example, or potentially have videos of people ⁓ in protests, and so ⁓ they could be ⁓ bloody, ⁓ for example, ⁓ or of self-immolation sorts of things. ⁓ and you realize that ⁓ The modality is important not just for customer reach, but you need to think about that a lot ⁓ so that it's not shock value, right? You're you're thinking more about the the sort of the the total presentation than you might otherwise have thought about, or you're thinking about other elements about it ⁓ than than you might have previously. It's i people draw analogies to Intel and journalism, which I feel is not fair because journalists are both the collector and the analyst and the author. And sometimes agencies divide the author and analyst role differently. all source agencies do that, whereas other places not as much. It's so But you learned lessons about and ⁓ tr I'm just kind of putting pieces together, I'm not trying to put words in your mouth. Sure. But you learned lessons about what it means to present a story with integrity to inform, but you also had to thread a needle of is this appropriate? Is that a fairer? ⁓ it's very fair, right. So not every piece that was submitted ⁓ was a piece that was one that we would want to publish. Certainly there were ⁓ there were ⁓ questions of of quality, ⁓ of content, ⁓ and you know with that the sort of the whole editorial review process ⁓ that we could spend another several podcasts ⁓ talking about. But ⁓ so there was a there was certainly a quality bar. There was a relevance bar, you know, is this piece something that we would run to rotten today or tomorrow or or the next day? But there was also mm this this is likely to get lots of views but may not really tell the story ⁓ that we want to tell right now. For whatever reason. you know, sort of ⁓ inappropriate in that fashion. ⁓ it would be distracting to a point of of you know not telling the message effectively, right? So there are there were a lot of different factors, certainly. It's f it's fascinating to me because again, this on the briefing experience, the most popular
article I ever put in front of a customer Which got multiple demands for I wanna read that. I wanna read that. I wanna read that from people that typically wouldn't consume intelligence. Was a salacious piece in my opinion about a particular foreign leader, ⁓ mostly about this person's ⁓ personal life. ⁓ Questionable intelligence value. Right. So yeah, which is another, I think, really important point. And this is this is actually a debate that still occurs today. Right. So just because a piece is read by a lot of people does not mean that it's a good piece. Right? So it's important to be able to know how many people consumed a piece. It's important to understand what markets ⁓ it was most effective ⁓ in reaching But quantity of consumption does not equal quality of peace or intelligence. This again was something that was extremely important that we would we would pass back. The I I think that concern more than any other has driven some of the more recent changes in wire that I'm privy to. And of course I've been away from it for a long, long time now. But some of the more recent changes on the website, which include the removal of ⁓ the availability of metrics, because there was a concern ⁓ a general availability of metrics, I should say. There was a concern that analysts were focusing too much on how many people read their piece as opposed to the quality of the the particular piece or the content. so Yeah, to your point, I think it is important to understand that reach does not equal quality. It's important to understand. I it can drive what you do, but it really should only be one factor. Yeah, you really amassed a lot of unique knowledge in this period of time. I'm a transition us a little bit. Sure. ⁓ so you talked a lot a little bit about the community, but let's dig into this a lot more because I think in your experience in that seven years, you had an indelible impact on collaboration culture and bring people together. When did you start to more seriously engage the the crowd, so to speak, that were pushing things like blogs and wikis and that sort of thing? When did you become aware of that When you start tapping into that? Yeah, pretty early on, ⁓ actually. So ⁓ Sean and Don, right, ⁓ were big in that area. Of course every year ⁓ when we when we were sort of developing the wire program, we would throw a conference and we would bring people in from around the community. And this was this was about, again, CIAA's leadership, right? Its centrality to the to the community. And we recognized that we were pioneering and we would pull together other pioneers. And sometimes we were pioneering at cross purposes. And other times we were in lockstep with each other. and it was so i to your question when it was early and often as we as we sort of moved forward over those years. Describe for me excellent ⁓ metaphor, lockstep at odds. Where were you in lockstep and where did you start to diverge? Well I think the lockstep was a recognition that things needed to change. that the institutions of the intelligence community needed to find sort of new modalities for making content available. The the difference between say Wire and Wikipedia, Intellipedia The the wire was essentially created on the sort of the premise that the institution, CIA, needed to rec recreate its voice or or ⁓ re find its voice, ⁓ and make that final yard to delivery of content to customers, ⁓ in a changed modality that allowed for a more comprehensive presentation of content. Wikipedia, on the other hand, was more egalitarian. This is now my view, it was more egalitarian. It was about bringing down the walls of the various intelligent community components in producing knowledge ⁓ in a a fashion more akin to the wisdom of the crowds, right? ⁓ and then making that content available. It was less about the the presentation of a a a member institution of the IC its content than say a wire was. So using that as an example, we were in lockstep in recognition that things needed to change, but we focused on different areas of that change. So one needed the other. There's a little symbiosis, right? There was some symbiosis. There was a point at time so b big in the way that we did the wire. behind the scenes we would create sort of visions, right? A vision video, for example, or a ⁓ a sort of a a premise ⁓ for the way forward. ⁓ and we envisioned at one point a merger of these various capabilities. So ⁓ you could in ⁓ envision a ⁓ sort of a a wire that started as a ⁓ a a a piece of intelligence become more a story about a particular ⁓ a particular sort of intelligence event or or circumstance that we had ⁓ reportage on. but that also included links to deeper content that was available ⁓ throughout the entirety of the community, ⁓ that Wikipedia type of ⁓ type of experience. So there was there was certainly some effort. I loved what ⁓ Don and Sean ⁓ focused on in terms of being the champion change. And so we tried to embody that as well. ⁓ actually create change in an institution. we learned a lot about how to how to create change ⁓ in organizations. ⁓ so yeah, that was ⁓ there was certainly partnership. And there was there was also ⁓ you know occasionally the sort of the the good natured kind of ribbing of the other guy on, well, you know, I'm reaching so and so customers, how about you? You're right. That kind of thing. But it was it was nice to have a a a group of people who recognize the importance of of change ⁓ and then were willing to pursue it. Let me get your reaction to this. So I recollect that at that time people would take a finished product, copy paste, drop it into telepedia. They might format it, they might not, you know. ⁓ and then someone would change that article and add a little something here, add a little something there. Nobody was happy in my estimation. No, I agree with you. There was that was actually a a fairly big concern and this is this is one of the the areas of a sort of fundamental divergence.
So the wisdom of crowds is a great tagline, but I wouldn't want a crowd to ⁓ advise me on how I might ⁓ you know ⁓ deal with a ⁓ a a fictional brain tumor ⁓ for example. ⁓ I'd want experts ⁓ to provide that. Now, I'm not saying that the opinion of the crowd and experientially, ⁓ well I had a brain terminator and I did this and I was, you know, I had the experience. ⁓ so it it can be valuable. but the the worry that I have is that the sort of the the wisdom in air quotes might not actually be so wise and it certainly wasn't ⁓ well documented or well sourced. And from a customer's standpoint too, the customer needs to understand w who is Who is telling me this and what are their sort of you know bona fides and and do they have some basis for making the judgment that they do? and you know the for all of the the the knocking down of walls that that comes with sort of this wisdom of Kraut and sort of the the notion that the individual components of the intelligence community don't matter, they do matter from the customer's perspective. So they matter. Think of think of those institutions as brands. Right? So there is a certain brand association with the different organizations, and with that comes sort of expertise and knowledge and familiarity, taste. Right? So It it's important in my mind for customers to understand what they're getting. And so there was a there's a real concern over any time ⁓ a ⁓ a piece would be presented making certain that it was presented with the seal of the institution that was actually providing that and any change after publication ⁓ was a real sort of no no. Right. And that was why we would allow comments, but we wouldn't you know we wouldn't change something without a sort of a a a a note from the editor, you know, this item has been changed post publication because of new intelligence reporting or ⁓ a a recall of a particular a particular report that was central to the the the piece. Yeah, that's something people don't understand about the internals of the business is that there are times where we figure out like that source is wrong. No, that's absolutely right. They're trying to deceive us or whatever. So it's gotta get pulled back. Yeah, we that was actually something that we were able to do again electronically that you could not effectively do on paper. Because once a piece of paper is disseminated, it's out there, right? ⁓ now electronically you could say the same thing, well, you know, somebody could just print it off. But what we were able to do was go back to the source document itself, its representation, and we were able to notify all the users who had read a piece, because we knew all of the users who had read a piece, ⁓ that a particular item had changed, had been recalled or or what have you. So we can't do that on paper. Tremendously powerful. Yeah, especially. I mean, yeah, if you're trying to keep people informed. It took us a long time to do that. Like once we w finally were digitized, at least on the
the message traffic system, the administratively recalled report would not be gone, but it would be flagged to say, Hey, this is bad. Right. For whatever reason. Sometimes you knew sometimes you didn't. Yeah, you it yeah, I mean you you need it to maintain sort of the the the relationship of the reader, you didn't want to disappear something that you had said, because that would be sort of changing the record of history. But you did want to correct the record if there was, as you say, a recall or what have you. Right? So in some cases, right, you know, pieces the the entire analytic line would change. It would go from not to will. That's a that's a big difference. Big change. Big difference. So in this time you mentioned Don and Sean, were did you have other allies that you leaned into? I mean you it takes a village, right? Yeah, I was gonna say that. I actually it does take a village. So the the allies it was interesting. So we we there was nothing that was assured about wire when we first started. we built up our allies over time. We had the the responsibility to fix the SEEB, but that could have been done and stopped just with some changes to the hard copy publication. I would tell you that the the allies that were most important was the team of folks that I worked with closely to actually give birth to wire and to drive it forward and that sort of ethos of change. So I'd I'd include Casey there certainly, Todd, Julia, Debbie. There are there are other names that that come to mind over the the time of the sort of the the running of wire. But I think I think what was important was these individuals were the right individuals ⁓ in the right place at the right time. I and we had an approach which was appropriate to the task. You talk a little bit about change management. What's important to achieve successful change in my mind in an institution is to provide value at essentially little to no cost. So bureaucracies are not folks say the word bureaucracy ⁓ and off ⁓ as is like a four letter word. They're not. They exist for a purpose, right? They exist to create a standardized output. Right? What happens though is that the world changes around them. And bureaucracies are not particularly good at rapid change. They're great at establishing sort of procedures and and product lines and what have you, ⁓ and they tailor to you know the you know whatever is of the particular need that is identified, and then they sort of become rigid. That's the problem. So you need to create ⁓ within that bureaucracy a an ability to create change. ⁓ and the way you create change, there're lots of ways to create change. But one of the most important ways is to deliver to the bureaucracy enhanced value for relatively little cost. So for example, when we first started WIRE, we asked the the producing organizations to do nothing different. We would ⁓ assume all of the work at the very end to take that content and make it available online to customers. Okay, sure. You know,
we don't have to do anything different. ⁓ and so then we could show them the difference and here, you know, we talked earlier about metrics matter. I could give them metrics on you know, how broad, how deep, how many consumers, how long, you know, where, when, these sorts of things. Stuff that they could never have before. And then all of a sudden I said, Well, you know, it would really be nice if we had some graphics, some thumbnails that went along with ⁓ well what's a thumbnail gonna cost, right? Not really that much, but it's something. And then I could show how important it was in terms of readership because I could compare some people hated thumbnails. They they would do the least amount of work. They would do like a flag. It it deals with, you know, Russia. So we have a tri tricolor, you know, thumbnail. ⁓ an item on Russia with a flag is a lot less interesting than an item on Russia that has sort of a picture of Putin at the particular meeting that the piece is talking about, for example. You could see a material difference in terms of readership. And then people would say, ⁓ okay, well a little bit of a little bit of change, a little bit of enhanced work ⁓ will allow us to, you know, reap this additional benefit. So you you sort of th the first hit is free, right? And then you know over time you sort of you know you you weave in these additional sort of costs, but there's additional benefits ⁓ associated with it. And eventually were you pushing ⁓ more of that workload to them and less for your staff? No, we ⁓ we ended up doing a lot of work ⁓ as well. But there was a a transformation that moved upstream, right? So you know, again, when you think about multimedia and interactive content, ⁓ that was something that wasn't really produced very you know, very heavily before. That that was just a a a market explosion, right, ⁓ in terms of the the availability. for analysts to think differently and to work with the multimedia and graphics people ⁓ to create content. So that was a substantial change ⁓ in the way ⁓ items were done. We focused a lot on graphics ⁓ and so that created some upstream ⁓ kind of ⁓ kind of work. But we at our at the sort of the the tail end, the wire program edited and reviewed content was a whole nother area for for conversation, ⁓ you know, the sort of the the relative value proposition and how much control ⁓ the the ⁓ producing organizations would have. ⁓ we focused on sort of innovation, we focused on customer relationship management, so we could understand the customers, we could sort of you know reach out to them, we could survey them, you know, for example, ⁓ if we ⁓ if we wanted to and needed to ⁓ in a couple of instances. I mentioned earlier that there was a a counterintelligence ⁓ value ⁓ as well. So there was a lot that was done by the the program. You know, you you make a determination of the success of a program in part by its growth, right? At the institution, if the institution gives you money, if the institution gives you ⁓ people, resources, you know that you're you're a success in the institution's eyes. A wire certainly grew to a point where its budget was larger. It's just the program ⁓ budget was larger than some DIO offices. Right? ⁓ so certainly there was ⁓ a a financial investment there was a a physical investment, you know, wire was broken off from the PDB so that it had its own kind of, you know, apparatus and and support structure ⁓ and what have you. And so again, ⁓ I think I think that what what mattered for us was creating a a change in the institution that delivered greater value both to the customer and to the institution. Right? So we became a an important nexus, not a choke point, but a nexus actually, ⁓ in delivering enhanced value in in both directions. So now we're twenty years from this time period. When you look back Is there anything you would have done differently? I don't want to use the word regret. I I don't like that word. But are the things you kind of look back at and say, Yeah, I just wish I did that a little differently. I wish it'd gone a little bit differently. yeah, I was really happy with the the the transformation that took place. I think I might have tried to do the ⁓ the mobile effort a little bit sooner, than we did. Although at the time it it happened ⁓ sort of organically within the organization. It was it seems like the next right thing to to do. I think that ⁓ you know hindsight being twenty twenty, you know, you ⁓ I I might have argued more forcefully in some cases ⁓ for certain things I might I really would have liked to have wire TV. Yeah. Come on out. Although we do have LiveWire out there as a result of as as a result of those efforts. And I you know I I think to be to be perfectly frank wire is a success story for the agency. I went to a DODIS conference, actually I remember now. ⁓ and I was on you know the main center stage and briefing hundreds of people. ⁓ and the title for ⁓ my briefing was CIA, a leader in information sharing. ⁓ and I said, so is this an oxymoron? ⁓ or is this true? And I'm gonna tell you a story and I'm gonna ask you, the audience, what you think at the end. And so I told the story of Wire. And I told about our sort of the journey, the the very stuff that we've been discussing today. And at the end, we won the day. You know, the audience was, ⁓ geez, you're you're leading. You're showing you know showing remarkable change and you know, CIA, a leader in information and sharing. That's pretty remarkable. And not known for sharing information. Not known for sharing information, no. Well, Jeff, this has been spectacular. Is there anything that you wanted to talk about that we didn't cover? You know, there was something in your notes earlier ⁓ that ⁓ that I was thinking about how I would respond to and it was sort of the question of well, the DNI and the D and I's establishment and ⁓ and whatnot. I and and how did that sort of play out with the agency? I touched on it ⁓ at least a little bit with respect to sort of there was this existential crisis or at least I I viewed it as such. I think it's important it was important to understand that so ⁓ I come from CIA, I'm a very proud retired officer of that organization. ⁓ we're really good at being very, very bad. and we need oversight. We need congressional oversight, there's a value. ⁓ to that. And I think there is a value to having a community oversight function. ⁓ so while I might quibble about the direction that the D and I took, particularly early on where it seemed to be all about hostility to the agency. I I do think that there is a value in that institution, ⁓ the notion of sort of sitting astride the the variety of members of the IC ⁓ and helping to provide some guidance. I don't think it's important that ⁓ we eliminate all overlap. ⁓ in fact I think some overlap is important from the standpoint of sort of the push pull that can exist and you can benefit from a thesis antitho. synthesis, ⁓ synthesis, ⁓ sort of thing. But I do think it's important to sort of get all of the horses ⁓ running in mostly the same direction. ⁓ and that's the role I think of ⁓ of community oversight. doubt I'll include this, but ⁓ where are we today? Yeah, so I I i I don't know ⁓ where we are today. the you know you're getting into sort of the the realm of politics and of course that is a realm that as intelligence officers ⁓ we have the sort of the good fortune of saying hey my job isn't to make the decisions, I just inform those decisions. As a citizen I would say I'm worried. ⁓ I I believe very strongly in there's actually a saying, it's a biblical quote on the walls of the agency. You walk in the front door and you've got the seal in front, you've got the stars on the right, and on the left is a passage that says, And you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free. I have always believed that. I have always believed that it is essential to gain as much insight as you can so that you can inform thinking and ideally good decisions. I'm not as confident today that it is information and sort of a sense of reality that is informing decisions. Sometimes it seems to me to be more about justifying decisions. And I don't think that's a role for intelligence. Everything about that. The assessment and that's I think where we've lost our way, is it we're not allowing the information and the analysis to lead us to a well informed position. We're just trying to make the information fit a narrative. Exactly. Not where you want to be. No. Well, Jeff, ⁓ again, this has been spectacular. ⁓ thank you for sharing everything. ⁓ it's my pleasure, absolutely. Kaiser. And I'm Brian Drake. And this has been the Unredacted Podcast.