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Why does nothing work? I wish there were a shorter answer to this, but then I wouldn't have a book. We created a system that had so many veto points in it.
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Should you propose to build a high-speed rail line or a new transmission line connecting clean power to a place that demanded load and was dependent on coal power, or you wanted to build housing, it was almost impossible to get it done.
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The two issues in present-day politics come from these two wildly different traditions, one of which says empower government to do more, and one of which says protect yourself from an oppressive government.
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What, from your perspective, has kind of gone wrong to some degree with progressivism is that progressives came to become libertarian. Present and future generations should have an opportunity to make their own mistakes.
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Welcome to the Liberalism.org Show. I'm Aaron Ross Powell, senior director of liberal projects at the Institute for Humane Studies, and I'm joined today by Mark J.
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Dunkelman, a fellow at Brown University's Watson School and the author of Why Nothing Works.
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It's not every day you read a progressive arguing that their own side has become too suspicious of power, but that's a big part of Mark's diagnosis of why America struggles to build housing, rail, and transmission lines.
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In our conversation, recorded at the inaugural Liberal Solutions Summit hosted by IHS, we talked about the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian impulses that have pulled progressivism in opposite directions from the start, whether gridlock is a fair price for keeping power out of the wrong hands, and why he'd rather see hard trade-offs made by elected officials than by courts.
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Why does nothing work? Yeah. Um, I wish there were a shorter answer to this, but then I wouldn't have a book. Um, uh,
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nothing works because, uh, after progressivism advocated for the bulk of its history from the late 1900s to the 1960s, maybe seven-- to the 1970s, the tragedy of the common needed to be addressed by
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agglomerating power so that experts could solve big problems. We discovered that in many cases, uh, centralized powerful Hamiltonian institutions often did bad things. They had sprayed DDT on our crops.
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They'd, uh, allowed, uh, automobiles that were unsafe at any speed. They had, uh, advocated for urban renewal. They had built the interstate highway systems through lots of neighborhoods. They'd sent us into Vietnam.
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Uh, eventually we discovered that they were involved in Watergate.
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And in the wake of all this evidence that centralized institutions were, in many cases, uh, malign actors, uh, we built a whole series of protections that were designed to stop
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those centralized Hamiltonian institutions from doing bad things. So we created, in a very well-intentioned way, uh, environmental protections, uh, endangered species protections, housing protections,
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on and on and on, uh, to the point that we created a system that had so many veto points in it that it-- should you propose to build a high-speed rail line or a new transmission line connecting, uh, clean power to a place that demanded load and was dependent on coal power,
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uh, or you wanted to build housing, uh, it was almost impossible to get it done. And so the sort of the, the ethos and the feeling, I think, among the American people that too much doesn't get done is a deliberate
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and, uh, follows directly from a, uh, culture, a cultural aversion to power that emerged, uh, at a very specific point in our history and that continues to define, uh, the desire, the, the, the, uh, emergent
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demand that we, in all circumstances, speak truth to power such that, uh, almost nothing can get done. This is one of the things I found most interesting about the thesis in the book is
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many books about why we can't build things anymore, whether that's whe- why the government can't do it or why
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companies or the private sector that wants to do positive things in the world runs into all of these choke points and vetoes and so on, look at it from the perspective-- from, like, the narrow perspective of
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there are small interests that now have a say. There are, like, all of the mechanisms. It's a mechanical story, and your book goes a lot into those mechanics. But
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I found it really interesting that it doesn't start there.
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It starts with these-- this tension between these two perspectives or beliefs or preferences or values within American progressivism, which y-you mentioned briefly in passing.
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There's the Hamiltonian and there's the Jeffersonian. Can you just unpack a little bit, like, what exact-- what is the Hamiltonian viewpoint? What is the Jeffersonian viewpoint?
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And then what's most interesting is kind of how people can hold them simultaneously. Sure. So, uh, yeah, you're absolutely right.
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The core of the book is this, uh, sort of under-examined, in my view, reality that, uh, progressivism is born from two separate and, in many ways, contradicting impulses. Um, one impulse which,
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to what you just said, is-- I call Hamiltonian, uh, after Alexander Hamilton, who was a- Big proponent of
Load full transcript
centralized, powerful, robust government authority, uh, during the early years of the Republic, um, is the sort of notion that we as a
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society face what would tradition- what would traditionally be called tragedies of the common, in the sense that, um, uh, we live in a city, we don't have a sewer system, we don't have a park system, we don't have a transit system, we don't have a great school system.
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In all of these, uh, in all these circumstances, no individual can solve the problem for themselves.
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We need some sort of common solution, and so the only real way to do that is to take the power that we all have individually, collect it into some
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figure or institution who will make these choices for us to determine where the sewers are gonna be put, who's gonna be hired in the schools, where the schools will be built, where, where we're gonna have a park, et cetera, et cetera.
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And, uh, that is the, you know, th- that is the sort of general challenge that we have.
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On the left, like when we talk about climate change, we generally imagine, without even noticing, that what we want is some sort of Hamiltonian solution to stop polluters from pumping noxious gas into the air.
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Like, that, that's our, our, our, our, our prior, our- Mm-hmm... our impulse is to, uh, to a Hamiltonian solution.
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There's a second narrative that is, exists in most of our hearts and minds individually, our individual hearts and minds simultaneously, which is a Jeffersonian impulse, after Thomas Jefferson, who really believed that, uh, yeoman farmers should be left alone by the powerful monarch or government, uh, who sat above them.
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Um, and that is a sort of a notion that there is an oppressive force in our world, in our life, in our experience, that is stopping us from fulfilling our own manifest desire for life, liberty, and, and, uh, the pursuit of happiness, and that in order to improve society, we need to wipe away those oppressive institutions so that people can flourish.
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Um, and you see that on the left in, for example, the civil rights or the, um, the reproductive rights movement, right?
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Like, our notion, almost without thinking it, is that the worst thing in the realm of, uh, reproductive rights would be for some bureaucrat to tell a woman what she can and cannot do with her body.
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And like, if you went into a coffee shop near a, a, a progressive college campus today and asked someone, you know, "What are your top two voting issues in 2024?"
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And they were sta- to say to you, you know, "I was really concerned about climate change and reproductive rights,"
like, you wouldn't think that was weird, you wouldn't think it was odd, like you would be pretty run-of-the-mill.
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And yet the two issues in present-day politics come from these two wildly different traditions, one of which says empower government to do more, and one of which says protect yourself from an oppressive government.
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Um, and the core of my book is that these two ideas have existed right from the beginning of the movement. There was a fight over how to deal with the big trusts and the railroads.
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Uh, at the turn of the 20th century, some people saw this as a problem of monopoly, and they wanted to break them up, which is a very Jeffersonian, uh, impulse.
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Some of which saw it as a problem of regulation and wanted to create a new big public bureaucracy that would tell the railroads where they could run their trains, what, what, what rates to protect consumer interests, that could protect the, the public interest.
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That was a Hamiltonian, um, uh, approach.
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And that throughout American history, uh, these two, within the progressive movement, and I think probably outside of it as well, but certainly within the progressive movement, these two sort of conflicting impulses have battled, uh, against one another in, in va- in various degrees, uh, to benefit and detriment of, of, of us all.
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So what changed? If, if part, if your story of why we are where we are now is that, at least right now, the Jeffersonian impulse is winning over the Hamiltonian one, what changed from the prior era?
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And I should say, like, you start the book by talking about Robert Moses and the guy who got a whole lot done in New York, a lot of it in ways that we would not applaud and, and caused a lot of harm, but built a lot of things.
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But then you talk about trying to do things in New York now, rebuild Grand Central Station, and so on, that just doesn't happen. Um- Yeah. And so what shifted? Was it cultural?
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I mean, this was happening at a time when there was Vietnam, there was the civil rights movement, there was television, so people were seeing what it looks like when the state is exercising
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wildly disproportionate and unjust force upon marginalized or, um, powerless people. Was it-- Why did we shift away from the Hamiltonian towards the Jeffersonian? So, um, the Hamiltonian impulse really reaches its peak
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through the Great Depression and the Second World War, where, uh, the American experience was at a moment that, you know, uh, uh,
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corporate welfare, the sort of notion that your, your, your employer would take care of you. Elizabeth Cohen has a terrific book about this called Making the New Deal.
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That, that the old, you know, community institutions, the, uh, the, the Ukrainian American society in Chicago, and the Jewish society, and the Catholic, and the, right, the, the various immigrant societies, and the businesses that were supposed to protect people, both of them failed as ways to protect families and individuals during the Great Depression from an economic catastrophe.
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And people turned to the government, and their- Uh, endless literature on whether the New Deal was successful or not.
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But by the end of the 1930s, when we go into the Second World War, like the feeling is like that was the one institution that seemed to have, uh, had an impact.
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And then through the Second World War, uh, yet another huge American public institution, the military, uh, protects us from, uh, the catastrophe of, of, uh, losing our freedoms.
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So for decades after those two experiences, uh, we, uh-- the, the Hamiltonian impulse is, is just cultural.
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I mean, even in the fact that the Eisenhower administration chooses not to, uh, strike down or repeal elements of the New Deal is evidence of just sort of a general sense that, um, and I think this is true across the, the board, that in, in most cases, uh, public authority is used for the good.
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It's a positive, uh, contribution. Uh, we can trust, uh, the government on some level.
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Uh, and that, you know, you see this, you know, up into the Kennedy administration, the presumption is that if we have a, a m-major problem in America, like for instance, what, what was called, uh, juvenile justice in those days, w-was really a sort of a, a, a euphemism for, uh, crime in high poverty parts of urban America, um,
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uh, that the government had the solution and the capacity to solve those problems.
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And then there is this moment, uh, from the, the '60s through the '70s, where it just becomes apparent that these huge public institutions are either incapable or in fact malign, that they are, uh-- urban renewal is a disaster for lots of communities.
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The interstate highway system is good in some ways, but in many ways it's terrible because it, it also takes, uh, and stakes through urban areas and, and decimates communities.
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But just generally, you see on the left, you know, the, the rise of the consumer movement is a sort of just after the counterculture.
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And both of those I-- the, the, the, the, the gestalt of both of those movements, uh, runs in line with the civil rights movement, which is very nervous about obviously Jim Crow, but a, a, a broader sense of,
of power.
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You're-- they're very nervous about militarism and the military industrial complex, which Eisenhower had, uh, had brought to people's attention in the, in the, uh, in, in his farewell address in nineteen sixty-one.
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And so in all of these realms, the implicit message is that, uh, centralized power is bad. Um, and you just see it. It, it sort of, it is remarkable.
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Like you look at what the, you know, what, what the movies were in the early '60s and the early '70s.
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By the early '70s, you know, we've got movies like One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest and The Graduate, uh, and Chinatown. Um, and these are all, all movies about how centralized power, uh, is oppressive.
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And so, um, it is like it starts with the culture, as you suggested. It starts with the culture and filters down into the political by meaning, uh, by inspiring a new generation largely of progressive lawmakers.
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But I mean, you know,
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Richard Nixon signs the National Environmental Policy Act into law in 1970, and that is now the bane of every, uh, developer and, uh, you know, th-this is, is now, you know, sort of in the political crosshairs because it has stopped so much development.
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But like that is a, like that's a cultural moment in American history, and the ethos behind it lasts not-- it lasts well into the '80s, the '90s, the 2000s, the 2010s.
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Um, y- only now, it seems to me, and we're at a conference here where we're talking about this, but only now are people beginning to realize that maybe we've overcorrected for the abuses of big institutions in the old days, um, and that we need to find a better balance between these Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian impulses.
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I confess reading the book as someone who spent seventeen years in the classical liberal and libertarian movement, um, it felt like the argument is that the--
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what from your perspective has kind of gone wrong to some degree with progressivism is that progressives came to become libertarian in a,
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uh, which is, was interesting 'cause from like perspective of someone working in it, like we don't think we've won to that extent. You know, so I'm just-- is that, is that a fair way to characterize it?
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And because it just doesn't feel like when I look out at progressives, it doesn't feel like they're just radical libertarians in this, you know, scale back the state, shrink power, devolve things to the individual.
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You know, I think that there's a, a real distinction between the head and the heart, uh, and that among progressives, uh, we view ourselves intellectually as the party of government.
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Democrats, uh, want to grow the government, and Ronald Reagan, as he famously said, you know, so the nine most terrifying words in the English language are, uh, "I'm from the government, and I'm here to help."
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We, we have defined ourselves intellectually, uh, in opposition to that pithy phrase. At heart, though, like we're very nervous about public power.
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We're very nervous about a Robert Moses figure or a developer who's got his, uh, or her, uh, influence in City Hall.
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We're very worried about ca- campaign finance, uh, violations and the ca-- and sort of the, the noxious influence of the establishment.
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Uh, the-- in fact, th- we have this term, the establishment, which I don't think actually means anything except that I don't like whatever the establishment, uh, uh, believes. So, um, uh-
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Y- y- you are, uh, right that progressives are not as, um, articulate about their aversion to government authority as perhaps a libertarian would be. But you hear progressives talk about, you know,
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housing is a right, uh, right? The, the, the, the, our, our rhetoric is very rights-oriented, um, even if, uh, it's sort of maybe to a different end. And the
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centralized narrative, I think, or the centralist-- the, the, the core narrative demands, in all cases, that progressives speak truth to power. That's the, that's the idea.
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Um, and, you know, I, I'm probably more interested in your perspective than in my own about whether that's libertarian. Um, uh, I'm sure you- you're, you're more deeply versed in that.
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But, but the s- that sort of deep aversion to public authority, I think counterintuitively runs right through progressivism, at least from the 1970s, uh, through recent times.
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How cyclical is this? I mean, it's to some extent because you're talking about prior eras that were more Hamiltonian and then the shift to Jeffersonian. But
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how much does it map onto often people's political views about how robust government should be, what it should do, has a lot to do with whether they feel like they're in power or not.
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When it's like people like me who agree with me are in power, now I want the government to do all sorts of things, and when people like me are out of power, now I want the government to not do all sorts of things and be severely limited.
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So how much of this shift is-- I mean, we talked about the cultural, but it's also like this period of the, the '80s under Reagan, um, in the early '90s under Bush. We had Clinton, who was a Democrat, but not
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like a
old school labor progressive type. Um,
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how much of it is progressives not being worried that the government, and then that right now, obviously, under, under Trump, it's not a progressive government at all, that it's, it's like less worry about kind of power qua power and more we're not the ones who are wielding it, so while we're not the ones, now concentrated power is very dangerous because non-progressives are in charge.
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In other words, if we get like a progressive, you get President AOC or something, um, in the next handful of years, do you think this swings back in a more Hamiltonian direction? Well, I think that
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progressives are beginning to realize, and there's a, a growing canon of people on the left and the center left who are beginning to realize that
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curtailing public power in all circumstances and speaking truth to power, uh, as our primary mandate hasn't worked out so great. So I think that, like,
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we are now on a path probably towards, uh, reconsidering some of our Jeffersonian priors and re-embracing some of our Hamiltonian past. Um, I think I'm less,
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uh, convinced that this is tr- a transient feeling or a cyclical feeling from moment to moment, that we, um, we are eager for executive power to be more robust when
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Democrats are in power and less when Republicans are in power. There is some truth to that on both sides, right?
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You know, the, the, the, the question of who should get to decide whether we're going to build wind turbines, uh, off the coast of New England, um, you know,
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I, I, I think progressives, when the person-- wh- when an institution says we sh- should build the wind turbines, we believe that is the right institution to make that decision.
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And when that same institution switches power and Trump is president and he tries to withdraw the contracts, we are suddenly averse, uh, to an executive branch official being able to make a choice like that.
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So the, uh, I mean, I think that there, there, there certainly is some, some malleability, uh, there. I, I will say y- y- you began the question about asking about s- the cyclical cycle here.
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I mean, I, I think that American history is just y- y-, whether it's cyclical or like a pendulum, right? We have this moment where the colonies are ruled by, we like to say, the monarch.
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Of course, it's the British Parliament. Uh, and that feels like a centralized institution that does not rep- represent our interests, so we write the Declaration of Independence.
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The Declaration of Independence is an explicitly Jeffersonian document, I mean, quite literally.
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Uh, and then we have this, this period of, uh, a little more than a decade under the Articles of Confederation, which is, uh, has very little centralized power, and that's in fact so problematic that we shift back to a much more Hamiltonian system, uh, under the Constitution, and the Federalists are the party of, of power and, uh, the predominant,
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uh, uh, movement of the early years of the Republic. And then we have the Jacksonian revolution, uh, in, in 1830.
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And at that point we are, again, we're vetted against the Bank of the United States, and we become, uh, more Jeffersonian again.
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And then, uh, you know, we can talk about the Civil War, which is sort of this, this almost a blip, because by the late 19th century, like we are very, very averse to centralized power until the railroads, um, at which point we sort of pick up the history that we, we talked about earlier, uh, in this podcast.
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So there is this element of America constantly overcorrecting- Uh, for whatever the last scourge was. And, um, we're at a moment where I think we're at a pivot.
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We've, we've sort of reached the peak of a Jeffersonian era, and now we are having the discussions about how to dial things back.
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And the challenge in this moment is can we figure out a way to do, I guess, what in economic terms would be called a soft landing?
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Can we figure out a way to restore the ability of government to get things done without going so far as to make it easy for some figure like Robert Moses to build another South-- another Cross Bronx Expressway decimating, you know, whole neighborhoods of a great urban metropolis.
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Yeah, I mean, that was ultimately my worry. Yeah. Um, about this- Well, you're a libertarian. That- Yeah... that's natural. That, that we see we've spent a long time
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investing a lot more power, like right now in the executive. We've been investing more and more power in the executive for a while now. Congress has been abdicating power- Yeah... for a while now. Um,
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and, and this worry that, yes, like big government can get certain things done, but it can also do terrible things on like a micro level or on the local level, or it can do stuff that has--
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it produces some goods, but has lots of bad costs that we might not wanna bear. And, and so to what extent is the,
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call it like Jeffersonian big government paralysis, the inability to, to pull a Robert Moses, even like a good guy Robert Moses, um, worth it just to live with in exchange for
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not running the risk that the bad
guys get a hold of all this power and then just like immediately do-- use it to, to do stuff that's catastrophically worse than the good things that a good guy Robert Moses could pull off?
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Right. So I think this is the ten thousand dollar question. And, uh, you know, at one end of the spectrum, you have, um, the
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scourge of a Robert Moses figure who's doing terrible things with centralized power, and at the other end of the spectrum, you have a, um,
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a stasis where nothing can move because everyone has been, uh, checked, uh, into a corner, and so we can't have any progress at all. And we're trying to titrate here in, uh, a, a, a more productive way.
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Uh, my friend, uh, Nick Bagley, who's a law professor at the University of Michigan, is about to come out with a book that is in this literature called, um, uh, Why We Can't Have Nice Things, uh, answers this, I think, and I'm, I'm
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quoting him, I think, in the right context, uh, that present and future generations should have an opportunity to make their own mistakes.
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Um, uh, which is sort of an interesting way to think about it, that like w- there are certain costs, there are trade-offs that need to be made, um, but we, we can't, uh, grow, survive, prosper,
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uh, make good on the promises of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness unless we're able to change the built environment, the, the, the elements of the social contract.
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Like, th- these things can't be set in stone by previous generations, uh, to be, to be, uh, uh, to be-- to, to exist in their present form forever.
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And, uh, in order for us to be able to amend those things so that they're appropriate to the age of artificial intelligence and clean energy and, um, uh, housing scarcity and whatnot, uh, you know, we're, we're gonna make some choices that
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require trade-offs, impose some harms, um, uh, and may, in the end, uh, be more catastrophic in some cases. But that we need to be able to make those mistakes because of, like,
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it's, it's a, it's a case of, um, uh, knowing that we're going to fail because we can't change anything to at least trying, uh, to ameliorate the concerns, uh, of today and tomorrow.
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And so, uh, we should be thinking about ways to do-- to, to, to make choices in a deliberative way.
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This is actually a, a place where I think I diverge from some of my colleagues in this, uh, movement for enhanced state capacity. I think
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th- there's a, there's a phrase in, in the world of development called a categorical exclusion, and the notion is that, you know, sometimes things are so important that we're going to exclude them from all the regulatory barriers.
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When, uh, when, when Governor Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania rebuilt that bridge immediately after it collapsed on I-95 outside Philadelphia, uh, he suspended a whole series of regulations and a whole series of requirements, uh, for contracting and whatnot, uh, with, with the Biden administration, uh, in conjunction, and they got it up quite quickly.
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It was essentially a categorical exclusion from all the onerous, uh, procedural requirements generally for an infrastructure project.
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And the impulse today is if you see a project that needs to be done, a high-speed rail line through California or Texas or a, a housing project or a transmission line, we should-- it's so important in many cases that, uh, we should have a categorical exclusion and not consider all these other, uh, ancillary concerns, you know, what the environmental costs would be, what the, uh, who gets the contracts, is it, is it fair sociologically, socioeconomically, uh, et cetera.
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Um, I, I, I think that categorical exclusions is a-- that's a lousy outcome, uh, as a progressive, that we ought to have some sort of deliberative process whereby, you know, all the considerations are put on the table, and then
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more expeditiously, we come to a decision where we take our own political and moral values, apply them to the trade-offs, and then make a selection and move forward.
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The problem today, in my view, is that we have created a whole series of processes where we're thinking about these things, and it's so legal. This sort of pushes back on your sense that the executive were powerful.
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In many cases, it's the courts that have become so powerful. And we knock these things into courtrooms, and the decisions are made by judges who are looking at the letter and interpretation of the law.
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They're not looking at the morals of where the highway should go or whether this trade-off is good when we are giving up the habitat an endangered species inhabits in order to build a clean power transmission line.
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They are interpreting that question through the lens of what is legal rather than what is actually right or what is an That is an explicitly political decision and ought to be left to the two other branches.
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And we need to create processes so that we're not doing categorical exclusions. We're not depending on deliberation within the judiciary, but are actually affirmatively making trade-offs between competing values.
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So the last question, we haven't talked a lot about policy. We've been talking about the kind of the higher level and the
ideological and the belief systems and values and so on.
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A lot of us recognize, I mean, whether we're classical liberal or libertarian or progressive, there's a lot of stuff where like it would be good. Like it'd be great if we could build more housing in the Bay Area, say.
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And there's all of these mechanisms that are putting a stop to it. And we can tell a similar story in all sorts of different areas. And so there's a sense that even if
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I was recently in Europe and talking with a couple of friends who work in public policy in London. And there,
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it's like everybody wants to the government like wants to change policies, wants to unleash growth, wants to do stuff. There's like there's strong, broad ideological commitment to doing this.
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But all of the mechanisms, the quangos and other things are just locked in and they can't no one can get anything done, even though it's not about like changing hearts and minds.
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It's about the hearts and minds have been changed and no one can do anything. So I'm curious if there was like a policy that we could implement now to move the needle on this,
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unlock growth and building and abundance or whatever these things are. This like modernizing our world in important ways. What's the policy that you would recommend? Well, it varies from realm to realm,
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and I have sort of more general guidance that I could offer on institutions that seem to work better than others. I think the most promising realm right now for those of us who are interested in
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speeding things along, YIMBYism has been at the vanguard of this, the sort of notion that if you own a piece of property, and there's a libertarian element to this, if you own the property, you should be able to build what you like on property that you own.
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That's actually a Jeffersonian impulse, right? You're taking power that is at the neighborhood level, which is telling you you cannot build, and pushing it down to the individual who owns the lot.
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In other realms of state capacity, the problem is not potentially solved by any Jeffersonian reform, because if you're going to build a transmission line or a high-speed rail line or whatnot, there is no
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individual owner who you can empower to build on their own. You have to go through a forest, you have to go across a neighborhood, you have to go through a city, you have to make choices. The most promising
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element right now of my colleague Jane Flagle at the Searchlight Institute is working day and night for this new permitting bill that is a bipartisan bill out of the Senate
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championed by Sheldon Whitehouse, my senator from Rhode Island, Martin Heinrich from
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New Mexico, I think Mike Lee and Shelley Moore Capito, who are from the Republican caucus. And
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that is a comprehensive bill designed to make it easier for people who are trying to bring new power onto the grid in a whole variety of ways
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will benefit them, but also at the same time forces those who are trying to build data centers to pay for the improvements that are to their benefit and in ways that will accrue to the communities that are going to have to deal with the externalities of that construction.
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And so you asked for a single piece of legislation that would make things work. That's an incredibly important piece of legislation that we hope will be passed in the
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lame duck period after this midterm election. But I think is the best evidence that you have, particularly that it's a bipartisan bill that has a real chance of being signed by President Trump.
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It's real evidence that things are turning in the direction of trying to move past some of these well-intentioned but now often oppressive regulations we've been erecting since the realization
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of how bad centralized power could be a half century ago. Thank you so much for the terrific conversation, Mark. I'm thrilled to be here. Thanks for having me.
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If you enjoyed this conversation, you can find more like it, along with original essays from contemporary liberal scholars at www.liberalism.org.