Jakson 5 Final step from the metaphysic of morals to the critique of the pure practical reason täydellinen litterointi

property of all rational beings. 67 00:03:41.280 --> 00:03:43.520 It is not enough, then, to prove it from certain 68 00:03:43.599 --> 00:03:47.199 supposed experiences of human nature, which indeed is quite impossible, 69 00:03:47.199 --> 00:03:49.680 and it can only be shown a priori. But we 70 00:03:49.800 --> 00:03:52.080 must show that it belongs to the activity of all 71 00:03:52.199 --> 00:03:55.800 rational beings endowed with a will. Now I say, every 72 00:03:55.879 --> 00:03:59.039 being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom 73 00:03:59.400 --> 00:04:01.560 is just for that reason, in a practical point of view, 74 00:04:01.599 --> 00:04:04.439 really free. That is to say, all laws which are 75 00:04:04.520 --> 00:04:07.639 inseparably connected with freedom have the same force for him 76 00:04:07.680 --> 00:04:09.479 as if his will had been shown to be free 77 00:04:09.599 --> 00:04:13.840 in itself by a proof theoretically conclusive. Now I affirm 78 00:04:13.960 --> 00:04:16.360 that we must attribute to every rational being which has 79 00:04:16.399 --> 00:04:18.600 a will, that it has also the idea of freedom, 80 00:04:18.600 --> 00:04:21.639 and acts entirely under this idea. For in such a being, 81 00:04:21.680 --> 00:04:24.360 we conceive a reason that is practical, that is, has 82 00:04:24.439 --> 00:04:28.560 causality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot possibly 83 00:04:28.600 --> 00:04:31.519 conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other 84 00:04:31.600 --> 00:04:34.240 quarter with respect to its judgments, For then the subject 85 00:04:34.240 --> 00:04:36.800 would ascribe the determination of its judgment not to its 86 00:04:36.839 --> 00:04:41.519 own reason, but to an impulse. It must regard itself 87 00:04:41.560 --> 00:04:45.959 as the author of its principles, independent of foreign influences. Consequently, 88 00:04:46.279 --> 00:04:49.079 as practical reason, or as the will of a rational being, 89 00:04:49.079 --> 00:04:51.199 it must regard itself as free. That is to say, 90 00:04:51.279 --> 00:04:53.079 the will of such a being cannot be a will 91 00:04:53.120 --> 00:04:56.160 of its own except under the idea of freedom. This 92 00:04:56.240 --> 00:04:58.600 idea must, therefore, in a practical point of view, be 93 00:04:58.639 --> 00:05:03.040 ascribed to every rational being. I adopt this message of 94 00:05:03.079 --> 00:05:06.160 assuming freedom merely as an idea which rational beings suppose 95 00:05:06.240 --> 00:05:09.279 in their actions, in order to avoid the necessity of 96 00:05:09.360 --> 00:05:12.439 proving it in its theoretical aspect. Also the former is 97 00:05:12.439 --> 00:05:14.920 sufficient for my purpose, For even though the speculative proof 98 00:05:14.959 --> 00:05:17.120 should not be made out, yet, a being that cannot 99 00:05:17.160 --> 00:05:19.600 act except with the idea of freedom is bound by 100 00:05:19.639 --> 00:05:21.560 the same laws that would oblige a being who is 101 00:05:21.600 --> 00:05:24.560 actually free. Thus we can escape here from the onus 102 00:05:24.879 --> 00:05:27.519 which presses on the theory of the interest. Attaching to 103 00:05:27.600 --> 00:05:32.240 the ideas of morality, we have finally reduced the definite 104 00:05:32.319 --> 00:05:35.920 conception of morality to the idea of freedom. This latter, however, 105 00:05:35.920 --> 00:05:38.560 we could not prove to be actually a property of 106 00:05:38.600 --> 00:05:41.439 ourselves or of human nature. Only we saw that it 107 00:05:41.519 --> 00:05:43.560 must be presupposed if we would conceive a being as 108 00:05:43.639 --> 00:05:46.519 rational and conscious of its causality in respect of its 109 00:05:46.560 --> 00:05:49.800 actions i e. As endowed with a will. And so 110 00:05:49.920 --> 00:05:52.040 we find that, on just the same grounds we must 111 00:05:52.079 --> 00:05:54.959 ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this 112 00:05:55.120 --> 00:05:58.519 attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of 113 00:05:58.560 --> 00:06:02.959 its freedom. It resulted, also from the presupposition of these ideas, 114 00:06:02.959 --> 00:06:05.399 that we became aware of a law that the subjective 115 00:06:05.439 --> 00:06:08.600 principles of action i e. Maxims must always be so 116 00:06:08.680 --> 00:06:11.199 assumed that they can also whole as objective, that is, 117 00:06:11.519 --> 00:06:14.959 universal principles, and so serve as universal laws of our 118 00:06:15.000 --> 00:06:18.199 own dictation. But why then, should I subject myself to 119 00:06:18.240 --> 00:06:21.040 this principle, and that simply as a rational being, thus 120 00:06:21.120 --> 00:06:24.680 also subjecting to it all other being endowed with reason? 121 00:06:25.759 --> 00:06:28.000 I will allow that no interest urges me to this, 122 00:06:28.360 --> 00:06:31.040 for that would not give a categorical imperative. But I 123 00:06:31.120 --> 00:06:32.879 must take an interest in it and discern how this 124 00:06:33.000 --> 00:06:35.959 comes to pass. For this, properly an I ought is 125 00:06:36.120 --> 00:06:39.800 properly an I would valid for every rational being, provided 126 00:06:39.839 --> 00:06:43.720 only that reason determine his actions without any hindrance. But 127 00:06:43.839 --> 00:06:46.160 for beings that are, in addition, affected as we are, 128 00:06:46.240 --> 00:06:49.319 by springs of a different kind, namely sensibility, and in 129 00:06:49.360 --> 00:06:51.680 whose case that is not always done, which reason alone 130 00:06:51.720 --> 00:06:54.680 would do. For these, that necessity is expressed only as 131 00:06:54.720 --> 00:06:58.279 an ought, and the subjective necessity is different from the objective. 132 00:06:59.160 --> 00:07:01.079 It seems then as if if the moral law, that is, 133 00:07:01.120 --> 00:07:04.040 the principle of autonomy of the will, were properly speaking

134 00:07:04.079 --> 00:07:06.920 only presupposed in the idea of freedom, and as if 135 00:07:06.959 --> 00:07:10.079 we could not prove its reality and objective necessity independently. 136 00:07:10.439 --> 00:07:12.959 In that case, we should still have gained something considerable 137 00:07:13.079 --> 00:07:15.920 by at least determining the true principle more exactly than 138 00:07:15.920 --> 00:07:18.920 had previously been done. But as regards its validity and 139 00:07:18.959 --> 00:07:22.439 the practical necessity of subjecting oneself to it, we should 140 00:07:22.519 --> 00:07:24.720 not have advanced a step. For if we were asked 141 00:07:24.720 --> 00:07:27.160 why the universal validity of our maxim as a law 142 00:07:27.240 --> 00:07:29.879 must be the condition restricting our actions, And on what 143 00:07:29.959 --> 00:07:32.439 we ground the worth which we assign to this manner 144 00:07:32.439 --> 00:07:34.759 of acting, a worth so great that there cannot be 145 00:07:34.800 --> 00:07:37.279 any higher interest. And if we were asked further, how 146 00:07:37.279 --> 00:07:39.560 it happens that it is by this alone a man 147 00:07:39.600 --> 00:07:43.160 believes he feels his own personal worth in comparison with 148 00:07:43.240 --> 00:07:45.959 which that of an agreeable or disagreeable condition is to 149 00:07:45.959 --> 00:07:48.720 be regarded as nothing. To these questions we could give 150 00:07:48.759 --> 00:07:52.839 no satisfactory answer. We find, indeed, sometimes that we can 151 00:07:52.879 --> 00:07:55.199 take an interest in a personal quality which does not 152 00:07:55.279 --> 00:07:58.319 involve any interest of external condition, provided this quality makes 153 00:07:58.399 --> 00:08:01.759 us capable of participating in the condition in case reason 154 00:08:02.000 --> 00:08:04.480 were to affect the allotment. That is to say, if 155 00:08:04.560 --> 00:08:08.199 mere being worthy of happiness can interest of itself even 156 00:08:08.240 --> 00:08:12.160 without the modive of participating in this happiness. This judgment, however, 157 00:08:12.279 --> 00:08:14.399 is in fact only the effect of the importance of 158 00:08:14.439 --> 00:08:16.920 the moral law which we before presupposed, when by the 159 00:08:16.959 --> 00:08:20.000 idea of freedom we detach ourselves from every empirical interest, 160 00:08:20.600 --> 00:08:22.920 but that we ought to detach ourselves from these interests, 161 00:08:23.000 --> 00:08:25.560 i e. To consider ourselves as free in action, and 162 00:08:25.639 --> 00:08:28.199 yet as subject to certain laws, so as to find 163 00:08:28.199 --> 00:08:30.879 a worth simply in our own person, which can compensate 164 00:08:30.920 --> 00:08:32.559 us for the loss of everything that gives worth to 165 00:08:32.559 --> 00:08:36.159 our condition. This we are not yet able to discern 166 00:08:36.159 --> 00:08:37.840 in this way, nor do we see how it is 167 00:08:37.879 --> 00:08:40.840 possible so to act. In other words, whence the moral 168 00:08:40.879 --> 00:08:45.120 law derives its obligation, it must be freely admitted that 169 00:08:45.159 --> 00:08:47.039 there is a sort of circle here from which it 170 00:08:47.039 --> 00:08:50.600 seems impossible to escape. In order of the efficient causes, 171 00:08:50.600 --> 00:08:54.200 we assume ourselves free, in order that, in the order 172 00:08:54.240 --> 00:08:56.960 of ends, we may conceive ourselves as subject to moral laws, 173 00:08:56.960 --> 00:08:59.960 and we afterwards conceive ourselves as subject to these laws, 174 00:09:00.320 --> 00:09:03.279 because we have attributed to ourselves freedom of will. For 175 00:09:03.440 --> 00:09:06.200 freedom and self legislation of will are both autonomy, and 176 00:09:06.240 --> 00:09:09.759 therefore are reciprocal conceptions. And for this very reason one 177 00:09:09.840 --> 00:09:11.799 must not be used to explain the other or give 178 00:09:11.840 --> 00:09:14.480 the reason of it, but at most only logical purposes 179 00:09:14.720 --> 00:09:17.320 to reduce apparently different notions of the same object to 180 00:09:17.360 --> 00:09:20.320 one single concept, as we reduce different fractions of the 181 00:09:20.320 --> 00:09:23.840 same value to the lowest terms, One resource remains to us, 182 00:09:23.919 --> 00:09:26.720 namely to inquire whether we do not occupy different points 183 00:09:26.759 --> 00:09:29.120 of view when, by means of freedom, we think ourselves 184 00:09:29.200 --> 00:09:32.200 as causes efficient a priori, and when we form our 185 00:09:32.200 --> 00:09:35.080 conception of ourselves from our actions as effects which we 186 00:09:35.080 --> 00:09:38.600 see before our eyes. It is a remark which needs 187 00:09:38.600 --> 00:09:41.200 no subtle reflection to make, but which we may assume 188 00:09:41.320 --> 00:09:44.799 that even the commonest understanding can make, although it be 189 00:09:44.879 --> 00:09:47.480 after its fashion by an obscure discernment of judgment, which 190 00:09:47.519 --> 00:09:50.519 it calls feeling, that all the ideas that come to 191 00:09:50.600 --> 00:09:54.039 us involuntarily as those of the senses, do not enable 192 00:09:54.120 --> 00:09:56.840 us to know objects otherwise than as they affect us, 193 00:09:57.679 --> 00:09:59.879 so that what they may be in themselves remains und 194 00:10:00.279 --> 00:10:03.559 to us. And consequently that as regards ideas of this kind, 195 00:10:03.639 --> 00:10:06.559 even with the closest attention and clearness that the understanding 196 00:10:06.559 --> 00:10:09.120 can apply to them, we can buy them only attain 197 00:10:09.200 --> 00:10:12.600 the knowledge of appearances, never to that of things in themselves. 198 00:10:13.200 --> 00:10:15.759 As soon as this distinction has once been made, perhaps 199 00:10:15.799 --> 00:10:18.320 merely in consequence of the difference observed between the ideas 200

00:10:18.320 --> 00:10:20.200 given us from without and in which we are passive, 201 00:10:20.519 --> 00:10:22.960 and those that we produce simply from ourselves and in 202 00:10:23.000 --> 00:10:25.960 which we show our own activity, then it follows of itself, 203 00:10:26.000 --> 00:10:29.000 that we must admit and assume behind the appearance something 204 00:10:29.000 --> 00:10:31.919 else that is not an appearance, namely the things in themselves, 205 00:10:32.720 --> 00:10:35.000 although we must admit that as they can never be 206 00:10:35.080 --> 00:10:37.600 known to us, except as they affect us, we can 207 00:10:37.639 --> 00:10:40.000 come no nearer to them, nor can we ever know 208 00:10:40.039 --> 00:10:43.960 what they are in themselves. This must furnish a distinction, however, crude, 209 00:10:44.159 --> 00:10:46.480 between a world of sense and the world of understanding, 210 00:10:47.240 --> 00:10:49.279 in which the former may be different according to the 211 00:10:49.279 --> 00:10:52.559 difference of the sensuous impressions in various observers, while the second, 212 00:10:52.759 --> 00:10:55.279 which is its basis, always remains the same. Even as 213 00:10:55.320 --> 00:10:57.639 to himself, a man cannot pretend to know what he 214 00:10:57.759 --> 00:11:00.720 is in himself from the knowledge he has by internal sensation, 215 00:11:01.240 --> 00:11:04.159 for as he does not, as it were, create himself, 216 00:11:04.159 --> 00:11:06.600 and does not come by the conception of himself after oory, 217 00:11:06.720 --> 00:11:09.559 but empirically, it naturally follows that he can obtain his 218 00:11:09.639 --> 00:11:12.080 knowledge even of himself, only by the inner sense, and 219 00:11:12.240 --> 00:11:15.039 consequently only through the appearances of his nature, and by 220 00:11:15.080 --> 00:11:17.720 the way in which his consciousness is affected. At the 221 00:11:17.759 --> 00:11:20.799 same time, beyond these characteristics of his own subject, made 222 00:11:20.840 --> 00:11:23.720 up of mere appearances, he must necessarily suppose something else 223 00:11:23.720 --> 00:11:27.200 as their basis, namely his ego, whatever its characteristics in 224 00:11:27.240 --> 00:11:30.600 itself may be. Thus, in respect to mere perception and 225 00:11:30.639 --> 00:11:33.799 receptivity of sensations, he must reckon himself as belonging to 226 00:11:33.799 --> 00:11:36.600 the world of sense. But in respect of whatever there 227 00:11:36.639 --> 00:11:39.440 may be of pure activity in him, that which reaches 228 00:11:39.480 --> 00:11:42.639 consciousness immediately and not through affecting the senses, he must 229 00:11:42.679 --> 00:11:45.919 reckon himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which, however, 230 00:11:45.960 --> 00:11:48.879 he has no further knowledge. To such a conclusion, the 231 00:11:48.960 --> 00:11:51.639 reflecting man must come with respect to all the things 232 00:11:51.639 --> 00:11:54.159 which can be presented to him. It is probably to 233 00:11:54.200 --> 00:11:57.360 be met with even in persons of the commonest understanding, who, 234 00:11:57.639 --> 00:12:00.000 as is well known, are very much inclined to see 235 00:12:00.159 --> 00:12:03.279 pose behind the objects of the senses something else, invisible 236 00:12:03.360 --> 00:12:06.559 and acting of itself. They spoil it, however, by presently 237 00:12:06.600 --> 00:12:09.279 sensualizing this invisible again, that is to say, wanting to 238 00:12:09.279 --> 00:12:11.600 make it an object of intuition, so that they do 239 00:12:11.639 --> 00:12:15.200 not become a whit. The wiser now man really finds 240 00:12:15.200 --> 00:12:17.759 in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes himself from 241 00:12:17.799 --> 00:12:20.720 everything else, even from himself as affected by objects and 242 00:12:20.759 --> 00:12:24.240 that is reason this being pure spontaneity, and is even 243 00:12:24.279 --> 00:12:27.200 elevated above the understanding. For although the latter is a 244 00:12:27.200 --> 00:12:30.559 spontaneity and does not, like sense, merely contain intuitions that 245 00:12:30.600 --> 00:12:33.519 arise when we are affected by things, and are therefore passive, 246 00:12:33.720 --> 00:12:36.480 yet it cannot produce from its activity any other conceptions 247 00:12:36.480 --> 00:12:38.639 than those which merely serve to bring the intuitions of 248 00:12:38.679 --> 00:12:42.320 sense under rules, and thereby to unite them in one consciousness. 249 00:12:42.519 --> 00:12:44.799 And without this use of the sensibility, it could not 250 00:12:44.879 --> 00:12:48.000 think at all. Whereas, on the contrary, reason shows so 251 00:12:48.159 --> 00:12:50.399 pure a spontaneity in the case of what I call 252 00:12:50.440 --> 00:12:55.279 ideas ideal conceptions, that it thereby far transcends everything that 253 00:12:55.320 --> 00:12:58.320 the sensibility can give it, and exhibits its most important 254 00:12:58.320 --> 00:13:00.879 function in distinguishing the world of sen sense from that 255 00:13:00.960 --> 00:13:05.000 of understanding, and thereby prescribing the limits of the understanding itself. 256 00:13:06.440 --> 00:13:08.960 For this reason, a rational being must regard himself qua 257 00:13:09.039 --> 00:13:12.000 intelligence not from the side of his lower faculties, as 258 00:13:12.039 --> 00:13:13.840 belonging not to the world of sense, but to that 259 00:13:13.879 --> 00:13:16.360 of understanding. Hence he has two points of view from 260 00:13:16.360 --> 00:13:19.080 which he can regard himself and recognize laws of the 261 00:13:19.120 --> 00:13:23.000 exercise of his faculties, and consequently of all his actions. First, 262 00:13:23.200 --> 00:13:25.000 so far as he belongs to the world of sense, 263 00:13:25.039 --> 00:13:28.960 he finds himself subject to the laws of nature heteronomy. Secondly, 264 00:13:29.159 --> 00:13:32.679 as

belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which, being 265 00:13:32.720 --> 00:13:35.519 independent of nature, have their foundation not in experience but 266 00:13:35.600 --> 00:13:39.399 in reason alone. As a rational being, and consequently belonging 267 00:13:39.399 --> 00:13:42.360 to the intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality 268 00:13:42.360 --> 00:13:44.799 of his own will otherwise than on condition of the 269 00:13:44.840 --> 00:13:48.120 idea of freedom. For independence of the determinate causes of 270 00:13:48.159 --> 00:13:51.480 the sensible world, an independence which reason must always ascribe 271 00:13:51.480 --> 00:13:55.360 to itself is freedom. Now the idea of freedom is 272 00:13:55.399 --> 00:13:58.879 inseparably connected with the conception of autonomy, and this again 273 00:13:59.120 --> 00:14:02.559 with the universal prince morality, which is ideally the foundation 274 00:14:02.639 --> 00:14:05.080 of all actions of rational beings, just as the law 275 00:14:05.120 --> 00:14:09.480 of nature is of all phenomena. Now the suspicion is 276 00:14:09.480 --> 00:14:11.919 removed which we raised above, that there was a latent 277 00:14:12.000 --> 00:14:14.759 circle involved in our reasoning from freedom to autonomy and 278 00:14:14.840 --> 00:14:17.600 from this to the moral law viz. That we laid 279 00:14:17.639 --> 00:14:19.919 down the idea of freedom because of the moral law, 280 00:14:20.200 --> 00:14:22.480 only that we might afterwards, in turn infer the latter 281 00:14:22.480 --> 00:14:25.279 from freedom, and that consequently we could assign no reason 282 00:14:25.320 --> 00:14:27.440 at all for this law, but could only present it 283 00:14:27.519 --> 00:14:31.039 as a petitio principi, which well disposed minds would gladly 284 00:14:31.080 --> 00:14:33.639 concede to us, but which we could never put forward 285 00:14:33.639 --> 00:14:36.720 as a provable proposition. For now, we see that when 286 00:14:36.759 --> 00:14:39.559 we conceive ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the 287 00:14:39.559 --> 00:14:42.519 world of understanding as members of it, and recognize the 288 00:14:42.559 --> 00:14:46.360 autonomy of the will with its consequence morality. Whereas if 289 00:14:46.360 --> 00:14:49.519 we conceive ourselves as under obligation, we consider ourselves as 290 00:14:49.559 --> 00:14:51.440 belonging to the world of sense and at the same 291 00:14:51.480 --> 00:14:56.840 time to the world of understanding. How is a categorical 292 00:14:56.879 --> 00:15:01.879 imperative possible? Every rational mone being reckons himself qua intelligence 293 00:15:02.000 --> 00:15:04.679 as belonging to the world of understanding, and it is 294 00:15:04.759 --> 00:15:07.480 simply as an efficient cause belonging to that world, that 295 00:15:07.559 --> 00:15:10.919 he caused his causality a will. On the other side, 296 00:15:10.960 --> 00:15:12.840 he is also conscious of himself as a

part of 297 00:15:12.879 --> 00:15:15.159 the world of sense, in which his actions, which are 298 00:15:15.200 --> 00:15:19.879 mere appearances phenomena of that causality, are displayed. We cannot, however, 299 00:15:19.919 --> 00:15:22.080 discern how they are possible from this causality which we 300 00:15:22.120 --> 00:15:24.799 do not know. But instead of that, these actions, as 301 00:15:24.799 --> 00:15:27.600 belonging to the sensible world, must be viewed as determined 302 00:15:27.600 --> 00:15:32.120 by other phenomena, namely desires and inclinations. If therefore, I 303 00:15:32.200 --> 00:15:34.480 were only a member of the world of understanding, then 304 00:15:34.519 --> 00:15:36.960 all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle of 305 00:15:36.960 --> 00:15:40.039 autonomy of the pure will. If I were only a 306 00:15:40.039 --> 00:15:42.320 part of the world of sense, that would necessarily be 307 00:15:42.360 --> 00:15:44.720 assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires 308 00:15:44.759 --> 00:15:47.840 and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of nature. 309 00:15:48.480 --> 00:15:51.519 The former would rest on morality as the supreme principle, 310 00:15:51.720 --> 00:15:55.000 the latter on happiness. Since, however, the world of understanding 311 00:15:55.000 --> 00:15:57.840 contains the foundation of the world of sense and consequently 312 00:15:57.840 --> 00:16:00.480 of its laws, also and accordingly gives the law to 313 00:16:00.559 --> 00:16:03.720 my will, which belongs wholly to the world of understanding directly, 314 00:16:04.600 --> 00:16:07.480 and must be conceived as doing so. It follows that 315 00:16:07.919 --> 00:16:10.279 although on the one side, I must regard myself as 316 00:16:10.320 --> 00:16:12.360 a being belonging to the world of sense, yet on 317 00:16:12.360 --> 00:16:14.960 the other side, I must recognize myself as subject as 318 00:16:15.000 --> 00:16:17.679 an intelligence to the law of the world of understanding, 319 00:16:17.799 --> 00:16:20.480 i e. To reason, which contains this law in the 320 00:16:20.519 --> 00:16:23.519 idea of freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy 321 00:16:23.559 --> 00:16:26.159 of the will. Consequently, I must regard the laws of 322 00:16:26.159 --> 00:16:29.080 the world of understanding as imperatives for me, and the 323 00:16:29.159 --> 00:16:32.840 actions which conform to them as duties. And thus what 324 00:16:32.919 --> 00:16:36.200 makes categorical imperatives possible is this that the idea of 325 00:16:36.240 --> 00:16:38.559 freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in 326 00:16:38.639 --> 00:16:41.279 consequence of which, if I were nothing else, all my 327 00:16:41.320 --> 00:16:43.559 actions would always conform to the autonomy of the will. 328 00:16:44.399 --> 00:16:46.360 But as I at the same time into it myself 329 00:16:46.399 --> 00:16:48.360 as a member of the world of sense, they ought 330

00:16:48.440 --> 00:16:51.559 so to conform. And this categorical ought implies a synthetic 331 00:16:51.679 --> 00:16:54.919 a priori proposition, inasmuch as besides my will, as affected 332 00:16:54.919 --> 00:16:57.720 by sensible desires, there is added further the idea of 333 00:16:57.759 --> 00:16:59.639 the same will, but as belonging to the world of 334 00:16:59.679 --> 00:17:03.320 the understanding, pure and practical of itself, which contains the 335 00:17:03.320 --> 00:17:07.160 supreme condition according to reason of the former will. Precisely 336 00:17:07.200 --> 00:17:09.839 as to the intuitions of sense, there are added concepts 337 00:17:09.839 --> 00:17:12.960 of the understanding, which of themselves signify nothing but regular 338 00:17:13.000 --> 00:17:15.599 form in general, And in this way synthetic a priori 339 00:17:15.640 --> 00:17:19.599 propositions become possible, on which all knowledge of physical nature rests. 340 00:17:20.880 --> 00:17:24.200 The practical use of common human reason confirms this reasoning. 341 00:17:24.880 --> 00:17:27.160 There is no one, not even the most consummate villain, 342 00:17:27.279 --> 00:17:29.359 provided only that he is otherwise accustomed to the use 343 00:17:29.400 --> 00:17:32.559 of reason, who, when we set before him examples of honesty, 344 00:17:32.640 --> 00:17:36.799 of purpose, of steadfastness in following good maxims of sympathy, 345 00:17:36.799 --> 00:17:40.480 and general benevolence, even combined with great sacrifices of advantages 346 00:17:40.480 --> 00:17:43.480 and comfort, does not wish that he might also possess 347 00:17:43.519 --> 00:17:46.920 these qualities. Only on account of his inclinations and impulses. 348 00:17:46.920 --> 00:17:49.160 He cannot attain this in himself, but at the same 349 00:17:49.200 --> 00:17:51.640 time he wishes to be free from such inclinations which 350 00:17:51.680 --> 00:17:54.640 are burdensome to himself. He proves by this that he 351 00:17:54.680 --> 00:17:57.640 transfers himself in thought, with a will, free from the 352 00:17:57.680 --> 00:18:00.400 impulses of the sensibility, into an order of things wholly 353 00:18:00.400 --> 00:18:02.519 different from that of his desires in the field of 354 00:18:02.559 --> 00:18:05.759 the sensibility, since he cannot expect to obtain by that 355 00:18:05.880 --> 00:18:09.440 wish any gratification of his desires, nor any position which 356 00:18:09.480 --> 00:18:12.880 would satisfy any of his actual or supposable inclinations, for 357 00:18:13.039 --> 00:18:15.319 this would destroy the pre eminence of the very idea 358 00:18:15.359 --> 00:18:18.559 which wrests that wish from him. He can only expect 359 00:18:18.599 --> 00:18:22.079 a greater intrinsic worth of his own person. This better person, however, 360 00:18:22.119 --> 00:18:24.640 he imagines himself to be when he transfers himself to 361 00:18:24.680 --> 00:18:26.240 the point of view of a member of the world 362 00:18:26.240 --> 00:18:29.680 of the understanding, to which he is involuntarily forced by 363 00:18:29.680 --> 00:18:33.400 the idea of freedom, i e. Of independence on determining 364 00:18:33.440 --> 00:18:36.720 causes of the world of sense. And from this point 365 00:18:36.720 --> 00:18:39.039 of view he is conscious of a good will which, 366 00:18:39.079 --> 00:18:41.759 by his own confession constitutes the law for the bad 367 00:18:41.799 --> 00:18:43.680 will that he possesses as a member of the world 368 00:18:43.680 --> 00:18:46.920 of sense, a law whose authority he recognizes while transgressing it. 369 00:18:47.799 --> 00:18:50.680 What he morably ought is than what he necessarily would 370 00:18:51.000 --> 00:18:53.200 as a member of the world of the understanding, and 371 00:18:53.279 --> 00:18:56.000 is conceived by him as an ought only inasmuch as 372 00:18:56.000 --> 00:18:58.319 he likewise considers himself as a member of the world 373 00:18:58.440 --> 00:19:05.160 of sense. Of the extreme limits of all practical philosophy, 374 00:19:05.880 --> 00:19:09.759 all men attribute to themselves freedom of will. Hence come 375 00:19:09.799 --> 00:19:12.680 all judgments upon actions as being such as ought to 376 00:19:12.720 --> 00:19:16.440 have been done, although they have not been done. However, 377 00:19:16.480 --> 00:19:19.039 this freedom is not a conception of experience, nor can 378 00:19:19.079 --> 00:19:22.359 it be so, since it still remains even though experience 379 00:19:22.359 --> 00:19:25.400 shows the contrary of what on supposition of freedom are 380 00:19:25.440 --> 00:19:28.880 conceived as its necessary consequences. On the other side, it 381 00:19:28.920 --> 00:19:31.480 is equally necessary that everything that takes place should be 382 00:19:31.480 --> 00:19:35.319 fixedly determined according to the laws of nature. This necessity 383 00:19:35.319 --> 00:19:38.799 of nature is likewise not an empirical conception, just for 384 00:19:38.839 --> 00:19:41.319 this reason that it involves the motion of necessity and 385 00:19:41.359 --> 00:19:45.519 consequently of an a priori cognition. But this conception of 386 00:19:45.559 --> 00:19:48.400 a system of nature is confirmed by experience, and it 387 00:19:48.519 --> 00:19:52.799 must be inevitably presupposed if experience itself is to be possible, 388 00:19:53.039 --> 00:19:55.880 that is, a connected knowledge of the objects of sense 389 00:19:55.960 --> 00:19:59.720 resting on general laws. Therefore, freedom is only an idea 390 00:19:59.720 --> 00:20:03.039 of reas reason, and its objective reality in itself is doubtful, 391 00:20:03.680 --> 00:20:06.759 while nature is a concept of the understanding which proves 392 00:20:06.839 --> 00:20:10.920 and must necessarily prove its reality and examples of experience. 393 00:20:13.680 --> 00:20:16.920 There arises from this a dialectic of reason. Since the 394 00:20:16.960 --> 00:20:19.960 freedom attributed to

the will appears to contradict the necessity 395 00:20:19.960 --> 00:20:23.200 of nature, and placed between these two ways, reason for 396 00:20:23.240 --> 00:20:26.519 speculative purposes finds the road of physical necessity much more 397 00:20:26.559 --> 00:20:30.240 beaten and more appropriate than that of freedom. Yet for 398 00:20:30.279 --> 00:20:32.960 practical purposes, the narrow footpath of freedom is the only 399 00:20:33.000 --> 00:20:34.720 one on which it is possible to make use of 400 00:20:34.759 --> 00:20:38.079 reason in our conduct. Hence, it is just as impossible 401 00:20:38.079 --> 00:20:40.839 for the subtlest philosophy as for the commonest reason of 402 00:20:40.880 --> 00:20:44.480 men to argue away freedom. Philosophy must then assume that 403 00:20:44.519 --> 00:20:47.559 no real contradiction will be found between freedom and physical 404 00:20:47.559 --> 00:20:50.400 necessity of the same human actions, for it cannot give 405 00:20:50.480 --> 00:20:55.039 up the conception of nature any more than that of freedom. Nevertheless, 406 00:20:55.079 --> 00:20:57.119 even though we should never be able to comprehend how 407 00:20:57.160 --> 00:20:59.680 freedom is possible, we must at least remove this apparent 408 00:20:59.680 --> 00:21:02.839 country prediction in a convincing manner. For if the thought 409 00:21:02.880 --> 00:21:06.200 of freedom contradicts either itself or nature, which is equally necessary, 410 00:21:06.240 --> 00:21:09.799 it must, in competition with physical necessity, be entirely given up. 411 00:21:10.519 --> 00:21:13.119 It would, however, be impossible to escape this contradiction if 412 00:21:13.160 --> 00:21:16.880 the thinking subject, which seems to itself free, conceived itself 413 00:21:16.920 --> 00:21:18.960 in the same sense or in the very same relation 414 00:21:19.039 --> 00:21:21.839 when it calls itself free, as when in respect of 415 00:21:21.880 --> 00:21:24.400 the same action it assumes itself to be subject to 416 00:21:24.440 --> 00:21:28.559 the laws of nature. Hence, it is an indispensable problem 417 00:21:28.559 --> 00:21:32.319 of speculative philosophy to show that its illusion respecting the 418 00:21:32.359 --> 00:21:35.200 contradiction rests on this that we think of man in 419 00:21:35.240 --> 00:21:37.599 a different sense in relation when we call him free, 420 00:21:37.920 --> 00:21:39.720 and when we regard him as subject to the laws 421 00:21:39.759 --> 00:21:42.759 of nature, as being part and parcel of nature. It 422 00:21:42.839 --> 00:21:45.799 must therefore show that not only can both these very 423 00:21:45.799 --> 00:21:48.160 well co exist, but that both must be thought as 424 00:21:48.200 --> 00:21:51.680 necessarily united in the same subject, since otherwise no reason 425 00:21:51.680 --> 00:21:54.519 could be given why we should burden reason with an idea, which, 426 00:21:54.759 --> 00:21:57.799 though it may be possibly without contradiction, be

reconciled with 427 00:21:57.839 --> 00:22:01.960 another that is sufficiently established, yet entangles us in a 428 00:22:02.039 --> 00:22:07.359 perplexity which sorely embarrasses reason in its theoretic employment. This duty, however, 429 00:22:07.400 --> 00:22:10.720 belongs only to speculative philosophy. The philosopher then has no 430 00:22:10.759 --> 00:22:13.200 option whether he will remove the apparent contradiction or leave 431 00:22:13.240 --> 00:22:16.000 it untouched, for in the latter case, the theory respecting 432 00:22:16.000 --> 00:22:19.000 this would be bonam Bacon's into the possession, of which 433 00:22:19.039 --> 00:22:21.279 the fatalist would have a right to enter and chase 434 00:22:21.279 --> 00:22:23.920 all morality out of its supposed domain, as occupying it 435 00:22:23.960 --> 00:22:27.319 without title. We cannot, however, as yet, say that we 436 00:22:27.359 --> 00:22:30.279 are touching the bounds of practical philosophy, for the settlement 437 00:22:30.319 --> 00:22:32.839 of that controversy does not belong to it. It only 438 00:22:32.880 --> 00:22:35.680 demands from speculative reason that it should put an end 439 00:22:35.720 --> 00:22:38.920 to the discord in which it entangles itself in theoretical questions, 440 00:22:39.200 --> 00:22:41.680 so that practical reason may have rest and security from 441 00:22:41.720 --> 00:22:44.920 external attacks which might make the ground debatable on which 442 00:22:44.960 --> 00:22:48.880 it desires to build. The claims to freedom of will 443 00:22:48.920 --> 00:22:51.559 made even by common reason are founded on the consciousness 444 00:22:51.599 --> 00:22:54.720 and the admitted supposition that reason is independent of merely 445 00:22:54.720 --> 00:22:59.440 subjectively determined causes, which together constitute what belongs to sensation only, 446 00:22:59.640 --> 00:23:03.160 and which consequently come under the general designation of sensibility. 447 00:23:03.960 --> 00:23:06.920 Man considering himself in this way as an intelligence, places 448 00:23:06.960 --> 00:23:09.279 himself thereby in a different order of things, and in 449 00:23:09.319 --> 00:23:12.240 a relation to determining grounds of a wholly different kind, 450 00:23:12.759 --> 00:23:14.559 when on the one hand, he thinks of himself as 451 00:23:14.559 --> 00:23:17.960 an intelligence endowed with a will and consequently with causality, 452 00:23:18.440 --> 00:23:20.440 and when on the other he perceives himself as a 453 00:23:20.440 --> 00:23:22.880 phenomenon in the world of sense, as he really is, 454 00:23:22.960 --> 00:23:26.960 also and affirms that his causality is subject to external determination. 455 00:23:27.079 --> 00:23:30.000 According to laws of nature. Now he soon becomes aware 456 00:23:30.039 --> 00:23:32.319 that both can hold good, nay must hold good at 457 00:23:32.359 --> 00:23:34.960 the same time. For there is not the smallest contradiction 458 00:23:35.000 -->

00:23:37.279 in saying that a thing in appearance, belonging to the 459 00:23:37.319 --> 00:23:40.000 world of sense is subject to certain laws of which 460 00:23:40.039 --> 00:23:42.279 the very same as a thing or being in itself 461 00:23:42.319 --> 00:23:44.799 is independent, and that he must conceive and think of 462 00:23:44.839 --> 00:23:48.000 himself in this twofold way, rests as to the first, 463 00:23:48.079 --> 00:23:50.720 on the consciousness of himself and as an object affected 464 00:23:50.720 --> 00:23:52.720 through the senses, and as to the second, on the 465 00:23:52.759 --> 00:23:56.240 consciousness of himself as an intelligence, i e. As Independent 466 00:23:56.279 --> 00:23:58.720 on sensible impressions in the employment of his reason, in 467 00:23:58.720 --> 00:24:02.039 other words, as belonging to the world of understanding. Hence 468 00:24:02.039 --> 00:24:04.240 it comes to pass that man claims the possession of 469 00:24:04.279 --> 00:24:06.519 a will which takes no account of anything that comes 470 00:24:06.559 --> 00:24:09.720 under the head of desires and inclinations, and on the contrary, 471 00:24:09.839 --> 00:24:13.039 conceives actions as possible to him, nay even as necessary, 472 00:24:13.039 --> 00:24:15.440 which can only be done by discarding all desires and 473 00:24:15.519 --> 00:24:19.440 sensible inclinations. The causality of such actions lies in him 474 00:24:19.519 --> 00:24:22.559 as an intelligence, and in the laws of effects and actions, 475 00:24:22.640 --> 00:24:26.279 which depend on the principles of an intelligible world, of 476 00:24:26.319 --> 00:24:28.680 which indeed he knows nothing more than that in it 477 00:24:28.839 --> 00:24:33.039 pure reason alone, independent of sensibility, gives the law. Moreover, 478 00:24:33.119 --> 00:24:35.480 since it is only in that world as an intelligence 479 00:24:35.559 --> 00:24:38.440 that he is his proper self, being as man, only 480 00:24:38.519 --> 00:24:41.559 the appearance of himself, those laws apply to him directly 481 00:24:41.599 --> 00:24:45.680 and categorically, so that the incitements of inclinations and appetites. 482 00:24:45.799 --> 00:24:47.559 In other words, the whole nature of the world of 483 00:24:47.599 --> 00:24:51.599 sense cannot impair the laws of his volition as an intelligence. Nay, 484 00:24:51.640 --> 00:24:53.799 he does not even hold himself responsible for the former, 485 00:24:54.039 --> 00:24:56.720 or ascribe them to his proper self i e. His will. 486 00:24:57.160 --> 00:24:59.640 He only ascribes to his will any indulgence which he 487 00:24:59.680 --> 00:25:02.319 might yield them if he allowed them to influence his 488 00:25:02.400 --> 00:25:05.119 maxims to the prejudice of the rational laws of the will. 489 00:25:07.079 --> 00:25:09.880 When practical reason thinks itself into a world of understanding, 490 00:25:09.920 --> 00:25:12.720 it does not thereby transcend its own limits, as it 491 00:25:12.759 --> 00:25:15.400 would if it tried to enter it by intuition or sensation. 492 00:25:15.960 --> 00:25:18.599 The former is only a negative thought in respect of 493 00:25:18.640 --> 00:25:20.880 the world of sense, which does not give any laws 494 00:25:20.920 --> 00:25:24.000 to reason in determining the will, and is positive only 495 00:25:24.039 --> 00:25:26.240 in the single point that this freedom as a negative 496 00:25:26.279 --> 00:25:30.079 characteristic is at the same time conjoined with a positive faculty, 497 00:25:30.400 --> 00:25:33.519 and even with a causality of reason, which we designate 498 00:25:33.559 --> 00:25:36.400 a will, namely, a faculty of so acting that the 499 00:25:36.400 --> 00:25:39.480 principle of the actions shall conform to the essential character 500 00:25:39.680 --> 00:25:42.200 of a rational motive, i e. The condition that the 501 00:25:42.240 --> 00:25:46.319 maxim have universal validity as a law. But were it 502 00:25:46.359 --> 00:25:48.559 to borrow an object of will, that is, a motive, 503 00:25:48.839 --> 00:25:51.480 from the world of understanding, then it would overstep its 504 00:25:51.519 --> 00:25:53.960 bounds and pretend to be acquainted with something of which 505 00:25:53.960 --> 00:25:56.480 it knows nothing. The conception of a world of the 506 00:25:56.559 --> 00:25:58.839 understanding is then only a point of view which reason 507 00:25:58.880 --> 00:26:02.200 finds itself compelled to take outside the appearances in order 508 00:26:02.200 --> 00:26:05.480 to conceive itself is practical which would not be possible 509 00:26:05.680 --> 00:26:08.839 if the influences of the sensibility had a determining power 510 00:26:08.920 --> 00:26:12.200 on man, but which is necessary unless he is to 511 00:26:12.240 --> 00:26:14.960 be denied the consciousness of himself as an intelligence and 512 00:26:15.079 --> 00:26:19.079 consequently as a rational cause energizing by reason, that is, 513 00:26:19.440 --> 00:26:23.359 operating freely. This thought certainly involves the idea of an 514 00:26:23.440 --> 00:26:25.599 order and a system of laws different from that of 515 00:26:25.640 --> 00:26:28.759 the mechanism of nature, which belongs to the sensible world, 516 00:26:29.279 --> 00:26:32.240 and it makes the conception of an intelligible world necessary, 517 00:26:32.400 --> 00:26:34.559 that is to say, the whole system of rational beings 518 00:26:34.599 --> 00:26:37.119 as things in themselves. But it does not in the 519 00:26:37.200 --> 00:26:39.680 least authorize us to think of it further than as 520 00:26:39.680 --> 00:26:42.640 to its formal condition, only that is the universality of 521 00:26:42.680 --> 00:26:45.960 the maxims of the will as laws, and consequently the 522 00:26:46.000 --> 00:26:49.720 autonomy of the latter, which alone is consistent with its freedom. Whereas, 523 00:26:49.720 --> 00:26:52.119 on the contrary, all laws that refer to a definite 524

00:26:52.160 --> 00:26:55.559 object give heteronomy, which only belongs to laws of nature 525 00:26:55.559 --> 00:26:59.160 and can only apply to the sensible world. But reason 526 00:26:59.200 --> 00:27:01.440 would overstep all all its bounds if it's undertook to 527 00:27:01.480 --> 00:27:04.240 explain how pure reason can be practical, which would be 528 00:27:04.279 --> 00:27:07.440 exactly the same problem as to explain how freedom is possible, 529 00:27:08.400 --> 00:27:10.720 For we can explain nothing but that which we can 530 00:27:10.759 --> 00:27:13.200 reduce to laws, the object of which can be given 531 00:27:13.200 --> 00:27:16.279 in some possible experience. But freedom is a mere idea, 532 00:27:16.599 --> 00:27:19.119 the objective reality of which can in no wise be 533 00:27:19.160 --> 00:27:22.039 shown according to laws of nature, and consequently not in 534 00:27:22.119 --> 00:27:25.000 any possible experience. And for this reason it can never 535 00:27:25.039 --> 00:27:27.960 be comprehended or understood, because we cannot support it by 536 00:27:28.000 --> 00:27:31.039 any sort of example or analogy. It holds good only 537 00:27:31.039 --> 00:27:33.720 as a necessary hypothesis of reason in a being that 538 00:27:33.759 --> 00:27:35.799 believes itself conscious of a will, that is, of a 539 00:27:35.839 --> 00:27:39.480 faculty distinct from mere desire, namely, a faculty of determining 540 00:27:39.519 --> 00:27:42.000 itself to action as an intelligence, in other words, by 541 00:27:42.079 --> 00:27:46.799 laws of reason, independently on natural instincts. Now, where determination 542 00:27:46.839 --> 00:27:50.680 according to laws of nature ceases, there all explanation ceases also, 543 00:27:50.799 --> 00:27:53.920 and nothing remains but defense, i e. The removal of 544 00:27:53.960 --> 00:27:56.200 the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper 545 00:27:56.240 --> 00:28:00.000 into the nature of things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom impossible. 546 00:28:00.880 --> 00:28:03.559 We can only point out to them that the supposed 547 00:28:03.599 --> 00:28:06.319 contradiction that they have discovered in it arises only from 548 00:28:06.359 --> 00:28:08.440 this that, in order to be able to apply the 549 00:28:08.519 --> 00:28:11.519 law of nature to human actions, they must necessarily consider 550 00:28:11.559 --> 00:28:15.079 man as an appearance. Then, when we demand of them 551 00:28:15.079 --> 00:28:17.559 that they should also think of him qua intelligence, as 552 00:28:17.559 --> 00:28:20.319 a thing in itself, they still persist in considering him 553 00:28:20.319 --> 00:28:23.440 in this respect, also as an appearance. In this view, 554 00:28:23.680 --> 00:28:26.039 it would no doubt be a contradiction to suppose the 555 00:28:26.079 --> 00:28:28.799 causality of the same subject, that is, his will, to 556 00:28:28.880 --> 00:28:31.880 be withdrawn from all the natural laws of the sensible world. 557 00:28:32.480 --> 00:28:35.559 But this contradiction disappears if they would only bethink themselves 558 00:28:35.559 --> 00:28:38.599 and admit, as is reasonable, that behind the appearances, there 559 00:28:38.680 --> 00:28:41.359 must also lie at their route, although hidden, the things 560 00:28:41.400 --> 00:28:44.000 in themselves, and that we cannot expect the laws of 561 00:28:44.079 --> 00:28:46.720 these to be the same as those that govern their appearances. 562 00:28:47.519 --> 00:28:50.039 The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will 563 00:28:50.079 --> 00:28:53.240 is identical with the impossibility of discovering and explaining an 564 00:28:53.240 --> 00:28:56.839 interest which man can take up in the moral law. Nevertheless, 565 00:28:56.839 --> 00:28:59.119 he does actually take an interest in it, the basis 566 00:28:59.119 --> 00:29:01.720 of which in us we call the moral feeling, which 567 00:29:01.799 --> 00:29:04.680 some have falsely assigned as the standard of our moral judgment, 568 00:29:05.160 --> 00:29:08.160 whereas it must rather be viewed as the subjective effect 569 00:29:08.359 --> 00:29:11.279 that the law exercises on the will, the objective principle 570 00:29:11.279 --> 00:29:14.920 of which is furnished by reason alone. Interest is that 571 00:29:14.960 --> 00:29:17.960 by which reason becomes practical i e. A cause determining 572 00:29:18.000 --> 00:29:20.880 the will. Hence, we say of rational beings only that 573 00:29:20.920 --> 00:29:23.880 they take an interest in a thing. Irrational beings only 574 00:29:23.880 --> 00:29:27.279 feel sensual appetites. Reason takes a direct interest in action, 575 00:29:27.480 --> 00:29:30.440 and only when the universal validity of its maxims is 576 00:29:30.480 --> 00:29:34.200 alone sufficient to determine the will. Such an interest alone 577 00:29:34.319 --> 00:29:36.680 is pure. But if it can determine the will only 578 00:29:36.680 --> 00:29:39.240 by means of another object of desire, or on the 579 00:29:39.279 --> 00:29:42.920 suggestion of a particular feeling of the subject, then reason 580 00:29:42.960 --> 00:29:46.160 takes only an indirect interest in the action. And as reason, 581 00:29:46.200 --> 00:29:49.039 by itself without experience, cannot discover either objects of the 582 00:29:49.079 --> 00:29:52.519 will or a special feeling actuating it, this latter interest 583 00:29:52.559 --> 00:29:55.319 would only be empirical, and not a pure rational interest. 584 00:29:55.759 --> 00:29:59.519 The logical interest of reason, namely to extend its insight, 585 00:29:59.720 --> 00:30:03.400 is no direct, but presupposes purposes for which reason is employed. 586 00:30:03.799 --> 00:30:06.039 In order indeed, that a rational being who is also 587 00:30:06.039 --> 00:30:09.319 affected through the senses should will what reason alone directs 588 00:30:09.319 --> 00:30:11.839 such beings that they ought to will. It is no 589

00:30:11.880 --> 00:30:14.359 doubt requisite that reason should have a power to infuse 590 00:30:14.400 --> 00:30:17.279 a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfillment of duty. 591 00:30:17.559 --> 00:30:19.319 That is to say, that it should have a causality 592 00:30:19.359 --> 00:30:22.880 by which it determines the sensibility according to its own principles. 593 00:30:23.359 --> 00:30:25.720 But it is quite impossible to discern i e. To 594 00:30:25.759 --> 00:30:28.839 make it intelligible a priori. How a mere thought which 595 00:30:28.880 --> 00:30:31.880 itself contains nothing sensible, can itself produce a sensation of 596 00:30:31.960 --> 00:30:35.279 pleasure or pain. For this is a particular kind of causality, 597 00:30:35.519 --> 00:30:38.240 of which, as every other causality, we can determine nothing 598 00:30:38.240 --> 00:30:41.680 whatever a priori, We must only consult experience about it. 599 00:30:42.000 --> 00:30:43.920 But as this cannot supply us with any relation of 600 00:30:43.960 --> 00:30:47.119 cause and effect except between two objects of experience. Whereas 601 00:30:47.119 --> 00:30:50.359 in this case, although indeed the effects produced lies within experience, 602 00:30:51.160 --> 00:30:53.839 yet the cause is supposed to be pure reason acting 603 00:30:53.880 --> 00:30:57.559 through mere ideas, which offer no object to experience. It 604 00:30:57.680 --> 00:31:00.440 follows that for us men, it is quite impossible to 605 00:31:00.440 --> 00:31:03.000 explain how and why the universality of the maxim is 606 00:31:03.039 --> 00:31:07.119 a law. That is, morality interests This only is certain 607 00:31:07.559 --> 00:31:10.240 that it is not because it interests us that it 608 00:31:10.279 --> 00:31:13.720 has validity for us, for that would be a heteronomy 609 00:31:13.759 --> 00:31:17.039 and dependence of practical reason on sensibility, namely on a 610 00:31:17.079 --> 00:31:19.920 feeling that its principle, in which case it could never 611 00:31:19.960 --> 00:31:23.640 give moral laws, but that it interests us because it 612 00:31:23.680 --> 00:31:26.279 is valid for us as men, inasmuch as it had 613 00:31:26.319 --> 00:31:29.440 its source in our will as intelligences, in other words, 614 00:31:29.599 --> 00:31:32.200 in our proper self. And what belongs to mere appearances 615 00:31:32.279 --> 00:31:35.119 is necessarily subordinated by reason to the nature of the 616 00:31:35.160 --> 00:31:39.759 thing in itself. The question, then, how a categorical imperative 617 00:31:39.799 --> 00:31:42.839 is possible, can be answered to this extent that we 618 00:31:42.880 --> 00:31:45.680 can assign the only hypothesis on which it is possible, 619 00:31:45.799 --> 00:31:48.880 namely the idea of freedom. And we can also discern 620 00:31:48.920 --> 00:31:51.960 the necessity of this hypothesis. And this is sufficient for 621 00:31:52.039 --> 00:31:54.680 the practical exercise of reason, that is, for

the conviction 622 00:31:54.759 --> 00:31:56.880 that the validity of this imperative and hence of the 623 00:31:56.880 --> 00:32:00.200 moral law. But how this hypothesis itself is possible can 624 00:32:00.240 --> 00:32:03.759 never be discerned by any human reason. On the hypothesis, however, 625 00:32:03.880 --> 00:32:06.759 that the will of an intelligence is free, its autonomy 626 00:32:06.759 --> 00:32:09.599 as the essential formal condition of its determination, is a 627 00:32:09.640 --> 00:32:13.079 necessary consequence. Moreover, this freedom of will is not merely 628 00:32:13.160 --> 00:32:16.640 quite possible as a hypothesis not involving any contradiction to 629 00:32:16.680 --> 00:32:18.880 the principle of physical necessity in the connection of the 630 00:32:18.920 --> 00:32:22.799 phenomena of the sensible world, as speculative philosophy can show. 631 00:32:23.319 --> 00:32:26.240 But further, a rational being who is conscious of causality 632 00:32:26.279 --> 00:32:28.880 through reason, that is to say, of a will distinct 633 00:32:28.880 --> 00:32:31.839 from desires, must of necessity make it practically, that is, 634 00:32:31.880 --> 00:32:35.319 an idea the condition of all his voluntary actions. But 635 00:32:35.440 --> 00:32:38.160 to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical 636 00:32:38.200 --> 00:32:40.480 without the age of any spring of action that could 637 00:32:40.480 --> 00:32:43.039 be derived from any other source, i e. How the 638 00:32:43.079 --> 00:32:45.880 mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims 639 00:32:45.880 --> 00:32:48.480 as laws, which would certainly be the form of a 640 00:32:48.480 --> 00:32:52.039 pure practical reason, can of itself supply a spring without 641 00:32:52.079 --> 00:32:55.039 any matter object of the will in which one could 642 00:32:55.119 --> 00:32:58.519 antecedently take any interest, and how it can produce an 643 00:32:58.519 --> 00:33:02.279 interest which would be called purely moral, Or in other words, 644 00:33:02.319 --> 00:33:05.000 how pure reason can be practical. To explain this is 645 00:33:05.039 --> 00:33:07.519 beyond the power of human reason, and all the labor 646 00:33:07.519 --> 00:33:12.319 and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost. 647 00:33:12.880 --> 00:33:14.400 It is just the same as if I sought to 648 00:33:14.400 --> 00:33:17.039 find out how freedom itself is possible as the causality 649 00:33:17.079 --> 00:33:19.599 of a will. For then I quit the ground of 650 00:33:19.599 --> 00:33:22.319 philosophical explanation, and I have no other to go upon. 651 00:33:23.079 --> 00:33:26.000 I might, indeed revel in the world of intelligences, which 652 00:33:26.039 --> 00:33:29.039 still remains to me, But although I have an idea 653 00:33:29.079 --> 00:33:31.240 of it which is well founded, yet I have not 654 00:33:31.279 --> 00:33:33.519 the least knowledge of it, Nor can I ever attain 655 00:33:33.599 --> 00:33:36.160 to such knowledge which all the efforts of my natural 656 00:33:36.200 --> 00:33:39.799 faculty of reason. It signifies only as something that remains 657 00:33:39.839 --> 00:33:42.160 over when I have eliminated everything belonging to the world 658 00:33:42.240 --> 00:33:45.359 of sense from the actuating principles of my will, serving 659 00:33:45.359 --> 00:33:47.920 merely to keep in bounds the principle of motives taken 660 00:33:47.920 --> 00:33:50.799 from the field of sensibility, fixing its limits and showing 661 00:33:50.839 --> 00:33:53.039 that it does not contain all in all within itself, 662 00:33:53.119 --> 00:33:55.559 but that there is more beyond it. But this something 663 00:33:55.640 --> 00:33:58.440 more I know no further of pure reason which frames 664 00:33:58.440 --> 00:34:01.279 this ideal. There remains, after the obstraction of all matter 665 00:34:01.359 --> 00:34:04.519 i e. Knowledge of objects, nothing but the form, namely 666 00:34:04.680 --> 00:34:07.880 the practical law of the universality of the maxims. And 667 00:34:08.039 --> 00:34:10.559 in conformity with this conception of reason in reference to 668 00:34:10.599 --> 00:34:13.679 a pure world of understanding as a possible efficient cause, 669 00:34:14.159 --> 00:34:17.280 that is, a cause determining the will, there must here 670 00:34:17.360 --> 00:34:20.639 be a total absence of springs, unless this idea of 671 00:34:20.679 --> 00:34:23.360 an intelligible world is itself the spring or that in 672 00:34:23.400 --> 00:34:26.480 which reason primarily takes an interest. But to make this 673 00:34:26.559 --> 00:34:29.920 intelligible is precisely the problem that we cannot solve. Here 674 00:34:29.960 --> 00:34:32.599 now is the extreme limit of all moral inquiry, and 675 00:34:32.760 --> 00:34:35.039 it is of great importance to determine it even on 676 00:34:35.079 --> 00:34:37.239 this account, in order that reason may not, on the 677 00:34:37.280 --> 00:34:39.800 one hand, to the prejudice of morals, seek about in 678 00:34:39.800 --> 00:34:42.039 the world of sense for the supreme motive and an 679 00:34:42.079 --> 00:34:45.199 interest comprehensible but empirical, but on the other hand, that 680 00:34:45.280 --> 00:34:47.719 it may not impotently flap its wings without being able 681 00:34:47.719 --> 00:34:51.440 to move in the for it empty space of transcendent concepts, 682 00:34:51.599 --> 00:34:54.480 which we call the intelligible world, and so lose itself 683 00:34:54.519 --> 00:34:58.000 amidst chimeras. For the rest, the idea of a pure 684 00:34:58.079 --> 00:35:01.480 world of understanding, as a system of all intelligences, and 685 00:35:01.519 --> 00:35:05.239 to which we ourselves, as rational beings, belong, although we are, likewise, 686 00:35:05.400 --> 00:35:08.480 on the other side, members of the sensible world, this 687 00:35:08.559 --> 00:35:11.360 remains always a useful and legitimate idea for the purposes 688

00:35:11.360 --> 00:35:15.480 of rational belief, although all knowledge stops at its threshold, useful, 689 00:35:15.559 --> 00:35:18.159 namely to produce in us a lively interest in the 690 00:35:18.159 --> 00:35:21.159 moral law, by means of the noble ideal of a 691 00:35:21.280 --> 00:35:25.280 universal kingdom of ends, in themselves rational beings to which 692 00:35:25.280 --> 00:35:27.960 we can belong as members. Then, only when we carefully 693 00:35:27.960 --> 00:35:30.599 conduct ourselves according to the maxims of freedom, as if 694 00:35:30.599 --> 00:35:39.760 they were laws of nature, concluding remark, the speculative employment 695 00:35:39.760 --> 00:35:42.440 of reason with respect to nature leads to the absolute 696 00:35:42.440 --> 00:35:45.800 necessity of some supreme cause of the world. The practical 697 00:35:45.840 --> 00:35:48.599 employment of reason with a view to freedom leads also 698 00:35:48.679 --> 00:35:51.480 to absolute necessity, but only of the laws of the 699 00:35:51.519 --> 00:35:54.639 actions of a rational being as such. Now it is 700 00:35:54.679 --> 00:35:57.800 an essential principle of reason, however, employed to push its 701 00:35:57.840 --> 00:36:00.719 knowledge to a consciousness of its necessity, without which it 702 00:36:00.760 --> 00:36:04.039 would not be rational knowledge. It is, however, an equally 703 00:36:04.159 --> 00:36:06.800 essential restriction of the same reason, that it can either 704 00:36:06.800 --> 00:36:10.280 discern the necessity of what is or what happens, nor 705 00:36:10.320 --> 00:36:12.920 of what ought to happen, unless a condition is supposed 706 00:36:13.000 --> 00:36:15.679 on which it is, or happens or ought to happen. 707 00:36:16.320 --> 00:36:19.400 In this way, however, by the constant inquiry for the condition, 708 00:36:19.760 --> 00:36:23.039 the satisfaction of reason is only further and further postponed. 709 00:36:23.559 --> 00:36:27.719 Hence it unceasingly seeks the unconditionally necessary, and finds itself 710 00:36:27.800 --> 00:36:30.559 forced to assume it, although without any means of making 711 00:36:30.559 --> 00:36:34.000 it comprehensible to itself happy enough, if only it can 712 00:36:34.039 --> 00:36:37.440 discover a conception which agrees with this assumption. It is 713 00:36:37.480 --> 00:36:40.199 therefore no fault in our deduction of the supreme principle 714 00:36:40.199 --> 00:36:42.559 of morality. But an objection that should be made to 715 00:36:42.639 --> 00:36:45.159 human reason in general, that it cannot enable us to 716 00:36:45.199 --> 00:36:49.079 conceive the absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law, such 717 00:36:49.079 --> 00:36:52.480 as the categorical imperative must be. It cannot be blamed 718 00:36:52.519 --> 00:36:55.280 for refusing to explain this necessity by a condition, that 719 00:36:55.400 --> 00:36:57.480 is to say, by means of some interest assumed as 720 00:36:57.480 --> 00:36:59.760 a basis, since the law would then cease to be 721 00:36:59.800 --> 00:37:02.599 as supreme law of reason. And thus, while we do 722 00:37:02.679 --> 00:37:06.119 not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, 723 00:37:06.519 --> 00:37:09.840 we yet comprehend its incomprehensibility. And this is all that 724 00:37:09.920 --> 00:37:12.320 can be fairly demanded of a philosophy which strives to 725 00:37:12.360 --> 00:37:15.199 carry its principles up to the very limit of human reason. 726 00:37:16.000 --> 00:37:24.480 The end end of section three recording by Drew More, Chicago, Illinois. 727 00:37:25.719 --> 00:37:28.599 End of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals by 728 00:37:28.639 --> 00:37:31.800 a manual account translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbot