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If you talk about data like it's one sort of amorphous solid lump, the way that kind of congresspeople have done until now, you end up with privacy legislation that's full of holes and really easy to manipulate in like big tech's favor, which is what we saw in California, and why they needed to update uh their law, the CCPA, like after a year, hello and welcome to Tech Won't Save Us.
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I'm your host, Paris Marks, and I have a very exciting show for you this week.
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But before we get into it, just a reminder that Tech Won't Save Us turned three years old this month, which is very exciting, I think.
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And to celebrate that, we're asking listeners like you to support the show over on patreon.com so that we can keep making this fantastic, high-quality show with these critical interviews and perspectives on the tech industry for you every single week, so that I can do the research that goes into putting these shows together, so that I can have these fantastic conversations with the guests that we have on the show, so that Eric can put it together and make it sound so great every week, and so that Bridget can make our transcripts.
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And on top of that, if we hit 200 new supporters this month, we're going to make a special series on Elon Musk looking into how he became this kind of genius figure that we are all expecting to save the world, you know, how this myth was created, how it has benefited him, and why it's so essential that we break this myth, that we stop seeing him as this genius if we ever want to hope to build a better world.
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And so if you want to help us hit that goal of 200 new supporters this month, you can go to patreon.com slash tech won't save us, become a supporter, and I'll also send you some stickers in the mail over the next couple months if you do that.
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Listener support is essential to being able to make Tech Won't Save Us every single week, to ensuring that the critical perspectives on the tech industry that we talk about in each episode reach as many people as possible.
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And so if you're able to help us out with that, I would really appreciate it.
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Now in this week's episode, it's time to talk about the proposed TikTok ban and the larger move against Chinese technology that is being made by the US government.
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And for the first time this week, I decided to try a slightly different format.
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So we have two shorter interviews in this episode to address two different angles of this conversation.
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Because when I thought about addressing it, I said, you know, I don't want two kind of long kind of TikTok episodes.
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I want to address this issue in a single episode, but I wanted to talk about, first of all, TikTok in particular, and whether the arguments that, you know, lawmakers and various other folks are making against it really makes sense.
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You know, is it really sending data back to the CCP to spy on Americans and all this sort of stuff?
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You know, what is actually happening with this app?
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How should we understand it?
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And then I also wanted to understand, you know, what does this kind of turn, not just against TikTok, but against Chinese technology as a whole, mean for kind of US tech policy?
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Because for a long time we had this idea that the internet needed to be open, that we needed to allow the internet and digital technologies to spread to every country around the world, and we couldn't kind of have limits on how those things worked, but now we can see that the US is turning against that approach.
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And so why did it adopt that type of policy in the first place?
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And what explains the turn in this moment?
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You know, I think that we approach these conversations through the lens of speech very often, but what does it actually mean to look at US market power and how these various policy approaches have actually helped the US government and the US tech industry?
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So to explore those two topics, I have two fantastic guests who have also been on the show in the past.
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So first up, I'll be talking to Shoshana Wodinski, a freelance reporter who's previously worked at Market Watch in Gizmode and who writes the Tubes newsletter.
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That of course refers to the internet.
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And so we'll be talking about this specific app, you know, how, you know, not just TikTok, but many other social media apps liaise with ad trackers and data brokers, and you know, how this muddies this whole conversation and shows that just banning a specific app wouldn't make much of a difference.
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Then I talked to Daniel Green, an assistant professor at the University of Maryland's College of Information Studies and the author of The Promise of Access, Technology Inequality and the Political Economy of Hope.
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And we talk about, you know, the US's approach to technology and the internet, the policies that were put in place in the 1990s and early 2000s, and how that shaped the internet that we have today, and how we should understand how those policies are changing in this moment and why the US is kind of altering its approach not just to TikTok and social media apps, but to Huawei and semiconductors and these other aspects of US tech policy and the technologies that we rely on and how we should understand all of this.
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Load full transcript
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So I hope that you enjoy this format.
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I hope that you enjoy these two perspectives.
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I hope that it helps to fill you in more on these issues, and you know, most importantly, gives you probably a bit of a different perspective than you've tended to be hearing on this discussion in other places.
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Obviously, the goal of the show is always to give you critical perspectives on these things, and if we feel that important perspectives are not being out there in the kind of general conversation, I feel like it's kind of our job to intervene in that and to present a different perspective on these issues, especially when they can be so heated like things are now when it comes to anything that has to do with China and technology.
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So before we get started, just a final note that if you want to support the show this month for its third birthday and to help us hit our goal, you can join supporters like Dylan in Denmark, Johnny in Tokyo, Matt L from Somerville, Zach in San Francisco, Emile in Windhoek, Namibia, Frank from Ann Arbor, Marybeth in Milwaukee, Simon from Halifax, Kendra from Athens, Georgia, Kaelin in Saskatoon, Mike in Boston, and Charlie from Copenhagen by going to patreon.com slash TechWon't Save Us and becoming a supporter.
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Thanks so much and enjoy our first interview with Shoshana Widinsky.
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Shoshana, welcome back to TechWon't Save Us.
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Happy to be here.
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Thanks for having me on.
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I'm very happy to have you on the show because obviously all of this stuff has been going on recently with TikTok.
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You know, this is something that is not entirely new.
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We saw it during the Trump campaign, and you were writing about it during that time when you were working at Gizmod.
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But now, you know, the Biden administration and you know the U.S.
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Congress have kind of brought this back.
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TikTok is back in the news.
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The government is talking about potentially banning it, and it's already been kind of banned from government devices in many states across the United States, I believe federally as well, and of course, many other Western countries have done the same and followed suit.
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Now, on March 23rd, TikTok CEO was in front of the U.S.
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Congress to answer questions.
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And I just kind of want to start us off with the big picture, and then we can zoom in on specific aspects of this.
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But what were your thoughts on the hearing and you know the larger US campaign that is being waged against TikTok?
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How long do you have?
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I wrote several thousand words about the first hour of the hearing alone.
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As it was going on, I was talking to a few other reporters in the space about this.
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I said that it felt kind of like five different tech hearings all cobbled together in some kind of like nightmarish golem because the questions being asked, they kind of related to each other.
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They were all about apps, they were all about phones, all about tech.
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But it sounded like sometimes that they were talking about completely different companies.
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When they were talking about TikTok, they were getting a lot of basic stuff wrong half the time.
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And like, look, I say that I'm an optimist about this stuff.
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When it comes to tech regulation, you know, we're seeing great moves being made against like Google, for example, which is facing several antitrust suits by like dozens of states.
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But then you watch something like this, the same Congress people that I've been cheering on with the Google stuff these past few months.
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Like one of the questions was literally about whether the app tracks people's eye movements for either targeted ad purposes or something like that.
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And I was listening to that and I was like, where did you get this idea?
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I wasn't even mad.
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I was just confused by a lot of the hearing.
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Yeah, I would say when I was reading your newsletter, I was also frequently very confused because you not only kind of had your thoughts on these different things that the Congresspeople were saying, but you also took out of the transcript some of these different things and really just kind of wild assertions that in some cases had some kind of grounding, but in other cases just seemed completely out there.
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Wild assertions that didn't let him get a word in edgewise.
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Like they would say something more than once.
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A congressperson would say something completely out of left field and very much not true.
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And then Q would just be like, Am I allowed to respond to this?
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And they would say, No, you have to talk to them.
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I came away from that hearing feeling bad for the guy.
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This is his first ever tech hearing, like against like Zuckerberg or P Chai or Dorsey.
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I don't think Congress people have been this mad in a long time at one of these hearings.
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And I think that's kind of owing
to them being mad.
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Like they picked the one thing they wanted to be mad about, even if it barely related to the app, and they were like, this is my chance, I'm gonna do it.
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And you came away from a hearing that was more confusing than comprehensive, which is why I was thinking, I'm like, everyone else, rightfully, is going to be pointing out how batshit this entire hearing was.
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And they're gonna do it a lot more eloquently than I would.
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And also, I've been writing that tape for four years.
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So I was like, cigarette in hand, what if I take these people at their word and try to see if there's anything salvageable in here?
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I kind of noodled around with it a little bit, but I literally made a pie chart when I was listening to the hearing, and like every time I heard like a claim that was actually pretty rounded in reality, and then immediately heard like something that was barely coherent, I was like, okay, maybe we can make like some sort of like fractions out of this.
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And in my newsletter, I was like, okay, if you go through every single claim, which I didn't, I went through the first hour.
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After that first hour, what I came away with was like maybe like a seventh, if I'm being generous, maybe like a seventh of their claims were sort of legitimate, and the rest of them were either wrong, just like absolutely ridiculous.
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They wouldn't be addressed by some sort of ban at all, or they were not only TikTok's problem, but metas and Twitter's and Google's as well.
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I mean, if the first hour is representative, then like there, there's kind of your answer.
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Absolutely.
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And, you know, I think you can see on one hand, you know, the Congresspeople tend to use these hearings in that kind of way where they want to kind of get their position in so that their supporters can see it, so that they can take the clip and put it elsewhere.
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But I think you can also see that this is a CEO from an app that operates in China, that's a Chinese company, that is not one of the big American companies that, you know, they still kind of do want to do well because it's good for the American economy.
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In this case, they really don't care.
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And they don't mind like just really kind of taking out all of their anger about social media more broadly on this guy who's come over to answer their questions.
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During the hearing, a lot of these senators were championing like their own version of like a privacy or like a tech bill.
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I heard it became kind of like they were doing these kind of promotional laps around the CEO.
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And I'm like, you want to look hard on big tech to get support for this bill that you have.
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And it just so happened that this guy was in the hot seat.
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That's why I said I kind of came away feeling that because it really was kind of a wrong place, wrong time.
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Obviously, any multi-billion dollar conglomerate does not need our pity.
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But I was looking at him and I'm just like, oh, I have kind of a bleeding heart about this stuff.
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It's my fault.
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So I do want to get into some of those specifics that you were talking about, some of the claims that they were making.
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And you know, I pulled out some of these things as I was reading your piece that you wrote, which of course I'll link to in the show notes.
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I was reading one quote by um a Republican congressperson, Kathy McMorris Rogers, and she says the Chinese Communist Party can use this as a tool to manipulate America as a whole.
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And I feel like that kind of plays into this broader kind of assumption or this broader accusation that's being made around TikTok that not only can it collect a ton of data, but it's funneling that data back to the Chinese Communist Party, which is getting all this stuff on the American public and then using that to kind of shape what the American public sees, to kind of, you know, engage in these misinformation, disinformation campaigns that we often hear talked about.
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And so I wonder how kind of accurate these sorts of arguments are around TikTok's data collection, handing that to the Chinese government and all these things that are associated with it.
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What do you make of that?
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I am a little bit rusty because it's been a while since I've had to make a living off of following this stuff.
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But there's been a lot of really good substantial research.
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Uh, like Citizen Lab in particular has done a lot of good stuff here, uh, where they kind of break down exactly what the app is collecting and where it's going.
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TikTok, the US company, which is legally kind of separate, I believe, from Doyin, which is back in mainland China, works off of uh servers, I believe, in California.
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And they've also made a deal with Oracle that you reported on a few years ago, where you know a lot of their data from the United States is stored on their servers, right?
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Right, exactly.
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But when you talk about data going from the phone that you're holding in your hand onto a server in San Francisco or in China or
wherever, it's not always a straight line.
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In my writing, because I write about uh advertising a lot, like advertising tech, typically not on platforms as large as TikTok, but sometimes that changes.
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There will be these sorts of intermediaries that can kind of swipe in and like siphon off different pieces of data from the stream that's going from your phone to that server.
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Sometimes it stops by multiple servers.
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And so I believe if memory serves, we have no evidence.
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When I checked this like two years ago, I believe I found American servers being pinged and nothing else.
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We have nothing on paper that shows data from the apps in an American's hand going to a server back in like Beijing.
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That said, there's some Chinese national security laws that basically mandate if a government official there asks for data from TikTok, they could say no.
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They could kind of deny it.
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But in the past, when tech companies have had foreign workers operating in the in like uh Beijing or like Shanghai or anywhere around there, there's stories that have come out about the Chinese government making these employees' life basically hell until the American company kind of like howtaws to their demands.
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So, like when I was covering Trump's ban three years ago, it was a different world back then.
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Donald Trump was president, we were all stuck in our homes, everyone was freaking out.
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And I believe you kind of felt this this time around with your own piece.
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I was getting a lot of pushback that my coverage was kind of ignoring the red threat that China could bring on all of us.
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And I was like, you know what?
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A lot of those critiques were in really bad faith and just ignored what I have written.
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But I was like, the same way that I took lawmakers out there were this time, I was like, okay, I will look into this and see how other kind of tech companies have fared.
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And it turns out they haven't necessarily fared that great.
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The Chinese government can be a little scary.
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So instead, my question wasn't, will like a TikTok ban do anything of substance?
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Instead, my question was, let's assume TikTok gets banned.
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Why not?
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What else could the Chinese government do?
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What other sorts of methods do they have at their disposal to like get into all of our pockets?
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And it turns out I found a
lot, circumstances depending.
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Yeah, I think you put it really well there, right?
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Because I think that this is a really important angle on this story and thing that we need to understand is that the way it's often being presented by people in government is that if we ban TikTok, then that cuts off the ability for China to access all of our data because we're using this app, right?
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But if we actually look at the connections, as you've outlined in some of the work that you've done that exist between all of the apps that we use on our phones, whether they are ones that are created by Chinese companies or not, even, you know, social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter or Instagram that are controlled by American companies that we're all very familiar with using, because, as you were saying, of the advertising that happens there and the data that's collected for that advertising by intermediaries and data brokers, that because of that, that offers many different ways that that data can get back to China or to anywhere else or to any other actor who might want to buy it or get access to it.
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You know, there's been reporting that at the FBI, that the Department of Homeland Security is buying data from these data brokers as well.
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And so that shows us that just shutting down TikTok is not going to be a way to solve this problem if it's something that is even happening in the first place.
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Right.
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There was actually, there's a story that came out pretty recently that was really kind of apropos to everything that's going on right now.
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Do you remember way, way back when, you know, the gay dating app Grinder, everyone knows it.
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It's everyone's favorite.
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I'm not sure if you remember, but Grindr was actually owned by a Chinese gaming company for many years.
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And there was some sort of legal situation where they were goaded into selling it to an American group.
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Smash cut to, I believe it was earlier this year, that the Washington Post put out a story where this priest was outed by some shady group that had somehow gotten his location data using a gay dating app that he had secretly hidden on his phone.
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So this shady group had full carte blanche access to his location.
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Grinder denied that it was possible.
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Everyone denied that it was possible.
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And it was owned by an American company.
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So what's the big deal?
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The kind of methodology that this shady group used to get that priest's location and track him from his home to the gay club that
he wasn't supposed to be at and then back home.
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The way that they did that was there's a data flow between that priest's phone and the servers that the company owns.
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And when it comes to advertising, you have sometimes 10 or 15 or literally hundreds of other folks in the middle that all operate certain things, like some of them will be doing analytics, some of them will be doing user acquisitions, some of them will be serving ads or measuring how well those ads perform.
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And what this shady group did was without grinders' know-how, they were able to set up shop somewhere between one of those possibly hundreds of middlemen and kind of blend in.
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And because of the way data works, they were specifically able to siphon off location data from that stream.
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So, I mean, if this stuff was used to like out one guy, but that's not the only group that's doing something like this.
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It's kind of an open secret in the ad tech world.
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Apps or websites have an agreement with advertisers and maybe a few middlemen and they shake on it.
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But occasionally a bad actor in the US or otherwise is free to kind of swoop in and kind of snarf stuff up.
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And in fact, you'd mentioned a piece that I'd written three years ago.
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Where some of those cross-border partnerships are actually codified.
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I've written about the company formerly known as Facebook.
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They have an active program where they work with Chinese advertisers.
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I know for a fact that there's ad agencies in Beijing that regularly work with Twitter and Snapchat.
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And because of the way advertising works, you need data from a person's device in order to run that ad in the first place.
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Sometimes it's location data, sometimes it's an IP address, but something's being traded off there.
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And my pet peeve with a lot of this stuff is when people talk about data protection, they never really clarify what kind of data, which like sounds like I'm being kind of an asshole.
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And like, yeah, I am.
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But at the same time, you know, that shady group was able to take that priest's location.
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They didn't know his home address.
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They had like a geofense, like some sort of like a rough spot on a map where he was.
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They weren't able to get his name.
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They managed to figure out who he was because they saw him go to a house and then to a gay club.
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And then they were like, oh, that's this guy's address.
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So are you worried about your precise location getting leaked?
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Sure, of course.
00:23:27.920 --> 00:23:29.039
A lot of people are.
00:23:29.279 --> 00:23:35.839
There was that story with Strava a few years ago where like military people were having their locations leaked by the app.
00:23:36.079 --> 00:23:42.000
So, okay, you can take care of location and iOS devices thankfully do this.
00:23:42.319 --> 00:23:52.000
But what about something like your credit card history or your work history or who your fiance is?
00:23:52.240 --> 00:24:18.400
If you talk about data like it's one sort of amorphous solid lump, the way that kind of congresspeople have done until now, you end up with privacy legislation that's full of holes and really easy to manipulate in like big tech's favor, which is what we saw in California, and why they needed to update uh their law, the CCPA, like after a year.
00:24:18.799 --> 00:24:19.920
I think it's a really good point.
00:24:20.000 --> 00:24:31.839
And it gives us important insight into how this actually works and why a TikTok ban doesn't address the problems that these legislators claim that they are interested in addressing, right?
00:24:32.000 --> 00:24:40.640
Because if you look at it, if you're just concerned about Chinese apps, there's many other Chinese apps that people are downloading from the app store, not just TikTok, right?
00:24:40.799 --> 00:24:46.640
And if you're actually concerned about all these data issues, these are issues with many other apps and not just TikTok.
00:24:46.960 --> 00:24:56.799
No, and I mentioned in my newsletter, like as of that writing, like the top 10 apps, two of them were from TikTok, but two of them were Chinese e-commerce apps.
00:24:57.119 --> 00:25:04.880
And by default, an e-commerce app is going to have your home address because that's how it's going to mail you those shoes.
00:25:05.039 --> 00:25:13.359
So I was like kind of looking at it and I'm like, is it because TikTok is presumably getting that data and manipulating us?
00:25:13.599 --> 00:25:15.519
Other apps do that too.
00:25:16.160 --> 00:25:23.440
There's countless stories of like foreign regimes taking like advantage of Twitter mobs, for example.
00:25:23.680 --> 00:25:35.279
That's besides the fact that Twitter already is giving data to folks abroad that are also beholden to these same laws that the Chinese government has in place.
00:25:35.839 --> 00:25:42.079
So by banning TikTok, you're just gonna make a lot of teenagers mad more than anything.
00:25:42.160 --> 00:25:48.400
And like, obviously, you know, deskots and bad actors, they're not gonna go away just because TikTok isn't there.
00:25:48.480 --> 00:25:50.799
They're just gonna follow you to where the people are.
00:25:51.279 --> 00:25:52.559
That's how they work.
00:25:53.200 --> 00:25:53.920
Absolutely.
00:25:54.079 --> 00:26:12.240
And, you know, to pull another
quote from the article that you wrote, this congressperson that I mentioned before, Kathy McMorris Rogers, she said in this hearing: TikTok has repeatedly chosen the path for more control, more surveillance, and more manipulation, as if every social media app hasn't done the exact same thing.
00:26:12.480 --> 00:26:18.160
But you mentioned the algorithm there and the idea that TikTok is making us believe certain things and whatnot.
00:26:18.319 --> 00:26:23.200
What do we know about TikTok's algorithm and what they're actually doing and how this works?
00:26:23.359 --> 00:26:34.880
Because this is something that the American social media companies seem particularly concerned about because the TikTok algorithm does seem to be more effective than what they've been doing for you know a number of years now.
00:26:35.279 --> 00:26:44.559
To back up really quickly, over the years, because I started covering TikTok, TikTok's privacy issue specifically, way before it was kind of this blockbuster app.
00:26:45.039 --> 00:26:54.960
So for a long time, I got used to following developers like based in China or based in Malaysia that were working for the company.
00:26:55.200 --> 00:26:57.359
There just wasn't anybody in the States back then.
00:26:57.519 --> 00:27:06.960
And I also noticed they tend to be more open about sharing exactly what's going on inside the company there than they are with folks in the US.
00:27:07.119 --> 00:27:12.240
And I believe one of the lawmakers during the hearing asked, like, why are you so nervous?
00:27:12.400 --> 00:27:15.119
Why are you trying to bury like your company's Chinese ties?
00:27:15.200 --> 00:27:18.240
And I'm just like, gosh, I wonder why.
00:27:20.240 --> 00:27:22.240
Because then this shit happens.
00:27:22.480 --> 00:27:32.960
So while I was writing up this 3,000-word newsletter, I wanted to get the kind of Beijing perspective on like what was going on over here.
00:27:33.119 --> 00:27:41.920
And I noticed a lot of folks linking to a specific kind of set of blog posts and like developer documents.
00:27:42.000 --> 00:27:51.519
And I should note a lot of this stuff was written in code, and a lot of this stuff was written in Mandarin code specifically, with a lot of jargon that doesn't translate across borders.
00:27:51.680 --> 00:27:53.839
But I did my best to decipher it.
00:27:54.160 --> 00:28:14.319
And what I found was either enough ByteDance folks had kind of spilled the beans, ByteDance being TikTok's parent company, or enough people living abroad had successfully reverse-engineered the app that they had essentially broken down what makes a lot of this stuff so addictive.
00:28:14.480 --> 00:28:18.160
And like I have like about 500 tabs of this stuff, literally.
00:28:18.400 --> 00:28:20.240
So I'll put most of it in the newsletter.
00:28:20.319 --> 00:28:32.640
But the kind of long and short is American platforms, like your YouTubes, your Instagrams, that sort of thing, they tend to throw the most popular person that you might be interested in.
00:28:32.799 --> 00:28:36.960
Like I mentioned earlier, I watch a lot of sewing videos.
00:28:37.200 --> 00:28:39.759
So because I'm trying to learn how to sew.
00:28:40.079 --> 00:28:49.279
So on Instagram, for example, when I get recommended new people to follow, it's like the dressmakers that have like thousands and thousands of followers.
00:28:49.440 --> 00:28:53.519
And it's like, I'm like, because the sort of thought process there is.
00:28:54.319 --> 00:29:01.039
If 5,000 people already like this dressmaker and you like dressmakers, chances are you're gonna like her too.
00:29:01.200 --> 00:29:02.480
Like it makes sense.
00:29:02.799 --> 00:29:10.079
TikTok, at least according to what these people were saying, it basically takes that formula and throws it out the window.
00:29:10.240 --> 00:29:21.279
TikTok does not really give a shit about popularity, and instead it will surface kind of random clusters of stuff that's related to what you're into.
00:29:22.240 --> 00:29:24.720
And it will just throw it your way.
00:29:24.960 --> 00:29:26.640
And if you like it, you like it.
00:29:26.880 --> 00:29:28.079
If you don't, you don't.
00:29:28.240 --> 00:29:37.039
But if you do, and if enough people like a certain video clip within a certain time frame, it gets recommended to a small circle of people at first.
00:29:37.200 --> 00:29:42.480
If it reaches that threshold, it gets recommended to a larger circle and then a larger circle and then a larger circle.
00:29:42.799 --> 00:29:58.240
But the way that these people were saying it's set up is that everyone kind of has a fair shot, which is why on Instagram I was being told to follow uh dressmakers that have these really pretty, aesthetic, flowy wedding dresses.
00:29:58.400 --> 00:30:08.400
But on TikTok, I got recommended a person with like 10 followers who makes furry suits because TikTok was just like, I don't know, like I guess you're into this now.
00:30:08.559 --> 00:30:10.079
And I totally was.
00:30:10.319 --> 00:30:13.200
TikTok will never say this stuff out loud.
00:30:13.359 --> 00:30:16.480
So I'm basically a lot of this is kind of hearsay.
00:30:16.640 --> 00:30:17.039
I don't know.
00:30:17.119 --> 00:30:18.400
I it makes sense to me.
00:30:18.720 --> 00:30:21.519
Yeah, this is all uh the proprietary algorithm.
00:30:21.599 --> 00:30:24.160
So they're certainly not going to share it with us.
00:30:24.480 --> 00:30:30.799
Like you hear me say that, and it all sounds pretty benign because I'm talking about wedding dresses and fursuits.
00:30:31.039 --> 00:30:33.119
This hearing just made me more confused than really.
00:30:33.599 --> 00:30:35.680
I mean, I was angry, but I was also really confused.
00:30:35.920 --> 00:30:44.960
So I was wondering, I'm like, what sort of media do they think a foreign adversary is going to push in front of us?
00:30:45.119 --> 00:30:50.960
Which, like, again, that sounds like like a really sort of like,
why do you care about like this really kind of specific thing?
00:30:51.039 --> 00:30:52.640
Like you're ignoring the big picture, yeah, yeah, yeah.
00:30:52.880 --> 00:30:54.319
Which, like, yeah, maybe I am.
00:30:54.559 --> 00:31:11.920
But if we don't know what we're kind of scared of and how that manipulation would happen, then you end up with accusations that are either wrong or could apply to literally anybody else.
00:31:12.319 --> 00:31:18.079
And also, I'll just say this before getting into all this stuff, I got a neuroscience degree.
00:31:18.319 --> 00:31:22.720
And I focused on uh learned behavior specifically.
00:31:23.119 --> 00:31:35.839
And a lot of sort of the manipulation that's being alleged, not only of TikTok, this is a platform thing in general, a lot of it's alleging kind of nefarious intent on their part.
00:31:36.000 --> 00:31:37.920
But really, people are just dumb.
00:31:38.079 --> 00:31:40.480
You see a pretty picture and you click on it.
00:31:40.799 --> 00:31:50.559
My sort of takeaway from a lot of this stuff, if you want not to be manipulated, you have to put in the legwork to try not to be.
00:31:50.799 --> 00:31:53.759
I don't think a lot of people know how to do that.
00:31:53.839 --> 00:31:57.839
So instead of asking, they're just pointing the finger somewhere else.
00:31:58.240 --> 00:32:23.039
I think that in having you describe that though, that also kind of points us in the direction of if we were really concerned about these problems of data collection, of the way that the algorithm is used, and of some of the other things that these lawmakers were pointing out when they actually made sense and were just completely ridiculous, that if we really wanted to address these problems, it's not a TikTok ban that you need to do in order to address it, right?
00:32:23.279 --> 00:32:28.160
It's federal data privacy regulations, regulations on algorithms and other things like that.
00:32:28.319 --> 00:32:32.400
But these lawmakers do not seem to be proposing those sorts of solutions.
00:32:32.640 --> 00:32:36.960
So what does that tell you about the actual kind of objective of this campaign?
00:32:37.119 --> 00:32:42.000
If it's identifying all these problems, but then not really offering a real solution to them.
00:32:42.640 --> 00:32:51.039
No, it's like during the uh hearing, a lot of the folks brought up that, oh, like this is an example of why we need like a federal data privacy law.
00:32:51.119 --> 00:33:00.079
And I would like, I would be chuffed to bits if this nonsense ended up being the reason that we finally get that law.
00:33:00.319 --> 00:33:06.160
Because right now in the US, different states have different rules for like what you can do.
00:33:06.240 --> 00:33:18.400
And as a result, in my ex in my interviews with sort of these middlemen and like shady characters, instead of abiding by one law in Virginia and one law in Connecticut, they just ignore both of them.
00:33:18.559 --> 00:33:29.680
And because lawmakers on the grounds in these states are so busy holding hearings that go on for five hours, they don't get caught.
00:33:29.839 --> 00:33:36.960
Really, the only place that has any sort of like substantial ground here is California with a now the CPRA.
00:33:37.039 --> 00:33:45.119
But again, they managed to get got so good that they passed the wrong version of a law the first time around.
00:33:45.680 --> 00:33:47.200
I think they're all good points.
00:33:47.279 --> 00:33:52.559
And I would say that, you know, I'm obviously quite pessimistic on everything that's being proposed here.
00:33:52.720 --> 00:34:12.800
And I think that really at the core of this is not really a desire to address these fundamental problems with social media and all of these apps that we're using constantly, but to kind of take on one of the competitors to, you know, the major social media companies that exist in the United States instead of addressing the core of all their business models as well.
00:34:13.119 --> 00:34:18.239
I mean, I've covered the company formerly known as Facebook quite a lot in my time.
00:34:18.400 --> 00:34:40.320
And I noticed this this was like around 2020 during the Trump administration, Mark Zuckerberg would very often position his app successfully as sort of the savior for small businesses, because it is true that many small businesses by default are dependent on Facebook's platform to reach their audiences.
00:34:40.400 --> 00:34:41.440
That's true.
00:34:41.679 --> 00:34:57.920
So like every time a sort of very reasonable critique was like aimed at the company, they wouldn't just immediately kind of pivot to if you regulate us, think of all the small businesses that would be harmed, which like, yeah, is true, but you can't have it both ways.
00:34:58.159 --> 00:35:07.840
So I thought it was really funny on the day of the hearing that TikTok flew in all of these influencers who also have their livelihoods depend on that app.
00:35:08.000 --> 00:35:13.199
And I'm like, oh, we're just using literal human shields now.
00:35:13.360 --> 00:35:23.280
And like it has worked for Facebook in the past because nobody wants to be the guy that topples your local ice cream store just to get back at some company in Silicon Valley.
00:35:23.519 --> 00:35:39.679
So in this case, if I'm thinking about like the most of the American public, I feel like going with the small business angle might be a better sound to congressmen's ears than influencers, when really on the ground they are the same thing.
00:35:39.920 --> 00:35:46.800
Luckily for TikTok, it's been leaning really hard into e-commerce lately without much success.
00:35:47.119 --> 00:35:56.719
But if you kind of read the tea leaves, you can see the company priming itself to be like, no, small businesses depend on us too.
00:35:57.119 --> 00:36:07.760
Which, you know, again, I have no sympathy for multi-billion dollar companies, but I'm just like, I'm watching it and I'm like, we didn't
learn the first time, and I don't know if we're gonna learn now.
00:36:09.199 --> 00:36:10.079
A perfect point.
00:36:10.159 --> 00:36:12.639
And I would just say that Amazon does the same thing, right?
00:36:12.719 --> 00:36:21.039
I was talking to Maura Weigel a few weeks ago, and they basically say, you know, we're protecting all these small businesses, making it possible for them to exist.
00:36:21.199 --> 00:36:25.199
And there's something, you know, very kind of pernicious and self-serving that's happening there as well.
00:36:25.360 --> 00:36:31.599
So I guess Shoshana, to kind of close off our conversation, you know, we've been talking about several different aspects of this.
00:36:31.760 --> 00:36:40.000
Is there anything else that you think people should know about this hearing in particular or about you know this kind of wider discourse around TikTok that we haven't gotten to in this conversation?
00:36:40.400 --> 00:36:49.840
Well, I mean, if they want to stomach my more than 3,000-word newsletter, and I'm I'm gonna keep writing all this stuff, so you can definitely follow that quick little plug there.
00:36:50.159 --> 00:37:14.480
But more than anything, I mean, when you read sorts of news stories about this, or news stories about any app, really, and you hear sorts of claims that like seem to be legitimate and seem to have backing and like sound true, just always ask, like, what exactly is this person afraid of, and what am I afraid of?
00:37:14.719 --> 00:37:18.400
And like, does this claim kind of address that?
00:37:18.639 --> 00:37:20.559
Because you'll typically find that it doesn't.
00:37:20.800 --> 00:37:27.440
I think that's always great advice for people to keep in mind when they're reading these stories and considering the narratives that we're getting around these tech companies.
00:37:27.599 --> 00:37:29.760
Shoshana, always great to have you on the show.
00:37:30.000 --> 00:37:33.280
I really appreciate you taking the time, and I can't wait to have you back on again.
00:37:33.440 --> 00:37:34.320
Thanks so much.
00:37:34.639 --> 00:37:35.760
Aw, thanks.
00:37:37.199 --> 00:37:51.519
So that was Shoshana Wodinski, and hopefully that gives you some insight, some perspective on the proposed TikTok ban, some of the arguments that are being made against TikTok in particular, and why some of these data arguments really don't make a ton of sense.
00:37:51.679 --> 00:38:02.239
I think it makes a lot of sense to look at the social media model, you know, that many of these companies, not just TikTok, have chased after for the past couple of decades, and whether that makes any sense to continue.
00:38:02.559 --> 00:38:08.960
But, you know, I don't think it makes a whole lot of sense to target TikTok in particular for things that many other companies are doing.
00:38:09.280 --> 00:38:14.079
Now we turn to my conversation with Daniel Green, where we talk about U.S.
00:38:14.239 --> 00:38:21.119
tech policy in the 1990s, how that has
evolved through the 2000s, and why we see a notable shift in this moment.
00:38:21.280 --> 00:38:23.119
So enjoy this conversation.
00:38:23.840 --> 00:38:26.000
Dan, welcome back to Tech Won't Save Us.
00:38:26.239 --> 00:38:27.119
Thank you so much, Paris.
00:38:27.360 --> 00:38:28.159
Happy to be here.
00:38:28.639 --> 00:38:30.559
Very excited to chat with you again.
00:38:30.719 --> 00:38:34.960
It's always great to have you on the show and to get your insights on the tech industry.
00:38:35.119 --> 00:38:54.559
And of course, in this moment where you know we're seeing the US government's policy on technology and the internet seeming to shift, you know, in response to, I would say, a number of factors, but in particular the competition from China, I think it's a good moment for us to kind of revisit a bit of history to inform a conversation around what's happening now.
00:38:54.719 --> 00:38:59.519
And so I want to start with a bit of that kind of historical piece just to inform what we're going to talk about.
00:38:59.679 --> 00:39:06.800
And I think, you know, it's important to understand where this framework for the US government's approach to tech and internet policy really came from.
00:39:06.960 --> 00:39:16.480
So what was the orientation in the late 1980s through the 1990s as the US government was formulating its policy on internet and technology?
00:39:17.760 --> 00:39:29.679
Yeah, I mean, as with everything else in American economic history, it's a history of blowback about uh, you know, overreaching in one particular area and then that coming to back to bite you in the butt a couple of decades later.
00:39:30.000 --> 00:39:41.519
So the commercialization of the internet really cannot be divorced from the moment of globalization that follows the economic crash of the 1970s.
00:39:41.760 --> 00:39:53.840
Um the kind of nationally oriented Keynesian economies of the 1970s start to fall apart for, you know, pick your poison for gold standard, oil crisis, drop in productivity, whatever.
00:39:54.159 --> 00:40:12.239
And we see then a move to much more nimble supply chain stretching all over the world, especially start to encircle countries which maybe had tried to create their own welfare states, but then were ruthlessly gutted by the Volker shock, by debt imposed by the IMF, et cetera, et cetera.
00:40:12.559 --> 00:40:22.000
So at the same moment, we also see that the Democrats have been really out of power for a long time in the US, with the semi-exception of Jimmy Carter.
00:40:22.239 --> 00:40:28.079
So during the 80s, during this time in the wilderness, the American Democratic Party is trying to figure out how to get back in.
00:40:28.239 --> 00:40:39.760
And they do so in part by proposing the internet and the class of people with an interest in the internet as the solution to the problems created by de-industrialization at home.
00:40:40.079 --> 00:40:48.480
The late 70s and 80s were also a period of heavy de-industrialization,
although that's a process going back, you know, as far as the really immediately after World War II.
00:40:49.039 --> 00:41:03.840
So, what Clinton and Gore and other folks in this Democratic Leadership Council do is both bring in a new class of voters and activists, so very different from the tense but multiracial working class coalition that undergirded the New Deal.
00:41:04.079 --> 00:41:11.440
We have a lot more professionals, people who work in office parks, people who are very committed to uh formal equality, but not necessarily equality of outcome.
00:41:11.519 --> 00:41:18.960
So, you know, against housing discrimination, ready to protest against that, not so much a fan of public housing being built in their neighborhood.
00:41:19.199 --> 00:41:23.920
And these folks often end up in office parks producing high-technology products.
00:41:24.079 --> 00:41:28.239
Montgomery County, Maryland, uh, Route 128 in Boston, Silicon Valley.
00:41:28.480 --> 00:41:34.639
And these are what uh are called the Atari Democrats, a name that they end up giving themselves.
00:41:34.880 --> 00:41:44.800
And that comes along also with a new group of investors at the top of the party, including some people like the heads of HP and Apple at the time, who were lifelong Republicans.
00:41:45.039 --> 00:42:11.119
And they were a little concerned about the kind of isolationism that Reagan promised and the threatened defunding of places like the Department of Education, because these were industries that were extremely capital-intensive, that had really broad ties to the global economy, but were also producing cultural products, things like software or you know, media, things that depended on English for remaining the language of global commerce.
00:42:11.440 --> 00:42:32.480
So this new group of financiers, of tech executives, of capital-intensive manufacturing, distinguished from especially like the oil people that really supported Reagan, started to reframe the party at the same moment that NSFnet was being transitioned towards privatization as the internet.
00:42:32.880 --> 00:42:46.000
So by the time Clinton wins the election in '92, they are proposing that the internet is going to be the thing that is going to take care of the industrialized US and secure American hegemony abroad.
00:42:46.079 --> 00:42:47.440
They've just defeated the Soviets.
00:42:47.599 --> 00:42:55.760
They're still a little scared of competition from Japan and West Germany, but we have the most robust internet infrastructure here in the US at the time.
00:42:56.000 --> 00:43:10.480
Extending that globally and building up abroad is a way to connect everybody to high-paying, knowledge work jobs that do not respect geography, unlike those old fuddy-duddy manufacturing jobs.
00:43:10.719 --> 00:43:22.159
So that promise to solve the problem of deindustrialization comes out at the exact same time as the people who would most benefit from internet liberalization have taken control of the party.
00:43:22.239 --> 00:43:26.000
And this is how they end up distinguishing themselves from Republicans.
00:43:26.159 --> 00:43:31.760
And this is why the 1990s are really the kind of the height of American liberalism.
00:43:31.920 --> 00:43:39.280
It's the thing that everyone keeps trying to return to because that was the moment when everything was going really right for them.
00:43:39.440 --> 00:43:58.719
And what we'll see is that a lot of the decisions they made on things like liberalizing telecommunications infrastructure as a condition of entry into the World Trade Organization, that then comes back to bite us in the butt as you know, like Huawei ends up taking all of the infrastructure projects for telecommunications across the world.
00:43:58.960 --> 00:43:59.679
It's such a fascinating.
00:44:00.159 --> 00:44:02.320
History and you describe it so well there.
00:44:02.400 --> 00:44:10.159
And I would be remiss if I didn't say, you know, if people do want to know more about what's going on in that period, of course, we talked about it more last time you were on the show.
00:44:10.320 --> 00:44:12.960
And of course, they can go back and listen to that interview too.
00:44:13.119 --> 00:44:23.840
But now, based on what you were talking there, obviously we see that there's this move toward the internet and privatizing the internet, liberalizing the internet, having the internet kind of go global.
00:44:24.000 --> 00:44:33.679
And some of the narratives that we usually have around this period is that, you know, because the internet is being liberalized, becoming more accessible, you know, the open internet is expanding everywhere.
00:44:33.840 --> 00:44:39.599
There's this kind of great expansion in freedom of speech and freedom of expression that is enabled by that.
00:44:39.760 --> 00:44:49.920
And I think that it can be easy to see that period solely or primarily through that lens and not kind of focus on the economic side of what was actually going on here.
00:44:50.159 --> 00:45:11.519
So you talked a bit about it there, but what was really kind of the goal of the Clinton administration and vice president Al Gore as they were pushing for this internet to be privatized, to be commercialized, and to be extended around the world so that many other countries were using this network that was kind of originating in the United States?
00:45:11.840 --> 00:45:18.000
Yeah, so the internet is a network of networks that not, you know, any one person can claim ownership to.
00:45:18.159 --> 00:45:45.280
So what we're really seeing with American economic and foreign policy at this moment is a way of identifying a particular setup of relatively frictionless communication between states, undergirded by Western but especially American infrastructure and Western, but especially American software firms and networking firms, so Microsoft, Cisco, that being the engine of liberalization.
00:45:45.440 --> 00:46:05.199
And there are plenty of people, you
know, in the US and out who have, you know, perhaps libertarian visions of an open internet, but one that is perhaps agnostic on or even opposed to American interests, you know, the kind of more anarcho-punk approaches to cyberspace.
00:46:05.519 --> 00:46:12.480
But the Americans were quite clear on both economic interests of the US and liberalization of the internet being the same thing.
00:46:12.559 --> 00:46:17.599
And if it's okay, I would really like to read just a really brief thing that Al Gore wrote in 1991.
00:46:17.760 --> 00:46:26.800
So there's this special issue of Scientific American with all the heavy hitters of tech libertarianism, you know, Necroponti, those sorts of people.
00:46:27.039 --> 00:46:30.880
And Gore was the champion of a liberalized internet in the Senate.
00:46:31.119 --> 00:46:33.119
He then took it on as vice president.
00:46:33.280 --> 00:46:42.880
I do not joke when I say that I really do think that Al Gore created the internet because his vision of what was going to happen is the world that we live in now.
00:46:43.119 --> 00:46:57.840
And he saw himself very much as the 1990s equivalent of his father, who was very, very integral to the creation of the American highway system, which was itself a kind of coldware project to make U.S.
00:46:58.000 --> 00:47:04.320
cities less reliant on single nodes and to increase the flow of goods between cities.
00:47:04.639 --> 00:47:14.320
So with that in mind, Gore in Scientific American in 91 writes, you know, quote, the unique way in which the US deals with information has been the real key to our success.
00:47:14.559 --> 00:47:18.320
Capitalism and representative democracy rely on the freedom of the individual.
00:47:18.480 --> 00:47:23.599
So these systems operate in a manner similar to the principle behind massively parallel computers.
00:47:23.760 --> 00:47:30.400
These computers process data not only in one central unit, but rather in tiny, less powerful units.
00:47:30.639 --> 00:47:32.559
Capitalism works on the same principle.
00:47:32.800 --> 00:47:43.920
People who are free to buy and sell products or services according to their individual calculations of the costs and benefits of each choice process a relatively limited amount of information, but do it quickly.
00:47:44.159 --> 00:47:51.199
When millions of individuals process information simultaneously, the aggregate result is incredibly accurate and efficient decisions.
00:47:51.440 --> 00:48:02.719
Communism, by contrast, attempted to bring all the information to a large and powerful central processor, which collapsed when it was overwhelmed by ever more complex information.
00:48:02.960 --> 00:48:12.239
So Gore is very deliberately saying here that the liberalization of the internet and the extension of that openness to the rest of the world is identical with American capitalist interests.
00:48:12.320 --> 00:48:22.079
They are the same thing and they will reward everybody else, but it's still his rules
and his country's tech, at least in the beginning, that is undergirding that project.
00:48:22.159 --> 00:48:24.239
You know, they are the same thing for them.
00:48:24.480 --> 00:48:37.840
In terms of how it ends up happening, you know, there is some argument that American contractors and the American state should shift some money from defense spending, no longer needed as much for the Cold War, into internet infrastructure build-out.
00:48:38.239 --> 00:48:41.039
That's more of a campaign tack than anything else.
00:48:41.119 --> 00:48:44.960
The actual money distributed, you know, never tops a couple of billion dollars.
00:48:45.039 --> 00:48:46.800
It's really nothing compared to the Pentagon.
00:48:46.880 --> 00:48:50.159
It's, you know, it doesn't even really compare to the crime bill in '94.
00:48:50.239 --> 00:49:09.679
Um, but it was important rhetorically, and it was important to kind of build the identity of this new political coalition, you know, to the point that when Gore is back on the campaign trail in '96, he's talking about his opposition in the dole campaign and saying, you know, these people that want to defund our internet build-out, they're unilaterally disarming us against international competition.
00:49:09.840 --> 00:49:19.760
Um, so it is very clear here that they see international economic liberalization and American interests and the growing internet as the same thing.
00:49:19.920 --> 00:49:20.960
They're all identical.
00:49:21.199 --> 00:49:33.039
The problem that we come into a couple years later, a couple decades later, is that those things are no longer identical, in part because that hegemonic coalition that Glore and Clinton were constructing around the internet begins to fracture.
00:49:33.519 --> 00:49:34.880
Yeah, I think really well put.
00:49:34.960 --> 00:49:43.280
And I think it's so important to understand like Gore's orientation toward the internet and how that really kind of sets up the internet that we have today, right?
00:49:43.599 --> 00:49:46.559
To put a fine point on it, I mean, he sounds like Hayek in that.
00:49:46.639 --> 00:49:54.159
Like, I mean, this is the argument that was made 70, 80 years prior about why communism couldn't work is because it was an inefficient economic process.
00:49:54.320 --> 00:50:00.960
And then you have the leader of the American liberalism saying the exact same thing for his pitch as a new Keynesian.
00:50:01.039 --> 00:50:04.800
You know, this is why we need to invest in this thing because it's American capitalism.
00:50:04.960 --> 00:50:14.880
It's a relatively coherent narrative from the kind of free market libertarianism of even like the 30s up to the internet liberalization that we start to see in the 90s.
00:50:15.199 --> 00:50:17.039
Yeah, a great point and a key one.
00:50:17.199 --> 00:50:22.480
I have one question that maybe kind of starts to bridge, you know, this period with what we're looking at now.
00:50:22.639 --> 00:50:31.440
And this is to say
that, you know, as you were talking about, this kind of idea of the open internet is coming along at a moment where, you know, there's a lot of neoliberal policies that are emerging.
00:50:31.519 --> 00:50:45.280
There's the effort toward globalization, and the US is kind of creating a global system that is oriented around kind of ensuring that Western capital can easily access more markets, you know, so capitalism continues to expand and all these sorts of things.
00:50:45.519 --> 00:50:59.519
And I feel like when we look at kind of the orientation toward the internet, or if you look at the internet from a US perspective, it can maybe not seem so bad that, you know, US companies are going abroad and that everything is open and whatnot.
00:50:59.679 --> 00:51:16.000
But I think that when you look at it from a forum perspective, you can very much see how as the internet goes global, it ensures and it allows US companies to really take over the sectors that you know are associated with the internet and that the internet is expanding into.
00:51:16.159 --> 00:51:23.280
And I think that for a while, it's difficult to see much pushback to that, or at least not pushback that gets a lot of attention, right?
00:51:23.440 --> 00:51:36.159
But I think that in recent years, we've begun to see more and more of that with Europe getting more frustrated that so many major US companies dominate its tech sector, obviously with China and its ability to build competitors to that.
00:51:36.320 --> 00:51:53.760
Other countries as well have been speaking out more about how these US companies kind of dominate the technology industry in their countries and make it difficult for their domestic competitors to compete if they are not allowed to take measures that kind of restrict the ability for US tech companies to dominate.
00:51:53.920 --> 00:52:09.360
And so I wonder what you make of that kind of, I guess, relative ignorance of that aspect of US tech policy or the ability of these US tech companies to really dominate internationally in that way, and how that has really begun to shift in recent years.
00:52:09.760 --> 00:52:15.920
Yeah, I mean, at least in the 90s and early 2000s, I think it's frankly, it's the success of American imperialism.
00:52:16.000 --> 00:52:23.119
So, you know, the the Soviet Union is defeated, and the US is the representative of global capitalism at that point.
00:52:23.360 --> 00:52:35.599
And, you know, I'm I'm pretty much agree with like Sam Gyndon's analysis here that like capitalism is global, but it is protected, set up, restored, spread through American imperialism.
00:52:35.840 --> 00:52:39.760
And, you know, especially in the 90s, that's the only game in town.
00:52:39.840 --> 00:52:46.719
You know, Chinese military is too weak and the workforce is too far down the value chain, ditto for Latin America and Africa.
00:52:47.039 --> 00:52:55.199
Europe, uh, at least at that point, is mostly happy to identify its kind of neoliberal ambitions with that of the US.
00:52:55.280 --> 00:53:03.280
So, you know, engagement with like the WTO or the general agreement on trade proceeds largely on American terms.
00:53:03.599 --> 00:53:05.920
That begins to fracture over time.
00:53:06.079 --> 00:53:16.800
I mean, I think the earliest kind of protests that you concede against that are largely identified with like, you know, there's the same kind of like content protectionism that we saw earlier in the century.
00:53:16.880 --> 00:53:30.000
So like the French effort to create Minitel is, you know, super interesting and is largely building off like the French content industry that is like protected and promoted and subsidized as an effort to protect French culture.
00:53:30.159 --> 00:53:36.400
And it's not that different from like Canadian content or you know, Quebec content being produced as a kind of protectionism.
00:53:36.639 --> 00:53:45.840
Minitel is probably the best kind of like national example of something that was uh built to oppose the American internet and it did work very differently, but it lost, it flamed out.
00:53:46.000 --> 00:54:04.400
So I think, especially in the 90s, and this is in part why American liberals are so nostalgic for that period, it is really the strength of American imperialism and the ability to enforce those trade agreements at a global scale that allows Americans to think, oh yeah, my interests are totally identified with the rest of the world's interests.
00:54:04.559 --> 00:54:06.079
That's the definition of hegemony, right?
00:54:06.159 --> 00:54:12.320
When you've imposed your particular class interests onto everyone else as supposedly a universal interest.
00:54:13.519 --> 00:54:27.519
No, I think it's a really important point to make and an important thing to understand about how this policy ultimately works and why there's so much kind of excitement about the global expansion of the internet, even though there are other things that are associated with it as well.
00:54:27.679 --> 00:54:31.920
And so obviously there's a lot that kind of happens in that intervening period, right?
00:54:32.000 --> 00:54:33.679
And we've talked about pieces of it.
00:54:33.840 --> 00:54:56.480
We certainly can't get to everything, but obviously in the past number of years, we have seen a significant or like the beginnings of a more significant shift in the US approach to its policy on the internet, internet infrastructure, other kinds of aspects of the tech industry that we haven't really seen as much, I would say, in those past recent decades, right?
00:54:56.639 --> 00:55:09.280
Where we have seen actions under the Trump administration around companies like Huawei, and now these things continuing into the Biden administration with the CHIPS Act and the potential action against TikTok and other things like that.
00:55:09.599 --> 00:55:20.800
So, what explains why the United States is making these radical shifts away from this more kind of open approach to
technology in the internet in this moment?
00:55:21.360 --> 00:55:28.320
Yeah, I think it's it's probably most helpful to talk here about things that are not specific to the US.
00:55:28.559 --> 00:55:42.639
So I would probably frame it as like two kind of general trends, you know, and one is like what the tech sector, and I think we can say that quite narrowly in the 2000s and 2010s, even the 90s, identified with software development.
00:55:42.719 --> 00:55:48.719
You know, what software development did to national economic development in a bunch of different places, including in China.
00:55:48.960 --> 00:55:56.320
And then how the rest of the international political economy has changed since the height of free trade liberalization in the 1990s.
00:55:56.559 --> 00:56:11.840
So I think it's just a reality that by the kind of like mini recession that we get during China's withdrawal in the 2015-2016 era, which you know comes back to hit especially like American Rust Belt states pretty hard, may have helped get Trump elected.
00:56:12.079 --> 00:56:16.480
We have a growing dissatisfaction with the tech sector, what we've often called the tech lash.
00:56:16.639 --> 00:56:21.599
This I think accelerates after Trump's election in the US, especially because of the concern of disinformation.
00:56:21.840 --> 00:56:25.840
But this is a broadly shared sentiment across the entire world.
00:56:26.000 --> 00:56:27.599
Part of it is political.
00:56:27.760 --> 00:56:40.239
Um, folks are everywhere, are extremely worried about social media and the power that a few American companies have to determine what counts as speech in large swabs of the world.
00:56:40.400 --> 00:56:49.599
You know, in some places, especially Facebook is identified not just with the content provider, but with the entire internet through their the way they package themselves with mobile services.
00:56:49.760 --> 00:56:55.039
And so a lot of people are worried about the power of these um platform companies and their effects on the macroeconomy.
00:56:55.119 --> 00:57:13.440
You know, it became pretty obvious to a lot of people, and I think this is the driving force behind um what people have called Biden's kind of supply-side liberalism, is that while software development made a lot of people very, very rich, there was even less trickle down there than in other places where you expected some trickle down in part because of the production process.
00:57:13.599 --> 00:57:19.440
Like you don't really need to employ that many people, and they're all of a relatively similar background.
00:57:19.760 --> 00:57:27.280
And the externalities are not that serious in the way that you would think of like large manufacturing or even like a big school or something like that.
00:57:27.440 --> 00:57:31.119
They're not building up larger ecosystems of anything besides software development.
00:57:31.280 --> 00:57:39.519
People talk about the kind of like Japanification of industrial economies in the post-recession period as being like, you know, a lost decade.
00:57:39.599 --> 00:57:46.000
Like we really did not have much wage growth or much job growth post-recession, especially in Europe.
00:57:46.159 --> 00:57:54.239
So I think there is this growing resentment across the world that placing all our eggs in the American software development basket just did not work.
00:57:54.400 --> 00:58:03.519
It just did not give us the job growth, it did not give us the wage returns, it did not give us the things that we needed besides like people being priced out of major downtown cores.
00:58:03.679 --> 00:58:04.480
So that's one thing.
00:58:04.639 --> 00:58:07.360
Everybody is feeling that all at the same time.
00:58:07.599 --> 00:58:14.480
And so the US is getting more suspicious about software developments, about these large platforms at the same time as everybody else's.
00:58:14.639 --> 00:58:22.639
You can see that in China with the recent kind of crackdown on tech executives, which is you know part of a larger crackdown on things like these tutoring companies and stuff like that.
00:58:22.719 --> 00:58:27.920
But there is a sense that these people have gotten too big for their britches and have kind of distorted the local state.
00:58:28.000 --> 00:58:31.360
That's interpreted in China as like they're challenging the party power.
00:58:31.599 --> 00:58:32.800
But same thing elsewhere.
00:58:32.960 --> 00:58:54.000
The other thing that's happening is that like the liberalization seems like a great idea for those people that are already on top of the value chain and are saying, like, okay, if we privatize all of your country's resources and maximize its openness to the free market, that's going to be great for us because we have a bunch of new low-wage exporters to process our iPhones or whatever.
00:58:54.159 --> 00:59:00.639
And that was really like the American dream for trade liberalization, is to see like China as the world's factory.
00:59:00.800 --> 00:59:01.440
That was great.
00:59:01.599 --> 00:59:02.880
They really liked that.
00:59:03.119 --> 00:59:12.000
The problem is that China in particular, and I would say absolutely South Korea, Japan, and West Germany did this earlier, Vietnam to an extent.
00:59:12.239 --> 00:59:21.119
These places did what everyone said they should do, which is move up the value chain throughout that period of globalization.
00:59:21.280 --> 00:59:27.440
And they often did it in ways that were not the kind of American path to doing things, especially in Vietnam and China.
00:59:27.519 --> 00:59:31.679
You have a fairly strong central state that is orienting this kind of economic development.
00:59:31.920 --> 00:59:41.920
But these places start to move into value-added manufacturing, they start to move into infrastructure development, they start to move into services, they start to move into web development.
00:59:42.079 --> 00:59:54.239
So I think, frankly, a lot of the American reaction to TikTok in
particular is wait a second, I thought we were the software guys, I thought we were the platform guys, I thought we were the surveillance capitalism guys.
00:59:54.400 --> 00:59:57.599
And now you have some Chinese guy coming in and telling me what to do with that?
00:59:57.760 --> 00:59:58.559
No way, Jose.
00:59:58.639 --> 00:59:59.840
Like that's my business.
01:00:00.079 --> 01:00:10.960
So I think the what they had hoped for in the 90s was like a global market for American goods and a global suppliers of low-wage labor to put those goods together.
01:00:11.199 --> 01:00:20.159
But what actually happened is that especially Chinese companies end up competing with a kind of leaner and meaner capitalism than Americans did.
01:00:20.400 --> 01:00:40.159
I remember in 2015, 2016, when you had Chinese venture capitalists in a room, they would usually say, like, and not incorrectly, if you want to start a company that can run into regulatory problems, you know, something like computer vision or something, which is always a touchy surveillance topic, you should come to China.
01:00:40.320 --> 01:00:41.599
You should do it in China.
01:00:41.760 --> 01:00:46.000
You will have less resistance from the state here than you will in the US.
01:00:46.159 --> 01:00:50.320
You know, we don't have all those burdensome regulations because I can pay off my local party guy.
01:00:50.480 --> 01:00:51.679
And that may have been true for a while.
01:00:51.760 --> 01:01:09.440
It's not, I don't think it's true anymore, but there was the openness of capitalism that was pursued in the 90s ended up all through the stack, from the chips to the infrastructure to the web development, ended up producing a new set of lean, mean companies that really challenge American hegemony.
01:01:09.519 --> 01:01:11.840
And Americans are not used to that.
01:01:12.239 --> 01:01:27.039
Yeah, when you we see these developments, like it's very clear how the Chinese have become very competitive with the United States, and that this is driving, in particular, much of the response against you know, Chinese companies because they're the biggest competitors that US firms are facing.
01:01:27.199 --> 01:01:39.199
And I wonder, you know, you talked there about how the United States kind of saw itself as making this software and kind of designing these things, and then China in particular was going to be the factory where all this was created.
01:01:39.360 --> 01:01:43.039
And then that was kind of you know how this kind of arrangement was going to work.
01:01:43.280 --> 01:02:01.760
But it seems that especially when we look at like Huawei and to a lesser degree the CHIPS Act and some of these other concerns about kind of, I guess, the critical minerals and you know, electric cars more broadly, because this is also kind of coming in with the regulations that the Biden administration is putting on electric car development and things like that.
01:02:01.920 --> 01:02:05.920
It looks like what we're seeing is kind of in part the consequence of that decision, right?
01:02:06.079 --> 01:02:08.559
We're not going to make very much in the United States.
01:02:08.719 --> 01:02:10.800
We're going to allow it to be made in China.
01:02:10.960 --> 01:02:29.360
And then as a result, China is learning from that manufacturing process, moving up the supply chain, gaining additional skills, and coming back to be able to compete with US firms who have lost a lot of that kind of, I guess, institutional knowledge on the production side, even as but they've been doing something else.
01:02:29.679 --> 01:02:44.239
Yeah, I think in general, what you're seeing with the Biden administration, this kind of supply-side liberalism, is a recognition of the divergence between the interests of global capital, if we can say there is such a thing, and the American state.
01:02:44.480 --> 01:02:48.800
And in the 90s, it was very easy to say those two things were the same.
01:02:48.960 --> 01:02:51.519
And perhaps even through the 2000s.
01:02:51.920 --> 01:02:57.840
The process whereby pretty much every American shipmaker, besides Intel, no longer makes their own ships.
01:02:58.000 --> 01:02:59.280
And this is relatively recent development.
01:02:59.360 --> 01:03:08.719
So there's a guy, Jerry Sanders, who's head of AMD, said sometime in the 90s, like, real men have fabs, uh, real men have fabrication plants where they make their own chips.
01:03:08.800 --> 01:03:10.960
Um, AMD now does not make its own chips.
01:03:11.199 --> 01:03:18.639
But this was seen as like a post-war style vertical integration where you would design the thing and build the thing.
01:03:18.880 --> 01:03:22.639
These days, America has a ton of chip designers.
01:03:22.800 --> 01:03:24.639
They're at the top of the value chain there.
01:03:24.880 --> 01:03:33.039
But bar Intel and some folks like lower down on the value chain who make like you know single-use stuff for like your car windows or whatever.
01:03:33.280 --> 01:03:36.159
We mostly don't fabricate a ton of chips.
01:03:36.639 --> 01:03:39.360
And the market is still very concentrated.
01:03:39.440 --> 01:03:48.320
Like it's pretty much just South Korea, the US, and China and Taiwan, and China is really, frankly, a distant fourth, that fabricate ships.
01:03:48.559 --> 01:03:56.079
But today, the most important ship-making company in the world is TSMC, it's Taiwanese semiconductors.
01:03:56.320 --> 01:03:58.639
And they do not design their own ships.
01:03:59.039 --> 01:04:04.559
They are a foundry who takes other people's designs and then manufactures them at scale.
01:04:04.880 --> 01:04:11.519
Probably the most important company in the world in terms of its kind of strategic value to everything that we make.
01:04:11.599 --> 01:04:17.760
You know, some people say that, you know, 50% of devices with a semiconductor in them have something from TSMC.
01:04:17.840 --> 01:04:20.079
You know, they produce Apple's chips, for example.
01:04:20.400 --> 01:04:23.599
And they're in Taiwan, you know, they're right across the street.
01:04:23.840 --> 01:04:28.480
If stuff pops off, that's the linchpin of the global economy right there.
01:04:29.119 --> 01:04:43.920
And that's the moment when folks in the national security apparatus start to get a little nervous and they say, well, you know, it's probably not true that China can just take TSMC and start producing its chips just like they did before for all the reasons you said.
01:04:44.000 --> 01:04:47.280
There's a lot of like skill involved, a lot of learned things.
01:04:47.440 --> 01:04:54.320
Um, especially in chip fabrication, the like design and fab work hand in hand.
01:04:54.400 --> 01:05:00.800
Like there's a lot of trial and error as you learn to use the tools and you adjust them to this particular place, and that feeds back back into the design.
01:05:01.119 --> 01:05:10.400
But it still makes people really nervous that that kind of thing is right there, right across the coast from China in a country that China does not believe exists.
01:05:10.639 --> 01:05:23.920
And so I think a lot of the kind of supply-side liberalism on ships, and then especially with infrastructure in Huawei, which is not really a place that Americans compete with, like most of Huawei's competition is Scandinavian.
01:05:24.000 --> 01:05:25.519
It's like Ericsson and Nokia.
01:05:26.079 --> 01:05:38.800
You're recognizing that the military is scared that they don't have control over these crucial components that are essential to everything in the world, but especially to American military superiority.
01:05:38.960 --> 01:05:42.239
You know, this is American military superiority and free trade.
01:05:42.320 --> 01:05:48.559
It was very visibly linked with the kind of smart bombs that we saw in the 90s live on CNN.
01:05:49.119 --> 01:05:59.599
And there's a decent argument that that is what is giving Ukraine such an advantage over Russia right now, or at least what is allowing Ukraine to prolong a protracted war that.
01:06:00.239 --> 01:06:03.760
would think that a much larger military would be able to win very quickly.
01:06:04.239 --> 01:06:11.920
So we have seen that those the interests of the American state and global capital are at least intention in this way.
01:06:12.159 --> 01:06:14.480
And the CHIPS Act is designed to correct that.
01:06:14.639 --> 01:06:15.840
It's not a ton of money.
01:06:16.000 --> 01:06:20.639
I think it's like something like$40 billion is incentives for Fabs and then more for RD.
01:06:20.880 --> 01:06:30.719
$40 billion is like one fabrication plant that takes three years to get online and is not going to be a top of the line kind of thing that you would put in an iPhone.
01:06:30.800 --> 01:06:36.320
Those are like more mature markets for chips that would go inside cars or toys or something like that.
01:06:36.559 --> 01:06:41.920
But it's trying to reshore or at least inshore companies like TSMC.
01:06:42.239 --> 01:06:49.280
It's trying to invest in RD so that American manufacturing can be more closely aligned with our chip designs.
01:06:49.440 --> 01:06:55.519
It's certainly not like the kind of like moonshot thing that would you know say like Intel is our national champion.
01:06:55.679 --> 01:07:00.159
We're going to pour so much money into Intel that they're basically nationalized.
01:07:00.239 --> 01:07:07.360
It's not that it is a recognition that there's a problem and they're trying to put the cat back in the bag.
01:07:07.599 --> 01:07:10.159
Whether that's going to be successful, I don't know.
01:07:10.400 --> 01:07:19.920
The sanctions against Huawei, you know, a little further up the stack in infrastructure were very, very harsh for a couple years and it really destroyed Huawei's revenue.
01:07:20.079 --> 01:07:21.360
But they're profitable again.
01:07:21.440 --> 01:07:27.199
You know, they're down 30 or 40% from where they were in 2018 or so before the sanctions started hitting.
01:07:27.360 --> 01:07:38.800
But they're profitable again and they seem to have been able to pour enough money into RD that they can develop their own chips and stuff that was prohibited from sanctions with US suppliers.
01:07:39.039 --> 01:07:46.480
So it may be that this just forces Chinese companies to create their own ecosystem, which would maybe backfire a little bit.
01:07:46.719 --> 01:07:54.559
But you are realizing now that this economic liberalization of the 1990s with these tech markets has come back to bite us in the butt.
01:07:54.719 --> 01:07:58.639
And that's what the Biden administration is trying to solve and that's what the Trump administration was trying to solve.
01:07:58.719 --> 01:08:02.000
I think there's much more continuity here than we think.
01:08:02.400 --> 01:08:12.480
Yeah it's interesting to see that kind of almost bipartisan aspect to it right where you know Trump was really pushing a lot of these things, I think, but then Biden has very much adopted them.
01:08:12.639 --> 01:08:27.039
And I think going back to the 90s when we were talking about you know it wasn't just Clinton and Gore and the Democrats who were interested in pushing the internet in this way, but Newt Gingrich and the Republicans were kind of right on board with this broader vision that was kind of going along with that.
01:08:27.199 --> 01:08:30.960
You know, we were talking about more of the kind of tech manufacturing side of it.
01:08:31.119 --> 01:09:04.720
We were talking about the Chips Act and Huawei but then there has also been this focus on TikTok and like some other kind of more technology services that are coming out of China as well that are competing with major service companies like Facebook and Instagram in this case in if we're thinking about services, but also you look at Xin and other kind of e-commerce companies that are competing with Amazon, for example, you know, there's recent rumblings that now that you know TikTok has been in the
spotlight, Xin might be getting in the spotlight kind of next it might be the next kind of focus.
01:09:04.880 --> 01:09:19.119
So what do you make of about this aspect of it where obviously there are a lot of arguments that are being made around why TikTok needs to be getting this attention that as I talked to Shoshana Wodinski about, like doesn't seem to really be accurate, right?
01:09:19.359 --> 01:09:29.039
A lot of the problems that are being identified with TikTok are the case for much of social media, but the regulatory action is only against TikTok specifically or proposed regulatory action.
01:09:29.279 --> 01:09:36.239
So how do you see the approach on the service side of things instead of as distinct from I guess the kind of Huawei and chip stuff?
01:09:36.720 --> 01:09:41.119
Honestly I do think like the approach to TikTok is relatively consistent in so far as like it's bad when China does it.
01:09:41.279 --> 01:09:42.159
That's consistent.
01:09:42.399 --> 01:09:57.439
I don't doubt that there is, you know, despite whatever financial maneuvering that makes it a an entirely private company with data stored in the US, as your excellent Jackman article pointed out I'm sure that there is still some Chinese Communist Party interest in white dance writ large.
01:09:57.600 --> 01:10:08.880
I mean they would be stupid not to just as the US would be stupid not to maintain interests in Facebook, Twitter, et cetera I mean we've seen plenty of like even like county level American law enforcement getting cooperation from Facebook.
01:10:09.039 --> 01:10:13.199
So I am sure the most powerful military in the history of the world is doing the same.
01:10:13.439 --> 01:10:15.439
And the Stone Revolution has told us exactly that.
01:10:15.520 --> 01:10:16.560
It's all through the stack.
01:10:16.640 --> 01:10:21.359
You know everything that they're scared of Huawei doing is exactly what we've been able to get ATT to Verizon.
01:10:21.840 --> 01:10:22.880
It's just China does it.
01:10:22.960 --> 01:10:23.520
So it's bad.
01:10:23.760 --> 01:10:26.239
So I I think that's relatively consistent there.
01:10:26.640 --> 01:10:44.159
The other thing I would say and I think your your point the comparison of Xian is a really good one and reminded of some lessons I've gotten from like scholars of intellectual property and race like Anjali Vatch or Liz Roman that intellectual property and you really saw this in the 90s with like the WTO agreements is inherently racialized.
01:10:44.319 --> 01:10:55.199
And there is a global hierarchy set by these trade agreements that specifies like who is a creator, who is a consumer and who is allowed to do what kind of creation.
01:10:55.520 --> 01:11:10.880
Even within Chinese finance circles or even outside investors who invest in China, everyone was kind of shocked at the success of ByteDance and TikTok just because like that kind of like cultural phenomenon was not something that people expected to come out of China.
01:11:11.279 --> 01:11:18.640
They had invested into as more as a producer of low-value commodities, not this kind of mass cultural phenomenon.
01:11:24.560 --> 01:11:28.640
Alipay to an extent, you know, TV like the wandering earth like that kind of thing.
01:11:28.800 --> 01:11:37.760
I think there is this sense from Western viewers that TikTok is exceptional because it's doing things that the Chinese economy shouldn't.
01:11:37.840 --> 01:11:43.600
It has broken the global hierarchy of creatorship, which is you know generally a color line.
01:11:43.840 --> 01:12:01.520
And I think you can read the accusations against TikTok alongside accusations of like copy theft in China as the place where like copyright goes to die, the place that we have to watch out for unless they take our movies and pirate our stuff from our brilliant Hollywood people.
01:12:01.680 --> 01:12:03.359
And it feels like pretty much the same thing.
01:12:03.520 --> 01:12:12.720
You're able to put a military gloss onto it because of surveillance advertising but ultimately I think it's rebelling against people who have gotten too far up the value chain.
01:12:13.039 --> 01:12:20.479
And I guess you know the final question to kind of reflect on all this is obviously the US is kind of changing its approach here, right?
01:12:20.640 --> 01:12:23.279
Because it is facing greater competition from China.
01:12:23.439 --> 01:12:50.000
It's also facing, as you were saying, you know, the greater kind of scrutiny of the tech industry in general do you think that its measures, that its policy approaches are actually going to work in defending kind of American tech hegemony from the competition it's facing from China or does it feel like the cat is kind of out of the bag here and we're in for quite a different kind of tech ecosystem or whatever you want to call it moving forward?
01:12:50.319 --> 01:12:57.760
Yeah I mean there's not a button that Grandpa Joe can push to that says stop neoliberalism on it.
01:12:57.920 --> 01:13:03.520
I don't think there's any one moment that's going to tell us that we've escaped you know whatever an earlier era is.
01:13:03.840 --> 01:13:22.239
This trend towards a more fragmented national internet I think has been going for a while and we continue into that direction where for reasons of protectionism, for reason of surveillance, both of which can you know have perfectly legit national interests involved even if I wouldn't like them that'll continue.
01:13:22.479 --> 01:13:32.159
For chips specifically and I the EU just passed their own even smaller bill you know that's when you realize they're a monetary union and not a fiscal one.
01:13:32.560 --> 01:13:38.560
The actual dollar amounts I don't think are significant enough to really move the needle.
01:13:38.720 --> 01:13:45.600
I mean like TSMC is putting something like 20 billion a year into RD alone and that's just that one company.
01:13:45.760 --> 01:13:50.880
Their largest fabrication plants are
worth hundreds of billions of dollars.
01:13:51.199 --> 01:13:58.560
You're really not changing the price of those items coming into the US I don't think it's enough to change the needle all by itself.
01:13:58.640 --> 01:14:19.439
I think there is an ecosystem effect whereby you know Huawei starts insuring, starts doing all of its stuff in China, the US through chips, through the IRA, through you know increased protectionism, through strategic decisions at Intel, who may actually be fabricating less moving forward all of those things I think start working together with Europe.
01:14:19.760 --> 01:14:23.279
Europe is frankly a little worried about the IRA and the CHIPS Act.
01:14:23.600 --> 01:14:27.920
They don't produce much chips wise there besides chips for German autos.
01:14:28.560 --> 01:14:37.760
As all those things taken together can start to move the needle where I think you really start to see immediate effects are stuff targeting personnel.
01:14:38.239 --> 01:14:52.079
So this is most visible in like holding the chairman of Huawei in jail for multiple years in Canada at the US's request for purportedly providing parts to Iran.
01:14:52.720 --> 01:15:15.920
But that is visible in a bunch of smaller actions where the sanctions against the Chinese semiconductor plants or fabs, the sanctions against Huawei are making it more and more difficult for example for like people of dual citizenship to work in one country or the other they have to choose and stick with that choice.
01:15:16.159 --> 01:15:25.039
It's making it harder for say like Dutch company ASMML who makes these basically lasers that are really important to cutting edge microchips.
01:15:25.119 --> 01:15:26.720
They're the only company in the world that can do it.
01:15:27.039 --> 01:15:29.840
It makes it much harder for them to work with Chinese companies.
01:15:30.079 --> 01:15:42.000
So I think these kinds of sanctions that are mostly done through the US Department of Commerce by placing these companies on the entity list, like that stuff is as much of a threat, if not more, than any American industrial program.
01:15:42.079 --> 01:15:48.399
So it's it's likely that this kind of old-fashioned protectionism, I think, is just as effective as like building up our own domestic supply.
01:15:48.720 --> 01:15:55.119
You know, we are really at a moment here where it does seem like there's an attempt to shift something in the global order around this.
01:15:55.199 --> 01:16:03.279
And so I think it's so important not just to understand that history of where this all came from but also the reasons why these things are shifting in this moment.
01:16:03.520 --> 01:16:09.039
And so I'm really happy that I was able to get your insight on this Dan Thanks again for taking the time to chat.
01:16:09.279 --> 01:16:11.760
Always a pleasure Paris and I agree this is really really important.
01:16:11.920 --> 01:16:13.199
We don't know what's going to happen next.
01:16:13.279 --> 01:16:18.239
We really don't and I think anyone that tells you that they know what's going to happen next to you is should not be trusted.
01:16:19.680 --> 01:16:23.920
Shoshana Wodinski is a freelance reporter and writes the tube's newsletter.
01:16:24.159 --> 01:16:29.279
Daniel Green is an assistant professor at the University of Maryland and the author of The Promise of Access.
01:16:29.760 --> 01:16:39.840
You can follow Shoshana on Twitter at at s wadinsky and you can follow Dan at at green underscore DM you can follow me at at Piratesmarks and you can follow the show at at tech won't save us.
01:16:40.000 --> 01:16:51.119
Tech won't save us is produced by Eric Wickham and it's part of the Arbinger Media Network and if you want to support the work that goes into making it every week you can go to patreon.com slash tech won't save us to become a supporter thanks for listening