TRANSKRIPTIO 🔗
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Hello and welcome to the Bitcoin.review podcast, where we explore developments
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and projects with the people who actually make them happen.
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The show is supported by Pod 2.0, SaaT Streaming and CoinKite.
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If you're a new listener, I'm NVK, I run CoinKite, where we've been helping
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people secure their Bitcoins for over a decade.
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We make the cold card and fun products like the Block Clock.
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You can find more information about it on CoinKite.com.
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Hello and welcome back to the Bitcoin.review podcast.
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It's been a little while.
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We've been doing this a little bit less frequently because, you know, you guys
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are just not shipping enough.
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We need more updates.
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But nothing is happening on Bitcoin.
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Today I have with me Mr. Seared Salmon.
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He's back.
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Hey, coming in blind like the Bybit signer.
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How you doing?
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Good, man.
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I blind co-signed that.
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And on my right, I have Mr. Rob de Hamilton from Anchor Watch.
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Hey, thanks for having me.
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Oh, man, they're coming in hot.
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It's blind and hot.
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All right.
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Quick housekeeping, Unleash the chat rebrands to datamachine.ai, enables Nasr
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Wallet Connect and a bunch of other stuff.
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Go have fun there with some AI DVMs and Nasr.
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I'm in right now.
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I'm not paying attention to the show now.
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I'm just going to be doing this the whole time.
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That was like two clicks with Nasr Wallet Connect.
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I'm already in.
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Yes.
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You know, we're just starting the show with words solid right from the top.
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Yeah, we want everyone to be asleep right away.
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That's right.
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All right.
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Let's get into the vulnerability disclosures.
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ECDSA private key extraction upon signing a malforming to input in Elliptic
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library vulnerability disclosure.
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This was on a JavaScript implementation, of course.
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So kids, don't use cryptographic libraries that are in JavaScript.
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You know, try to import the C version of it or something else.
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Anything but JavaScript.
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JavaScript is great to animate the stuff on the UI, but that's just about it.
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Hold on, it's up now.
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So this was...
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It says here it's because the hex strings were accepted as input types and that
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leads to potential non-series, right?
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That's like level one stuff.
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Like we're in Snorland now and people are still having ECDSA issues.
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They weren't they weren't doing type checking.
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You know, you could almost create the theory that Snor was made closed IP wise
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so that ECDSA and RSA were released so that people would never be able to
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create implementations that are safe.
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That those folks would be able to get into it.
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Whoa.
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That was an NVK John's take on that.
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I mean, it's funny because like even JavaScript, I mean, like it has a thing
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called TypeScript where you can do typing that could have just added types to
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do type validation.
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That's that's incredible.
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They're just like they were just taking that data and wow.
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This goes to really not just like the danger of using non-standard libraries
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when it comes to really important things.
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It's also the peer reviewing, right?
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Like you want to have something that's open and sitting there.
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And this is where like LibSecP in Bitcoin 4, like there's a whole section in
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that GitHub repo, which is just the cryptography, the math.
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It's like math.exe. Like it's just like the entire just like here's all this
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and everyone's looking at it and it's open source.
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Like everyone in the world very slowly, methodically goes through changes.
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And it's pretty wild that something like that in a library that people are
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probably using for their JavaScript models.
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That too, there's really funny like you can see JavaScript jokes where it's
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like one plus like the string zero gives you 10.
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So they're just taking numbers and string and they get all like all over the
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place.
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Like it's scary.
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It is.
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And then and then what what the folks do, they just load it from a CDN
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without checking the hash of the library.
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Right.
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NPM install, smash.
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It's funny, we actually don't allow NPN stuff in pretty much most of the things
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we do, including servers, except for side projects.
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So one of our guys like does the Node stuff and then and then like we
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can't run locally unless he precompiles stuff for us.
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It's like Node is literally not allowed on the computer.
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I'm guessing you don't feel so happy about Cargo either for that reason.
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Oh, God, that's the Rust version.
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Basically, the package manager.
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Yes.
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Are they signing the stuff?
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And like, is there like a proper sort of chain of of a validation?
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And yeah, so there's a so this crates.io, which is actually like the repo
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equivalent of like where the stuff sits.
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To my knowledge, there isn't formal signing of the libraries.
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I'm actually looking into that right now.
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But you can but you have clean hashes like and the nature of a compiled time
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language like Rust where you can kind of mitigate these things because you're
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like you can do determine it like you can look at it and build it out
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ahead of time.
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Yeah.
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You'd think of why are there no better solutions for all these things?
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You know, hi Spooks.
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They're the ones they're the only ones awake at this point.
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We just got a few more Virginia listeners.
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So hi.
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US East one just spiked.
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Well, there's like two solutions, right?
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Like there's your solution, MBK, where the tried and true BSD minimal
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dependency, you've audited it a million times, you're comfortable.
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--> 00:06:22.980
And there's like the new kids, which is like Nix where everything is hashed out
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and you look at the hash and you can deploy an environment specific just for
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one purpose.
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And one instance, there's probably like in between.
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I think the challenge is, you know, if you want to iterate fast, you know,
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you're going to break shit.
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So it goes with that.
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What I like about the FreeBSD approach in a way is that it's very few people
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who are allowed to really merge or do anything.
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And then, you know, they're less open, in my view, to social attacks, you know,
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like and having or having somebody sort of like be trying to squeeze in
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something after being trusted, like we saw.
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What was the project that we saw that happening?
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Was was not OpenSSL, I think it was something else.
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I mean, there was a couple of those in the past year where like people were
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just trying to like merge things in and they found out they were like in the
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tests dumping a bunch of base 64 strings that were actually executing code.
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Was it the XZ stuff on Terminal?
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Yeah, there you go.
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Yes, that was it.
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Yeah, I mean, like the problem is that like when you're making critical like
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security, critical stuff, like you just can't break things.
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Right.
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And it's very hard to defend against like trusted contributors.
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Right.
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Like you have to review every goddamn space that they put in.
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Right.
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Like every character, everything.
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And like that really slows down everything.
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So, so, yeah, I mean, it's not like a super easy to solve problem unless, you
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know, like we get the AIs to go and sort of double check everything.
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But even then, it's like who trained the models?
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Mitigations would be you'd like run your own mirror of the packages.
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Right.
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And then you would like be like, these are the ones I'm running.
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I'm not going to pull it
from random server.
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I'm going to pull it from my own server and check the hashes.
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But what happened was like, you know, a trusted subcontributor pushed in a
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backdoor into a master.
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For that one specifically.
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No, it's specifically that one.
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I was thinking about the earlier one with, you know, with CreatesIO for Rust or
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NPM, Node, whatever, for JavaScript.
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Like you at least like at least host the libraries on your own server.
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So you're not just like randomly having a server to do stuff.
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But who's reviewing, like who's auditing all the dependencies?
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Right.
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That's always the question.
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There's a there's a value for a company to do that, where they just like sit
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on top of these.
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And then you could charge for like being able to pull the reviewed libraries.
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Yeah, that's right.
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It's hilarious.
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I didn't even know what XZ was or I was using it until I tried brew
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install vim.
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And apparently it was there.
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Yeah, it's on everything.
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I don't think anybody knows all these dependencies and all the packages that
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they're using.
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It's pretty brutal.
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All right.
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Next, ESP32 security concerns.
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We had a very interesting CVE.
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The release of the CVE was a little fuddy.
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However, their mistake on that article was not supporting it with the other
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problems that it has to validate their security concern.
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So essentially, like this, these guys are trying to sell like a security
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analysis product or whatever.
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But they found a bunch of undocumented commands on the ESP32 Bluetooth and, you
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know, they essentially allow for a lot of backdoors.
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The thing is, you need to be running like custom firmware on it.
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Now, you know, what people and they forgot to mention there is it's very easy
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to run custom firmware and bypass the secure boot on ESP32.
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There is a bunch of exploits on it.
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There is even unpatched exploits on it.
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And yeah, I mean, ESP32 is just not a good platform for building secure things.
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It was designed for you to make very cool Christmas lights, blink, block
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clocks, other things that are not holding Bitcoin.
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I find that the lack of visibility on the secure boot bypass issues that ESP32
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have like to be not great.
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It should come to the forefront.
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There is this nice little website there called ESP32.fail. It has a list of a
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lot of ESP32 exploits.
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Looking through them now.
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So I won't say the name of the person because I didn't get their permission to.
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But they told me this was three years ago that they have actually seen ESP32s
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that had Bluetooth disabled get remotely hacked at a DEF CON conference to turn
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back on remotely.
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So they didn't even have physical access to the device.
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They were able to remotely re-enable Bluetooth.
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I haven't looked through all of these CVEs yet.
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I mean, how many do we have?
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We have CVE.
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My list was shorter than the list on that website, but there is more.
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Yeah, there's 30 here.
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There's 30 CVEs.
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And a lot of them are only fixable via Silicon, right?
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That's the very scary part, I think.
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And then there is the third part, which is like, you know, I'm not going to
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shit on a specific hardware wallet, but there is a popular hardware wallet
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that's based on ESP32 and it's programmed in China.
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So, you know, like technically you don't even need to bypass the secure boot if
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you're like if you're a Chinese factory loading these.
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The supply chain, yeah.
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It's tricky, right?
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Now, if you had a very good secure boot chain, technically the factory
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shouldn't be a big issue because, you know, like you have confidence on that on
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the chain and you can push things.
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So so anyways,
it's it's just it's just not great.
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It's scary.
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People shouldn't be using these platforms, you know, like I'm going to be like,
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you know, great screaming about these things in 20 years from now, 30 years
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from now and still going to be the same problem.
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So, you know, we're going to bitch about it.
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We're going to bring it up.
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People are still going to do it.
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And until people lose money, they are not going to change.
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But I think the worst part is a lot of people are going to lose money
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without knowing that that's how they lost the money, that that is the best part
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of these attacks is that you will not know how the money disappeared.
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You're going to think you got your backup compromised or something, but it
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really was through something like this.
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It is scary.
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If you live in a condo, Bluetooth is a good 50 meters with basic 50 meters
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is a lot of floors.
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Every floor is what, like two and a half meters, three meters or something like
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that.
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So there you go.
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And then you add a little bit of a high gain antenna to a standard module.
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Like, boom, you have the whole building.
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Oh, wait, there is also a building in front of you.
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Oh, look, all this kind of people now being pawned.
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Right.
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Like it is tricky.
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00:13:19.740 --> 00:13:25.920
I highly discourage people having any device that for Bitcoin that has
249
00:13:25.920 --> 00:13:30.660
Bluetooth in it, because unless you can disable the Bluetooth physically, like
250
00:13:30.660 --> 00:13:35.360
cut traces or do something that Bluetooth is there, it could be re-enabled by
251
00:13:35.360 --> 00:13:35.800
software.
252
00:13:36.680 --> 00:13:39.660
Does this also then talk about kind of the tradeoffs if you're looking for?
253
00:13:39.800 --> 00:13:45.440
Because Bluetooth tends to be really useful for people who want to like replace
254
00:13:45.440 --> 00:13:46.360
USB, right?
255
00:13:46.360 --> 00:13:48.160
They want a way to communicate with the device.
256
00:13:48.380 --> 00:13:52.120
Is this where like NFC comes in as the better tradeoff of if you're going to
257
00:13:52.120 --> 00:13:56.160
do some sort of communication, you want to be able to like, for example, like
258
00:13:56.160 --> 00:13:58.940
if I use a hardware wallet with Bluetooth, I can connect it to my phone.
259
00:13:58.940 --> 00:14:03.680
But then if I have NFC, you're getting that same functionality with tradeoffs
260
00:14:03.680 --> 00:14:04.340
still, right?
261
00:14:04.400 --> 00:14:08.140
Compared to like a pure like it never connects online, but like a better form
262
00:14:08.140 --> 00:14:09.940
factor for communicating that data.
263
00:14:10.500 --> 00:14:12.020
There is a few things at play here.
264
00:14:12.460 --> 00:14:16.160
First is Bluetooth is an extremely complex protocol.
265
00:14:16.320 --> 00:14:18.240
It's like USB-C is a fucking disaster.
266
00:14:19.640 --> 00:14:21.000
Like, just don't have it.
267
00:14:21.560 --> 00:14:25.080
Second is was designed for mid-range radio, right?
268
00:14:25.100 --> 00:14:27.380
So it is designed for you to access remotely.
269
00:14:27.380 --> 00:14:31.820
That's why, you know, you forget your phone, even though you have your ear pods
270
00:14:31.820 --> 00:14:33.860
and you continue walking, it's still working, right?
271
00:14:34.460 --> 00:14:38.180
So with high gain antennas, you can still improve that even further to reach
272
00:14:38.180 --> 00:14:38.700
really far.
273
00:14:39.800 --> 00:14:45.260
And then third is so like NFC is a much nearer design, right?
274
00:14:45.280 --> 00:14:46.940
Like it's a lot less complex.
275
00:14:47.040 --> 00:14:48.340
There's a lot less things happening.
276
00:14:48.500 --> 00:14:51.480
And it was designed for you to be literally beside it.
277
00:14:51.480 --> 00:14:56.440
However, it's still radio with the right equipment and the right money, you
278
00:14:56.440 --> 00:14:59.480
could technically access it further away.
279
00:14:59.620 --> 00:15:02.580
But there is limits and the limits drop fast.
280
00:15:02.740 --> 00:15:03.880
It's an inverse square rule.
281
00:15:04.540 --> 00:15:08.940
Inverse square rule applies fast to something like this.
282
00:15:09.980 --> 00:15:14.340
But, you know, if you're going to use your hardware wallet for like deep code
283
00:15:14.340 --> 00:15:21.220
storage, I would still recommend like permanently disabling the NFC in any
284
00:15:21.220 --> 00:15:21.860
radio already.
285
00:15:23.000 --> 00:15:25.760
It is sketchy what you can do with it.
286
00:15:26.220 --> 00:15:26.860
You're totally right.
287
00:15:27.060 --> 00:15:31.640
It's a spectrum of like if you're looking at the full spectrum of I have a
288
00:15:31.640 --> 00:15:37.460
seed phrase sitting on my computer to like, OK, I have something that's not on
289
00:15:37.460 --> 00:15:39.360
my computer, but it's Bluetooth enabled and NFC.
290
00:15:39.560 --> 00:15:43.220
And then like something that never even talks to the Internet in between with
291
00:15:43.220 --> 00:15:44.480
Sneakernet, right?
292
00:15:44.540 --> 00:15:46.480
This is actually you were mentioning the complexity of USB-C.
293
00:15:46.480
--> 00:15:51.620
I always love the talk you did back when the VR conferences during COVID, you
294
00:15:51.620 --> 00:15:56.580
did a whole like 40 minutes on like how bad USB-C is as a spec.
295
00:15:57.120 --> 00:16:01.140
Like the whole USB spec is just because everyone it's this open thing that
296
00:16:01.140 --> 00:16:02.580
people have been building on for decades.
297
00:16:02.720 --> 00:16:05.580
So everyone just kind of keeps wedging in new things into the protocol to do
298
00:16:05.580 --> 00:16:06.120
new things.
299
00:16:06.140 --> 00:16:09.820
And then you just have an ever expanding surface area for interfacing with
300
00:16:09.820 --> 00:16:10.140
stuff.
301
00:16:10.140 --> 00:16:14.020
It's more than like having like a terabyte a second connection in the same line
302
00:16:14.020 --> 00:16:15.180
as you're like serial.
303
00:16:17.260 --> 00:16:21.700
It's like, you know, you can run a screen, you can run a toaster, you know,
304
00:16:21.720 --> 00:16:23.180
like you can make a light blink.
305
00:16:23.640 --> 00:16:24.940
Like it's insanity.
306
00:16:25.480 --> 00:16:25.720
Right.
307
00:16:25.840 --> 00:16:28.480
And every manufacturer has their own needs.
308
00:16:28.680 --> 00:16:28.920
Right.
309
00:16:29.500 --> 00:16:33.220
Because, again, it was not designed to be used for security.
310
00:16:33.960 --> 00:16:36.220
So, you know, ideally, don't use it.
311
00:16:36.320 --> 00:16:37.500
And here's the worst part.
312
00:16:38.280 --> 00:16:44.720
Pretty much all hardware wallets, the programming of their MCU is done over
313
00:16:44.720 --> 00:16:48.060
USB, either over serial or UART.
314
00:16:48.740 --> 00:16:52.900
So, you know, that's also how you do the programming.
315
00:16:53.720 --> 00:16:54.820
It's not great.
316
00:16:55.360 --> 00:16:58.700
You know, we can't change the programming because that's how the chips work.
317
00:16:58.780 --> 00:17:00.760
But just don't use the USB, right?
318
00:17:01.340 --> 00:17:02.580
It's pretty brutal that way.
319
00:17:04.000 --> 00:17:06.500
By the way, that's how you program ESP32 as well.
320
00:17:07.500 --> 00:17:15.380
I think you nailed it where, you know, ESP32 is amazing for IoT lightbulbs, for
321
00:17:15.380 --> 00:17:19.099
like homebrew sprinkler system, you know, things like that.
322
00:17:19.180 --> 00:17:24.380
But to want to secure your funds with that, it's undeniable that you're
323
00:17:24.380 --> 00:17:30.080
increasing the attack surface, maybe for the justification of a low cost just
324
00:17:30.080 --> 00:17:31.860
because of the commercial viability.
325
00:17:32.100 --> 00:17:34.040
But is that really worth it?
326
00:17:34.100 --> 00:17:35.680
It's like very short term thinking.
327
00:17:36.220 --> 00:17:39.820
Because like if you want to move fast, prototype, have a standard library that
328
00:17:39.820 --> 00:17:44.680
you can just kind of like, you know, start, go, run, like you can get like
329
00:17:44.680 --> 00:17:46.020
proof of concepts in there.
330
00:17:46.100 --> 00:17:46.220
Right.
331
00:17:46.220 --> 00:17:49.440
But then I think ideally you're talking about migrating that to a more
332
00:17:49.440 --> 00:17:52.900
restrictive area because the fact that you can quickly prototype is exactly why
333
00:17:52.900 --> 00:17:54.280
there's concerns around that.
334
00:17:54.280 --> 00:17:58.820
I think that the biggest issue is like in this industry in general, is that
335
00:17:58.820 --> 00:18:03.920
like people rightly so start with something like ESP32 or Raspberry Pis or
336
00:18:03.920 --> 00:18:07.300
something to sort of like create their product.
337
00:18:07.840 --> 00:18:08.020
Right.
338
00:18:08.640 --> 00:18:13.660
But then they don't actually do any of the work of like picking secure chips,
339
00:18:13.880 --> 00:18:17.940
building a board and putting the stuff in there and sort of like, you know,
340
00:18:17.960 --> 00:18:19.400
creating an actual secure product.
341
00:18:20.120 --> 00:18:25.060
They're essentially using like a prototyping platforms designed for you to like
342
00:18:25.060 --> 00:18:28.940
control Christmas lights, right, to create secure hardware wallets.
343
00:18:29.100 --> 00:18:30.420
Like it just doesn't work.
344
00:18:30.820 --> 00:18:31.820
It was not designed for that.
345
00:18:32.600 --> 00:18:34.480
And then you end up with all this vulnerabilities.
346
00:18:34.540 --> 00:18:35.060
Right.
347
00:18:35.200 --> 00:18:39.500
It's very disappointing that, you know, it's been so long and people still
348
00:18:39.500 --> 00:18:44.400
can't like, you know, get enough talent to build a thing from scratch.
349
00:18:44.840 --> 00:18:46.360
That's the bare minimum there.
350
00:18:46.900 --> 00:18:50.220
You know, the ledger guys get a lot of flack for their, you know, backdoor as
351
00:18:50.220 --> 00:18:52.140
a service and all their new features.
352
00:18:52.480 --> 00:18:55.560
But at least those guys are playing for real.
353
00:18:55.680 --> 00:18:55.780
Right.
354
00:18:55.800 --> 00:18:57.560
Like, I mean, they have real security people.
355
00:18:57.740 --> 00:18:59.460
They're doing real security research.
356
00:19:00.200 --> 00:19:02.440
You know, they're using like real security hardware.
357
00:19:02.800 --> 00:19:05.120
You know, I want to see more of that.
358
00:19:06.320 --> 00:19:07.240
Yeah, more red teaming.
359
00:19:07.980 --> 00:19:08.420
Yes.
360
00:19:09.100 --> 00:19:09.300
Yeah.
361
00:19:09.300 --> 00:19:13.940
We used to have a lot more like criticism of security, like Bitcoin hardware in
362
00:19:13.940 --> 00:19:14.420
this market.
363
00:19:14.420 --> 00:19:18.560
I think everybody is now just sort of like quiet out because they want to sell
364
00:19:18.560 --> 00:19:19.380
more or something.
365
00:19:20.060 --> 00:19:24.080
I think that and also like the newest, the last of like the major players that
366
00:19:24.080 --> 00:19:26.400
will hold out was like the
Trezor.
367
00:19:26.520 --> 00:19:28.160
Right now, the Trezor even has a secure element.
368
00:19:28.340 --> 00:19:28.600
Like everyone.
369
00:19:28.860 --> 00:19:33.320
And now that that level of execution and integrating that stuff has gone so
370
00:19:33.320 --> 00:19:33.740
much higher.
371
00:19:33.980 --> 00:19:36.320
It's a lot harder to be like, hey, I pwned this new thing.
372
00:19:36.380 --> 00:19:36.560
Right.
373
00:19:36.600 --> 00:19:39.180
Because in the early days, everyone was just trying to figure out how to do it.
374
00:19:39.420 --> 00:19:40.780
So there's a lot of open.
375
00:19:41.040 --> 00:19:42.640
But, you know, iron sharpens iron.
376
00:19:42.640 --> 00:19:48.820
Didn't they choose the same secure element that UBI uses that just got pwned
377
00:19:48.820 --> 00:19:49.040
too?
378
00:19:49.540 --> 00:19:49.940
Did they?
379
00:19:50.460 --> 00:19:51.200
Yeah, I think so.
380
00:19:51.980 --> 00:19:53.420
I'm looking it up right now.
381
00:19:54.300 --> 00:19:56.020
I'll live fact check in a minute.
382
00:19:56.940 --> 00:19:57.760
But the.
383
00:19:58.620 --> 00:20:03.400
I think the economics of like the pwning don't make sense either, because, you
384
00:20:03.400 --> 00:20:05.400
know, you're like taking a shot in the dark.
385
00:20:05.560 --> 00:20:09.880
You're trying to pwn something maybe like a month to like four months.
386
00:20:09.920 --> 00:20:10.680
You have no idea.
387
00:20:11.000 --> 00:20:14.720
And then if you're a good person, you're going to give them like 90 days or
388
00:20:14.720 --> 00:20:18.480
something and then they're going to maybe give you like three thousand dollars.
389
00:20:20.120 --> 00:20:25.220
So the bad people usually will just take it to the dark web and try to
390
00:20:25.220 --> 00:20:26.340
exploit or something.
391
00:20:26.740 --> 00:20:26.880
Right.
392
00:20:27.020 --> 00:20:32.540
So the economics are kind of messed up for the red team, unless you're a
393
00:20:32.540 --> 00:20:36.700
behemoth like Ledger where you can actually have your dungeon team.
394
00:20:36.700 --> 00:20:38.160
Million dollar lab.
395
00:20:38.420 --> 00:20:38.680
Exactly.
396
00:20:39.200 --> 00:20:39.500
Yeah.
397
00:20:39.640 --> 00:20:41.300
So I'm looking at it live right now.
398
00:20:41.720 --> 00:20:50.940
Trezor uses the Aftiga TrustMV3 chip, which did have a exploit called EUC leak.
399
00:20:52.120 --> 00:20:55.340
And the first hit that comes up is the Trezor subreddit.
400
00:20:55.500 --> 00:20:58.900
And Stick directly replies saying that they use different cryptography than the
401
00:20:58.900 --> 00:20:59.580
one they exploited.
402
00:20:59.840 --> 00:21:01.780
So it doesn't do that.
403
00:21:01.780 --> 00:21:06.360
But I am not a security researcher that could look at that and cross verify the
404
00:21:06.360 --> 00:21:06.820
implementation.
405
00:21:08.160 --> 00:21:09.200
But Stick is saying it's not.
406
00:21:09.560 --> 00:21:10.340
It's the same chip.
407
00:21:10.640 --> 00:21:14.300
They're just using different crypto accelerators, I think, inside the chip.
408
00:21:15.120 --> 00:21:17.180
Yeah, it looks like the YubiKey one, though, was a pun.
409
00:21:17.340 --> 00:21:21.400
Yeah, it's a YubiKey 5 series, everything with firmware below 5.7. So it looks
410
00:21:21.400 --> 00:21:23.980
like it was at least not a silicon hack that you could upgrade it.
411
00:21:24.060 --> 00:21:26.260
And it was a firmware way they could upgrade it, which is nice.
412
00:21:26.460 --> 00:21:28.560
That was like about six months ago or something, right?
413
00:21:28.860 --> 00:21:29.040
Yeah.
414
00:21:29.440 --> 00:21:30.940
Yeah, it was a while back.
415
00:21:30.940 --> 00:21:31.120
Yeah.
416
00:21:32.440 --> 00:21:32.800
All right.
417
00:21:33.000 --> 00:21:39.180
CoinOS revokes Nostra Wallet Connection secrets due to security leak concerns.
418
00:21:39.800 --> 00:21:40.360
OK.
419
00:21:41.520 --> 00:21:43.620
I don't think anybody probably lost money.
420
00:21:44.260 --> 00:21:47.840
Well, I just used Nostra Wallet Connect for data machine AI.
421
00:21:48.060 --> 00:21:50.100
So maybe you're going to be posting as me soon.
422
00:21:51.000 --> 00:21:51.640
Hang on.
423
00:21:52.060 --> 00:21:52.820
We can't.
424
00:21:53.020 --> 00:21:53.960
We don't have the keys.
425
00:21:55.220 --> 00:21:56.180
I hope not.
426
00:21:56.480 --> 00:22:00.300
I don't know why they removed Nostra Wallet Connect.
427
00:22:00.300 --> 00:22:04.160
I mean, for those at home that are still awake, Nostra Wallet Connect is just a
428
00:22:04.160 --> 00:22:08.240
nice plugin that allows you to take your NSEC, your master private key on
429
00:22:08.240 --> 00:22:09.980
Nostra and being able to sign into other services.
430
00:22:10.200 --> 00:22:14.380
And you have tight access controls on what kind of events you authorize and
431
00:22:14.380 --> 00:22:16.040
what data you allow.
432
00:22:16.280 --> 00:22:18.280
And for how long you open up that connection.
433
00:22:19.120 --> 00:22:20.480
But yeah, that's interesting.
434
00:22:21.680 --> 00:22:21.780
Yeah.
435
00:22:22.540 --> 00:22:26.280
You sent me a DM here with some data machine AI.
436
00:22:27.460 --> 00:22:28.080
I did.
437
00:22:28.380 --> 00:22:29.120
I did not show you.
438
00:22:29.920 --> 00:22:30.940
I'm not going to share.
439
00:22:34.140 --> 00:22:35.060
Just kidding.
440
00:22:36.020 --> 00:22:37.220
Hang on a second.
441
00:22:41.440 --> 00:22:46.720
Let's move on, because otherwise we're going to derail the show here.
442
00:22:48.180 --> 00:22:48.580
All right.
443
00:22:48.640 --> 00:22:49.040
Next.
444
00:22:49.940 --> 00:22:55.660
So Vivek's Corner, Invalid Mining Jobs by Ampu and Friends during Fork.
445
00:22:56.080 --> 00:22:57.320
Vivek, do you want to talk about that?
446
00:22:57.320 --> 00:23:01.380
I mean, I just wanted it in the list more than anything.
447
00:23:02.180 --> 00:23:07.100
I think OXBTC did some more mempool and node
network analysis.
448
00:23:07.720 --> 00:23:13.440
And I saw him requesting, I think it was mempool.space to, or someone else was
449
00:23:13.440 --> 00:23:16.200
saying Ampool and Friends instead of saying they're different miners.
450
00:23:16.680 --> 00:23:21.780
So it goes back to that recurring feeling of like, how decentralized is
451
00:23:21.780 --> 00:23:24.020
template construction, things like that.
452
00:23:24.680 --> 00:23:26.700
I mean, the only way to do that is to use Ocean.
453
00:23:27.740 --> 00:23:29.320
Yeah, Datum and Stratum.
454
00:23:30.320 --> 00:23:32.580
Yeah, I mean, Stratum v3 might fix it.
455
00:23:34.800 --> 00:23:41.480
To be honest, I kept up with what's the difference between v2 and Datum still.
456
00:23:41.740 --> 00:23:45.600
But I did see that Datum dropped binary a while back.
457
00:23:45.960 --> 00:23:49.680
And also, you don't need to update your node, I think, infrastructure.
458
00:23:50.060 --> 00:23:53.820
You don't need to do a bunch of stuff to get Datum to work with existing
459
00:23:53.820 --> 00:23:54.360
systems.
460
00:23:54.460 --> 00:23:56.040
I think that was the main selling point.
461
00:23:56.720 --> 00:23:59.420
You know, people can hate on them as much as they want.
462
00:23:59.520 --> 00:24:01.500
They're the only people actually shipping shit.
463
00:24:02.220 --> 00:24:06.860
All the Stratum v2 folks, they're not really involved with miners.
464
00:24:07.280 --> 00:24:07.820
I don't know.
465
00:24:08.080 --> 00:24:09.880
It's been years and I don't see it.
466
00:24:10.020 --> 00:24:14.320
And then Datum comes around with the guys from Ocean and it's like, boom,
467
00:24:14.420 --> 00:24:14.980
things are moving.
468
00:24:15.600 --> 00:24:17.960
So shipping code is the best.
469
00:24:18.860 --> 00:24:21.780
It's like hypothetically being like, oh, there's a way we could do this versus
470
00:24:21.780 --> 00:24:22.980
like, oh, here's the pull request.
471
00:24:23.060 --> 00:24:24.300
Let's do the change, right?
472
00:24:24.300 --> 00:24:26.240
It just totally changes the conversation.
473
00:24:26.420 --> 00:24:29.400
I'm like, no, we're no longer in hypotheticals.
474
00:24:29.500 --> 00:24:30.740
Like, here's a working implementation.
475
00:24:31.460 --> 00:24:34.700
And I'm sure in the mechanics of it, there's some tradeoffs that Stratum v2
476
00:24:34.700 --> 00:24:36.460
would on paper be better.
477
00:24:36.620 --> 00:24:41.640
But having code that can do it now today is a lot easier, more scalable.
478
00:24:41.800 --> 00:24:46.580
And since it could plug into existing architecture, like mining pools aren't
479
00:24:46.580 --> 00:24:49.680
looking to do a bunch of dev work and risk the bag, right?
480
00:24:50.200 --> 00:24:52.320
They want things that are super simple and easy.
481
00:24:52.880 --> 00:24:56.660
I think the problem is like we're not going to change consensus probably for a
482
00:24:56.660 --> 00:24:59.840
while or forever, even though we all
want little things.
483
00:24:59.960 --> 00:25:01.940
Everybody wants a personal little thing in there.
484
00:25:03.400 --> 00:25:07.700
And I think because it's unlikely we get consensus changes.
485
00:25:08.660 --> 00:25:13.860
I think a lot of the heavy hitters and a lot of the people who would
486
00:25:13.860 --> 00:25:18.660
normally be championing or pushing big things like this are no longer sort of
487
00:25:18.660 --> 00:25:19.500
participating.
488
00:25:19.500 --> 00:25:24.440
So you end up with, you know, like there is the folks doing a lot of
489
00:25:24.440 --> 00:25:29.900
amazing grant work and, you know, plumbing on core, but it's all non-consensus.
490
00:25:30.120 --> 00:25:32.020
It's all just improving the software kind of thing.
491
00:25:32.320 --> 00:25:36.680
And, you know, honestly, I mean, you don't need to update the core, you really
492
00:25:36.680 --> 00:25:40.680
don't, unless there's consensus changes, right?
493
00:25:41.220 --> 00:25:49.720
And, yeah, I mean, it's what happens to almost all large FOSS protocol level
494
00:25:49.720 --> 00:25:54.840
projects is that like they just slow down on the big things, slow down on the
495
00:25:54.840 --> 00:25:59.520
big changes, and they just continue on with people bickering about small shit.
496
00:26:00.960 --> 00:26:05.820
Just to quickly take it back to Datum and Stratum, I think that was originally
497
00:26:05.820 --> 00:26:07.720
the drama there.
498
00:26:07.720 --> 00:26:13.020
I guess Datum shipped, like you guys are saying, amazing, you know, more and
499
00:26:13.020 --> 00:26:14.300
more alternatives, the better.
500
00:26:15.440 --> 00:26:20.300
And apparently Stratum V2 folks felt that there was FUD because Stratum V2
501
00:26:20.300 --> 00:26:24.100
works as is, and there were like proxy servers that could be accessed.
502
00:26:24.780 --> 00:26:29.640
So they felt that was FUD on the Datum people's part, and they were FUDing them
503
00:26:29.640 --> 00:26:34.060
back, how Datum felt that like their code was not open source.
504
00:26:34.060 --> 00:26:40.420
So I guess I think a guy named Jason shipped the binary, it was like NC,
505
00:26:40.640 --> 00:26:46.400
your favorite NVK, and, you know, you could analyze the assembly, whatever
506
00:26:46.400 --> 00:26:46.860
needed.
507
00:26:47.160 --> 00:26:52.360
I don't know the current state of things there, but it was overall positive for
508
00:26:52.360 --> 00:26:52.780
the industry.
509
00:26:53.180 --> 00:26:56.000
Yeah, we need more drama.
510
00:26:56.140 --> 00:26:57.100
We need more fights.
511
00:26:57.240 --> 00:27:01.500
We need to go back to adversarial, you know, like there's too many Kumbaya
512
00:27:01.500 --> 00:27:02.600
people now on core.
513
00:27:02.600 --> 00:27:07.280
There is a lot of commies and like, you know, like a lot of the adversarial
514
00:27:07.280 --> 00:27:11.420
people, the drug dealers, the people who cared, you know, like sort of laughed.
515
00:27:12.280
--> 00:27:19.980
So if you don't have adversarial thoughts, adversarial scuffs, like, you know,
516
00:27:20.060 --> 00:27:25.180
in security devices, in Bitcoin core and all those things, like, you know, it's
517
00:27:25.180 --> 00:27:26.900
much harder to find the problems.
518
00:27:26.980 --> 00:27:28.620
It's much harder to improve things.
519
00:27:28.900 --> 00:27:31.360
This system was designed for war, right?
520
00:27:31.360 --> 00:27:36.300
It was not designed for people to have like, you know, counts of how many, you
521
00:27:36.300 --> 00:27:39.060
know, like equity shit there is on Bitcoin, right?
522
00:27:39.100 --> 00:27:42.980
Like it was designed for countries to literally like shoot each other.
523
00:27:43.840 --> 00:27:46.620
So, you know, we need people fighting over stuff.
524
00:27:46.720 --> 00:27:52.340
It's OK, guys, like we can be friends and still like scream at each other over
525
00:27:52.340 --> 00:27:57.440
issues like, you know, like we don't have to go back to like the sort of,
526
00:27:57.440 --> 00:27:58.740
you know, gay shit.
527
00:27:58.740 --> 00:28:02.420
Yeah, I think it's like structurally, I think you're right in that there needs
528
00:28:02.420 --> 00:28:04.880
to be more just abrasiveness.
529
00:28:05.040 --> 00:28:09.320
And when we're talking about Bitcoin, like just like everyone, like, OK, we all
530
00:28:09.320 --> 00:28:10.480
agree, Bitcoin, cool.
531
00:28:10.640 --> 00:28:12.780
But now we need to fight over all the other details around it.
532
00:28:13.260 --> 00:28:14.160
Iron sharpens iron.
533
00:28:14.560 --> 00:28:17.780
To your point about like the formal gray beards who would kind of put things
534
00:28:17.780 --> 00:28:21.340
forward in the past, they have, I think, already have taken a step back.
535
00:28:21.580 --> 00:28:24.700
They don't want to be anywhere near consensus stuff or they're retired on, you
536
00:28:24.700 --> 00:28:25.680
know, wherever they are.
537
00:28:26.100 --> 00:28:26.800
That's important.
538
00:28:26.920 --> 00:28:30.860
I think in the past year, to your point, NBK, about like you can run old
539
00:28:30.860 --> 00:28:32.520
versions of Core, you can.
540
00:28:32.860 --> 00:28:33.400
That's the beauty.
541
00:28:33.580 --> 00:28:36.060
Like for a very long, you can go run a bunch of old versions.
542
00:28:36.520 --> 00:28:39.240
One of the big things Core changed over the past year is their disclosure
543
00:28:39.240 --> 00:28:40.980
policy for vulnerabilities.
544
00:28:41.720 --> 00:28:42.960
And I'm looking at the website right now.
545
00:28:43.020 --> 00:28:47.580
The last time there was a CVE for Core was actually in 2024.
546
00:28:47.940 --> 00:28:50.780
Not a consensus break, but basically ways to get DDoS nodes.
547
00:28:51.300 --> 00:28:53.180
But that was patched in version 25.
548
00:28:53.180 --> 00:28:53.860
Yeah.
549
00:28:54.480 --> 00:28:59.380
So like how far back this stuff goes, like you can see what's happening and
550
00:28:59.380 --> 00:29:00.240
stuff like that, right?
551
00:29:00.500 --> 00:29:02.460
We're on version 28 for those at home, right?
552
00:29:02.520 --> 00:29:04.000
So like we're talking like a year and a half ago.
553
00:29:06.040 --> 00:29:06.840
Bitcoinuptime.org.
554
00:29:07.520 --> 00:29:08.280
Let's see here.
555
00:29:09.100 --> 00:29:11.280
OK, there is two CVEs that matter.
556
00:29:11.760 --> 00:29:12.200
That's it.
557
00:29:13.440 --> 00:29:14.380
Yeah, that's right.
558
00:29:14.720 --> 00:29:15.300
There were two.
559
00:29:15.480 --> 00:29:18.580
The one, the inflation bug, those are the ones that actually met right on the
560
00:29:18.580 --> 00:29:19.280
consensus level.
561
00:29:19.280 --> 00:29:23.140
So like there's a difference between like, oh, you personally like attacked my
562
00:29:23.140 --> 00:29:26.540
node versus the entire network had a chain split and like had a break.
563
00:29:26.640 --> 00:29:26.780
Right.
564
00:29:26.840 --> 00:29:32.800
And I'd agree that like and we're now looking at Bitcoinuptime.org, 4,376 days.
565
00:29:33.580 --> 00:29:33.680
Right.
566
00:29:34.080 --> 00:29:38.540
There's like some sort of threshold, though, I believe is like 17 or something
567
00:29:38.540 --> 00:29:41.180
where during a sync, it might stall out.
568
00:29:41.640 --> 00:29:41.760
Yeah.
569
00:29:42.140 --> 00:29:44.300
But you can patch that yourself, too.
570
00:29:44.940 --> 00:29:45.080
Yeah.
571
00:29:45.080 --> 00:29:45.260
Yeah.
572
00:29:45.260 --> 00:29:48.340
You can just bring your blocks, the block that that.
573
00:29:48.340 --> 00:29:49.160
Yeah, right.
574
00:29:49.340 --> 00:29:50.780
Bitcoin was designed that way.
575
00:29:51.060 --> 00:29:56.340
Yeah, you know, it was it was supposed to be that like I can, you know,
576
00:29:56.360 --> 00:29:57.760
it's the man in the coma thing, right?
577
00:29:57.760 --> 00:30:00.460
Like I can take my software, I can go offline, I can come back later, get
578
00:30:00.460 --> 00:30:01.820
caught up to the chain tip of the network.
579
00:30:02.140 --> 00:30:04.660
And the last time I reviewed the software, I can access and do everything.
580
00:30:05.540 --> 00:30:09.900
To your point, Enrique, about like the changing and like people getting in
581
00:30:09.900 --> 00:30:10.080
there.
582
00:30:10.460 --> 00:30:14.200
James O'Byrne last week just did it's Bitcoin.
583
00:30:14.200 --> 00:30:15.520
I dropped it in the chat.
584
00:30:15.680 --> 00:30:24.240
It's PR 31,989, 31989 to merge in check template verify with no activation
585
00:30:24.240 --> 00:30:24.620
code.
586
00:30:24.900 --> 00:30:28.440
Literally just to be like, it's the same code that Jeremy wrote five years ago
587
00:30:28.440 --> 00:30:30.380
and trying to just get that in there.
588
00:30:30.440 --> 00:30:34.940
And there's discussion around that now to talk about all of the changes around
589
00:30:34.940 --> 00:30:35.060
it.
590
00:30:35.080 --> 00:30:37.560
So if that's
something interesting on the consensus side, I'd give that a look
591
00:30:37.560 --> 00:30:37.860
as well.
592
00:30:37.960 --> 00:30:42.560
And James is such an MVP, completely underappreciated because he's polite.
593
00:30:45.060 --> 00:30:46.380
I would say that.
594
00:30:46.480 --> 00:30:49.460
And also James like touches and works with a lot of this stuff.
595
00:30:49.520 --> 00:30:49.620
Right.
596
00:30:49.640 --> 00:30:51.520
He's not like a full time core researcher.
597
00:30:52.100 --> 00:30:54.480
Like he touches and uses Bitcoin in a real way.
598
00:30:54.600 --> 00:30:59.740
I mean, he's done a lot of like audit review work on core.
599
00:31:00.500 --> 00:31:03.040
You know, he's got like a decent amount of visibility on it.
600
00:31:03.880 --> 00:31:05.680
You know, you should have him on sometime.
601
00:31:05.920 --> 00:31:08.360
He's actually someone who understands this stuff.
602
00:31:08.460 --> 00:31:11.060
I don't want to destroy his public image of being polite.
603
00:31:14.160 --> 00:31:15.760
No, he's like, it's great.
604
00:31:15.940 --> 00:31:20.200
Like I like looking through the PR, like it's just, you know, it's trying to
605
00:31:20.200 --> 00:31:24.220
also break out this distinction between like, is there technical consensus?
606
00:31:24.320 --> 00:31:27.060
How do we activate this thing to be like, the code is good, right?
607
00:31:27.120 --> 00:31:31.280
Like this, like, like there is no I mean, CTV has been around for five years
608
00:31:31.280 --> 00:31:31.760
at this point.
609
00:31:31.860 --> 00:31:35.140
I think there's a multi coin Bitcoin bounty on if anyone finds a bug, no one's
610
00:31:35.140 --> 00:31:35.940
found a bug in it.
611
00:31:36.280 --> 00:31:40.400
It's one of those things that, you know, just it's funny because I had the same
612
00:31:40.400 --> 00:31:41.960
conversation on our HR last week.
613
00:31:41.960 --> 00:31:46.680
The other Bitcoin list show talking about specifically the shortlist.
614
00:31:46.880 --> 00:31:47.740
Yeah, exactly.
615
00:31:47.820 --> 00:31:51.220
The shortlist show where you go for macro econ stuff.
616
00:31:51.360 --> 00:31:55.040
And then maybe you get a couple of things at the end for the crowd.
617
00:31:55.180 --> 00:31:55.780
We met at Marty.
618
00:31:56.100 --> 00:31:57.300
I love you guys.
619
00:31:59.340 --> 00:32:04.940
But the the nature of it, though, is that you have totally lost my train of
620
00:32:04.940 --> 00:32:05.120
thought.
621
00:32:05.660 --> 00:32:09.880
Basically, you just have this distinction of as building a business in Bitcoin.
622
00:32:09.880 --> 00:32:13.160
I can't put chips on the table, assuming that something's going to change,
623
00:32:13.360 --> 00:32:13.520
right?
624
00:32:13.680 --> 00:32:16.720
But it'd be cool to like, as someone who's touching and doing work and building
625
00:32:16.720 --> 00:32:17.560
a business in this.
626
00:32:17.820 --> 00:32:22.380
It's a whole different conversation
than like abstractly thinking about what's
627
00:32:22.380 --> 00:32:22.960
good for the network.
628
00:32:23.020 --> 00:32:26.460
And that's I was having a conversation back before with Matt Corallo on Twitter
629
00:32:26.460 --> 00:32:29.220
about vault use cases and being like, where's the demand?
630
00:32:29.380 --> 00:32:32.780
And I was like, hi, hi, I'm helping people secure layer one Bitcoin.
631
00:32:33.120 --> 00:32:35.200
I would love to be able to have reactive security, please.
632
00:32:35.200 --> 00:32:35.640
Great.
633
00:32:35.760 --> 00:32:38.420
And being able to kind of like, I think, have open dialogues, those
634
00:32:38.420 --> 00:32:43.720
conversations for the gray beards and the wizards and the blue hairs in the
635
00:32:43.720 --> 00:32:43.900
world.
636
00:32:44.300 --> 00:32:48.380
I think there is a lot of unfair expertise around.
637
00:32:48.960 --> 00:32:51.960
And like there is folks who have no idea what they're talking about, but
638
00:32:51.960 --> 00:32:54.280
they're famous for something else they did.
639
00:32:55.100 --> 00:32:56.100
And then it gets tricky.
640
00:32:57.240 --> 00:33:00.420
You know, that's the beauty of Bitcoin.
641
00:33:00.580 --> 00:33:01.260
Rough consensus.
642
00:33:01.780 --> 00:33:02.780
Rough consensus, indeed.
643
00:33:02.780 --> 00:33:07.820
I love the dialogues and the talking points and the ability to see who's just
644
00:33:07.820 --> 00:33:09.500
like repeating stuff.
645
00:33:09.760 --> 00:33:14.680
Like a common one is if it works on a signing server already, right, then, you
646
00:33:14.680 --> 00:33:16.780
know, why do you need it in the code?
647
00:33:17.200 --> 00:33:20.240
And the other one is like, hey, no one's using it today.
648
00:33:20.520 --> 00:33:22.040
So you should build a signing server.
649
00:33:22.580 --> 00:33:23.020
Right.
650
00:33:23.160 --> 00:33:26.060
And this is that's I said, right, like, is anything to be emulated?
651
00:33:26.160 --> 00:33:28.280
And like, we've talked about this on the show before.
652
00:33:28.280 --> 00:33:32.340
Like your dream is you want to be able to just take all of the logic
653
00:33:32.340 --> 00:33:34.860
of all the things you do, the cold card, and it's just done.
654
00:33:35.120 --> 00:33:36.260
Like you can go retire.
655
00:33:36.620 --> 00:33:38.360
You can go sell coconuts at the beach.
656
00:33:38.440 --> 00:33:39.460
You could be fully done.
657
00:33:39.940 --> 00:33:41.120
And like it all just works on chain.
658
00:33:41.220 --> 00:33:41.400
Right.
659
00:33:41.440 --> 00:33:44.080
And there's a long road to get there, to be clear.
660
00:33:44.180 --> 00:33:46.920
Like there's many things like 64 bit math.
661
00:33:46.920 --> 00:33:50.540
So you can actually do velocity controls based on, oh, if I'm sending one
662
00:33:50.540 --> 00:33:51.500
Bitcoin, I can do this.
663
00:33:51.540 --> 00:33:53.200
But if I'm sending 10 Bitcoin, I have to do that.
664
00:33:53.500 --> 00:33:55.200
Like that's further and further out.
665
00:33:55.200 --> 00:33:59.460
But like primitives like an op vault, being able to restrict outputs like
666
00:33:59.460 --> 00:34:03.980
covenants as a general bucket can take all of these human meatspace operations
667
00:34:03.980 --> 00:34:06.940
and like technical architecture and put it on chain.
668
00:34:07.280 --> 00:34:08.820
And you're only taking a couple bytes on chain.
669
00:34:08.920 --> 00:34:09.400
It's such a win.
670
00:34:09.920 --> 00:34:13.159
I think I think the biggest problem and the reason why we're not going to get
671
00:34:13.159 --> 00:34:15.760
covenants is because it's coming from the payments people.
672
00:34:16.020 --> 00:34:19.179
It's coming from let's scale and try to save more people.
673
00:34:20.120 --> 00:34:23.679
And like, you know, the majority of the economic capacity in Bitcoin doesn't
674
00:34:23.679 --> 00:34:24.400
give a shit.
675
00:34:24.400 --> 00:34:28.219
It's like, it's like, is my, you know, store of value secure?
676
00:34:28.540 --> 00:34:28.840
Yes.
677
00:34:29.020 --> 00:34:29.300
Great.
678
00:34:29.500 --> 00:34:30.560
Then go pound sand.
679
00:34:31.840 --> 00:34:35.120
So like they need to shift the marketing.
680
00:34:35.280 --> 00:34:39.440
They need to shift the narrative into like, hey, you know, we can make store of
681
00:34:39.440 --> 00:34:40.739
value even more stored.
682
00:34:41.920 --> 00:34:42.179
Right.
683
00:34:42.300 --> 00:34:43.440
You can make it even better.
684
00:34:43.860 --> 00:34:43.960
Right.
685
00:34:44.020 --> 00:34:45.620
This is I a thousand percent agree.
686
00:34:45.739 --> 00:34:46.280
That's me.
687
00:34:46.400 --> 00:34:47.699
Selfishly, I'm a layer one guy.
688
00:34:47.860 --> 00:34:48.900
I'm a layer one boomer.
689
00:34:49.300 --> 00:34:52.219
That's my focus for my company, myself personally, my interest in value.
690
00:34:52.219 --> 00:34:52.860
Probably Bitcoin.
691
00:34:53.480 --> 00:34:55.400
If payment and other things get unlocked.
692
00:34:55.900 --> 00:34:56.180
Cool.
693
00:34:56.660 --> 00:34:58.060
But that's not my hobby horse.
694
00:34:58.540 --> 00:34:58.640
Right.
695
00:34:59.200 --> 00:34:59.400
Yeah.
696
00:34:59.460 --> 00:35:00.940
I mean, it doesn't scale anyways.
697
00:35:01.100 --> 00:35:04.460
I mean, nothing like, you know, even shared UTXOs, they're all going to be
698
00:35:04.460 --> 00:35:06.940
bound by Bitcoin's like throughput, period.
699
00:35:07.220 --> 00:35:07.960
Like layer one.
700
00:35:08.620 --> 00:35:09.000
Exactly.
701
00:35:09.120 --> 00:35:12.420
Like, you know, go, go, go push a shoe for payments.
702
00:35:12.640 --> 00:35:17.740
And then, you know, like we we can focus on on making like very secure store
703
00:35:17.740 --> 00:35:18.700
of value solutions.
704
00:35:18.700 --> 00:35:24.960
You know, like for all the hate that Saylor gets from cypherpunks, the he did
705
00:35:24.960 --> 00:35:28.920
say one thing that was very smart in regards to changing consensus rules.
706
00:35:29.260 --> 00:35:36.080
Is that like, you know, when you buy BTC, right, like you are trusting that the
707
00:35:36.080 --> 00:35:39.240
contract and the economic incentives are in a certain way.
708
00:35:39.640 --> 00:35:39.820
Right.
709
00:35:40.420 --> 00:35:44.040
And like if you change that, you just change the rules.
710
00:35:44.380 --> 00:35:44.920
Right.
711
00:35:44.980 --> 00:35:46.940
Like that you bought into a contract.
712
00:35:46.940 --> 00:35:49.140
And that's sort of unethical.
713
00:35:49.580 --> 00:35:49.700
Right.
714
00:35:49.760 --> 00:35:52.120
I mean, like you can interpret that in many ways.
715
00:35:52.580 --> 00:35:55.800
You know, you may even disagree, but like I find that it's an interesting
716
00:35:55.800 --> 00:36:00.600
framing of like how you look at like at the Bitcoin contract.
717
00:36:01.140 --> 00:36:01.280
Right.
718
00:36:01.320 --> 00:36:03.080
Like, did you buy into it?
719
00:36:03.240 --> 00:36:07.020
Now, you know, he just maybe technically doesn't understand that like maybe
720
00:36:07.020 --> 00:36:11.300
covenants is not going to change economic aspects of Bitcoin and it might
721
00:36:11.300 --> 00:36:12.600
actually improve store of value.
722
00:36:12.840 --> 00:36:13.960
But that's a different conversation.
723
00:36:13.960 --> 00:36:14.640
Right.
724
00:36:14.840 --> 00:36:17.560
That's on us to try to get people to understand it.
725
00:36:18.360 --> 00:36:19.880
Yeah, I agree.
726
00:36:20.320 --> 00:36:21.520
Very well said.
727
00:36:21.720 --> 00:36:25.080
And I would say that as someone who he is, someone who is holding a lot
728
00:36:25.080 --> 00:36:29.800
of coins, imagine with like a covenant like upgrade, he can get orders of
729
00:36:29.800 --> 00:36:33.920
magnitude, better security and with an upvote like then then what is possible
730
00:36:33.920 --> 00:36:35.620
today with how his coins are being held.
731
00:36:35.860 --> 00:36:38.400
And then he can give you a few basis points to ensure it.
732
00:36:39.100 --> 00:36:39.560
Sure.
733
00:36:39.940 --> 00:36:43.280
Listen, like ultimately that's I'm selling my wares and what I can do.
734
00:36:43.280 --> 00:36:46.620
But like that makes it more insurable and lower risk.
735
00:36:47.000 --> 00:36:49.080
And this is all to come back to this idea of reactive security.
736
00:36:49.260 --> 00:36:52.720
Like I was talking about this with Matt, like when when money moves in Bitcoin
737
00:36:52.720 --> 00:36:56.340
and something has gone wrong, you have less than 10 minutes.
738
00:36:56.480 --> 00:36:59.920
You have one before the next block confirms to try and undo it somehow.
739
00:37:01.100 --> 00:37:05.420
With with an upvote model, you are able to wait hundreds of blocks, maybe a
740
00:37:05.420 --> 00:37:06.680
thousand blocks, days, weeks.
741
00:37:06.920 --> 00:37:11.000
Like and that's just orders of magnitude, better less than one block to
742
00:37:11.000
--> 00:37:12.300
hundreds, if not thousands of blocks.
743
00:37:12.300 --> 00:37:13.540
Like it's just a better way.
744
00:37:14.100 --> 00:37:16.380
And it's ultimately a key management problem at the end of the day.
745
00:37:17.080 --> 00:37:20.420
Well, Bitcoin security ultimately becomes a key management problem, but you're
746
00:37:20.420 --> 00:37:23.540
providing a larger surface area to be able to mitigate risks.
747
00:37:24.160 --> 00:37:24.260
Yes.
748
00:37:25.020 --> 00:37:25.740
All right.
749
00:37:25.740 --> 00:37:32.420
And with that, let's get the two Miniscript cheerleaders who bullied CoinKite
750
00:37:32.420 --> 00:37:41.800
and ColdCard into moving another step forward in Miniscript being closer
751
00:37:41.800 --> 00:37:43.180
to master.
752
00:37:44.200 --> 00:37:47.720
So the ColdCard release, Edge release.
753
00:37:48.530 --> 00:37:49.920
Is this the one that's here?
754
00:37:50.220 --> 00:37:51.640
Here, Edge release.
755
00:37:52.020 --> 00:37:53.280
Oh, there was another one.
756
00:37:53.280 --> 00:37:59.920
But anyways, so there's the Edge release version 6.3.5x for Mac 4 and version
757
00:37:59.920 --> 00:38:05.040
3.5, 6.3.5 QX for the Q.
758
00:38:05.620 --> 00:38:08.040
Catches up with the release above we're going to mention.
759
00:38:09.080 --> 00:38:15.220
And this firmware changes the scary messages from the cover, from the login.
760
00:38:15.220 --> 00:38:23.080
We still suggest people use this with quorums where this is not a single point
761
00:38:23.080 --> 00:38:23.980
of failure key.
762
00:38:24.320 --> 00:38:25.320
Very important.
763
00:38:25.820 --> 00:38:30.300
But we feel way more confident and we think this is qualified for this
764
00:38:30.300 --> 00:38:32.600
Miniscript wallets like Anchor Watch.
765
00:38:33.720 --> 00:38:35.440
And both of these are on both.
766
00:38:35.640 --> 00:38:37.660
It's on both hardware solutions have these.
767
00:38:38.540 --> 00:38:42.240
So now you can Miniscript out to your heart's desire.
768
00:38:43.160 --> 00:38:48.060
Yeah, just to start, I mean, thank you for kind of updating the language and
769
00:38:48.060 --> 00:38:49.340
continuing to work with us.
770
00:38:49.480 --> 00:38:55.400
I have spent dozens and dozens of hours with the MK4 and the Q specifically
771
00:38:55.400 --> 00:38:57.080
with the Miniscript stuff.
772
00:38:57.220 --> 00:39:00.900
And I'll say probably in the order of hundreds of hours at this point over the
773
00:39:00.900 --> 00:39:02.420
past two years or so.
774
00:39:03.000 --> 00:39:07.660
And I have yet to find anything that was a money losing buck.
775
00:39:07.660 --> 00:39:08.180
Right.
776
00:39:08.240 --> 00:39:12.240
There hasn't been any sort of there hasn't been any exhibited behavior that
777
00:39:12.240 --> 00:39:12.860
would cause that.
778
00:39:13.120 --> 00:39:20.660
Most of the time, friction points are around the interactivity with the
779
00:39:20.660 --> 00:39:22.740
descriptors, which is always a formative thing.
780
00:39:22.920 --> 00:39:23.020
Right.
781
00:39:23.060 --> 00:39:23.640
Just making sure.
782
00:39:23.760 --> 00:39:27.660
And I would say it always I'd look at it like, oh, this is why I'm
783
00:39:27.660 --> 00:39:29.000
misformatting the string this way.
784
00:39:29.020 --> 00:39:29.300
Right.
785
00:39:29.560 --> 00:39:35.040
So in that sense, like, I feel great about the offering as it exists today.
786
00:39:35.040 --> 00:39:39.180
I think this is part of what I was also talking about last week on RHR
787
00:39:39.180 --> 00:39:43.700
is just understanding ways to further streamline the UX.
788
00:39:44.160 --> 00:39:46.040
That was a whole conversation around.
789
00:39:46.680 --> 00:39:51.140
And just to rehash it for this group and the audience listeners that are here,
790
00:39:51.320 --> 00:39:56.000
is that the moment you leave single sig Bitcoin, the moment you leave a single
791
00:39:56.000 --> 00:39:58.700
sig Bitcoin, there is now more state.
792
00:39:58.920 --> 00:40:00.540
There's more things that need to be known.
793
00:40:00.540 --> 00:40:00.920
Right.
794
00:40:01.380 --> 00:40:05.000
If it's a two of three multi sig, if you have two keys, that's not enough
795
00:40:05.000 --> 00:40:06.760
information to be able to recover the funds.
796
00:40:07.160 --> 00:40:08.900
You need the output descriptor.
797
00:40:09.620 --> 00:40:13.280
And the way this works to take a step back at a higher level is that
798
00:40:13.280 --> 00:40:14.940
when you spend money to Bitcoin.
799
00:40:15.360 --> 00:40:15.780
Right.
800
00:40:15.880 --> 00:40:17.480
And the moment you're using a script.
801
00:40:17.780 --> 00:40:17.900
Right.
802
00:40:17.920 --> 00:40:21.340
You're using not just a single private key, like a single public key.
803
00:40:21.440 --> 00:40:21.540
Right.
804
00:40:21.540 --> 00:40:23.060
You're doing more rules.
805
00:40:23.580 --> 00:40:26.660
You need to be able to not only have the necessary key material.
806
00:40:26.980 --> 00:40:29.520
You need to be able to prove to the entire Bitcoin network.
807
00:40:29.520 --> 00:40:34.520
Hey, this address maps to this hash, which maps to this script.
808
00:40:35.200 --> 00:40:35.400
Right.
809
00:40:35.560 --> 00:40:39.360
And so when you get to multi sig, you have to have that output descriptor.
810
00:40:39.460 --> 00:40:44.200
So you have the ability to show I control the script that is able to access
811
00:40:44.200 --> 00:40:44.780
this address.
812
00:40:45.600 --> 00:40:49.980
It is added that when you go to something like mini script, where you're not
813
00:40:49.980 --> 00:40:53.480
just doing a multi sig, which in the sense of since it's always just N of
814
00:40:53.480 --> 00:40:57.260
M, you can pretty easily say it's a three of five, a two of three, whatever
815
00:40:57.260 --> 00:40:57.800
it is.
816
00:40:58.370 --> 00:41:02.140
You need to be able to also understand, OK, I'm not just doing two of three,
817
00:41:02.220 --> 00:41:02.680
three of five.
818
00:41:02.780 --> 00:41:06.980
I'm also now doing things like a two of three that becomes a one of three.
819
00:41:07.160 --> 00:41:08.920
So how do you actually display that information?
820
00:41:09.220 --> 00:41:13.640
And the simplest way of being able to do that right now, in the sense of
821
00:41:13.640 --> 00:41:17.320
just technically is just presenting that information on screen, which is the
822
00:41:17.320 --> 00:41:22.840
wallet policies BIP, which I think is BIP three descriptor wallet.
823
00:41:22.840 --> 00:41:26.680
Wallet policies for descriptors, which is BIP three eighty eight, and being
824
00:41:26.680 --> 00:41:29.640
able to basically show the high level information.
825
00:41:30.380 --> 00:41:33.540
And then also the added layer that I talk about is you also want to know
826
00:41:33.540 --> 00:41:34.740
the XPUBs, right?
827
00:41:34.800 --> 00:41:38.260
You have to know and trust the XPUBs because even if the descriptor is like,
828
00:41:38.300 --> 00:41:42.060
oh, I'm doing this two of three, if the XPUBs are not the XPUBs you think
829
00:41:42.060 --> 00:41:44.940
they are, that's essentially an attack.
830
00:41:44.940 --> 00:41:49.560
It's amazing to me that like essentially outside a cold card, nobody else
831
00:41:49.560 --> 00:41:53.140
checks the XPUBs or stores the XPUBs of the other signers.
832
00:41:53.600 --> 00:41:59.560
No, the only other, yeah, no, it's I think there's only one other one to my
833
00:41:59.560 --> 00:42:01.020
knowledge that.
834
00:42:01.140 --> 00:42:01.940
Maybe Bitbox?
835
00:42:02.660 --> 00:42:06.780
It's actually the, it's not, maybe the Bitbox does.
836
00:42:06.840 --> 00:42:08.480
I haven't played with the Bitbox in a while, I'll be honest.
837
00:42:08.580 --> 00:42:11.380
I've been meaning to because thinking about just things to work on.
838
00:42:11.380 --> 00:42:16.080
But the, the Keystone wallet, which is the former Clobo vault.
839
00:42:16.640 --> 00:42:18.940
Yeah, but it's like a coin wallet, nobody uses that.
840
00:42:19.520 --> 00:42:20.340
No, it is.
841
00:42:20.440 --> 00:42:21.040
No, it is.
842
00:42:21.100 --> 00:42:24.940
But it was, it was really interesting that they, that they specifically allowed
843
00:42:24.940 --> 00:42:25.580
you to do that.
844
00:42:25.640 --> 00:42:25.840
Right.
845
00:42:25.860 --> 00:42:26.020
Right.
846
00:42:26.040 --> 00:42:29.520
And the reason why this is important is not for verifying, also being able to
847
00:42:29.520 --> 00:42:30.460
verify change addresses.
848
00:42:30.880 --> 00:42:31.120
Yes.
849
00:42:31.420 --> 00:42:33.340
Which is the most important thing that there is.
850
00:42:33.500 --> 00:42:37.180
Like, it is amazing that wallets don't crack for change address.
851
00:42:37.180 --> 00:42:42.060
It's like, like, say you have one big UTXO, all your money UTXO.
852
00:42:42.100 --> 00:42:43.060
I have a hundred Bitcoin.
853
00:42:43.180 --> 00:42:45.560
You want to send just 1% of that out.
854
00:42:45.740 --> 00:42:48.520
That needs to return to you and wallets don't check that.
855
00:42:48.600 --> 00:42:50.460
It's the most important part, right?
856
00:42:50.500 --> 00:42:56.000
If you have a hundred Bitcoin in a UTXO and I send NVK one Bitcoin, that
857
00:42:56.000 --> 00:42:58.160
99 Bitcoin comes back to me as change.
858
00:42:58.480 --> 00:43:02.420
It's more important than verifying where I'm sending the funds to, that it's
859
00:43:02.420 --> 00:43:03.380
going back to the change.
860
00:43:03.380 --> 00:43:06.780
You're going to keep on stealing cold card until some other wallet does the
861
00:43:06.780 --> 00:43:07.080
same.
862
00:43:07.380 --> 00:43:09.440
And then I'll promise them, I'll mention them.
863
00:43:10.580 --> 00:43:14.340
The cold card, doesn't it also, if I set up a multi-sig of just cold
864
00:43:14.340 --> 00:43:17.200
cards, you're able to set up the quorum fully offline?
865
00:43:17.420 --> 00:43:18.600
You can do the quorum offline.
866
00:43:18.880 --> 00:43:19.000
Yes.
867
00:43:19.180 --> 00:43:19.280
Yeah.
868
00:43:19.540 --> 00:43:22.000
Eventually, who knows, maybe a mini script one day.
869
00:43:22.380 --> 00:43:23.240
Maybe that'd be nice.
870
00:43:23.420 --> 00:43:23.560
Yeah.
871
00:43:24.240 --> 00:43:28.000
And going back to like the descriptor, like the problem is that unless you're
872
00:43:28.000 --> 00:43:31.180
technical, like it's a lot of information to be able to fully parse and digest.
873
00:43:31.180 --> 00:43:36.420
I mentioned this on the show, when I was talking about this last week on RHR,
874
00:43:36.760 --> 00:43:41.000
is that we at AnchorWatch do a bunch of audits offline.
875
00:43:41.220 --> 00:43:44.700
I'm not going to go into the intricacies of that, but like we do quadruple
876
00:43:44.700 --> 00:43:48.060
checking of many different things in many different places to make sure before
877
00:43:48.060 --> 00:43:52.420
we set up the policy that your actual thing is being correctly formatted,
878
00:43:52.740 --> 00:43:54.860
including ownership of XPUBs, right?
879
00:43:55.360 --> 00:43:58.740
So for us, it's something we've put a lot of thought into, and we tried to
880
00:43:58.740 --> 00:44:02.720
basically be able to abstract away that because we're running those processes.
881
00:44:03.260 --> 00:44:07.120
It's something, though, that if you're doing something in your own in your
882
00:44:07.120 --> 00:44:09.580
basement by yourself, you have to understand this stuff.
883
00:44:10.800 --> 00:44:14.860
And Salvatore at Ledger did a really great talk at Tabcon last year.
884
00:44:15.100 --> 00:44:18.440
I just retweeted it this week because it was a good chat talking about high
885
00:44:18.440 --> 00:44:19.300
entropy and low entropy.
886
00:44:19.780 --> 00:44:21.080
Humans are bad at high entropy.
887
00:44:21.560 --> 00:44:23.220
And that's why we use hardware vaults, right?
888
00:44:23.300 --> 00:44:25.340
To keep the secret, to do the thing, right?
889
00:44:25.580 --> 00:44:29.500
And the problem with like output, just like these are really high entropy.
890
00:44:29.620 --> 00:44:31.040
It's really confusing to look at it.
891
00:44:31.100 --> 00:44:34.080
So how do you try and compress that information to be lower entropy?
892
00:44:34.220 --> 00:44:36.780
So I can look at my screen and be like, oh, yeah, I'm setting up this
893
00:44:36.780 --> 00:44:42.740
vault between myself, Vic and NVK because in XPUB, high entropy, like it's a
894
00:44:42.740 --> 00:44:43.980
bunch of letters and numbers.
895
00:44:44.120 --> 00:44:46.920
And you're like, if you're not don't not know what you're doing, like you can't
896
00:44:46.920 --> 00:44:48.880
at a glance verify it.
897
00:44:48.880 --> 00:44:50.980
So I think there's a role in the future.
898
00:44:51.600 --> 00:44:53.700
I don't know how it exactly finally takes form.
899
00:44:54.200 --> 00:44:56.520
It'd be really awesome, though, if I could have a way where I could be like,
900
00:44:56.580 --> 00:44:58.960
oh, I'm setting up a multisig with myself, Vic and NVK.
901
00:44:59.080 --> 00:45:01.900
And it's just in plain text and the hardware wallet is doing that lift.
902
00:45:02.260 --> 00:45:04.080
I don't know how to do that, though, to be clear.
903
00:45:04.160 --> 00:45:04.920
Like it's a big problem.
904
00:45:05.440 --> 00:45:09.580
There's a couple of things that we had that would help a little bit of that.
905
00:45:10.340 --> 00:45:13.920
So on the signing side, PSPT should have been signed.
906
00:45:14.720 --> 00:45:16.080
Yes, we've talked about this.
907
00:45:16.080 --> 00:45:21.480
You know, if PSPTs were signed, at least you have confidence that what you're
908
00:45:21.480 --> 00:45:27.620
signing is the same thing that was displayed on the wallet software, right?
909
00:45:28.320 --> 00:45:31.640
Like the coordinator, if you're using Sparrow or do you at least have some
910
00:45:31.640 --> 00:45:33.040
chain of custody of that?
911
00:45:33.160 --> 00:45:34.100
This came from this device.
912
00:45:34.240 --> 00:45:34.420
Yes.
913
00:45:34.420 --> 00:45:38.040
And that key doesn't have to actually handle funds on chain for the world to
914
00:45:38.040 --> 00:45:40.400
see, but it could help you for your own internal transfer ops.
915
00:45:40.400 --> 00:45:40.840
Absolutely.
916
00:45:41.280 --> 00:45:47.760
For the signed script, that was the goal of DSMS, right?
917
00:45:47.820 --> 00:45:49.860
It was Bitcoin multisig something.
918
00:45:50.060 --> 00:45:51.380
I can't remember now what it stands for.
919
00:45:51.600 --> 00:45:53.140
Bitcoin multisig secure setup or something.
920
00:45:53.460 --> 00:45:54.040
There you go.
921
00:45:54.120 --> 00:45:55.240
That was a secure setup.
922
00:45:55.400 --> 00:45:56.700
It was supposed to be signed.
923
00:45:57.020 --> 00:45:57.820
Bit 129.
924
00:45:58.340 --> 00:46:00.660
But, you know, as usual, bike
shedding, whatever.
925
00:46:00.660 --> 00:46:08.180
So I think one thing we could do is we could hash and then we can
926
00:46:08.180 --> 00:46:13.020
map the script hash to bit 39 words.
927
00:46:14.340 --> 00:46:17.620
So you could have like, you don't need all that entropy, right?
928
00:46:17.720 --> 00:46:20.300
Like the 256 bits or 128.
929
00:46:20.580 --> 00:46:21.900
You can do lower, right?
930
00:46:21.940 --> 00:46:25.660
Like you can have, say, like, you know, just like four words or something,
931
00:46:25.740 --> 00:46:26.720
which is probably what?
932
00:46:26.720 --> 00:46:31.420
Four times 24 times 16 bits.
933
00:46:31.740 --> 00:46:31.900
Yeah.
934
00:46:31.980 --> 00:46:32.680
Twenty forty eight.
935
00:46:33.180 --> 00:46:36.540
I'm just looking at the number of entropy times four.
936
00:46:37.220 --> 00:46:39.040
Sorry, I'm doing math life.
937
00:46:39.340 --> 00:46:43.480
It would be two to the 11th.
938
00:46:44.320 --> 00:46:47.520
Yeah, I mean, you know, it's enough to the 44.
939
00:46:47.680 --> 00:46:47.900
Sorry.
940
00:46:48.280 --> 00:46:50.060
Yeah, because remember, this is for double checking.
941
00:46:50.140 --> 00:46:52.660
This is not against an actor trying to swap it.
942
00:46:53.600 --> 00:46:58.240
So what you would do is you can map the script to, say, four words and
943
00:46:58.240 --> 00:47:02.800
then you display the four words on the coordinator, display the four words on
944
00:47:02.800 --> 00:47:04.600
the screen of the hardware wallet.
945
00:47:05.000 --> 00:47:08.140
And then you have some confidence that the script is the same.
946
00:47:08.500 --> 00:47:08.620
Yeah.
947
00:47:09.040 --> 00:47:12.460
So but you can review that script in a big screen on a computer or something.
948
00:47:13.360 --> 00:47:13.740
Right.
949
00:47:13.840 --> 00:47:16.900
And what I'm thinking about this, too, it's kind of like the anti-phishing
950
00:47:16.900 --> 00:47:17.960
words you get on the cold card.
951
00:47:18.040 --> 00:47:18.560
Yeah, exactly.
952
00:47:18.680 --> 00:47:19.820
You get two words to boot, right?
953
00:47:19.940 --> 00:47:20.120
Right.
954
00:47:20.160 --> 00:47:21.080
So you get something.
955
00:47:21.080 --> 00:47:25.400
That's interesting, too, because you also don't have to worry about the XPods.
956
00:47:25.500 --> 00:47:28.120
You're just looking at like this is the script template and it just kind of
957
00:47:28.120 --> 00:47:29.020
comes out the four words.
958
00:47:29.620 --> 00:47:34.640
In theory, someone could grind and attack one that matches the same four words
959
00:47:34.640 --> 00:47:35.140
in theory.
960
00:47:35.280 --> 00:47:37.720
But like, yeah, that's already orders of magnitude.
961
00:47:38.400 --> 00:47:40.920
It's more like a low hanging fruit kind of thing, right?
962
00:47:40.920 --> 00:47:43.720
Like it's not like a a long con kind of deal.
963
00:47:43.760 --> 00:47:44.820
It's for the setup time.
964
00:47:45.580 --> 00:47:46.480
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
965
00:47:46.600 --> 00:47:47.200
No, absolutely.
966
00:47:47.620 --> 00:47:50.700
And you can display the script on a QR as well.
967
00:47:50.700 --> 00:47:50.900
Right.
968
00:47:51.020 --> 00:47:55.760
So you can double check so you can have cold card, maybe scan the screen of
969
00:47:55.760 --> 00:47:57.500
your coordinator script.
970
00:47:58.520 --> 00:47:58.620
Yeah.
971
00:47:58.720 --> 00:48:00.900
And just double check that you're signing the same script.
972
00:48:01.040 --> 00:48:02.780
I mean, there's a few things like that.
973
00:48:03.480 --> 00:48:06.980
I like the idea of like very few words to check things.
974
00:48:07.420 --> 00:48:09.860
It's like it really works well and people get it.
975
00:48:10.340 --> 00:48:15.480
You know, if we had advanced hardware, like much more complex, harder than I'll
976
00:48:15.480 --> 00:48:16.280
just use an emoji.
977
00:48:16.500 --> 00:48:18.860
So I like a couple of emojis, but like we can't map out.
978
00:48:22.320 --> 00:48:26.680
Remember, like Signal used to use emojis for you to double check that the
979
00:48:26.680 --> 00:48:30.400
crypto matched, that your connection was secure between two parties.
980
00:48:30.520 --> 00:48:33.420
They would show you a couple of emojis and they would show the other party a
981
00:48:33.420 --> 00:48:33.960
couple of emojis.
982
00:48:34.820 --> 00:48:37.360
That was their way of checking that hash.
983
00:48:38.140 --> 00:48:39.520
So anyway, like something like that.
984
00:48:39.600 --> 00:48:39.800
Right.
985
00:48:39.840 --> 00:48:41.820
I'm sure there is like a technical name for this.
986
00:48:42.700 --> 00:48:44.880
But yeah, I think I think that could work.
987
00:48:45.660 --> 00:48:48.280
Emoji is great, too, because you only need a couple of them to map out the
988
00:48:48.280 --> 00:48:48.720
whole space.
989
00:48:48.720 --> 00:48:53.420
But emoji, it's just it's a whole other set for you to track.
990
00:48:53.500 --> 00:48:55.200
And like, where are you going to store that in a hardware wallet?
991
00:48:55.240 --> 00:48:55.400
Right.
992
00:48:55.420 --> 00:48:56.520
And how are you going to display them?
993
00:48:57.020 --> 00:48:59.940
You have the UTF-8 characters and just the UTF-8.
994
00:48:59.940 --> 00:49:04.920
Yeah, I know, dude, we're so far from that on our very limited hardware
995
00:49:04.920 --> 00:49:05.440
devices.
996
00:49:05.800 --> 00:49:06.200
Of course.
997
00:49:06.280 --> 00:49:06.720
Of course.
998
00:49:07.140 --> 00:49:09.200
Anyway, so, yeah, I mean, that maybe could work.
999
00:49:10.120 --> 00:49:14.300
Having put in hundreds of hours into this stuff, I feel very good about it.
1000
00:49:14.840 --> 00:49:17.120
Haven't found any issues yet or any cross compatibility.
1001
00:49:17.560 --> 00:49:20.220
I feel fine talking about the fact that we use Bitcoin DefKit.
1002
00:49:20.780 --> 00:49:20.980
Right.
1003
00:49:21.240 --> 00:49:24.640
I'm pretty proud user of Bitcoin
DefKit and being able to build what we do.
1004
00:49:25.020 --> 00:49:28.700
I've never had inconsistencies between the information Bitcoin DefKit is
1005
00:49:28.700 --> 00:49:31.620
processing and the cold card being able to interpret it and sign and execute.
1006
00:49:32.100 --> 00:49:35.780
It's actually pretty cool when you sign a PSPT, when you're using time locks,
1007
00:49:35.840 --> 00:49:37.660
you have to alter the end lock time time field.
1008
00:49:38.100 --> 00:49:39.460
And it actually gets shown pretty clearly.
1009
00:49:39.640 --> 00:49:41.980
Like the cold card would tell you like, hey, you're signing for this.
1010
00:49:42.080 --> 00:49:44.700
Also, it's not valid until this date in the future.
1011
00:49:44.700 --> 00:49:45.060
Right.
1012
00:49:45.220 --> 00:49:48.260
The cold card doesn't know what time it is because it doesn't talk to the
1013
00:49:48.260 --> 00:49:50.620
Internet, but it's able to say like, hey, yeah, you're signing this
1014
00:49:50.620 --> 00:49:51.080
transaction.
1015
00:49:51.360 --> 00:49:54.740
Also, it's not valid until this block height or this calendar time.
1016
00:49:54.760 --> 00:49:55.580
And it's clean.
1017
00:49:57.500 --> 00:50:02.500
Talking about that, so new release version five point four point one, this is
1018
00:50:02.500 --> 00:50:05.340
done master right in version one point three point one for Q.
1019
00:50:05.760 --> 00:50:08.000
So there is this new message signing feature.
1020
00:50:08.140 --> 00:50:11.920
You can sign a message from a secure note that could be your script.
1021
00:50:11.920 --> 00:50:12.620
Right.
1022
00:50:13.460 --> 00:50:18.020
You know, and then you can scan with the QR scanner and just, you know, like
1023
00:50:18.020 --> 00:50:19.060
do a dance.
1024
00:50:20.660 --> 00:50:21.760
Delta molding instruments.
1025
00:50:22.120 --> 00:50:22.480
Now we can.
1026
00:50:22.720 --> 00:50:23.840
Oh, now it's like this is cool.
1027
00:50:23.920 --> 00:50:28.860
So if you use your Delta pin, you can hide the devices, hide your secured notes
1028
00:50:28.860 --> 00:50:29.400
and passwords.
1029
00:50:30.780 --> 00:50:35.760
So if you have to give away the device like entry pin, right.
1030
00:50:36.520 --> 00:50:40.400
So you have a passphrase for the thing for the for your stuff or as multi
1031
00:50:40.400 --> 00:50:43.920
-sig, but you still have to give an attacker access to it and you don't want
1032
00:50:43.920 --> 00:50:46.380
to lose your passwords or secure notes.
1033
00:50:46.760 --> 00:50:49.780
If you use the Delta pin, it hides them.
1034
00:50:50.160 --> 00:50:52.960
It can also set it so it deletes the seed vault as well.
1035
00:50:53.540 --> 00:50:54.160
It wipes.
1036
00:50:54.700 --> 00:50:57.500
I think it's hide or wipe, hide or wipe.
1037
00:50:57.740 --> 00:50:57.980
Yeah.
1038
00:50:59.080 --> 00:50:59.700
You choose.
1039
00:51:00.340 --> 00:51:01.720
So that's further on that.
1040
00:51:02.420 --> 00:51:02.800
I don't know.
1041
00:51:02.840 --> 00:51:06.480
Most people know how cool Delta is, how you can even sign the transaction,
1042
00:51:06.780 --> 00:51:10.400
broadcast it and how the network will validate it.
1043
00:51:10.400 --> 00:51:10.700
Yeah.
1044
00:51:11.280 --> 00:51:15.500
We generate an invalid signature for your transaction.
1045
00:51:16.860 --> 00:51:18.100
It's not going.
1046
00:51:18.260 --> 00:51:19.020
It's not going.
1047
00:51:19.320 --> 00:51:20.280
It's not my fault.
1048
00:51:24.340 --> 00:51:25.420
And right.
1049
00:51:25.600 --> 00:51:26.760
Address display changes.
1050
00:51:27.160 --> 00:51:31.500
So we liked like where Trezor started with the whole putting a gap between
1051
00:51:31.500 --> 00:51:33.980
every few digits on addresses.
1052
00:51:34.420 --> 00:51:35.880
So it's easier to read.
1053
00:51:36.660 --> 00:51:40.200
And we improved that a bit by adding inverse video as well.
1054
00:51:40.200 --> 00:51:42.940
So like it's very easy to read now addresses.
1055
00:51:43.620 --> 00:51:45.000
So you can double check them.
1056
00:51:46.360 --> 00:51:50.080
And that goes to say that hardware wallets should have a screen.
1057
00:51:51.200 --> 00:51:53.780
And without a screen, you can't double check where you're sending the money to.
1058
00:51:54.780 --> 00:51:54.880
Right.
1059
00:51:55.080 --> 00:51:57.940
Especially if your software stack is lying to you.
1060
00:51:58.140 --> 00:51:58.240
Right.
1061
00:51:58.380 --> 00:52:02.320
So because see, like if you have an app on iPhone, it doesn't matter if the
1062
00:52:02.320 --> 00:52:03.540
app is open source or not.
1063
00:52:03.620 --> 00:52:08.200
You cannot validate that what you're running on your iPhone is that same app
1064
00:52:08.200 --> 00:52:08.940
code.
1065
00:52:08.940 --> 00:52:09.460
Right.
1066
00:52:10.000 --> 00:52:14.200
And if you have a server involved in that, you also cannot validate that the
1067
00:52:14.200 --> 00:52:18.900
company that's giving you the stuff is doing what it claims to do or it's not
1068
00:52:18.900 --> 00:52:19.580
being hacked or whatever.
1069
00:52:19.800 --> 00:52:26.100
So that screen is paramount to double check your destination address, script or
1070
00:52:26.100 --> 00:52:26.440
whatever.
1071
00:52:27.900 --> 00:52:28.420
What else?
1072
00:52:29.080 --> 00:52:29.440
Yes.
1073
00:52:30.000 --> 00:52:32.280
And 32xpub obsolete.
1074
00:52:33.560 --> 00:52:35.820
Yeah, there was a bunch of other little changes.
1075
00:52:36.880 --> 00:52:42.200
Oh, yeah, you can verify the barbecue QR, sign RFC messages.
1076
00:52:43.280 --> 00:52:44.960
Anyways, a bunch of other stuff.
1077
00:52:45.040 --> 00:52:45.800
Go check it out.
1078
00:52:46.960 --> 00:52:56.140
Sparrow version 2.1.3. One key pro and classic one support, 329 labels export,
1079
00:52:56.280 --> 00:52:57.560
including additional fields.
1080
00:52:57.760 --> 00:52:57.920
So, yeah.
1081
00:52:58.460 --> 00:53:05.240
So there was a campaign, me
being part of the instigators to bully Craig into
1082
00:53:05.240 --> 00:53:12.880
adding other accounting fields to BIP329 because that's what we all need.
1083
00:53:13.420 --> 00:53:15.580
So now it supports a bunch of other little things.
1084
00:53:16.300 --> 00:53:21.180
DocHacks was, I think, who made the PR on BIP329.
1085
00:53:21.840 --> 00:53:23.500
So we got some of that.
1086
00:53:24.460 --> 00:53:27.940
And yeah, so a bunch of other updates to Sparrow.
1087
00:53:28.880 --> 00:53:32.420
Xavier is the huge champion of that, right?
1088
00:53:32.420 --> 00:53:35.500
Like he was trying to show up for two years, trying to get some traction.
1089
00:53:35.620 --> 00:53:36.280
He must be happy.
1090
00:53:37.400 --> 00:53:37.760
Yes.
1091
00:53:39.180 --> 00:53:42.720
As usual with software, it's about bullying.
1092
00:53:42.980 --> 00:53:47.480
Like we got bullied into changing the mini script warning message, you know,
1093
00:53:47.920 --> 00:53:48.900
bullying works.
1094
00:53:49.540 --> 00:53:50.560
It's funny, right?
1095
00:53:50.560 --> 00:53:54.980
On the outside, it looks like bullying, but there is like a methodical process
1096
00:53:54.980 --> 00:53:59.520
to everything where, like, you know, someone's frustrated because it's chicken
1097
00:53:59.520 --> 00:53:59.920
or egg.
1098
00:53:59.920 --> 00:54:04.440
How can they test it if it's not in prod or able to be used?
1099
00:54:04.900 --> 00:54:05.000
Yeah.
1100
00:54:05.160 --> 00:54:10.440
So you'll compromise there, but also they'll be like, oh, you know, NVK is
1101
00:54:10.440 --> 00:54:11.420
playing ball or something.
1102
00:54:11.520 --> 00:54:12.940
It's like, no, that's not how it works.
1103
00:54:13.080 --> 00:54:18.880
Like you have to slowly upgrade things, find bugs, fix, upgrade, find bugs,
1104
00:54:19.340 --> 00:54:19.840
upgrade.
1105
00:54:20.000 --> 00:54:20.940
But what about bugs?
1106
00:54:21.040 --> 00:54:22.040
You still owe me one.
1107
00:54:22.680 --> 00:54:24.580
Rob still owes me reg test access.
1108
00:54:24.580 --> 00:54:27.160
So I'm passing the can to him.
1109
00:54:29.060 --> 00:54:30.380
Reg test is great.
1110
00:54:31.060 --> 00:54:31.160
Right.
1111
00:54:32.060 --> 00:54:41.640
And then Lark version 1.1.0. This is Craig's redo of HWI and
1112
00:54:41.640 --> 00:54:44.160
he keeps on updating for all the harder wallets.
1113
00:54:44.560 --> 00:54:45.360
Incredible service.
1114
00:54:45.620 --> 00:54:48.380
That's the Java based HWI.
1115
00:54:48.660 --> 00:54:48.860
Yeah.
1116
00:54:49.200 --> 00:54:49.480
Wow.
1117
00:54:49.860 --> 00:54:53.020
I mean, he's the only person in the world that wants it either in Java.
1118
00:54:53.020 --> 00:54:54.520
So, I mean, he had the code.
1119
00:54:55.820 --> 00:54:57.980
Him and like Chris Stewart, right?
1120
00:54:58.220 --> 00:54:58.980
Java guys.
1121
00:54:59.280 --> 00:55:00.480
Anyone else in Bitcoin?
1122
00:55:01.380 --> 00:55:01.500
Yeah.
1123
00:55:03.280 --> 00:55:11.340
Perhaps version 25.03.0 top root with WSH miniscript support.
1124
00:55:12.360 --> 00:55:15.440
Eastern Egg reveal hints have been interlaced.
1125
00:55:16.060 --> 00:55:19.820
Swiping sideways to change keypad set and a few other things.
1126
00:55:20.460 --> 00:55:21.980
More camera modes.
1127
00:55:22.830 --> 00:55:24.800
More intuitive tamper check.
1128
00:55:25.440 --> 00:55:26.220
Other bug fixes.
1129
00:55:26.500 --> 00:55:27.460
Kripps is so cool.
1130
00:55:28.200 --> 00:55:29.640
They do use ESP32.
1131
00:55:30.000 --> 00:55:32.180
It's the K10 chipset.
1132
00:55:32.940 --> 00:55:36.560
You know, we talked about ESP32 issues, but, you know, the difference is these
1133
00:55:36.560 --> 00:55:41.860
guys are focused on, you know, experimentation and multi-sig and things that
1134
00:55:41.860 --> 00:55:44.480
sort of like de-risk some of those issues.
1135
00:55:45.480 --> 00:55:47.580
So it's, and you load it yourself.
1136
00:55:48.020 --> 00:55:50.020
It's not pre-programmed in China.
1137
00:55:50.600 --> 00:55:56.360
So, you know, it does have a different, a different security path there.
1138
00:55:56.600 --> 00:55:59.280
I keep telling myself I need to go buy one of these and put it all
1139
00:55:59.280 --> 00:55:59.620
together.
1140
00:55:59.860 --> 00:56:00.860
I've been meaning to do that.
1141
00:56:01.000 --> 00:56:01.480
That's fun.
1142
00:56:01.840 --> 00:56:02.000
Yeah.
1143
00:56:02.220 --> 00:56:05.040
I see on here it says SD card PSPT signing.
1144
00:56:06.080 --> 00:56:07.500
That's, it's fantastic.
1145
00:56:07.760 --> 00:56:09.680
You know, the more options, the better.
1146
00:56:10.080 --> 00:56:10.380
Yes.
1147
00:56:10.440 --> 00:56:15.520
Like I like QRNNFC, but they're not perfect either because of whatever training
1148
00:56:15.520 --> 00:56:17.660
the users to get phished or.
1149
00:56:17.660 --> 00:56:23.160
I love the crooks to double check transactions, to double check keys and do
1150
00:56:23.160 --> 00:56:23.900
things like that.
1151
00:56:24.620 --> 00:56:28.740
It's much better than a Raspberry Pi because, you know, it's a lot less attack
1152
00:56:28.740 --> 00:56:29.200
surface.
1153
00:56:30.300 --> 00:56:31.660
And it's nice and DIY.
1154
00:56:31.920 --> 00:56:34.000
You can get the parts on anywhere, really.
1155
00:56:34.680 --> 00:56:35.960
Then it's touchscreen, kind of fun.
1156
00:56:37.160 --> 00:56:43.340
Anyways, PoveWallet version 0.2.1. Add more plausible deniability to decoy pin,
1157
00:56:43.740 --> 00:56:48.740
pretend change to change pin and trick pins in settings screen, make it easier
1158
00:56:48.740 --> 00:56:52.600
to click change pin in the settings.
1159
00:56:53.540 --> 00:56:55.820
iOS beta is now available in TestFlight.
1160
00:56:55.960 --> 00:56:57.720
Guys, seriously, this wallet is awesome.
1161
00:56:58.580 --> 00:57:01.360
I think everybody should download and help test, help Praveen.
1162
00:57:01.580 --> 00:57:04.600
There is a
group you can join to give feedback.
1163
00:57:05.840 --> 00:57:07.580
So, and he's really plowing through it.
1164
00:57:07.700 --> 00:57:12.740
So it's supporting NFC, it's supporting QRs, you know, it's really simple.
1165
00:57:12.740 --> 00:57:15.200
He's not adding Lightning.
1166
00:57:15.640 --> 00:57:20.200
So it's like a Bitcoin only sort of like simple wallet to use.
1167
00:57:20.640 --> 00:57:21.900
It's BDK based.
1168
00:57:22.580 --> 00:57:24.480
I can't speak highly enough of this project.
1169
00:57:24.720 --> 00:57:29.980
I really think, you know, it's going to be a nice little contender for, you
1170
00:57:29.980 --> 00:57:32.580
know, I need a simple phone wallet.
1171
00:57:32.900 --> 00:57:35.640
A lot of mobile wallets fell into this trap of adding Lightning.
1172
00:57:36.100 --> 00:57:36.520
Yes.
1173
00:57:36.760 --> 00:57:38.080
Because like, oh, it's Lightning, it's payments.
1174
00:57:38.080 --> 00:57:42.960
And the problem is, is that like, that's a lot of code and infrastructure you
1175
00:57:42.960 --> 00:57:44.160
need to maintain and worry about.
1176
00:57:44.400 --> 00:57:46.820
And now you have to worry about a Lightning service provider, right?
1177
00:57:46.860 --> 00:57:49.760
Like now you have to deal with other vendors where like, you know, back in my
1178
00:57:49.760 --> 00:57:51.240
day, all the mobile wallets were just layer one.
1179
00:57:51.400 --> 00:57:54.020
Back when I got into Bitcoin, there was like 20 different ones that would run,
1180
00:57:54.340 --> 00:57:55.740
you know, they were just hanging around.
1181
00:57:55.960 --> 00:58:00.920
And being built on BDK is such a great improvement to just like allowing
1182
00:58:00.920 --> 00:58:02.860
someone to be able to ship and build and not have to worry about the low
1183
00:58:02.860 --> 00:58:06.300
level cryptographic primitives and, you know, like Praveen's able to just kind
1184
00:58:06.300 --> 00:58:07.640
of lift and shift on what's on BDK.
1185
00:58:07.640 --> 00:58:08.920
It's awesome.
1186
00:58:09.180 --> 00:58:14.500
Yeah, I think this would be a fantastic wallet for people who need, you know, a
1187
00:58:14.500 --> 00:58:19.000
spending wallet or maybe a watch-only wallet because, you know, they support
1188
00:58:19.000 --> 00:58:20.180
harder wallets on it.
1189
00:58:20.320 --> 00:58:20.420
Yeah.
1190
00:58:21.200 --> 00:58:24.820
UTXO freezing I'm seeing here, upcoming update will include coin control.
1191
00:58:25.320 --> 00:58:28.760
Like that's just like an obvious like those are those are great things.
1192
00:58:29.180 --> 00:58:31.280
My favorite anecdote, like we added coin control.
1193
00:58:31.400 --> 00:58:33.780
It was like an afternoon because BDK just makes it really straightforward.
1194
00:58:34.480 --> 00:58:36.100
He's iterating really quickly, right?
1195
00:58:36.100 --> 00:58:39.480
I think I heard this wallet maybe like two months ago because he posted some
1196
00:58:39.480 --> 00:58:41.980
BBQR library in Rust.
1197
00:58:42.800 --> 00:58:43.820
How old is this wallet?
1198
00:58:44.080 --> 00:58:44.600
Do you guys know?
1199
00:58:45.800 --> 00:58:49.060
It's like, I don't know, like six months maybe or something like that.
1200
00:58:49.140 --> 00:58:50.840
Like he's just full time working on it.
1201
00:58:51.720 --> 00:58:51.880
Nice.
1202
00:58:52.340 --> 00:58:55.200
Yeah, it's and there is a designer involved.
1203
00:58:55.620 --> 00:58:56.920
That's why the app looks great.
1204
00:58:57.480 --> 00:58:58.380
The UX is good.
1205
00:58:58.940 --> 00:59:02.340
There is a designer literally designing the screens and he's calling them up.
1206
00:59:02.540 --> 00:59:04.520
Like it's a great little pairing there.
1207
00:59:04.800 --> 00:59:06.480
I think we need more of that.
1208
00:59:08.020 --> 00:59:08.120
Yeah.
1209
00:59:08.840 --> 00:59:18.620
Next is Nunchuk desktop version 1.9.43 and Android version 1.9.64. So yeah,
1210
00:59:18.640 --> 00:59:21.420
Nunchuk is another great little phone wallet.
1211
00:59:21.800 --> 00:59:23.640
It's a little bit more complex to use.
1212
00:59:23.780 --> 00:59:28.840
I keep on giving Hugo a lot of grief on DMs to simplify the wallet and
1213
00:59:28.840 --> 00:59:33.200
you know, but they do support like a lot of different things.
1214
00:59:33.200 --> 00:59:36.940
There is like end-to-end encrypted chats for you to do your multi-sig
1215
00:59:36.940 --> 00:59:37.480
collaboration.
1216
00:59:38.940 --> 00:59:43.320
You know, there is like multi-key support, multi-sig, multi-key support, all
1217
00:59:43.320 --> 00:59:44.040
kinds of stuff.
1218
00:59:44.180 --> 00:59:45.340
This is really...
1219
00:59:45.340 --> 00:59:46.120
Bullying works.
1220
00:59:46.800 --> 00:59:48.120
See, everyone just bullies everyone.
1221
00:59:48.380 --> 00:59:50.340
Everyone just bullies everyone at making their stuff better.
1222
00:59:51.280 --> 00:59:53.300
I see Taproot multi-sig in here.
1223
00:59:53.360 --> 00:59:53.920
That's awesome.
1224
00:59:54.460 --> 00:59:54.680
Yes.
1225
00:59:54.960 --> 00:59:55.220
Nice.
1226
00:59:55.260 --> 00:59:56.860
It's always good to see where we are.
1227
00:59:57.500 --> 00:59:57.800
Absolutely.
1228
00:59:58.540 --> 00:59:58.820
Yeah.
1229
00:59:59.280 --> 01:00:01.200
I know you're a big proponent of this too.
1230
01:00:01.200 --> 01:00:04.280
It's all written in native C so they're not a bunch of serializations running
1231
01:00:04.280 --> 01:00:04.680
around, right?
1232
01:00:04.820 --> 01:00:05.260
That's right.
1233
01:00:05.420 --> 01:00:06.580
They are all native.
1234
01:00:07.080 --> 01:00:08.440
I think that's the way to do it.
1235
01:00:08.500 --> 01:00:11.200
Either you write yourself all native or you go BDK.
1236
01:00:12.440 --> 01:00:19.940
Just don't do any of this shit yourself if you're not a wallet dev and nothing
1237
01:00:19.940 --> 01:00:20.520
in JavaScript.
1238
01:00:22.300 --> 01:00:25.940
We don't do anything in
JavaScript that's actually to the key infrastructure.
1239
01:00:26.460 --> 01:00:27.220
No money handling.
1240
01:00:27.780 --> 01:00:30.040
No, it makes the website run and pretty.
1241
01:00:30.040 --> 01:00:31.040
That's what it does.
1242
01:00:31.260 --> 01:00:31.640
That's right.
1243
01:00:32.540 --> 01:00:36.760
BTC Pay Server version 2.0.7. Display fiat amount.
1244
01:00:37.300 --> 01:00:39.220
Preview in transaction detail page.
1245
01:00:39.380 --> 01:00:43.820
Greenview adding endpoint to set server email settings.
1246
01:00:44.680 --> 01:00:45.340
Bitcoin Keeper.
1247
01:00:45.460 --> 01:00:48.020
Redesign, manage subscription screen.
1248
01:00:48.240 --> 01:00:50.640
Support external key for Miniscript Vault.
1249
01:00:50.960 --> 01:00:54.720
Support Spectre DIY for Miniscript Vaults.
1250
01:00:55.060 --> 01:00:57.940
Improve code card NFC integration.
1251
01:00:58.180 --> 01:00:59.600
Improve old wallet speed.
1252
01:00:59.600 --> 01:00:59.880
Nice.
1253
01:01:00.760 --> 01:01:03.380
So Keeper, I mean, they're moving faster, too.
1254
01:01:03.520 --> 01:01:05.720
It's like a nice little competitor to Nunchuck.
1255
01:01:06.020 --> 01:01:09.740
They both have sort of like different ways in how they went about things, which
1256
01:01:09.740 --> 01:01:10.140
is nice.
1257
01:01:10.220 --> 01:01:10.820
So you have choice.
1258
01:01:11.780 --> 01:01:12.900
I like them.
1259
01:01:13.520 --> 01:01:13.960
BlueWallet.
1260
01:01:14.160 --> 01:01:15.040
Yeah, you got Ben Coffman.
1261
01:01:15.300 --> 01:01:15.580
Yes.
1262
01:01:15.820 --> 01:01:17.760
Yeah, Ben Coffman ships, man.
1263
01:01:18.020 --> 01:01:19.920
Yeah, he went on sabbatical.
1264
01:01:20.220 --> 01:01:22.740
He went on sabbatical for a bit and he's now he's back in Bitcoin.
1265
01:01:22.860 --> 01:01:23.380
He's just shipping.
1266
01:01:23.380 --> 01:01:24.020
Yes.
1267
01:01:25.240 --> 01:01:31.420
BlueWallet version 7.1.0. Add support for importing minikeys, cashacious coin,
1268
01:01:31.960 --> 01:01:33.220
satori coin, etc.
1269
01:01:33.380 --> 01:01:35.340
You're debating on redeeming a cashacious coin.
1270
01:01:35.460 --> 01:01:38.240
Just let me know and I'll just buy it from you at spot price and then
1271
01:01:38.240 --> 01:01:40.200
I can go sell it for 30% markup.
1272
01:01:40.320 --> 01:01:42.940
Just throwing that out there that you never want to redeem those things.
1273
01:01:44.040 --> 01:01:44.340
Yeah.
1274
01:01:46.120 --> 01:01:47.580
Unless it's a president, right?
1275
01:01:48.400 --> 01:01:48.740
Right.
1276
01:01:49.020 --> 01:01:49.640
He had to.
1277
01:01:49.940 --> 01:01:51.800
I bet he converted to Trump coin.
1278
01:01:53.620 --> 01:01:54.100
Totally.
1279
01:01:54.560 --> 01:01:58.560
He had to see the Trump coin with his cashacious coin that it was given to
1280
01:01:58.560 --> 01:01:59.280
him.
1281
01:02:00.920 --> 01:02:02.840
I know somebody who gifted him one.
1282
01:02:03.000 --> 01:02:03.460
It's brutal.
1283
01:02:03.980 --> 01:02:04.080
Thanks.
1284
01:02:04.200 --> 01:02:05.860
Yeah, we know.
1285
01:02:06.440 --> 01:02:07.220
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
1286
01:02:07.220 --> 01:02:07.620
Yeah, rough.
1287
01:02:08.240 --> 01:02:14.980
Bitcoin safe version 1.1.0. Support for Jade, that build.
1288
01:02:15.300 --> 01:02:15.600
Yeah.
1289
01:02:15.780 --> 01:02:16.440
Expo import.
1290
01:02:16.680 --> 01:02:17.620
So these guys are moving.
1291
01:02:18.040 --> 01:02:19.120
It's an interesting little project.
1292
01:02:19.380 --> 01:02:21.880
I met them at the there was a rough summit at Bitcoin Park last year.
1293
01:02:21.880 --> 01:02:24.460
And it's a great project.
1294
01:02:24.540 --> 01:02:25.160
Simple GUI.
1295
01:02:25.580 --> 01:02:31.540
It gives me vibes of like the Electrum server, like very basic going through
1296
01:02:31.540 --> 01:02:31.960
the steps.
1297
01:02:32.140 --> 01:02:34.320
And also it uses Nostra, right, for group communication.
1298
01:02:35.280 --> 01:02:35.380
Yeah.
1299
01:02:35.780 --> 01:02:38.320
So if you have if we're all in a multi-sig, we can use Nostra to
1300
01:02:38.320 --> 01:02:39.280
coordinate and the client.
1301
01:02:39.800 --> 01:02:41.280
That's the part that I don't like.
1302
01:02:41.380 --> 01:02:45.420
Don't use Nostra for private DMs until there is forward privacy.
1303
01:02:45.640 --> 01:02:46.080
Double ratchet.
1304
01:02:46.600 --> 01:02:48.500
Yeah, they don't have the PFS still, right?
1305
01:02:48.500 --> 01:02:52.080
I mean, you guys have like a NIP or something for that, but it's not deployed.
1306
01:02:52.820 --> 01:02:55.460
Well, the thing is, like, this is the part that I guess Bitcoiners don't get
1307
01:02:55.460 --> 01:02:57.980
about Nostra is that Nostra doesn't have to have hard consensus.
1308
01:02:58.480 --> 01:02:58.580
Right.
1309
01:02:58.600 --> 01:03:01.680
So like if some people want to implement double ratchet, if some people want to
1310
01:03:01.680 --> 01:03:03.960
implement MLS, some people want to do something else.
1311
01:03:04.040 --> 01:03:06.920
I mean, you know, it's client sort of choice, right?
1312
01:03:07.720 --> 01:03:09.640
There is a lot of work being done on that.
1313
01:03:10.080 --> 01:03:12.660
And there is a few different SPACs and people building on it.
1314
01:03:13.420 --> 01:03:14.120
But yeah, it's moving.
1315
01:03:15.500 --> 01:03:20.400
BitKey app version 2025.1.1, inheritance is here.
1316
01:03:20.620 --> 01:03:23.000
You can now, OK, there is no actual.
1317
01:03:23.520 --> 01:03:25.160
So they have an inheritance thing.
1318
01:03:25.460 --> 01:03:29.100
The inheritance feature, which is kind of similar to CASAs, right?
1319
01:03:29.340 --> 01:03:32.100
Where you're able to take your phone key and transfer it to someone else.
1320
01:03:32.940 --> 01:03:33.140
Yeah.
1321
01:03:33.820 --> 01:03:36.440
I mean, I've been disappointed at their marketing.
1322
01:03:37.100 --> 01:03:39.720
I feel like, you know, it's not transparent.
1323
01:03:40.420 --> 01:03:41.240
It bothers me.
1324
01:03:42.060 --> 01:03:43.780
I've written a little bit about it.
1325
01:03:44.120 --> 01:03:48.240
And I think it's a great solution, stepping stone for people coming off
1326
01:03:48.240 --> 01:03:48.720
exchanges.
1327
01:03:49.080 --> 01:03:54.260
But, you know, it's like a full trust me kind of set up and people should
1328
01:03:54.260 --> 01:03:57.360
migrate out of it once they start understanding and having more coin.
1329
01:03:58.420 --> 01:04:02.980
I don't think it's a thing for people to stay on, you know.
1330
01:04:03.400 --> 01:04:03.780
PubPul.
1331
01:04:05.460 --> 01:04:13.140
LibWally Core version 1.4.0, add caching signature, hash generation, PSPT
1332
01:04:13.140 --> 01:04:16.240
signing, making faster and a bunch of other updates.
1333
01:04:17.100 --> 01:04:23.760
I saw a point where it said add support for deriving RSA keys from BIP 85.
1334
01:04:24.240 --> 01:04:27.600
Do people use Bitcoin keys to derive RSA keys?
1335
01:04:27.760 --> 01:04:31.920
I know, I think SecP also has this, but I was wondering, like, if you guys
1336
01:04:31.920 --> 01:04:36.960
have heard people doing this in practice or anyone using these RSA keys for
1337
01:04:36.960 --> 01:04:37.360
anything?
1338
01:04:38.380 --> 01:04:39.480
RSA keys for which one?
1339
01:04:40.460 --> 01:04:43.980
LibWally Core had an update where it said BIP 85 support.
1340
01:04:44.120 --> 01:04:47.280
You can derive RSA keys via BIP 85 now.
1341
01:04:48.420 --> 01:04:52.340
I guess that makes you, because you have a master, Sec, where would you use it?
1342
01:04:52.420 --> 01:04:55.240
I don't even know where anyone's using RSA for anything Bitcoin related right
1343
01:04:55.240 --> 01:04:55.440
now.
1344
01:04:56.680 --> 01:04:59.500
Maybe they're trying to do that for some sort of side encryption thing.
1345
01:05:00.360 --> 01:05:05.640
Yeah, there is, what did GitHub and a bunch of other sort of like SSH based
1346
01:05:05.640 --> 01:05:07.660
Git solutions started offering now?
1347
01:05:07.840 --> 01:05:12.320
There was a new SPAC, GitHub keys.
1348
01:05:12.660 --> 01:05:14.320
It was not a DSA stuff.
1349
01:05:14.420 --> 01:05:18.300
It was something else that's more efficient that people are using.
1350
01:05:19.380 --> 01:05:22.340
I thought SSH, GPG, something else.
1351
01:05:23.220 --> 01:05:31.340
No, because there's DSS, which is DSA, there's RSA, but there is one more that
1352
01:05:31.340 --> 01:05:34.120
people are starting to use, becoming common.
1353
01:05:34.760 --> 01:05:35.740
I can't remember.
1354
01:05:36.860 --> 01:05:37.200
Anyways.
1355
01:05:38.280 --> 01:05:44.060
Yeah, so you guys know what RSA keys with BIP 85 is used for, if there's
1356
01:05:44.060 --> 01:05:46.100
any applications that are out in the world?
1357
01:05:46.560 --> 01:05:50.140
I mean, the BIP 85 part doesn't truly matter because that's just the way I can
1358
01:05:50.140 -->
01:05:52.040
have my seed plate buried under a mountain.
1359
01:05:52.140 --> 01:05:56.120
I can generate child RSA keys, but I don't know offhand why anyone is using
1360
01:05:56.120 --> 01:05:56.780
that for anything.
1361
01:05:58.180 --> 01:05:58.380
Yeah.
1362
01:05:58.380 --> 01:06:07.720
All right, BISC 2 version 2.1.6, RoboSats version 0.7.4
1363
01:06:07.720 --> 01:06:15.860
-alpha, Boltz updated, Zapwrite updated, Blockstream Explorer API update, a new
1364
01:06:15.860 --> 01:06:19.900
feature include 99.9 SLA transparent pricing.
1365
01:06:20.660 --> 01:06:23.760
Wait, so it's like a paid Block Explorer?
1366
01:06:23.760 --> 01:06:30.380
Yes, they are offering a service where you are able to use their infrastructure
1367
01:06:30.380 --> 01:06:31.680
and you just get a dedicated endpoint.
1368
01:06:32.060 --> 01:06:35.340
And then if you're a business or a service, whatever, and you don't have to
1369
01:06:35.340 --> 01:06:39.060
worry about all of the infrastructure overhead of maintaining your own Electrum
1370
01:06:39.060 --> 01:06:40.680
nodes, you can tap them.
1371
01:06:41.080 --> 01:06:43.360
Isn't Mempo that space free?
1372
01:06:44.280 --> 01:06:48.100
Yeah, well, I mean, they also have a commercial side where you could have your
1373
01:06:48.100 --> 01:06:49.260
own endpoints, too.
1374
01:06:49.260 --> 01:06:54.500
So it's interesting seeing like these essentially two forks battling it out now
1375
01:06:54.500 --> 01:06:55.000
in the market.
1376
01:06:55.540 --> 01:06:58.180
Yeah, and you can also just run your own, right?
1377
01:06:58.620 --> 01:07:02.860
Yeah, the beta tier where you get a couple hundred thousand requests per month.
1378
01:07:03.120 --> 01:07:06.340
So I will say it's like you're just like in your base and you're coding up
1379
01:07:06.340 --> 01:07:07.400
a basic prototype app.
1380
01:07:07.640 --> 01:07:11.140
Great use case to just throw this in there to like be able to have something
1381
01:07:11.140 --> 01:07:11.640
to hit against.
1382
01:07:11.800 --> 01:07:14.300
Because while you're just shipping and building the front end and the wallet
1383
01:07:14.300 --> 01:07:16.960
and the architecture for your own app, you don't worry about the blockchain
1384
01:07:16.960 --> 01:07:17.400
source.
1385
01:07:17.900 --> 01:07:20.880
Well, that's probably a great use case to start poking around with that.
1386
01:07:22.140 --> 01:07:28.880
All right, Mempo version 1.5.2, Iris wallet, oh wait, am I?
1387
01:07:29.060 --> 01:07:29.400
Yes.
1388
01:07:29.920 --> 01:07:39.280
Iris wallet desktop, U3XO, ESPminer updated, Project Spotlight, reorg
1389
01:07:39.280 --> 01:07:43.340
calculator, a calculator to estimate the probability of an attacker
1390
01:07:43.340 --> 01:07:48.780
reorganizing blocks and considering their hash power and the time ratio.
1391
01:07:49.400 --> 01:07:49.560
Cool.
1392
01:07:50.300 --> 01:07:50.920
Very cool.
1393
01:07:51.880 --> 01:07:56.260
Bitcoin Core, Config Generator, didn't Lopp used to have one?
1394
01:07:56.340 --> 01:07:57.980
Jamison had one.
1395
01:07:58.080 --> 01:07:59.220
This is a TUI though.
1396
01:07:59.860 --> 01:08:00.060
Yeah.
1397
01:08:00.520 --> 01:08:01.020
Oh, interesting.
1398
01:08:01.180 --> 01:08:05.220
So random idea, speaking of a TUI, Terminal User Interface, right?
1399
01:08:05.960 --> 01:08:09.680
Do you think there's any demand for a Bitcoin wallet that's a TUI so that you
1400
01:08:09.680 --> 01:08:14.120
can just go into a server and just like do things without having a full graphic
1401
01:08:14.120 --> 01:08:14.940
user interface?
1402
01:08:15.720 --> 01:08:17.260
I mean, it never hurt anyone.
1403
01:08:18.060 --> 01:08:18.180
Right.
1404
01:08:18.359 --> 01:08:19.819
Just another form factor, right?
1405
01:08:19.840 --> 01:08:24.520
So you can just SSH into a server somewhere and do wallet ops without it being.
1406
01:08:25.060 --> 01:08:26.540
I had this random idea the other day.
1407
01:08:26.600 --> 01:08:29.080
There's some there's some stuff I use that has really cool terminal user
1408
01:08:29.080 --> 01:08:29.500
interfaces.
1409
01:08:29.600 --> 01:08:32.120
And I was wondering why no one ever hit the UX for that.
1410
01:08:32.180 --> 01:08:34.979
But I think it's probably because it'd be really technical people who'd want to
1411
01:08:34.979 --> 01:08:35.540
consume that.
1412
01:08:35.800 --> 01:08:39.200
And then at that point, I think nobody wants to share their data.
1413
01:08:39.560 --> 01:08:40.140
Oh, no.
1414
01:08:40.240 --> 01:08:43.200
Those open source, like literally like download this like thing and then you
1415
01:08:43.200 --> 01:08:45.880
can just like, yeah, like app install whatever.
1416
01:08:46.060 --> 01:08:48.120
And then you have a little TUI that just sits there and hangs out.
1417
01:08:48.500 --> 01:08:48.640
Yeah.
1418
01:08:48.979 --> 01:08:49.260
OK.
1419
01:08:49.520 --> 01:08:50.359
Not that I'm busy enough.
1420
01:08:50.380 --> 01:08:51.500
I'll just go do something else, too.
1421
01:08:53.020 --> 01:08:53.700
But it's cool, though.
1422
01:08:53.779 --> 01:08:55.859
Terminal User Interface for this is nice, too.
1423
01:08:55.920 --> 01:08:58.720
If you're just like remoting into a server somewhere and you're trying to set
1424
01:08:58.720 --> 01:09:02.040
up core, like it's nice to be able to just like hit the buttons and then
1425
01:09:02.040 --> 01:09:03.279
have the config files fit out.
1426
01:09:03.359 --> 01:09:03.580
Yeah.
1427
01:09:03.660 --> 01:09:04.300
Like that's great.
1428
01:09:05.340 --> 01:09:10.020
Bitcoin Core snapshots, fast track your nodes set up with pre-sync blockchain
1429
01:09:10.020 --> 01:09:10.760
data.
1430
01:09:11.680 --> 01:09:15.840
Boot protocol, decentralized protocol for Bitcoin hashing nodes to share block
1431
01:09:15.840 --> 01:09:17.640
rewards and reduce variance.
1432
01:09:18.880 --> 01:09:25.319
Multi-sig backup, encrypt and inscribe your K of N
multi-sig descriptor,
1433
01:09:25.600 --> 01:09:28.520
recover with any K seeds.
1434
01:09:29.939 --> 01:09:33.359
No, so this goes to what we were talking about earlier about you need to have
1435
01:09:33.359 --> 01:09:34.080
all of this data.
1436
01:09:34.420 --> 01:09:38.640
So you could do an encrypted blob, I guess, using ordinal inscription stuff.
1437
01:09:38.779 --> 01:09:38.920
Right.
1438
01:09:38.939 --> 01:09:40.399
And then you have that as your data recovery.
1439
01:09:40.520 --> 01:09:44.260
So as long as you have one of your keys, you could go to that encrypted
1440
01:09:44.260 --> 01:09:46.300
blob and recover the whole output descriptor.
1441
01:09:46.880 --> 01:09:50.859
So that makes it removes that need to make sure you have a redundant digital
1442
01:09:50.859 --> 01:09:53.340
copy backup of the output descriptor, if that makes sense.
1443
01:09:53.980 --> 01:09:54.420
Yeah.
1444
01:09:55.600 --> 01:09:56.200
I don't know.
1445
01:09:56.540 --> 01:09:57.740
I don't know how I feel about it.
1446
01:09:59.140 --> 01:10:03.460
Wallet backup, a document, standardized Bitcoin wallet backup formats.
1447
01:10:04.480 --> 01:10:06.080
I actually have a random shout out.
1448
01:10:06.200 --> 01:10:07.440
I'm going to drop it in here.
1449
01:10:08.380 --> 01:10:10.260
Thunderbiscuit, part of the Bitcoin Dev Kit team.
1450
01:10:10.340 --> 01:10:10.980
He's an Android dev.
1451
01:10:11.040 --> 01:10:11.980
He does some really cool stuff.
1452
01:10:12.500 --> 01:10:16.000
He has he has RegTest in a box that uses Podman as a docker, like the
1453
01:10:16.000 --> 01:10:20.400
docker instantiation, and it spins up the node, the electris and like a really
1454
01:10:20.400 --> 01:10:22.440
simple like HTML block explorer.
1455
01:10:22.640 --> 01:10:27.120
So if you're doing local dev for those at home, like RegTest is a Bitcoin
1456
01:10:27.120 --> 01:10:31.040
network type where you basically can spin up your own local entire network on
1457
01:10:31.040 --> 01:10:31.440
your machine.
1458
01:10:31.560 --> 01:10:32.700
You can give yourself a bunch of coins.
1459
01:10:32.700 --> 01:10:33.440
You can move them around.
1460
01:10:33.520 --> 01:10:36.780
You can do all your testing, following the Bitcoin consensus rules with some
1461
01:10:36.780 --> 01:10:37.600
modifications, right?
1462
01:10:37.600 --> 01:10:39.300
Because you're just mining blocks to yourself.
1463
01:10:39.700 --> 01:10:41.980
But it's a cool way to do dev testing, right?
1464
01:10:42.000 --> 01:10:45.660
And have like God mode over a blockchain, whereas like a SIGNET would be like,
1465
01:10:45.840 --> 01:10:48.800
I'm hosting a service like MutinyNet and I want everyone to be able to come log
1466
01:10:48.800 --> 01:10:49.700
in and like view it.
1467
01:10:50.100 --> 01:10:51.420
RegTest is like for like my local machine.
1468
01:10:51.540 --> 01:10:52.920
I could do testing too, right?
1469
01:10:53.600 --> 01:10:56.300
So it's a cool little service, RegTest in a pod.
1470
01:10:57.260 --> 01:10:58.940
Thunderbiscuit on the Bitcoin Dev Kit team put that out.
1471
01:10:59.000 --> 01:10:59.440
Pretty nice.
1472
01:10:59.880 --> 01:11:04.260
Yeah, there's I think another one that people like called Nigiri, right?
1473
01:11:04.360 --> 01:11:05.060
Or am I mixing?
1474
01:11:05.660 --> 01:11:06.020
Nigiri?
1475
01:11:06.200 --> 01:11:07.400
Yeah, no, Nigiri is another one too.
1476
01:11:07.460 --> 01:11:08.780
There's like a whole spin up of everything.
1477
01:11:08.940 --> 01:11:09.160
Yeah, yeah.
1478
01:11:09.820 --> 01:11:15.060
Yeah, these are so clutch just for getting the environment set up so quickly.
1479
01:11:16.240 --> 01:11:20.520
Yeah, this is like developer tooling, which is one of those things that often
1480
01:11:20.520 --> 01:11:22.400
gets overlooked because it's not the end consumers.
1481
01:11:22.560 --> 01:11:26.920
But these things being available just helps people ship faster, right?
1482
01:11:26.920 --> 01:11:30.320
Being able to like have this stuff just off the shelf that you can take and
1483
01:11:30.320 --> 01:11:31.300
you can go build tools.
1484
01:11:32.100 --> 01:11:35.480
Dev experience, like user experience, is something that a lot of people in
1485
01:11:35.480 --> 01:11:36.320
Bitcoin just look over.
1486
01:11:36.900 --> 01:11:39.880
And it's such a force multiplier to have this stuff that you can take off the
1487
01:11:39.880 --> 01:11:42.860
shelf and run with because you spend more time actually solving problems and
1488
01:11:42.860 --> 01:11:46.440
less time figuring out the plugging and piping to be able to do the work
1489
01:11:46.440 --> 01:11:46.960
exactly.
1490
01:11:47.840 --> 01:11:48.240
Yeah.
1491
01:11:49.020 --> 01:11:53.160
All right, guys, let's move on to the vulnerability disclosures that were not
1492
01:11:53.160 --> 01:11:55.980
critical, but critical for somebody else, not for us.
1493
01:11:57.180 --> 01:12:02.660
JavaScript injection attack was on SafeWallet and there was the ByteBitch
1494
01:12:02.660 --> 01:12:06.600
attack that resulted in $1.4 billion stolen.
1495
01:12:07.400 --> 01:12:07.520
Yeah.
1496
01:12:07.740 --> 01:12:08.820
I mean, we talked about this.
1497
01:12:08.920 --> 01:12:12.940
Don't use JavaScript and check on the hardware wallet, which is impossible
1498
01:12:12.940 --> 01:12:15.940
because Ethereum's design made it impossible for you to double check.
1499
01:12:16.700 --> 01:12:22.360
Yeah, so there was a, I guess, how many lines smart contract that they had to
1500
01:12:22.360 --> 01:12:27.240
verify from the browser on a Ledger wallet via USB.
1501
01:12:27.740 --> 01:12:29.460
That sounds like a setup for disaster.
1502
01:12:30.320 --> 01:12:31.560
Well, it's pretty brutal, right?
1503
01:12:31.700 --> 01:12:36.080
Like, you know, one thing I've been saying is that like, you know, it was not
1504
01:12:36.080 --> 01:12:39.240
technically their fault, but practically was for
Ledger.
1505
01:12:39.540 --> 01:12:43.000
Like because, you know, listen, if you're signing, if you allow your users to
1506
01:12:43.000 --> 01:12:47.920
sign something to give them confidence that they're signing something that
1507
01:12:47.920 --> 01:12:51.360
like, you know, they think they're doing it securely, you're part of the
1508
01:12:51.360 --> 01:12:51.900
problem.
1509
01:12:52.440 --> 01:12:55.360
You know, like, just ditch support for Ethereum.
1510
01:12:55.640 --> 01:12:56.040
That's it.
1511
01:12:56.200 --> 01:12:58.060
Sure, you're going to lose some sales, but you know what?
1512
01:12:58.160 --> 01:13:02.180
Like, at least you're not finding shit or giving people confidence to something
1513
01:13:02.180 --> 01:13:03.340
that they're going to lose money on.
1514
01:13:03.620 --> 01:13:07.620
Have you done a Bitcoin.review since this ByteBitch hack happened?
1515
01:13:08.000 --> 01:13:08.840
I don't think so.
1516
01:13:09.480 --> 01:13:12.160
So this is, I mean, it's wild, right?
1517
01:13:12.600 --> 01:13:17.040
The CEO of ByteBitch was like, I was the last signature and I used my Ledger
1518
01:13:17.040 --> 01:13:17.620
and signed it.
1519
01:13:18.160 --> 01:13:23.200
Like, this is a huge distinction in how Bitcoin versus Ethereum works.
1520
01:13:23.880 --> 01:13:28.240
Bitcoin, all of the state, all of the information that's relevant for a
1521
01:13:28.240 --> 01:13:31.540
transaction lives at the UTXO, where you're sending the money from.
1522
01:13:32.100 --> 01:13:32.200
Right.
1523
01:13:32.260 --> 01:13:37.060
Whereas Ethereum, you have this big, arbitrary, smart contracting language that
1524
01:13:37.060 --> 01:13:37.980
has a bunch of information.
1525
01:13:38.300 --> 01:13:42.600
And the part of the reason why hardware wallets are so valuable is that it can
1526
01:13:42.600 --> 01:13:44.740
deconstruct the state in plain English.
1527
01:13:44.880 --> 01:13:48.420
Be like, you are sending 10 Bitcoin to this address.
1528
01:13:48.600 --> 01:13:49.400
Do you approve?
1529
01:13:50.040 --> 01:13:50.280
Right.
1530
01:13:50.420 --> 01:13:54.140
And the problem is with ETH, the nature of how that all works, you actually
1531
01:13:54.140 --> 01:13:58.340
can't have that same level of clarity when you're doing these larger,
1532
01:13:58.380 --> 01:14:01.600
arbitrary, smart contracts if you're not setting it up correctly.
1533
01:14:01.800 --> 01:14:04.860
So like, I'll send it over to you guys in the chat.
1534
01:14:05.480 --> 01:14:07.660
Like gigantic hacks.
1535
01:14:08.200 --> 01:14:09.580
Yeah, no, that's exactly it.
1536
01:14:09.580 --> 01:14:09.740
Right.
1537
01:14:09.740 --> 01:14:11.280
So I just dropped it in the chat.
1538
01:14:11.280 --> 01:14:16.760
Like what you're looking at is message hash and it's a bunch of hexadecimal.
1539
01:14:16.900 --> 01:14:17.080
Right.
1540
01:14:17.280 --> 01:14:22.500
And unless you're somehow in parallel, re-computing and making sure, yep,
1541
01:14:22.560 --> 01:14:23.900
that's the hash I should be signing.
1542
01:14:24.300 --> 01:14:26.460
You're not doing the secure blind signing.
1543
01:14:26.620 --> 01:14:28.280
You're not actually verifying anything.
1544
01:14:28.380 --> 01:14:33.860
And this is just a huge tradeoff between Ethereum and Bitcoin in the design
1545
01:14:33.860 --> 01:14:35.260
decisions and tradeoffs are being made.
1546
01:14:35.620 --> 01:14:37.100
This is one of those downsides.
1547
01:14:37.180 --> 01:14:40.120
You actually can't meaningfully discern this stuff.
1548
01:14:40.120 --> 01:14:42.300
You think output descriptors are a pain in the ass?
1549
01:14:42.460 --> 01:14:45.720
Like, this is every time you do a transaction, at least with the output
1550
01:14:45.720 --> 01:14:48.620
descriptor stuff, it's the first time you set up the wallet, you do this kind
1551
01:14:48.620 --> 01:14:51.900
of secure handshake and then going forward, you're fine.
1552
01:14:52.140 --> 01:14:55.260
This is every time you just move money, period, because all of the state is in
1553
01:14:55.260 --> 01:14:56.540
the contract address.
1554
01:14:56.780 --> 01:14:56.900
Right.
1555
01:14:56.960 --> 01:15:00.920
So this is just a huge miss to have something like that kind of go on.
1556
01:15:02.040 --> 01:15:05.420
And then, you know, to shift on Ethereum a little more, of course, you know,
1557
01:15:05.460 --> 01:15:11.620
malicious PyPy package that steals Ethereum private keys by looking while it
1558
01:15:11.620 --> 01:15:12.080
functions.
1559
01:15:12.480 --> 01:15:12.960
Amazing.
1560
01:15:14.140 --> 01:15:19.060
Something like this only happens because, you know, they know those people
1561
01:15:19.060 --> 01:15:19.820
don't check the code.
1562
01:15:20.760 --> 01:15:21.860
Wow, that's wild.
1563
01:15:22.400 --> 01:15:24.360
So it literally just sat there and saw.
1564
01:15:24.820 --> 01:15:25.040
Yeah.
1565
01:15:25.340 --> 01:15:28.240
Well, one, you're using like you can't, you're not even using Python, you're
1566
01:15:28.240 --> 01:15:29.480
using SetNoodles, OK?
1567
01:15:29.860 --> 01:15:30.100
Yeah.
1568
01:15:30.380 --> 01:15:32.640
That has a thousand and seventy seven downloads to date.
1569
01:15:32.900 --> 01:15:34.320
Well, the package is gone now, thankfully.
1570
01:15:34.320 --> 01:15:35.020
I'm just looking.
1571
01:15:35.880 --> 01:15:41.140
Disguised as the Python simple utility set, it mimics the widely used library
1572
01:15:41.140 --> 01:15:45.240
Python utils that has seven hundred and twelve million downloads.
1573
01:15:45.700 --> 01:15:50.140
And it's just called SetNoodles and all it was was basically just being able to
1574
01:15:50.140 --> 01:15:50.740
rip out the data.
1575
01:15:51.680 --> 01:15:52.940
There you go.
1576
01:15:53.380 --> 01:15:55.440
People are getting really clever with this.
1577
01:15:55.520 --> 01:15:58.000
I saw maybe a month ago or something like that.
1578
01:15:58.360 --> 01:16:03.260
There was
Google ads for like a fake homebrew, right, where when you're trying
1579
01:16:03.260 --> 01:16:07.860
to install and set up your Mac OS and you need a package manager, most people
1580
01:16:07.860 --> 01:16:08.800
would just go homebrew.
1581
01:16:09.600 --> 01:16:14.160
And I guess the original script was like a malicious code base.
1582
01:16:14.520 --> 01:16:17.700
And Google just allowed them to be advertised at the top.
1583
01:16:18.120 --> 01:16:20.460
And it was like, they're probably paying a lot of money.
1584
01:16:21.140 --> 01:16:25.200
Yeah, that's where everybody lost money with blockchain.info back in the day.
1585
01:16:25.360 --> 01:16:28.900
It was like they would allow, Google would allow all these ads to be above
1586
01:16:28.900 --> 01:16:32.940
blockchain.info website that took you to malicious sites that asked you to type
1587
01:16:32.940 --> 01:16:35.560
in your hash for your private key.
1588
01:16:36.280 --> 01:16:38.240
I'm looking at this exploit.
1589
01:16:38.500 --> 01:16:42.680
It sat and listened for whenever from key or from mnemonic was called.
1590
01:16:45.260 --> 01:16:48.940
So it just sat on your machine whenever you're running code and whenever you
1591
01:16:48.940 --> 01:16:51.760
did crypto things, it was like, OK, I'm going to listen now.
1592
01:16:52.420 --> 01:16:52.920
Oh, man.
1593
01:16:53.700 --> 01:16:54.180
Pretty brutal.
1594
01:16:54.860 --> 01:16:56.020
Yeah, pretty brutal.
1595
01:16:56.020 --> 01:16:57.140
All right.
1596
01:16:57.180 --> 01:17:01.620
OpenSSH vulnerabilities expose clients and servers to attacks.
1597
01:17:02.180 --> 01:17:04.340
OpenSSH is an absolute clusterfuck.
1598
01:17:05.560 --> 01:17:11.160
USB side channel attacks a new privacy threat through hub congestion because
1599
01:17:11.160 --> 01:17:14.220
you have all your signals going through the same fucking hub.
1600
01:17:15.000 --> 01:17:18.980
Security researchers discover a novel USB side channel attack that exploits USB
1601
01:17:18.980 --> 01:17:23.420
hub congestion to monitor user activity without physical access to the malware
1602
01:17:23.420 --> 01:17:24.120
installation.
1603
01:17:24.740 --> 01:17:24.980
Nice.
1604
01:17:26.020 --> 01:17:32.980
They can get keystrokes, recovery attacks, USB mouse detect, typing patterns
1605
01:17:32.980 --> 01:17:34.000
and a bunch of stuff.
1606
01:17:34.060 --> 01:17:34.780
It's a disaster.
1607
01:17:35.300 --> 01:17:36.900
Don't use USB for hardware wallets.
1608
01:17:37.960 --> 01:17:42.560
Celebrite, a critical Android security flaw exploited to target student
1609
01:17:42.560 --> 01:17:43.600
activists in Serbia.
1610
01:17:44.380 --> 01:17:44.720
Nice.
1611
01:17:45.520 --> 01:17:46.320
Don't use Android.
1612
01:17:48.920 --> 01:17:52.760
Messaging vulnerabilities, mesh task and firmware vulnerability allows
1613
01:17:52.760 --> 01:17:53.660
impersonation.
1614
01:17:54.060 --> 01:17:55.880
That's nice to see that being patched.
1615
01:17:57.300 --> 01:18:02.000
GitVenom, a cryptocurrency theft campaign uses fake GitHub projects.
1616
01:18:02.200 --> 01:18:02.580
Nice.
1617
01:18:03.580 --> 01:18:04.760
We're going to only see more.
1618
01:18:04.880 --> 01:18:08.680
We haven't even started in this industry with the attacks because it's just so
1619
01:18:08.680 --> 01:18:09.580
much money to be stolen.
1620
01:18:10.680 --> 01:18:16.140
Stablecoin payment firm Infini loses $50 million in exploit developer deception
1621
01:18:16.140 --> 01:18:16.940
suspected.
1622
01:18:18.360 --> 01:18:20.580
Five-dollar-rich attacks, there were a few.
1623
01:18:21.640 --> 01:18:23.260
So, yeah, man, what a clusterfuck.
1624
01:18:23.260 --> 01:18:28.740
With dev in the stablecoin theft held on to admin keys after the project was
1625
01:18:28.740 --> 01:18:28.980
over.
1626
01:18:29.500 --> 01:18:30.000
Yeah, classic.
1627
01:18:30.280 --> 01:18:32.260
I mean, you know, you want to found a project, found a dev.
1628
01:18:32.720 --> 01:18:33.920
Well, that is a wild thing, too.
1629
01:18:34.040 --> 01:18:37.500
Like, like being in industry, maybe you get the suit off of like, I was
1630
01:18:37.500 --> 01:18:38.940
advertising, like, hey, I'm looking to make some hires.
1631
01:18:39.400 --> 01:18:43.340
The amount of random accounts that would reach out with random GitHubs.
1632
01:18:44.120 --> 01:18:45.760
And I'm like, who are you?
1633
01:18:45.800 --> 01:18:47.080
No, no, I'm not.
1634
01:18:47.140 --> 01:18:48.940
No, I'm not even taking a call with you.
1635
01:18:49.700 --> 01:18:54.360
It's not like you just having some real presence and being able to see this
1636
01:18:54.360 --> 01:18:54.640
stuff.
1637
01:18:54.780 --> 01:18:58.620
Like, by the way, looking to hire full stack devs, if you're interested, hit me
1638
01:18:58.620 --> 01:18:58.800
up.
1639
01:18:58.940 --> 01:19:00.880
Non-spook, please apply to Rob.
1640
01:19:00.940 --> 01:19:02.420
Yeah, non-spook, please.
1641
01:19:02.560 --> 01:19:04.980
But if you made it this far into the podcast, that's a pretty good initial
1642
01:19:04.980 --> 01:19:05.360
indicator.
1643
01:19:05.520 --> 01:19:08.860
You can email me at rob at anchorwatch.com with your resume and having a real
1644
01:19:08.860 --> 01:19:09.640
GitHub page, too.
1645
01:19:09.740 --> 01:19:11.420
And this is actually, this happened a bunch in ETH.
1646
01:19:11.460 --> 01:19:12.680
They were hiring North Korean hackers.
1647
01:19:12.740 --> 01:19:14.580
They were just like, oh, I have a monkey JPEG.
1648
01:19:14.640 --> 01:19:17.080
And then they hire and work on a project and they just take all the money.
1649
01:19:17.520 --> 01:19:20.020
Not that that was even possible in our architecture, but it's one of those
1650
01:19:20.020 --> 01:19:24.120
things to be mindful of, you know, you can be a friendly organization because
1651
01:19:24.120 --> 01:19:25.400
they're going to get in no matter what.
1652
01:19:25.780 --> 01:19:29.960
So just
design your systems, your code and everything in a way that, you know,
1653
01:19:29.980 --> 01:19:33.080
like you're actually benefiting from all this NSA training.
1654
01:19:33.380 --> 01:19:37.040
Well, this is what I'm like, our architecture set up in a way where like the
1655
01:19:37.040 --> 01:19:39.620
nature of how it's all set up is distributed in that sense.
1656
01:19:39.700 --> 01:19:42.180
So like even like there are no keys stored on the server.
1657
01:19:42.280 --> 01:19:43.100
So, OK, you got into this.
1658
01:19:43.180 --> 01:19:44.100
OK, there's nothing there.
1659
01:19:44.520 --> 01:19:45.580
I think it's smart to do that.
1660
01:19:45.580 --> 01:19:48.040
Like this is actually what the Taproot Wizards did when they hired Rheindell.
1661
01:19:48.140 --> 01:19:49.140
They're like, Rheindell's a spook.
1662
01:19:49.280 --> 01:19:50.440
We would love a spook on our team.
1663
01:19:50.520 --> 01:19:51.860
That would help with our marketing with Mossad.
1664
01:19:52.180 --> 01:19:52.540
Right.
1665
01:19:52.660 --> 01:19:54.820
They just kind of bring it and you just like open arms.
1666
01:19:54.920 --> 01:19:55.680
You just bring them all in.
1667
01:19:55.940 --> 01:19:56.140
Yes.
1668
01:19:57.180 --> 01:19:58.360
Leverage all their training.
1669
01:19:59.860 --> 01:20:01.120
OK, audience questions.
1670
01:20:01.680 --> 01:20:02.560
Thanks, everyone who sent in.
1671
01:20:02.660 --> 01:20:07.880
OK, audience question for guests to comment on flaw in Bitcoin Core regarding
1672
01:20:07.880 --> 01:20:12.100
mining pools and their vulnerability against block withholding attacks.
1673
01:20:12.900 --> 01:20:14.700
Referring on this post, it was Anon.
1674
01:20:15.660 --> 01:20:21.820
I mean, I don't I find a lot of these issues to be not a huge
1675
01:20:21.820 --> 01:20:22.260
issue.
1676
01:20:23.100 --> 01:20:25.600
So this was by Steve Barbour.
1677
01:20:26.160 --> 01:20:27.660
The stashing chief of Bitcoin.
1678
01:20:27.920 --> 01:20:29.560
The stashing chief learned to pull.
1679
01:20:31.860 --> 01:20:35.240
Most Bitcoiners are not aware of significant flaw in Bitcoin Core.
1680
01:20:35.580 --> 01:20:40.580
A mining pool can never be both publicly accessible and privacy focused because
1681
01:20:40.580 --> 01:20:45.060
they will be attacked by something called a block withholding attack.
1682
01:20:45.580 --> 01:20:51.660
This means people who are interested in censoring resistance will have to pull
1683
01:20:51.660 --> 01:20:56.480
their hash power privately, which is very difficult, hard to scale when you're
1684
01:20:56.480 --> 01:20:58.020
trying to conceal your identity.
1685
01:20:58.540 --> 01:21:04.440
The result is that all mining pools will trend towards KYC state worship
1686
01:21:04.440 --> 01:21:08.660
centralization, making network censorship relatively easy to enforce.
1687
01:21:09.120 --> 01:21:11.320
Unfortunately, the only known solution is a hard fork.
1688
01:21:12.680 --> 01:21:14.440
I don't think it's that.
1689
01:21:14.760 --> 01:21:15.900
I don't even know what the hard fork is.
1690
01:21:16.100 --> 01:21:17.260
How does the hard fork fix that?
1691
01:21:17.680 --> 01:21:21.400
Yeah, I don't know what the hard fork will be, but I don't I don't think
1692
01:21:21.400 --> 01:21:23.140
this is a big issue.
1693
01:21:23.880 --> 01:21:26.960
I agree with the assessment, but maybe not the conclusion.
1694
01:21:27.320 --> 01:21:28.600
And it's like Cloudflare, right?
1695
01:21:28.620 --> 01:21:29.400
We all use it.
1696
01:21:29.920 --> 01:21:30.120
Yes.
1697
01:21:30.920 --> 01:21:35.720
Yeah, I think you're just going to have like different markets of people that
1698
01:21:35.720 --> 01:21:39.920
are looking to be more privacy focused, that are going to put their hash in
1699
01:21:39.920 --> 01:21:40.680
like all those bid acts.
1700
01:21:40.820 --> 01:21:42.920
Bid acts just found a block yesterday, right?
1701
01:21:43.080 --> 01:21:46.460
Like you're just going to have pockets of hash and things are going to kind of
1702
01:21:46.460 --> 01:21:47.000
roll through.
1703
01:21:47.300 --> 01:21:49.240
We have a lot of large publicly traded companies.
1704
01:21:49.240 --> 01:21:51.360
They're looking for SOC 2 in compliance.
1705
01:21:51.640 --> 01:21:53.300
Bhutan man, Bhutan is mining.
1706
01:21:53.660 --> 01:21:53.800
Right.
1707
01:21:54.040 --> 01:21:55.620
You know, like you're going to have different countries.
1708
01:21:55.760 --> 01:21:57.780
They're going to hate each other because that's what countries do.
1709
01:21:58.220 --> 01:22:01.920
And then and then, you know, like you're going to have some stuff, you know,
1710
01:22:01.960 --> 01:22:03.000
coming out of different places.
1711
01:22:03.140 --> 01:22:06.480
Flag theory for Bitcoin mining has always been part of the model.
1712
01:22:07.640 --> 01:22:12.900
And hopefully with Ocean Mining, it's not as concerning because if you have
1713
01:22:12.900 --> 01:22:16.840
block construction done by the hasher, it's not as concerning what the pool
1714
01:22:16.840 --> 01:22:17.420
wants to do.
1715
01:22:17.540 --> 01:22:18.380
It really isn't.
1716
01:22:18.620 --> 01:22:18.720
Right.
1717
01:22:18.760 --> 01:22:19.020
Right.
1718
01:22:19.060 --> 01:22:23.500
Because, you know, you're constructing the the template you want with the
1719
01:22:23.500 --> 01:22:24.480
transactions that you want.
1720
01:22:24.600 --> 01:22:26.340
So that that is a lot less concerning.
1721
01:22:27.400 --> 01:22:30.740
Anyways, the last little bit of the show, let's just mention a few project
1722
01:22:30.740 --> 01:22:39.960
spotlights on Nostr, 24242.io, this seems to be high performance Nostr
1723
01:22:39.960 --> 01:22:43.440
CDN for Blossom, which is really cool.
1724
01:22:43.540 --> 01:22:45.240
I tested it seems to be very fast.
1725
01:22:46.200 --> 01:22:49.460
And for some weird reason, there is a second one that appeared the same week.
1726
01:22:49.640 --> 01:22:52.380
Nostr.media. It's another one of these.
1727
01:22:52.600 --> 01:22:54.120
It seems that they're popping up everywhere.
1728
01:22:54.240 --> 01:22:57.020
Maybe people are figuring out how to do this cheaply.
1729
01:22:57.020 --> 01:22:57.520
Nice.
1730
01:22:59.120 --> 01:23:04.460
Froster, simple T of N remote signing and key rotating protocol for Nostr using
1731
01:23:04.460 --> 01:23:05.540
the power of Frost.
1732
01:23:05.860 --> 01:23:06.880
I tested this.
1733
01:23:06.900 --> 01:23:07.900
It's actually really cool.
1734
01:23:08.160 --> 01:23:08.700
Very cool.
1735
01:23:08.820 --> 01:23:09.960
This is the ship post now.
1736
01:23:10.420 --> 01:23:10.940
You can do a ship.
1737
01:23:11.120 --> 01:23:11.380
Right.
1738
01:23:11.460 --> 01:23:15.080
You can have your end pub actually be a multi-sig of people that can come
1739
01:23:15.080 --> 01:23:16.440
together to do stuff, which is nice.
1740
01:23:17.320 --> 01:23:19.940
Or it can be multiple of your own emails or whatever.
1741
01:23:20.160 --> 01:23:21.420
Like it's it really works.
1742
01:23:21.720 --> 01:23:22.180
Very nice.
1743
01:23:22.400 --> 01:23:25.120
I'm going to go DOS them until they make roster or roaster.
1744
01:23:27.020 --> 01:23:27.520
I know.
1745
01:23:27.660 --> 01:23:27.780
Right.
1746
01:23:27.880 --> 01:23:34.640
Like that was my first question to them when they told me Nostr double ratchet
1747
01:23:34.640 --> 01:23:37.120
implementation, double ratchet encryption in Nostr.
1748
01:23:37.300 --> 01:23:41.900
This is this is another cool way of doing a DM's secure.
1749
01:23:42.580 --> 01:23:43.780
Another proposal.
1750
01:23:45.300 --> 01:23:50.580
DVM CP bringing MCP servers to Nostr's data vending machines.
1751
01:23:51.000 --> 01:23:52.940
It's a cool little project.
1752
01:23:53.680 --> 01:23:57.920
Some means BLE mesh for Nostr when the Internet is down.
1753
01:23:58.380 --> 01:23:59.360
BLE means Bluetooth.
1754
01:24:00.320 --> 01:24:05.020
Welshman, a Nostr toolkit focused on creating a highly configurable client
1755
01:24:05.020 --> 01:24:08.880
system extracted from Coraco Nostr client.
1756
01:24:09.680 --> 01:24:12.780
Norma, Nostr relay management panel.
1757
01:24:12.940 --> 01:24:13.320
Oh, nice.
1758
01:24:13.400 --> 01:24:15.740
This is being a very wanted little project.
1759
01:24:16.520 --> 01:24:19.160
Don't know if this one is good, but that's a needed thing.
1760
01:24:20.120 --> 01:24:25.120
Wallet Relay, high performance relay for enabling Nostr Wallet Connect and
1761
01:24:25.120 --> 01:24:26.100
Cachew Wallets.
1762
01:24:27.420 --> 01:24:32.940
Nostr Zero, a web application that allows Nostr to search, visualize Nostr
1763
01:24:32.940 --> 01:24:34.320
events using NPUBs.
1764
01:24:35.500 --> 01:24:40.600
Nauth Protocol, decentralized two-part authentication and secure document
1765
01:24:41.680 --> 01:24:42.260
transmission.
1766
01:24:43.500 --> 01:24:49.140
Holster, a rental accommodation using purely peer-to-peer technologies such as
1767
01:24:49.140 --> 01:24:49.620
Nostr.
1768
01:24:50.340 --> 01:24:50.560
Cool.
1769
01:24:51.260 --> 01:24:53.940
So, yeah, I mean, there's so much stuff happening in Nostr.
1770
01:24:54.120 --> 01:24:55.140
Things are moving fast.
1771
01:24:55.400 --> 01:24:56.660
Highly recommend checking it out.
1772
01:24:57.200 --> 01:25:00.740
If you are a Bitcoiner of Nostr derangement syndrome, at least create an
1773
01:25:00.740 --> 01:25:03.980
account there just in case Twitter decides that they no longer likes
1774
01:25:03.980 --> 01:25:04.600
Bitcoiners.
1775
01:25:06.200 --> 01:25:08.260
And I think with that.
1776
01:25:08.820 --> 01:25:11.520
I saw you tweet something about Hamster.
1777
01:25:11.520 --> 01:25:12.700
I was curious about that.
1778
01:25:12.780 --> 01:25:13.280
What is that?
1779
01:25:14.900 --> 01:25:21.300
So somebody created a library that connects the Nostr event to read
1780
01:25:21.300 --> 01:25:26.440
transmission over Ham Radio using, I think, a JSA protocol.
1781
01:25:26.660 --> 01:25:27.380
I can't remember now.
1782
01:25:28.020 --> 01:25:28.840
So that's really cool.
1783
01:25:29.220 --> 01:25:29.500
Nice.
1784
01:25:30.620 --> 01:25:30.940
All right.
1785
01:25:30.960 --> 01:25:34.440
Let me read some boosts while you guys pick any other stories you want to read
1786
01:25:34.440 --> 01:25:35.440
or we're going to wrap up.
1787
01:25:36.080 --> 01:25:36.700
All right.
1788
01:25:36.700 --> 01:25:37.800
So top boost action.
1789
01:25:38.120 --> 01:25:40.060
Open source decentralized CIA.
1790
01:25:40.340 --> 01:25:43.900
Sounds like y'all need to tap into intellectual Silk Road.
1791
01:25:45.900 --> 01:25:49.060
Pinkmonkey boosted, Anonymous boosted.
1792
01:25:49.600 --> 01:25:53.760
Martin Barilek, short AI intro, right?
1793
01:25:56.460 --> 01:26:02.980
Monotashta Mosby, our Kansas traveler was a great song recommendation.
1794
01:26:03.730 --> 01:26:07.260
Well, yeah, I think we sang that on the last episode, maybe.
1795
01:26:08.440 --> 01:26:10.440
I think it was Paul, future Paul.
1796
01:26:12.100 --> 01:26:13.180
Justbada Zap.
1797
01:26:14.080 --> 01:26:14.860
All right, guys.
1798
01:26:14.960 --> 01:26:17.260
Thank you for the zaps.
1799
01:26:17.720 --> 01:26:19.420
It's always fun to receive zaps.
1800
01:26:20.900 --> 01:26:24.480
And I mean, listen, go look at the whole list.
1801
01:26:25.360 --> 01:26:28.320
I think we covered maybe like 5% of the list.
1802
01:26:28.980 --> 01:26:30.280
There is a lot in there.
1803
01:26:30.380 --> 01:26:32.540
It's a great newsletter on Substack.
1804
01:26:33.240 --> 01:26:36.120
And a lot of good links and good information there.
1805
01:26:36.260 --> 01:26:37.880
Johnny puts a lot of work into this.
1806
01:26:38.140 --> 01:26:39.040
Very nice signal.
1807
01:26:39.280 --> 01:26:43.680
I think this is like the information that gets passed through here, like side
1808
01:26:43.680 --> 01:26:45.480
swap, taproot assets.
1809
01:26:45.620 --> 01:26:47.260
Like there's a bunch of stuff we didn't get a chance to go into.
1810
01:26:47.340 --> 01:26:48.540
Validating lightning signers.
1811
01:26:48.740 --> 01:26:53.480
So I'd recommend everyone to definitely give that a follow on Substack.
1812
01:26:53.900 --> 01:26:59.300
I think this is a much better email to receive from Substack than like pretty
1813
01:26:59.300 --> 01:27:01.260
much all the other shit that comes to your inbox.
1814
01:27:01.260 --> 01:27:03.840
So anyways, go check that out.
1815
01:27:04.520 --> 01:27:08.120
Boys, thank you so much for joining me on this.
1816
01:27:08.360 --> 01:27:09.300
It was a pleasure.
1817
01:27:09.640 --> 01:27:12.220
Any final thoughts, Mr. Seared Salmon?
1818
01:27:13.100 --> 01:27:19.180
Hope to see you all at Bitcoin Takeover or the BitDevs the night before.
1819
01:27:19.700 --> 01:27:21.680
Austin's the spot right now.
1820
01:27:22.160 --> 01:27:22.700
That's it.
1821
01:27:23.520 --> 01:27:24.120
Cool, man.
1822
01:27:24.200 --> 01:27:24.800
Thanks for coming.
1823
01:27:25.180 --> 01:27:25.940
Mr. Rob.
1824
01:27:26.680 --> 01:27:30.200
Yeah, I'll be at OpNext in April.
1825
01:27:30.200 --> 01:27:33.000
My co-founder, Becca, is going to be at the Bitcoin Takeover if you want to
1826
01:27:33.000 --> 01:27:33.600
say hi to her.
1827
01:27:34.320 --> 01:27:35.800
I'm hiring a full stack dev.
1828
01:27:36.020 --> 01:27:39.400
So hit me up at rob at anchorwatch.com if you're interested in learning more,
1829
01:27:39.600 --> 01:27:42.980
like maybe getting a policy, agent at anchorwatch.com.
1830
01:27:43.420 --> 01:27:46.000
Or if you have any other questions, don't hesitate to shoot me a note directly
1831
01:27:46.000 --> 01:27:48.240
on Twitter or shoot me an email.
1832
01:27:48.420 --> 01:27:49.400
And thanks for having me on.
1833
01:27:50.220 --> 01:27:52.500
This was fun and you guys have a great day.
1834
01:27:53.020 --> 01:27:53.540
See ya.
1835
01:27:56.660 --> 01:27:57.480
Thanks for listening.
1836
01:27:57.720 --> 01:27:59.800
For more resources, check the show notes.
1837
01:27:59.800 --> 01:28:01.540
We put a lot of effort into them.
1838
01:28:01.860 --> 01:28:03.860
And remember, we don't have a crystal ball.
1839
01:28:04.080 --> 01:28:05.480
So let us know about your project.
1840
01:28:05.820 --> 01:28:09.460
Visit bitcoin.review to find out how to get in touch.