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Hi there, and welcome back to another episode of the
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Rules of Investing, a podcast that gets inside the minds
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of leading investors, economists and industry experts that's brought to
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you by Live Wie Markets. I'm James Marley, and in
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the last episode we heard from Ben Clark, fresh off
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the back of a trip to the US that turned
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him from AI skeptic to a fully converted die hard.
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My guest today is also joining us fresh off the
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trip to the US, but his interests and expertise line
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the machinations of central banks pricing in bond markets and
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what these mean for other asset classes.
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Many of you.
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Will be familiar with Christopher Joy, who is portfolio manager
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and Chief Investment Officer at Coolibar Capital Investments. Coolbar managers
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in excess of ten billion dollars of assets on part
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of institutional and retail investors across the firm's suite of
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fixed income portfolios. Chris is also a regular columnist in
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the AFR, where he publishes the firm's research on topics
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ranging from the inflation outlook that trajects you of interest
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rates and to Australia's favorite hobby house price prediction. Now
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our session today will cover insights from Chris's recent trip
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to the US, some of the risks that are bubbling
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away in the background, and of course we'll touch on
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the resurgent property market here in Australia. If you're in
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Apple podcast or Spotify user, don't forget to subscribe to
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the podcast so that you don't miss an episode, or
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if you're a live hy subscriber, hit the follow button
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at the bottom of the wire to be notified when
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new episodes are available. If you're not a live hy
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subscriber yet, we'd love to have you on board. Just
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head on over to live y markets dot com. It's free,
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easy to register and you'll get access to insights from
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the leading investment minds in the country. With that, Chris,
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I'd like to welcome you to the podcast.
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Great to see you, Thanks mate for having me back.
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I think the last time we did a podcast it
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was great fun and I'm thrilled to be able to
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engage with your audience and talk through some ideas well.
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We're going to start big picture from the US trip
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and we'll come back to the local economy before we
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do that. I'm interested to know you are a prolific writer.
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Your column The AFAR as well followed publish on LinkedIn.
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You share a lot of the research that you generate
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internally at Kolibar. What's the motivation for that to you?
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Oh, man, it's a bit of a long story. I've
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been writing for newspapers since i was about twenty three
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area I'm forty seven now. I've always loved writing. I
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find it's a good part of the process being forced
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into the discipline of articulating your view of the world,
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and then you get held to account and that becomes
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a mark to mark for your perspectives at that particular juncture,
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and people all go back through timement and trying to
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assess what you said and whether it came to pass.
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So it's a very, i think, intellectually honest process putting
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down in black and white what you think of the world,
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what your ideas are as you say, disseminate a cool
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abart a lot about research, so often I'll reference the
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research produced by our sixteen analysts across the business. But
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it's also great fun just engaging with the world. Historically,
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I've written on national security, politics, cybersecurity technology. The AFR
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is a terrific platform. Livewise an amazing platform. It is
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sometimes a little bit hard doing it weekly. Sometimes I
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just get jammed with meetings and I typically only have
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max an hour or two to write the column, and
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it's about thirteen hundred words, so it's not a trivial task.
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Nobody writes from for me, I'm often asked to Stone
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Show to write the column. It's never happened, never will happen.
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But I love it. It's just part of my process.
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And I guess at two am, and.
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You're not fearful of putting your views out there and
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being wrong, no, happy.
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To be proven wrong. I am fearful about consequences. So
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you know, one of the reasons I stopped writing about
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national security was, you know, I had broken some big
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global stories about allegations that Huawei was spying for China,
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and I interviewed the head of the CIA, I interviewed
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the head of National Security Agency, I interviewed the head
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of ASIO. Here in Australia, the head of our electronic
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eavesdropping arm and known as the Australian Signals STRUCTURER and
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I kind of felt like there was potentially going to
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be a bit of blowback over time. You know, the
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Chinese Ministry for State Security, the equivalent of the CIA,
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actually approached our Beijing bureau chief of the Financial Review
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Angus Greek, and basically offered to pay money to get
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an inside running on every kind of national security story
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I was writing at that time, and so I thought, listen,
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I'm a fund manager and I had to run money.
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I need to have an unalloyed, unambiguous focus on running
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the money. And that was a bit of a distraction.
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All bit, geopolitics have been very important to our investment process.
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You might remember we produce something called the Wall Laboratory
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of the War app. You can see it at predicting
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war dot com, where we use AI to basically put
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an empirical probability on the likelihood of true military conflicts
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a kinetic conflicts coming to pass based on two hundred
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years of conflict data. And so the AFI has been
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an important clearinghouse for ideas. The ideas themselves have become
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more focused in telescoped over the years because of you know,
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I can't really write about politics anymore, and you I've
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got a lot of clients that probably not throw about me,
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you know, not that I'm politically partisan, but they're not
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short about me engaging in politics. So I
try and
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just focus a little bit more on fixed income markets,
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and that I think makes the condomne a little bit
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more anadyne these days. But it's great fun.
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Well, as I mentioned, you've just been to the US
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a raging economy. It seems from the outside at the moment.
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What were some of the key observations that you took
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from that trip.
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Yeah, it was fascinating. I mean, we're one of the
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biggest traders of credit globally, so we're trading about seven
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hundred million dollars a day of bonds every day, traded
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about forty four billion dollars of bonds in the last
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three months, about one hundred and thirty three billion dollars
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last year. So we trade with more than eighty banks globally,
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and we have lots of counterparties in the US, and
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it was fascinating. I learned so much. I met with
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all of our trading counterparties. I met with George Soros's
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family office, who runs twenty to thirty billion US and
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it was it was really sinkinging the pulse of the street,
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as we refer to it, observations would be Firstly, I
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really feel like there's a lot of cognitive dissonance between
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what the economy is telling you and what acid prices
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are doing. Your equities at all time highs, bicoin at
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all time highs, you've got credit spreads which have compressed
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tight levels. But on the other hand, we've got clearly
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evidence suggesting that there's a reacceleration in US inflation, and
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indeed here in Australia Ossie inflation, which the market's sort
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of ignoring. Bond yields have kicked up, so we've seen
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US ten government bond yards pop from three point eight
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percent to in the last couple of days as high
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as four point four seven percent. But I think there's
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a lot of abulliance, a lot of complacency on the street.
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People just think things are going to straight line in
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or any sense from current prices. I don't see many
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people talking about big corrections, big dislocations. In our land
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fixed income, there's a lot of talk of the difference
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between yield buyers and spread buyers. The yield bias is
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focused on the fact that if I was to use
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a local example or hybrid's paying a six and a
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half percent yield, which is attractive, or six and a
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half to seven ze year, But the spread on a
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hybrid is really unattractive. It's only two hundred thirty five
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basis points, you know, the cash proxy. Normally it's three
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hundred and twenty five to three fifty above the cash proxy.
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If I look at US high yields paying about three
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hundred over US treasuries normally for single B rated high
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bonds or junk bonds, normally those junk bonds pay you
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about five fifty over US treasuries. The rubbies that in
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a default cycle they normally pay you about a thousand
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over US treasuries. So how do you reconcile those two things?
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And one of the ways you can reconcile it is well,
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the overall yield on high yield is attracted because cash
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rates have gone from zero percent to you know, five
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and a quarter and five and a half in the
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case of the Fed's policy rate. So yeah, complacency, cognitive dissonance.
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And then interestingly for my acid class, there's been an
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explosion hedge front pods and specifically credit pods. These guys
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who were trading bank bonds, corporate bonds, and surer bonds.
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And it's really interesting because you know, I was told
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that Millennium has eight credit pods, Rich has eight credit pods,
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Citadel has three to four credit pods. But the fascinating
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thing is every trader on the street said, they're all
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X Street traders and they've all got the same positions.
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We would speak to traders and they would say, I
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get hit by one pot, I get hit by twelve pots.
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They're all talking to each other. They're loosely in a
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colluding and I don't think anyone thinks they really have
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any edge. They're just X Street traders that
don't have
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any analytical advantages. And you know, to our mind, well
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they have become like a second street. So you've got
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the banks that are the market makers in bonds, and
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now you have this second street, which is you know,
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scores of credit hedge fund pods that are comprised of
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X Street traders that are providing a lot more liquidity.
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So some of the biggest US banks said that the
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hedge fund pods are about half of their training volumes
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these days. But it's all one side. They've all got
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the same positions, the same positions as the street and
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obviously in any massive dislocation, they're all going to be
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rushing for a small legsit at the same time, so
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we're going to see price moves could be heavily exaggerated
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and amplified by this new injectional liquidity. So I thought
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that was interesting. I also heard that the returns on
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these hedgehund credit pods have been really poor over the
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last twelve months. They do twenty but they've done poorly
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in the last year, and actually some are staying to
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be shut down. In our hedge front a strategies like
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our launch or credit fund, pre fees is done about
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eight a percent in the last twelve months after fees
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sort of mid teens, and that's the Aussies INNIT class.
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The US ELI in the class, I think it's done
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about fifteen percent net of fees. So so returns have
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been strong, and I think there's been a ton of
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opportunity and there is still a lot of opportunity. That's
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a new development that is relatively nay center as far
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as it's emerged in recent years, but it's kind of
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changing our acid class.
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You talk there about these brilliant conditions, a risk on environment,
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what we've seen more recently is that pricing of interest
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rate cuts in the US is rapidly being wound back.
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Everyone was expecting there to be you know, sort of
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four rate cuts sooner rather than later. It's now the
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quantum of rate cuts and the timing of those rate
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cuts is looking to be wound back. Yet the market
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seems to be taking its stride. How do you so,
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how do you rationalize those two things?
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Well, our views haven't changed. In late twenty twenty one,
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you know, our tailor rule models were saying. We prepared
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presentations in December twenty one when the cash rate was
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zero point one percent and US ten years were at
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one percent. Our modeling was suggesting the FED needed to
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get to five to six percent. We have those presentations
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showing that now no one in the world was saying
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that at that point in time. The peak in the
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Fed's cash rate in late twenty one that was forecast
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for twenty two twenty three was like around one percent,
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So they thought they'd lifted off newar zero to a
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circle one. No one was thinking they'd go to five
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to six And obviously they're a five and a quarter
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five and a half right now, and our modeling for
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the Aussie cash rate pointed to a four to five
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percent cash rate, and I actually myself thought that both
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those conclusions seemed very extraneous. It seemed like getting to
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five to six percent and four to five percent in
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the US Australia would have pretty cataclysmic consequences for the economy.
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The thing that I think everyone missed was the mergence
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of these huge cash savings buffers. So in the US,
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the buffer was about nine percent of non world GDP,
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worth about two years of extra economic growth, and they
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were spent over twenty two to twenty three. Households spent
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those cash buffers that were accumulated because we ran massive
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physcal deficits gaboel of the cash household's saved because they're
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forced too due to lockdowns. And that's what has really
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supported the global economy, in the US economy in particular
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over twenty two to twenty three. And that's what's given
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us this sense that, oh, we don't have
to have
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a recession. You know, we've had a soft landing. The
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risk junkies are all talking about, Hey, you know, no recession,
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look at the soft landing. But the cycle's not over,
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you know, New Zealand's just had twelve months and agay
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the GDP growth. They're in recession. The UKs had twelve
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months and need of GDP growth. You know, we've had
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really poor economic growth data out of Japan, and we
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had definitely seen cracks appear. I know, US bankruptcies last
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year with the highest since twenty ten, right despite as
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you said, you know, the raging economy. Global corporate defaults
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already in the first three months of this year the
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worst since two thousand and nine in the GFC. So
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coming back to your question, our forecast and modeling were
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all implying that this would be a protracted, multi year
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inflation cycle. And it wasn't just goods prices. It was
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about services or demand side inflation. So supply side inflation
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really pertains to goods prices. We shut down supply chains.
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00:12:12.799 --> 00:12:15.360
Goods prices went up about twelve percent, you know, on
256
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a trend anialized basis, and then they've come down. So
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in the US now we have goods deflation, so goods
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prices are falling, so in inflation is negative and we
259
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also have that here in Australia and that is what
260
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has pulled down for inflation from you know, the sevens
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and ads all the way down to now in the US,
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depending on how you measure it, three and a half
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to four and a half. The THEAD effected a Dubvish
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pivot last year right on the basis of these goods
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prices falling. But ourgun was, well, that's a temporary effect.
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It's a level effect. It's not a growth effect. It's
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like a peak through a python, because once the supply
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chains normalized, good prices can't continuously fall to zero, right
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at some point they have to stabilize. And then if
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you've got strong services or demand side inflation, which is
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00:12:56.159 --> 00:12:59.159
being driven by completely different factors, normally a three point
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00:12:59.159 --> 00:13:01.600
eight percent unemployment in the US or a three point
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00:13:01.639 --> 00:13:04.360
seven percent on point right here Australia, very strong wave
274
00:13:04.440 --> 00:13:07.360
growth of four to five percent, very poor labor productivity,
275
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and most businesses are services. Business isn't their biggest cost
276
00:13:10.559 --> 00:13:13.039
as people, and the cost of people has been increasing
277
00:13:13.279 --> 00:13:17.559
very rapidly. We're also seeing a political narrative around reregulation
278
00:13:17.639 --> 00:13:19.720
of labor markets, the right to disconnect, the right to
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00:13:19.799 --> 00:13:22.840
not work. Here in Australia, we're stearing down the barrel
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of a big minimum wage increase, that's around the corner.
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00:13:25.840 --> 00:13:27.759
Last year they increased the minimum wage by eight point
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00:13:27.799 --> 00:13:30.080
six percent and they increase award wages by five point
283
00:13:30.120 --> 00:13:32.559
seventy five percent. That effects on our numbers about twenty
284
00:13:32.559 --> 00:13:34.000
five to three percent of will workers. That we're got
285
00:13:34.000 --> 00:13:37.279
another one of those changes looming, and basically the several
286
00:13:37.320 --> 00:13:40.840
governments are arguing for, on our numbers a minimum four
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00:13:40.919 --> 00:13:44.279
percent increase in the minimum wage, which would be potentially
288
00:13:44.360 --> 00:13:48.919
very inflationary. So the bottom line is that, to answer
289
00:13:48.919 --> 00:13:51.840
your question directly, in January this year, markets were pricing
290
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one hundred and seventy five basis points it cuts from
291
00:13:53.759 --> 00:13:55.879
the FED, and they were expecting the FED to start
292
00:13:55.919 --> 00:13:58.000
coming in March. We call bullshit on that. We were like,
293
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there's just no chance. We've got strong services inflation. The
294
00:14:01.000 --> 00:14:03.120
goods of deflation will dissipate at some point, and then
295
00:14:03.159 --> 00:14:05.559
you're going to get a researchers to inflation and lo
296
00:14:05.679 --> 00:14:07.799
and behold, that's exactly what we've had last three CPR
297
00:14:07.840 --> 00:14:09.639
prints in the US, and we get another one in
298
00:14:09.679 --> 00:14:12.879
the next twenty four hours. The last three three CPR
299
00:14:12.919 --> 00:14:16.120
prints will all been big upside surprises. We have seen
300
00:14:16.840 --> 00:14:20.720
massive reacceleration in core US inflation. So to give you
301
00:14:20.799 --> 00:14:23.120
the numbers off the top of my head, a core
302
00:14:23.240 --> 00:14:27.039
pc inflation in the US, which is the preferred measure,
303
00:14:27.039 --> 00:14:31.200
has jumped from about two
percent on a monthly annualized
304
00:14:31.200 --> 00:14:33.200
trend basis to about three and a half percent.
305
00:14:33.279 --> 00:14:33.360
Now.
306
00:14:33.399 --> 00:14:35.600
The fedes targeting two and they're currently rang at three
307
00:14:35.600 --> 00:14:37.639
and a half, so that's a big proper The move
308
00:14:37.679 --> 00:14:39.399
down to two is what gave us the dubbish pivot.
309
00:14:39.440 --> 00:14:41.360
It's what gave us one hundred and seventy five basis
310
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points of cuts expected for this year. It also pushed
311
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the US ten year down to three point eight percent.
312
00:14:45.679 --> 00:14:48.120
Now it's back at four point four on the core
313
00:14:48.240 --> 00:14:51.120
CPI measure, inflation has jumped from a low last year
314
00:14:51.159 --> 00:14:54.440
about three percent up to about four and a half percent. Now.
315
00:14:54.519 --> 00:14:57.159
This has all been driven by our kind of thesis
316
00:14:57.559 --> 00:15:02.200
services inflation, So US services and inflation has reaccelerated to
317
00:15:02.240 --> 00:15:05.039
about six point three percent annualized or a few explode
318
00:15:05.080 --> 00:15:07.360
rants about six and a half percentized, So service inflation
319
00:15:07.399 --> 00:15:09.720
are running about six to seven percent. Pre pandemic, it
320
00:15:09.759 --> 00:15:13.320
was running about three right, So to get to get
321
00:15:13.360 --> 00:15:15.159
inflation back to two percent. You really need to get
322
00:15:15.639 --> 00:15:18.519
services inflation back down to circle three, and we're sitting
323
00:15:18.559 --> 00:15:20.399
at six's and sevens. Here in Australia, we're sitting at
324
00:15:20.399 --> 00:15:24.000
five to six. So we have this real services inflation
325
00:15:24.120 --> 00:15:27.320
product problem, which is arguably precipitating a bit of a
326
00:15:27.399 --> 00:15:30.960
wage price spiral because it's keeping overall inflation high. Inflation
327
00:15:31.000 --> 00:15:33.559
has been artificially dragged down by the goods deflation, but
328
00:15:33.639 --> 00:15:36.519
that's a temporary effect. So really there's no basis for
329
00:15:36.559 --> 00:15:38.759
the FED to cut right now. The FED desperately wants
330
00:15:38.799 --> 00:15:41.480
to cut, and the reason they want to cut is
331
00:15:41.639 --> 00:15:43.799
because they want to start cutting well before the five
332
00:15:43.919 --> 00:15:46.759
NOVEMBA US election because they don't want to be seen
333
00:15:46.840 --> 00:15:50.720
to be politically interfering with that process. But the problem, James,
334
00:15:50.879 --> 00:15:53.159
that I fear they're going to make, also the mistaken
335
00:15:53.200 --> 00:15:55.639
thing they don to make, is they're going to over
336
00:15:55.759 --> 00:15:58.519
and invest themselves in one of these intellectual narratives or
337
00:15:58.519 --> 00:16:02.480
paradigms that Central makeser fond of sabricating. So the classic
338
00:16:02.600 --> 00:16:04.279
is full low. I'm not going to cut rates until
339
00:16:04.279 --> 00:16:07.519
twenty four, you know, don't worry go and borrow Bingjohn
340
00:16:07.600 --> 00:16:09.320
dead because the cash rd's going to say the zero
341
00:16:09.360 --> 00:16:10.679
said all the way to twenty twenty four. We're on
342
00:16:10.799 --> 00:16:12.200
twenty four and the cash rates at four point three
343
00:16:12.240 --> 00:16:14.679
five percent black And so whenever they make these long
344
00:16:14.799 --> 00:16:18.440
term forecasts, they end up often blowing up in their faces.
345
00:16:18.840 --> 00:16:21.080
And my concern is we're going to get a reacceleration
346
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inflation that provides no basis for cutting the cut rates
347
00:16:24.320 --> 00:16:27.720
in June, because they desperately want to cut rates in June.
348
00:16:28.399 --> 00:16:31.399
But we'll see that this potentially only reinforces the inflation
349
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and precious and if I could add, and this is crucial,
350
00:16:34.399 --> 00:16:35.879
and I think quite a few people have notice this
351
00:16:36.360 --> 00:16:39.759
that the whole dubbish pivot has propagated a massive equity
352
00:16:39.799 --> 00:16:43.080
and risk rally because everyone's like, okay, hiking supples over next,
353
00:16:43.120 --> 00:16:45.919
weave its down, we're off the races. And you see
354
00:16:45.919 --> 00:16:48.600
it anecdotally and survey data, like consumers think big rate
355
00:16:48.639 --> 00:16:51.559
cuts are coming in the US. In Australia, you know
356
00:16:51.759 --> 00:16:55.080
all the risk junkies, the commercial real estate guys VCPE equities,
357
00:16:55.440 --> 00:16:58.120
they're all desperately in need of big rate cuts this
358
00:16:58.279 --> 00:17:01.120
year to be bailed out of otherwise are sustainable positions.
359
00:17:01.519 --> 00:17:03.559
So this is the cognitive dissonance I'm talking about?
360
00:17:03.960 --> 00:17:07.599
And what are some of the implications across asset prices?
361
00:17:07.680 --> 00:17:10.279
So you've talked about this big run up in inequities.
362
00:17:10.359 --> 00:17:12.440
People seem to be buying into it, getting a full
363
00:17:12.480 --> 00:17:15.680
head of steam. Do you think there's a catalyst that
364
00:17:15.759 --> 00:17:18.799
would precipitate a bigger fall there? You've had the yield
365
00:17:18.880 --> 00:17:21.839
curve in fixed income markets has been inverted. No one
366
00:17:21.880 --> 00:17:23.799
seems to be paying attention to it. It hasn't called
367
00:17:23.799 --> 00:17:26.440
it correctly. What are some of the implications for the
368
00:17:26.480 --> 00:17:27.759
big asset class pricing?
369
00:17:28.480 --> 00:17:30.039
So the interesting thing is I like to work in
370
00:17:30.200 --> 00:17:33.160
scenarios where we're right and wrong. So you know, scenario
371
00:17:33.319 --> 00:17:36.519
one is like we get sticky services inflation. Either the
372
00:17:36.599 --> 00:17:39.720
FED doesn't cut and possibly hikes again, or cuts have
373
00:17:39.799 --> 00:17:41.480
deferred for a long time and you're stuck with this
374
00:17:41.559 --> 00:17:43.599
high cost of capital? Can card be? What we know
375
00:17:43.799 --> 00:17:47.839
is that the pressure is building that boiling frog dynamic. So,
376
00:17:47.920 --> 00:17:49.839
as I mentioned, corporate defaults for at few months of
377
00:17:49.839 --> 00:17:52.519
this year worse as the GFC bankruptcies in the US
378
00:17:52.599 --> 00:17:56.440
worsys to twenty ten, Ossie insolvencies worses twenty fifteen worse
379
00:17:56.519 --> 00:17:58.319
in basically a decade in the heading in one direction.
380
00:17:58.839 --> 00:18:02.119
If you open out private debt portfolios, it's mayhem. It's
381
00:18:02.160 --> 00:18:04.359
only gonn get worse. Those guys all need to be
382
00:18:04.400 --> 00:18:07.440
boiled out by massive cost of capital reductions. You've got
383
00:18:07.559 --> 00:18:10.640
a big wall of high yield or bond maturities next year,
384
00:18:10.680 --> 00:18:13.599
in the year after, they're all hoping that they can
385
00:18:13.680 --> 00:18:16.759
refinance those bonds that low interest rates care of cuts.
386
00:18:17.200 --> 00:18:22.119
So that's the context. If we're wrong, however, let's assume
387
00:18:22.160 --> 00:18:24.880
that we get the so called immaculate disinflation. Let's assume
388
00:18:24.920 --> 00:18:27.920
inflation zooms back to two percent. Then what we face
389
00:18:28.000 --> 00:18:30.200
is a really interesting situation because the central banks run
390
00:18:30.319 --> 00:18:33.559
these neutral rate models where they're basically trying to figure
391
00:18:33.559 --> 00:18:38.279
out what's the right rate to assert itself over the
392
00:18:38.359 --> 00:18:40.680
course of the business cycle through the cycle steady state,
393
00:18:41.319 --> 00:18:45.079
and that neutral rate model basically wants to see inflation
394
00:18:45.119 --> 00:18:48.279
at two percent, lower employment, trend growth. Well, right now
395
00:18:48.359 --> 00:18:51.400
the US has high inflation, low on employment, and trend
396
00:18:51.440 --> 00:18:56.079
plus growth. Except if I'm wrong and inflation isn't persistently
397
00:18:56.160 --> 00:18:58.799
problematic and it zooms back down at two percent, well
398
00:18:58.799 --> 00:19:01.799
you're going to have all three Acterior satisfied you're gonna
399
00:19:01.799 --> 00:19:04.599
have two percent inflation on employment traplus growth, and so
400
00:19:04.720 --> 00:19:07.279
that in turn implies that there's not much scup at
401
00:19:07.319 --> 00:19:09.160
all for the FED to cut rates. That neutral is
402
00:19:09.160 --> 00:19:11.200
actually very close to where they are right right now.
403
00:19:11.599 --> 00:19:14.519
Ironically here in Australia, not many people understand this, but
404
00:19:14.599 --> 00:19:17.240
we're at four point three five percent, which is weird
405
00:19:17.319 --> 00:19:19.640
because normally the IUSI cash rate is kept one hundred
406
00:19:19.640 --> 00:19:22.799
and fifty bases points above the US rate. But the
407
00:19:23.119 --> 00:19:25.519
RBA has been really politically compromised. I think it has
408
00:19:25.519 --> 00:19:28.759
become very dubbish, and it's really gambling on the idea
409
00:19:28.880 --> 00:19:32.240
that the rest of the world key rates high and
410
00:19:32.799 --> 00:19:36.200
basically apply type monetrip, so they will do the heavy
411
00:19:36.240 --> 00:19:39.440
lifting for the RBA. Because the RBA's estimate of neutral,
412
00:19:39.480 --> 00:19:42.240
which matches Coolabar's estimate, it's just three point eight percent.
413
00:19:42.759 --> 00:19:44.599
So the RBA has got their cash rate on your
414
00:19:44.640 --> 00:19:47.759
bestick above neutral, which implies it's not very restrictive. And
415
00:19:47.759 --> 00:19:49.799
if you look at the ass data, three point seven
416
00:19:49.839 --> 00:19:53.759
percent uneployments, strong wage growth, okay, overall economic growth. You
417
00:19:53.839 --> 00:19:57.039
know we've got booming population growth. House prices are searching
418
00:19:57.599 --> 00:20:00.960
there's not many signs that the economy in our notwithstanding
419
00:20:00.960 --> 00:20:03.160
the tails are referred to, there's tons of in the
420
00:20:03.240 --> 00:20:06.559
non bank lenders. The risky the zombie company is the
421
00:20:07.079 --> 00:20:11.079
commercial property owners that REZI developers. They're all cactus, right,
422
00:20:11.640 --> 00:20:13.680
But for most of us who are not those folks,
423
00:20:14.279 --> 00:20:17.759
the economy is actually really quite healthy and resilient. So
424
00:20:18.599 --> 00:20:23.240
I think the consequences either way you kind of land
425
00:20:23.319 --> 00:20:25.880
in a scenario where you're left with high flow. Because
426
00:20:26.039 --> 00:20:28.240
what I'm trying to say here is if we get
427
00:20:28.599 --> 00:20:31.839
rapid disinflation to two percent and the fed's happy, they're
428
00:20:31.839 --> 00:20:34.359
not going to cut ras by much. The last time
429
00:20:34.440 --> 00:20:36.759
they engined it well, in fact, the only time they've
430
00:20:36.759 --> 00:20:38.799
een engineered a soft landing since World War Two, this
431
00:20:38.920 --> 00:20:41.000
is the Fair was in nineteen ninety five and they
432
00:20:41.000 --> 00:20:43.599
only cut by seventy five basis points. And it also
433
00:20:43.720 --> 00:20:45.720
feels that there's a risk that history could be repeating
434
00:20:45.759 --> 00:20:49.039
itself a little bit with this dubbish pivot, because they've
435
00:20:49.160 --> 00:20:52.039
really invested themselves in the dublish pivot. There's a lot
436
00:20:52.079 --> 00:20:55.000
of Fed rhetoric right now
that is trying to rationalize
437
00:20:55.200 --> 00:20:57.880
a June cut before the election. But we saw in
438
00:20:57.920 --> 00:21:00.440
the nineteen seventies of the cut rates two fives and
439
00:21:00.559 --> 00:21:03.480
too early, and what actually happened was inflation reaccelerated, which
440
00:21:03.559 --> 00:21:06.400
left the FIT having to lift rates into double digit territory.
441
00:21:06.440 --> 00:21:09.359
And I know that Jamie Diamond in his annual letter
442
00:21:09.440 --> 00:21:13.279
I think recently said that JP Morgan a modeling two
443
00:21:13.640 --> 00:21:16.759
key stress tests, one where interestreates got eight percent and
444
00:21:16.799 --> 00:21:19.119
another way they go to two percent. Now, the two
445
00:21:19.160 --> 00:21:23.200
percent scenario would be a big disinflationary shock, you know,
446
00:21:23.240 --> 00:21:25.960
it could be some sort of external category. In any
447
00:21:26.160 --> 00:21:30.839
external crisis. Rates tendative trended towards zero. But the eight
448
00:21:30.880 --> 00:21:33.319
percent scenario is interesting, which is kind of like, you know,
449
00:21:33.480 --> 00:21:36.839
the persistent inflation problem. So I think in some way
450
00:21:36.880 --> 00:21:40.799
what I'm saying is I don't see positive ramifications for
451
00:21:40.880 --> 00:21:45.119
asset prices in either contingency. If we get a macular disinflation,
452
00:21:45.519 --> 00:21:47.200
were left with a high cost of capital, which is
453
00:21:47.279 --> 00:21:49.359
bad for risky borrowers, and I think bad for the
454
00:21:49.400 --> 00:21:53.000
pricing of risky assets like equities, commit real estate, VCPE,
455
00:21:53.519 --> 00:21:56.160
private debt. Even on the other hand, we get the
456
00:21:56.160 --> 00:22:00.319
sorry that we're advocating, which is persistent services inflation keeping
457
00:22:00.359 --> 00:22:03.000
cause high and giving us a much tougher cycle than
458
00:22:03.000 --> 00:22:05.480
we expect. And the markets are pricing so as you know,
459
00:22:06.200 --> 00:22:08.000
we've gone from one hundred and seventy five based points
460
00:22:08.000 --> 00:22:09.920
BECAUST to seed just seventy five, and we've gone from
461
00:22:10.000 --> 00:22:12.079
pricing March. Now they're saying June. But June's like a
462
00:22:12.119 --> 00:22:15.720
fifty fifty proposition, and we're recording this one day before
463
00:22:15.759 --> 00:22:18.079
we get the next batch of US inflation data, which
464
00:22:18.079 --> 00:22:20.960
will be crucial, and we could see if we get
465
00:22:21.000 --> 00:22:24.240
a few more strong inflation prints, we could see total
466
00:22:24.319 --> 00:22:27.400
capitulation and equity pricing and risk pricing. But thus far
467
00:22:27.680 --> 00:22:29.759
equities and risk of buried their head in the sand,
468
00:22:30.119 --> 00:22:32.559
and they basically said, Okay, we're going to ignore all
469
00:22:32.599 --> 00:22:35.000
these upsides of prises to inflation, even though folks like
470
00:22:35.160 --> 00:22:38.119
cool I had anticipated that this would happen, and the
471
00:22:38.200 --> 00:22:39.960
FEDS also trying to ignore it. I mean, one of
472
00:22:40.000 --> 00:22:41.880
the things that Fed's doing is it's arguing that there
473
00:22:41.920 --> 00:22:45.759
might be some residual quant unquote seasonality that's biasing up
474
00:22:45.839 --> 00:22:48.599
with some of the US inflation data. Only time will tell.
475
00:22:49.279 --> 00:22:51.799
We have a sense that one could see is more
476
00:22:51.880 --> 00:22:54.079
luckily than the other. But we think both contingencies could
477
00:22:54.079 --> 00:22:55.200
be problematic for risk.
478
00:22:56.680 --> 00:22:58.640
Just before we move on to a couple of the
479
00:22:58.680 --> 00:23:00.559
other risks. So I want to to talk that you've
480
00:23:00.559 --> 00:23:02.640
touched on a few of the points already, But do
481
00:23:02.680 --> 00:23:05.119
you think there's a chance that the FED doesn't touch
482
00:23:05.599 --> 00:23:08.240
They seem to have talked themselves into this position where
483
00:23:08.400 --> 00:23:11.839
everyone's almost factored one hundred percent chance of there being
484
00:23:12.160 --> 00:23:14.960
at least a rate cut between now and the election.
485
00:23:15.240 --> 00:23:17.039
Do you think there's a chance that they're not able.
486
00:23:16.920 --> 00:23:19.079
To Yeah, The funny thing about central banks is they
487
00:23:19.160 --> 00:23:24.160
kind of yoyo between the vainglorious and supercilious construction of
488
00:23:24.279 --> 00:23:28.319
these grand intellectual narratives. You know, we're in a love
489
00:23:28.400 --> 00:23:30.880
for long the world, high for long the world. Yeah,
490
00:23:31.000 --> 00:23:34.640
the yield curve target in the RBA case, which they
491
00:23:34.799 --> 00:23:38.599
were sensationally forced to dump more or less in between meetings,
492
00:23:38.960 --> 00:23:42.440
you know, the productivity miracle and the potentially the death
493
00:23:42.480 --> 00:23:45.160
of the business cycle Epinek used to talk about. And
494
00:23:45.759 --> 00:23:49.200
I think that the FED is ultimately going to be
495
00:23:49.279 --> 00:23:51.759
data dependents. So they yoyo between the narrative and the data,
496
00:23:52.359 --> 00:23:54.880
and right now I think the data is pulling them
497
00:23:54.920 --> 00:23:59.240
towards pragmatic reality, which is, hey, there may not be
498
00:23:59.279 --> 00:24:02.039
a case of cutting, and we may have to neutral
499
00:24:02.119 --> 00:24:03.880
maybe higher than we thought it was. We run four
500
00:24:03.920 --> 00:24:06.799
different neutral models that the FED uses, and we have
501
00:24:06.960 --> 00:24:10.000
neutral having increase from say two and a half percent
502
00:24:10.039 --> 00:24:11.920
where the FED thinks it is currently what they say
503
00:24:11.960 --> 00:24:14.200
two
point six percent up into three and a half
504
00:24:14.200 --> 00:24:17.880
to four percent territory. And if the economy isn't responding,
505
00:24:17.960 --> 00:24:19.519
if we're not getting an increased to our employment, if
506
00:24:19.519 --> 00:24:21.279
we're not getting a decceleration and waste growth in and
507
00:24:21.319 --> 00:24:24.480
we're not getting sustainable inflation around two percent, then they're
508
00:24:24.759 --> 00:24:26.480
going to have to lift rates further. So I think
509
00:24:26.519 --> 00:24:29.160
that there is absolutely a chance that the FED doesn't hike,
510
00:24:29.319 --> 00:24:32.400
so it doesn't cut and either keeps rates at these
511
00:24:32.480 --> 00:24:34.960
levels for longer or all contemplates hiking again. And I
512
00:24:35.039 --> 00:24:36.799
think ultimately going to be data true, because you've got
513
00:24:36.839 --> 00:24:39.359
to remember, you know, on the subject of these grand
514
00:24:39.480 --> 00:24:43.359
delinquent sort of intellectual edifices, this is exactly what happened
515
00:24:43.400 --> 00:24:45.079
in twenty twenty one. Like in twenty twenty one they
516
00:24:45.079 --> 00:24:47.640
taught us inflation is transtry and not a problem. It's
517
00:24:47.680 --> 00:24:51.400
all temporary or ephemeral, and so they told told us
518
00:24:51.440 --> 00:24:54.240
that this transitree inflation would pass and they wouldn't need
519
00:24:54.319 --> 00:24:56.839
to lift rates aggressively. But of course that were stopped
520
00:24:56.839 --> 00:24:59.200
out of that position and compelled to lift rates to
521
00:24:59.319 --> 00:25:02.039
levels that we haven't seen for decades. So I think
522
00:25:02.119 --> 00:25:06.680
the data will ultimately be deterministic and decisive apropos their decisioning.
523
00:25:07.079 --> 00:25:09.079
But right now we're in this twilight zone where they
524
00:25:09.119 --> 00:25:11.680
would love to stick to the dublish pivot narrative start
525
00:25:11.759 --> 00:25:14.720
chiseling rates lab each year have a kind of a
526
00:25:14.839 --> 00:25:17.839
normal glide path heading into the US election. They're probably
527
00:25:17.920 --> 00:25:21.000
fearful about what a US election means for inflation, frankly,
528
00:25:21.440 --> 00:25:24.119
and what it means for their livelihoods in the case
529
00:25:24.160 --> 00:25:28.799
of the FED. But pardise the core cpis and core
530
00:25:28.920 --> 00:25:32.839
PCEs are strong, then they're going to be potentially forced
531
00:25:32.839 --> 00:25:34.240
to sit on the sidelines.
532
00:25:34.240 --> 00:25:36.240
What some move through to a couple of the other
533
00:25:36.279 --> 00:25:37.960
big events that happened this year. We have a US
534
00:25:38.039 --> 00:25:41.119
election fifth of November. Do you think that's a risk
535
00:25:41.160 --> 00:25:43.759
that people need to think about. I mean, Trump's are
536
00:25:44.319 --> 00:25:46.359
not the wild card that he was the first time
537
00:25:46.440 --> 00:25:48.559
he got elected. And even if you knew the outcome,
538
00:25:49.000 --> 00:25:52.000
the response in markets probably wasn't what most people were
539
00:25:52.079 --> 00:25:53.680
expecting it to be. Do you think that that's a
540
00:25:54.000 --> 00:25:56.160
it's a big risk on the horizon for people to consider,
541
00:25:56.240 --> 00:25:58.039
or do you not spend too much time thinking about it?
542
00:25:58.359 --> 00:26:00.480
And we do a lot of macro modeling, a lot
543
00:26:00.519 --> 00:26:03.279
of macro forecasting, so quantitative analysis. So even though our
544
00:26:03.319 --> 00:26:05.839
tip golding period is measured in days in the bond market,
545
00:26:05.880 --> 00:26:08.599
trading seven hundred million a day, often only holding for
546
00:26:08.839 --> 00:26:11.359
a few days any given position, and we're hyperactive and
547
00:26:11.359 --> 00:26:14.279
we're like this big quantitative market maker, what we find
548
00:26:14.359 --> 00:26:17.039
is that macro forecasting is really important to try for
549
00:26:17.240 --> 00:26:20.319
trying to predict regime changes. So we find we have
550
00:26:20.440 --> 00:26:23.400
eighty proprietary bond pricing models, and we typically use twenty
551
00:26:23.480 --> 00:26:25.640
to thirty models to price any given bond. But we
552
00:26:25.759 --> 00:26:28.680
find that the macro can result in markets showing that
553
00:26:28.720 --> 00:26:31.440
may be out with the bath water episodically. So every
554
00:26:31.519 --> 00:26:33.319
few years, like late twenty one, we sold all of
555
00:26:33.359 --> 00:26:35.480
our credit, all our bank bonds, all that corporate vides,
556
00:26:35.480 --> 00:26:38.119
all our shurm bonds, insurance bonds, because basically we felt
557
00:26:38.440 --> 00:26:41.519
that interest thrates going much higher markets were pricing that
558
00:26:41.599 --> 00:26:44.240
credit spreads were going to move explosively wider and the
559
00:26:44.359 --> 00:26:47.039
value of those bonds would decline, and so we got
560
00:26:47.160 --> 00:26:49.160
completely out of our own our class. We're actually we
561
00:26:49.200 --> 00:26:52.000
in net short. And then at the time we exited
562
00:26:52.000 --> 00:26:54.240
about ten billion positions. And then in June twenty two,
563
00:26:54.240 --> 00:26:57.200
when spreads moved explosive grow up explosively wider, we jump
564
00:26:57.240 --> 00:26:59.880
back in and brought about ten billion a credit. As
565
00:27:00.160 --> 00:27:03.519
you know, those entry points have improved tramatically. The history
566
00:27:03.680 --> 00:27:07.480
of Trump suggests he's a volatively amplification device. So he's
567
00:27:07.559 --> 00:27:10.960
just a constant source of know no ones, no nuns
568
00:27:10.960 --> 00:27:14.680
are no no nuns, and he's highly capricious, highly mercurial.
569
00:27:14.960 --> 00:27:17.559
You know, we are focused on him because he's one
570
00:27:17.559 --> 00:27:20.200
of those external shocks that could result in markets training
571
00:27:20.200 --> 00:27:23.480
the Baba with the bathwater. And crucially, the model's not working.
572
00:27:23.839 --> 00:27:26.799
So what we find is the quantitative techniques we use
573
00:27:26.839 --> 00:27:29.920
to price bonds, if there's a minicing dislocation, they may
574
00:27:30.000 --> 00:27:32.079
not work for a period time, they always work. Our
575
00:27:32.119 --> 00:27:34.039
assets always mean revert because we're dealing with eight at
576
00:27:34.039 --> 00:27:36.519
double A rated bonds that are very very safe and
577
00:27:37.200 --> 00:27:40.920
inherently mean reverting and very liquid and super liquid like
578
00:27:41.519 --> 00:27:44.160
as I mentioned, we're trading seven hundred million dollars day.
579
00:27:44.160 --> 00:27:46.440
We offer turnover our portfolios twenty five times a year.
580
00:27:46.920 --> 00:27:50.240
But between late twenty one and early twenty two, you know,
581
00:27:50.319 --> 00:27:53.319
the models were not necessarily going to give you good
582
00:27:53.440 --> 00:27:56.880
signals about the cross sectional mispricings. It was really about
583
00:27:56.880 --> 00:27:59.920
the time series and longitudinal analysis about where are these
584
00:28:00.079 --> 00:28:03.880
assets in a historical context. And so for US macro forecasting,
585
00:28:03.960 --> 00:28:08.160
James's key to trying to understand the probability of these
586
00:28:08.240 --> 00:28:09.960
big stool shifts. So we're doing a lot of work
587
00:28:09.960 --> 00:28:13.000
contrap and my quick thumbnail sketch on Trump would be
588
00:28:13.799 --> 00:28:17.039
he's all the things I've described one two. His campaigning
589
00:28:17.079 --> 00:28:19.799
on the basis of, you know, slashing immigration and de
590
00:28:19.920 --> 00:28:22.559
facto kind of shutting borders to many folks, which is
591
00:28:22.640 --> 00:28:24.920
only going to put a lot of upward pressure on waveguurss.
592
00:28:25.279 --> 00:28:28.480
So the US labor cost problem is likely to be
593
00:28:28.559 --> 00:28:32.640
amplified by his immigration policies because that immigration is providing
594
00:28:32.720 --> 00:28:35.440
a lot of labor supply that's otherwise attenuating wage brushures.
595
00:28:35.480 --> 00:28:39.200
So that's bad for inflation. Is border policies. And then Secondly,
596
00:28:39.240 --> 00:28:42.400
he's campaigning on slapping tariffs on Chinese imports, which is
597
00:28:42.480 --> 00:28:45.039
going to be highly inflationary. And then third the hour
598
00:28:45.079 --> 00:28:47.920
intelligence suggests that the folks he's surrounding himself with his
599
00:28:48.079 --> 00:28:50.400
advisors this time around are even more loopier than the
600
00:28:50.440 --> 00:28:52.880
guys he had and't plays the last time around. But
601
00:28:53.039 --> 00:28:54.839
you know, ultimately he's a capitalist and you hope he's
602
00:28:54.839 --> 00:28:57.880
a rational actor. So I think, we don't know what's
603
00:28:57.920 --> 00:28:59.599
going to happen, but we're worried about it and we
604
00:28:59.680 --> 00:29:03.240
think it could be an opportunity. So where actually would
605
00:29:03.319 --> 00:29:06.680
like to see more volatility and more dislocations, and so
606
00:29:06.759 --> 00:29:09.200
we're definitely doing a lot of diligence Trump to understand
607
00:29:09.240 --> 00:29:13.000
the probability distribution around TROW. I definitely one hundpset think
608
00:29:13.039 --> 00:29:14.759
that this is something that investors should be focused on.
609
00:29:15.160 --> 00:29:17.680
And do you have you done work on the probability
610
00:29:17.680 --> 00:29:20.559
of him winning the US election? We've done some works.
611
00:29:20.680 --> 00:29:23.039
I mean a lot of the betting markets have him
612
00:29:23.359 --> 00:29:26.319
winning the election, but it's difficult to know because some
613
00:29:26.400 --> 00:29:28.279
of those benning markets have been wrong, and the survey
614
00:29:28.359 --> 00:29:30.079
data you get these days, because.
615
00:29:29.880 --> 00:29:32.000
The following data is often unreliable correct.
616
00:29:32.039 --> 00:29:36.079
You know, people don't use landlines anymore, so it's difficult
617
00:29:36.119 --> 00:29:39.400
to decipher. But yeah, we're kind of gaming for both
618
00:29:39.480 --> 00:29:41.440
contingencies and trying to understand what the world looks like
619
00:29:41.519 --> 00:29:42.960
in Biden and Trump.
620
00:29:43.039 --> 00:29:46.519
Well, you mentioned a few times in this interview today already,
621
00:29:46.640 --> 00:29:49.720
but at Live while Live in late twenty twenty three,
622
00:29:50.400 --> 00:29:53.400
your prediction as part of your session was that we're
623
00:29:53.400 --> 00:29:56.160
about to see the biggest corporate default cycle since the
624
00:29:56.240 --> 00:29:59.039
nineteen ninety one receession of the GFC. Could you give
625
00:29:59.079 --> 00:30:01.240
us a bit of an update on that prediction that
626
00:30:01.279 --> 00:30:03.440
you made and what some of the implications that people
627
00:30:03.519 --> 00:30:04.079
need to think through.
628
00:30:04.200 --> 00:30:06.000
Ut Yeah, James, why are you really trying to pin
629
00:30:06.079 --> 00:30:08.720
me down on those big There's always a mistake going
630
00:30:08.759 --> 00:30:11.839
to those live while events and putting bold calls out,
631
00:30:11.960 --> 00:30:15.319
But that one it looks like it's traveling pretty well.
632
00:30:15.480 --> 00:30:19.279
So Yeah, Basically, US bankruptcies last year was since twenty ten.
633
00:30:19.680 --> 00:30:21.799
Corporate defaults this year were since two thousand and nine.
634
00:30:22.480 --> 00:30:25.880
Much really rides for that forecast on what happens with
635
00:30:26.039 --> 00:30:28.559
race this year. If we get high for long guns,
636
00:30:29.279 --> 00:30:31.079
this is something borrowers we are just in a position
637
00:30:31.119 --> 00:30:33.960
to service their debts and you know, you've had an explosion.
638
00:30:34.079 --> 00:30:36.079
And we'll talk about this later perhaps, but you know,
639
00:30:36.200 --> 00:30:39.279
in things like private credit and those guys haven't ever
640
00:30:39.279 --> 00:30:41.039
seen a defult cycle. We actually haven't had a proper
641
00:30:41.079 --> 00:30:43.599
defaul cycle here in Australia since thirty eighty one. There
642
00:30:43.599 --> 00:30:45.640
are a lot of people in pain. There are a
643
00:30:45.680 --> 00:30:48.480
minority of people, like most people are doing absolutely fine,
644
00:30:49.039 --> 00:30:52.480
partly because in Wokstan or just taking a step back,
645
00:30:52.519 --> 00:30:55.279
we did see and this is posly very sad that
646
00:30:55.480 --> 00:31:01.839
in many non democratic authoritarian countries like Iran, Porea, China
647
00:31:02.000 --> 00:31:05.799
and Victoria extreme lockdowns, but we saw, we saw really
648
00:31:05.839 --> 00:31:07.759
extreme lockdowns in Australia. And so if you look at
649
00:31:07.759 --> 00:31:10.680
the cash buffers are built up in the US, the
650
00:31:11.319 --> 00:31:13.640
US buffer was about nine percent of GDP three years
651
00:31:13.680 --> 00:31:16.039
of growth. In Europe was about from remember about five
652
00:31:16.160 --> 00:31:18.920
or six percent of GDP about one few years of growth.
653
00:31:19.200 --> 00:31:21.640
In Australia, our buffers we worth thirty percent of GDP
654
00:31:21.759 --> 00:31:24.680
about three years growth and we've only spent about third
655
00:31:24.759 --> 00:31:26.799
to half of the in the exs savings. There's a
656
00:31:26.799 --> 00:31:29.440
lot of excess savings that still exists in Australia. In
657
00:31:29.480 --> 00:31:31.880
the US, Europe, their excess savings buffers have been excaused,
658
00:31:32.480 --> 00:31:34.880
and that's why I think a stagflationary future is kind
659
00:31:34.880 --> 00:31:37.119
of very likely for the global economy. That's what you
660
00:31:37.119 --> 00:31:38.839
have in New Zealand, which is around the Cold Wine.
661
00:31:38.880 --> 00:31:41.440
The New Zealanders were raising rates before most in October
662
00:31:41.480 --> 00:31:43.839
twenty one. They started. We didn't start here in austral
663
00:31:43.880 --> 00:31:46.279
on May twenty two. And in New Zealand, as I mentioned,
664
00:31:46.319 --> 00:31:48.519
you've had twelve months in needing GB growth, so they're
665
00:31:48.519 --> 00:31:51.400
basically in recession, but you've still got very high inflation,
666
00:31:51.799 --> 00:31:55.440
high service inflation, actually still had goods inflation. You're very
667
00:31:55.480 --> 00:31:57.720
strong wage growth, and even though the unemployment rate has
668
00:31:57.759 --> 00:31:59.799
increased from about three point two percent to four point
669
00:31:59.799 -->
00:32:02.680
two So you've got a recession in New Zealand, but
670
00:32:02.839 --> 00:32:06.000
you still have this stagflation and it's going to be
671
00:32:06.160 --> 00:32:07.839
shoulder interesting to see how they beat that out of
672
00:32:07.920 --> 00:32:10.480
the system, because really what you need is a big recession.
673
00:32:11.119 --> 00:32:14.279
But coming to your question about our kind of prediction
674
00:32:14.519 --> 00:32:16.240
for the worst of fall cycle sense the GIFC, I
675
00:32:16.279 --> 00:32:19.640
think we're more or less in line or tracking close
676
00:32:19.720 --> 00:32:23.359
to that expectation. If we get a macular disinflation and
677
00:32:23.400 --> 00:32:26.160
the FED cuts aggressively or at least cuts a little
678
00:32:26.680 --> 00:32:29.599
to their new estimate of neutral, then potentially some of
679
00:32:29.640 --> 00:32:31.920
those borrowers will be bailed out. But I'm pretty comfortable
680
00:32:31.960 --> 00:32:34.519
that you don't want to have any cyclically sensitive risk
681
00:32:34.559 --> 00:32:37.039
in your portfolios. You don't want to be exposed to
682
00:32:37.279 --> 00:32:39.799
those businesses which you find out a lot of growth
683
00:32:39.839 --> 00:32:42.799
equity portfolios and a lot of VCP and a lot
684
00:32:42.799 --> 00:32:45.000
of high and a lot of private debt. Those businesses
685
00:32:45.079 --> 00:32:48.960
that predicated their finances on the presumption of perpetually cheap money.
686
00:32:49.359 --> 00:32:52.039
You know that believe fiel Low, that rates would stay
687
00:32:52.720 --> 00:32:55.319
low for years and years and years and really can't
688
00:32:55.319 --> 00:32:58.039
survive and survive in a high cost of capital environment.
689
00:32:58.279 --> 00:33:01.319
And that high cost of capital this is what creative
690
00:33:01.400 --> 00:33:03.680
destruction and capitalism is all about. That high cost of
691
00:33:03.680 --> 00:33:07.200
capital is actually meant to craft weaker businesses and push
692
00:33:07.240 --> 00:33:09.640
them out of the system like a bushfire cathartically, you
693
00:33:09.920 --> 00:33:13.640
rushing through a national park and to kill off the
694
00:33:13.680 --> 00:33:17.400
weak businesses and allow more productive and vibrant concerns to
695
00:33:17.559 --> 00:33:20.200
rise up in their stead and get that capital labor
696
00:33:20.240 --> 00:33:23.000
that was in that zombie company reallocated to those people
697
00:33:23.039 --> 00:33:26.559
and that money to much more productive businesses. So I'm
698
00:33:26.599 --> 00:33:29.200
super neat in those spaces, and so.
699
00:33:29.200 --> 00:33:31.319
You've mentioned it a few times. You have some concerns
700
00:33:31.359 --> 00:33:34.519
about the private debt space and the private credit space.
701
00:33:34.559 --> 00:33:38.240
It's been a burgeoning asset class and a lot of interests,
702
00:33:38.319 --> 00:33:41.440
a lot of new operators entering the market. Talking about,
703
00:33:41.640 --> 00:33:44.920
you know here locally, the pullback that the big four
704
00:33:44.960 --> 00:33:47.319
banks have had. You've mentioned it a couple of times.
705
00:33:47.400 --> 00:33:49.720
I already that you have some concerns around that space.
706
00:33:49.920 --> 00:33:53.640
Explain that to me. Those businesses have, as you said,
707
00:33:54.319 --> 00:33:57.440
had explosive growth. You got to remember private credit did
708
00:33:57.480 --> 00:34:00.680
not exist Australia in the GFC Ascently it's like two
709
00:34:00.680 --> 00:34:02.359
thousand and eight, but none of those funds are around.
710
00:34:02.880 --> 00:34:04.640
So none of these funds have been through a default cycle.
711
00:34:04.880 --> 00:34:07.880
The last in the GFC, our unemployment rate peaked in
712
00:34:07.920 --> 00:34:09.719
the high fives. We didn't have two quarters in the
713
00:34:09.760 --> 00:34:12.280
e of GDP growth. The last real recession Australia was
714
00:34:12.320 --> 00:34:14.559
the ninety one recesson where unemployed went to eleven percent
715
00:34:14.880 --> 00:34:17.679
and as in Westpac almost went under. Why because of
716
00:34:17.760 --> 00:34:22.599
their exposures to commercial real estate and RESI developers. You say,
717
00:34:22.679 --> 00:34:25.639
they argue that banks are pulled back, but that's obviously
718
00:34:26.159 --> 00:34:28.440
not entirely true in the sense that banks are desperate
719
00:34:28.480 --> 00:34:30.880
to land. Banks want to grow their balance sheets. Banks
720
00:34:30.920 --> 00:34:33.760
are all affording over themselves to land to businesses. So
721
00:34:33.840 --> 00:34:37.840
there's no shortage, absolutely no shortage finance available for good borrowers.
722
00:34:38.280 --> 00:34:40.960
They can get the lines from banks and meet their
723
00:34:41.079 --> 00:34:44.559
serviceability standards. What we are seeing is that there's a
724
00:34:44.679 --> 00:34:47.280
sway that borrowers out there that don't have the capacity
725
00:34:47.639 --> 00:34:49.480
to get a loan from a bank because they're uprivate.
726
00:34:49.800 --> 00:34:52.239
So after the GFC regulators did go to the banks
727
00:34:52.239 --> 00:34:54.320
and say, hey, you've been landing made who can't afford
728
00:34:54.320 --> 00:34:56.559
to repay those lines. You've got to stop. But if
729
00:34:56.559 --> 00:34:58.239
you can't afford to repay the loan, the bank will
730
00:34:58.320 --> 00:35:01.079
land to you. So these subp borrows that actually are
731
00:35:01.440 --> 00:35:04.599
very risky propositions and lo and behold, if you open
732
00:35:04.679 --> 00:35:06.880
up private debt portfos in Australia, you will find a
733
00:35:06.960 --> 00:35:10.199
lot of Australias like the Genesis healthcare loans that were
734
00:35:10.239 --> 00:35:13.840
completely wiped out, a lot of healthcare I think exposures,
735
00:35:13.920 --> 00:35:16.159
of course, a lot of mayhem,
but the biggest driver
736
00:35:16.239 --> 00:35:19.599
is actually commercial property and REZI developers and construction lines.
737
00:35:20.119 --> 00:35:22.760
And one thing that the Making Regulator APRA has documented
738
00:35:22.800 --> 00:35:26.280
over one hundred plus years is that the biggest killers
739
00:35:26.360 --> 00:35:30.639
of banks and therefore lenders is commercial real estate or
740
00:35:30.639 --> 00:35:34.280
RESI developers. Now, what's unusual about Australian private and it's
741
00:35:34.320 --> 00:35:37.119
many unusual things, but one unusual face of the Australian
742
00:35:37.159 --> 00:35:39.320
private debt industry is that if you go to the
743
00:35:39.440 --> 00:35:41.079
US and go to Europe, you open up a private
744
00:35:41.119 --> 00:35:43.800
credit fund, you'll see very little real estate. It's all
745
00:35:43.840 --> 00:35:48.440
diversified across industry sectors, big diversified portfois. In Australia, almost
746
00:35:48.480 --> 00:35:50.719
every private credit fland is a real estate debt fund.
747
00:35:51.199 --> 00:35:53.880
And now they're creating real estate equity funds. I wonder why,
748
00:35:54.360 --> 00:35:56.800
because the loans have gone to default and they've ended
749
00:35:56.880 --> 00:35:58.880
up with real estate equity and they want to flip
750
00:35:58.920 --> 00:36:01.440
that to the real estate funds. So it's quite amazing
751
00:36:01.559 --> 00:36:05.519
getting real estate equity funds popping up alongside real estate
752
00:36:05.599 --> 00:36:09.480
dead funds. And these are sectors that are clearly not sustainable.
753
00:36:09.719 --> 00:36:12.840
And I think that it's very few players you aside
754
00:36:12.880 --> 00:36:15.559
from the likes of metrics metrics obviously five hundred pound grell,
755
00:36:15.599 --> 00:36:17.400
one hundred and twenty five staff. Lucky. The guy that
756
00:36:17.760 --> 00:36:19.599
runs that business is clearly a bit of the beast.
757
00:36:19.920 --> 00:36:21.960
But these shops are normally two men and a dog.
758
00:36:22.079 --> 00:36:26.239
They've got no resources, really few skills. Sometimes they've got
759
00:36:26.280 --> 00:36:28.199
no skills as they've never worked in the sect that
760
00:36:28.199 --> 00:36:31.639
they've just decided to make subprime loans to their mates.
761
00:36:32.119 --> 00:36:34.440
Actually had a client reading mest saying it's oh, mate,
762
00:36:34.599 --> 00:36:37.480
I've got this Rezie developer of Western Sydney. They're also
763
00:36:37.599 --> 00:36:40.760
me at eight eight percent, and I'm like, this guy's smart,
764
00:36:41.079 --> 00:36:43.360
and he's like, what do you think? I said, well,
765
00:36:44.000 --> 00:36:45.559
so where do you sit? Is it a saying you like?
766
00:36:45.599 --> 00:36:48.440
Because yet seen? I said, so what you're not subordinated anyway?
767
00:36:48.440 --> 00:36:51.320
He says, oh, well, we'll subordinated at the bank dead, Like,
768
00:36:51.519 --> 00:36:53.119
what do you think the bank's going to do when
769
00:36:53.159 --> 00:36:56.280
the borow defaults? It's all over it road. So you're
770
00:36:56.280 --> 00:37:00.679
basically providing equity and you know, Western City is kind
771
00:37:00.679 --> 00:37:04.880
of ground zero for mortgage stress, high property prices, high
772
00:37:04.920 --> 00:37:06.960
interest rates, the risk as they go high because the
773
00:37:07.039 --> 00:37:09.440
RBA is forced to raise again, and the risk is
774
00:37:09.480 --> 00:37:11.719
that you know there's a slow down in population growth
775
00:37:11.760 --> 00:37:15.840
in the overall economy starts to kind of stagnate. So
776
00:37:16.000 --> 00:37:19.960
I think private credit is completely a liquid it's I
777
00:37:20.079 --> 00:37:22.280
think there are very good managers, but there's also a
778
00:37:22.320 --> 00:37:25.079
lot of most of I think I'm not going to
779
00:37:25.360 --> 00:37:27.840
survive the cycle. I think people need to understand what
780
00:37:27.920 --> 00:37:30.280
they're buying. One of the problems in private debt is
781
00:37:30.719 --> 00:37:34.199
we haven't seen the credit spreads on private debt portrays
782
00:37:34.679 --> 00:37:37.480
match the moves in credit spreads in liquid ourset classes.
783
00:37:38.239 --> 00:37:40.199
And you know, it used to be the case. You
784
00:37:40.239 --> 00:37:41.920
can get six seven, eight percent in private debt and
785
00:37:42.000 --> 00:37:43.679
they look really attractive when the cash rat was at
786
00:37:43.760 --> 00:37:46.159
zero and term deposits were paying zero point five percent,
787
00:37:46.719 --> 00:37:48.800
and a high grade credit fund might have been paying
788
00:37:48.800 --> 00:37:51.239
two or three percent. But now you know our floating rate,
789
00:37:51.320 --> 00:37:53.639
how your fund has a yield of eight point three percent.
790
00:37:54.400 --> 00:37:57.159
That's a rated A plus rated. In fact, Aussie bake
791
00:37:57.199 --> 00:37:59.880
bonds two thirds senior one thirty two. We do some gearing,
792
00:38:00.599 --> 00:38:02.840
but if you can get you eight to nine percent
793
00:38:03.000 --> 00:38:05.320
on Ossie bank bonds with very little default risk and
794
00:38:05.400 --> 00:38:08.800
liquidity to risk, and that creates a high hurdle for
795
00:38:08.960 --> 00:38:11.519
riskier asset classes that do have default risks, that have
796
00:38:11.599 --> 00:38:14.039
no liquidity, so you'd really want double digital returns, and
797
00:38:14.079 --> 00:38:16.280
then you'd want to interrogate the underlying assets. So I
798
00:38:16.320 --> 00:38:18.719
think private credit has r a role to playing portfolios.
799
00:38:19.000 --> 00:38:21.280
I think right now, given we're in the midst of
800
00:38:21.320 --> 00:38:23.920
the worst default cycles since the GFC, and it's only
801
00:38:24.000 --> 00:38:27.480
luckily to get a lot worse. Personally, I think I'd
802
00:38:27.480 --> 00:38:29.679
be sitting on the sidelines and looking at an opportunity
803
00:38:29.719 --> 00:38:33.039
to re enter the sector on new outsets at some
804
00:38:33.119 --> 00:38:35.559
point over the next twelve to twenty four months. But
805
00:38:36.079 --> 00:38:39.079
you know, we've heard more stories of about a dozen
806
00:38:39.280 --> 00:38:42.239
Aussie private credit funds that have got liquidity crises because
807
00:38:42.280 --> 00:38:45.079
people are pulling money and borrowers are not repaying their
808
00:38:45.119 --> 00:38:47.760
loans and they've been looking for emergency liquidity from family
809
00:38:47.760 --> 00:38:50.000
officers who have been gearing the private credit funds up
810
00:38:50.400 --> 00:38:53.039
to allow them to meet redemptions. So I think it's
811
00:38:53.360 --> 00:38:56.440
it's it's It is amazing and breathtaking how many of
812
00:38:56.440 --> 00:38:58.800
these shops have opened up, and that in and of
813
00:38:58.880 --> 00:39:01.519
itself is a signal no barriers to entry. It's dead
814
00:39:01.559 --> 00:39:04.480
easy for Joe blogs to open up a private debt
815
00:39:04.519 --> 00:39:09.960
fund to start making mezzanine subordinated lines to risky and
816
00:39:10.119 --> 00:39:13.199
racy developers who are desperately need You need a cash
817
00:39:13.239 --> 00:39:14.599
because the bank's prudently won't lent.
818
00:39:15.159 --> 00:39:18.719
Now, the cynic or or the skeptic would say, you're
819
00:39:18.760 --> 00:39:21.920
talking talking your own book. These are competitive firms. What's
820
00:39:21.960 --> 00:39:22.920
what's the response to that.
821
00:39:23.519 --> 00:39:26.440
We're really different asset plusses. Our our portfolios at a
822
00:39:26.480 --> 00:39:29.119
double A rated liquid portfolio, which we turn over twenty
823
00:39:29.159 --> 00:39:31.719
five times a year. We don't really come up against
824
00:39:31.760 --> 00:39:34.239
private credit funds twom minus most of the time because
825
00:39:34.360 --> 00:39:37.840
I'm allocated out of high grade fixed income. They're allocated
826
00:39:37.880 --> 00:39:40.559
out of high yield or private debt or alternatives. We
827
00:39:40.679 --> 00:39:43.679
do have some products that crossover, like that floating rate
828
00:39:43.719 --> 00:39:45.840
high yield fund that's to nine percent and has probably
829
00:39:45.840 --> 00:39:48.000
done about eleven half percent after fees over the last
830
00:39:48.000 --> 00:39:51.400
twelve months. But our we're not running private debt. It's
831
00:39:51.480 --> 00:39:54.440
kind of like, you know, saying an equity manager competes
832
00:39:54.480 --> 00:39:58.480
with you know, a reate adagar maybe they have similar
833
00:39:58.519 --> 00:40:02.360
tager returns. We're in different asset classes. They're in liquid lines,
834
00:40:02.360 --> 00:40:04.559
where in highly liquid lines, which we only hold for
835
00:40:04.599 --> 00:40:07.039
a few days. We're getting out returns from mispricings and
836
00:40:07.119 --> 00:40:09.599
our fhack using those eighty models to try and get
837
00:40:09.679 --> 00:40:12.440
price appreciation. On topic yield, they're just chasing yield, which
838
00:40:12.440 --> 00:40:15.360
is a pure property for risk. So but I want
839
00:40:15.400 --> 00:40:18.119
to stress, like I think Private Dead has royal playing portfolios.
840
00:40:18.440 --> 00:40:20.159
I'm not sure that in the middle of the default
841
00:40:20.159 --> 00:40:22.519
cycles are best. When things happen properly read price is
842
00:40:22.519 --> 00:40:24.400
the best time to allocate. And I do think that
843
00:40:24.480 --> 00:40:27.039
there are very good managers. You know that we've mentioned
844
00:40:27.079 --> 00:40:31.679
already that perhaps amazing resources, yeah, and skilled and capability.
845
00:40:32.239 --> 00:40:33.880
I saw some researchers, so I'm going to bring it
846
00:40:33.880 --> 00:40:36.599
back to the Australian market, have a quick chat here
847
00:40:36.599 --> 00:40:38.840
before we get into some of our regular questions. But
848
00:40:39.320 --> 00:40:42.239
I saw some research from Roy Morgan showing that inflation
849
00:40:42.400 --> 00:40:46.480
expectations have risen for four consecutive weeks. Do you think
850
00:40:46.519 --> 00:40:50.000
the RBA is losing control of the inflation flight here
851
00:40:50.039 --> 00:40:50.440
a little bit.
852
00:40:51.000 --> 00:40:53.000
I think that they're losing a lot of credibility because
853
00:40:53.039 --> 00:40:56.400
nobody understands. I can give you some pretty powerful anecdotes.
854
00:40:56.440 --> 00:40:58.920
Nobody understands why Australias cash rates at four point three
855
00:40:59.000 --> 00:41:01.880
five percent, when normally he would be one point five
856
00:41:01.880 --> 00:41:05.320
percent above the US Fed Fund rate. So the Fed
857
00:41:05.400 --> 00:41:08.079
fund rate is currently called it roughly five and a half,
858
00:41:08.199 --> 00:41:09.840
So that would imply a caserat should be in the
859
00:41:10.400 --> 00:41:13.920
sixers and sevens, right, So that's problem. Problem two is
860
00:41:14.599 --> 00:41:18.000
the RBIT publishes the macroeconomic models it uses to determine
861
00:41:18.000 --> 00:41:20.159
what the right cash rate is, and we run those models,
862
00:41:20.840 --> 00:41:23.440
and those models imply that the RBA should be at
863
00:41:23.519 --> 00:41:26.920
five or higher. And then number three is Jonathan ERNs
864
00:41:27.039 --> 00:41:29.360
was head of economic analysis the RBA up until recently.
865
00:41:29.360 --> 00:41:31.119
I think he was there for twenty eight years. He
866
00:41:31.320 --> 00:41:34.119
just recently last years spun out. He's now cheap economist,
867
00:41:34.119 --> 00:41:36.519
a challenger, and he's written on live Wire. I think
868
00:41:36.800 --> 00:41:39.360
like what we've written, which is that if you run
869
00:41:39.400 --> 00:41:41.480
the RBA's macro models, they should be at five. There's
870
00:41:41.519 --> 00:41:43.800
this no reason for them to be at four point
871
00:41:43.840 --> 00:41:47.280
three five. So they're doublishly trying to preserve these employment gains.
872
00:41:47.960 --> 00:41:50.559
And you know, we've got this reacceleration in the OSSIE
873
00:41:50.599 --> 00:41:53.559
inflation data as well, and I think that the more
874
00:41:53.679 --> 00:41:57.920
you see inflation entrenched at high three four five percent rates,
875
00:41:58.440 --> 00:42:01.679
the more likely that you'll get this up drifting in expectations,
876
00:42:01.760 --> 00:42:05.079
and then that will feedback into the wage price setting process.
877
00:42:05.199 --> 00:42:07.360
And we're seeing this with these minimum wage and award
878
00:42:07.400 --> 00:42:11.559
wage determinations, where you know, the government's saying that workers
879
00:42:11.599 --> 00:42:13.559
can't go back in real terms, so therefore they need
880
00:42:13.679 --> 00:42:16.920
and then a full inflation adjustment. So the government's arguing
881
00:42:16.960 --> 00:42:20.960
for four percent, but the RBA is saying, because our
882
00:42:21.039 --> 00:42:25.199
labor productivity serve or four percent wage growth each year
883
00:42:25.760 --> 00:42:27.480
does not give us two and a half percent inflation
884
00:42:27.599 --> 00:42:28.960
right now. It gives us about three and a half
885
00:42:28.960 --> 00:42:32.719
percent inflation. So the RBA can't hit its inflation target
886
00:42:32.800 --> 00:42:35.599
right now with four percent inflation growth, and to get
887
00:42:35.719 --> 00:42:38.119
inflation back to target in twenty five twenty six, the
888
00:42:38.280 --> 00:42:41.800
RB has had to make these heroic assumptions about productivity growth,
889
00:42:42.119 --> 00:42:45.400
and basically it's assuming a massive increase in productivity, which
890
00:42:45.440 --> 00:42:47.599
we have in commently got and to a level that
891
00:42:47.840 --> 00:42:51.840
is actually sustained at thresholds significantly above their pre pandemic trend.
892
00:42:51.960 --> 00:42:54.639
So I think the RBA, you know this is it's
893
00:42:54.719 --> 00:42:56.480
rolling the dice. They may get away with none of
894
00:42:56.559 --> 00:42:59.840
us known. We could get the immaculate disipination. But I
895
00:42:59.880 --> 00:43:03.280
think there's a real risk that the RBA blows itself
896
00:43:03.360 --> 00:43:06.199
up again with these silly games that they play with
897
00:43:06.320 --> 00:43:10.079
these intellectional areas. The cart narrative bang that we're fi
898
00:43:10.239 --> 00:43:11.880
and we was going to hope the rest of the
899
00:43:11.880 --> 00:43:14.320
world of that heavy lifting, and we want to look
900
00:43:14.360 --> 00:43:17.159
at the dual targets in our mandate, which are price
901
00:43:17.199 --> 00:43:19.639
stability or in the inflation target
two and a half percent,
902
00:43:20.280 --> 00:43:22.519
and full employment. We've got full employment right now and
903
00:43:22.559 --> 00:43:24.679
we don't want to lose full deployment. I think, you know,
904
00:43:24.760 --> 00:43:28.320
there's also a risks they were politically compromised because Michelle
905
00:43:28.360 --> 00:43:31.400
Bullock was not expected to be the appointed governor. It
906
00:43:31.559 --> 00:43:35.400
was expected the Charmers, our treasurer, would appoint an external candidate,
907
00:43:35.480 --> 00:43:38.280
and at the last minute Buller got the job. Charmers
908
00:43:38.400 --> 00:43:40.880
obviously wouldn't have appointed someone who he thought was going
909
00:43:40.960 --> 00:43:43.920
to go crazy on raising rates, and you know, she's
910
00:43:43.960 --> 00:43:46.599
been pretty dubbished to date. But I think, ultimately again
911
00:43:47.159 --> 00:43:53.239
thinking that yo yo oscillation between the fictitious intellectual paradigm
912
00:43:53.320 --> 00:43:55.840
or narrative that they're trying to propagate and the data,
913
00:43:56.039 --> 00:43:58.079
ultimately they're going to mean revert to the data every
914
00:43:58.079 --> 00:44:00.119
single time the central makes it to be forced to
915
00:44:00.159 --> 00:44:01.840
respond to the data. It's just a question of how
916
00:44:01.920 --> 00:44:04.199
long they can divorce themselves from the data.
917
00:44:04.920 --> 00:44:07.840
Property it's had, it had a full and it's been
918
00:44:07.880 --> 00:44:08.800
a strong bounce back.
919
00:44:08.800 --> 00:44:10.079
I think it court people. Why surprise.
920
00:44:10.679 --> 00:44:14.360
What's your take on what's take place Inustralia residential property market,
921
00:44:14.599 --> 00:44:15.679
particularly in the major cities.
922
00:44:15.800 --> 00:44:17.880
Yes, just for the record, in October tween one and
923
00:44:18.079 --> 00:44:21.480
Live one, we were the only public analysts had had
924
00:44:21.519 --> 00:44:24.119
a view that house prices would fall based on our
925
00:44:24.199 --> 00:44:25.679
view that the RBO would lifts to the cash raid.
926
00:44:26.280 --> 00:44:28.079
Our internal modeling had the cash raid going at four
927
00:44:28.119 --> 00:44:30.159
twenty five, where obviously got to four to thirty five.
928
00:44:30.719 --> 00:44:33.000
That four to twenty five cash rate. In our models,
929
00:44:33.039 --> 00:44:35.719
we use the RBA's model of house prices, the Tulip
930
00:44:35.760 --> 00:44:39.880
Saunders model, Saunder's Tulip model and a fifteen percent nominal
931
00:44:39.920 --> 00:44:43.639
correction in national house prices as a minimum. We offered
932
00:44:43.639 --> 00:44:45.920
a fifteen to twenty five per cent rate according to
933
00:44:46.000 --> 00:44:48.960
the Daily Ecology house price in NICK data. That got
934
00:44:48.960 --> 00:44:51.159
Donic in disis that I was at coin venture on
935
00:44:51.239 --> 00:44:54.480
the pattern
applications house prices fell ten percent beat to
936
00:44:54.519 --> 00:44:57.880
trough and then since in so bes between May twenty
937
00:44:57.880 --> 00:45:00.280
two and forty twenty three, they have subsequently come at
938
00:45:00.280 --> 00:45:04.639
all those losses, I appreciate it further. So we expected
939
00:45:04.679 --> 00:45:06.880
a fifteen percent plus draw down. We got ten. That
940
00:45:07.000 --> 00:45:09.239
was the second biggest four in forty years of data.
941
00:45:09.639 --> 00:45:13.039
Inflation adjusted house rice did for fifteen percent, but we
942
00:45:13.159 --> 00:45:15.400
were surprised by the fact that they didn't fall further,
943
00:45:15.960 --> 00:45:19.119
a little bit further, and we were surprised that that
944
00:45:19.320 --> 00:45:21.119
that we got the rebound we got. I think Louis
945
00:45:21.159 --> 00:45:23.920
Chris Frash had called it pretty well the twenty twenty
946
00:45:24.000 --> 00:45:27.559
three pounds, and I think what we underestimated Whilst we
947
00:45:27.639 --> 00:45:30.559
expected a massive increase in immigration once the border has opened,
948
00:45:30.599 --> 00:45:36.159
and we forecast that, we didn't perhaps expect the ferocious
949
00:45:36.239 --> 00:45:38.599
nature of that population growth that I was running basically
950
00:45:38.639 --> 00:45:40.800
world beating population growth, and also the composition of the
951
00:45:40.840 --> 00:45:44.679
population growth was probably more well healed than we had anticipated.
952
00:45:44.679 --> 00:45:46.320
A lot of people coming to Australia, bringing a lot
953
00:45:46.360 --> 00:45:48.960
of money to Australia. Yeah, just anecdotally in the Yst
954
00:45:48.960 --> 00:45:51.599
and subb the Sydney, you're seeing one thousand square meter
955
00:45:52.000 --> 00:45:54.239
lots with a six hundred square meter of homeown it
956
00:45:54.599 --> 00:45:57.159
sell for forty million dollars. I mean, it's just ridiculous.
957
00:45:57.519 --> 00:45:59.840
And when you speak to agents, they'll tell you that
958
00:46:00.119 --> 00:46:03.480
it's Chinese buyers and Vietnamese buyers. Apparently, you know, a
959
00:46:03.519 --> 00:46:05.639
lot of Vietnamese money's come into the country because when
960
00:46:05.639 --> 00:46:08.719
the supply chain shifted from China to Vietnam, they made
961
00:46:08.760 --> 00:46:12.239
out like bandits. So I think you're seeing a lot
962
00:46:12.280 --> 00:46:15.800
of foreign money come into the country. And as to
963
00:46:15.840 --> 00:46:19.440
the outlook, so were we expected the drawdown. The drawdout
964
00:46:19.480 --> 00:46:22.039
wasn't as big as we got. Also, the drawdown that
965
00:46:22.119 --> 00:46:24.599
we thought we'd get it was larger than what we
966
00:46:24.760 --> 00:46:28.800
ultimately saw, and we were surprised by the bounce. As
967
00:46:28.920 --> 00:46:32.280
to we're from here, we haven't published any hard views.
968
00:46:33.239 --> 00:46:35.400
I'm kind of lie to express any other than I
969
00:46:35.519 --> 00:46:38.480
do think there are pockets of opportunity. And as he
970
00:46:38.559 --> 00:46:41.079
Reasy from an investment perspective, you know, I like the
971
00:46:41.119 --> 00:46:43.559
Sunshine Coast and we bought a place on Bridge in
972
00:46:43.639 --> 00:46:47.719
Beach and the noose is crazy expansive. But south of
973
00:46:48.199 --> 00:46:51.360
Noosey you got the twenty thirty to Brisbane oldpic the
974
00:46:51.440 --> 00:46:54.519
Queenslanders are interesting that and all it running. So the
975
00:46:54.599 --> 00:46:57.360
state owns the infrastructure, they can rivitize anything, and the
976
00:46:57.440 --> 00:46:59.400
infrastructure is very high quality and they're building a ton
977
00:46:59.480 --> 00:47:02.400
of it. And property is very cheap south of Nursa,
978
00:47:02.960 --> 00:47:06.760
so that Sunshine Coast is attractive. I think Perth is
979
00:47:06.840 --> 00:47:09.199
also very cheap. Was tempted to buy property in Perth.
980
00:47:09.679 --> 00:47:11.920
And then you get these kind of little enclaves in
981
00:47:12.199 --> 00:47:15.639
the well killed sectors of Sydney like Belbie Hill where
982
00:47:15.800 --> 00:47:18.760
I own, where prices have got crazy because of just
983
00:47:18.840 --> 00:47:22.039
the proximity at Bay, the city and the amenas. He
984
00:47:22.159 --> 00:47:25.079
got two schools Cranbrook and Scots on Victoria Road Belby
985
00:47:25.199 --> 00:47:28.519
or he got access to the train station and Bonno junction.
986
00:47:28.639 --> 00:47:31.239
So I think there are tons of opportunities because there's
987
00:47:31.280 --> 00:47:33.480
no doubt there's a lot of momentum. I saw a
988
00:47:33.599 --> 00:47:36.599
place a Caburida on the beach there that they were
989
00:47:36.679 --> 00:47:39.880
marketing for twelve millions of fourteen. I'm sure there are
990
00:47:40.000 --> 00:47:42.679
mini auctors that others have, so I think there's opportunities.
991
00:47:42.760 --> 00:47:46.039
Probably with this, I think the population growth will stays strong.
992
00:47:46.400 --> 00:47:49.639
Austral As always running broadly amongst the strongest population growth
993
00:47:49.679 --> 00:47:52.400
in the OECD where the immigrant country a furnamus was
994
00:47:52.519 --> 00:47:55.800
born here one and two is he's have a foreign parent,
995
00:47:56.199 --> 00:47:58.719
And I don't think it's going to change. Immigration is
996
00:47:59.280 --> 00:48:01.920
massively powerfed for productivity, and it makes it quite bullish
997
00:48:01.960 --> 00:48:04.039
on the I was the economy overall, but that all
998
00:48:04.360 --> 00:48:07.159
all those rows lead to hire insist rates and the
999
00:48:07.239 --> 00:48:09.360
house price action can't be comforting to the RBA.
1000
00:48:10.119 --> 00:48:14.559
Yep, yep, Chris. In your property, you've been loath to
1001
00:48:14.599 --> 00:48:17.119
give too many predictions.
In the fixed income market. Do
1002
00:48:17.199 --> 00:48:19.519
you like duration at the moment or do you prefer
1003
00:48:19.599 --> 00:48:21.760
to beat the shorter end, or do you like taking
1004
00:48:21.760 --> 00:48:24.039
on some duration because we've talked about what is quite
1005
00:48:24.079 --> 00:48:27.840
an uncertain and dynamics outlooks for that for interest rates,
1006
00:48:28.039 --> 00:48:30.920
So I mean that obviously poses a challenge for someone
1007
00:48:31.000 --> 00:48:32.440
like you that plays within those markets.
1008
00:48:33.039 --> 00:48:37.039
Yeah, we've advocated floating rate, particularly since late twenty one,
1009
00:48:37.760 --> 00:48:40.000
and then when US ten year bond yields started piercing
1010
00:48:40.039 --> 00:48:44.719
four percent, we've advocated averaging into duration between a four
1011
00:48:44.800 --> 00:48:47.880
o five percent US ten uregapment bond yield. Right now
1012
00:48:47.920 --> 00:48:50.280
we're a four point four percent area. We've got this
1013
00:48:50.519 --> 00:48:53.320
crucial inflation data in the next twenty four hours. If
1014
00:48:53.320 --> 00:48:56.280
it's ugly, we could see yields pushed back towards five.
1015
00:48:56.360 --> 00:48:58.639
But I think, yeah, duration right now makes sense. In
1016
00:48:58.719 --> 00:49:03.599
my portfolios, I'm probably seventy five percent floating, so zero
1017
00:49:03.719 --> 00:49:07.559
duration and twenty five percent fixed or long duration. But
1018
00:49:07.639 --> 00:49:10.760
I think you could rationalize here and now, with where
1019
00:49:10.880 --> 00:49:13.000
current yields are, particularly if they creep up into the
1020
00:49:13.800 --> 00:49:16.920
north of four point five percent, could easily got fifty
1021
00:49:16.920 --> 00:49:20.000
to fifty fixed floating, so half your portfolio long duration,
1022
00:49:20.119 --> 00:49:22.840
half your portfolio zero duration. Obviously, at stress, this is
1023
00:49:22.880 --> 00:49:24.920
not personal financial advice. This is just me talking to
1024
00:49:25.000 --> 00:49:27.400
myself about what you know I would be hypotatically doing
1025
00:49:27.920 --> 00:49:30.559
me in my own PA book. The duration is so
1026
00:49:30.679 --> 00:49:33.039
much more attractive than it's ever been. You know, obviously
1027
00:49:33.079 --> 00:49:35.000
ten you get my bundles in pre one one percent
1028
00:49:35.239 --> 00:49:37.559
duration was handsOn out attracted. But a ten year yields
1029
00:49:38.119 --> 00:49:41.039
before and a half percent that basically the same yield
1030
00:49:41.039 --> 00:49:43.519
you're getting on a grade office property, or you know,
1031
00:49:43.599 --> 00:49:45.639
that's a better yield than you're getting on an investment
1032
00:49:45.679 --> 00:49:48.239
property in RESI before any transaction costs you have to
1033
00:49:48.320 --> 00:49:52.360
incur and other depreciation costs in in REZI, so I
1034
00:49:52.440 --> 00:49:56.000
think duration has some pretty attractive insurance properties self plug,
1035
00:49:56.400 --> 00:49:59.039
we do run Australia as best performing long duration strategy.
1036
00:49:59.119 --> 00:50:02.599
The active composite on fun It's ETF ticker is FIXD.
1037
00:50:02.840 --> 00:50:05.280
Last twelve months after fees a return six point three
1038
00:50:05.360 --> 00:50:08.519
five percent. I believe the index in just one point
1039
00:50:08.559 --> 00:50:10.519
three five percent. We did about five percent above the
1040
00:50:10.519 --> 00:50:12.960
index near to fees, and to the best of my knowledge,
1041
00:50:12.960 --> 00:50:15.440
we've been every long duration manager in Australia one year,
1042
00:50:15.480 --> 00:50:17.719
three or five years and since inception in March seventeen.
1043
00:50:18.360 --> 00:50:21.599
So I think I invest in FIXT. Obviously, this is
1044
00:50:21.639 --> 00:50:23.639
not versaal advice, and you should n't speak to an
1045
00:50:23.639 --> 00:50:25.000
advisor about what you want to do with your own
1046
00:50:25.000 --> 00:50:25.480
put flier.
1047
00:50:25.800 --> 00:50:28.280
All right, well, Chris, I'm conscious we've gone a little
1048
00:50:28.320 --> 00:50:30.760
bit over time, but I do have three questions i'd
1049
00:50:30.840 --> 00:50:32.679
like to finish up on, So if you're happy to
1050
00:50:32.719 --> 00:50:35.480
stick with me, I'll get through our regular questions. What
1051
00:50:35.559 --> 00:50:37.800
do you think investors are overlooking or getting wrong about
1052
00:50:37.880 --> 00:50:38.519
markets today?
1053
00:50:39.320 --> 00:50:41.519
Yeah, I just think it's this dichotomy between what the
1054
00:50:41.719 --> 00:50:45.079
economy suggesting needs to happen with interest rates and what
1055
00:50:45.280 --> 00:50:47.880
markets are pricing. Will happen with the instructs. You see
1056
00:50:47.880 --> 00:50:50.239
it very clearly. We run, as I mentioned, the tailor
1057
00:50:50.320 --> 00:50:52.840
rule that basically tells us where US rates should go,
1058
00:50:53.440 --> 00:50:55.800
and then we map against that where markets are saying
1059
00:50:56.239 --> 00:50:59.119
US rates will go, and there's a big gap. It's
1060
00:50:59.119 --> 00:51:01.400
the same is true here in Australia modeling and the
1061
00:51:01.480 --> 00:51:04.800
Aussie cash rate implies ra SID to go up knockdown.
1062
00:51:05.280 --> 00:51:07.639
So I think we're gonna get a hell of a
1063
00:51:07.679 --> 00:51:10.840
lot of super important information on US inflation and wages
1064
00:51:10.880 --> 00:51:13.280
and unemployment. I mean, we had very strong payroll data
1065
00:51:13.400 --> 00:51:16.760
last week before we recorded this blue market estimates out
1066
00:51:16.800 --> 00:51:19.159
of the water. But if this strong data keeps on
1067
00:51:19.239 --> 00:51:22.639
coming through, hold on to your motherfucking hats, because you
1068
00:51:22.719 --> 00:51:25.280
know the world is not price for this risk. Make
1069
00:51:25.400 --> 00:51:28.639
no freaking mistake. There is no margin for error in
1070
00:51:28.679 --> 00:51:31.679
enlisted equities. There's no margin for error in venture capital,
1071
00:51:31.719 --> 00:51:37.000
private equity zero and crypto, in commercial real estate, in
1072
00:51:37.079 --> 00:51:41.639
REZI developing our development stock, in high yield junk bonds
1073
00:51:41.800 --> 00:51:44.440
and private credits. So all these guys at price for perfection,
1074
00:51:44.800 --> 00:51:47.039
they're all assuming we're going to get a big reduction
1075
00:51:47.159 --> 00:51:49.559
in interest rates, that cost of capital relief which is
1076
00:51:49.639 --> 00:51:54.400
going to in turn radically reduce repayments and bowl them
1077
00:51:54.440 --> 00:51:58.920
out of their zombie graves. But if we get persistent,
1078
00:51:59.039 --> 00:52:02.719
prolonged portrayed to the elongated core inflation, then we're going
1079
00:52:02.760 --> 00:52:04.960
to have a huge amount of strife and I think
1080
00:52:04.960 --> 00:52:09.639
another regime change. So that's what we're in my AFR columns. Yeah,
1081
00:52:10.159 --> 00:52:12.559
every cell column talking about services plation. In fact, that
1082
00:52:12.559 --> 00:52:14.000
I pretty much talked about in every column for the
1083
00:52:14.039 --> 00:52:16.480
last two years, and all of the one's talking about
1084
00:52:16.559 --> 00:52:18.719
right now of services inflation. But it's still not so
1085
00:52:18.960 --> 00:52:20.840
I think front and center because the fed's trying to
1086
00:52:20.880 --> 00:52:23.400
diss the data, saying, oh we can still cut in June,
1087
00:52:23.440 --> 00:52:26.559
and everyone's trying to rationalize the dublish biod. But asset
1088
00:52:26.639 --> 00:52:30.639
prices I think these days, particularly ja June. What I
1089
00:52:30.679 --> 00:52:33.079
mean by that there is I feel like with the
1090
00:52:33.119 --> 00:52:35.719
amount of passive money and ETF flows and the amount
1091
00:52:35.719 --> 00:52:39.639
of retail money, and then also the amount of momentum
1092
00:52:39.719 --> 00:52:44.599
based algorithmic money inequities, you get a lot of exuberance,
1093
00:52:44.800 --> 00:52:48.199
So a lot of extreme exuberance that's not really paying
1094
00:52:48.239 --> 00:52:51.280
attention to the data. I tell you something interesting, between
1095
00:52:51.400 --> 00:52:54.360
late twenty one and early tweeny two, we notice these
1096
00:52:54.559 --> 00:53:00.239
really weird disconnects between data releases and market reactions. See
1097
00:53:00.320 --> 00:53:03.440
bad inflation data come out and equity rally, and we'd
1098
00:53:03.519 --> 00:53:06.679
see a strong payrolls print and the unemployariy falling and
1099
00:53:06.760 --> 00:53:09.199
equities rally, and we're like, dudes, this is early twenty
1100
00:53:09.440 --> 00:53:12.800
twenty two. Well, dude, what's going on here? This is
1101
00:53:12.880 --> 00:53:15.920
going to mean hikes. Hikes are terrible for risk. But
1102
00:53:16.199 --> 00:53:19.000
for about six months there, the equy markets couldn't price
1103
00:53:19.079 --> 00:53:22.400
the economic data correctly. And I said to my team recently,
1104
00:53:22.440 --> 00:53:25.239
I think I'm seeing the same regime, the same heuristic
1105
00:53:25.320 --> 00:53:28.440
once again apply itself, where it feels like the price
1106
00:53:28.519 --> 00:53:32.599
action in risk is really insensitive to an ignor of
1107
00:53:33.239 --> 00:53:35.800
the signals in the economic data noise that we're seeing
1108
00:53:35.880 --> 00:53:39.360
very clearly. Chris, can you share a lesson from a
1109
00:53:39.440 --> 00:53:42.039
big win or a big loss? Tell us what happened
1110
00:53:42.119 --> 00:53:44.480
and what was the weston? Yeah? Easy, I sat with
1111
00:53:44.559 --> 00:53:46.360
a big loss. No, it was a big loss. But
1112
00:53:46.880 --> 00:53:50.159
we had these wonderful macro models in late twenty one,
1113
00:53:50.199 --> 00:53:51.920
as I mentioned, where we sold all about credit and
1114
00:53:51.960 --> 00:53:53.599
we're a credit manager and we had no credit. We
1115
00:53:53.639 --> 00:53:55.280
actually went in net short credit. I think I had
1116
00:53:55.599 --> 00:53:58.199
more than twelve billion dollars of investment grade credit shorts,
1117
00:53:58.280 --> 00:54:01.519
coross various portfolio and it was the world's greatest care
1118
00:54:01.639 --> 00:54:04.239
was fantastic, and credit spread when about one hundred and
1119
00:54:04.239 --> 00:54:06.039
fifty bases points wide as they tick that box and
1120
00:54:06.159 --> 00:54:09.800
we hit it in infrastrate hedged sovereign bonds, but we
1121
00:54:09.920 --> 00:54:12.639
hedged the bonds with futures. We had this idea that
1122
00:54:12.679 --> 00:54:14.599
banks would be forced to buy about three hundred to
1123
00:54:14.639 --> 00:54:16.559
five hundred million of these bots. Everyone said we were
1124
00:54:16.559 --> 00:54:18.519
wrong at the time. Since that time, the banks have
1125
00:54:18.599 --> 00:54:21.519
done exactly that and everyone agrees. We found a liquidity
1126
00:54:21.599 --> 00:54:24.159
hole on bank balance hips in twenty twenty one, and
1127
00:54:24.519 --> 00:54:26.480
we were basically I went to a matt Common the
1128
00:54:26.519 --> 00:54:28.440
COOCBA aoud this. I went into all the make treasure
1129
00:54:28.440 --> 00:54:30.159
and I said, you got this massive liquidy hole. You
1130
00:54:30.280 --> 00:54:32.480
have to buy three hundred and five hundred bllion government bonds.
1131
00:54:32.960 --> 00:54:34.920
They all agreed with this today, but at the time
1132
00:54:34.960 --> 00:54:36.320
they were kind of trying to push back and no
1133
00:54:36.360 --> 00:54:38.360
one in the market knew anything about it. In the
1134
00:54:38.400 --> 00:54:42.320
same way that
again I said, sound too self referential,
1135
00:54:42.360 --> 00:54:46.360
But like last week, SMP upgraded all the banks TI
1136
00:54:46.480 --> 00:54:49.280
to bond ratings and hybrid ratings. We had written in
1137
00:54:49.320 --> 00:54:51.440
a live wire in November tween twenty three. We think
1138
00:54:51.519 --> 00:54:53.639
we thought this would happen. We were the only analyst
1139
00:54:53.760 --> 00:54:56.119
or investors globally that we're aware of this. S and
1140
00:54:56.159 --> 00:54:57.599
P said, no one else on the planet and asked
1141
00:54:57.639 --> 00:54:59.840
them with a question on the subject, and it had
1142
00:55:00.159 --> 00:55:02.760
last week. So anyway, I was thinking, we've done all
1143
00:55:02.760 --> 00:55:04.159
the right things. We got out of risk. We were
1144
00:55:04.280 --> 00:55:07.239
sure credit late twenty one, and we're hiding in sovereign bonds.
1145
00:55:07.280 --> 00:55:08.880
And those sovereign bonds were going to be a high demand,
1146
00:55:08.920 --> 00:55:11.519
but we hedged them with futures. If we'd hedge them
1147
00:55:11.559 --> 00:55:13.599
with swaps, this is inside beltway and most people won't
1148
00:55:13.679 --> 00:55:15.519
understand the difference. But if we'd hedge them with swaps,
1149
00:55:16.000 --> 00:55:18.159
the spread on the sovereign bonds to swaps would have
1150
00:55:18.159 --> 00:55:20.960
compressed forty basis points. We hedged them with futures, the
1151
00:55:21.000 --> 00:55:23.320
spread on the sovereign bonds to futures went fifty basis
1152
00:55:23.320 --> 00:55:25.920
points wider. So it's better than being credit. But because
1153
00:55:25.960 --> 00:55:28.400
we got the hedge wrong, we didn't get the monster
1154
00:55:28.480 --> 00:55:30.760
returns that we would have otherwise got and that was
1155
00:55:30.800 --> 00:55:32.719
partly because the RBA blew up the swaps market when
1156
00:55:32.719 --> 00:55:34.880
they dropped the yelk curb target in late twenty twenty one,
1157
00:55:35.559 --> 00:55:38.360
and swap spreads went crazy. And the lesson for that
1158
00:55:39.119 --> 00:55:41.320
process was we could have hitged with swaps or futures.
1159
00:55:41.360 --> 00:55:44.440
We not historically use futures because a sorry swaps because
1160
00:55:44.480 --> 00:55:47.760
futures were cheaper and we'll liquid, but there are an
1161
00:55:47.800 --> 00:55:50.000
approximate hedge. They want a perfect edge. The swaps were
1162
00:55:50.000 --> 00:55:53.159
a perfect head, and had we hedged with swaps, we
1163
00:55:53.199 --> 00:55:55.239
would be we would have been probably the best performing
1164
00:55:55.320 --> 00:55:57.280
fixed come matage with the world over the twelve months
1165
00:55:57.320 --> 00:55:59.639
of June twenty two because we got all the shorts right,
1166
00:55:59.679 --> 00:56:02.440
we got the acid class, we got the idea right,
1167
00:56:02.519 --> 00:56:04.360
but we got the hedge wrong. And so the lesson
1168
00:56:04.360 --> 00:56:06.639
in that story is you want to be very, very precise.
1169
00:56:06.760 --> 00:56:11.000
And so these days we're incredibly anal and precise on
1170
00:56:11.039 --> 00:56:13.400
all our interest rate hedging and we don't leave any
1171
00:56:13.440 --> 00:56:17.039
residual risks. So that's one thing we got wrong. The
1172
00:56:17.119 --> 00:56:19.400
thing we got right that was I think interesting, was
1173
00:56:20.119 --> 00:56:23.199
a good story. In March twenty twenty three. Credit credits
1174
00:56:23.199 --> 00:56:25.079
whist is about the collapse and a lot of the
1175
00:56:25.199 --> 00:56:27.840
buzzy credit funds. They were loaded to the gills with credits,
1176
00:56:28.440 --> 00:56:31.559
loads of the gills with credits with hybrids, and unfortunately
1177
00:56:31.599 --> 00:56:33.360
all these hybrids were wiped out, so they were zero.
1178
00:56:34.119 --> 00:56:36.599
Our analysts put a blanket bound on any long exposure
1179
00:56:36.639 --> 00:56:38.360
to credits Wiss in May twenty one, so we weren't
1180
00:56:38.360 --> 00:56:40.119
interested in going along. Credits was. In fact, we were
1181
00:56:40.119 --> 00:56:42.880
short selling credits with Senior Bozz in twenty twenty two.
1182
00:56:43.639 --> 00:56:46.239
But at the time their collapse in twenty twenty three,
1183
00:56:47.079 --> 00:56:50.199
Ubs with the obvious merger partner and they were forced
1184
00:56:50.239 --> 00:56:53.079
by the Swiss regulator Finnmar into a shotgun marriage over
1185
00:56:53.199 --> 00:56:55.880
a weekend. But when the market woke up on Monday
1186
00:56:56.159 --> 00:57:00.559
and Ubs announced that they bought credits Wiss, the market says,
1187
00:57:00.639 --> 00:57:02.039
this is going to be a disaster. So everyone was
1188
00:57:02.079 --> 00:57:05.039
shorting Uba sequity of bonds. Their shared bruce fell sixteen
1189
00:57:05.039 --> 00:57:07.480
percent and their senior one spreads went from one to
1190
00:57:07.480 --> 00:57:09.679
fifty on the boards to three ten other points. Our
1191
00:57:09.719 --> 00:57:13.000
analysis was a complete opposite. Our analysis was UBS's buying credits.
1192
00:57:13.039 --> 00:57:15.119
We is for three billions with francs when it's probably
1193
00:57:15.159 --> 00:57:17.000
worth about thirty three billion, so we thought they got
1194
00:57:17.039 --> 00:57:19.599
it thirty billion cheap. They subsequently announced they got it
1195
00:57:19.679 --> 00:57:22.320
thirty seven billion cheap plus the Swiss government was giving
1196
00:57:22.360 --> 00:57:25.079
them a nine billion ostin Demni, and the Swiss Sectra
1197
00:57:25.119 --> 00:57:26.840
Banker was giving them one hundred and fifty billion of
1198
00:57:27.480 --> 00:57:29.320
cheap lines, and then finally they were taking out their
1199
00:57:29.440 --> 00:57:31.639
one combat it right. So they're becoming like a monopoly
1200
00:57:32.400 --> 00:57:35.440
systematically important bank
in Switzerland. So on that day I
1201
00:57:35.559 --> 00:57:36.880
rang up one of my pension of our clients. We
1202
00:57:36.920 --> 00:57:39.000
shared them with the research and they said, yeah, we're in,
1203
00:57:39.440 --> 00:57:42.159
and we bought about a billion dollars of UBS senior
1204
00:57:42.199 --> 00:57:45.159
bonds that day at three hundred plus overboards, and that
1205
00:57:45.280 --> 00:57:47.679
spread has since come in one hundred and fifty basis points.
1206
00:57:47.719 --> 00:57:50.079
We've made massive money on that trade, and it's a
1207
00:57:50.119 --> 00:57:53.719
good example of what we do. We're massively contrary and countercyclical,
1208
00:57:54.039 --> 00:57:56.239
and we tend to have very different positions to what
1209
00:57:56.280 --> 00:57:57.159
the rest of the world has.
1210
00:57:57.800 --> 00:58:00.400
Final question, Chris, if you had to pick an acid
1211
00:58:00.400 --> 00:58:02.480
class to buy and hold for the next five years,
1212
00:58:02.840 --> 00:58:04.440
say markets we're going to shut, you had to had
1213
00:58:04.480 --> 00:58:05.840
to pick an accid class to buying hole for the
1214
00:58:05.840 --> 00:58:06.480
next five years.
1215
00:58:06.800 --> 00:58:09.719
What would it be and why would you hold it? Yeah,
1216
00:58:09.880 --> 00:58:13.199
what I like is government guaranteed banks that are the
1217
00:58:13.280 --> 00:58:15.440
two big to file that have government guaranteed deposits and
1218
00:58:15.559 --> 00:58:18.840
implicitly go guaranteed bonds. So if you take the senior
1219
00:58:19.000 --> 00:58:22.920
bonds issued by the four major banks and you gear
1220
00:58:23.000 --> 00:58:26.039
them up, you know seventy eight percent, you know you
1221
00:58:26.159 --> 00:58:29.039
can earn a seven to eight percent prior of return
1222
00:58:29.320 --> 00:58:30.960
which you can hold to the maturity of those five
1223
00:58:31.079 --> 00:58:35.920
year bonds. That is really, in my personal opinion and
1224
00:58:36.039 --> 00:58:40.039
exposure that has relatively low risk. So you've got senior
1225
00:58:40.079 --> 00:58:42.440
bonds are implicitly government guaranteed double A march rated from
1226
00:58:42.480 --> 00:58:45.559
amst CBA and APPED Westpac paying seven to eight percent
1227
00:58:46.400 --> 00:58:49.880
random that are very liquid, that have no default risk
1228
00:58:50.280 --> 00:58:52.039
unless you think one of those banks is going to bust.
1229
00:58:52.559 --> 00:58:54.360
You can trade hundreds of millions of dollars a day
1230
00:58:54.800 --> 00:58:57.039
and you're basically locking in a seven to eight percent yield.
1231
00:58:57.119 --> 00:58:59.800
That's super attractive. That for me, is a pretty good
1232
00:59:00.079 --> 00:59:03.400
trade in world where all acid classes are expensive. Housing
1233
00:59:03.440 --> 00:59:07.440
looks expensive, eigres looks expensive, commercial real estate looks expensive,
1234
00:59:08.000 --> 00:59:11.039
and all the other assists private dead high yield VCPR
1235
00:59:11.840 --> 00:59:14.320
financial spreads because we still have a bit of an
1236
00:59:14.360 --> 00:59:18.440
echo of the credit Swiss collapse in our memories. You know,
1237
00:59:18.519 --> 00:59:22.119
Ossie Bake senior bond spreads are actually still cheap, So
1238
00:59:22.239 --> 00:59:25.280
hybrid's not cheap. Hybrid's trading two thirty five over baked
1239
00:59:25.280 --> 00:59:26.920
bills and normally they traded three twenty five to three
1240
00:59:27.000 --> 00:59:29.679
fifty other banks, So bankhiber is not cheap, but banked
1241
00:59:29.679 --> 00:59:32.480
senior bonds are cheap, which is interesting. And then if
1242
00:59:32.519 --> 00:59:34.840
you can leverage them and get seven to eight percent
1243
00:59:34.960 --> 00:59:38.800
returns more or less banked, then I think that's pretty attractive.
1244
00:59:38.800 --> 00:59:41.320
Now if the spreads go tighter, so if they go
1245
00:59:41.400 --> 00:59:43.800
from being cheap to normally valued or even expensive, which
1246
00:59:43.840 --> 00:59:45.840
I think they will do, then you're going to get
1247
00:59:45.920 --> 00:59:49.079
an additional capital gain on top of that yield, so
1248
00:59:49.239 --> 00:59:51.639
your total return is going to be much higher. So
1249
00:59:51.679 --> 00:59:53.719
in our floating rate high yield fund, the yield over
1250
00:59:53.760 --> 00:59:55.119
the last year has been about eight eight and a
1251
00:59:55.119 --> 00:59:58.280
half percent. The total return prefe has been twelve and
1252
00:59:58.320 --> 01:00:01.119
a half percent. Because of the hour FI from finding
1253
01:00:01.239 --> 01:00:04.239
cheap bank bonds. That normalizes all men revert and provide
1254
01:00:04.280 --> 01:00:06.239
some price appreciation so that's what I would do, and
1255
01:00:06.280 --> 01:00:09.440
I probably do half fixed half floating. Said a bit
1256
01:00:09.519 --> 01:00:11.639
of a pun on duration for the next five years.
1257
01:00:12.400 --> 01:00:14.880
So in rates get cut the floating rate notes, their
1258
01:00:15.000 --> 01:00:18.079
rates will fall. But if you hunt on duration and
1259
01:00:18.159 --> 01:00:20.679
low duration of the portfolio, then I think it's highly
1260
01:00:20.719 --> 01:00:23.239
diversifying in the event that at some point central banks
1261
01:00:23.280 --> 01:00:23.880
do lower rates.
1262
01:00:24.119 --> 01:00:27.000
Now, well, Chris, thanks so much for taking the time
1263
01:00:27.079 --> 01:00:29.840
to speak with us today. Really enjoyed hearing a bit
1264
01:00:29.840 --> 01:00:32.440
about the views on what's quite a dynamic space with
1265
01:00:32.679 --> 01:00:35.360
the interest rate and inflation settings, and also hearing a
1266
01:00:35.480 --> 01:00:37.000
bit about what you've been doing with the portfolios at
1267
01:00:37.039 --> 01:00:37.719
Coulback Capital.
1268
01:00:37.920 --> 01:00:39.519
Jave's man, it's been a great privilege. What you're doing
1269
01:00:39.559 --> 01:00:42.760
at Live is absolutely incredible. You guys have been market leaders,
1270
01:00:42.800 --> 01:00:46.400
not in Australia but globally, hyper innovative and to be
1271
01:00:46.480 --> 01:00:48.519
a clearing house for the best minds in the business
1272
01:00:49.119 --> 01:00:51.719
every day, all day. You know, I'm obsessed with Live.
1273
01:00:51.840 --> 01:00:54.800
I read it NonStop. I've got the feet on my phone.
1274
01:00:55.119 --> 01:00:57.199
I've actually got a Live Way dedicated screen in my
1275
01:00:57.280 --> 01:01:00.960
toilet so i can see the Live WIF joke, that's
1276
01:01:01.000 --> 01:01:04.159
no joke. So it's yeah. I always want to be connected,
1277
01:01:04.360 --> 01:01:07.920
and it's just not me that we'll see publishes on livelie.
1278
01:01:08.239 --> 01:01:10.960
I haven't published as much of late. I do actually
1279
01:01:11.000 --> 01:01:14.320
have other contractional commitments to the Financial Review, but my
1280
01:01:14.559 --> 01:01:17.639
chief macro strategist, Kieran Davies publishes all the time, and
1281
01:01:17.719 --> 01:01:22.239
Live were very short, punchy, parsimonious pieces, a little bit
1282
01:01:22.320 --> 01:01:24.920
doer like can be a bit dryer. He's also pretty
1283
01:01:25.239 --> 01:01:27.760
doer to be Frank KD. He's not necessarily the most
1284
01:01:27.800 --> 01:01:30.480
charismatic character, but he's an absolute beast and definitely the
1285
01:01:30.519 --> 01:01:32.760
miss the best of member economist in this country in
1286
01:01:32.840 --> 01:01:35.920
my not so humble opinions. So have a look for
1287
01:01:36.039 --> 01:01:38.440
Kieran Davies on Live wire. Otherwise you can find Twitter
1288
01:01:38.599 --> 01:01:43.719
at cjay or LinkedIn, and we'll continue punching out as
1289
01:01:43.760 --> 01:01:46.360
mad as we can as a public good and also
1290
01:01:46.440 --> 01:01:47.920
to educate our clients. Well.
1291
01:01:47.960 --> 01:01:50.159
Thanks Chris, and to all of you listeners out there,
1292
01:01:50.400 --> 01:01:52.719
thank you very much for tuning in to today's podcast.
1293
01:01:53.000 --> 01:01:55.960
I hope you enjoyed it. Remember hit the subscribe button
1294
01:01:56.159 --> 01:01:58.559
on your podcast platform with choice so you don't miss
1295
01:01:58.679 --> 01:02:00.800
future episodes. Thanks very much for listening.