رونوشت 🔗
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I want to welcome everyone back to the Picanhona Show.
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I am here with two gentlemen. Let me introduce them first.
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Hans Vogel, how are you doing, Hans?
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Fine, thank you. What about yourself?
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Doing good, doing good. And Michael Palmer, how are you?
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I'm fine, thank you.
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All right. Hans, I'll let you go first. Tell everybody
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a little bit about yourself.
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Well, I'm a historian. I studied in the Netherlands. And
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I did my PhD and my master's in America at
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the University of Florida, which I found a great experience.
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I learned a lot about Latin America, which is my specialty,
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and about the United States and especially the South, which
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I love, and especially the food and the people. Well,
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not in that order though. And I've been working as
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a history professor at several universities in Europe and in Argentina.
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And since I'm retired for some 20 years now, I
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left early because of, well, the university environment, academic environment
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didn't really work for me. In the end, I didn't
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work for them. So I left university and I've never
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felt better since then. And I write for the Hunt
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Review and for my own Substack. And I've been writing
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for Pravda in Russia and for other outlets. So I
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keep myself busy.
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Great. Michael, how about you?
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Well, I'm not listening to my English name. I'm actually
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from Germany, as you might guess from my accent. So
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I got an MD degree in Germany and worked after that.
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for about 10 years in a department of medical microbiology.
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And in 2001, I took up a professorship at the
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University of Waterloo in Canada, where I still live, in biochemistry.
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And that lasted until 2022, until I got kicked out
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for refusing the COVID shot. And so I have been
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prematurely retired since then.
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I quit my last job, the last job I had
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before They instituted the COVID shot, the mandatory COVID shot,
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and they told everybody a week before they had to
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get it that they would be fired if they didn't
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get it. So, yeah, I think that changed a lot
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of people's, not only their opinions on how things work,
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but also the trajectory in their life and their work life.
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It was a very interesting experience. I mean, I was
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at a university that didn't have any medical school, so
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I was one of very few medical people there, right?
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So I actually tried to inform people. I mean, by
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the time that these mandates came around, there were already
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several months of experience with the COVID shots and the
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dead bodies were already piling up, right? I mean, you
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could see it in all the databases, but nobody was interested.
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Nobody was listening to me. That was really a surreal experience,
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I must say.
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All right, so we are here because Antelope Hill just
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published a book by, I believe I'm pronouncing his name right,
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Bernd Schripper. And it is called Germany and Stalin's Crosshairs.
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And I think one of the reasons why I really
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got excited about this book when it came out is
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because I've read Hoffman's Stalin's War of Extermination and Suvorov
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Resin's Icebreaker. And I've adopted those theories. I believe that
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they are true. But a lot of what is, a
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lot of those books are basically, here is all the evidence.
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And you never, you have, it's almost overwhelming evidence that
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Stalin was planning to invade Germany and thus invade Europe.
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But it never really gets down to, you just have
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to be like, yes, that's what I believe. And then,
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so you're waiting for conclusive evidence. Do you think that
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this book puts the nail in the coffin of the
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theory that Stalin was not going to invade Germany and Europe?
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I think everybody who actually reads this book thoroughly and
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considers the arguments in the book, I think, will have
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to come pretty much to that conclusion. I mean, that is...
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Load full transcript
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That is the impression I got when I read the
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German version, the German original of that book. That is
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also ultimately what made me feel that this is really
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an important contribution to the historic debate and that motivated
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me to offer the author to translate this book.
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I agree, yes. I think it's the final word on
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the issue. Any historian who... persists in repeating or regurgitating
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the traditional, now traditional view of the Second World War
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and its various details, like Anthony Beaver and all the
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other people who are covered with laurels and with psychophantic
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commentaries and praises. All those people will have to recognize
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the book by Schreber. I'm sure they won't. So it
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will create a bifurcation in the historical field dedicated to
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the history of the Second World War. But in the end,
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it's impossible to ignore this book. It's impossible. If you
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do so, you prove that you're an idiot, I think.
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Not to say so in those sort of... um basic
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words but that's the way i feel about it.
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So i don't know the how this came about was
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this some a book that um one of you or
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both of you uh knew about and offered to translate
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or was this something that antelope hill came to you and.
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Asked you to translate No, I found the original German
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work and was really quite excited about it. I found
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it in, was it 2018 or something? It had already
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been published in 2015, but for the first couple of
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years I wasn't aware of it. But when I found
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it and got around to reading it, I... really felt
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this was a very profound contribution. I mean, it is
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full of evidence and it is also very professionally analyzed.
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I mean, one needs to take a step back perhaps
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and consider the person of Ben Schipper, the author. He
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is a former general of the East German Army, Nationale Volksarmee.
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He had been promoted to general major already at, or
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major general is the English expression, to major general by
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the time that his employment ended. So he was actually
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kicked out of the army when the two Germanists reunited
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in 1990. So then he found himself without a job, essentially.
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And in his premature retirement, he then decided to take
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up historic investigation. And he spent several years digging through
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the archives in Moscow and in Minsk, to research the
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prehistory of World War II. I think he wasn't able
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to do so. Firstly, obviously, he had the required military expertise.
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He even had received his own general staff education in Moscow,
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so he was familiar with the Soviet military tradition and culture.
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And he was fluent in Russian. I mean, everybody in
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East Germany growing up there, would receive Russian rather than
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English training at elementary school already. And so he was
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fluent in Russian also through his military career. So he
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had the perfect credentials, he had the time, and he
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dug up a lot of stuff. So in addition to
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this archival work, he could also rely on several document collections.
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that were published in the 1990s and in the early
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2000s by Russian historians. And I think actually most of
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the material in the book is taken from those collections
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or can at least be also found in those collections.
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So those readers who are actually able to read Russian,
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they can verify those citations for themselves. And I was
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actually very lucky. After I had offered Bernd Schipper that
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Hans spontaneously offered to help when I approached him because, firstly,
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he's a professional historian, which I am not. And on
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top of that, Hans is also a little bit of
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a language genius. He speaks just about every European language,
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including German and Russian. And so he could actually verify
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much of the material that's contained in the book, right,
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could double-check the translations. And he also weeded out quite
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a few– technical errors, referencing errors, page numbers
and whatnot
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that had slipped into the German original. So I think
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Hans helped a lot. I mean, on top of his
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general expertise, he is also, I think Hans, it's correct
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to say that one of his specialties is military history, right?
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So I think he had a very good background to
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really make sure that this translation was as solid as
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we could make it. At least it's a lot more
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solid than it would have been if I had worked
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on it on my own. So I'm very grateful to
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Hans for helping with this.
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It was great fun working together.
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Yes.
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It was a pleasure, really. So that's the added benefit
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of doing this kind of work. is that you fortify
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your ties, your friendship, your bonds of friendship, which I
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really appreciate very much. It's great to work on this project.
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May I add something on Schwieper, which I think makes
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him a unique author. You know, there are historians and
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there are military people, sort of soldiers. And it's very
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rare for a soldier to become a very sort of
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solid historian, especially military historian. There are of course, very
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few of these. And I don't know any of them,
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at least in modern times, except for Bernd Schwieper. There
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may be two or three more out there, but I
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don't know them. So he's a rarity. And he has
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a unique combination, a very strong combination of knowledge and
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of talent and of expertise. which no historian of the
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Second World War has. Maybe one or two were reserve
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officers a long time ago, but he was a general,
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made a career in the military, in the East German military,
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very good sort of military apparatus, and he's a very
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solid historian, very solid researcher. So this combination makes the
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book very powerful and a very strong argument, the definitive argument,
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I would say.
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Yes.
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One could assume from this subject, which is a subject
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that no mainstream academic would undertake, that does he have
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some kind of ideological reason for picking this subject and
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running with it?
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He is not very strongly ideologically committed to anything, I
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would say. I mean, his upbringing was in the.
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In the GDR, right? So I think he imbibed the
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usual socialist propaganda and the friendship with the Soviet Union
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and so on. Obviously, he has distanced himself somewhat from
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that view, but he still takes a somewhat sympathetic view,
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for example, of the current Russian ideology of the Great
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Patriotic War, right? I mean, if you listen to even
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current Russian propaganda or Russian news and this kind of thing,
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they always celebrate their great patriotic war as a heroic achievement,
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which in a way it is, right? Indeed, the resistance
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they offered after they were already at the brink of
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disaster is really quite remarkable. But at the same time,
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what they totally skip is the entire idea that– this
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disaster was completely avoidable from the end, right? They simply
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should have abstained from preparing for war and that would
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have been the end of it. They would not have
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been attacked if they had kept the peace on their side. So,
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but he still takes a sympathetic view of that. He also,
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for example, takes a somewhat, I think, rosy view of
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Lenin's communism. So he contrasts in his final chapter the
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socialism of Lenin and the socialism of Stalin, and Lenin
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is the good guy and Stalin is the bad guy.
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So I don't think that this is that part of
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the story. I mean, it's not central to the argument
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of the book, obviously, and I don't think it's particularly well-researched,
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but I think it is just some sort of atavism
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that shows through, right? This is just some sort of
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remnant of his early education. So he has distanced himself, obviously,
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from the view that the Soviet Union was attacked by
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just some sort of raging dictator, Hitler, who simply was
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hell-bent on conquest. He obviously does not think that. But
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it is not that Schwieper is ideologically committed. I mean,
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if you read the book, which I guess you have
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done at least in parts. I mean, it's a very
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thick book to get through, but I think the tone
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of the book is really, really quite sober and factual.
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I mean, Schipper always tries to stick to the facts.
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Let's try to get into a little bit of the
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book here.
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Right. Yeah.
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Let's start with the territorial expansion of the Soviets. The
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arguments always made that they knew that Germany was coming,
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so putting troops on Romania's borders so that you could
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secure oil for the coming onslaught. Sure, that makes sense,
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but when you really start nailing down exactly what they
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were doing and what they were putting where, it's kind
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of hard to argue that they were planning on building
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up defenses, especially considering how many defensive things like the
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Stalin Wall they had already torn down.
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Well, I think particularly striking, I mean, the book deals
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with two years, essentially, right? 1940 and 1941, the first half.
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And what is particularly striking is really the enormous imbalance
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of forces between Germany and the Soviet Union in the
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summer of 1940, right? So at that time, in spring
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and early summer of 1940, Germany had been conducting its
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campaign in the West against France. It had defeated France
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after some six weeks of campaigning. But during that time
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and for some time afterwards, the bulk of the Wehrmacht
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was really in the West. And the eastern border, that
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was after Poland had been divided up between Germany in
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the West and the Soviet Union in the East. There
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was a direct line of contact, several hundred kilometers long.
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And that border was guarded at the time by only
241
00:16:23.720 --> 00:16:27.580
some 15 divisions. And
these 15 divisions were not panzer
242
00:16:27.600 --> 00:16:30.720
divisions or something, but these were actually just infantry divisions
243
00:16:30.759 --> 00:16:34.370
that were very poorly equipped and so on and so forth.
244
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And so they were certainly not frontline battalions, not frontline units.
245
00:16:39.879 --> 00:16:44.240
And at the same time, the Soviet Union had concentrated,
246
00:16:45.019 --> 00:16:51.019
particularly in the northern part of that common border, 102 divisions.
247
00:16:51.139 --> 00:16:55.419
So this was a six to seven-fold superiority of troop strength.
248
00:16:56.679 --> 00:17:01.230
And what is also quite compelling, when in addition to
249
00:17:01.289 --> 00:17:04.730
the preparations of infrastructure and so on, the AAA is out,
250
00:17:04.809 --> 00:17:07.950
he documents how the troops were actually the Soviet troops
251
00:17:08.029 --> 00:17:12.710
at the time. were training for warfare in East Prussia, right?
252
00:17:12.730 --> 00:17:15.910
So they were making preparations for war. They had maneuvers
253
00:17:15.970 --> 00:17:20.190
and this kind of thing. They reinforced engineer battalions and
254
00:17:20.210 --> 00:17:24.579
so on because in East Prussia, there's lots of water, right?
255
00:17:24.619 --> 00:17:29.440
Lots of lakes and rivers to traverse. So they strengthened
256
00:17:29.460 --> 00:17:33.660
their engineer forces that would actually help them cross those obstacles.
257
00:17:34.500 --> 00:17:37.829
And One of the outstanding chapters, I would say, in
258
00:17:37.849 --> 00:17:40.990
the entire book is chapter 9, which deals with the
259
00:17:41.609 --> 00:17:47.349
operational plans. And the operational plans of the year 1940,
260
00:17:47.349 --> 00:17:51.589
they spell out exactly those war plans that the practical
261
00:17:51.670 --> 00:17:56.759
preparations also mirror. So there is explicit language that relates
262
00:17:56.859 --> 00:18:00.200
to the conquest of East Prussia there. And it is
263
00:18:00.279 --> 00:18:04.380
also clear from those war plans that these were not
264
00:18:04.400 --> 00:18:08.460
defensive plans. So the Soviet troops, they would not wait,
265
00:18:08.480 --> 00:18:10.839
the Red Army would not wait for a German attack
266
00:18:10.900 --> 00:18:15.359
and then counterattack. But indeed, it was planned that the
267
00:18:15.380 --> 00:18:22.609
Red Army should take the initiative and strike into East
268
00:18:22.730 --> 00:18:28.430
Prussia even before the German troops, the Wehrmacht, would be
269
00:18:28.490 --> 00:18:31.230
fully concentrated. So while the Wehrmacht was still in the
270
00:18:31.329 --> 00:18:35.849
process of marching up its troops, the Russians would already
271
00:18:35.910 --> 00:18:41.579
strike and destroy these troops before they could even attain
272
00:18:41.619 --> 00:18:47.160
a battle posture, right? And this motive is really found
273
00:18:47.220 --> 00:18:50.339
throughout all of these operational plans. So Schipper dissects a
274
00:18:50.400 --> 00:18:57.269
number of operational plans and five of them overall. And
275
00:18:57.349 --> 00:19:00.250
in each of them, you find this kind of central
276
00:19:00.329 --> 00:19:04.640
idea that the Red Army would strike first and would
277
00:19:04.680 --> 00:19:09.880
strike deep into enemy territory at the troops as they
278
00:19:09.920 --> 00:19:15.349
were just reaching their destination, but not right even before
279
00:19:15.529 --> 00:19:19.369
the enemy troops had to raid themselves into a battle line.
280
00:19:20.109 --> 00:19:23.940
So it was clear that these were always first strike plans.
281
00:19:25.430 --> 00:19:27.910
It really doesn't get any clearer than that. So I
282
00:19:27.930 --> 00:19:30.450
think the analysis, I mean, you can really enjoy the chapter,
283
00:19:30.509 --> 00:19:35.690
reading it just as just what Schripper just put all
284
00:19:35.730 --> 00:19:38.400
the pieces into place and arranging them and really making
285
00:19:38.460 --> 00:19:44.200
it clear what these elements really mean. I found that
286
00:19:44.500 --> 00:19:48.220
chapter particularly stimulating to read and to translate. Mm-hmm.
287
00:19:51.839 --> 00:19:58.500
And especially also the equipment of the location and the
288
00:19:58.539 --> 00:20:03.440
dislocation of the location of the troops and their equipment
289
00:20:04.140 --> 00:20:08.740
and the building of railway lines to the east, to
290
00:20:08.759 --> 00:20:12.049
the German border. I found very convincing as well. And
291
00:20:12.089 --> 00:20:16.880
the entire replacement of sort of the moving of the
292
00:20:16.950 --> 00:20:21.400
industry to the east of Russia, to the eastern parts
293
00:20:21.420 --> 00:20:26.240
of Russia, which also restarted early. I think everything in
294
00:20:26.500 --> 00:20:30.460
the Soviet Union was designed to attack Germany. You can
295
00:20:30.480 --> 00:20:33.319
see that by the structure and the decisions taken sort
296
00:20:33.339 --> 00:20:36.779
of in the back echelons of the army at the
297
00:20:36.819 --> 00:20:38.819
top level, but at all the levels you can see that.
298
00:20:39.589 --> 00:20:42.430
And I think it would be good to also refer,
299
00:20:42.809 --> 00:20:47.769
maybe I'm diverging a bit, but to the work of
300
00:20:47.849 --> 00:20:54.890
a Finnish historian who, as a matter of fact, supports
301
00:20:54.930 --> 00:21:00.049
or gives additional evidence to support Schreiber. Schreiber doesn't know
302
00:21:00.089 --> 00:21:03.349
about him. It's a Finnish historian who died a couple
303
00:21:03.369 --> 00:21:07.009
of years ago, Hautamäki, and who had the private archive
304
00:21:07.029 --> 00:21:13.339
of Finnish leader Mannaheim in his care, and he said
305
00:21:13.380 --> 00:21:16.759
that Germany was about to be attacked, that the plans
306
00:21:17.299 --> 00:21:22.339
were to attack Germany from two sides. Russia would attack,
307
00:21:22.440 --> 00:21:26.299
the Soviet Union would attack, and England, Britain, and France
308
00:21:26.319 --> 00:21:29.400
would also attack at the same time. They would encircle
309
00:21:29.440 --> 00:21:33.660
Germany and attack it from all directions. That's also the
310
00:21:33.740 --> 00:21:37.720
reason why the Russians invaded the Baltic countries and why
311
00:21:37.740 --> 00:21:41.160
they started the Finnish War. So there was a big plan,
312
00:21:41.579 --> 00:21:48.619
and the Russian plans were part of a broader design
313
00:21:48.740 --> 00:21:52.309
to destroy Germany, to attack Germany. I think it's important
314
00:21:52.329 --> 00:21:53.990
to also refer to that.
315
00:21:56.049 --> 00:21:59.279
Maybe I can add to your bringing up of the
316
00:21:59.319 --> 00:22:04.589
distribution of the arms and so on. One very striking
317
00:22:04.950 --> 00:22:08.509
aspect of this preparation is indeed how very close to
318
00:22:08.529 --> 00:22:12.410
the western border of the Soviet Union facilities such as
319
00:22:12.619 --> 00:22:16.299
airfields were located. There were many airfields that were within
320
00:22:16.359 --> 00:22:19.440
something like 10 or 20 kilometers of the western border.
321
00:22:19.480 --> 00:22:22.920
So they were even within German artillery range. So if
322
00:22:23.039 --> 00:22:27.539
indeed the Soviet Union had been preparing for a defensive war,
323
00:22:28.019 --> 00:22:30.200
the very last thing they would have done is to
324
00:22:30.279 --> 00:22:35.750
put their assets this far forward. the initial catastrophe of
325
00:22:35.769 --> 00:22:42.359
the Red Army was brought about by this extremely forward
326
00:22:44.799 --> 00:22:48.160
deployment of the troops, but also of the Air Force,
327
00:22:48.180 --> 00:22:51.819
for example. I mean, all these assets were lost within
328
00:22:51.859 --> 00:22:55.420
a few days of fighting after the Wehrmacht had attacked, right?
329
00:22:56.019 --> 00:23:02.089
And then it became very difficult indeed to organize an
330
00:23:02.150 --> 00:23:05.789
effective defense at that point. Another point is that the
331
00:23:07.829 --> 00:23:11.349
troops had really been arrayed in not some sort of
332
00:23:11.430 --> 00:23:17.000
continuous defensive line or a series of staggered defensive lines,
333
00:23:17.599 --> 00:23:21.720
but they had been concentrated in large offensive groupings, right?
334
00:23:21.779 --> 00:23:25.549
So they had been really clustered together. The Germans knew that.
335
00:23:25.650 --> 00:23:28.710
They knew where these Soviet troops were located. There was
336
00:23:29.069 --> 00:23:31.569
aerial reconnaissance on both sides and so on. So they
337
00:23:31.630 --> 00:23:34.509
could simply punch through the gaps between those clusters and
338
00:23:34.529 --> 00:23:37.990
then circle them. So I don't know the exact number,
339
00:23:38.029 --> 00:23:40.890
I must say. I'm not sure
exactly how many Red
340
00:23:41.009 --> 00:23:44.009
Army soldiers were taken prisoner in the first couple of
341
00:23:44.049 --> 00:23:46.319
weeks of fighting, but I think it's in the millions.
342
00:23:46.359 --> 00:23:47.319
Maybe Hans knows better.
343
00:23:47.339 --> 00:23:50.859
I think one and a half million. That's what I
344
00:23:50.859 --> 00:23:52.819
sort of stood in my mind. Yeah, yeah.
345
00:23:53.640 --> 00:23:55.119
Right, right. That sounds about right.
346
00:23:56.200 --> 00:23:58.509
That number doesn't sound like a defensive force.
347
00:23:59.670 --> 00:24:04.109
No, no. Particularly not if it's encircled, right? I mean....
348
00:24:07.049 --> 00:24:09.490
Can we talk a little bit about the preliminary order
349
00:24:09.529 --> 00:24:13.190
of June 11th, 1941? Because he spends a lot of
350
00:24:13.210 --> 00:24:13.950
time on that one.
351
00:24:15.380 --> 00:24:21.599
Yes. So the preliminary order that was issued by Timoshenko,
352
00:24:21.819 --> 00:24:25.700
who was the secretary of war or defense, whatever you
353
00:24:25.720 --> 00:24:29.069
want to call them at this point. People's Commissar for Defense.
354
00:24:29.869 --> 00:24:38.009
And he was ordering, according to Schipper, he was ordering
355
00:24:38.029 --> 00:24:48.039
the high commands, right? So he trickled down the hierarchy,
356
00:24:48.099 --> 00:24:55.650
I suppose, to prepare for offensive actions effectively. And so
357
00:24:56.549 --> 00:25:00.589
the language in that order is really quite explicit. And
358
00:25:00.670 --> 00:25:03.829
if this order can be proven to really exist for real,
359
00:25:04.490 --> 00:25:08.869
then I think this order alone is already sufficient to
360
00:25:10.029 --> 00:25:13.450
seal the deal, to close the case. The problem with
361
00:25:13.470 --> 00:25:16.529
this order is that there is no archival reference for it.
362
00:25:16.930 --> 00:25:19.559
It has been published. The text of this order has
363
00:25:19.619 --> 00:25:23.319
been published. Who was the author again, Hans, who published that,
364
00:25:23.559 --> 00:25:25.220
the Soviet-Russian author?
365
00:25:25.619 --> 00:25:32.420
Oops, I forget. Sorry. The two collections of documents, yes, yes,
366
00:25:32.440 --> 00:25:35.250
I know. Yes, they're online, yes, indeed.
367
00:25:36.369 --> 00:25:42.410
No, Bunitsch, Bunitsch, Bunitsch, Operatia Groza, so the Operation Thunderstorm.
368
00:25:43.809 --> 00:25:48.789
So Bunitsch was a Russian historian and he has published
369
00:25:49.049 --> 00:25:52.329
a a good number of books on a variety of subjects,
370
00:25:52.470 --> 00:25:57.359
including several on World War II. And he has published
371
00:25:57.410 --> 00:26:00.799
the text, which he most likely found in one or
372
00:26:00.819 --> 00:26:04.180
the other archive. But in order to protect the person
373
00:26:04.240 --> 00:26:07.640
who actually handed him the document, he didn't give the
374
00:26:07.660 --> 00:26:09.640
full
details of it. I guess this is what it
375
00:26:09.680 --> 00:26:14.880
comes down to. And Schwipper cites the text in its entirety,
376
00:26:15.000 --> 00:26:19.710
and he makes the case– that the order should be
377
00:26:19.769 --> 00:26:23.569
considered authentic because it fits in with all the context, right?
378
00:26:23.609 --> 00:26:27.250
With other directives that were issued shortly before and shortly
379
00:26:27.349 --> 00:26:31.279
after and so on. Importantly, there is actually one order, right?
380
00:26:31.319 --> 00:26:34.900
So this order is directed at the land forces, but
381
00:26:34.960 --> 00:26:38.019
there exists a parallel order dating from the same day
382
00:26:38.559 --> 00:26:42.390
to the Navy. And that order actually was indeed, is
383
00:26:42.470 --> 00:26:48.009
a matter of record. This order was actually, um, transmitted
384
00:26:48.490 --> 00:26:51.250
to the ships, to the Russian ships, to the fleet
385
00:26:51.650 --> 00:26:56.250
at sea at the time, and was overheard by Finnish reconnaissance.
386
00:26:56.910 --> 00:26:59.869
So an order of very similar import that is directed
387
00:27:00.069 --> 00:27:05.589
to the Navy was indeed overheard the very same day.
388
00:27:05.609 --> 00:27:07.450
And I think that is probably the strongest bit of
389
00:27:07.549 --> 00:27:11.799
evidence to support the assumption that the order to the
390
00:27:11.839 --> 00:27:14.559
land forces should also be considered authentic.
391
00:27:15.779 --> 00:27:19.200
It seems like the key directive of the order was
392
00:27:19.289 --> 00:27:22.369
for staffs of the military districts and subordinate army and
393
00:27:22.450 --> 00:27:26.930
corps staffs to be ready to carry out offensive operations
394
00:27:27.049 --> 00:27:30.329
by July 1st, 1941. That's correct, yes.
395
00:27:30.349 --> 00:27:32.559
Which would mean Barbarossa would have cut that off by
396
00:27:32.579 --> 00:27:43.339
eight days. Yes, that's right. What could assume, I guess,
397
00:27:43.420 --> 00:27:48.019
that battle readiness by July 1st probably meant that the
398
00:27:48.140 --> 00:27:52.619
actual attack would have been planned slightly later. Schwipper, it
399
00:27:52.740 --> 00:27:58.069
uses several arguments to make the case that most likely
400
00:27:58.109 --> 00:28:04.750
the attack would have occurred between the 8th and the
401
00:28:04.789 --> 00:28:08.029
15th or something like that of July. But anyway, in
402
00:28:08.529 --> 00:28:15.710
either way, I mean, Barbarossa really preempted the planned Russian attack,
403
00:28:16.130 --> 00:28:17.910
most likely by less than a month, right?
404
00:28:19.829 --> 00:28:28.329
The amount of aircraft that were being made at this time,
405
00:28:28.349 --> 00:28:32.390
the manufacturing at this time, cannot be ignored, right?
406
00:28:32.829 --> 00:28:35.230
No, it's absolutely astonishing, right?
407
00:28:36.369 --> 00:28:41.309
Well, the kind, sorry, not only the number, But the
408
00:28:41.910 --> 00:28:45.720
fighter bombers, not so much fighters, fighter bombers, attack planes.
409
00:28:46.359 --> 00:28:52.650
Fighter bombers, but also long distance bombers, also lots of gliders, right,
410
00:28:52.750 --> 00:29:00.599
for paratroopers. So indeed, it was very clearly offensively oriented.
411
00:29:01.400 --> 00:29:04.480
I mean, also even the long-distance bombers, I mean, they
412
00:29:04.680 --> 00:29:09.829
were also located within fairly close range from the border, right?
413
00:29:09.869 --> 00:29:15.789
So they were located between 150 to 250 kilometers from
414
00:29:15.829 --> 00:29:18.690
the border, which for a long-distance bomber is not really
415
00:29:18.730 --> 00:29:22.539
very much, right? So they were also positioned so as
416
00:29:22.619 --> 00:29:27.660
to strike deep within German territory. So the range of
417
00:29:27.680 --> 00:29:31.599
the bombers was such that... most of the major German
418
00:29:31.640 --> 00:29:33.619
cities would have been in their range.
419
00:29:35.390 --> 00:29:39.599
And, of course, bombers themselves, heavy bombers, are not a
420
00:29:39.640 --> 00:29:46.609
defensive weapon. Heavy bombers, per se, are designed to mass
421
00:29:46.619 --> 00:29:51.349
destroy buildings and cities and structures and mass kill people.
422
00:29:51.990 --> 00:29:55.109
So that's the answer right there.
423
00:29:57.079 --> 00:29:59.559
I suspect, though, that the Russians will probably have focused
424
00:29:59.619 --> 00:30:02.279
more on military targets than the English and the Americans did.
425
00:30:02.299 --> 00:30:06.099
Yes, well, big, yeah, like big factories and sort of things.
426
00:30:06.279 --> 00:30:09.779
That's right, yes. Railway junctions, that sort of thing.
427
00:30:10.220 --> 00:30:11.900
Yes, exactly, yeah.
428
00:30:13.119 --> 00:30:16.940
Something else that he talks about in here, that he
429
00:30:16.980 --> 00:30:23.869
talks about Stalin, how Stalin misinterpreted Hitler's intentions, that he
430
00:30:23.910 --> 00:30:27.740
didn't believe because Hitler was a a veteran of, of
431
00:30:28.069 --> 00:30:31.710
world war one, that he would be stupid enough to, uh,
432
00:30:32.930 --> 00:30:37.170
start a two front war. And, um, even, even Golikov
433
00:30:38.250 --> 00:30:41.230
said that a lot of what they're planning, a lot
434
00:30:41.269 --> 00:30:46.839
of their planning surrounded the fact that what they believe,
435
00:30:46.980 --> 00:30:50.619
they didn't believe that Germany was going to, was going
436
00:30:50.680 --> 00:30:51.259
to invade.
437
00:30:51.279 --> 00:30:58.329
Well, I suspect that the generals and also Golikov were
438
00:30:58.369 --> 00:31:01.630
probably a lot more worried about the possibility than Stalin was.
439
00:31:02.369 --> 00:31:05.690
I think that it's really that Stalin has an enormous
440
00:31:05.750 --> 00:31:11.329
personal responsibility for the extent of the disaster by insisting
441
00:31:12.329 --> 00:31:16.910
on his miscalculation against the advice of anybody else. There's
442
00:31:16.950 --> 00:31:22.480
also one really interesting aspect in the Russian reconnaissance, right?
443
00:31:24.259 --> 00:31:27.980
It seems that on the one hand, the reconnaissance at
444
00:31:28.019 --> 00:31:31.839
the tactical level was very good. So the Russians knew
445
00:31:31.920 --> 00:31:37.490
down to the battalion level how the German troops were distributed,
446
00:31:37.890 --> 00:31:42.289
stationed and so on. At the same time, when the
447
00:31:43.130 --> 00:31:46.789
numbers were tallied and an overall estimate of German strength
448
00:31:46.829 --> 00:31:51.990
was compiled, then they always vastly overestimated German strength by
449
00:31:52.059 --> 00:31:57.359
dozens of divisions and thousands of tanks. And that estimate
450
00:31:57.400 --> 00:32:02.119
was then given to Stalin. So what I suspect cannot
451
00:32:02.180 --> 00:32:05.940
prove it with this speculation, what I suspect is that
452
00:32:06.220 --> 00:32:10.039
in this manner, by inflating these numbers that they gave
453
00:32:10.079 --> 00:32:13.359
to Stalin, the generals actually tried to get Stalin to
454
00:32:13.400 --> 00:32:16.089
see the light, to understand that the threat from the
455
00:32:16.119 --> 00:32:20.329
German side was real. that Germany was serious about preparing
456
00:32:20.490 --> 00:32:24.279
for a preemptive attack on the Soviet Union. And by
457
00:32:24.599 --> 00:32:31.079
insisting that this wasn't true, right, it was one striking example,
458
00:32:31.119 --> 00:32:33.779
which Weber also quotes, right, there is a German deserter
459
00:32:33.819 --> 00:32:37.799
that was caught the very day before, that was picked
460
00:32:37.880 --> 00:32:41.119
up the very day before the war broke out. And
461
00:32:41.349 --> 00:32:44.710
that deserter told them that indeed the attack was coming
462
00:32:45.609 --> 00:32:52.259
at the planned hour. And Stalin still said, okay, but
463
00:32:52.359 --> 00:32:55.019
what if this is just disinformation and this kind of thing?
464
00:32:55.319 --> 00:32:57.130
So he still didn't want to believe it.
465
00:32:57.920 --> 00:33:04.329
He didn't believe his agent in Japan, Sorge. Sorge also
466
00:33:04.369 --> 00:33:09.130
said that the Germans were going to attack. He ignored that.
467
00:33:09.619 --> 00:33:14.740
And Sorge was apparently ordered back to Russia and knew
468
00:33:14.759 --> 00:33:17.420
better and stayed away because otherwise he would have probably
469
00:33:17.460 --> 00:33:19.440
been executed for his.
470
00:33:20.619 --> 00:33:21.700
He was eventually.
471
00:33:22.400 --> 00:33:27.099
Yes, he was eventually, yes. But under different circumstances. Yes.
472
00:33:28.559 --> 00:33:32.289
The question that's always answered is, or always asked is,
473
00:33:32.380 --> 00:33:40.950
did Germany kick off Operation Barbarossa solely... as a preventative
474
00:33:40.990
--> 00:33:45.009
measure because they knew that the Soviet Union was going,
475
00:33:45.069 --> 00:33:48.029
that Stalin was going to invade. Does he answer this
476
00:33:48.089 --> 00:33:50.890
question and does he answer it in a way that
477
00:33:51.289 --> 00:33:51.990
is inarguable?
478
00:33:53.210 --> 00:33:58.890
That's a very good question. Schipper has written another book,
479
00:33:58.930 --> 00:34:02.009
which is even more voluminous than this one, on the
480
00:34:02.049 --> 00:34:06.369
question what the Germans knew and how that influenced their
481
00:34:07.190 --> 00:34:09.349
the decision making and I have not read that book
482
00:34:09.389 --> 00:34:13.650
yet so I can't really say how much more he
483
00:34:13.909 --> 00:34:19.889
adds on that particular point but in this book he
484
00:34:20.010 --> 00:34:28.280
does include some calculations by Hitler that suggests it was
485
00:34:28.500 --> 00:34:31.480
not merely to head off a Russian attack the first
486
00:34:31.619 --> 00:34:36.170
point is that the Germans indeed underestimated Russian strength. So
487
00:34:36.190 --> 00:34:39.389
they actually expected a fairly quick victory. Within a couple
488
00:34:39.409 --> 00:34:46.199
of months, they expected to have defeated the Russians. That
489
00:34:47.039 --> 00:34:51.079
doesn't discount the idea that it was a preemptive attack.
490
00:34:51.440 --> 00:34:53.480
I mean, if they had simply waited for the Russians,
491
00:34:53.539 --> 00:34:57.260
then obviously things would have become a lot harder. But
492
00:34:57.340 --> 00:35:01.989
they did underestimate Russian strength, which might, on the other hand,
493
00:35:02.110 --> 00:35:07.570
suggest that they were not too worried about the eventuality
494
00:35:07.849 --> 00:35:11.010
or the possibility of a Russian attack on them. And
495
00:35:11.090 --> 00:35:17.170
another point is that Hitler calculated, I mean, Hitler had
496
00:35:17.289 --> 00:35:24.360
hoped to conclude some sort of peace with England, right?
497
00:35:24.699 --> 00:35:27.659
In 1940, after the fall of France, he had let
498
00:35:27.880 --> 00:35:33.710
the British army escape at Dunkirk as a sort of
499
00:35:34.630 --> 00:35:38.179
olive branch to the English, but the English were not
500
00:35:38.409 --> 00:35:40.619
willing to conclude a peace. Then he toyed with the
501
00:35:40.719 --> 00:35:49.000
idea of invading England outright with a fleet, but I
502
00:35:49.039 --> 00:35:52.510
guess his generals or his admirals convinced him that this
503
00:35:52.550 --> 00:35:55.570
was not a good idea. It would have been probably
504
00:35:57.070 --> 00:36:01.710
enormously costly and ended in failure, so he did not
505
00:36:01.750 --> 00:36:08.309
do this. And his calculation was that England was holding
506
00:36:08.489 --> 00:36:13.880
on only because it was hoping for Russian secure. So
507
00:36:13.909 --> 00:36:17.780
his calculation was by defeating Russia, he would deprive England
508
00:36:18.380 --> 00:36:23.599
of that hope, of that hope of support. And that
509
00:36:23.679 --> 00:36:26.880
would have also on its own been a viable motive
510
00:36:27.000 --> 00:36:30.000
for attacking Russia, which was not, I don't think should
511
00:36:30.039 --> 00:36:35.530
be construed as directly preemptive. So we are not really
512
00:36:35.590 --> 00:36:40.699
quite clear how much weight each of these two motives
513
00:36:40.920 --> 00:36:43.760
had in Hitler's calculus, I would say.
514
00:36:45.139 --> 00:36:50.159
I think it's also good to point out that the
515
00:36:50.199 --> 00:36:54.039
Germans were very well prepared, and so were the Russians
516
00:36:54.099 --> 00:36:57.179
for another operation, for an attack, not for a defense.
517
00:36:57.800 --> 00:37:03.130
But the Germans were very well prepared. Save on one thing,
518
00:37:03.409 --> 00:37:08.289
on one item. I think that the German general, German
519
00:37:08.309 --> 00:37:14.639
leadership didn't have a good grasp of the size of
520
00:37:14.719 --> 00:37:21.099
Russia and of the complications involved with the rapidly advancing
521
00:37:21.219 --> 00:37:27.690
army and with expanding lines of communication. becoming ever more
522
00:37:27.969 --> 00:37:32.590
complicated between the points out there on the front line
523
00:37:33.280 --> 00:37:38.219
and sort of points in back echelons, et cetera, et cetera,
524
00:37:38.800 --> 00:37:44.760
communications became so difficult, so complicated, and so sort of
525
00:37:44.820 --> 00:37:50.880
vulnerable that it became every day that they advanced made
526
00:37:50.920 --> 00:37:53.780
the entire operation weaker, and they didn't have a grasp
527
00:37:53.840 --> 00:37:57.690
of that. because of the size of Russia. I think
528
00:37:57.730 --> 00:38:02.469
you can, this is what they're doing, not really the
529
00:38:03.289 --> 00:38:07.989
Russian defenses, but actually the physical circumstances of the rapid advance,
530
00:38:08.969 --> 00:38:09.250
I think.
531
00:38:09.269 --> 00:38:15.260
I wanted to jump back to Stalin's speech of April
532
00:38:15.260 --> 00:38:20.219
1940 to senior Red Army commanders. When you read things
533
00:38:20.280 --> 00:38:23.949
like this, when you read about... the first step was
534
00:38:23.989 --> 00:38:27.250
the reconquest of Belarus and Western Ukraine, and then you
535
00:38:27.289 --> 00:38:32.280
had the Winter War, and then you have this speech.
536
00:38:33.199 --> 00:38:35.940
It's very hard for... I mean, we know that mainstream
537
00:38:35.960 --> 00:38:40.300
historians are going to stay to the post-war consensus opinion,
538
00:38:41.000 --> 00:38:43.500
but this is just another nail in the coffin of
539
00:38:44.920 --> 00:38:45.840
Stalin's plans.
540
00:38:47.280 --> 00:38:47.500
Yes.
541
00:38:48.449 --> 00:38:48.610
I mean.
542
00:38:49.070 --> 00:38:49.849
I'm sorry.
543
00:38:49.989 --> 00:38:52.510
I didn't form that in the question.
Sorry.
544
00:38:52.570 --> 00:38:57.409
Yeah. Okay. So, I mean, in this speech, Stalin spells
545
00:38:57.610 --> 00:39:00.579
out that there's a great opportunity for Russia to strike
546
00:39:00.960 --> 00:39:05.900
while Germany is fighting with the Western powers, right? So,
547
00:39:05.920 --> 00:39:09.059
I mean, at the time of that speech, the Western
548
00:39:09.400 --> 00:39:14.139
campaign against France had not yet begun. It might have
549
00:39:14.199 --> 00:39:16.420
just been underway. It's just a matter of days, really,
550
00:39:16.460 --> 00:39:20.429
but it had not been concluded. So, Germany was still
551
00:39:20.820 --> 00:39:24.769
facing England and France in the West. So, as I
552
00:39:24.789 --> 00:39:29.170
mentioned earlier, all its forces were busy there. So, indeed,
553
00:39:29.260 --> 00:39:34.360
this created a great opportunity for Russia to strike at Germany.
554
00:39:35.099 --> 00:39:37.880
And it could at that point not be foreseen that
555
00:39:37.920 --> 00:39:42.039
Germany would conclude its Western campaign against France within just
556
00:39:42.139 --> 00:39:46.139
only six weeks. One could, I guess, fairly expect it
557
00:39:46.179 --> 00:39:49.969
to last at least several months. And that indeed would
558
00:39:50.010 --> 00:39:55.269
have created the perfect opening for the Soviet Union to strike.
559
00:39:55.329 --> 00:40:01.969
And in this speech of April 1940, Stalin lays it
560
00:40:02.110 --> 00:40:10.000
out just very clearly. So the war between Germany and
561
00:40:10.019 --> 00:40:14.239
the Western powers had already created the opportunity for the
562
00:40:14.280 --> 00:40:17.500
Winter War against Finland. So he had seized that opportunity.
563
00:40:18.699 --> 00:40:26.139
And now he proposes to his leading commanders that the
564
00:40:26.739 --> 00:40:29.659
Red Army needs to be beefed up because it has
565
00:40:29.780 --> 00:40:33.710
shown some weaknesses against Finland. But on the other hand,
566
00:40:34.289 --> 00:40:37.989
the ultimate success against Finland was not only a success
567
00:40:38.050 --> 00:40:43.780
against Finland as such, but also against its allies. military
568
00:40:43.840 --> 00:40:47.920
advisors and suppliers from Germany, among other countries, right? So
569
00:40:47.960 --> 00:40:51.300
he really tries to instill some confidence into his commanders
570
00:40:51.340 --> 00:40:54.940
that if they keep at it and prepare properly, they
571
00:40:54.980 --> 00:41:00.590
will be able to successfully take the fight to Germany.
572
00:41:01.110 --> 00:41:03.829
It's very clearly laid out there. And indeed, I mean,
573
00:41:04.670 --> 00:41:09.710
Schwimmer makes the case that this speech was the key
574
00:41:09.809 --> 00:41:15.219
event that set in motion all the feverish preparations that
575
00:41:15.639 --> 00:41:19.409
then began in what he calls the Western Theater of
576
00:41:19.510 --> 00:41:20.710
War against Germany.
577
00:41:20.750 --> 00:41:23.550
Do you have anything to add to that, Hans?
578
00:41:24.389 --> 00:41:28.630
No, I think Michael has a very good grasp of
579
00:41:28.670 --> 00:41:31.929
all the details, and I could not improve on that.
580
00:41:31.949 --> 00:41:38.179
I wanted to go back to this topic because it's
581
00:41:38.280 --> 00:41:44.110
court history, and we know it from... We're told one
582
00:41:45.199 --> 00:41:49.119
country's intentions, but not the other. When Swipper talks about
583
00:41:49.239 --> 00:41:53.579
the invasion of Poland by Germany and then the Soviet
584
00:41:53.659 --> 00:42:00.980
Union also invades, what does Swipper give as the Soviet
585
00:42:01.960 --> 00:42:04.840
reason for doing it? What are their aims in the
586
00:42:04.900 --> 00:42:05.800
invasion of Poland?
587
00:42:07.579 --> 00:42:15.440
Recuperation. It's territory that belonged to Russia once. All of it.
588
00:42:15.840 --> 00:42:22.679
I mean, the division of Poland between Germany and Russia
589
00:42:23.840 --> 00:42:27.059
restored more or less the conditions that had prevailed before
590
00:42:27.099 --> 00:42:30.199
World War I, right? I mean, Poland had been divided also.
591
00:42:30.219 --> 00:42:34.559
I mean, there was also a share by Austria-Hungary at
592
00:42:34.579 --> 00:42:39.389
the time. So more or less the borders... that were
593
00:42:39.429 --> 00:42:42.210
running through Poland at that point were really very similar
594
00:42:42.230 --> 00:42:46.210
to those that had prevailed before World War I. Okay,
595
00:42:46.250 --> 00:42:49.860
so indeed it is an opportunity. You could simply pass
596
00:42:49.909 --> 00:42:51.699
it off as a war of opportunity. There was an
597
00:42:51.719 --> 00:42:55.420
opportunity for territorial aggrandizement, and why not? I mean, every
598
00:42:56.179 --> 00:43:02.239
power likes to take such opportunities. But it is very
599
00:43:02.340 --> 00:43:07.789
clear that there was more behind it. Because immediately after
600
00:43:07.809 --> 00:43:14.380
these areas had been conquered, the Soviet Union began to
601
00:43:17.019 --> 00:43:20.960
prepare for an additional war. So the infrastructure was created,
602
00:43:21.019 --> 00:43:25.380
as you already alluded to, Hans. The railways were built
603
00:43:25.460 --> 00:43:30.250
up and this kind of thing. Infrastructure was apparently fairly
604
00:43:30.329 --> 00:43:33.710
weak in those areas. There were several difficulties. For example,
605
00:43:33.769 --> 00:43:37.329
you have wider railroad tracks in Russia than in the
606
00:43:37.369 --> 00:43:40.889
remainder of Europe. So the Western territories now all of
607
00:43:40.929 --> 00:43:49.969
a sudden had narrower tracks, I guess. And also the capacity,
608
00:43:50.010 --> 00:43:53.900
the railroad capacity was just simply too low in those areas.
609
00:43:54.000 --> 00:43:58.519
So one priority was to build railroad tracks. new ones
610
00:43:58.699 --> 00:44:01.949
or upgrade the
existing ones. And on top of that,
611
00:44:02.070 --> 00:44:06.050
there was a lot of airfield construction. It's another striking feature, right?
612
00:44:06.110 --> 00:44:10.510
As I already mentioned before, airfields were built very close
613
00:44:10.550 --> 00:44:13.170
to the border and that border in question was this
614
00:44:13.309 --> 00:44:17.190
new border, right? Which had only been acquired as of
615
00:44:17.230 --> 00:44:24.960
September 1939. So immediately the construction of airfields began in
616
00:44:25.019 --> 00:44:29.619
the immediate vicinity of that newly attained border. So clearly
617
00:44:30.920 --> 00:44:34.159
offensive preparations, and they could only be directed against Germany
618
00:44:34.179 --> 00:44:37.010
because that happened to be the power on the other
619
00:44:37.050 --> 00:44:38.030
side of that border.
620
00:44:38.050 --> 00:44:40.750
I would like to expand a bit on what Michael
621
00:44:40.789 --> 00:44:45.250
just said about the railways. To add this is, I think,
622
00:44:45.269 --> 00:44:49.409
an important argument, important fact, that the railways were also
623
00:44:49.489 --> 00:44:54.570
improved in the sense that they were made ready for
624
00:44:54.630 --> 00:44:58.880
sort of receiving a higher number of trains per day.
625
00:44:59.909 --> 00:45:06.880
And that required also reinforcing bridges and other sort of work,
626
00:45:07.699 --> 00:45:12.559
other artwork supporting those railways, bridges, tunnels, et cetera, et cetera,
627
00:45:12.579 --> 00:45:16.760
to make them adaptable, sort of ready for bigger trains,
628
00:45:16.820 --> 00:45:19.440
longer trains, heavier trains, et cetera, et cetera. It was
629
00:45:19.500 --> 00:45:20.840
an enormous undertaking.
630
00:45:21.960 --> 00:45:25.010
Right, exactly. The same also applies to roadways, right? So
631
00:45:25.030 --> 00:45:29.050
just the west-east roadways were also reinforced and the bridges
632
00:45:29.070 --> 00:45:34.949
reconstructed and so on and so forth. All manner of
633
00:45:35.010 --> 00:45:37.469
transportation were upgraded.
634
00:45:38.670 --> 00:45:41.769
Which, if you don't do it for yourself, you're doing
635
00:45:41.789 --> 00:45:45.460
it for the enemy. So you're facilitating the enemy's advance
636
00:45:45.760 --> 00:45:46.380
in your country.
637
00:45:47.199 --> 00:45:51.010
Yes, right. And one point that Schripper makes, and it's
638
00:45:52.309 --> 00:45:55.619
quite interesting. So he points out that really only the
639
00:45:55.739 --> 00:45:59.000
West-East traffic connections were upgraded, but not the ones that
640
00:45:59.039 --> 00:46:03.360
run North-South, right? And Schripper argues that if you prepare
641
00:46:03.400 --> 00:46:10.510
for the defense, you have to enable these lateral movements
642
00:46:10.590 --> 00:46:13.929
behind the front line. You don't know exactly where On
643
00:46:13.949 --> 00:46:17.989
the front, the enemy is going to attack, right? He
644
00:46:18.150 --> 00:46:20.590
is going to focus his attack. So you have to
645
00:46:20.630 --> 00:46:23.949
be able to swiftly regroup your own forces and put
646
00:46:24.010 --> 00:46:27.880
them opposite to the enemy's attack. So therefore, you have
647
00:46:27.940 --> 00:46:31.780
to have transportation that runs parallel to the front and
648
00:46:31.860 --> 00:46:36.920
not perpendicular to the front. And this parallel transportation simply
649
00:46:36.960 --> 00:46:40.739
was completely neglected. And another point, I mean, that is really...
650
00:46:41.940 --> 00:46:47.260
very striking, the complete neglect of defensive installations, right? So
651
00:46:47.280 --> 00:46:50.570
there was the Stalin line, which had been running, had
652
00:46:50.610 --> 00:46:56.269
been constructed behind the old Western border. And then there
653
00:46:56.329 --> 00:47:01.449
had been, there was supposedly the Molotov line that was
654
00:47:01.489 --> 00:47:04.690
to be constructed, right? So a line of defensive installations
655
00:47:04.750 --> 00:47:09.550
that were close to the new Western border. But Both
656
00:47:09.610 --> 00:47:15.150
of these defensive lines were created with a great deal
657
00:47:15.190 --> 00:47:19.789
of neglect. Inferior building materials were used. The weapon systems
658
00:47:19.909 --> 00:47:24.559
that were made available were completely outdated. They were using
659
00:47:24.679 --> 00:47:30.380
some artillery pieces from the 19th century. The ones that
660
00:47:30.400 --> 00:47:33.820
were from the early 20th century were already classified as
661
00:47:33.920 --> 00:47:39.550
modern relative to the others in those defensive installations. And
662
00:47:39.659 --> 00:47:44.409
also the manpower was sorely lacking. So even in the
663
00:47:45.489 --> 00:47:49.050
few weeks before the war actually broke out, they were
664
00:47:49.090 --> 00:47:51.849
still at a manpower level of something like 30% or so,
665
00:47:51.909 --> 00:47:56.570
if I remember correctly. So it was very obvious that
666
00:47:56.610 --> 00:48:01.570
these defensive installations were neglected to a shocking degree.
667
00:48:02.929 --> 00:48:03.469
Pro forma.
668
00:48:04.030 --> 00:48:05.030
Yes. Yes.
669
00:48:06.090 --> 00:48:07.349
Basically, the Red Army is.
670
00:48:08.900 --> 00:48:15.019
Attempting a massive deployment and the, how, how did they
671
00:48:15.099 --> 00:48:19.480
try to cover this up? And did they, um, were
672
00:48:19.519 --> 00:48:24.699
the disinformation campaigns at all effective, um, with what we
673
00:48:24.739 --> 00:48:27.190
know about what German intelligence was telling them?
674
00:48:28.789 --> 00:48:31.750
The Germans knew exactly what they were doing. They were
675
00:48:31.789 --> 00:48:32.469
very well informed.
676
00:48:32.489 --> 00:48:33.449
I thought.
677
00:48:33.590 --> 00:48:33.829
Yeah.
678
00:48:34.150 --> 00:48:38.090
Yes. I mean, there was some, some, uh, There was
679
00:48:38.130 --> 00:48:42.460
some political dissimulation, right? I mean, there were some statements
680
00:48:42.539 --> 00:48:46.400
probably authored by Stalin or his immediate circle that were
681
00:48:46.460 --> 00:48:49.519
published by TASS at the time and that were just
682
00:48:49.559 --> 00:48:52.599
simply saying, we are just simply holding some routine maneuvers
683
00:48:52.679 --> 00:48:55.320
and we do this every year and so on. But
684
00:48:56.969 --> 00:48:59.469
I don't think anybody was deceived by it. I mean,
685
00:48:59.489 --> 00:49:05.150
these publications occurred in response to pieces in the international press.
686
00:49:05.849 --> 00:49:08.840
So everybody in the West actually was more or less
687
00:49:09.280 --> 00:49:12.199
understanding what was going on and everybody was expecting some
688
00:49:12.239 --> 00:49:17.250
sort of confrontation, some sort of clash. So I don't
689
00:49:17.269 --> 00:49:19.610
think the Germans were deceived. It seems that the Germans
690
00:49:19.670 --> 00:49:22.760
were more successful at deceiving Stalin as to their intention
691
00:49:22.820 --> 00:49:25.800
because Stalin wanted to believe in the first place that
692
00:49:25.840 --> 00:49:30.280
Hitler wouldn't attack and that the opportunity would be there
693
00:49:30.320 --> 00:49:33.519
for him to take. So I think Stalin engaged in
694
00:49:33.559 --> 00:49:36.039
a bit of wishful thinking there, and the Germans actually
695
00:49:36.079 --> 00:49:40.800
fed into this by telling stories how they were, for now,
696
00:49:42.400 --> 00:49:45.300
building up their forces in the east, just simply in
697
00:49:45.380 --> 00:49:47.940
order to protect them, to keep them at a safe
698
00:49:47.980 --> 00:49:53.429
distance from British air attacks. But the plan ultimately was
699
00:49:53.869 --> 00:49:59.010
that the troops would be then shifted to the west,
700
00:49:59.610 --> 00:50:04.590
and then this landing operation in England would go forward.
701
00:50:04.630 --> 00:50:09.179
And to further add to the credibility of this deception,
702
00:50:09.800 --> 00:50:15.300
the Germans actually made a point of also building up
703
00:50:15.380 --> 00:50:21.309
some forces in the West, right? So with only superficial inspection,
704
00:50:21.329 --> 00:50:26.230
you might indeed have been misled by this. They also...
705
00:50:28.630 --> 00:50:32.489
use deceptive measures such as recruiting English teachers for the
706
00:50:32.550 --> 00:50:33.969
troops and so.
707
00:50:37.449 --> 00:50:42.039
On. You might also say that Germany, both Germany and
708
00:50:42.159 --> 00:50:45.420
the Soviet Union were led by a dictator. They were
709
00:50:45.460 --> 00:50:52.219
not democracies as we, well, but the Soviet style democracy
710
00:50:52.780 --> 00:50:56.349
was more of a traditional Eastern type. more sort of
711
00:50:56.610 --> 00:51:02.809
similar to the position of the Sultan in the Turkish
712
00:51:03.010 -->
00:51:09.710
Empire in the 17th century, 18th century, where it would
713
00:51:09.730 --> 00:51:13.389
be very dangerous to contradict the Sultan. And if you
714
00:51:13.409 --> 00:51:17.150
did so, you would end up on a gallows or something,
715
00:51:17.829 --> 00:51:21.869
or also at any rate dead. In Germany, not. I
716
00:51:21.909 --> 00:51:23.139
think Hitler had a.
717
00:51:26.190 --> 00:51:30.210
A better understanding with his underlings than Stalin. And it
718
00:51:30.269 --> 00:51:36.519
was better possible to criticize or to offer alternative views
719
00:51:36.539 --> 00:51:41.039
to Hitler than it was to Stalin. So I think
720
00:51:41.219 --> 00:51:43.000
this also needs to be taken into account.
721
00:51:45.159 --> 00:51:48.380
I think that's a very good point. I mean, even
722
00:51:48.400 --> 00:51:50.980
in the final days of the war, when obviously tensions
723
00:51:51.019 --> 00:51:56.780
were running very high, Guderian... dare to contradict Hitler, and
724
00:51:56.940 --> 00:51:59.260
all that Hitler did was simply fire him, but he
725
00:51:59.300 --> 00:52:00.980
didn't touch him otherwise.
726
00:52:01.000 --> 00:52:06.389
Yeah, considering the speech on the lessons from the Winter
727
00:52:06.449 --> 00:52:14.269
War and Stalin basically acknowledging the ambition for offensive warfare
728
00:52:14.329 --> 00:52:17.219
in the Red Army's current state, the kind of buildup
729
00:52:17.260 --> 00:52:19.539
that they had to do, they did in less than
730
00:52:19.579 --> 00:52:22.260
a year, would have been impossible to hide. Yeah.
731
00:52:25.150 --> 00:52:25.750
Yes, of course.
732
00:52:26.869 --> 00:52:27.150
Yes.
733
00:52:28.210 --> 00:52:30.769
Of course. The Germans had very good aerial reconnaissance.
734
00:52:31.829 --> 00:52:38.360
What's his takeaway from the, when you compare the German invasion,
735
00:52:38.639 --> 00:52:41.340
the kind of success that they could immediately have with
736
00:52:41.599 --> 00:52:46.539
the Russian response? What's his takeaways from that as we'll
737
00:52:46.579 --> 00:52:47.199
wrap this up?
738
00:52:48.059 --> 00:52:51.639
Well, I mean, he deals with the actual fighting only
739
00:52:51.679 --> 00:52:55.880
very briefly and only to the extent that it supports
740
00:52:55.960 --> 00:52:58.900
the argument that Russians were not prepared for a defense.
741
00:52:59.159 --> 00:53:04.940
I mean, he doesn't really discuss the numbers in detail
742
00:53:04.960 --> 00:53:08.219
or the operational successes in detail. He really focuses on
743
00:53:08.260 --> 00:53:13.090
the prehistory. I mean, it is really quite clear. I mean,
744
00:53:13.110 --> 00:53:17.869
he does make the statement that the catastrophic defeats of
745
00:53:17.889 --> 00:53:23.650
the Soviet army in the First World War in the
746
00:53:23.690 --> 00:53:26.010
initial period of the war, makes it clear that they
747
00:53:26.050 --> 00:53:29.449
were obviously unprepared for the defense. On top
of that,
748
00:53:29.929 --> 00:53:39.030
he also cites some Russian officers who were given orders
749
00:53:39.409 --> 00:53:44.349
to attack, even as the Germans were already attacking. For
750
00:53:44.369 --> 00:53:48.590
a short while, the Red Army stuck to its prepared
751
00:53:48.670 --> 00:53:53.730
plans and wanted to actually force its own attack into
752
00:53:53.769 --> 00:54:01.090
the rolling German attack, unrushing German attack. And only the
753
00:54:01.230 --> 00:54:06.070
utter failure of this attempt probably forced them after some
754
00:54:06.170 --> 00:54:12.530
time to change their approach. But it is clear both
755
00:54:12.630 --> 00:54:16.210
from the disaster that was unfolding and from the orders
756
00:54:16.469 --> 00:54:23.070
initially given to the Soviet generals that indeed the Red
757
00:54:23.150 --> 00:54:26.659
Army had been preparing for the offensive. And this is
758
00:54:26.699 --> 00:54:29.099
really where Schripper leaves it at. He doesn't really go
759
00:54:29.139 --> 00:54:30.519
into much detail on this question.
760
00:54:31.260 --> 00:54:35.340
It's basically the planning. The planning and all the decisions
761
00:54:35.380 --> 00:54:40.159
and the political framework and everything. Yes. Which is the
762
00:54:40.179 --> 00:54:42.380
best argument, I think. It is.
763
00:54:42.400 --> 00:54:47.269
I would really like to see Schripper to offer his
764
00:54:47.510 --> 00:54:50.250
analysis of what was unfolding afterwards. I think it should
765
00:54:50.289 --> 00:54:54.369
be quite interesting given his knowledge and understanding of the matter,
766
00:54:54.630 --> 00:54:56.070
but it is not included in this book.
767
00:54:57.510 --> 00:55:01.280
So I'll go back and I'll finish by addressing something
768
00:55:01.300 --> 00:55:04.980
that I addressed in the beginning. is do you think
769
00:55:05.039 --> 00:55:07.519
that as long as you're an honest actor and an
770
00:55:07.619 --> 00:55:10.980
honest reader of history and not somebody that has to
771
00:55:11.039 --> 00:55:17.119
stick to a prescribed script or myth, that this book
772
00:55:18.320 --> 00:55:22.750
just settles it once and for all, that beyond a
773
00:55:22.809 --> 00:55:25.969
shadow of a doubt, the Soviet Union was planning on
774
00:55:26.050 --> 00:55:33.050
invading Germany and Europe, and that the Germans the German
775
00:55:33.130 --> 00:55:38.800
preemptive strike prevented that until, at least until 1945.
776
00:55:38.800 --> 00:55:42.300
I would say so, yes. And I think on top
777
00:55:42.320 --> 00:55:44.500
of that, I think you can actually really enjoy this
778
00:55:44.559 --> 00:55:49.480
book because you can really see Schripper's independent-minded work, how
779
00:55:49.519 --> 00:55:52.719
you can really enjoy watching him fit together all the
780
00:55:52.760 --> 00:55:55.579
pieces of the puzzle into one coherent picture. I think
781
00:55:55.639 --> 00:55:57.219
it is really quite interesting. Yes.
782
00:55:57.239 --> 00:55:57.380
Yes.
783
00:55:58.000 --> 00:55:58.260
Absolutely.
784
00:55:59.320 --> 00:56:06.019
Absolutely. It's a great book. It's very military jargon sometimes,
785
00:56:06.619 --> 00:56:11.030
but it's a good book. It's the definitive answer, basically.
786
00:56:11.670 --> 00:56:16.119
And if you still argue, well, you....
787
00:56:17.389 --> 00:56:20.550
You're wrong well firstly you are you will be wrong
788
00:56:20.610 --> 00:56:23.829
and certainly you will deprive yourself of the pleasure to
789
00:56:23.889 --> 00:56:30.409
appreciate an honest independent uh very competent uh minded work
790
00:56:30.920 --> 00:56:32.139
absolutely yes.
791
00:56:32.539 --> 00:56:34.480
All right this is where i ask each of you
792
00:56:34.579 --> 00:56:37.380
to um tell people where they can find your work
793
00:56:37.559 --> 00:56:40.840
or um you know i know hans you mentioned writing
794
00:56:40.880 --> 00:56:44.420
for uns um so hans why don't you go first.
795
00:56:45.489 --> 00:56:51.420
Well, I published a book on the history of 20th
796
00:56:51.440 --> 00:57:00.559
century Europe with Arctos in 2021. That's called How Europe
797
00:57:00.599 --> 00:57:04.090
Became American. And you can get it through Amazon or whatever.
798
00:57:04.969 --> 00:57:08.670
And it's also indicated in the articles I write for AMS.
799
00:57:10.739 --> 00:57:14.519
And otherwise I write in Dutch and I write in Spanish.
800
00:57:14.800 --> 00:57:17.389
So that's where the audience has to be really interested.
801
00:57:18.130 --> 00:57:23.250
Michael? Well, okay. So I write some stuff in German.
802
00:57:24.590 --> 00:57:29.469
I am interested in medical topics. So actually I've been
803
00:57:29.510 --> 00:57:35.980
working with two organizations that have addressed the COVID fiasco.
804
00:57:36.260 --> 00:57:43.050
The German one is MWGFD. But it's the content there
805
00:57:43.070 --> 00:57:45.989
is in German. Then we have the Doctors for COVID Ethics.
806
00:57:46.150 --> 00:57:51.159
Short handle is d4ce. org. And then I have my personal
807
00:57:51.199 --> 00:58:07.610
website at mpalmer.heresy.org. Sorry, what is it? Is it heresy.org? heresy.empalmer.heresy.is.
808
00:58:07.699 --> 00:58:10.369
That's what it is. I have some old books that
809
00:58:10.389 --> 00:58:13.849
you can download there for free, and occasionally I publish
810
00:58:13.889 --> 00:58:16.429
a post. But I don't write as much as Hans,
811
00:58:16.590 --> 00:58:21.010
so I don't have anything up every week or something
812
00:58:21.030 --> 00:58:21.309
like that.
813
00:58:22.989 --> 00:58:27.900
No, do I. I try to, but... Yeah.
814
00:58:27.920 --> 00:58:29.400
All right.
815
00:58:29.460 --> 00:58:33.130
I'm going to encourage everyone to go to antelopehill.com buy
816
00:58:33.170 --> 00:58:36.980
the book germany and stalin's crosshairs you can use code
817
00:58:37.039 --> 00:58:39.480
pete q to get five percent off and order a
818
00:58:39.519 --> 00:58:42.000
bunch of other books while you're there all their books
819
00:58:42.039 --> 00:58:47.119
are worthwhile and uh they um they're doing a service
820
00:58:47.199 --> 00:58:50.650
and it's it's um rather brave what they're doing over
821
00:58:50.690 --> 00:58:53.690
there some of the things that they're publishing so i
822
00:58:53.730 --> 00:58:56.070
want to thank both of you gentlemen for joining me
823
00:58:56.389 --> 00:58:59.469
um please don't don't exit out i gotta wait for
824
00:58:59.510 --> 00:59:03.050
the audio files to upload but um I appreciate both
825
00:59:03.070 --> 00:59:05.449
of your time and, thank you very much for doing
826
00:59:05.489 --> 00:59:11.579
this I'm going to finish this book and because it's
827
00:59:11.659 --> 00:59:14.519
just I have to know the real history of things
828
00:59:14.639 --> 00:59:17.760
and not I just don't I can't sit by and
829
00:59:17.820 --> 00:59:22.719
accept the myths and the fairy tales that we're fed
830
00:59:23.039 --> 00:59:24.659
and I'm sure you both are the same way or
831
00:59:24.699 --> 00:59:25.239
you wouldn't be.
832
00:59:25.179 --> 00:59:31.579
Here absolutely we agree on that yes Thank you very much, Pete.
833
00:59:31.599 --> 00:59:32.920
It was a very enjoyable interview.
834
00:59:33.380 --> 00:59:35.090
Thank you, Pete. Very nice.