رونوشت 🔗
WEBVTT
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HEELERB is a commercial name for a
USB device that kills the computer you connected,
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and it sends two hundred most through
the data lines and it completely burns
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the computers. Welcome, Everyone's the
Industrial Security Podcast. My name is Nate
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Nelson. I'm here with Andrew Ginter, the vice president of Industrial Security at
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Waterfall Security Solutions, who's going to
introduce the subjects and guest of our show
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today. Andrew, how are you? I'm very well, Thank you,
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Nate. Our guest today is Mario
Prieto Santez. He is a solution architect
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at off USB, and we're going
to be looking at USB firmware attacks and
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what we can do about them.
These are not just you know, open
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the USB drive and click on a
malicious file. Oops, they got us.
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These are attacks where the USB device
itself is attacking us. Okay,
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then let's get into it. Here's
your interview with Mario. Hello Mario,
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and thank you for joining us.
Before we get started, can you tell
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us a few words about yourself and
about the good work that you're doing at
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all USB. Hello Andrew, thank
you for invite me. I'm Mario for
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a OLDCHB. I'm appreciache engineer and
I worked three years ago for OUTDSB.
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I started computer science engineer and also
higher technician on micro computer systems and networks
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which we are focus on the cybersecurity
systems to provide protect our cients. He
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now on now to be we contact
the clients to prevent the company to be
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attacked with some different kinds of malware
attacks or also hardware attacks. Thanks for
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that. And you know you've used
the word USB a couple of times.
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I've used it a couple of times. We all, you know, vaguely
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know what the USB is, especially
a USB thumb drive. But we're here
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talking about attacks. Why is the
USB a problem? How can you attack
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anybody across the USB? What?
What sort of the spectrum? What's possible
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bad you know, badness wise on
the USB? For example, the FBI
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told us to prevent us to connect
something to the USB charging ports on the
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airport, for example, because we
can get infect our phone or our iPad
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or our
Load full transcript
whatever. For example,
we we can get infect connecting something to
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your computer storage device apparently storage device. You connect to your computer and you
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get infected, or for example,
you get your device killed by by the
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device. There are many many ways
to to to attack your system. For
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example, that killer us B is
a commercial name for a use B device
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that kills the computer you connected,
and it sent two hundred balls through the
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data lines and it completely completely burns
the computer. So there are many many
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ways to get infected with the electrical
three, the software three, or for
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example, the hardware three that start
injecting code in your machine. So there
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are several ways to attack your system
with the USB devices. So that's interesting.
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I've I've heard the word killer USB
before. I thought. I thought
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killer USB with software, some kind
of software hack. You're telling me it's
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hardware. Yeah, the killer used
is a hardware device that have electrical components
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built inside the apparently normal USB.
So when you connect to computer, the
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killer is we charged dot electrical components
and then send two hundred and twenty boats
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through the data lines or maybe just
sixty boats through the data lines, so
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it completely burns the computer. It
seems like a lightning strict to your computer
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that burns the power supply, but
in reality is a USB that kills the
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motorboard and it's used to the first
lot of security and companies. You know,
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I had some notion already that USBs
could be dangerous. You know the
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classic you leave a USB in the
parking lot, someone picks it up,
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brings it into their nuclear facility and
it has stuck in it on it situation.
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But this thing where it delivers like
voltage to kill a computer is I've
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never heard of anything in that ballpark. Yeah, I had surprising, you
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know, I thought I understood attack
techniques, but this one is new to
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me. So I did some reading
afterwards, and yeah, the apparently the
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way it works is the device has
capacitors in the USB drive. You plug
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it in and it starts drawing power. I mean, USB devices can do
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that. You can draw power from
these interfaces, draws the power, charges
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the capacitors, and then discharges the
capacitors at two hundred volts and fries your
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motherboard. So, and you know, these devices are commercially available, you
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can buy them. They're not apparently
illegal. Using them is illegal, but
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the device themselves isn't illegal. In
theory. Their devices that manufacturers can use
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to test their motherboards and harden their
motherboards. You know, in practice,
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I don't know any pentester who does
this. I mean, why would you
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go and burn out a dozen of
your client's computers. How can you do
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that with with you know, without
consequences? But you know, the reading
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I've done online does include a caveat
It says basically, don't do this at
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home, kids. So has this
kind of thing ever actually been pulled off
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by anybody? Apparently, you know, one student did use a device like
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this, burned out sixty six to
zero computers at their school, videoed themselves
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doing this, and went to jail
for a year. Well that's nasty.
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I mean I really didn't know that, Thank you. I had heard of
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the charging port scenario. You know, I dimly understand what's happened in there,
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but you know you're the expert on
it. Can you tell us what's
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happening under the hood in the airport
when one of these charging ports is compromised.
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The FBI told us we should not
connect anything to the charging ports because
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the bad guys can change the filmwork
of the of the charging port. The
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charging port is built with a chip
set or a component that its name is
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a BMS. Is that a component
that controls the electricity that needs to be
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sent to the device, so they
can change the behavior of that chip set
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to In fact, whatever is connected
or for example, do you know bad
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USB is is a commercial name of
apparently starts device, but in reality is
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a chipset that sends data to the
computer. It acts like a keyboard,
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but it physically is a part.
It's like a normal USB. So when
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you connected that but the USB to
your computer, you get infected by some
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script injected by uh but UH
a
cyber criminal. So I've heard of bad
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us B before. I thought,
you know, you said you could buy
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it. I thought bad USB was
was open source, was sort of a
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demonstration of you know, for the
for the penetration testers, the demonstration of
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what's what's available for what's possible attack
wise. Yeah, but the USB is
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uh is open source. You can
build your own, but you also can
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buy it like started kid with some
threads, some scripts that are already injected
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on the one you buy from the
network. So there's a lot of scripts
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already on for example, githab that
you just need to follow a few steps
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to configure your USB in order to
get for example, passwords or inject backdoor
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for the system or wherever. There
are already published on GitHub, so you
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just need to download it. So
bad USB, I mean, can you
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take us a little bit deeper.
What is bad USB? How does it
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work? Okay, So when you
can get a thundrack, a normal thundrap,
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you see a normal screen with the
explorer of what's inside, what is
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store stored on that thundrap. But
when you connect bad USB, do you
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only see for example, in Windows, in Windows system, you only see
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the console, the console of the
system that is injecting something. But just
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a few seconds, less than one
second, maybe that injects something and that
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is living on your on your system
is a backdoor or a software that the
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service that is running in your computer. You only see a black screen for
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a little a little seconds, one
second maybe, uh, And when it's
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closed, nothing's happened. Nothing's happening, and you only see a thundraid connected,
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but you don't know what is happening. There are a lot of sophisticated
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but ESV with for example an electrical
component then even a first connection so explorer
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with the software inside. But when
you connect later in the second connection,
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it sends the payload, it sends
the descript injected on the on the computer.
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So there are sophisticate sophisticated the kinds
of bad use piece not sure if
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I missed some crucial bit of detail
there, But it sounds like what Mario's
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--> 00:11:28.559
describing is more along the lines of
the kinds of USB attacks that I'm already
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aware of. Yeah, I mean
the classic attack is one where there's a
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nasty in the data of the USB
drive. So I mean that was stucksnet.
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The structure of the you know,
the file system entries in the USB
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drive itself confused the Windows explore exploit
de volvability, and off you went.
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The more conventional one is, you
know, forget that kind of sophistication,
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just put a nasty you know,
hackers r us dot X on the USB
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and trick someone into double clicking it. Yes, I know it says hackers
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are us, but that's why you
have to click click it now, click
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there, You're done. It's over. You know, that's the contents,
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that's you know, there's there's gigabytes, tens of gigabytes of space on these
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devices. If you fill it with
malware and you trick someone or trick the
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computer into executing it, it's all
over. This is a different attack.
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This is where you know, every
one of these USBs has a tiny little
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CPU in it. People imagine it's
a device. It's not a device,
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it's a computer. There's a CPU
in the USB device. It has its
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own software. That little CPU is
executing its own software that's called the firmware,
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and normally the software, you know, you connect to the computer that
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the computer inside the USB fires up
and says, hey, I'm here,
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I'm a uh, you know,
a storage device. What do you want
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me to do? And the computer
says, well, you know, show
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me what's in your you know what, what files you got, and and
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it goes back and forth that way. There's a conversation between the computer and
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the USB and in your computer.
What's happening here is you connect it up
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and it says, hey, I'm
a storage device. And that conversation starts,
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and the USB says, by the
way, I'm also a keyboard,
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and it starts typing as if it
were an external keyboard on your computer.
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And it brings up a command window
and starts typing into that window. For
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a second or two, you might
catch it, you might be glancing away,
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you might not. The window closes, and it has injected a nasty
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into your computer as if it had
typed it from the keyboard. That seems
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so remarkable to me. Is there
no easy way for a computer to catch
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that kind of attack before it happens. Well, this is what we're talking
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about. We're describing the problem here, but we're going to see the solution
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in a minute. This is what
ath USB does. Yeah, okay,
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So basically though, the lesson is
that, besides it's the contents the files
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on USB drive, it's the device
itself too that you have to worry about
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trust with. So maybe you don't
accept a USB on those grounds from anyone
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besides like a very trusted source.
Yeah, it's it's worse than that.
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Actually, you know, there's there's
stories out there. You know, pen
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testers have published scenarios saying you've got
to be aware of this because we just
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did it to our client. The
scenario was, you know, the pen
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testers were tasked with getting into a
heavily defended client and they looked around and
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said, you know, we just
can't get in through these people's network.
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It's it's locked up tight. So
what they did was one of these you
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know USB things. They went out
and purchased a very expensive mouse, a
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very nice mouse, carefully took the
packaging apart, carefully took the mouse apart,
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inserted a USB drive into the mouse, connected it all up to the
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house's USB, put it all back
together, shrink wrap the whole thing,
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and sent it to you know,
one of the victims in this the company
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they were testing because they've done some
social media research. They figured out this
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person just came back from an expensive
conference and said, thank you for attending
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the conference. Here's a thank you
gift, you know, complete with the
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conference logo, very official looking.
This person says, lovely, opens it
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up. Oh, this is nice. This is a two hundred dollar mouse
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from my three thousand dollar conference.
Thank you, plugs it in, starts
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using it. Twelve hours later in
the dead to night. It says,
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yes, I'm a mouse, I'm
also a USB drive, And you know,
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the window pops up and the mouse
starts moving, double clicks on the
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contents, and now the computer's compromise. So it's not just USB drives that
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are at issue here. If you're
given a gift of any USB device,
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be deeply, deeply suspicious of it. So this is all nasty, but
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you know, this is the Industrial
Security podcast. Can you talk about the
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industrial environment? I mean, I
see USBs everywhere I mean, what what
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should industrial users be worried about?
What should they be thinking about? Here?
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The best way to prevent an attack
with use the devices is just don't
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use in them. Don't use them. So in ot environments, in industrial
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environments, uh, they cannot do
that. They are they need to use
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use the devices because they have legacy
devices where they cannot carry their update or
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whatever. So they need to use
use the devices. They are forced to
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use USB devices on all the environments. You know, I kind of expected
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that I see people using USBs and
industrial sites. I assume it's because they
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have to, you know, because
they're aware of these problems. The what
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what's the solution? I mean,
if you have to use a USB to
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load a new I don't know letter
logic program into a PLC, how do
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you avoid this kind of of exposure. You need something that checks everything that
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is started on the device. You
need something that when you came with thundra,
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you connected to that device, to
that system, and the it's it
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says, if it's fair enough to
the company, if you can go inside
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with that thundrick. How do we
all this problem? I mean, I
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see people using USB's at industrial sites
because presumably they have to they have to
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load a PLC ladder logic program into
the device, and then you know the
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the USB is the only way to
do it. How do they do?
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How do you address this problem?
So the only way you can get protect
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through to these attacks is three checking
three kinds of three the electrical one,
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the hardware one, and the software
attack. You need to check the behavior
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of the thund drive in order to
detect these three kinds of three. If
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you can get that, your protect
of every kind of attack with the USB
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protocols. Okay, So, so
there's three things that we have to protect
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against. We have to protect against
the the you know, the high voltage
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electrical nasty. We have to do
something about the hardware. Can you can
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you tell us? You know what
what you guys do this? What do
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you guys do when you say the
words electrical, hardware and software? When
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you do this, what does it
mean? What do you guys actually do
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with your product? Okay? So
we develop a device, a hardware device,
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physical device which the text the behavior
of wherever is connected to our device.
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So if you connect a killer US
via electrical thread, when you connect
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it, we check the behavior and
if if it breaks they used be protocol
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for storage device. We block it, we detect it, we block it,
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and we also report to the admin
that something someone is connecting. Killer
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used to be on the poor number
one in the in the device in the
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com company, or on the floor
three or your company. So the idea
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is to check the USB protocol that
which is which is very strict the USB
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protocols said you need to do this
in this exactly time. So if something
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is connected and don't follow strictly the
USB protocol, it means that it's talking
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with some other components, is talking
with or is typing to the computer,
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or is charging the electrical components to
to send the boats through the daylimees.
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So it means it's doing something else
that needs to be needs to do.
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If it was startage device, you
check the hardware. If there's over voltage,
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you know you you block that.
That's great, you've checked the the
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USB protocol. It's supposed to be
a drive, it's not supposed to be
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a keyboard. When you say checking
the protocol, you've said electrical hardware and
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software is checking the protocol. Hardware
and software, what's you know? What
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did we miss something here? I
only heard two things. I heard I
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heard I heard electrical, I heard
protocol. What what is what is the
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hardware? What
is the software?
The electrical one is the killer US with
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that charge the electrical components and then
send the boats through the daytimes. The
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hardware attack is the raberday the bad
USEV with all the we talked. And
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then is the software that is this
kind of three? The software three is
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a completely normal thund drive but with
some software, some malware inside. So
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we checked the US protocol for for
the to the electrical We checked the used
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protocol for the electrical attack, and
we checked the used protocol for the hardware
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attack. And we have antibious built
inside on our device to check the software
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attack. Can you tell me,
I mean, how does your device?
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What does it look like physically?
I mean, is this something that I,
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you know, plug into the wall
to have power and I put my
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USB in and it gives me a
green light and says your USB is good,
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go use it wherever you want.
And then I go plug the USB
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into the PLC. Or do I
plug your device into the PLC and then
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plug the USB into your device?
Is it between the USB and the and
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the PLC or is it is sort
of off on the side somewhere. Okay,
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00:22:52.400 --> 00:22:59.400
So the our device is the it's
gonna be the first layer of security.
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00:22:59.480 --> 00:23:08.440
Or your co company is located on
the first door of your industrial facilities.
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So when someone came to your industrial
organization with with the thund drive,
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they go to the security the security
office with the security guy. He connected
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the thund drave to our solution,
and from our solution you can transfer the
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files to the net through the network
to your LC or to the start folder
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you want to s STPs a folder
you want in order to get that files
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directly from our device without connecting that
thround drive, that thund drive to your
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computer and exposing yourself to thunder.
That change the behavior, for example in
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00:24:06.319 --> 00:24:12.720
the second connection, so our device
is connected to a power supply and and
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00:24:12.799 --> 00:24:22.480
also with the Ethernet coal to your
network. Andrew, I'm going to need
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00:24:22.519 --> 00:24:26.079
a little bit of help here.
I follow how this device handles you know,
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typical software threats, right, he
mentioned anti virus, But how does
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it prevent the you know, the
USB that is going to fry my motherboard.
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00:24:37.720 --> 00:24:40.880
That's just it. This is a
separate physical device plugged into the wall.
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It does not prevent the USB frying
your motherboard. It detects. So
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you stick the USB drive in there, and you know it's going to give
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00:24:51.799 --> 00:24:56.000
you a red flashing light saying whatever
you do, don't plug this thing into
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00:24:56.119 --> 00:24:59.960
the POC, it will fry your
POC. It detects rather than prevent.
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00:25:00.960 --> 00:25:06.640
Okay, but then why doesn't this
USB fry the device itself that's detecting this?
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00:25:07.279 --> 00:25:11.000
Well, you know that's the thing
that the device is designed understanding that,
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you know, nasty stuff physically electrically
could be coming at it. So
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00:25:15.079 --> 00:25:21.200
it's designed to withstand electrical abuse.
You know, you can design a circuit
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board for two hundred volts. You
know, there's there's things you can do.
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00:25:23.880 --> 00:25:27.359
You just you have to know what's
coming at you. And they they've
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00:25:27.400 --> 00:25:30.240
they've taken this into account, you
know, and they so you know,
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they do detection, They do antivirus, just like you said, they do
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the electrical saying something electrical just happened, and they do the firmware detection as
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well. Really, you know what
he said was, look, we understand
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00:25:45.000 --> 00:25:49.200
electrically, you know, voltage wise
and signal wise electrically, what a normal
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00:25:49.359 --> 00:25:56.079
USB drive behaves like it behaves at
five volts. We understand USB protocol wise,
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00:25:56.519 --> 00:26:00.240
what a normal USB drive behaves like. You say, did this question?
277
00:26:00.359 --> 00:26:03.839
It sends you back that answer,
you send it this other thing.
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00:26:03.839 --> 00:26:10.960
You understand the USB protocol for a
thumb drive. And so what they're doing
279
00:26:11.039 --> 00:26:15.279
is looking hard at what the USB
is doing. Is it deviating from the
280
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electrical protocol with high voltage? Is
it deviating from the drive protocol by saying,
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00:26:21.279 --> 00:26:23.839
hey, I'm a keyboard. Any
deviation gives you a red light saying,
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00:26:23.880 --> 00:26:27.319
whatever you do, do not plug
this thing into your industrial network.
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00:26:27.880 --> 00:26:32.240
Yeah. It also occurs to me, now that you're describing all of this
284
00:26:32.400 --> 00:26:36.519
that if were the USB to fry
this device, which as you mentioned,
285
00:26:36.599 --> 00:26:38.839
it won't because they've prepared for that, that would be a
pretty good detection
286
00:26:38.960 --> 00:26:41.960
mechanism in and of itself, because
they need to have a broken machine,
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00:26:42.000 --> 00:26:45.599
and then you'd probably not want to
plug that USB in anywhere. It kind
288
00:26:45.599 --> 00:26:52.680
of sounds like an advanced version of
something we've talked about on prior episodes,
289
00:26:52.759 --> 00:26:59.240
the USB sanitation station, where if
you bring a device like that into manufacturing
290
00:26:59.279 --> 00:27:02.440
plan or something, you've got to
plug in your USB there or else,
291
00:27:02.519 --> 00:27:06.279
you're not going to be allowed to
use it elsewhere, but maybe like one
292
00:27:06.359 --> 00:27:08.799
or two extra steps involved. That's
exactly what it is. I mean,
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00:27:08.920 --> 00:27:14.319
you've used the term sanitation station.
I've heard the term kiosk. This is
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00:27:15.200 --> 00:27:19.039
a physical device that sits at physical
security. You know, you come into
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00:27:19.079 --> 00:27:25.079
the secure zone in the plant,
You're asked to empty your pockets. Do
296
00:27:25.160 --> 00:27:29.200
you have any USBs? Stick all
the USBs in the device. You're not
297
00:27:29.319 --> 00:27:33.720
allowed to carry the USBs into the
system anyway. It takes the files off
298
00:27:33.759 --> 00:27:40.119
the system, you know, puts
the files into the network, the clean
299
00:27:40.119 --> 00:27:42.799
ones that antivirus has blessed. So, yeah, this is a kiosk.
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00:27:42.920 --> 00:27:48.039
It's a sanitation station. It lives
as part of your physical security system,
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00:27:48.359 --> 00:27:56.400
sort of checking information and people and
devices on the way into physically on the
302
00:27:56.440 --> 00:28:03.720
way into the secure area. Okay. And so if I have a PLC
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00:28:03.799 --> 00:28:07.119
and the only way to change the
latter logic is with the USB, then
304
00:28:07.119 --> 00:28:11.440
what I have to do is take
my sort of external USB, my suspect
305
00:28:11.880 --> 00:28:17.519
USB, run it through your device, get the files off of it on
306
00:28:17.559 --> 00:28:21.960
the other side, and then you
know, inside the industrial network, I
307
00:28:22.039 --> 00:28:25.559
need a bunch of I don't know, color coded USBs that have never touched
308
00:28:25.599 --> 00:28:27.799
the outside world. I put the
file back on one of those and I
309
00:28:27.839 --> 00:28:32.519
carry it over to the PLC.
Is that how it works? Yeah,
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00:28:32.599 --> 00:28:38.119
we have several modes to work with
our product. We have an automatic mode
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00:28:38.319 --> 00:28:44.559
for people who's working on the factory
that is only there for working, not
312
00:28:44.680 --> 00:28:51.720
for knowing how to use our product
or other kinds of products. So we
313
00:28:51.799 --> 00:29:00.720
have a mode that automatically transfer everything
from the external fun drive to a internal
314
00:29:00.039 --> 00:29:07.720
thund drive that is protected by you. That is an inventory bye by you,
315
00:29:07.480 --> 00:29:14.839
so it's known by our device.
So that all makes sense. Can
316
00:29:14.880 --> 00:29:18.400
you give us some examples in the
industrial space in your experience? Who is
317
00:29:18.559 --> 00:29:22.400
using these kind of products? What
are they using them for? You know,
318
00:29:22.440 --> 00:29:30.799
are they finding anything? Yeah,
our main clients are big companies with
319
00:29:32.839 --> 00:29:48.200
critical infrastructures, also defense and the
public infrastructures. They find attacks with the
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00:29:48.480 --> 00:30:00.200
USB devices and something that is important
from our devices. When you cannot check
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00:30:00.799 --> 00:30:08.680
something, you are not knowing nothing
about that about the tour of your company.
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00:30:08.720 --> 00:30:15.440
For example, if you don't have
something that checks the email, you
323
00:30:15.519 --> 00:30:22.880
are not checking if someone is downloading
something from the from the email. So
324
00:30:23.799 --> 00:30:33.680
at this time nobody has nothing to
control what is moving with the sun drives
325
00:30:33.720 --> 00:30:41.920
on your company. So at the
first time, at the first day you
326
00:30:41.039 --> 00:30:48.680
connect our product, you start having
everything that is running on the sun drives
327
00:30:48.720 --> 00:30:56.000
on your company is reported in real
time to a central console, so the
328
00:30:56.079 --> 00:31:00.920
admin can check everything that is running
on sun drives and from there we have
329
00:31:02.039 --> 00:31:10.200
clients that the techt someone is trying
to inject the company with bad use be.
330
00:31:11.000 --> 00:31:15.680
So that means that you are under
attack because that you. The bad
331
00:31:15.799 --> 00:31:25.880
used be are built specifically for you. There are not there. They are
332
00:31:25.920 --> 00:31:30.319
built by because of you. They
are built specifically for you. It is
333
00:31:30.359 --> 00:31:38.680
a strange to detect the bad use
be that is not target to you.
334
00:31:41.039 --> 00:31:47.519
So with the text killer used to
be with the tech we have clients that
335
00:31:47.599 --> 00:31:55.839
the text killer used be also bad
use be. The attack the software attack
336
00:31:56.079 --> 00:32:02.759
is very very common. It is
it's normal to have thoundraid that half that
337
00:32:02.960 --> 00:32:09.920
half a malware site. So the
most important is the most important to detect
338
00:32:10.359 --> 00:32:20.599
and unblocked and also report is the
electrical and the hardware attacks. So that
339
00:32:20.799 --> 00:32:24.279
was a long answer. Let me
let me summarize. What I heard Mario
340
00:32:24.440 --> 00:32:30.799
say was that, yeah, their
systems in use, and most of their
341
00:32:30.799 --> 00:32:36.920
customers are large critical infrastructure sites.
Their systems have detected all three kinds of
342
00:32:36.920 -->
00:32:39.319
attacks. The most common attack that
they detect is, you know, the
343
00:32:39.319 --> 00:32:43.480
stuff that the anti virus catches.
There's a nasty in you know, you
344
00:32:43.480 --> 00:32:45.400
know, one of your files in
the six hundred files on the drive,
345
00:32:45.920 --> 00:32:52.599
you know, and quarantine it.
So that's sort of commonplace. He also
346
00:32:52.759 --> 00:32:57.680
said that the killer US be the
high voltage, has been detected in the
347
00:32:57.720 --> 00:33:01.400
wild, which surprises me. I
would have thought that, you know,
348
00:33:01.799 --> 00:33:05.920
if that was going on in the
wild, you'd hear more about it,
349
00:33:05.960 --> 00:33:07.839
and you know, this is the
first I've heard of it, so that's
350
00:33:07.880 --> 00:33:13.480
a bit of a surprise. He
also said that the firmware attacks have been
351
00:33:13.519 --> 00:33:19.119
detected in the wild, and these
are in a sense particularly alarming because he
352
00:33:19.200 --> 00:33:23.680
says, in practice, when they've
been detected, pretty much always they have
353
00:33:24.200 --> 00:33:32.240
identified a targeted attack, meaning someone
with a lot of resources put together an
354
00:33:32.279 --> 00:33:39.240
attack that is specific to this critical
infrastructure site or that you know, very
355
00:33:39.319 --> 00:33:44.240
valuable in industrial site. You know, who has those kinds of resources for
356
00:33:44.319 --> 00:33:49.279
that kind of investment in attack technology, It's usually a nation state, So
357
00:33:49.559 --> 00:33:52.319
that's disturbing. That these have been
discovered in the wild as well. Yeah,
358
00:33:52.359 --> 00:33:57.400
it strikes me that these kinds of
attacks wouldn't be cyber criminal in nature,
359
00:33:57.440 --> 00:34:01.480
but also that I haven't really heard
about them before. Is there a
360
00:34:01.519 --> 00:34:06.880
reason why they wouldn't make the news? You know, you have to ask
361
00:34:07.039 --> 00:34:10.119
who's detecting these attacks. If if
it is nation state, it may well
362
00:34:10.159 --> 00:34:15.360
be you know, nation state attacks
on very sensitive targets. You know,
363
00:34:15.440 --> 00:34:19.320
he did not say that they have
I don't know military customers. If you've
364
00:34:19.320 --> 00:34:24.039
got a very sensitive target, they
if you know, let's say a large
365
00:34:24.079 --> 00:34:28.920
government owned facility, whatever kind of
facility it is, you know, they
366
00:34:28.960 --> 00:34:35.239
might just not report, Hey,
we think the Russians or Iran or someone,
367
00:34:35.280 --> 00:34:37.400
you know, North Korea has just
come after us. They might share
368
00:34:37.440 --> 00:34:45.840
that knowledge within you know there they're
classified within their their their circle of you
369
00:34:45.880 --> 00:34:49.559
know, people that they inform confidentially
about these attacks to say, you know,
370
00:34:49.599 --> 00:34:53.760
here's what's happening. Protect yourself.
But you know, if the man
371
00:34:53.760 --> 00:34:58.679
on the street is not at risk
of you know, a nation state coming
372
00:34:58.719 --> 00:35:02.719
after them, you know, maybe
they figure they don't need to know,
373
00:35:04.000 --> 00:35:07.440
and the people who do need to
know. You know, our allies have
374
00:35:07.559 --> 00:35:10.159
been informed through classified channels. I
don't know. I don't have a security
375
00:35:10.159 --> 00:35:13.639
clearance. I never see any of
this, So this is all speculation on
376
00:35:13.719 --> 00:35:19.360
my part, but it seems plausible. So on the industrial side, let
377
00:35:19.480 --> 00:35:22.519
let's take a step back. On
the industrial side, the USB attack everybody
378
00:35:22.599 --> 00:35:28.679
talks about is stocks net a very
sophisticated attack, you know Nation state grade?
379
00:35:29.199 --> 00:35:34.360
How confident should we be of the
USB solution? Could can you detect?
380
00:35:35.159 --> 00:35:39.960
You know that grade of sophisticated attack. We are confident on our solution
381
00:35:42.239 --> 00:35:49.320
because of we check the behavior,
but the confident that the client needs to
382
00:35:50.199 --> 00:36:00.960
contact us is We are thirtified by
our Spanies Cryptological Center. Also we are
383
00:36:01.239 --> 00:36:08.960
approved and also certified as two two
options here certified or approved, we are
384
00:36:09.079 --> 00:36:19.280
both. We are certified and approved
to work with the our Spanish National Cybersecurity
385
00:36:19.400 --> 00:36:31.920
Scheam and also we are certified to
work with NATO NATO countries. We we
386
00:36:32.159 --> 00:36:44.079
get through a reverse engineer program in
order to certified, and we are one
387
00:36:44.159 --> 00:36:50.960
hundred percent made in Spain. We
don't use electrical components from the from outside
388
00:36:51.440 --> 00:37:06.320
outside of the European Union. So
that's the confidence we send to the to
389
00:37:06.400 --> 00:37:09.760
the our clients. So that's good. You guys have been, you know,
390
00:37:09.800 --> 00:37:15.599
doing this for a while. Can
you give us any view in the
391
00:37:15.639 --> 00:37:17.880
future. I mean, where's this
going? What are you guys doing next?
392
00:37:19.920 --> 00:37:24.519
The version we have today is the
third version we start this company.
393
00:37:24.760 --> 00:37:37.199
We started this company in twenty eighteen, twenty eighteen, twenty and eighteen,
394
00:37:37.679 --> 00:37:44.079
and this is the third version that
we are working on. The new versions
395
00:37:44.159 --> 00:37:52.360
with more ports. The model today
have two ports through two person three of
396
00:37:52.400 --> 00:38:00.880
the USB protocol. And we are
working on the different kinds of devices everything
397
00:38:02.079 --> 00:38:08.440
to to the attack used to be
attacked, but different kinds of the devices
398
00:38:08.480 --> 00:38:16.719
with maybe a screen or with more
connectors type CE version to to to support
399
00:38:16.719 --> 00:38:24.079
the US with type C or we
are we are working on more than more
400
00:38:24.119 --> 00:38:29.119
than one device, more than one
model. Well, this has been great,
401
00:38:29.159 --> 00:38:30.719
Mario, thank you for joining us. Before we let you go,
402
00:38:31.239 --> 00:38:35.000
you know, can you tell our
listeners what what should they be? What
403
00:38:35.039 --> 00:38:37.480
should they be taking away? What
should they be watching? In this USB
404
00:38:37.599 --> 00:38:42.559
space? The first thing is never
trust. Used to be the vices.
405
00:38:42.840 --> 00:38:47.679
It can look like thun drive,
like your your friends thund drive, but
406
00:38:50.960 --> 00:38:57.039
in reality it can be anything.
It can be a keyboard, it can
407
00:38:57.119 --> 00:39:06.880
be Bluetooth is gonna action or Wi
Fi connection, So bigware of bigware of
408
00:39:07.519 --> 00:39:15.239
thun drives because it is the first
thing the cyber criminal tries to do,
409
00:39:15.400 --> 00:39:21.119
because it's cheap and it is uh
is the first is the fastest way to
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get inside your system. So the
second thing you need to know is we're
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goods from the how to use be
is the we We are focused on those
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00:39:40.800 --> 00:39:47.039
environments where they need to use us
BE devices every day for every action,
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00:39:47.960 --> 00:39:54.639
and we are checking the behavior.
We are the only ones that check the
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00:39:54.719 --> 00:40:02.440
behavior of the us BE devices.
Other looks on the black list or white
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00:40:02.480 --> 00:40:08.079
list. We we just checked the
behavior of whatever is connected. And we
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00:40:08.360 --> 00:40:15.519
also report everything in real time,
so the admin of your company can can
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00:40:15.599 --> 00:40:22.599
see everything in in real time.
So if you want to know more about
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00:40:22.960 --> 00:40:30.000
our solutions, you can just contact
us with Our website is out USB dot
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00:40:30.079 --> 00:40:38.800
net and from there you can contact
and know more about our solutions. All
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00:40:38.880 --> 00:40:43.559
right, that seems to have concluded
your interview with Mario Andrew. Do you
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have a final thought that you can
take us out with. Yeah, I
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mean something Mario said in sort of
his sum up reminded me. You know,
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we've talked about sort of in a
sense, the mundane, the normal,
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the kinds of attacks to expect in
you know, he reminded me that
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these kinds of attacks can become much
more sophisticated. Imagine something that I mean,
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these USB drives, they've got CPUs
inside. They can be arbitrarily complicated,
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they can be arbitrarily powerful because they're
little computers. Imagine a USB drive
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that has a CPU inside. Yes, and I don't know cellular hardware,
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so it can reach out to the
cellular network and say here I am What
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would you do with that? Well, it would you know, it could
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say to the computer, hey,
I'm a drive. Great, I'm also
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a keyboard, I'm also a mouse, I'm also a screen. And you
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know what's the default behavior on most
Windows computers when when it says hey,
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I'm another screen, it mirrors the
first screen to the second screen. And
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now you've got you're seeing a copy
of the screen. You can move the
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00:41:54.800 --> 00:41:58.679
mouse, you can type in the
keyboard. This is nasty, but you
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00:41:58.679 --> 00:42:01.440
know, all over the internet,
all by remote control. You know.
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The bottom line here is that,
you know, we need to be deeply
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00:42:10.559 --> 00:42:15.920
suspicious of any USB drive that comes
into our industrial network from the outside world.
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00:42:15.960 --> 00:42:20.719
We need to scan it nine ways
to Sunday, you know, on
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00:42:21.400 --> 00:42:24.679
the way into the network, ideally
pulling the you know, the contents off
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00:42:24.679 --> 00:42:30.159
of it, not allowing the physical
device into the network at all. So
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00:42:30.400 --> 00:42:34.559
yeah, it's it's a modern threat. It's you know, thank you to
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00:42:34.599 --> 00:42:39.000
Mario for reminding us of this nasty
attack pathway. Yes. Thank you to
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00:42:39.159 --> 00:42:44.039
Mario Sandlist for speaking with you.
Andrew, and Andrew, thank you as
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00:42:44.039 --> 00:42:46.480
always for speaking with me. It's
always a pleasure. Thank you, Nan.
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00:42:46.960 --> 00:42:52.920
This has been the Industrial Security podcast
from Waterfall. Thanks to everyone out
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00:42:52.960 --> 00:43:00.239
there listening. It's something the