رونوشت 🔗
WEBVTT
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What actually happens inside an organisation
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during the very first few hours of a cyber attack?
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And why do so many companies regain control quickly
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while others descend into confusion and chaos?
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In cyber security conversations I think we often
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focus on sophistication of the attackers. The
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latest ransomware groups, the newest security
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tools that are entering the market. Yet many
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of the biggest failures during a cyber -crisis
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have very little to do with the attacker at all.
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They actually come from the uncertainty inside
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an organisation. Teams are unsure who owns the
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decisions, leaders are asking for updates every
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few minutes during a P1 as teams are frantically
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trying to find out what's happening, and departments
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are competing for priority all while the clock
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keeps on ticking. Well, my guest today has spent
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nearly two decades working directly inside those
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moments. His name's Andrew Carr and he's a managing
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director at Booz Allen Hamilton, where he leads
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the firm's commercial threat detection and incident
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response practice. And over the course of his
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career in digital forensics, ransomware response
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and enterprise incident management, he's someone
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that's helped organisations deal with some of
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their most challenging cyber events. So it's
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from that vantage point that Andrew has seen
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similar patterns repeating themselves again and
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again. And that is organisations that stabilise
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the fastest are rarely the ones with the longest
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security policies or the largest budgets. Very
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often that can be more box -ticking than anything
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else. The successful ones are those that understand
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their own environment with precision. They rehearse
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realistic crisis scenarios. They build almost
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muscle memory across the entire business from
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the technical teams, yes, but also to executive
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leadership and stakeholders around the business.
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So in this conversation today, I want to explore
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why the first 72 hours of a cyber crisis often
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determine the long -term business impact and
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why siloed tabletop exercises are useful, but
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they can leave companies exposed and learn why
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leadership discipline plays a much larger role
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in cyber resilience than many executives realise.
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So if your organisation had to respond to a major
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cyber incident tomorrow morning, would every
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team know exactly what to do and understand how
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their decisions affect the rest of the company?
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These are a few of the things we're going to
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tackle today, but enough from me. Let me introduce
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you to my guest now. So thank you for joining
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me on the podcast today. Can you tell everyone
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listening a little bit who you are and what you
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do? Absolutely. My name is Andrew Carr, Managing
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Director of Booz Allen Hamilton and the Commercial
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Incident Response Practice, where I oversee our
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threat detection and response team. I've been
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in the digital forensics and incident response
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space for almost two decades now, both in the
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forensic side, ransomware negotiation, academia,
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you name it. So I've been involved in hundreds,
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if not at this point, thousands of incidents.
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And so I service our commercial clients to try
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and help them prepare and respond to these cyber
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incidents that are popping up. And digital forensics
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is an exciting space, something I've been following
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for some time, incredibly exciting. I think in
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a former life, I'd love to be involved in that.
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But I mean, you've worked on incident response
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in some of the most sensitive environments from
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national security to enterprise infrastructure.
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But when you look at today's threat environment
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and everything that you're seeing, where do organizations
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still underestimate their own exposure? Because
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you've got somewhat of a unique vantage point
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here. Yeah, I would
Load full transcript
say kind of the most critical
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under underestimation is in relation to supply
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chain risk We've seen a number of headlines recently
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related to that But it continues to be something
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that I think doesn't get the exposure within
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an organization that it deserves and I think
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the impacts of those supply chain disruptions
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can be underestimated as well. You know, there
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might be regulatory or breach notification obligations
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for their customers or clients, employees, business
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partners. And I think it's just something that
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because it's outside of the organization, it's
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seen as someone else's problem when in reality,
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you know, it really needs to be something that
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the organization takes a tough look at and anticipates
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how those disruptions might impact them. And
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when doing a little research on you, I was reading
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that you've said that most failures are not about
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attackers sophistication, the tools they're using,
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but it's more about a lack of internal clarity.
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So what does understanding your environment,
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it's a phrase we hear a lot, what does that actually
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mean in practical terms for boards and executive
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teams and indeed business leaders listening to
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this conversation today? Absolutely. So a word
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I would focus on is precision. Good enough is
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not good enough. Many organizations that we come
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into, they've done some work in this area, and
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they've tried to map out their external attack
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surface generally, or they've created an asset
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inventory that, you know, is maybe updated once
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a year. But unfortunately, when it comes to an
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active incident, you know, that good enough is
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not going to work. It's going to create confusion.
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It'll create blind spots. So that precision in
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that understanding of the environment is going
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to be critical for, you know, helping us get
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in there, work quickly, efficiently, and effectively
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with their internal teams to get the organization
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back up and running should one of these incidents
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happen. And additionally, it creates an opportunity
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for kind of improvement as you go through these
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exercises you start to see where maybe you're
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overlooking things or Maybe there's a new department
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that comes online that has interrelation with
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others that you just weren't expecting So it
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really helps you stay on top of what's going
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on in your organization And it's often said that
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the first 72 hours of any cyber crisis are the
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most decisive and from your experience what separates
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organizations that stabilize quickly from those
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that spiral into confusion during that window
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because a lot happens it doesn't matter what
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plan you've got in place I think it was Mike
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Tyson said everyone's got a plan until you're
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smacked in the face but when that P1 hits everything
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goes out the window but tell me more about that
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Yeah, so I'll touch back on that precision piece.
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If you really know everything in your environment
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and you know how it interrelates between departments,
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you can quickly move when something like this
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happens. We're not trying to figure those things
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out on the fly during those first couple of days.
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We know everything and how it interrelates. We
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know everything that's available to the attacker.
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We know where the sensitive information is stored
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and what they're going to be looking for. So
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that allows us to quickly move, quickly determine
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those risks and understand what it is that the
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threat actor might have done while in the environment.
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Additionally, it helps the organization understand
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kind of that minimum viable company piece. where
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they can understand what they can live without
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for three days, six days, two weeks, which can
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allow us to focus on the most critical assets
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to get them back to kind of status quo, if you
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will. And there'll be many people listening that
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inside their company, they run those tabletop
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exercises within a single department, probably
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a tech department. But why does this siloed approach
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fall short when real enterprise wide incident
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unfolds and Key applications are missing, et
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cetera, and folders are inaccessible. Is it important
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to have a more collaborative approach and bring
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in stakeholders too? Yeah, I think as far as
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those kind of departmental level. Tabletops or
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exercises if you will those are very important
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for helping Those pieces of the organization
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understand their capabilities and you know, who's
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doing what? But overall we need to understand
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how that department is going to interact with
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other departments and how the organization as
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a whole is going to prioritize things So, you
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know those are Important but should be looked
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at as a broader strategy both at the technical
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level executive level Across the organization
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so that each department knows what it needs to
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do and how its actions will impact The actions
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of other departments and the organization as
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a whole, you know once a year is kind of the
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the base minimum for that muscle memory piece
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of it, but really these individual departments
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should be looking at these on almost a quarterly
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basis from different perspectives, a ransomware
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one, a supply chain disruption, you know, you
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name it, we need to work out that muscle memory,
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but from different angles. When everyone believes
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that their function is the top priority we see
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this a lot with stakeholders around a business
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and every function feels that they are the most
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important especially during a breach and when
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people are trying to fix those particular problems
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there'll be people asking for updates every 10
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minutes from every department. How should leadership
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structures and decision making and what kind
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of structure should be in place
for when the
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inevitable escalation arrives to avoid that analysis
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paralysis or avoid getting distracted or firefighting?
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Yeah, so it's important for the organization
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to understand kind of that minimum viable company.
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They need to know what core functions are required
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to keep the wheels turning. And sometimes that's
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different for each organization. But if you don't
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go through that process, you're not going to
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understand the ins and outs of the mapping between
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departments. What if this piece of infrastructure
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goes down? How does that impact the overall organization
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in relation to that minimum viable company? And
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it also helps set priority. If there's no priority
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set, every department is going to raise their
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hand and say, hey, we're the most important.
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We need to get back up and running. When in reality,
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that department, while important, may not be
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required for those first few weeks while things
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are kind of getting back up and going. So it's
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something where if you don't approach that with
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specificity and like I said, precision, it's
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going to leave a lot of wiggle room that's going
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to create a lot of issues and frankly conflict
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during a time where we should be facilitating
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communication and cooperation between departments
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to get everybody back up and running. fighting
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for priority. It's just going to slow things
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down across the board and no department is going
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to benefit from that. And I do think there has
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been a mindset shift from a decade ago when many
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boardrooms struggled to see the value in something
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that might happen one day. I think we've all
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seen in recent years it's not if but when. We've
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seen so many different examples there and there's
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this thirst for change and wanting to move to
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a more proactive approach to cyber security that
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more than reactive. And you yourself have emphasized
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that building muscle memory before an incident
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occurs is incredibly valuable. So what does a
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realistic rehearsal look like and how should
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an organization or a leader listening be training
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to make those instincts feel almost automatic
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when, when the inevitable happens? Yeah. So Like
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I mentioned before, kind of the annual test is
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almost a minimum requirement, right? But bringing
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it up to a quarterly, having both technical,
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executive exercises, you're gonna wanna make
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those realistic from a perspective of what that
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particular organization might encounter. You
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want to ensure that it can be sufficiently disruptive
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as part of the exercise, right? So it's probably
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not going to take down just one business unit.
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Typically we see these attacks will take down,
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you know, half of the company or everything.
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So taking it from a perspective of if everything
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went down tomorrow, how can we approach it? And
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then also, you know, not just going with the
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buzzwords of like ransomware and some of those
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others, you know, looking at some of the secondary
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types of incidents that might occur, whether
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it be a breach to an AI model or a supply chain
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disruption or attack on a vendor, something like
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that. Trying to approach it from different perspectives
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is going to give the organization an understanding
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of how those different plans will play out in
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real time, what different business units are
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required to have involvement in those particular
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types of incidents. But again, just trying to
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repeat that process with regularity so that it's
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not new, it's not novel to everyone involved
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in the process. I mean, even think of just new
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oncoming staff, if we only do this once a year.
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there could have been a number of people that
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came onto the organization since that last exercise
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that unfortunately would be kind of in the dark
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aside from maybe an instant response plan. And
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many
organizations over the years have, to their
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credit, invested heavily in policies and tools,
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but they still find themselves struggling when
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a crisis hits. So in your view, and from what
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you've seen, your experiences and insights here,
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what role does leadership discipline play in
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turning cybersecurity from that technical function
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that it's often seen as into an enterprise -wide
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responsibility? Is that a difficult message to
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deliver as well? It can be. You know, cyber incidents
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and cyber risk, they're an organizational risk
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and it needs to be approached from the executive
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team as such. This isn't just a CISO job or a
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CTO, CIO job anymore. You know, the old adage
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of, you know, that's not my job or that someone
00:14:14.370 --> 00:14:18.330
else's, that doesn't cut it anymore. The leadership
00:14:18.330 --> 00:14:20.529
of each business unit and the organization as
00:14:20.529 --> 00:14:23.809
a whole needs to be informed. They need to have
00:14:23.809 --> 00:14:26.289
at least a basic technical competency when it
00:14:26.289 --> 00:14:29.139
comes to these risks. and how they can be avoided
00:14:29.139 --> 00:14:33.559
and remediated. It's no longer appropriate just
00:14:33.559 --> 00:14:37.080
to pass this to the IT or security team, because
00:14:37.080 --> 00:14:38.980
if we're doing that, they're operating in a vacuum
00:14:38.980 --> 00:14:41.600
that may not take into consideration all the
00:14:41.600 --> 00:14:43.600
ins and outs of what the executive leadership
00:14:43.600 --> 00:14:46.460
has in mind should something like this occur.
00:14:47.179 --> 00:14:50.019
So it's really ownership of that risk, ownership
00:14:50.019 --> 00:14:54.240
of the process, and getting involved. And for
00:14:54.240 --> 00:14:56.679
any leader listening who wants to strengthen
00:14:56.679 --> 00:14:58.919
their preparedness tomorrow, maybe want to listen
00:14:58.919 --> 00:15:00.620
to this podcast and the reason they're listening
00:15:00.620 --> 00:15:03.759
is to take that valuable takeaway. What is the
00:15:03.759 --> 00:15:06.399
first cultural or even structural shift that
00:15:06.399 --> 00:15:09.320
they need to think about or make to ensure that
00:15:09.320 --> 00:15:12.000
that next exercise that they take truly reflects
00:15:12.000 --> 00:15:15.320
the pressure and complexity of a real attack?
00:15:15.440 --> 00:15:17.159
You must have seen a lot of examples here, some
00:15:17.159 --> 00:15:19.159
good, some bad, but what would you like them
00:15:19.159 --> 00:15:22.889
to take away and try? Yeah, so I think the the
00:15:22.889 --> 00:15:25.529
first step is they need to define their minimal
00:15:25.529 --> 00:15:28.990
viable company and then Working on a scenario
00:15:28.990 --> 00:15:32.389
that's going to push that to its limits It's
00:15:32.389 --> 00:15:34.070
everything's great on paper and as you said before
00:15:34.070 --> 00:15:36.730
that you know Mike Tyson quote We really want
00:15:36.730 --> 00:15:38.870
to stress test the environment. This shouldn't
00:15:38.870 --> 00:15:41.350
be easy. This shouldn't be something that everybody
00:15:41.350 --> 00:15:44.830
just kind of you know half pays attention to,
00:15:45.190 --> 00:15:47.149
it should be straining. It should be difficult.
00:15:48.070 --> 00:15:50.649
And it's something that kind of tests the abilities
00:15:50.649 --> 00:15:53.429
of those involved so that they can improve. We
00:15:53.429 --> 00:15:55.350
don't get better at anything if we're not pushing
00:15:55.350 --> 00:15:59.269
ourselves outside of our comfort zone. So really
00:15:59.269 --> 00:16:01.629
defining what that that minimum viable company
00:16:01.629 --> 00:16:04.210
is and pushing it to its limits in the scenario
00:16:04.210 --> 00:16:06.529
are really going to help you identify those weaknesses,
00:16:07.029 --> 00:16:09.309
identify areas for improvement, which ultimately
00:16:09.309 --> 00:16:12.000
is going to set the organization up on a better
00:16:12.000 --> 00:16:15.549
footing going forward. And one of the things
00:16:15.549 --> 00:16:17.830
I always try and do on here as well is allow
00:16:17.830 --> 00:16:21.669
my guests a moment to bust a few myths and misconceptions
00:16:21.669 --> 00:16:25.549
that they may often read online or just even
00:16:25.549 --> 00:16:27.929
untruth sometimes that you see about the cyber
00:16:27.929 --> 00:16:30.570
security industry. So what would you say people
00:16:30.570 --> 00:16:33.909
most misunderstand about your industry or are
00:16:33.909 --> 00:16:36.830
there any myths about your job or field of expertise
00:16:36.830 --> 00:16:39.149
that we can lay to rest today? Anything spring
00:16:39.149 --> 00:16:43.429
to mind there? I would say Just looking at it
00:16:43.429 --> 00:16:46.850
from a purely technical perspective, obviously
00:16:46.850 --> 00:16:49.009
there's a lot of technical things that we as
00:16:49.009 --> 00:16:51.330
incident responders do, but a lot of what we
00:16:51.330 --> 00:16:55.009
do is communication, is coordination, is kind
00:16:55.009 --> 00:16:58.690
of quarterbacking the situation, right? It's
00:16:58.690 --> 00:17:02.529
helping the organization work through these pitfalls
00:17:02.529 --> 00:17:05.490
that inevitably come up, the unforeseen circumstances
00:17:05.490 --> 00:17:08.430
that we've probably seen hundreds of times. and
00:17:08.430 --> 00:17:11.549
working with the organization to prioritize those
00:17:11.549 --> 00:17:14.289
business functions, work with internal teams
00:17:14.289 -->
00:17:17.190
to help get things up and running. A lot of it
00:17:17.190 --> 00:17:20.589
is in more of those soft skills, right? It's
00:17:20.589 --> 00:17:24.829
well beyond just the hands on a keyboard, investigating
00:17:24.829 --> 00:17:27.130
and digging for data and doing all of those things.
00:17:27.450 --> 00:17:29.970
That's one piece of a larger function of instant
00:17:29.970 --> 00:17:34.049
response teams where we're trying to help supplement
00:17:34.049 --> 00:17:38.240
the organization's executive staff. to get those
00:17:38.240 --> 00:17:41.000
business units to a place where they can keep
00:17:41.000 --> 00:17:43.839
the wheels running and keep the lights on. Love
00:17:43.839 --> 00:17:48.599
that. And looking ahead in your personal career
00:17:48.599 --> 00:17:51.960
and indeed for Booz Allen, anything you're focusing
00:17:51.960 --> 00:17:54.900
on this year, anything that you're looking into,
00:17:54.960 --> 00:17:57.480
watching closely, there's a big talk about agentic
00:17:57.480 --> 00:18:00.579
AI and numerous agents going out there, but anything
00:18:00.579 --> 00:18:02.940
that you're monitoring closely excites you, rurries
00:18:02.940 --> 00:18:06.000
you, or anything in between? Yeah, absolutely.
00:18:06.299 --> 00:18:08.660
So obviously the AI piece is on the front of
00:18:08.660 --> 00:18:11.559
everyone's mind, but we're definitely putting
00:18:11.559 --> 00:18:14.779
a lot of time and effort into development of
00:18:15.470 --> 00:18:18.210
incident response capabilities related to AI,
00:18:19.150 --> 00:18:23.369
working with these organizations to protect and
00:18:23.369 --> 00:18:26.130
assess their AI models and use. A lot of people
00:18:26.130 --> 00:18:27.769
will put these into place because they're very
00:18:27.769 --> 00:18:30.630
productive and very helpful, but have they considered
00:18:30.630 --> 00:18:33.769
the security implications surrounding that use
00:18:33.769 --> 00:18:37.269
or what types of systems is that agent connected
00:18:37.269 --> 00:18:41.690
to? And as we've seen in the last year or so,
00:18:41.730 --> 00:18:43.609
there've been a number of instances where You
00:18:43.609 --> 00:18:48.789
know, agentic AI platforms had very simple vulnerabilities
00:18:48.789 --> 00:18:52.349
associated with tokens and the like. So it's
00:18:52.349 --> 00:18:54.089
understanding those risks, understanding how
00:18:54.089 --> 00:18:55.890
you can mitigate those. And then if, you know,
00:18:55.950 --> 00:18:58.089
something did happen, how we would go about an
00:18:58.089 --> 00:19:00.410
investigation of that to help them understand
00:19:00.410 --> 00:19:02.410
is there a risk to the model? Does the model
00:19:02.410 --> 00:19:05.890
need to be retrained, decommissioned? Just understanding
00:19:05.890 --> 00:19:09.890
that so that while they can use AI and gain from
00:19:09.890 --> 00:19:13.420
its productivity. they're not just eschewing
00:19:13.420 --> 00:19:15.460
the risks and responsibilities that come with
00:19:15.460 --> 00:19:18.240
that. And I'm curious, if we were to take all
00:19:18.240 --> 00:19:20.559
the conversations that you're having with customers
00:19:20.559 --> 00:19:22.720
all around the world and all the tech conferences
00:19:22.720 --> 00:19:25.140
and everything that you're seeing and hearing
00:19:25.140 --> 00:19:27.200
out there, if you put all that into a big melting
00:19:27.200 --> 00:19:29.819
pot, are you seeing any trends in the kind of
00:19:29.819 --> 00:19:32.859
things that businesses are looking for help with,
00:19:32.859 --> 00:19:35.180
et cetera? And if you can share there around
00:19:35.180 --> 00:19:37.440
what you're seeing on the ground floor this year.
00:19:38.440 --> 00:19:41.619
Yeah, so I think the biggest thing comes from
00:19:41.619 --> 00:19:43.960
conversations regarding resilience. I think it's
00:19:43.960 --> 00:19:46.019
still something that many organizations struggle
00:19:46.019 --> 00:19:48.160
with because they don't know if they're doing
00:19:48.160 --> 00:19:51.559
enough, too much. It's really a balance. And
00:19:51.559 --> 00:19:53.880
I think they're typically looking for guidance
00:19:53.880 --> 00:19:57.559
on, you know, what is it that we need to do to
00:19:57.559 --> 00:19:59.980
put ourselves in an appropriate position because
00:19:59.980 --> 00:20:02.160
no one's ever going to prevent every attack.
00:20:03.140 --> 00:20:04.720
You know, there's just too many threat actors
00:20:04.720 --> 00:20:07.430
out there. There's too many... You know entries
00:20:07.430 --> 00:20:10.109
into an organization. So it's it's trying to
00:20:10.109 --> 00:20:12.869
have an assessment of where do we find that balance?
00:20:13.130 --> 00:20:15.990
Where is the level of resource spend appropriate?
00:20:16.529 --> 00:20:18.650
What tools and technologies can we implement
00:20:18.650 --> 00:20:22.750
that are? effective and appropriate Just trying
00:20:22.750 --> 00:20:24.769
to set themselves up for success I think everyone
00:20:24.769 --> 00:20:27.589
has come to terms with the fact that it's not
00:20:27.589 --> 00:20:31.569
if it's when So just trying to really dial in
00:20:31.569 --> 00:20:34.410
the best bang for their buck and what the things
00:20:34.410 --> 00:20:37.190
are that they can do that will prevent the majority
00:20:37.190 --> 00:20:39.150
of things and essentially make them a hard target.
00:20:40.609 --> 00:20:42.789
And I think that is a powerful moment to end
00:20:42.789 --> 00:20:45.710
on. But before I let you go, for anybody interested
00:20:45.710 --> 00:20:48.950
in connecting with you, learning more about Booz
00:20:48.950 --> 00:20:51.049
Allen, maybe following some of the big announcements
00:20:51.049 --> 00:20:53.049
that will be coming out throughout the year,
00:20:53.349 --> 00:20:54.670
where would you like to point everyone listening?
00:20:55.589 --> 00:20:57.849
Absolutely. So you
can find us at BoozAllen .com.
00:20:58.039 --> 00:21:01.299
You can find me on LinkedIn. I'm not incredibly
00:21:01.299 --> 00:21:04.380
active on there, but I certainly put some nuggets
00:21:04.380 --> 00:21:08.400
of information out there from Booz Allen. Happy
00:21:08.400 --> 00:21:10.980
to interact with anybody that has questions about
00:21:10.980 --> 00:21:12.880
what it is we do in the Incident Response Space.
00:21:13.859 --> 00:21:15.519
But yeah, that's the best way to get ahold of
00:21:15.519 --> 00:21:18.480
us. Awesome and I think the big message from
00:21:18.480 --> 00:21:21.039
talking with you today is we can't control the
00:21:21.039 --> 00:21:23.640
adversary or even predict which parts of our
00:21:23.640 --> 00:21:26.599
infrastructure will be impacted but we can control
00:21:26.599 --> 00:21:29.740
how we prepare and how often and I think that's
00:21:29.740 --> 00:21:31.759
often where the biggest gaps lie. So I would
00:21:31.759 --> 00:21:33.700
have links to everything that you mentioned there.
00:21:33.880 --> 00:21:36.259
I'd also like to throw this out to everybody
00:21:36.259 --> 00:21:38.539
listening. There'll be a blog post associated
00:21:38.539 --> 00:21:41.579
with this episode at Tech Talks Network. Please
00:21:41.579 --> 00:21:43.920
share with me your insights, your experiences,
00:21:44.259 --> 00:21:46.420
what you're seeing and hearing. out there, but
00:21:46.420 --> 00:21:48.680
more than anything, just thank you to you for
00:21:48.680 --> 00:21:51.279
starting this conversation today. Thanks so much
00:21:51.279 --> 00:21:53.900
for having me on, really appreciate it. I think
00:21:53.900 --> 00:21:58.299
when a cyber incident unfolds, what separates
00:21:58.299 --> 00:22:01.299
organizations that regain control incredibly
00:22:01.299 --> 00:22:04.059
quickly from those that spend weeks trying to
00:22:04.059 --> 00:22:07.759
understand what happened? As my guest explained
00:22:07.759 --> 00:22:10.980
today, the difference often comes down to preparation
00:22:10.980 --> 00:22:15.480
that goes far beyond technology. Cyber resilience
00:22:15.480 --> 00:22:18.180
is actually built through clarity, rehearsal,
00:22:18.680 --> 00:22:21.200
leadership discipline, and it's the organizations
00:22:21.200 --> 00:22:24.339
that understand their own environments in great
00:22:24.339 --> 00:22:27.579
detail. Only then can they move faster during
00:22:27.579 --> 00:22:31.180
an attack. And teams that rehearse realistic
00:22:31.180 --> 00:22:33.500
scenarios, they're the ones that develop this
00:22:33.500 --> 00:22:37.019
muscle memory needed to act under pressure. And
00:22:37.019 --> 00:22:39.960
companies that define their minimum viable operations
00:22:39.960 --> 00:22:43.000
ahead of time. These are the ones that are able
00:22:43.000 --> 00:22:46.740
to navigate and avoid the chaos of every department
00:22:46.740 --> 00:22:50.920
competing for priority during a crisis. But one
00:22:50.920 --> 00:22:52.980
idea that really stood out to me was the importance
00:22:52.980 --> 00:22:56.559
of treating cyber security as a leadership responsibility
00:22:56.559 --> 00:23:00.079
across the entire business. Instant response
00:23:00.079 --> 00:23:03.440
cannot sit solely with the security team. Every
00:23:03.440 --> 00:23:06.680
department now plays a role in recovery, communication
00:23:06.680 --> 00:23:09.940
and decision making when those systems go down.
00:23:10.779 --> 00:23:14.220
And without that shared understanding even well
00:23:14.220 --> 00:23:16.519
-funded organisations quickly find themselves
00:23:16.519 --> 00:23:19.900
stuck in analysis paralysis when every second
00:23:19.900 --> 00:23:23.599
counts. And I think Andrew reminded us that incident
00:23:23.599 --> 00:23:27.059
response is as much about communication and coordination
00:23:27.059 --> 00:23:30.730
as it is about technical investigation. And it
00:23:30.730 --> 00:23:33.289
is that ability to guide teams through uncertainty,
00:23:33.589 --> 00:23:36.670
set priorities and keep the organisation moving
00:23:36.670 --> 00:23:38.490
forward. These are the things that determine
00:23:38.490 --> 00:23:41.869
whether a crisis becomes a short disruption or
00:23:41.869 --> 00:23:44.710
a long -term business setback on appearing in
00:23:44.710 --> 00:23:46.650
the news headlines for all the wrong reasons.
00:23:47.990 --> 00:23:49.950
But for anyone listening, if you want to strengthen
00:23:49.950 --> 00:23:52.049
your own preparedness, I think the message is
00:23:52.049 --> 00:23:55.089
simple. Stress test the organisation before the
00:23:55.089 --> 00:23:58.089
attacker does. push scenarios beyond the comfortable
00:23:58.089 --> 00:24:01.329
assumptions and identify the weak points while
00:24:01.329 --> 00:24:04.750
the stakes are still low. But after listening
00:24:04.750 --> 00:24:07.809
to this conversation, I want you to marinate
00:24:07.809 --> 00:24:10.809
on this for a while. How confident are you that
00:24:10.809 --> 00:24:14.150
your organisation could respond with clarity
00:24:14.150 --> 00:24:18.150
during the first 72 hours of a cyber crisis?
00:24:18.329 --> 00:24:20.609
If you would take one thing away from this conversation,
00:24:21.029 --> 00:24:23.660
it's that you go away and think about that. And
00:24:23.660 --> 00:24:25.940
maybe share it with me, share it with my guests.
00:24:26.039 --> 00:24:29.480
You can reach me, of course, at Tech Talks Network.
00:24:29.880 --> 00:24:31.599
4 ,000 interviews there. You can leave me an
00:24:31.599 --> 00:24:35.480
audio message, DM, social channels. You'll find
00:24:35.480 --> 00:24:37.279
everything there. But let me know your thoughts.
00:24:37.299 --> 00:24:38.839
If you've got anything you want to add to the
00:24:38.839 --> 00:24:41.079
conversation, if you'd like to come on here and
00:24:41.079 --> 00:24:43.299
share your side of the story, I'd love to hear
00:24:43.299 --> 00:24:46.759
from you too. But that's it for today. So thank
00:24:46.759 --> 00:24:48.680
you for listening, as always, and I'll speak
00:24:48.680 --> 00:24:59.279
with you all again very soon. Bye for now. Thanks
00:24:59.279 --> 00:25:01.759
for watching!