رونوشت 🔗
WEBVTT
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Hey, Patrick. Yeah, apparently
you can't use beef stew as a password.
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You know why? Why? It's
not strong enough? Oh come on,
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I see you laugh. You can't
hide it. I refuse to audibly
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laughs. All right, folks,
Dwayne is not here, as you can
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probably tell because he did not laugh. If he was here, he might
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not laugh anyway. But he's off
on it. What is he doing.
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He's on a work thing, right, Oh? No, robotics. Oh
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that's right, his robotics team,
his overlords are in the championships or in
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the finals or something like that.
So wow, okay, cool. So
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we have six stories. We'll do
three. We'll take a break, we'll
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do the last three. And of
course the clickbait is about the smart garage
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door opener that you do not want
to own. Well, truth in advertising,
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you know, right? All right? So win RAR. So win
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RAR is like zip. Uh,
you know, win zip or zip before
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that, and you can compress a
file and Windows a self extracting archive is
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the technical term that you'll see in
this article. And RAR isn't probably even
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older than ZIP. Maybe maybe not. I don't think anything's older than ZIP,
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except for maybe ARC. It's it's
old it's it's been around for a
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long time. There was some controversy
with win rar because there was there were
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two websites you could get it from, and one seemed to be the real
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one and the other one seemed to
not be the real one. I never
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got satisfaction on that, so all
you gotta be careful where you get it
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from. But like anything else,
it's it's it's about convenience. That's not
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what this is about. This is
an archive that can run PowerShell without being
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detected. Right. But but on
top of that, it's if you get
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the wrong version, it can do
a lot more. Yeah, if this
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is if you get the right version, Okay, so if you get the
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one. So so here's the problem. Self extractors should not like zip and
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win raw file should not be able
to run PowerShell. No, they should
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be able to do one thing un
zip right, right, and so um,
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this is a somebody that built in
decompression stub is being used to call
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PowerShell and run uh, you know, whatever commands are they want to enable,
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and most systems do have PowerShell enabled. So this is this is a
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pretty big deal. If you've been
asleep for the last what fifteen years,
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PowerShell invented by my friend Jeffrey Snober. By the way, he basically created
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a sort of a hyper version of
the command prompt. You know, the
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command prompt used to be the operating
system itself, the ms DOST, but
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the command prompt is you know,
if you drop to a command line and
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then you can execute commands will.
PowerShell allows you to do many, many
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more things, including you know,
Cloud things and Google things and Amazon things
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and stuff that you can just sort
of download and install PowerShell plugins for an
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apps and then you can do a
whole bunch of stuff the command line that
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you couldn't do just an irregular command
line. So anyway, all that is
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to say that a PowerShell is very
powerful and it can do things on your
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behalf, especially if you're logged in
as an admin. So that's why this
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is really scary, isn't it.
Yeah, it is, And it runs
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as far as I can see,
it runs as anti authority system, which
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system privileges are pretty pretty powerful.
They're not all powerful, is not as
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all powerful as you think. They
don't have privileges off the box, but
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they do have powerful privileges on the
box. Typically, if you install a
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Windows service that runs with the NT
service or system account times they have to
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run a system since it depends on
where they are. But think about system
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anti system is something that's going to
give you a lot of power locally but
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nothing remote. Right, yeah,
all right, so what can we do
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about that? It's a it's a
hack. Is it patchable? Yea?
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So I think if you if you
ended up talking to people who you know
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run wind roar, would say,
yeah, this is as as expected as
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it's supposed to be. They haven't
said that. I haven't seen anything from
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wind roar. But this is just
the ability to use. It's like a
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can opener used as a as a
deadly weapon.
Load full transcript
They're not going to recall
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can openers because somebody effectively used one. Right, But but the long and
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short of it is it shouldn't be
able to run power shell scripts. That's
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that's true, you're right, But
that also means you need to be very
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careful about where and what you get
from different sources. But what does that
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mean? So if if I download
a RR file, right, for some
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reason, I have to download a
RR file and I write click on it,
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and I've got wind roar installed,
if I just say, you know,
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um decompress, you know, expand
to this particular folder. Am I
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at the risk of a hack?
Yeah? If the if the if the
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provider of it decided to, you
know, you utilize this mechanism to deliver
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a h an attack against you,
then yeah, it's it's It's basically like
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sending you a word document. I
can tell you half to download a word
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document that has macro's enabled, okay, but in order to use it.
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But if the source is trusted,
like say it's Microsoft or Google or somebody,
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and I know that I'm on their
official page it says Google dot com
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or whatever, Yeah, does the
likelihood that there's going to be something malicious
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in there go down? So if
you look in the article in order to
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the attack sequence is actually well documented. The observed attack chain is a graphic
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and I saw that. So it's
a place SFX archive on disc create utilman
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debugger as SFX archive trigger it.
I don't I don't know what that means,
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but basically it means that somebody this
isn't an accidental thing. This isn't
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somebody has to craft the attack with
that that wind roar file as opposed to
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it's not that win rour files make
you vulnerable. It's that wind or our
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files can be used. Okay,
so if the sort like if if I'm
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giving you the wind roar, then
it's not a problem. If I download
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it and extract it, it's probably
not an issue. If you download it
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and extract it from someone who's not
trying to hack you, it's not an
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issue. If you download an extracted
from Dwayne in Trouble. You said it,
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I didn't, but literally, I
My understanding of this is that the
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--> 00:06:32.560
the only the way this works as
somebody sends you one of these as as
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a trap, it's a trap.
Yeah, okay, all right. And
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also from this article, it says
this type of attack is likely to remain
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undetected by traditional anti virus software that
is, looking from malware inside of an
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archive, which is often also passed. We're protected, rather than the behavior
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from a self extracting archive decompressor stub. Yeah. Interesting. So if somebody
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does want to hack you like this, it's pretty effective. Yeah, but
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the delivery is I have to get
you to un I have to get you
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to unpack a wind roar file that
I've set up for you to to.
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I have to get you to eat
the poison donut. Right. So therefore,
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if it is being downloaded from a
well known, trusted domain, the
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chances are lower that it's going to
be malicious, unless, of course,
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it's from the irs. But that's
another story. Hey, oh hey,
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we'll get to that one. That's
a good story. This is a This
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means that if a if a bad
actor. So, for example, if
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I took over the email of someone
you trusted, right, this, this
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is where I see this being dangerous. I took over the email of someone
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you trusted and said hey God at
Heaven dot com, for example, and
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I end up having control of their
email, and I get you a message
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as them that says, hey,
you know, I found what you I
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found what we're looking for. Um, it's it's here's here's a link to
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the zip file, the the archive
file. And then that little voice in
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your head goes off that says,
you know, Carl Patrick and Dwayne said,
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never ever open a link or click
on a link that's sent an email.
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Ever, No, you call,
you call the person up and you
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say what's wrong with you sending me
these links? And then they'll say I
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didn't send you a link. That's
right, you know, I don't.
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Yeah, you know, I don't
open links, or they'll say, oh
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I thought that was okay, and
then then maybe you still open it.
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Who knows. But that's really the
way it would be, is somebody tricks
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you into download. Really,
you
shouldn't be going on the internet and just
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grabbing things from untrusted websites. You
should not. Yeah, but right,
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but if it again, if it's
a players going to play a company that
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has products that you own, and
the domain checks out and HTTPS is on
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there, you know, and you
got a good back up. Yeah,
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okay, next euler or is the
oiler e U L E R? And
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I think it's pronounced oiler, isn't
it? I think I think so.
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So this is funny. This is
just a little comic relief. Oiler says
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all quote recoverable funds end quote stolen
in a two hundred million dollar hack have
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been returned. Yeah, the culprit
had already apologized. What so there was
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a comment. There was a cryptic
comment in one of the transactions that was
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taken as an apology from the hacker. I have no idea why this happened.
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I don't know, I don't I
can't conceive of the situation where somebody
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steals, goes to the trouble stealing
two hundred million dollars worth of something and
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then returns it. And it was
a coin, right is ten thousand ethereum
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over ten thousand ethereum? Wow?
So it says the hacker responsible for roiling
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Euler or Oiler Finance by draining of
some two hundred million of assets has returned
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everything. Blockchain data on our coome
intelligence shows the crypto address associated with the
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exploiter transferred ten thousand, five hundred
and eighty ether et work ethereum worth some
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nineteen million dollars to you. I
don't see. There's a product called Oiler
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and it's spelled the same way.
Okay, yeah, so I don't know
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how ye what the event signals a
positive ending to one of this year's largest
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crypto exploit I just don't know,
Patrick, It's like, oops, uh,
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you know, I was writing a
script and it got out of control.
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I didn't mean to steal nineteen million
dollars, but here you go.
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I only wanted to steal one point
nine million. I don't know it's I
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moved to decimal. I only wanted
to steal nineteen dollars and Uh, you
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know, it's just looking for a
burger and uh, you know, there
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you go. That's funny. Yeah, I don't know, it's a weird
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I mean, it's a good story
in that um they people were made whole,
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it seems like. But it certainly
undermines confidence in crypto currencies in general.
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There's been a lot of that going
around, but it was one of
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the largest crypto exploits from last you
know, from this year, So it's
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weird ending. I don't know,
maybe his mother found out and told him
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that he's ground his Xbox. It
can take away his Xbox unless do you
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remember in the days before even PCs, this might have been an Apple thing,
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but somebody wrote a virus called cookie
Monster, and basically it would it
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was on text based consoles. It
might have been a PC, might have
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been I don't know, TRS eight, I don't know. Oh, this
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was in the This was in the
BBS system days, right, yeah,
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BBS system days. So you're on
a text based computer and you know,
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the word cookie just pops up keeps
popping up on the screen in different places.
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Now this is text base, right, no graphics, so it just
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overwrites cookie, cookie, cookie and
It gets at first very you know,
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it's very sparse, and then it
gets more more and more intense, and
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you know, half an hour later
your screen is filled with cookie messages and
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the only way to stop it is
to go to the command line and type
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cookie and then it says, thank
you, I've forgotten about that. Well
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that's not the story. But the
story is FBI sees his stolen credentials market
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Genesis in Operation Cookie Monster. Yeah, so what really happened here? So
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this is uh so remember Silk Road, Yes, well you could go and
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buy explosives and people and yeah and
all sorts of you know, drugs and
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things like that. Well, Genesis
market is um is similar to that,
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but it's more about identities. So
if you if I want to buy your
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bank account, right, I could
even buy a subscription to your identities on
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Genesis wow. Um. And the
FEDS you know, managed to get an
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invite to the to the to the
special party. Uh, they reconned it
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and they took it all down and
then they they even arrested I think one
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hundred and twenty users
of the site. Wow. And so that's that's the
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warning here. That's the lesson here
is that even using this stuff. It
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could get you, you know,
arrested and get you prosecuted because it's illegal
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to buy someone's credit card information and
somebody's Netflix password. It's not just illegal
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to sell it. And I like
that. The FBI called it Operation Cookie
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Monster. That's just really funny.
Yeah, that's because they got an invite
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and you know they had to.
I think there was some cookie shenanigans that
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went went into it, but they're
right, but this is good. And
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then they put up a banner on
the site that said this website has been
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seized. UM, you know your
your pole UM eurojust there's a whole bunch
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of organizations that work together, the
UM. The police from Ireland, Canada,
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UM pretty much all over the world
helped, you know, take this
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thing down. And it's whackable.
There's going to be a new one.
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But now there's a slowdown now it
You know, if you're if you're somebody
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who's looking to buy this stuff,
you you might go a month before you
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find another reliable, safe place to
get this stuff from. Yeah, and
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then and now you know, well
people got arrested for you being users,
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so how you might have to create
a new identity it's just slowing them down.
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So and it also take weeks off
the street the people they actually got
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to arrest. Right, Hey,
Patrick, do you have any Samsung engineering
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and code secrets? I can get
some for you. You want to buy
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some, I'll tell you all about
that story after the break. Stick around.
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We'll be right back and we're back. You're listening to Security this week.
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I'm Carl Franklin. That's my friend
Patrick Hines, and we of course
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talk about security issues through the lens
of current events. And there were six
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this week, including this one,
which made me smile. Network. There
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are other chat GPT stories that we
are specifically avoiding this week because we'll do
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them next week, but this one
made me laugh and cringe at the same
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time. Samsung workers made a major
error by using chat GPT. Yeah.
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Big Samsung meeting notes and new source
code are now in the wild after being
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leaked in chat GPT. Yeah.
It's always a problem when someone goes to
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chat GPT and says, can you
keep a secret? Yeah? You know.
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So. The company allowed engineers at
its semiconductor arm to use the AI
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writer to help fix problems with their
source code, but in doing so,
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the workers input in confidential data,
such as the source code itself for a
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new program, internal meeting notes data
relating to their hardware. So the upshot
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is that in just under a month, there were three recorded incidences of employees
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leaking sensitive information via chat GPT.
Since chat GPT retains user input data to
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further train itself, these trade secrets
from Samsung are now effectively in the hands
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of Open Ai, company behind the
AI service. There's a moral of the
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story here. Kids don't share sensitive
data with chat GPTA or anybody else for
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that matter. Yeah. I mean, if you think about this is this
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is kind of stupid on any level, because what other website would you paste
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secure sensitive code to and think,
well, this is good, this is
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a good idea. This is a
good idea to paste this as an input
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on any website. You wouldn't google
your data, you wouldn't put you wouldn't
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post it on Facebook, you wouldn't. So I don't understand what possessed them
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to think that, for somehow they
had some secret bond with chat EPT.
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Yeah, it's it's not good.
It just it goes to show you that
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this thing is not intelligent. Really, it's a language model. It doesn't
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care about facts. It just spits
out language that has been used by other
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people, and it synthesizes it in
real time. And it's there's a server
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behind it with people behind it that
have the right to read the data that
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you you send to them. That's
right, So be careful, be careful.
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It's not what you think it is, all right. So the two
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stories, and in fact, the
next story, I think if it weren't
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for the clickbait factor, this would
have been the headliner. Uh, maybe
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you should tell us about this one.
Yeah, So so I this is
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from bleeping computer IRS authorized e file
dot com tax return software caught serving JavaScript
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malware and so this is it looks
like this isn't done to every request,
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which is actually a really cool technique
Dwayne would be loving right now. Yeah,
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in that if I've got a if
I've got a high volume target,
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like tens of thousands, hundreds of
thousands of people clicking on things, I
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don't want to hit all of them. So if I hit all of them,
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I might overwhelm my own system with
the requests. But I also am
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going to get caught a lot easier
because of research. Will go in and
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try to recreate it, and it'll
get recreated every time. But if I
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do it to every like random,
you know one, like every every prime
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number one, and then repeat after
you know, ten thousand, um,
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then it's going to be hard for
them to recreate because when they try to
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recreate it, they're gonna they're not
going to get the result. And that
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seems to be what's going on here. Somehow. There's even a reference in
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the code to math dot random,
and that's a library inside JavaScript that creates
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random numbers exactly. So basically,
you know, the site is pretty mundane.
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It uses JavaScript libraries that you would
expect, but there's a reference to
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am and I can't even say how
to what the RL says. It's info
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Aman, I'm a new on leang
dot online and that's registered in China.
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Yeah, and then it uses math
dot random at the end to prevent low
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cashing and load a fresh copy of
the malware in case they want to change
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it every time. So every time
it's going to be a little bit different.
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It adds a little bit of entropy, and it may even be something
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that they're doing to prevent it from
happening each time. But what happens is
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this if you get this this lucky
cookie when you go to file your when
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you go to efile dot com,
it tells you your browsers not supported.
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It gives you an error and it
asks you to install either an update dot
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ex or an installer. And and
that's how they own you. That's how
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they get you. And it looks
like the website e file dot com was
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hijacked a couple of weeks ago on
March seventeenth. Yep. On that day,
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to reddit thread surfaced where multiple efile
colm users suspected the website was hijacked.
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And at the time it showed an
SSL error message that you get.
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You know that, Hey, these
the site isn't who they say they are.
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Um, you know click here if
you want to update the browser.
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Blah blah blah. And so it
was hacked. It is not that efile
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dot com decided to hack your you
know, they didn't do it themselves.
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Yeah, bad actor. And SANS
has been a big part of digging this
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down. Um doctor Johannes Ulrich from
Sans Instito, who's a very interesting speaker
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as well as a gifted analyst.
M the domain the one I read info
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Eman. I'm a I'm a new
on lean dot online. That domain only
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existed since the twelfth of March,
so it was created for this attack.
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It was last updated on seventeen March. Wow. Um, so not good.
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So what's the moral here? Well, I mean, if you file
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tax in the US, then E
file is something that you certainly didn't think
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you had to worry about it.
That's why we went. I made that
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allusion to the trusted website earlier.
Is what's a trusted website is it?
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Is it a site that you trust
or a site you trust that won't get
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hacked as well? Right? Um? That said, if you did see
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this from a trusted site, if
you see behavedavior from a trusted site that
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doesn't smell right like it wants you
to download something, it wants you to
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install something, it wants you to
go somewhere else, just don't, right,
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Just you know, just say no. When my browser acts up,
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when I see a pop up that
I don't think should be there, I
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kill the browser. I kill most
of my tabs. I sometimes reboot the
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computer and then run a virus check
when it comes back on. I'm fairly
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paranoid about that. But you don't
want to let them get a toe hole.
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Yep, you don't want to let
them get in. So your behavior
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matters even when these things are presented. Yes, yep. And Patrick's right.
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You know, if
you see that
warning sign, just shut it down,
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go back later. All right,
Shall we talk about the elephant in
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the garage. This was in PC
magazine April fourth, so it is not
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an April fool's choke. Do you
have this smart garage door opener? Disconnect
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it now? And that is I
do not. And this is the X
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not next, but any x X
smart garage door opener, and a bug
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in these controllers makes it easy for
hackers to remotely open them. Yeah,
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this is it relies on our universal
password that applies across all devices, a
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hard coded password. That's the problem. Yeah, And so it's you know,
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I hate to say it because you
and I are both developers at heart.
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Is the developers to blame, absolutely, you know that. Otherwise,
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you know, I don't know how
great a product. It would be,
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probably a very good one. But
when you leave the door open, yeah,
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it doesn't matter how good the lock
is if you leave, if you
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give it, give an easy way
for it to be unlocked. When you
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leave the door opened. The door
can be opened, that's right. So
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you know, this is this is
the problem of you know, developers believe
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the code that no one's ever going
to see my code. It's compiled,
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right, but it still ends up
on the device and it still has to
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be read unencrypted by the processor.
And so unless you're in the most secure
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of design systems where the chips are
part of the scheme, your code's going
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to be read. You have to
assume that your code is going to be
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readable, right, and the secrets
have to be hidden in a way that
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they can't be retrieved just because you
have the code, and that there's been
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you know, we've been through the
evolutions of development where absolutely, you know,
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this has been learned, and I
think in the last ten years developers
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have mostly woken up to the fact
that, oh, my comments are going
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to be available on GitHub forever.
Oh every time I you know, push
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to a repository, uh, you
know, that's there in the history.
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So yeah, I probably don't want
to do anything you know, un towards
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Yeah, exactly, so that I
don't want to be a represented by and
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yet it still happens. Yeah,
it still goes on. It was a
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major company that was going to release
as to open source their their code for
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one of their projects. I forget
what it was, and they couldn't because
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the comments were too um not family
friendly. The comments. Yeah, they
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they it would they they estimated it
would take two years to clean up the
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comments in the millions of lines of
code they're going to release. So we
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didn't we missed out. Um,
this isn't a comment though, this is
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actually a device configuration with a default
password. Yeah, and so, um,
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you know, a universal backdoor.
So when you build these backdoors,
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um, you know we've seen this
with you know, governments wanting backdoors into
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encryption systems. If you build a
backdoor, the good guys aren't the only
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ones that are going to use it. Yep, that's right, And they're
337
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certainly not the only ones they're gonna
find it. The bad guys are looking
338
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for backdoors all the time, and
when they find them, they become a
339
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vulnerability. So this product, I'm
sure this is not good for the bottom
340
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line of any xx rum because now
it's like, Okay, if I was
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going to buy one today, I
probably wouldn't not because it's a it's a
342
00:24:57.640 --> 00:25:00.160
problem with the product there's a problem
with the code and a problem with the
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00:25:00.200 --> 00:25:04.359
culture obviously that let that go by. Yeah, one bad Apple. It
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could just be one developer who And
I don't mean to make excuses. I'm
345
00:25:10.279 --> 00:25:14.000
not an apologist in this regard,
but this is so ubiquitous. We see
346
00:25:14.000 --> 00:25:17.160
this in so many places. When
we do code reviews, we find this
347
00:25:17.160 --> 00:25:19.440
stuff in spades in most companies.
You know, the difference between Next and
348
00:25:19.640 --> 00:25:23.759
some of the other open garage door
openers is this one got published. Yep,
349
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that's right. Yeah, but you
know you're you're smart. You're listening
350
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to security this week, so you
know, if you have one of those
351
00:25:30.039 --> 00:25:34.000
things, you know to trade it
in and get something else, or you
352
00:25:34.039 --> 00:25:41.519
just don't know how to change the
channel. All right, buddy, keep
353
00:25:41.559 --> 00:25:44.599
talking. Yeah you too. I'll
talk to you and hopefully Duyne next week.
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All right, Stay safe out there, yeah, and we'll see it
355
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by bye bye. Five