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These are the problems that we have that it comes back to, man. We should be doing more tabletops, man. And to me a tabletop is the exercise of going through and thought, thinking through what is the worst that can happen. Give a scenario. Every scenario you give helps you and your team and the OT side and the IT side and the leadership understand the risks. And what are we going to do in these scenarios?
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You're listening to Protect it all where Aaron Crow expands the conversation beyond just OT delving into the interconnected worlds of IT and OT cyber security.
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Get ready for essential strategies and insights.
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Here's your host, Aaron Crow.
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Hey everyone.
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Thank you for joining me on the Protect it all podcast.
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I am here unfortunately having a similar conversation to some of the episodes I've done recently, which is a little different than normal where I'm usually having guests sitting across, talking about fun stuff and, and different, different types of topics. But this one is right, you know, and all that's going on, let's just dive in. Right. So when is the last time we've, we've done a, you know, a threat hunt specifically looking for pre positioned adversarial access in your, in your OT or ICS network?
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Probably not a lot of places are doing that. Right. We're not usually when I've done threat hunts or I've done red teams, I've done those things. I've usually done them from the corporate side. I've usually done them in a protected environment.
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I'm not usually doing them in the actual assets in the environments that because there's such a risk and most organizations are, you know, averse to that risk in these spaces for good reason. Right. I remember doing pen testing and, and, and all of that in these spaces and power plants. And we did this with a, a large consultancy. It's when I was an asset owner and we went plant to plant to plant and I would not allow any of them to actually touch keyboard. So I was taking my machine, I was doing hands on keyboard, getting them data out, but we were still very cautious and we were communicating with the plant and we were doing it in down times.
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But remember we were at a, at a site and we were in the break room and we'd done the pre job brief that morning and we were drinking coffee like had not done anything yet and the plant tripped. The first thing everybody did is what'd you guys do?
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Nothing. We're literally sitting here, our computers are in our, in our bags, we're having coffee and donuts that we brought in for for the entire team and they you know, panicked because we were there, we done the pre job brief, we knew what we were do, they knew what
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we were doing that day and they, we had to prove or they had to prove that it wasn't us before we were able to do anything. So in these environments it's so difficult to do this stuff right.
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And now we're, we're dealing with an actual incident with Striker.
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According to Microsoft Threat Intelligence, an Iranian state sponsored group called Lemon Sandstorm has maintained persistent access since I'd critical national infrastructure networks including energy and water, ICS and SCADA systems. For more than two years they've been sitting there waiting and with Operation Epic Fury which is you know, the US's attack against Iran, the US Israeli military campaign against Iran, it's the intelligence community is assessing that activation that this thing is sitting there somewhere in these places, in these energy systems, in these water systems, in these ICS and GATA systems and that now that there's an attack going on that there's dormant access that they've just been waiting and it's going to do. Right.
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So most people are talking about this tracker attack now. Right. We also absolutely need to talk about it. Landmark event but I want to make sure we talk about the right context. Right.
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Because what happened with Stryker is not an isolated incident.
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It's the, the first conform confirmed, you know, destructive I guess cyber operation of, of an active military conflict there. There have been and that's debatable. Right. You know obviously we don't always know the things that we don't know but this one being public and being confirmed is, is really what I'm talking about there. Right? Is, is you know, for everybody out there that's like me that's protecting you know, critical infrastructure, you know that's, that's pretty scary.
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The fact that we've got energy, water, manufacturing, healthc care, these types of things can be happening in these spaces and be a part of war. Right. Used to, you know, thinking back to my, my parents and my, my grandparents and, and war and you know, as atrocious as war always is, no matter what it looks like, you know, World War II, World War I, they're on another continent. Especially as an American, it's on another continent. Obviously we got hit in Pearl harbor, but again in the homeland we're not exactly being hit by bombs. Like I can't imagine living in Israel or in Iran or any of these places where as just a citizen, not part of the military, just as being at home with my family, those things coming in, the risk that we saw all the way back to you know, with the, the stuxnet, right is, is that was a, a weapon that was fired at ironically enough the Iranians for their, their centrifuges. Right. But that thing is that weapon can be fired back, right? It's not like a bomb that blows up and you know, they can be fired back. We even see the drones nowadays.
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I've seen the, the recent thing with the drones that you know, actually Iran built us re redesigned and are using the same technology back against them again. Right. All this to say there's, there's a lot of war, warfare looks different especially when we bring in the cyber component to that warfare. Right. So let's get start started with the, the facts of the, you know, attack itself.
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Striker corporation, roughly what 25 billion dollar medical technical technology company it says with 56,000 employees across 60 plus countries.
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They disclosed a global disruption to its Microsoft Environment on March 11.
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Pro Iranian Hacktivist Group called Handala which is also tracked as Void Manticore and assessed to have ties to Iran's military of intelligence and security. They claimed responsibility.
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Their claim numbers is that they have more than 200,000 devices wiped across 79 countries and approximately 50 terabytes of data exfiltrated before the wipe commands went out.
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All right. Striker confirmed there was no evidence of ransomware. It was just purely destructive. Right. They didn't, they didn't want money, they didn't want, they weren't threatening, they weren't saying hey do this or else. It was just I want to do damage. The technical piece that, that we need to understand is that they didn't write a custom wiper.
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They compromised the Microsoft Entra ID tenant. Right. So we all have these Microsoft 365 tenants and we're connected with Azure and identity access management and they actually gained administrative access into Microsoft intune. Right. This goes back to all the way back in the day when we used to have active directory and we're logging in as domain admins on endpoints and we got to protect the hash and pass the hash. There's all these problems. I'm not saying it's the same thing, but it's a very similar type problem. Right. As they gut access and once you have domain access or, or, or admin administrative access at those levels you're hosed.
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Right. So their, their MDM system, mobile device management system and from there they, they were, they used the intool like living off the land. We've Heard that term. They've used the built in products and capabilities that we have. Like we give these laptops out, we want, hey, we need to make sure that we can remote wipe them. If somebody loses a laptop in an airport or leaves it in a rental car or somebody steals it out of the back of your car or breaks in your hat, whatever those things are, we need to be able to remote wipe and factory reset they logged in and use those exact capabilities that were designed as part of the disaster recovery, as part of incident response planning in our, in our plans here. The
problem is, is if they get, if the, if the bad actors get into those spaces and have those capabilities, we're giving them access to those things.
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It's why in, in IT or in ot, we do, you know, we, I, I for sure and many, many that I hear are so adamant about segmentation. And it's not just network segmentation, it's segmentation. It's separation of duties. It's all the way back to the reason why your accountant, like you have separation duties between your accounting department and your payroll and all this kind of stuff because you don't want one person to be able to write themselves a check and also cook the books so that you don't understand what just happened. Right? There's, there's those separations of duties, right? In, in a very similar way. This is, this is an issue.
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The attack used legitimate functionality in their system.
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There was no malicious payload. It wasn't custom, it wasn't malware, it wasn't ransomware. It was nothing that your security tools were going to detect because they, it was built in, it was, it was purpose as designed by Microsoft and by the organization.
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There's no Endpoint AV or EDR to detect it came from the management plane itself. Right. And that's, that's the important piece there is. It wasn't, you know, a malicious code or malware or anything else in that space.
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So again, we've been talking about it, I've mentioned a few times already, but in ot we call it living off the land where they use legitimate tools. Adverse or you know, bad actors use legitimate tools and protocols.
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Your HMIs, your engineering workstation, CMP3, Modbus, OPC. Like we know these things are insecure and they use those things to, to move. They can use those things to move through the control system environments without triggering detection. You're not going to notice if somebody sends a DMP3 or a Modbus command, even though I don't want them to and they shouldn't be doing those things. It's not something that my security tools are going to detect.
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Crash override, abused ICS protocols, targeted safety, instrument systems.
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Pipe dream took a toolkit for abusing whatever's already on the OT network. What this bad actor, what this group did with Stryker, is the exact same playbook applied to the enterprise IT side, right? It's, it's to the corporate side of this conversation because it's, it's that, that integrated Microsoft platform. The tool is different.
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The principle is identical, though. It's that living off the land, like what tools are here and what can I do with it and scale the destruction, right? So if I can push patches, if I can reboot, if I can force wipe.
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Cool, let's do that. Some hospitals, EMS providers
temporarily disconnected from Striker cloud services as a precaution, including LifeNet, the platform used for the, you know, transmitting EKGs from ambulances to hospitals. And that, that downstream consequence of an IT attack on a device company. Patient safety and clinical operations were in fact affected. Infected.
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That's a different thing. There was no infection. It was just all as built. So we've all seen the headlines. It's been out for, you know what, today's the 16th, so it came out the 11th, so it's been out for almost a week now.
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This deserves attention.
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And how do you have, you know, that defensive thinking about as an attacker, as a bad actor, what can I do with this access? I remember sitting in a, at a, a tabletop exercise at a plant and the CISO was in the room with us and we were going through all these different scenarios and it was a corporate LED one, right? So it had IT stuff and management stuff and OT stuff, all the things.
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And, and the CISO said, well, if we were talking about bringing down power plants, like who, who is the person that is the most dangerous?
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And I said, and I raised my hand and I said, me and my team.
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He said, well, why do you say that? I said, well, because we know the passwords to every site.
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I know I have an account on every side. I have admin rights on every account. I have the local accounts to everything.
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Because the question he had was like, if, if a, you know, a bad person, a bad actor came in and, and, and took me hostage or had my family and held a gun to their head and said, go in and do this or else you couldn't stop me.
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Like, I have that access. Nobody would even know it until it was too late. So how do you fix that? How do you monitor for that? How do you adjust for that?
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Like you need me and my team to be able to do what I need to do, but you also don't want me to have so much power that I can shut everything down before you and you can't do anything about it. Right. So it's that, it's that catch 22 that sometimes security makes things more difficult and complexity is not necessarily what is needed at an OT space. When I need to be able to respond quickly because again, and in a difference from an IT world, in an OT world, I need to be able to respond. It's the reason why you walk into a control room and there's no passwords on those systems. An operator gets up and walks and goes to the bathroom. They're not locking their screen behind them.
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In an IT world, you would say, oh, that's dangerous. Like somebody could walk in and, and steal your data or, or do something, right? Well, we handle those in different ways. We lock the room. Nobody's in the room that shouldn't be.
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And if something's going on on the system, if, you know, think about Chernobyl or a nuclear power plant of any kind or any type of mechanical thing that's moving, if there's a safety incident, if there's a danger to the system that's going to damage the, the equipment, even if I'm not even talking about human life, if I'm just going to damage equipment can take me down. I need to be able to react. It seconds matter. So I don't want to lock the workstation just because, you know, Bob went up to go to the restroom and then Bob's in the restroom and then the plants melting down and I have to wait till Bob comes back and logs in to be able to take action. Of course not.
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But that makes it difficult to protect and to air gap and to which as we know, air gap is usually a figment of imaginations.
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But these things are part of it. Right? These are the difficulties. If, if it wasn't for this OT would be no different than it. It would be super simple to secure it. This is very much in our wheelhouse as practitioners, as cyber security people protecting this and, and working on these things. Right.
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You know, the, there's so many different groups that are involved in, in this that we know of. That doesn't mean that there aren't more that are out there. Right. Anytime that there's a, a conflict. And again, this is not to, is not to talk about right, wrong and different. It's just a fact when there when there is a, a conflict, there's going to be bad actors or not even bad actors, depending on your perspective.
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Hackers, hacktivists, people that believe in one side or the other and are going to go after the other side, right? You know, different APT groups, you know, different government sponsored ones, not government sponsored ones.
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It doesn't matter, right? There's going to be additional ATT given. And we know that the OT spaces are vulnerable. We know that the, you know, they, we know where, where the difficulties are, let's just put it that way, without, without saying too much.
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These are not secrets, these are not surprises that these environments are, are risky. We know that the energy sector is a prime target. Like look at any major incident. Like you look at, you know, a hurricane coming through.
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One of the biggest problems that we have when those things power loss, when power goes down, nothing else works. Whereas North Carolina a couple years ago where a substation went down, I think somebody actually shot it with a, with a rifle. But that substation went down, they shot a transformer. They couldn't get that transfer back up. An entire section was down. I think it was an entire county.
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But this entire big geographical area
was completely out of power for like a week. So if you want to get gas, you had to drive next county over. Grocery stores didn't work, water didn't work. There was no pumping of water.
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You know, refrigeration didn't work. Like nothing worked because everything in our world is tied to electricity.
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So you don't have to go after the water, you just hit the electricity and the water goes down too. So it's that big domino. We know that is a prime target. We know that is the biggest concern. It's, it's critical, right? There's, there's potential for espionage. We just talked about a gunfire so I could shoot a transformer that's got cyber. But those are things that we have to be concerned about. So I could run a car, like they could drive a truck into it. They could, they could, you know, walk into something and bring in malware. Like there's any number of things that can happen. This wasn't that, right? Striker was not that it was pre positioned access, it was getting into Microsoft, it was getting into a tenant, it was using, you know, living off the land type capabilities. Right. Activist groups and all of that is going to surge because of conflicts. The electronics operations room in Iran coordinated hacktivist platform is reportedly coordinating about 60 groups of activists. They've conducted 149 confirmed denial of service attacks against 110 organizations across 16 countries since the conflict began. ICS and OT specific attacks from the activist ecosystem surged 50% in March. Now most activist attacks, not nuisance level rather than, you know, bringing down a plant, but it's not always true. Obviously all it takes is one of them to get through and be able to bring something down. As we know, the grid is very tightly woven and easily not easy. But if I can bring down a domino, the right domino, if I can pull the right peg out at the right time or the wrong time, how big of an issue that can be. So there's just a lot of attention focused on other countries, other organizations. And even though, you know, the power plant didn't do anything, the, the, the, you know, your organization didn't do anything.
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It's just a matter of that we are in this space like we are in a place where there is an action going on and that is going to cause more attention, right? So again, the, so what? Okay, Aaron, like, yeah, we know this is going on. I see it in the news every day. It's on my social media feed. What the hell should I, should I do about it, right? This is a great time to raise that flag, right? It's a great time to start searching the, the logs. It's a great time to, you know, raise the flag with your, with your management, with your leadership and talk about, hey, this is a, another justification for why, right? Because what it really comes down to in most organizations that I see is lack of time, money and resources, right? I, I don't have enough money to justify the bodies, the, the process, the, the technology that I need in these spaces.
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And a lot of times it's because, hey, we've been running this plant for 40 years and nothing bad has ever happened.
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Why am I going to put money into this? Now let's kick the can down the road a little bit further or I'll give you a little bit like what if, if I had to prioritize. Out of this big list of things that, that you say are, are deficient, what is the one that you need most, right? So this is the, the things to think about as you're looking at your organization. Look at this, this attack and this incident and bring, boil that up and, and convert that into what does this mean for me and my organization?
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Are we at risk for this?
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What is the downstream impact of that? Right? If my organization is using Microsoft or whatever those things are, just go through that tabletop exercise, pretend that that happened to your organization. What could happen?
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Obviously this was a medical device company.
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What, what could that, what could happen in your space?
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Are you transportation? Are you wastewater? Are you a manufacturing facility? Like, what are you. What could it do in these scenarios? This is why I think we do as a, as a entity or an organization.
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Usually we use tabletops incorrectly. We do once a year and we have these big ones and we bring people from all over the country. And I'm not saying there's anything wrong with that, but we should be doing a tabletop. Every time we have something like this come up, we should be doing a tabletop monthly, weekly, as often as possible.
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This is just war gaming. It's thinking through the scenario of if I have these problems, how would I respond?
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And the more that you do them, the more issues you're going to find, the more solutions you're going to find. It's not just about finding the holes, it's also about finding solutions. And those solutions aren't always just a technology or a person. It can be just, hey, if we change this setting to that or we change this configuration, this way, it reduces our risk because of X, Y and Z.
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I can't patch this system. But if I put it behind this firewall in this separate network and I monitor it because I already have all these things in place, and I monitor it because I can't reduce. I need RDP and I need ssh.
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So. But I also know that I only should be sshing from this other machine over here and I could put antivirus and all the other tools on it. Okay, well that, that secures me more than just having this thing be able to be directly RDP'd to like. Those are examples. I'm just throwing an example
out of. You have to really go through and understand that. And the more that you're doing these exercises, I can't tell you how many times I've done this. And I walk through these plants, I walk through an environment and. And I'm like, well, you don't have remote access. No, we don't have remot completely air gapped or it's completely isolated or blah, blah, blah. We walk over like, okay, well what is this? Well, this is a system. What is that? Well, it's got a wireless card on it. Well, who, who's that? Wireless card? Oh, well, that's for the vendor. Okay, does, how does that, how do they get access to that? Oh, well, they just have direct access.
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Okay, buddy, that's called remote access.
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And then that is also plugged into your OT network, which means that Vendor or a bad actor going through that vendor now has access directly into this system because you gave them access or they gave themselves access to this environment through a cellular modem.
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Now they have access to this system and then they can pivot because that system is also plugged into the rest of your OT system because it's not segmented, it's not air gapped, it's not. It's all one big network many times, or maybe it's not one network, but are there other systems on that environment that they can get to or pivot to or all your. Even if I am segmented, is it blocked down enough that if I get into that space that I'm going to be able to detect or restrict them from being able to do other things when they're there? Like, these are the problems that we have that it comes back to, man. We should be doing more tabletops, man. And to me, a tabletop is the exercise of going through and thought, thinking through what is the worst that can happen. Give a scenario. Every scenario you give helps you and your team in the OT side and the IT side and the leadership understand the risks. And what are we going to do in these scenarios? It's the same reason we. I know I sound like a broken record, but it's the same reason why we do fire drills and businesses and buildings. Because you don't want the first time somebody is evacuating a building with a fire to be the first time they think about, what am I supposed to do? Where do I go? How do I do this? I'm on the 32nd floor. Where do I take this elevator? Do I take that elevator? Where do I go to? Where's the muster point? So reason we do fire drills occasionally. So we go through the exercise. So when it does happen. Oh yeah, I remember I'm. I'm not supposed to take the elevators, I'm supposed to take the stairwells. I'm supposed to go down X number of floors and then there'll be a, a person that's there that's supposed to say, should I keep going or stop here? Like, there's examples of, of why we do these things.
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And again, in many organizations we're doing them once a year, which is better than none, but we're still doing them once a year. If nothing else, take this scenario. Take the things that are going on in the news, take the things that we're seeing in the space and do your own. Use whatever tools you can, write on a piece of paper, Reach out to others that have done it and build your own scenario. It doesn't have to be super complex, but put the scenario in, have a conversation, have it. Bring in lunch, bring in your operators, bring in your, your cyber security folks, bring your networking guys, bring your firewall guys. Hey guys, this is, this is what's going on. This is scenario. I put together a brought in lunch. Let's talk about it. This is the bad thing that could happen. What could happen? How could they get to, how could they pivot? Let's look at our firewall rules. Let's look for this.
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Like that's how you start thinking ahead. Because that's what the bad actors are doing. They get in, they're like, oh, what can I do at this place?
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And they're dedicated their time to doing those things. They're not just in meetings, they're not just, you know, updating firewalls or, or adding new technology or capabilities. Because the problem is, is as we know, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.
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So yeah, you may be updating firewalls across your organization, you may be adding this or that or whatever.
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I don't know how to get the message across to those that aren't hearing in the back, the place that you installed and updated five years ago and haven't been back to, that's where they're going to get in. The vendor that has access to that 3G modem we talked about, or 5G or whatever cellular modem directly into their system. That's how they get in the unsecure wireless network that the operator plugged in. Because I need access at Saturday, at 3 o' clock in the morning. And nobody, the IT organization hasn't deployed out to them yet. So they got a D link off from, from Walmart and they plugged it into their network. That's how they're going to get in.
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And these people, you know that operator that did that, they're not doing it to be malicious. They're doing it because I need to do their job.
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And the system failed them many times. That's what happens.
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It makes it so complex, so expensive, so difficult to get anything through. Like, forget it, I'll just do it myself. Because I need to work today. I don't need to work in six months when I go through all these boards and approvals and, and all the things, it's a, it's a $50 freaking modem. I can plug it in. And we this afternoon.
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And they don't understand the vulnerabilities and the risks that they brought in but they needed it to work and we didn't help them. Use this as an opportunity to have additional conversations. Talk to your teams, go
to the sites, figure out, go through these scenarios, do a tabletop, bring in somebody like us that does them and has tools and can do it or do it yourself. Like find a way to take some positive action in this ways and it doesn't have to be expensive. Like I said, if you're doing this yourself, it's 15 minutes chatgpt going through some scenarios and having a conversation, bringing in lunch. Like how much is. Is buying some pizza for a team of 20 or 50 or 100 a heck of a lot cheaper than a cyber incident. A heck of a lot cheaper. Bringing down a plant, a heck of a lot cheaper than loss of life in these spaces. Do something, take action. Make positive progress. All right, that's it guys. I appreciate the time.
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Definitely like subscribe all the things, get the message out. This is too important not to.
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We have to be doing, taking actions in the right direction. I don't care how much budget you have. There's definitely things that you can do and they don't have to be expensive and they don't have to be super time consuming. They can just be taking baby steps. I think back to what about Bob?
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Baby steps on the, on the plane, baby steps on the train. Baby steps to get to that place. Like just take baby steps if I'm moving in the right direction. I started rucking what five years ago or something and I started with a, a 10 pound weight in a JanSport backpack. And now I, I carry, you know, anywhere up to 65 pounds and I have dedicated. I've got like five different rocks from Goruck and all the things and all those patches behind me back there that I've gotten from events and, and all the things. Right?
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Thousand miles a year, many times on, on, on doing rocks on, on these ones over here.
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But it started with I decided I picked up a backpack, I threw a little bit of weight in and I started taking steps and it was hard and I didn't go very fast. I didn't go very far. But that over time became hey, I can grab a pack and run. And I've done marathons and I've done crazy events and I, I've hiked a 10k with a friend of mine and, and fourteener in Colorado. It starts with making a decision, finding the direction I want to go and taking baby steps in that path. It's the same in your personal life. It's the same in everything. So if you have questions, this is a great community. Reach out to others that are there.
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All the, all the Instagram and all the things are fine. But, you know, the one thing I love about LinkedIn is, is there's so many folks that are on there that are sharing and are willing to have the call, set up a conversation, say, hey, this is what I've done in the past. This is what worked for me. This is how, you know, I would take action if I had a dollar, if I had a million dollars. Because there's, there's steps you can take. No matter what your budget level is, even if it's zero, there's still things you can do. All right, everyone, keep up the good fight. Come see us at ICS Village. We'll be at rsa.
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We'll be at DEFCON in Vegas. We'll also be at defcon in Singapore.
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So depending on where you are on this planet, there's definitely places to plug in and find people, have conversations. If you're new, you're trying to get into OT or ics, you're in it, whatever those things are, we need everyone to be fighting this fight. Thanks a lot.
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Thanks for joining us on Protect it all, where we explore the crossroads of IT and OT cybersecurity.
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Remember to subscribe wherever you get your podcasts to stay ahead in this ever evolving field. Until next time.