رونوشت کامل 131. Hack or Be Hacked: AI, Linux, Binance, and the New Security Reality

server. Yeah. 86 00:04:16.820 --> 00:04:19.540 Why does it say Ubuntu 87 00:04:19.540 --> 00:04:25.525 and Red Hat still have no fix? What does Red Hat have to do with this? Do they have distributions 88 00:04:25.845 --> 00:04:26.725 of Linux? 89 00:04:27.365 --> 00:04:30.165 Yeah. It used to be called Red Hat Enterprise Linux. 90 00:04:30.324 --> 00:04:34.324 I think they changed the name of it recently, but those That's 91 00:04:34.405 --> 00:04:36.324 Ubuntu Enterprise now, right? 92 00:04:37.170 --> 00:04:38.050 Was it? 93 00:04:38.530 --> 00:04:39.250 Okay. 94 00:04:39.890 --> 00:04:41.570 I see. So Ubuntu 95 00:04:41.570 --> 00:04:48.850 is a product from Red Hat? I don't know. Know that there's like... Because I run Ubuntu on my laptop 96 00:04:48.850 --> 00:04:54.585 and it keeps asking me if I want upgrade to Ubuntu Enterprise. 97 00:04:55.224 --> 00:04:57.145 Obviously, I'm not running a server. 98 00:04:57.305 --> 00:05:00.025 It's just my little laptop, but still, 99 00:05:01.145 --> 00:05:03.384 I don't know. I saw another tweet that 100 00:05:03.880 --> 00:05:11.960 was interesting because it mentions that Anthropic says its unreleased AI model turned it into a remote root exploit. Apparently, Anthropic 101 00:05:12.280 --> 00:05:12.840 has 102 00:05:13.640 --> 00:05:15.880 a ninety day public notice 103 00:05:16.365 --> 00:05:17.165 policy, 104 00:05:17.565 --> 00:05:21.485 meaning they might have known about this three months ago. Oh interesting. 105 00:05:23.005 --> 00:05:31.670 I don't know the cadence of all these things but I think again, I mean this has been a topic of conversation a handful of our pods now is like shit keeps breaking, 106 00:05:31.990 --> 00:05:35.590 it doesn't seem like it's slowing down. No, seems like it's accelerating. 107 00:05:36.550 --> 00:05:39.270 Anthropic has an unreleased 108 00:05:39.270 --> 00:05:40.870 AI model that can 109 00:05:41.670 --> 00:05:44.070 find and do these exploits. 110 00:05:45.235 --> 00:05:48.915 They're not releasing their model but they're like sharing all the exploits. 111 00:05:48.915 --> 00:05:54.675 Yeah, they're saying, hey we found this. By the way you can't have the tool that found it. Yeah, 112 00:05:55.235 --> 00:05:55.635 wow. 113 00:05:57.600 --> 00:05:58.640 So, 114 00:05:58.880 --> 00:06:00.400 all right, is this... 115 00:06:01.520 --> 00:06:04.880 I mean, kind of circling back to where we started the conversation, 116 00:06:04.960 --> 00:06:06.880 like when mankind 117 00:06:06.880 --> 00:06:15.135 entered the Bronze Age, were people just destroying society around them with all their newly found and developed tools? 118 00:06:17.134 --> 00:06:20.175 It says, I looked up a timeline of 119 00:06:20.815 --> 00:06:21.695 the Linux 120 00:06:21.854 --> 00:06:23.055 CVE, which is 121 00:06:23.920 --> 00:06:28.800 nine eight four three two for those who are following along. Its rate is 9.8 supercritical. 122 00:06:28.800 --> 00:06:30.080 I think that's out of 10. 123 00:06:31.600 --> 00:06:35.760 The vulnerable code was introduced to the kernel in October 2015. 124 00:06:37.165 --> 00:06:38.605 And then October 125 00:06:38.605 --> 00:06:39.485 1, 126 00:06:40.205 --> 00:06:41.725 so a month ago, 127 00:06:43.645 --> 00:06:48.045 Eric Dumaset submitted a patch crediting anthropic researchers. 128 00:06:48.940 --> 00:06:54.220 October 5, the patch was merged into the upstream kernel, so they did. They had at least thirty days 129 00:06:54.460 --> 00:06:56.220 Mhmm. Notice. 130 00:06:56.220 --> 00:07:01.900 Who knows how long Anthropic knew about it before this guy, Eric, submitted the patch. 131 00:07:03.180 --> 00:07:03.500 But 132 00:07:04.245 --> 00:07:08.645 the first stable kernels were released containing the fix on October 11. 133 00:07:09.765 --> 00:07:11.125 Linux 7.3 134 00:07:11.125 --> 00:07:12.965 was released October 18. 135 00:07:13.765 --> 00:07:16.645 Twenty seventh, Anthropic published the demonstration 136 00:07:16.725 --> 00:07:17.845 of the 137 00:07:18.085 --> 00:07:20.165 remote 138 00:07:19.070 --> 00:07:20.590 root exploitation. 139 00:07:22.510 --> 00:07:30.190 And then it says October 30, so a couple days ago, Red Hat published the security bulletin and mitigation instructions. AWS published the guidance, 140 00:07:31.005 --> 00:07:33.965 and the patch rollout is continuing. 141 00:07:35.165 --> 00:07:37.885 Some major distributions lack fixes. 142 00:07:38.285 --> 00:07:40.445 It's a use after free 143 00:07:40.685 --> 00:07:45.245 race condition during I p p... I p v four TCP connections. 144 00:07:47.120 --> 00:07:53.360 And an attacker could exploit a vulnerable server with a multipath, that's what you said, TCP listener. 145 00:07:54.880 --> 00:08:01.120 It says that on a vulnerable server, it takes fifty three minutes to get root access on that server. 146 00:08:01.815 --> 00:08:02.535 Wow. 147 00:08:03.095 --> 00:08:04.295 Who's in charge 148 00:08:04.615 --> 00:08:06.215 of ranking 149 00:08:06.535 --> 00:08:11.014 the threat level of the vulnerability? Yeah, what would have had to change in this 150 00:08:11.495 --> 00:08:15.095 vulnerability to get those extra point two basis 151 00:08:15.000 --> 00:08:19.160 points to be a 10. I find that fascinating. Clearly they have some 152 00:08:19.479 --> 00:08:21.320 ranking mechanism. Yeah. 153 00:08:21.879 --> 00:08:27.560 Does this affect me? This is Pod 56, Eco and I ask questions and Scott researches. 154 00:08:27.560 --> 00:08:28.680 Yeah. Go. 155 00:08:29.445 --> 00:08:30.245 The 156 00:08:30.325 --> 00:08:31.205 CVSS 157 00:08:31.205 --> 00:08:33.765 system, Common Vulnerability Scoring System, 158 00:08:34.245 --> 00:08:38.165 is developed and maintained by FIRST, a nonprofit cybersecurity organization. 159 00:08:38.325 --> 00:08:39.285 They 160 00:08:39.285 --> 00:08:41.445 maintain the standard, but they don't do the scores. 161 00:08:42.640 --> 00:08:44.720 The actual scores themselves 162 00:08:44.880

--> 00:08:45.520 are... 163 00:08:45.840 --> 00:08:53.520 A bunch of different people put it together, but, NIST does some of it and NVD, the National Vulnerability Database 164 00:08:53.680 --> 00:08:54.400 in The US, 165 00:08:55.415 --> 00:09:00.375 in combination with all the big software vendors, Microsoft, Red Hat, Cisco, etcetera. 166 00:09:01.175 --> 00:09:02.535 And then there's, like, 167 00:09:03.735 --> 00:09:05.175 these CVE 168 00:09:05.175 --> 00:09:07.574 numbering authorities that I think just, like, 169 00:09:08.260 --> 00:09:09.300 they numbered We those 170 00:09:10.180 --> 00:09:13.779 should rank some Bitcoin mining firmware vulnerabilities according to their 171 00:09:14.100 --> 00:09:16.180 Yeah. Can we Standards. 172 00:09:16.820 --> 00:09:17.620 Can we 173 00:09:18.339 --> 00:09:26.995 do that? I don't know. I mean I'm sure we could... Because... So it's... The ranking is... The score is calculated mathematically. 174 00:09:27.395 --> 00:09:27.875 Yeah. 175 00:09:28.595 --> 00:09:29.235 So, 176 00:09:29.555 --> 00:09:36.810 I would I would think if that is open source, I we think it's a worthwhile exercise. We could run it. It's a measure of 177 00:09:37.530 --> 00:09:38.570 the vulnerability's 178 00:09:38.570 --> 00:09:39.530 severity, 179 00:09:39.530 --> 00:09:41.770 not the probability of exploitation. 180 00:09:44.090 --> 00:09:44.970 It's like, 181 00:09:45.770 --> 00:09:52.465 it could be very damaging but only affect like one machine and it could still have a high ranking Right. Or high score. 182 00:09:52.865 --> 00:09:53.505 Right. 183 00:09:54.065 --> 00:09:57.904 Are there any known instances of this recent Ubuntu 184 00:09:57.904 --> 00:09:59.025 vulnerability 185 00:09:59.265 --> 00:10:00.145 getting 186 00:10:00.865 --> 00:10:02.225 used in the wild? 187 00:10:02.545 --> 00:10:03.904 Oh, that's a good question. 188 00:10:04.690 --> 00:10:06.290 And on the flip side of that, 189 00:10:07.170 --> 00:10:09.810 like when this all started with Coldcard and 190 00:10:10.930 --> 00:10:11.730 then we had 191 00:10:13.089 --> 00:10:18.449 something else, like something broke in lightning right after that. And then there was the 192 00:10:19.165 --> 00:10:21.325 liquid BTC hack, 193 00:10:21.965 --> 00:10:29.805 right? Yeah, Bolt shut down. Bolt shut down, and then not long after we had like PHP. 194 00:10:29.885 --> 00:10:39.560 Treasure customer data. Oh yeah, treasure customer data. The ledger hardware vendor. Yeah, the vendor that was putting that extra chip to 195 00:10:39.960 --> 00:10:43.240 capture the data going to the display. And then 196 00:10:43.975 --> 00:10:44.775 Binance. 197 00:10:45.015 --> 00:11:00.130 Yeah. And then the Binance hack, dude. My gosh. The Binance hack. We haven't talked That since was last Friday or Thursday. That was only the biggest ever exploit by, like, dollar value? In crypto, yeah. Six, like almost $7,000,000,000 198 00:11:00.130 --> 00:11:04.130 worth? Yeah. But I think like half of it was frozen. 199 00:11:04.130 --> 00:11:06.370 Yes. Half of it was stablecoins 200 00:11:06.450 --> 00:11:07.490 on Tether. 201 00:11:08.370 --> 00:11:12.645 And US dollar coin, and they were able to like freeze those from moving. 202 00:11:13.205 --> 00:11:17.845 And then the majority of the rest of it has been swept into an Ethereum wallet, 203 00:11:18.965 --> 00:11:22.325 which I think would be chef's kiss if they rolled back the ETH chain. 204 00:11:23.045 --> 00:11:31.520 And then the whole thing just got frozen and undone. It was just fiat with extra steps. I don't know if they'll roll the chain back again. I don't know, maybe. 205 00:11:33.040 --> 00:11:38.400 That was so much drama for Ethereum when they did that the first time, and then we wound up with Ethereum Classic 206 00:11:38.640 --> 00:11:39.840 and Ethereum. 207 00:11:39.920 --> 00:11:44.375 Okay. That's where Ethereum Classic is. I didn't know that. Yeah. That was probably for less money. 208 00:11:44.855 --> 00:11:56.695 Oh, yeah. For sure. Was it a fat finger or an exchange that got hacked? Like a fat finger fee or something? I don't know. I think it was a proper hack. It was in the... Like some Ethereum DAO. 209 00:11:57.500 --> 00:12:00.300 Yeah. It was a DAO hack. Yeah. 210 00:12:01.020 --> 00:12:07.740 But this Binance one is fascinating because it... They said it was a senior DevOps engineer's laptop that was compromised. 211 00:12:07.740 --> 00:12:09.180 Compromised by his 212 00:12:10.625 --> 00:12:24.225 North Korean girlfriend. Nice. No way. Nice. The rumor, at least, is that he had a girlfriend who turned out to be a North Korean spy, and on the day that the hack happened, he left his laptop 213 00:12:24.970 --> 00:12:25.850 unattended 214 00:12:26.330 --> 00:12:28.090 with her supposedly. 215 00:12:28.090 --> 00:12:29.530 Holy shit. 216 00:12:32.010 --> 00:12:35.370 That is girlfriends, guys. Dude, talk about betrayal. 217 00:12:35.370 --> 00:12:39.345 Like Well, didn't they I wonder if they broke up. They also had 218 00:12:39.745 --> 00:12:40.464 one 219 00:12:40.704 --> 00:12:41.505 key, 220 00:12:41.505 --> 00:12:42.865 one master key. 221 00:12:43.584 --> 00:12:46.385 Could you imagine talking to your girlfriend about that 222 00:12:46.785 --> 00:12:48.305 at dinner that evening? Yeah, 223 00:12:49.904 --> 00:12:51.824 that seems like such an awkward conversation. 224 00:12:52.310 --> 00:12:58.550 Did you know that she peaced out and is back in North Korea, hopefully. Yeah, no, I'm sure she fled for sure. 225 00:12:59.269 --> 00:13:01.589 She took the money and ran, as they say. 226 00:13:03.510 --> 00:13:04.470 I think that's, 227 00:13:05.865 --> 00:13:07.225 mean, it's proof that 228 00:13:08.105 --> 00:13:08.584 weakest 229 00:13:09.065 --> 00:13:10.825 link in the chain is 230 00:13:11.225 --> 00:13:14.985 usually a person. Yeah. It's not even the code. Right. 231 00:13:15.625 --> 00:13:18.345 Someone... Knowing that,

you need to have 232 00:13:19.210 --> 00:13:20.570 secure procedures, 233 00:13:20.570 --> 00:13:22.410 right? It's like Yeah. 234 00:13:23.130 --> 00:13:27.130 Dude has apparently the keys to the Binance 235 00:13:27.210 --> 00:13:28.090 To billions of 236 00:13:29.690 --> 00:13:37.475 on his laptop or some method by which to get it on his laptop. Like, coulda gotten drunk and left it at a bar. He could have gotten wrench attacked. 237 00:13:38.995 --> 00:13:41.635 A lot He shouldn't have things had the ability to do that 238 00:13:42.115 --> 00:13:43.155 to begin with. 239 00:13:44.035 --> 00:13:47.795 It reminds me of that Darknet Diaries episode where they have 240 00:13:50.310 --> 00:13:51.430 the dark... 241 00:13:53.670 --> 00:13:55.430 What do you call those marketplaces? 242 00:13:56.070 --> 00:13:56.950 Dark web? 243 00:13:57.430 --> 00:13:59.670 Like that dark... Black market? Yeah, 244 00:13:59.670 --> 00:14:01.270 black market vendor, 245 00:14:01.670 --> 00:14:02.470 and 246 00:14:02.735 --> 00:14:04.894 the dude takes every 247 00:14:04.894 --> 00:14:05.774 precautionary 248 00:14:05.774 --> 00:14:08.334 measure to ensure that he doesn't get caught. 249 00:14:08.735 --> 00:14:10.575 He only uses tails 250 00:14:10.654 --> 00:14:13.454 and he has all of his passwords memorized 251 00:14:13.695 --> 00:14:16.334 and he's renting an apartment 252 00:14:16.735 --> 00:14:18.255 that's 253 00:14:17.580 --> 00:14:19.340 literally just for 254 00:14:19.660 --> 00:14:22.060 him to have a router 255 00:14:22.140 --> 00:14:26.300 that he uses specifically for getting onto the marketplace and selling. 256 00:14:27.580 --> 00:14:28.540 In the end, 257 00:14:29.740 --> 00:14:32.140 his boss ends up getting arrested 258 00:14:32.765 --> 00:14:38.365 and since his boss knew him personally and knew everything about him, just ratted him out. 259 00:14:39.485 --> 00:14:40.925 And so like, 260 00:14:41.325 --> 00:14:43.965 and he beats the purpose. Yeah, he got caught that way. 261 00:14:44.860 --> 00:14:46.220 But yeah, it's like, 262 00:14:47.340 --> 00:14:49.820 you know, you can take all the privacy 263 00:14:49.820 --> 00:14:51.500 and security measures 264 00:14:52.060 --> 00:14:55.260 you want, but if the people around you 265 00:14:55.660 --> 00:14:57.580 are not using 266 00:14:57.945 --> 00:15:02.825 the same level of precautions as you are and you're interacting with them, 267 00:15:03.305 --> 00:15:05.705 you're increasing your attack surface. 268 00:15:06.025 --> 00:15:07.065 What 269 00:15:07.065 --> 00:15:08.185 should people do? 270 00:15:09.225 --> 00:15:11.065 Stay vigilant first and foremost. 271 00:15:12.850 --> 00:15:15.730 I think it comes back to the basics. 272 00:15:17.170 --> 00:15:18.290 Don't 273 00:15:18.290 --> 00:15:18.930 use 274 00:15:19.410 --> 00:15:21.090 KYC exchanges, 275 00:15:21.250 --> 00:15:23.490 they're honey pots and big targets. 276 00:15:24.529 --> 00:15:26.450 Not your keys, not your coins, 277 00:15:27.285 --> 00:15:28.005 right? 278 00:15:28.085 --> 00:15:28.725 Like 279 00:15:29.285 --> 00:15:32.405 if you're trusting a third party, in this case Binance, 280 00:15:33.205 --> 00:15:34.645 to hold your Bitcoin 281 00:15:35.125 --> 00:15:39.685 and something goes wrong at Binance, well they say they're going to cover the loss here, 282 00:15:40.889 --> 00:15:47.290 but you know we'll see. I mean look at Mt. Gox, there's reasons we've learned these lessons in the past, and 283 00:15:48.170 --> 00:15:56.329 I think you stick with the basics, not your keys, not your coins, so just remember that and take that into consideration if you're thinking about 284 00:15:56.865 --> 00:15:59.825 using an exchange or giving someone else unilateral 285 00:15:59.825 --> 00:16:01.345 control over your Bitcoin. 286 00:16:03.745 --> 00:16:06.785 I'm a big fan of self custody, 287 00:16:07.345 --> 00:16:10.705 a big fan of keeping your KYC information 288 00:16:11.105 --> 00:16:11.985 off the lists, 289 00:16:12.440 --> 00:16:13.320 like trying 290 00:16:13.959 --> 00:16:15.480 to use Bitcoin as 291 00:16:15.720 --> 00:16:22.279 privately as possible in terms of... Obviously it's like a transparent and public ledger, 292 00:16:22.680 --> 00:16:25.959 so what I mean when I say using it privately is that 293 00:16:26.455 --> 00:16:28.214 like not associating 294 00:16:28.214 --> 00:16:34.695 your legal name with your bitcoin transactions is what I mean by that. You do got to be vigilant. 295 00:16:35.415 --> 00:16:35.815 Yeah 296 00:16:37.335 --> 00:16:41.415 and just I mean dude like even with like cold card for example, 297 00:16:42.370 --> 00:16:46.529 the really shitty thing about that exploit is so many people 298 00:16:47.089 --> 00:16:48.850 thought they were doing the right thing. 299 00:16:49.730 --> 00:16:51.250 They were 300 00:16:51.649 --> 00:16:53.889 using, they were practicing self custody, 301 00:16:54.455 --> 00:17:00.295 they were doing an advanced form of self custody called cold storage where the private key 302 00:17:00.535 --> 00:17:03.175 never touches an online device, 303 00:17:03.575 --> 00:17:04.615 which I think is 304 00:17:05.175 --> 00:17:06.855 a very sensible approach. 305 00:17:08.669 --> 00:17:10.830 But in their case, was a 306 00:17:11.390 --> 00:17:12.749 bug introduced 307 00:17:13.390 --> 00:17:14.429 with the 308 00:17:15.390 --> 00:17:16.190 firmware. 309 00:17:17.309 --> 00:17:20.110 Yeah, the random number generator was not 310 00:17:20.645 --> 00:17:23.684 generating the private keys randomly enough. 311 00:17:24.645 --> 00:17:25.924 And they ended up, 312 00:17:27.284 --> 00:17:29.044 know, someone figured out 313 00:17:29.445 --> 00:17:34.245 what number space those keys should fall in, and then it was like shooting fish in a barrel. 314 00:17:36.560 --> 00:17:38.080 So yeah, I mean even 315 00:17:39.600 --> 00:17:46.399 taking that advice like not your keys, not your coins, keep your KYC information out of

it, practice self custody, 316 00:17:48.000 --> 00:17:49.679 even with that advice you 317 00:17:49.760 --> 00:17:51.040 never know where 318 00:17:51.495 --> 00:17:54.855 the attack is going to come from and it's hard to 319 00:17:55.175 --> 00:17:57.414 defend yourself against something that you 320 00:17:57.895 --> 00:18:02.774 don't know is coming, right? And that's why you just really need to stay vigilant and 321 00:18:03.015 --> 00:18:04.295 keep your head on a swivel. 322 00:18:04.850 --> 00:18:07.169 I saw some commentary 323 00:18:07.890 --> 00:18:08.770 this week 324 00:18:09.090 --> 00:18:14.210 and end of last about how with the cadence that which exploits are being found, 325 00:18:14.850 --> 00:18:17.090 is this an indication that 326 00:18:18.065 --> 00:18:22.544 self hosting might not be for everyone, right? Because that was long the story. 327 00:18:22.785 --> 00:18:25.184 Let's get more people self hosting, but then 328 00:18:25.505 --> 00:18:26.465 that's 329 00:18:26.465 --> 00:18:29.585 more people that are individually responsible for 330 00:18:30.590 --> 00:18:33.470 keeping up with the best security and privacy measures. 331 00:18:34.270 --> 00:18:37.390 I guess through these SaaS models, these hosting platforms, 332 00:18:38.430 --> 00:18:41.470 that's one thing they can claim that they can do is we 333 00:18:41.470 --> 00:18:47.674 hire people full time to be on top of this for you. Have you guys been thinking about that? Well my 334 00:18:48.155 --> 00:18:49.595 argument is that, 335 00:18:50.795 --> 00:18:57.590 and it's related to self custody too, and using bitcoin in a self custodial manner, it's like you're 336 00:18:57.910 --> 00:19:00.550 taking on the radical responsibility 337 00:19:01.030 --> 00:19:02.710 of being your own bank, 338 00:19:03.590 --> 00:19:04.550 and you're 339 00:19:05.350 --> 00:19:06.710 wholly responsible 340 00:19:06.790 --> 00:19:10.230 for all the benefits and all the consequences 341 00:19:10.230 --> 00:19:11.110 of that decision. 342 00:19:13.635 --> 00:19:19.235 Same thing with self hosting, like when you want to self host something, you're taking on that radical responsibility 343 00:19:19.235 --> 00:19:20.354 of being 344 00:19:20.515 --> 00:19:22.354 your own service provider, 345 00:19:22.755 --> 00:19:26.460 keeping up with the security updates, keeping your infrastructure 346 00:19:26.460 --> 00:19:28.140 up to date and online, 347 00:19:28.780 --> 00:19:35.580 and for anyone who's ever spun up a Bitcoin node or tried to host a video server or 348 00:19:36.220 --> 00:19:39.585 some other service that they like to use, you 349 00:19:39.585 --> 00:19:41.345 learn very quickly that 350 00:19:42.145 --> 00:19:49.025 you just wanted your own little service that you didn't have to pay a subscription for. That's 351 00:19:49.025 --> 00:19:53.440 usually where I get started, but then you learn very quickly like okay, 352 00:19:53.840 --> 00:20:07.225 now I'm a fucking IT manager. Yeah, it's like I kind of get what I was paying for. Yeah, in addition to just trying to lead my normal life, now I've fallen down this rabbit hole of like managing this infrastructure. 353 00:20:07.225 --> 00:20:08.825 And so I think 354 00:20:09.785 --> 00:20:14.184 I love self hosting and I love the idea of radical 355 00:20:14.184 --> 00:20:14.985 responsibility 356 00:20:15.580 --> 00:20:17.980 and taking 357 00:20:17.980 --> 00:20:19.100 the trusted 358 00:20:19.420 --> 00:20:21.340 third parties out of the equation, 359 00:20:21.900 --> 00:20:23.420 but people need to understand 360 00:20:24.540 --> 00:20:26.460 that that's a big responsibility, 361 00:20:26.540 --> 00:20:28.140 and there's no 362 00:20:28.380 --> 00:20:29.820 one-eight hundred number 363 00:20:30.325 --> 00:20:34.405 that you can call and get your transaction reversed or a call to 364 00:20:35.285 --> 00:20:41.765 undo the hack, or there's no one coming to save you, so you need to understand what the trade offs are. 365 00:20:43.570 --> 00:20:52.209 That's my take on it. I think there's also this false sense of security when you're using a hosted service that they're just going to do it right too. They 366 00:20:53.169 --> 00:20:56.289 probably have lots of engineers that want girlfriends and 367 00:20:56.545 --> 00:20:59.585 Yep. You know, you you... It's sort of this 368 00:21:01.425 --> 00:21:02.945 counterparty risk. 369 00:21:03.425 --> 00:21:05.425 Right? Because they're bigger targets 370 00:21:05.665 --> 00:21:08.304 Yep. Because they have lots of people's data. 371 00:21:09.105 --> 00:21:12.440 And so while it maybe is harder to exploit them, 372 00:21:12.680 --> 00:21:13.320 maybe 373 00:21:13.720 --> 00:21:19.960 they're a bigger target, so more people are working on it. There's maybe more of a financial interest in doing it versus doing my home server 374 00:21:20.520 --> 00:21:21.640 and just getting 375 00:21:22.200 --> 00:21:23.240 my personal data. 376 00:21:24.735 --> 00:21:29.294 Kind of branching off that I saw a tweet that you chimed in on, I think Scott about 377 00:21:29.775 --> 00:21:32.014 with all these attacks, people are thinking about 378 00:21:33.775 --> 00:21:34.335 security 379 00:21:35.135 --> 00:21:36.095 through obscurity. 380 00:21:36.910 --> 00:21:38.510 Wasn't Yeah, there a tweet about which 381 00:21:40.030 --> 00:21:40.909 is like 382 00:21:41.630 --> 00:21:42.590 kind of a 383 00:21:42.990 --> 00:21:47.630 handful of folks are thinking maybe closed source is the way to go, not open source. Because 384 00:21:48.030 --> 00:22:01.965 when you have open source code bases, if there is a vulnerability, you're just exposing it directly to the world rather than an attacker having to do more hunting to find it. But I think we found with our own red teaming and decompiling and hacking as of late, 385 00:22:03.020 --> 00:22:04.619 just adds more 386 00:22:05.260 --> 00:22:06.779 barriers for the fixes 387 00:22:06.940 --> 00:22:08.059 to be

instituted. 388 00:22:09.020 --> 00:22:13.099 Yeah. Yeah, I think that's right. It comment was that I've seen a lot is that 389 00:22:14.140 --> 00:22:16.059 maybe open source is 390 00:22:16.325 --> 00:22:22.004 another attack factor for hackers if they can see your source so they can see how your program works. 391 00:22:23.365 --> 00:22:25.044 And my comment is that 392 00:22:25.285 --> 00:22:26.004 these 393 00:22:26.485 --> 00:22:27.285 disassembly 394 00:22:27.285 --> 00:22:28.485 and decompilation 395 00:22:28.565 --> 00:22:29.445 tools 396 00:22:30.085 --> 00:22:32.165 are so good now that 397 00:22:32.460 --> 00:22:38.460 just because it's... Your program has been compiled into a binary doesn't mean that it's hard 398 00:22:38.460 --> 00:22:40.460 to extract the information out of. 399 00:22:41.980 --> 00:22:45.019 But what it does mean is that there's less eyes 400 00:22:45.100 --> 00:22:46.860 on your your source, 401 00:22:47.245 --> 00:22:52.445 And I think very... It's very important to realize that if you have a closed source project, 402 00:22:52.924 --> 00:22:55.804 your secrets aren't safe just because it's compiled, 403 00:22:56.365 --> 00:22:59.804 but also there are no people who are actively developing, 404 00:22:59.804 --> 00:23:14.254 you know, besides the the people at your company, there are no people who are actively developing on your code and who are scrutinizing it with an incentive to do so. Right? It's like if I take an open source project and I start a company that uses it, right, I am 405 00:23:14.495 --> 00:23:24.815 very incentivized to make sure that it's working right because Yep. This is like the basis for our company. And so you'll be scrutinizing the code. And the more people that are doing that and are incentivized to scrutinize the code, 406 00:23:25.690 --> 00:23:32.330 the better. Right? Because some of those people will find stuff, and they will want to contribute those fixes upstream. 407 00:23:32.570 --> 00:23:35.130 So the whole ecosystem gets better 408 00:23:35.530 --> 00:23:36.410 versus 409 00:23:37.050 --> 00:23:38.010 it being 410 00:23:38.434 --> 00:23:39.235 reliant 411 00:23:39.235 --> 00:23:44.835 entirely on the people in your company who have the code to be the the white hats and and fix stuff. 412 00:23:45.395 --> 00:23:48.514 And then there's all the people who wanna attack it and are... 413 00:23:48.835 --> 00:23:54.249 Know, who can decompile it and look at it. And they're not as incentivized to report problems. 414 00:23:54.889 --> 00:23:56.649 I think the cold card 415 00:23:57.049 --> 00:23:58.009 example 416 00:23:58.889 --> 00:24:02.889 really underscores that point because they switched from 417 00:24:03.450 --> 00:24:05.849 an open source license. 418 00:24:05.850 --> 00:24:06.169 They were, 419 00:24:06.934 --> 00:24:09.735 what were they originally? Were they GPLv3? 420 00:24:10.294 --> 00:24:15.095 They were originally GPL, yeah. And then they switched to Commons Clause,

421 00:24:15.095 --> 00:24:15.575 which 422 00:24:15.975 --> 00:24:17.654 stated that you can't 423 00:24:17.975 --> 00:24:19.575 create a commercial 424 00:24:19.735 --> 00:24:21.174 product with their 425 00:24:22.220 --> 00:24:23.020 code. 426 00:24:23.820 --> 00:24:27.020 And that was right around the time that Foundation Devices 427 00:24:28.060 --> 00:24:31.580 did exactly that. They took the GPLv3 428 00:24:32.700 --> 00:24:35.740 code base and they made a new product out of it, 429 00:24:36.595 --> 00:24:40.754 which was like the whole point of it being open source to begin with, 430 00:24:41.875 --> 00:24:47.154 or part of the point. The other part is like having the visibility to ensure 431 00:24:48.115 --> 00:24:50.835 the end product is doing what it purports to be doing. 432 00:24:51.840 --> 00:24:52.960 But now 433 00:24:53.200 --> 00:24:58.320 we get into the incentive part because once they introduce the commons clause, 434 00:24:59.680 --> 00:25:04.240 no one can build a commercial product out of their code, so where's the incentive to 435 00:25:05.025 --> 00:25:08.544 really look into it and see what's going on in there 436 00:25:09.105 --> 00:25:10.785 and look at what happened? 437 00:25:11.505 --> 00:25:16.945 The incentive was there if you wanted to hack it? Yeah, yeah for sure. How does it Yeah. 438 00:25:18.730 --> 00:25:22.729 But, yeah, I... You see those comments of, like, people who are 439 00:25:22.970 --> 00:25:48.979 starting to use cold cards again, and their argument is like, well, now this is... They've fixed the the entropy bug, and this is now very scrutinized code, so it must be safe to use cold card. And my argument there is I don't think the underlying issue that caused this problem in the first place has been fixed. Correct. It's still not a proper open source license, so there aren't people who are really digging into it, like, anymore. 440 00:25:49.299 --> 00:25:50.979 So something like this, 441 00:25:51.779 --> 00:25:56.019 while it's not guaranteed, it just seems like the the same type of 442 00:25:56.659 --> 00:25:57.460 situation 443 00:25:57.460 --> 00:26:01.405 that caused this bug could still happen. Right? They have probably 444 00:26:01.405 --> 00:26:04.684 now an even smaller set of developers working 445 00:26:04.685 --> 00:26:05.245 at 446 00:26:05.565 --> 00:26:07.485 CoinKite on the cold card. 447 00:26:08.125 --> 00:26:08.605 So 448 00:26:09.405 --> 00:26:11.245 I agree with you. I don't 449 00:26:11.565 --> 00:26:18.000 think it's a good idea personally to go back to using cold card because this could just happen all over again. Right. 450 00:26:18.880 --> 00:26:20.240 Yeah, the incentive 451 00:26:20.240 --> 00:26:26.480 structure hasn't been changed. And it's like that saying, Show me the incentives and I'll show you the outcome, right? 452 00:26:29.045 --> 00:26:31.524 If they haven't changed that incentive structure, 453 00:26:32.005 --> 00:26:34.005 I think it's going to happen

again. 454 00:26:34.405 --> 00:26:36.804 So now let's say you're building software 455 00:26:37.925 --> 00:26:40.245 in the AI agentic world 456 00:26:40.770 --> 00:26:42.850 from scratch to start, 457 00:26:43.170 --> 00:26:49.970 right? So I guess you could say that you have the tools at your disposal to make more perfect code 458 00:26:50.530 --> 00:26:54.610 that is scrutinized by these genius coding agents. 459 00:26:55.475 --> 00:26:57.635 Some of them might say, 460 00:26:57.955 --> 00:26:59.955 well, should I release my software 461 00:27:00.435 --> 00:27:02.995 product, closed source or open source? 462 00:27:03.475 --> 00:27:12.610 And if we get through this pain point, right, where we're kind of, it's this phase shift where all this human written code is getting scrutinized by a super genius AI 463 00:27:12.690 --> 00:27:14.929 and getting polished to be AI 464 00:27:15.010 --> 00:27:16.770 hardened code. Now, 465 00:27:18.770 --> 00:27:25.255 does it make more sense than ever to just any software project should be released with AI hardened code from the start? 466 00:27:25.655 --> 00:27:31.174 Yeah, it really should be. I think we've gotten to the point that AI is really good at this stuff and 467 00:27:31.335 --> 00:27:32.215 purely 468 00:27:32.215 --> 00:27:35.415 human generated and reviewed code is a liability. 469 00:27:36.049 --> 00:27:41.889 I don't think the code will make it very far in a project's life cycle 470 00:27:42.049 --> 00:27:44.130 unless it's AI hardened 471 00:27:44.130 --> 00:27:49.250 at this point. Yeah. Right? And I think builders and companies just need to assume that 472 00:27:50.265 --> 00:27:51.385 whether your 473 00:27:51.865 --> 00:27:53.785 binaries are accessible 474 00:27:54.425 --> 00:27:59.625 from the package itself or the code is out there, just assume the code's a commodity. It exists. 475 00:28:01.880 --> 00:28:04.999 Anyone who wants to get access to it will get access to it. 476 00:28:05.559 --> 00:28:09.079 Right, which brings us back to the grocery store for example. 477 00:28:09.880 --> 00:28:10.679 That 478 00:28:10.919 --> 00:28:13.079 was like a proprietary 479 00:28:13.080 --> 00:28:14.039 closed source 480 00:28:14.265 --> 00:28:15.705 building management 481 00:28:15.705 --> 00:28:25.945 software system that was Most certainly to, like, save energy when there's no one in the aisle. They could change the temperatures remotely or something of the freezers. Yeah. I got the details on that. 482 00:28:27.190 --> 00:28:29.430 Do you wanna hear Go listen. What happened. 483 00:28:31.190 --> 00:28:32.630 So this happened today. 484 00:28:33.990 --> 00:28:38.230 Hackers targeted refrigeration systems across European grocery stores. 485 00:28:39.745 --> 00:28:42.545 Apparently, it was some internet exposed refrigeration 486 00:28:42.545 --> 00:28:43.425 controllers 487 00:28:43.425 --> 00:28:44.465 from a... 488 00:28:45.265 --> 00:28:48.865 They were older models from a company called Danfoss. 489 00:28:49.425 --> 00:28:50.225 Oh. 490 00:28:50.785 --> 00:28:51.825 You know Danfoss? 491 00:28:52.130 --> 00:28:56.450 Sour Danfoss. They make a lot of hydraulic products. Yeah. Okay. 492 00:28:56.850 --> 00:28:58.690 Okay. So apparently they have, 493 00:28:59.010 --> 00:29:00.290 like, an IoT 494 00:29:00.290 --> 00:29:02.530 or some sort of Internet connected 495 00:29:02.530 --> 00:29:03.330 controller 496 00:29:03.330 --> 00:29:05.010 for your refrigeration systems, 497 00:29:07.235 --> 00:29:11.635 which is a really interesting hack. Because you think about... There's there's a ton of value 498 00:29:12.275 --> 00:29:13.555 that is essentially 499 00:29:14.435 --> 00:29:16.355 secured by these refrigerators. 500 00:29:16.355 --> 00:29:20.435 Right? You think about all the stock of all these products, all these 501 00:29:21.070 --> 00:29:27.950 steaks, everything, right, that's super high value and it's super perishable, right, and Dude, being steak is expensive as fuck these days. 502 00:29:28.510 --> 00:29:30.990 Yes. I mean, everything is, but yes. 503 00:29:31.230 --> 00:29:37.994 Right? So everything... There's probably millions of dollars in a single grocery store of products that is only like... 504 00:29:38.394 --> 00:29:40.874 Value is secured by these refrigerators. 505 00:29:41.514 --> 00:29:42.154 So 506 00:29:42.955 --> 00:29:45.834 It's an interesting way to think of it. They 507 00:29:47.674 --> 00:29:50.715 got into the refrigerator's 508 00:29:49.590 --> 00:29:50.470 controller, 509 00:29:50.470 --> 00:29:52.389 and they remotely changed the settings, 510 00:29:52.950 --> 00:29:54.549 and they didn't just turn them off. 511 00:29:55.190 --> 00:29:56.549 They put it into 512 00:29:58.070 --> 00:30:00.149 repeated defrost cycles, 513 00:30:00.309 --> 00:30:14.455 which actually heats it up, right, to defrost the coils. Oh my god. And so they didn't just, like, you know, wait for them to go bad at room temperature. They set the temperature... They were able to drive the temperature of these refrigerators up to a 122 degrees Fahrenheit. 514 00:30:14.535 --> 00:30:15.095 Woah. 515 00:30:17.200 --> 00:30:18.159 700 516 00:30:18.400 --> 00:30:20.639 businesses were affected in France. 517 00:30:20.960 --> 00:30:21.520 Holy 518 00:30:21.760 --> 00:30:26.639 I mean, I Wait. Hold on. This is high stereo level. Yeah. I guess there was a previous hack that... 519 00:30:27.120 --> 00:30:29.679 That number comes from... Some of them were from a previous hack. 520 00:30:30.115 --> 00:30:31.075 Oh, okay. 521 00:30:31.875 --> 00:30:40.914 So that's like 700 over like a longer timeframe? Yeah. Let's see. When does that go back to? Maybe it goes back almost a year, but... Oh, okay. 522 00:30:41.715 --> 00:30:43.955 So some researchers dug in and found 523 00:30:44.840 --> 00:30:53.000 that there are 800 UK retail refrigeration systems with Internet accessible management interfaces using across 15 Danfoss systems. 524

00:30:54.600 --> 00:30:55.559 So they just 525 00:30:55.960 --> 00:31:02.075 probably, like, did a did a scrape for all these Internet connected systems. So this this wasn't necessarily all 526 00:31:03.355 --> 00:31:05.595 that were compromised, 527 00:31:05.674 --> 00:31:07.434 but just found those systems. 528 00:31:09.049 --> 00:31:12.570 Yeah. That's wild. Right? Like, IoT is 529 00:31:14.010 --> 00:31:18.809 really kinda scary in this new era because they are small 530 00:31:19.450 --> 00:31:22.570 embedded systems that typically don't have 531 00:31:23.575 --> 00:31:30.855 as robust to security measures as like a server at AWS or even a server in your house. 532 00:31:32.135 --> 00:31:35.655 Have like because that's not the main function. Know, that's a company that makes 533 00:31:36.500 --> 00:31:42.260 hydraulic systems and chillers. And so just getting some bare bones IoT functionality, 534 00:31:42.260 --> 00:31:43.539 they're like, done, 535 00:31:43.620 --> 00:31:44.580 right? It works. 536 00:31:45.539 --> 00:31:48.659 The security hardening is not top of mind. It's 537 00:31:49.139 --> 00:31:51.139 like this stripped down bare bones 538 00:31:51.985 --> 00:31:57.744 Internet connection on these devices, but it's still, like, connected to the Internet just like any other server. 539 00:31:58.065 --> 00:31:59.984 So it has the same exposure 540 00:32:00.065 --> 00:32:02.304 surface to the Internet as 541 00:32:02.784 --> 00:32:05.985 servers that have, like, gigabytes of RAM, whereas these only have, 542 00:32:06.860 --> 00:32:12.220 like, a megabyte of RAM. So it's just this Yeah. It's very tough, and they 543 00:32:12.860 --> 00:32:13.500 are 544 00:32:14.220 --> 00:32:15.260 almost certainly 545 00:32:15.980 --> 00:32:17.020 not updated 546 00:32:17.260 --> 00:32:28.714 as frequently cause it's just harder to update it. Right? There's not like a computer terminal necessarily and a keyboard. Can be like, you know, run update. Dude, it's probably one guy that works at this company who built that. 547 00:32:29.274 --> 00:32:33.274 And some of them might require, like, physical access to each one to update the firmware. 548 00:32:33.809 --> 00:32:39.250 Yeah, the hot tub pump controller here at the space, it has some archaic 1990s 549 00:32:39.250 --> 00:32:47.730 looking web interface and that's how you know, it's like, you're fucked. Yeah. That's probably not so good. Yeah. This is I think where the Libre board shines 550 00:32:47.895 --> 00:32:49.414 because it helps 551 00:32:49.815 --> 00:32:52.375 remove these auxiliary devices. 552 00:32:52.455 --> 00:32:56.934 Yes. Right? Because the LibreBoard is like the Swiss army knife 553 00:32:57.015 --> 00:33:01.175 of mining control boards. Now that's a great point because that hot tub 554 00:33:01.530 --> 00:33:04.570 has a Bitcoin miner running 555 00:33:04.570 --> 00:33:05.690 some aftermarket 556 00:33:05.690 --> 00:33:06.490 firmware, 557 00:33:06.890 --> 00:33:12.010 managing that part of the system, if we think about it as a system, and then some entire third party 558 00:33:12.250 --> 00:33:14.170 control my spa vendor 559 00:33:14.410 --> 00:33:17.210 with some archaic IoT 560 00:33:16.625 --> 00:33:17.505 platform 561 00:33:17.505 --> 00:33:19.025 to manage the pumps. 562 00:33:19.585 --> 00:33:29.745 Right. And then that's where we threw Home Assistant. Yep. Add another layer, another threat vector, right where we try to marry them in software and you get this whole like Rube Goldberg machine. Yeah. 563 00:33:30.490 --> 00:33:32.889 And I have a feeling that that is actually most... 564 00:33:33.130 --> 00:33:41.450 To your point, Eco, that's probably most building management systems. A 100%. Yeah. It's just a hodgepodge of shitty IoT devices Yep. Married together. 565 00:33:42.010 --> 00:33:45.529 Yeah. I was working at a pretty big office building once, and it was like, 566 00:33:46.195 --> 00:33:50.195 everyone was freaking out because the heater was on in the middle of summer. And so we went down to, like, 567 00:33:50.755 --> 00:33:58.355 talk to the building manager, and he was like, oh, yeah. Let's let's see if we can, like, fix this. And we go, and then he's like, this is the terminal, and it's this, like, old ass computer. 568 00:33:58.595 --> 00:34:02.350 And he gets on there, and it's like... It looks like one of those DOS 569 00:34:02.750 --> 00:34:08.510 GUIs, you know, where it's like the whole, like, thing is made out of text, it's, like, blue and magenta. 570 00:34:08.510 --> 00:34:11.790 And, he's getting in there and, like, changing stuff, and it's like, 571 00:34:12.765 --> 00:34:14.685 man, that stuff... You know, there... 572 00:34:15.244 --> 00:34:20.045 This was this was in the, like, twenty tens, and the thing looked like it was made in, like, 573 00:34:20.605 --> 00:34:22.045 I don't know, the nineties. 574 00:34:22.444 --> 00:34:27.300 Damn. So clearly, hadn't been updating it. Yeah. So you gotta think if 575 00:34:27.300 --> 00:34:33.940 that thing is internet connected or on the local network and something else has a vulnerability that lets people get onto the local network, 576 00:34:34.420 --> 00:34:37.220 how's that? That's where I think about government systems, 577 00:34:37.860 --> 00:34:42.425 traffic lights, like how secure is that? Yeah, this is 578 00:34:42.905 --> 00:34:45.225 stuck next. Do you remember that exploit? Specifically 579 00:34:46.745 --> 00:34:47.625 targeted, 580 00:34:47.625 --> 00:34:48.825 I think it was toward 581 00:34:49.465 --> 00:34:50.345 GE 582 00:34:52.170 --> 00:34:54.170 power plant control systems, 583 00:34:54.170 --> 00:34:54.810 right? 584 00:34:55.849 --> 00:34:57.450 Think that sounds right. Yeah, I 585 00:34:58.810 --> 00:35:01.850 think it was more than just power plants. Wasn't it like 586 00:35:03.450 --> 00:35:06.315 uranium enrichment or something really dicey? 587 00:35:06.395 --> 00:35:07.595 Yeah, it was a... 588

00:35:08.875 --> 00:35:10.715 I'm pretty sure it was for a... 589 00:35:11.195 --> 00:35:11.915 Maybe 590 00:35:11.995 --> 00:35:16.715 it wasn't a nuclear power plant, maybe it was a uranium enrichment facility, I don't know. 591 00:35:17.360 --> 00:35:19.600 They were doing something nuclear, 592 00:35:20.320 --> 00:35:21.760 and it was a very 593 00:35:22.400 --> 00:35:23.600 sophisticated 594 00:35:24.080 --> 00:35:25.520 targeted attack. 595 00:35:26.640 --> 00:35:31.840 Back then I think they probably only could have pulled that off with insider knowledge, 596 00:35:33.704 --> 00:35:35.065 but nowadays 597 00:35:35.065 --> 00:35:36.185 I think 598 00:35:36.825 --> 00:35:40.185 it's looking to me like on this trajectory, 599 00:35:40.825 --> 00:35:42.665 and to your point, yeah, 600 00:35:43.464 --> 00:35:44.905 traffic light systems, 601 00:35:45.545 --> 00:35:48.184 think about like your city's water pumps, 602 00:35:49.760 --> 00:35:51.040 your electrical 603 00:35:51.040 --> 00:35:52.560 grid infrastructure. 604 00:35:53.040 --> 00:35:55.200 Even if you don't go after the power plant, 605 00:35:55.760 --> 00:35:59.920 if there's some way through IoT devices that aren't well secured to just 606 00:36:00.640 --> 00:36:15.815 excessively draw load on the grid, you can cause brownouts. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That's a really interesting point because you think about, like, why would hackers wanna, like, change the stoplights in, like, bumblefug nowhere? Right? That, like, doesn't get you anything. But if it's a very wide, 607 00:36:16.455 --> 00:36:16.775 you know, 608 00:36:18.180 --> 00:36:19.940 vulnerable attack surface, 609 00:36:20.099 --> 00:36:32.515 now you can really start to screw things up if you collect all these exploits and where they're all deployed and go after them sort of vulnerable. Was my takeaway with the refrigeration was I would have never thought that's such a creative 610 00:36:32.515 --> 00:36:33.155 way 611 00:36:33.795 --> 00:36:35.155 to cause chaos. 612 00:36:36.435 --> 00:36:37.075 Yes. 613 00:36:38.675 --> 00:36:42.035 Right. I mean, what was their motive 614 00:36:42.035 --> 00:36:45.395 here? Was it just someone who wanted to cause chaos? Was it like 615 00:36:45.960 --> 00:36:47.000 competitors? 616 00:36:47.080 --> 00:36:50.440 What's interesting is last week, the UK government 617 00:36:51.400 --> 00:36:53.080 notified its citizens 618 00:36:53.080 --> 00:36:54.040 to prepare 619 00:36:54.359 --> 00:36:57.080 food and water and power generation for 620 00:36:57.320 --> 00:36:59.000 an oncoming threat of cyber attacks. 621 00:36:59.575 --> 00:37:05.095 My conspiracy theory brain goes a little like, is this a psyop? Is this coordinated? 622 00:37:05.095 --> 00:37:14.055 It's the cyber pandemic. They've been planning it. They have. I mean, Charles Schwab mentioned it like in 2022 at the World Economic Forum. It was the next big thing. But then The US 623 00:37:14.840 --> 00:37:20.760 has also instructed all

of its military bases to have three months of local power generation 624 00:37:21.000 --> 00:37:24.840 and food and water prepared on base. And I 625 00:37:25.400 --> 00:37:26.360 vaguely recall 626 00:37:27.025 --> 00:37:30.785 something about a group of hackers coming out and saying 627 00:37:31.345 --> 00:37:35.665 that they could shut down the worldwide internet by attacking 10 628 00:37:36.065 --> 00:37:37.425 central hubs 629 00:37:38.145 --> 00:37:39.425 or something like that. 630 00:37:40.225 --> 00:37:41.825 Was like a handful of 631 00:37:42.210 --> 00:37:45.490 choke points that could shut the worldwide internet down. 632 00:37:46.930 --> 00:37:51.170 I think that was years and years and years ago too when they were saying that. 633 00:37:51.490 --> 00:37:53.490 Yeah, mean my prediction is 634 00:37:53.650 --> 00:37:59.985 the chaos we've seen in the past two, three months in software land is going to start 635 00:38:00.065 --> 00:38:01.025 impacting 636 00:38:01.745 --> 00:38:03.505 hardware connected systems, 637 00:38:05.105 --> 00:38:05.665 infrastructure 638 00:38:06.465 --> 00:38:07.105 things. 639 00:38:09.110 --> 00:38:12.950 Yeah, now imagine like all the cars are self driving. 640 00:38:13.270 --> 00:38:14.070 Yeah. 641 00:38:14.310 --> 00:38:18.230 Right? You know, these are like the types of kill switches that 642 00:38:18.470 --> 00:38:22.230 the paranoid and conspiracy theorists among us have been warning about, 643 00:38:23.115 --> 00:38:27.595 and it just seems like society is just barreling toward this 644 00:38:27.835 --> 00:38:28.875 inevitable 645 00:38:29.515 --> 00:38:32.235 end where everything is susceptible 646 00:38:32.235 --> 00:38:34.875 to getting controlled remotely 647 00:38:34.955 --> 00:38:38.315 and not in a good way. Dude, how many people have 648 00:38:38.990 --> 00:38:42.430 ring door locks on their house? Oh, fuck. Yeah. 649 00:38:45.069 --> 00:38:46.110 Yeah. That's 650 00:38:46.510 --> 00:38:47.150 is... 651 00:38:48.510 --> 00:38:54.965 That's bad news. I feel like it's it's not just your privacy at risk here. Right? It's these 652 00:38:56.085 --> 00:39:01.925 IoT smart devices, man. I'm telling you, they're they're not well secured. They're not easy to update, and they're 653 00:39:02.725 --> 00:39:06.085 potentially on the Internet as first class web servers. So 654 00:39:07.059 --> 00:39:11.859 I would expect companies like Ring and Google with their Nest ecosystem 655 00:39:11.859 --> 00:39:12.500 are... 656 00:39:13.299 --> 00:39:16.740 They're very software native companies and platforms, 657 00:39:16.740 --> 00:39:22.305 and, you know, slick user experience and interface is is a core product and offering from them. 658 00:39:22.705 --> 00:39:23.585 Where I get 659 00:39:24.065 --> 00:39:34.785 worried is these niche companies like the chiller, the hot tub pump controller. That shit is not updated. What's the last update for that firmware? Probably five years ago, whatever. You know

what I mean? And 660 00:39:36.250 --> 00:39:37.770 are those companies even 661 00:39:38.090 --> 00:39:40.090 remotely aware of what's going on? 662 00:39:40.890 --> 00:39:44.090 Yeah. I mean, it's probably installed by third party contractors. 663 00:39:44.250 --> 00:39:45.770 They're like, install this system. 664 00:39:46.010 --> 00:39:58.675 Literally. Then you're like Solar inverters, random shit. You're like, okay, cool. It works. But you're not going to keep paying that guy to come back every month and run the updates and check it for vulnerabilities and stuff, right? It's like once the job's done, you're like, cool, 665 00:39:59.234 --> 00:40:00.035 that's done. 666 00:40:01.555 --> 00:40:08.000 It's working, let's just let it ride. Meanwhile, these exploits are being developed against it. It's a pretty frightening situation. 667 00:40:08.480 --> 00:40:15.440 So the hackers I was thinking of says here on 05/19/1998, 668 00:40:16.320 --> 00:40:20.205 seven members of the hacker group LOFT Heavy Industries 669 00:40:20.365 --> 00:40:25.164 testified 670 00:40:25.164 --> 00:40:30.924 before the U. S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs stating that any one of them could make the internet 671 00:40:31.820 --> 00:40:33.900 unusable for the entire nation 672 00:40:34.300 --> 00:40:35.900 within thirty minutes. 673 00:40:36.700 --> 00:40:39.260 The threat was based on a discovered vulnerability 674 00:40:39.260 --> 00:40:41.580 in the Border Gateway Protocol 675 00:40:43.494 --> 00:40:47.655 the core routing protocol that directs traffic across the internet. 676 00:40:47.895 --> 00:40:54.855 The flaw would allow a cascading failure where one router's crash would send faulty routing information to the next, 677 00:40:55.095 --> 00:40:58.375 knocking systems offline in rapid automated chain reaction. 678 00:40:59.220 --> 00:40:59.860 So 679 00:41:00.260 --> 00:41:07.540 there's a hacker, super cool dude, Joe Grand. He was part of the LOFT, and there's a cool... He he wrote a book about this whole, 680 00:41:07.940 --> 00:41:11.460 work that they did and testifying before congress about it. Anyways, Joe Grand 681 00:41:11.865 --> 00:41:12.905 demonstrated 682 00:41:12.985 --> 00:41:14.345 the ledger 683 00:41:15.065 --> 00:41:16.745 hack, supply chain attack, 684 00:41:19.065 --> 00:41:23.065 a few months ago. That was the same dude? Same dude. Crazy. 685 00:41:23.225 --> 00:41:24.825 Yeah. What a G. 686 00:41:25.065 --> 00:41:26.425 Yeah. Yeah. Cool dude. 687 00:41:26.990 --> 00:41:27.790 There's 688 00:41:27.790 --> 00:41:30.030 an old magazine. I don't know if you guys... 689 00:41:31.790 --> 00:41:32.750 No offense, 690 00:41:33.630 --> 00:41:38.350 you're probably too young for this one. Magazine? You might know. 2600? 691 00:41:38.829 --> 00:41:42.695 Yeah. Do remember that magazine? Yeah, thousand six hundred is awesome. So 692 00:41:43.575 --> 00:41:44.695 there was like this 693 00:41:45.495 --> 00:41:46.775 Captain Crunch 694

00:41:47.015 --> 00:41:48.375 cereal box, 695 00:41:48.695 --> 00:41:49.735 the cereal, 696 00:41:49.895 --> 00:41:57.540 and they had like a whistle, like the cereal boxes used to include toys for the kids, and so there was like a whistle that Captain Crunch 697 00:41:57.780 --> 00:42:00.420 was including with their breakfast cereals, 698 00:42:01.140 --> 00:42:02.980 and this whistle 699 00:42:03.299 --> 00:42:06.020 had a very specific frequency 700 00:42:06.420 --> 00:42:07.940 and it was 2,600 701 00:42:09.345 --> 00:42:10.465 if someone 702 00:42:10.465 --> 00:42:20.545 figured out if you pick up a phone and blow the Captain Crunch whistle into it, it was the frequency the tone was waiting to hear to connect 703 00:42:20.705 --> 00:42:22.945 long distance calls for free. 704 00:42:24.020 --> 00:42:24.900 So if 705 00:42:25.380 --> 00:42:29.060 you did that, you could make long distance calls without having to pay. 706 00:42:29.460 --> 00:42:31.780 That's funny. Yeah, and so anyways, 707 00:42:32.099 --> 00:42:34.420 magazine, 2600 magazine, 708 00:42:34.500 --> 00:42:34.580 has 709 00:42:36.285 --> 00:42:37.085 just 710 00:42:37.565 --> 00:42:40.045 they were quarterly publications, 711 00:42:40.924 --> 00:42:46.045 but it's just like articles upon articles upon articles of all sorts of neat 712 00:42:46.045 --> 00:42:47.885 tricks and hacks and 713 00:42:48.300 --> 00:42:52.940 just interesting things you can do with tech. And it dates back. 714 00:42:53.340 --> 00:42:55.260 That is cool. Yeah, it's 715 00:42:55.500 --> 00:42:56.940 a really neat magazine. 716 00:42:57.100 --> 00:42:58.940 So the 2,600 Hertz 717 00:42:59.900 --> 00:43:01.820 hack that was discovered with the whistle, 718 00:43:02.735 --> 00:43:13.215 once they realized that that was the thing, they started making boxes that would emit the specific frequency tone onto the phone line to take over. It was called the trunking system. It's like the switches that control 719 00:43:13.375 --> 00:43:15.615 how your phone was connected back in the day. 720 00:43:16.580 --> 00:43:21.140 And so they made these boxes that could do that. Were called blue boxes. They just named them that for some reason. 721 00:43:21.620 --> 00:43:23.380 But fun history 722 00:43:23.460 --> 00:43:26.900 fact, that is what Steve Jobs and Wozniak, 723 00:43:27.220 --> 00:43:33.435 that's what they were building before they started Apple, was building No way. And selling Blue boxes? Blueboxes. 724 00:43:33.435 --> 00:43:35.035 And they have a very 725 00:43:35.275 --> 00:43:36.155 famous about 726 00:43:36.955 --> 00:43:37.995 how they 727 00:43:39.755 --> 00:43:40.715 called, 728 00:43:40.875 --> 00:43:41.915 like from 729 00:43:42.075 --> 00:43:43.755 California presumably, 730 00:43:43.755 --> 00:43:44.235 called 731 00:43:45.119 --> 00:43:47.040 and got ahold of 732 00:43:47.440 --> 00:43:48.240 the 733 00:43:48.960 --> 00:43:49.760 Queen 734 00:43:49.760 --> 00:43:50.720 of England. 735 00:43:50.880

--> 00:43:52.000 No way. 736 00:43:52.480 --> 00:43:53.440 That's awesome. 737 00:43:54.240 --> 00:43:56.400 That's insane. What did they say to her? 738 00:43:57.055 --> 00:43:57.935 They just 739 00:43:58.175 --> 00:44:00.735 talked to some assistant, and it was on the 740 00:44:03.455 --> 00:44:08.175 public phone number. Right? It was like... Right. They got ahold of the internal phone number, 741 00:44:08.735 --> 00:44:10.095 I'm 742 00:44:10.095 --> 00:44:11.775 trying to remember when. I think that 743 00:44:12.400 --> 00:44:14.880 it was like, she's asleep 744 00:44:14.960 --> 00:44:18.000 and like... They're like, this is important. Wake her up. 745 00:44:20.080 --> 00:44:26.000 And then I think they whisked out at that point, if I'm remembering the story correctly and like hung up or something. But like they they like 746 00:44:26.424 --> 00:44:29.305 it was going to happen. Dude, that's crazy. 747 00:44:30.744 --> 00:44:36.825 I think that's effectively what the hackers are doing today. They're just playing around, seeing what they can probe. Yeah. I mean, 748 00:44:38.920 --> 00:44:39.880 the same 749 00:44:40.360 --> 00:44:41.080 story, 750 00:44:41.320 --> 00:44:43.000 but yeah, if there's a 751 00:44:43.240 --> 00:44:44.120 weak point, 752 00:44:44.280 --> 00:44:45.800 someone's going to find it. 753 00:44:47.000 --> 00:44:49.000 Especially now. You don't even have to 754 00:44:49.880 --> 00:44:57.245 put in as much time, right? We have these incredible tools that especially with obliterated models, right? You can just 755 00:44:58.125 --> 00:45:03.565 you don't have to necessarily have this great financial incentive to try hacking something, right? Just the curiosity. 756 00:45:04.059 --> 00:45:04.700 Right. 757 00:45:05.099 --> 00:45:07.500 Don't don't make your $1,000,000 758 00:45:07.660 --> 00:45:09.820 stake collection dependent on 759 00:45:10.700 --> 00:45:12.300 some IoT device. 760 00:45:13.020 --> 00:45:13.820 Have good 761 00:45:14.220 --> 00:45:17.660 network security at your house. Change your default Wi Fi password. 762 00:45:18.305 --> 00:45:24.225 Yeah. Store all your company documents on an encrypted hard drive and don't put it on the Internet. 763 00:45:24.705 --> 00:45:25.345 Yeah. 764 00:45:25.985 --> 00:45:29.425 Yeah. The the IoT thing is really crazy because it's just been so 765 00:45:30.480 --> 00:45:31.280 ignored 766 00:45:31.280 --> 00:45:37.840 for so long. Like, we had the the TVs, the Hisense TVs that were just... First of all, they were snooping on you 767 00:45:38.080 --> 00:45:39.360 Yeah. And recording 768 00:45:39.360 --> 00:45:41.360 what you watched and all sorts of 769 00:45:42.000 --> 00:45:47.075 personal details, but they were uploading them to Hisense's server, 770 00:45:47.395 --> 00:45:48.755 which was totally 771 00:45:49.234 --> 00:45:50.115 insecure. 772 00:45:50.115 --> 00:45:52.355 Right? That server was wide open. 773 00:45:52.595 --> 00:45:54.915 We talked about this a

little bit last time, but, like, 774 00:45:55.315 --> 00:45:57.155 you know, they just didn't even think that, like, 775 00:45:58.070 --> 00:45:58.790 because 776 00:45:59.110 --> 00:46:06.230 it's closed source firmware in this TV and we have the URL in there and it's in a binary and no one can see it, that 777 00:46:06.790 --> 00:46:10.150 we don't need to secure the server, which is actually kinda hard to do 778 00:46:11.015 --> 00:46:14.055 because you need to have the credentials in the TV also. But, 779 00:46:14.535 --> 00:46:19.255 yeah, there's... I think there's gonna be... We're gonna see more and more and more vulnerabilities, 780 00:46:19.335 --> 00:46:21.975 especially in that, like, IoT stuff. 781 00:46:23.190 --> 00:46:25.510 Well, you know what'll fix them for sure 782 00:46:25.910 --> 00:46:26.630 is 783 00:46:26.790 --> 00:46:28.150 more KYC 784 00:46:29.430 --> 00:46:31.270 and more centralization. 785 00:46:31.910 --> 00:46:41.455 Yes. Definitely going to be... Do not resist. Yeah, don't resist. Definitely, yeah. Just get the ID of everyone who legitimately uses your service and you'll be fine. Yeah, 786 00:46:41.775 --> 00:46:49.375 what could go wrong? You know what we haven't talked about? It's been two weeks now, but we got so sucked into all of the critical vulnerabilities is 787 00:46:50.170 --> 00:46:51.370 the Bitwater. 788 00:46:51.530 --> 00:46:52.970 Our friends at Heatbit, 789 00:46:54.570 --> 00:47:02.410 water heating element Bitcoin miner they made. You guys saw that I'm sure? It's like a direct replacement to a typical 790 00:47:02.535 --> 00:47:03.815 heating element. Legacy 791 00:47:04.214 --> 00:47:06.295 hot water heating element, right? Yeah. 792 00:47:06.694 --> 00:47:07.895 What do you think of it? 793 00:47:08.375 --> 00:47:12.695 I think it's super cool. You're right. It's squarely in your wheelhouse. It is in my wheelhouse. 794 00:47:14.055 --> 00:47:14.855 So those 795 00:47:15.095 --> 00:47:19.730 electric hot water heaters which are quite prevalent in The US, it's like half of them, 796 00:47:20.050 --> 00:47:22.050 they use these nickel chromium 797 00:47:22.050 --> 00:47:31.890 resistive elements and that's their job is they suck current and they have a lot of resistance so they get glowing red hot and they heat up your water and they're upwards of 798 00:47:32.685 --> 00:47:34.765 four to 6,000 watts. 799 00:47:34.925 --> 00:47:43.485 And then a 50 gallon tank, they don't have to run that long. You like a lot of wattage because they call it a high recovery time. That way, you use your 50 gallons of hot water, 800 00:47:43.725 --> 00:47:47.085 it heats for thirty minutes or whatnot and you got hot water again. Right. 801 00:47:48.920 --> 00:47:51.160 Which I really liked are the 802 00:47:51.480 --> 00:47:53.880 on demand water heaters. Those are sweet. 803 00:47:54.119 --> 00:48:00.920 Where you don't have this massive reservoir. It's just heating the water as it's passing through. And those work great with gas 804 00:48:00.920 --> 00:48:04.425 because the flames are so hot. So you have a really high temperature 805 00:48:04.585 --> 00:48:05.545 heat source. 806 00:48:05.945 --> 00:48:08.665 For electric tankless, you need like 50 807 00:48:09.305 --> 00:48:13.465 amps or something. Oh damn. They have smaller ones, right? The InstaHot, 808 00:48:13.545 --> 00:48:21.280 right? That'll like go below your sink, right? It can't do your whole house, but it can do like a sink. Like a coil for just that flow. 809 00:48:21.600 --> 00:48:23.520 Or the old school suicide showers. 810 00:48:24.640 --> 00:48:29.760 Old school suicide showers. What's that? They're really popular in the developing world, 811 00:48:30.160 --> 00:48:33.520 but it's basically an attachment that goes on your showerhead. 812 00:48:33.954 --> 00:48:43.555 Yes. And it's wired into mains power, usually in a sketchy ass way. But it basically heats the water at your showerhead by just pumping a bunch of current through, and it's called a suicide The 813 00:48:44.994 --> 00:48:51.140 exposed wires are right there and it's... Yeah. Yeah. I traveled to South America 814 00:48:51.859 --> 00:48:52.660 like 815 00:48:52.660 --> 00:48:54.340 early 2000s 816 00:48:54.420 --> 00:48:55.140 and 817 00:48:55.220 --> 00:48:56.020 experienced 818 00:48:56.020 --> 00:48:59.460 that firsthand and it was super sketchy. Was the water warm though? 819 00:49:00.145 --> 00:49:01.345 It 820 00:49:01.345 --> 00:49:02.305 was all right. 821 00:49:02.865 --> 00:49:03.345 Right. 822 00:49:03.825 --> 00:49:05.985 It was better than just like cold 823 00:49:05.985 --> 00:49:08.465 room temperature water. Yeah. Well, 824 00:49:09.185 --> 00:49:12.945 HeatBit product is interesting because, okay, you can't really fit. 825 00:49:13.940 --> 00:49:16.579 This is the difference, those nickel chromium 826 00:49:16.579 --> 00:49:23.140 resistive elements they get really hot like 800 degrees and you can't get an ASIC chip that hot, right? 827 00:49:23.700 --> 00:49:24.099 No, 828 00:49:25.555 --> 00:49:30.835 I forget what it is in Fahrenheit, we're talking what like 80 degrees Celsius? Yeah, so 829 00:49:31.075 --> 00:49:31.875 way 830 00:49:32.035 --> 00:49:33.075 lower temperature. 831 00:49:33.955 --> 00:49:43.690 And then the other thing is just your space constrained to flow that much current, not that much current is flowing through the chips, Scott would know. And so if you have a form factor that's just the same size element, 832 00:49:44.089 --> 00:49:48.890 heat bits is like 600 watts. So 10 times, eight times less. 833 00:49:49.290 --> 00:49:50.890 And what does that mean? 834 00:49:51.290 --> 00:49:53.369 It means it's running way more often, 835 00:49:54.155 --> 00:50:20.650 but it also takes way longer to heat the 50 gallons. But the cool thing of it running way more often is you're mining Bitcoin way more often. That's why the water heater has kind of been this hard one to solve

because if it only ran for fifteen minutes a couple times a day, it's like, why did I buy the expensive Bitcoin miner? You know, it has little bursts of mining. So they had an interesting strategy, which I'm excited to test out. It's like, it's a 600 watt miner. I think it's like 35 terahash and it basically is running all the time. 836 00:50:21.525 --> 00:50:25.045 And depending on how many people are in your household, how much hot water you're using, 837 00:50:25.765 --> 00:50:29.525 it may or may not work. Most electric hot water heaters though, they do have 838 00:50:29.845 --> 00:50:31.285 two element ports. 839 00:50:31.684 --> 00:50:35.845 And so you would replace the bottom one with the heat bit water 840 00:50:36.369 --> 00:50:37.410 and that 841 00:50:37.490 --> 00:50:44.770 convection, that hot water rises and then if you need to top it off before it goes out, have the 6,000 watt one as a backup 842 00:50:45.090 --> 00:50:47.490 for your quick recovery time. How 843 00:50:48.770 --> 00:50:50.210 hot can 844 00:50:52.775 --> 00:50:54.055 what's it called bit water? 845 00:50:54.295 --> 00:50:55.974 How hot can that thing get 846 00:50:56.135 --> 00:50:57.734 50 gallons of water? 847 00:50:58.055 --> 00:51:01.335 I think they tweeted somewhere like 140 848 00:51:01.335 --> 00:51:05.575 degrees Fahrenheit. You don't want much hotter than that. There's some kind of range too where 849 00:51:06.309 --> 00:51:09.510 you're trying to avoid certain bacteria growth and then also 850 00:51:10.150 --> 00:51:12.950 the scaling of the calcium buildup in the minerals. 851 00:51:13.109 --> 00:51:13.830 If 852 00:51:15.030 --> 00:51:17.590 the bit water is only capable of doing like, 853 00:51:17.990 --> 00:51:21.030 is that like what an ASIC runs at? Like 140 degrees? 854 00:51:22.355 --> 00:51:31.315 What's 80 degrees Celsius? The chips will be hotter and then the heat sinks will be slightly cooler and then the water is slightly cooler because heat transfers from hot to cold. It's like a gradient. But 855 00:51:32.515 --> 00:51:37.040 if they can get the water to 140, then the chips are something above that. Interesting. 856 00:51:37.040 --> 00:51:42.560 Okay. Yeah. You could probably get an ASIC up to... An ASIC chip up to 857 00:51:43.520 --> 00:51:44.960 a 190, 858 00:51:45.520 --> 00:51:47.760 maybe almost 200 degrees Fahrenheit. 859 00:51:48.095 --> 00:51:52.175 Yeah. They're close to boiling almost. Wow. Yeah. They're really close to boiling. 860 00:51:54.015 --> 00:51:54.655 That... 861 00:51:55.454 --> 00:51:58.734 So that's plenty hot for water. I mean, I guess there's... 862 00:51:59.214 --> 00:52:01.135 Chip surface temperature doesn't exactly 863 00:52:01.980 --> 00:52:07.580 mean that's what the water temperature will be, but there's some room there. It's 864 00:52:07.820 --> 00:52:11.180 cool though because that's like a fifteen minute replacement. Rip 865 00:52:11.180 --> 00:52:12.460 out your whole hot water heater. 866 00:52:14.075 --> 00:52:19.515 The flip side here is those heating elements are like $25 at Harbor Freight or Supply House. 867 00:52:19.755 --> 00:52:22.635 It's just a really inexpensive disposable 868 00:52:23.674 --> 00:52:26.395 piece of equipment. How much is the bit water? 869 00:52:27.115 --> 00:52:27.994 900 870 00:52:28.350 --> 00:52:32.990 Damn, introductory 900. I think they said it was 1,200 after the 871 00:52:33.470 --> 00:52:34.350 price. I 872 00:52:34.750 --> 00:52:39.550 did some napkin math like if you have below I think 14¢ power it's effectively free heat 873 00:52:39.790 --> 00:52:45.015 so for your hot water. There's some arbitrage there. It's cool to see though. I think there's 874 00:52:45.095 --> 00:52:50.855 at least a Zetta hash of electric hot water heaters already out there waiting to be converted to 875 00:52:51.015 --> 00:52:53.255 from zero hash rate to hash rate. 876 00:52:54.000 --> 00:52:55.920 There's a little bit of a catch though because 877 00:52:56.880 --> 00:53:01.120 they... I think they said it was 20 chips in their BM 13 seventies. 878 00:53:01.360 --> 00:53:02.320 And if 879 00:53:03.360 --> 00:53:08.705 you're running that at at its nominal hash rate, which would be the highest efficiency 880 00:53:09.025 --> 00:53:11.585 miner, that's only going to be 400 watts. 881 00:53:12.225 --> 00:53:12.865 So 882 00:53:13.185 --> 00:53:20.865 you would have to really overdrive them to get up to the 600 watts they're talking about, and that's going to have lower efficiency. So less bitcoin 883 00:53:20.865 --> 00:53:21.265 per, 884 00:53:22.240 --> 00:53:22.640 I'm input 885 00:53:24.080 --> 00:53:26.400 curious to see how the software works 886 00:53:26.960 --> 00:53:31.520 and how it all plugs in as an IoT device in the home. 887 00:53:32.000 --> 00:53:33.200 Well, speaking of which, 888 00:53:35.694 --> 00:53:38.415 is this an open source product? Was it 889 00:53:39.055 --> 00:53:41.375 forked from an existing project? 890 00:53:41.855 --> 00:53:44.655 It's certainly their own PCB design because 891 00:53:44.974 --> 00:53:46.415 it looks like a rod, 892 00:53:47.055 --> 00:53:54.500 but I haven't heard word on the source for the hardware or the software. I think it's pre orders right now just announced. Didn't they just released 893 00:53:54.980 --> 00:53:59.380 some hardware source, right? Was that the Bitwater or something That's the Bitair. 894 00:54:00.100 --> 00:54:04.100 Okay, Bitair. What's the Bitair? Scott will describe it best. 895 00:54:04.795 --> 00:54:05.595 BitAir 896 00:54:05.595 --> 00:54:06.555 is a... 897 00:54:07.435 --> 00:54:10.555 It's like an air filter, like a small... 898 00:54:10.875 --> 00:54:15.595 It's like this. I don't know. It looks like maybe a slightly taller paint can. 899 00:54:17.515 --> 00:54:18.155 And 900 00:54:18.395 --> 00:54:19.835 it 901 00:54:19.410 --> 00:54:21.010 is a Bitcoin miner, 902 00:54:21.410 --> 00:54:25.330 and it has some... I don't know

exactly how it works, some sort of air filtration 903 00:54:25.970 --> 00:54:29.090 aspect to it. So the idea is that you can 904 00:54:29.490 --> 00:54:32.210 filter your air and mine Bitcoin at the same time. 905 00:54:33.089 --> 00:54:33.490 And 906 00:54:33.935 --> 00:54:35.775 So it's similar to the... 907 00:54:36.175 --> 00:54:36.735 They 908 00:54:37.295 --> 00:54:40.335 sent one to Bitcoin Park and I set it up. That's 909 00:54:40.335 --> 00:54:45.695 the Heatbit Trio. The Trio, yeah. And that has a HEPA filter as well, but it's 910 00:54:45.695 --> 00:54:53.000 way more wattage as in it can heat a room. This is what, like it's tiny wattage. It's meant to be a solo miner. Yeah. Yeah. It has... 911 00:54:53.320 --> 00:55:00.360 It's based on the Bidax Gamma, and it has one BM thirteen seventy in it. It's gonna be Just one ASIC chip. Yeah. So it's gonna be 912 00:55:01.875 --> 00:55:09.235 20 watts or so of Bitcoin mining. I mean, there's also some electrical power that's gonna be used to run the the big fan to 913 00:55:09.635 --> 00:55:13.155 to do the electricity. You're not noticing it on your power bill at all? Yeah. 914 00:55:13.730 --> 00:55:21.010 Yeah. I assume it will warm the air a little bit, but I think the thought is they're moving so much air through it that it's it's not gonna warm it up that much. 915 00:55:21.490 --> 00:55:23.490 So they released the the board 916 00:55:24.289 --> 00:55:24.770 source. 917 00:55:25.425 --> 00:55:27.745 They did. They did. They released the the 918 00:55:28.145 --> 00:55:28.945 Yeah. I files, 919 00:55:29.665 --> 00:55:32.865 like, it's it's really cool. They released the source 920 00:55:33.345 --> 00:55:35.185 for the the mining 921 00:55:35.505 --> 00:55:37.265 board in there, which is 922 00:55:38.079 --> 00:55:44.079 got... It... It's a little bit different, like, PCB shape, but it... For the... For all intents and purposes, it's, 923 00:55:44.319 --> 00:55:46.400 very similar to the Bidax Gamma. 924 00:55:47.040 --> 00:55:50.400 So this is an example of a company 925 00:55:50.705 --> 00:55:52.545 making a derivative 926 00:55:53.265 --> 00:55:59.905 product out of an open source project and commercializing it and 927 00:56:00.545 --> 00:56:03.505 doing so in a way where they're complying with the license 928 00:56:04.865 --> 00:56:05.985 and 929 00:56:06.620 --> 00:56:07.820 making profit. 930 00:56:08.940 --> 00:56:09.500 Absolutely. 931 00:56:10.060 --> 00:56:14.940 Win win win across the board, right? It's almost like we've been saying that for a long time. 932 00:56:15.660 --> 00:56:20.775 Yeah, would hope that this allowed them to get it to market a lot sooner 933 00:56:21.015 --> 00:56:23.735 because the whole hardware design is there. 934 00:56:25.335 --> 00:56:25.975 Also, 935 00:56:27.095 --> 00:56:27.815 firmware 936 00:56:28.215 --> 00:56:29.095 is there. 937 00:56:29.494 --> 00:56:31.255 They have yet to release the firmware, 938 00:56:32.180 --> 00:56:35.300 which they are obligated to do. Okay, 939 00:56:35.300 --> 00:56:39.540 their tweet today said they're intending to, so hopefully that does come soon. 940 00:56:40.500 --> 00:56:42.340 Yeah, yeah, I think they 941 00:56:42.740 --> 00:56:45.780 I've been I've been talking with 942 00:56:45.115 --> 00:56:50.875 a couple people at HeapIt, and they they do intend to do it. If I had my... 943 00:56:51.595 --> 00:56:59.275 If if this were done perfectly in my opinion, the... Both the hardware and the firmware source would have been released before they started shipping them, but, 944 00:57:00.540 --> 00:57:02.220 you know, baby steps there. 945 00:57:02.940 --> 00:57:06.860 Well, it could have been a lot worse. Right? They could have just said, 946 00:57:07.100 --> 00:57:08.060 fuck off. 947 00:57:08.780 --> 00:57:10.380 We we took your 948 00:57:10.620 --> 00:57:13.340 project and commercialized it, and 949 00:57:14.325 --> 00:57:16.085 if you don't like it, sue us. 950 00:57:16.405 --> 00:57:17.045 Yeah. 951 00:57:17.445 --> 00:57:21.685 Yeah, that's right. And there certainly have been people that have done that and that is, 952 00:57:23.205 --> 00:57:24.005 in my opinion, 953 00:57:25.299 --> 00:57:26.980 well, it's illegal. 954 00:57:27.140 --> 00:57:29.940 It is illegal copyright infringement. 955 00:57:30.260 --> 00:57:32.180 But then also you are just... 956 00:57:32.500 --> 00:57:35.619 Especially if you're making like a home Bitcoin miner, I think you're really 957 00:57:36.500 --> 00:57:36.980 leaving 958 00:57:37.715 --> 00:57:41.235 a lot of potential on the table for people to 959 00:57:41.555 --> 00:57:42.675 get involved 960 00:57:42.755 --> 00:57:45.395 and improve on this project to 961 00:57:46.435 --> 00:57:54.980 work on it. And I think especially with small home miners, there will be a non zero amount of people who will buy it because it's open source and they 962 00:57:55.540 --> 00:58:09.335 want to hack on it. They want to play with it. They want to learn from it. But even if you're not going to hack on it, I think it's worth emphasizing that, okay, what does this little device do that they made? It's an air purifier and then it uses some negligible 963 00:58:09.335 --> 00:58:13.255 amount of electricity flowing through it to mine Bitcoin solo mining. 964 00:58:13.895 --> 00:58:14.455 It 965 00:58:15.575 --> 00:58:16.615 is providing 966 00:58:17.335 --> 00:58:18.535 work to the network. 967 00:58:19.050 --> 00:58:23.050 If someone were to solo mind a block with their BitAir, the fact that the firmware 968 00:58:23.050 --> 00:58:26.650 will be released soon and then the device is open source, it allows 969 00:58:26.810 --> 00:58:27.850 the individual 970 00:58:28.170 --> 00:58:31.370 when something is big on the line as like a solo mind block 971 00:58:31.825 --> 00:58:39.345 to go inspect, validate, verify that there is no funny business going on. And so that's where it's like, yeah, it's just a little tiny, 972

00:58:39.425 --> 00:58:44.225 whatever 50 watt air purifier. But the second you're playing around with the neutral 973 00:58:44.705 --> 00:58:48.020 peer to peer electronic cash monetary protocol, that 974 00:58:48.180 --> 00:58:54.100 the status quo should be open source for that part of it. Right. I think that was an important distinction is like, 975 00:58:54.500 --> 00:58:57.700 I have less interest in the way the air purifier 976 00:58:57.859 --> 00:59:04.695 hardware works being open source. But the second you're fucking around with the global monetary system that we all believe in, open source. 977 00:59:05.655 --> 00:59:07.975 Yeah. It really... It is it is 978 00:59:08.694 --> 00:59:09.815 intrinsic 979 00:59:11.255 --> 00:59:15.015 to Bitcoin that it'd be open source. Right? Because this... We are 980 00:59:15.540 --> 00:59:16.660 breaking down 981 00:59:16.900 --> 00:59:18.420 the the legacy 982 00:59:18.740 --> 00:59:19.620 financial 983 00:59:20.100 --> 00:59:21.780 money, right, which is 984 00:59:22.020 --> 00:59:23.380 designed to, 985 00:59:24.580 --> 00:59:30.805 not sort of enable your your self sovereignty, to not allow you to be in charge of how it works. Bitcoin 986 00:59:31.925 --> 00:59:34.325 smashes all that and that it 987 00:59:34.565 --> 00:59:45.630 does that in a number of ways. But one of the big ones is open source. Right? You can really own it. You can understand how it works, and you can make sure that it's working for you. And so 988 00:59:45.870 --> 00:59:48.110 that's why I think open source is 989 00:59:49.870 --> 00:59:51.230 just nonnegotiable, 990 00:59:51.390 --> 00:59:53.470 in my opinion, in in Bitcoin. 991 00:59:54.190 --> 00:59:55.550 And 992 00:59:55.224 --> 00:59:56.345 worth reiterating, 993 00:59:56.345 --> 00:59:57.945 I think that hopefully, 994 00:59:57.945 --> 01:00:01.785 I'm sure the fact that they were able to derive this 995 01:00:02.025 --> 01:00:18.560 design from an open source project saved them so much freaking time. I hope I mean, this is what we... This is how kind of been the thesis is. Right. The references are out there. You don't have to go reinvent the wheel. It becomes that much easier to go build your product, your company, your services 996 01:00:18.640 --> 01:00:20.320 around those devices. 997 01:00:20.400 --> 01:00:20.800 And 998 01:00:21.280 --> 01:00:24.480 I think we're going to see a bunch more unique use cases. 999 01:00:25.085 --> 01:00:26.605 It's pretty cool. 1000 01:00:27.404 --> 01:00:28.285 Yeah. I mean, 1001 01:00:30.845 --> 01:00:31.724 BitAir 1002 01:00:31.805 --> 01:00:37.005 uses the BitX Gamma design and it uses that voltage regulator that's in there. And there have been 1003 01:00:37.510 --> 01:00:45.670 you know, a thousand hours of engineering time that has gone into making that voltage regulator work really well. Like, it's a complicated one. 1004 01:00:45.990 --> 01:00:48.070 ASICs have very specific 1005 01:00:48.870 --> 01:00:51.030 power demands that are not 1006 01:00:52.085 --> 01:00:53.445 necessarily standard, 1007 01:00:53.605 --> 01:00:54.484 and all 1008 01:00:54.484 --> 01:00:56.085 that work has been done for you. 1009 01:00:56.645 --> 01:01:02.565 So you can use it, and just the the deal here is that you open source your changes. 1010 01:01:03.684 --> 01:01:05.605 Did Heap Bit contribute any 1011 01:01:07.100 --> 01:01:09.100 pull requests or modifications 1012 01:01:09.100 --> 01:01:12.780 back to the code or the hardware designs? 1013 01:01:15.180 --> 01:01:16.700 They haven't yet. 1014 01:01:17.020 --> 01:01:18.060 That's not required. 1015 01:01:19.265 --> 01:01:20.145 Right, 1016 01:01:20.145 --> 01:01:23.985 yeah, I wasn't suggesting it was required. I was just curious if they maybe 1017 01:01:24.305 --> 01:01:26.785 found something while they were developing and 1018 01:01:27.265 --> 01:01:28.305 wanted to Yeah, 1019 01:01:29.025 --> 01:01:30.225 haven't and 1020 01:01:31.265 --> 01:01:39.140 I don't know if... I haven't looked into it enough yet to know if they made any improvements on it, but publishing the source 1021 01:01:39.300 --> 01:01:40.020 is 1022 01:01:40.820 --> 01:01:43.700 what's required, and that's fine too. Right? It's Well, 1023 01:01:44.740 --> 01:01:49.275 if they made it somehow better to that voltage regulator analogy, 1024 01:01:50.155 --> 01:02:02.180 Yeah. You and other people put in the thousand hours to get it to where it was, heap it, took it as a starting point, might have polished it a little bit better. They then released that and then that's how you just get this stable rock solid 1025 01:02:02.900 --> 01:02:04.420 AI hardened 1026 01:02:05.220 --> 01:02:07.060 snowball effect. Yeah, really. 1027 01:02:08.339 --> 01:02:10.980 Yeah. Yeah. Actually, do want to go and look at it and see because 1028 01:02:11.460 --> 01:02:14.339 see how they're doing the power delivery to it. And 1029 01:02:15.085 --> 01:02:19.885 if anything has been added there. The cool thing is that they published the source so you can go and look at it. 1030 01:02:20.685 --> 01:02:22.525 And I am sure it would be a lot easier 1031 01:02:22.605 --> 01:02:23.325 if 1032 01:02:23.885 --> 01:02:25.965 they didn't have to desolder chips but 1033 01:02:26.940 --> 01:02:28.060 that's the longer 1034 01:02:28.380 --> 01:02:33.100 goal. That's the longer goal. That's right. That's right. I think we'll get there, but, 1035 01:02:33.500 --> 01:02:34.460 yeah, right now, 1036 01:02:35.420 --> 01:02:36.140 that's 1037 01:02:36.380 --> 01:02:39.500 I'm sure a big headache for their production 1038 01:02:39.500 --> 01:02:42.619 line, right, is that you can't buy those BM 13 seventies 1039 01:02:43.125 --> 01:02:46.325 new. Or you can, but it's through sort of sketchy 1040 01:02:46.325 --> 01:02:47.685 third party means. 1041 01:02:48.565 --> 01:02:49.045 They 1042 01:02:49.365 --> 01:02:50.405 producing 1043 01:02:52.645 --> 01:02:55.685 this commercial product with

resoldered chips? 1044 01:02:55.925 --> 01:02:57.845 Like they're harvesting the chips to make this thing? 1045 01:02:58.910 --> 01:03:01.870 I don't know for sure. I've had a couple of conversations 1046 01:03:02.270 --> 01:03:03.630 in that realm, 1047 01:03:04.030 --> 01:03:04.830 so I 1048 01:03:05.070 --> 01:03:07.470 think so, but I don't know for Wow. 1049 01:03:08.350 --> 01:03:11.965 Wild. Man, we need an ASIC manufacturer 1050 01:03:11.965 --> 01:03:14.685 like anti miner to just 1051 01:03:17.405 --> 01:03:18.445 sell chips 1052 01:03:18.605 --> 01:03:19.085 a I la 1053 01:03:19.645 --> 01:03:20.525 was at 1054 01:03:21.085 --> 01:03:22.605 a happy hour last week 1055 01:03:23.440 --> 01:03:44.025 and I was talking to this guy that I met who does PCB design for one of the defense companies out here in Colorado. There's a lot of aerospace companies and I alluded to what we do and the reverse engineering that Scott has to do to talk to chips, no data sheets, no reference designs. He was like, this is the most insane thing I've ever heard. How is this a real industry? 1056 01:03:44.505 --> 01:03:46.025 That's 1057 01:03:46.025 --> 01:03:49.625 awesome. And I was like, wait till you hear how high up in the 1058 01:03:50.120 --> 01:03:56.360 order quantity they are at Samsung or TSMC too. It's not like a niche small thing. That's the weird part to me. 1059 01:03:56.920 --> 01:03:59.800 These are giant companies with huge orders. 1060 01:04:00.280 --> 01:04:02.280 Yeah, that rival Apple 1061 01:04:02.280 --> 01:04:03.080 silicon 1062 01:04:03.080 --> 01:04:07.875 production space at these shift boundaries, right? Yes, and then they just 1063 01:04:08.355 --> 01:04:11.875 totally behave like not the rest of the industry. Yeah. 1064 01:04:13.235 --> 01:04:14.195 It's 1065 01:04:14.195 --> 01:04:17.555 so weird. It is weird. It is weird. But 1066 01:04:18.920 --> 01:04:23.000 this is what we are going to fix, right? Because we have this tough problem. 1067 01:04:23.480 --> 01:04:24.359 I'm sure 1068 01:04:24.680 --> 01:04:27.400 if you rolled into Bitmain and you were like, 1069 01:04:28.039 --> 01:04:35.095 I want to order a billion dollars worth of your ASICs, and I want them brand new. I want the data sheet. They'd be like, alright. 1070 01:04:35.494 --> 01:04:38.455 But no one's gonna order a billion dollars worth of chips 1071 01:04:39.335 --> 01:04:40.135 without, 1072 01:04:40.135 --> 01:04:40.775 like, 1073 01:04:41.095 --> 01:04:42.855 having this this business, 1074 01:04:44.160 --> 01:04:46.160 you know, proven out. 1075 01:04:46.880 --> 01:04:52.400 I feel like they'd still, like, just shit the bed on the data sheet part of it. 1076 01:04:53.119 --> 01:04:57.440 Yeah. Probably. They probably have a terrible data sheet if they even have one at all. But, 1077 01:04:58.644 --> 01:05:18.980 you know, money talks, so I'm sure you could make it work, but no one's gonna have a billion dollars to do this until this market segment

is totally proven out. Right? And so that's where we come in. That's where two fifty six comes in. Right? It's just like the tools and it's the the resources you get to start these businesses, to start small, to prove this out, to grow, to be bigger, and then, 1078 01:05:19.300 --> 01:05:20.020 you know, 1079 01:05:20.580 --> 01:05:23.220 hopefully by then there'll be manufacturers 1080 01:05:23.220 --> 01:05:25.335 who will do, a 1081 01:05:25.335 --> 01:05:27.095 million dollar order or whatever. 1082 01:05:27.815 --> 01:05:29.335 It's exciting. Yeah. 1083 01:05:29.975 --> 01:05:32.455 What's up with this Learjet that crashed? 1084 01:05:33.015 --> 01:05:33.575 Man, 1085 01:05:33.975 --> 01:05:46.030 that's crazy. Did you guys listen to the audio in the last few Yes, I wish I didn't, but yes. I did too. I got the pro tip not to, did not do it. Yeah, it's pretty sad. Very. 1086 01:05:46.590 --> 01:05:47.630 That's brutal. 1087 01:05:48.030 --> 01:05:52.350 Yeah, I'm wondering like do we have any idea like what went wrong that 1088 01:05:52.590 --> 01:05:54.670 caused this plane to start nose diving? 1089 01:05:55.695 --> 01:05:58.095 I think it lost its vertical stabilizer. 1090 01:05:58.815 --> 01:06:05.855 So it just became a lawn dart. That so that's the part like on the tail. It was a T wing. So it lost 1091 01:06:06.015 --> 01:06:07.775 this part of the T. Yeah. 1092 01:06:08.015 --> 01:06:08.575 Which 1093 01:06:08.850 --> 01:06:10.290 elevation control. 1094 01:06:11.170 --> 01:06:15.410 And it just turned the plane into a long dart. How do they lose that stabilizer? 1095 01:06:15.410 --> 01:06:16.370 I don't know. 1096 01:06:16.690 --> 01:06:19.970 I saw something about that particular jet had 1097 01:06:20.865 --> 01:06:23.425 an issue with that stabilizer. 1098 01:06:23.425 --> 01:06:25.345 I think I saw that too, like in 1099 01:06:25.985 --> 01:06:27.665 certain turbulence and stressful 1100 01:06:28.625 --> 01:06:29.505 conditions. 1101 01:06:30.945 --> 01:06:34.145 So it's not looking like this airplane was hacked in midair? 1102 01:06:34.590 --> 01:06:40.110 No. I I saw some speculation that there was some updraft kind of thing that they went through. 1103 01:06:40.510 --> 01:06:42.430 I guess the pilot was pretty young. 1104 01:06:42.670 --> 01:06:45.310 It was awfully close to Mar A Lago. 1105 01:06:45.710 --> 01:06:47.550 Really? Yeah, it was like 1106 01:06:48.185 --> 01:06:50.025 six minutes away. Wow. 1107 01:06:50.425 --> 01:06:51.145 I 1108 01:06:51.305 --> 01:06:51.945 wonder, 1109 01:06:52.185 --> 01:06:54.105 just wonder what's going on here. 1110 01:06:55.305 --> 01:06:57.225 Well, my first thought was, 1111 01:06:58.185 --> 01:07:00.905 which Epstein key witness just got silenced? 1112 01:07:02.160 --> 01:07:06.560 We still don't know who was on them. Apparently little jets are pretty dangerous. 1113 01:07:07.119 --> 01:07:11.280 Yeah. I've never been on one. I don't really have interest nor helicopters. 1114 01:07:11.920 --> 01:07:14.400 I mean, I've been on some small planes, but they were like, 1115 01:07:15.405 --> 01:07:21.325 I don't think they were jets, right? Like what did we take in Kenya out to the... I think that was a turboprop. 1116 01:07:21.805 --> 01:07:25.165 It's like a little bit of jet, little bit of prop. Yeah, best 1117 01:07:25.405 --> 01:07:27.005 of both worlds. No turbo? 1118 01:07:28.460 --> 01:07:31.580 I guess it probably has a turbo in it somewhere. Know 1119 01:07:31.900 --> 01:07:34.140 how it works, but it definitely had propellers. 1120 01:07:34.220 --> 01:07:35.500 Two. Well, 1121 01:07:35.660 --> 01:07:37.260 that one had just one, but 1122 01:07:37.819 --> 01:07:41.420 yeah. I've been in some Cessnas with like a single propeller in the front. 1123 01:07:42.895 --> 01:07:43.535 Dang. 1124 01:07:44.015 --> 01:07:46.335 You haven't done that? No. I've been 1125 01:07:46.895 --> 01:07:47.935 skydiving, 1126 01:07:48.015 --> 01:07:53.295 that was in a very small plane, and then the plane was perfectly fine and I jumped out of it anyways. 1127 01:07:57.240 --> 01:07:59.880 What do you guys think is gonna be 1128 01:08:00.440 --> 01:08:03.960 exploited by Pod two fifty six episode 132? 1129 01:08:04.600 --> 01:08:07.640 Man, alright my prediction for this week is that 1130 01:08:08.360 --> 01:08:12.265 we see a hydro dam get attacked. 1131 01:08:12.745 --> 01:08:13.785 It 1132 01:08:14.105 --> 01:08:16.585 does seem like they're going after lower value targets 1133 01:08:16.985 --> 01:08:17.945 more and more. 1134 01:08:18.425 --> 01:08:22.745 See, because the canary in the coal mine is the cryptocurrency stuff, right? Because 1135 01:08:23.800 --> 01:08:25.400 it's final settlement, 1136 01:08:26.520 --> 01:08:28.199 they're bearer assets, 1137 01:08:28.840 --> 01:08:32.280 most of them can't get frozen except when 1138 01:08:32.360 --> 01:08:33.880 you're talking about stable coins. 1139 01:08:35.895 --> 01:08:38.054 So yeah, I mean it's pretty instantaneous 1140 01:08:38.935 --> 01:08:42.215 return on your exploit if you can pull it off. 1141 01:08:43.095 --> 01:08:46.695 Whereas like some of this other stuff, like with the grocery store for example, 1142 01:08:49.190 --> 01:08:52.310 I think it'd be a hard case to make to suggest that 1143 01:08:52.790 --> 01:08:57.350 someone was just really mad at the grocery stores and targeted 1144 01:08:57.750 --> 01:08:58.390 them 1145 01:08:58.550 --> 01:08:58.790 for 1146 01:08:59.955 --> 01:09:03.554 something specific. I think it was more like an opportunistic 1147 01:09:04.115 --> 01:09:06.035 exploit that was found, 1148 01:09:06.835 --> 01:09:08.195 or an opportunistic 1149 01:09:08.195 --> 01:09:09.315 vulnerability, 1150 01:09:09.875 --> 01:09:13.475 and then they just decided to see how far they could go with it, right. 1151 01:09:14.100 --> 01:09:19.139 So I think what we see going forward is a lot of these 1152 01:09:19.699 --> 01:09:20.979

opportunistic 1153 01:09:21.619 --> 01:09:25.060 exploits popping up where it's like not necessarily 1154 01:09:25.060 --> 01:09:25.780 a 1155 01:09:26.020 --> 01:09:28.340 targeted attack with like 1156 01:09:28.885 --> 01:09:30.085 a predetermined 1157 01:09:30.085 --> 01:09:40.965 outcome or a desired outcome, but just more like people fucking around with stuff and finding things that have weaknesses and then just trying to break things. 1158 01:09:42.650 --> 01:09:50.170 Putting into the defrost cycle is particularly mischievous, right? It wasn't just like, let's kill the fridges. It was like, let's ruin 1159 01:09:50.250 --> 01:09:52.730 their contents as quick as possible. 1160 01:09:53.530 --> 01:09:54.250 Let's 1161 01:09:54.650 --> 01:09:56.650 do the opposite of keeping the food cold. 1162 01:09:57.405 --> 01:09:58.124 Yeah, 1163 01:09:58.364 --> 01:10:00.044 yeah, that's pretty gnarly. 1164 01:10:01.085 --> 01:10:02.764 Yeah, I think something 1165 01:10:03.165 --> 01:10:04.524 that will put load 1166 01:10:04.684 --> 01:10:06.044 or add load 1167 01:10:06.445 --> 01:10:07.564 to the grid. 1168 01:10:08.605 --> 01:10:09.965 So it would cause a brownout? 1169 01:10:10.510 --> 01:10:12.590 Like, I I think back to 1170 01:10:13.070 --> 01:10:15.070 Schnitzel telling me that in Switzerland, 1171 01:10:15.310 --> 01:10:20.830 this is when he was telling me about the the the solar setup there. They all have, like, 1172 01:10:21.390 --> 01:10:24.989 basically one solar inverter company manages the whole country. 1173 01:10:25.310 --> 01:10:25.950 Goddamn. 1174 01:10:27.275 --> 01:10:40.074 So what could possibly go wrong? Yeah. Right. Yeah. There's all kinds of things. If you could just command all these, like, grid connected inverters, right? You could put them all into a bad state, and 1175 01:10:41.070 --> 01:10:45.310 that would have a pretty disastrous effect on the grid, I think. Mhmm. 1176 01:10:45.630 --> 01:10:47.790 And probably a bunch of upstream 1177 01:10:49.870 --> 01:10:50.830 dependencies. 1178 01:10:51.310 --> 01:10:55.710 Do you know what? Alright. So here's my prediction. Maybe not next, but coming soon. 1179 01:10:56.425 --> 01:10:57.224 The next 1180 01:10:57.625 --> 01:11:00.505 scary as fuck hack is going to be cars. 1181 01:11:00.985 --> 01:11:01.784 Cars? 1182 01:11:02.105 --> 01:11:10.824 Cars, man. We got Internet cars everywhere, and some of them are old. Right? Some of them are... Even the gas ones, they're all, like, remote software update now. Yeah. Oh, yeah. 1183 01:11:11.680 --> 01:11:14.000 Supposedly cars since like the 2010s 1184 01:11:14.000 --> 01:11:15.440 just basically had 1185 01:11:16.080 --> 01:11:19.280 persistent cellular connections, right? So you think that's 1186 01:11:19.600 --> 01:11:20.320 like 1187 01:11:20.960 --> 01:11:21.760 fifteen 1188 01:11:22.320 --> 01:11:23.520 years or so. 1189 01:11:24.000 --> 01:11:25.520 Wow. And 1190 01:11:26.325 --> 01:11:28.325 Who's how secure

are 1191 01:11:28.325 --> 01:11:30.405 paying the data subscription fees? 1192 01:11:31.364 --> 01:11:38.645 The car companies that are harvesting all your personal data via the... Yeah, the OnStar button that's listening to you. They just prepay? 1193 01:11:41.020 --> 01:11:43.900 Mean, they don't do their Wi Fi networks. They're not high Yeah, data 1194 01:11:44.860 --> 01:11:47.900 but any data that's getting sent from the car. 1195 01:11:48.540 --> 01:11:53.740 I think probably ten years ago, I was in a friend's car that he had just got and he was like, Look, I got this app 1196 01:11:55.205 --> 01:12:06.485 that controls the car. And we were like on a road trip and we opened the app and it was like all these buttons of things you can do. And we're like, oh, roll down the windows and like honk the horn and like all kinds of stuff like while we were driving. 1197 01:12:08.020 --> 01:12:11.300 So all that's going from the cell phone to some server, 1198 01:12:11.940 --> 01:12:18.420 and then the server's communicating back to the vehicle Yeah. And causing the window to roll down. Yes. 1199 01:12:18.980 --> 01:12:19.460 Yeah. Mean, 1200 01:12:20.500 --> 01:12:21.460 there... There's gonna be... 1201 01:12:22.675 --> 01:12:36.355 Our only hope there is that there's so many different car makers that it's not like a totally, like, apocalyptic event because you can't target all cars at once. But Well, it's worse than window switches now because now they're like steer by wire, brake by wire, 1202 01:12:37.630 --> 01:12:43.389 throttle by wire has been the standard for a while. I don't think we'll see it by next week, 1203 01:12:43.710 --> 01:12:44.190 but 1204 01:12:45.390 --> 01:12:47.870 there's 1205 01:12:47.870 --> 01:12:49.150 gonna be 1206 01:12:49.935 --> 01:12:52.415 a mega mining company 1207 01:12:52.575 --> 01:12:54.975 where something just goes haywire. 1208 01:12:55.455 --> 01:13:00.175 To your point about it being connected to maybe they're scheduled for a 1209 01:13:00.575 --> 01:13:02.255 curtailment and 1210 01:13:02.830 --> 01:13:06.590 things are not shutting off when they're telling them to shut off or like 1211 01:13:07.469 --> 01:13:10.190 the hash rate gets pointed somewhere else 1212 01:13:11.230 --> 01:13:12.110 or 1213 01:13:12.670 --> 01:13:16.429 That's the thing about the large miners. It switches to Bcash. 1214 01:13:17.165 --> 01:13:18.125 They have 1215 01:13:18.364 --> 01:13:19.165 one, 1216 01:13:19.325 --> 01:13:24.045 many of them are publicly traded companies with a fiduciary responsibility, 1217 01:13:24.045 --> 01:13:25.244 but also they have, 1218 01:13:25.565 --> 01:13:30.285 they are upstream and close to the power generation source 1219 01:13:30.760 --> 01:13:36.360 At at large scale. And that's the part where it's like, how is the status quo? 1220 01:13:36.920 --> 01:13:37.880 Just seem like sitting 1221 01:13:38.520 --> 01:13:41.960 ducks. Like they're like, someone's gotta be looking at that. Like, 1222 01:13:43.175 --> 01:13:47.255 Let's figure out what we can fuck with in here. Is Forman open No, 1223 01:13:48.935 --> 01:13:50.614 I don't think so. And is 1224 01:13:50.935 --> 01:13:52.935 that on prem or is it cloud service? 1225 01:13:54.570 --> 01:14:05.130 I imagine it's a cloud service. Yeah. Think it's a cloud service, but my guess. I don't know. But don't worry. They have SOC two compliance. Nothing can go wrong. It's perfect. That seems like a honeypot. 1226 01:14:05.369 --> 01:14:06.730 SOC two compliance is a joke. 1227 01:14:07.715 --> 01:14:08.355 Yeah. 1228 01:14:09.555 --> 01:14:12.675 Yeah. I wonder how much hash rate these monitoring 1229 01:14:12.675 --> 01:14:13.554 softwares... 1230 01:14:13.715 --> 01:14:15.074 Well, and then Luxor, 1231 01:14:15.875 --> 01:14:18.275 like two weeks ago, three weeks ago, they added 1232 01:14:19.230 --> 01:14:22.270 account creation What's for the Luxor 1233 01:14:22.270 --> 01:14:23.470 up with that dude? 1234 01:14:24.190 --> 01:14:27.230 Like you have to have an account to run their firmware? 1235 01:14:27.870 --> 01:14:32.430 They claimed it wasn't for all users. I don't know if that how they're distincting between 1236 01:14:32.645 --> 01:14:38.485 I have a site and I'm just tinkering with LuxOS on my Slim 19 1237 01:14:38.565 --> 01:14:40.885 that's converted to run off 110. 1238 01:14:41.685 --> 01:14:44.085 Are they going to implement age verification now? 1239 01:14:45.440 --> 01:14:51.520 I mean, I think that the... We didn't even mention that fun hack that totally destroyed SSL 1240 01:14:51.520 --> 01:14:53.680 and encrypted communications over the Internet. 1241 01:14:54.560 --> 01:14:55.280 The 1242 01:14:55.840 --> 01:14:56.800 EMUDRA 1243 01:14:56.800 --> 01:14:57.440 certificate? 1244 01:14:57.695 --> 01:14:58.575 EMudra, 1245 01:14:58.575 --> 01:15:04.735 right? I didn't try it, but I'm pretty convinced that that would allow you to use third party firmware 1246 01:15:04.815 --> 01:15:06.335 and not pay the dev fee. 1247 01:15:06.815 --> 01:15:08.095 Oh, interesting. 1248 01:15:09.375 --> 01:15:21.400 This is kind of fun to be a part of alive during this time. Mean it's kind of stressful, but because we're aware of it, ignorance is bliss, think the average person is like, what? My Wells Fargo account works. Right. 1249 01:15:21.800 --> 01:15:25.400 Yeah, we have a front seat to the end of the world. It's like get out the popcorn. 1250 01:15:26.125 --> 01:15:29.485 I wonder what LinkedIn is like right now, because my 1251 01:15:29.485 --> 01:15:34.045 Twitter feed is just like, Oh, another vulnerability, another vulnerability. But I'm sure LinkedIn is like, 1252 01:15:34.845 --> 01:15:38.525 Here's what KimmyK3 taught me about B2B SaaS sales. 1253 01:15:39.565 --> 01:15:41.565 Yeah, not my thing, but 1254 01:15:42.780 --> 01:15:46.300 best of luck to the rest of you out there. Well, I think 1255 01:15:46.940 --> 01:15:48.860 the next Kimi is 1256

01:15:49.420 --> 01:15:52.380 supposed to release their open weights in 1257 01:15:52.380 --> 01:15:55.420 early November, so that's coming right up. That's going to... 1258 01:15:56.395 --> 01:15:58.635 Because Nice. When they release the open weights, then the 1259 01:15:59.114 --> 01:16:02.954 obliterated models can be made, so that's going to open up a new wave of attacks. 1260 01:16:03.275 --> 01:16:04.394 Yes, more And 1261 01:16:05.114 --> 01:16:07.914 aren't the midterm elections tomorrow? 1262 01:16:07.915 --> 01:16:08.235 Yep. 1263 01:16:09.000 --> 01:16:11.080 There's got to be some voting 1264 01:16:11.080 --> 01:16:12.280 machine hacks 1265 01:16:12.520 --> 01:16:19.800 coming up in the next twenty four hours then. I wonder how many vendors there are for those. I think it's one. Dick Cheney's company DieBold. 1266 01:16:20.440 --> 01:16:23.320 And you don't even need AI to hack that, right? Those are notorious. 1267 01:16:23.925 --> 01:16:28.324 Yeah. They probably have a super, super talented software team. Yeah. 1268 01:16:28.565 --> 01:16:32.885 Right? I think it's an Israeli foreign ministry company. 1269 01:16:34.565 --> 01:16:35.365 We shall see. 1270 01:16:36.100 --> 01:16:38.340 We shall see. I'm going on a 1271 01:16:38.980 --> 01:16:43.700 Bitcoin Magazine TV tomorrow to talk about $2.56. Oh really? Really? Congrats. 1272 01:16:43.700 --> 01:16:44.820 Yeah. Alright. 1273 01:16:45.780 --> 01:16:50.580 How do you tune in? I didn't know Bitcoin Magazine had a TV channel. 1274 01:16:50.660 --> 01:17:01.525 Yeah, it's pretty recent, end of the summer I want to say. They have a whole studio in Nashville where they've done some in person interviews. It kind of just looks like a newsroom. I've 1275 01:17:01.525 --> 01:17:03.525 been to their office out there in Nashville, it's nice. 1276 01:17:04.570 --> 01:17:09.610 So are you going to Nashville? No, just calling in but we're talking about they 1277 01:17:10.090 --> 01:17:10.730 asked, 1278 01:17:11.370 --> 01:17:14.890 what do you think is going on in mining? And we mentioned it earlier, I 1279 01:17:16.025 --> 01:17:28.265 think I'm just going to talk about how I think the whole industry is dying and burning down and being rebuilt and it will come out stronger and better. The Phoenix that rises from that. Not to say that we're trying to kill it, we're trying to make it better, 1280 01:17:31.305 --> 01:17:32.710 but it ain't going to be painless. 1281 01:17:33.030 --> 01:17:34.630 People should be able to 1282 01:17:35.190 --> 01:17:35.989 verify, 1283 01:17:36.310 --> 01:17:37.190 inspect, 1284 01:17:37.429 --> 01:17:38.309 modify 1285 01:17:39.030 --> 01:17:42.789 their Bitcoin mining hardware and software freely, 1286 01:17:44.265 --> 01:17:46.344 just and like the rest of the ecosystem 1287 01:17:46.824 --> 01:17:50.505 and right now they cannot do that for the most part. 1288 01:17:50.905 --> 01:17:51.545 Yeah, 1289 01:17:51.784 --> 01:17:52.905 yeah exactly. 1290 01:17:53.864 --> 01:17:55.545 Yeah we had two 1291 01:17:55.864 --> 01:17:58.425 relatively big difficulty adjustments upwards, 1292 01:17:59.030 --> 01:18:00.949 right? The last one was 1293 01:18:01.350 --> 01:18:02.390 5.5% 1294 01:18:02.390 --> 01:18:05.510 and the one before that was 5.9%. 1295 01:18:07.510 --> 01:18:11.670 The next one is looking like it's going to be a downward adjustment of 2.8%. 1296 01:18:12.535 --> 01:18:15.655 You think that's just colder weather 1297 01:18:16.615 --> 01:18:21.175 bringing hash rate up? Or do you think people are getting more efficient machines? 1298 01:18:21.415 --> 01:18:25.335 I don't think more companies are deciding, oh my gosh, Bitcoin mining is profitable. 1299 01:18:26.350 --> 01:18:28.750 I mean, there was a massive drop in... 1300 01:18:29.070 --> 01:18:31.230 This looks like it was back in February. 1301 01:18:32.510 --> 01:18:36.030 Yeah, but here since October, it's been up. Yeah, 1302 01:18:36.430 --> 01:18:37.550 there's your October. 1303 01:18:38.925 --> 01:18:57.990 October, so yeah, people are plugging machines. You're probably right. It's probably the weather is it starts to get cool. I know I I plugged in like three bit axes here, so yeah, it's probably mostly me. Is it nice and toasty in there now? Yeah, it's actually toasty because it hasn't cooled off enough to really warrant the number of miners that I plugged in. 1304 01:18:58.390 --> 01:18:59.030 Yeah, 1305 01:18:59.270 --> 01:19:03.110 we've certainly turned ours on from the cool weather. I think that's a big part of it. 1306 01:19:04.725 --> 01:19:08.644 Because those s 23 air cooled still don't exist, right? No one has those? 1307 01:19:09.045 --> 01:19:13.284 No, I don't think that those have shipped yet, just the s 23 hydros. 1308 01:19:13.764 --> 01:19:15.925 And I don't think that many sites run hydros. 1309 01:19:16.500 --> 01:19:22.099 I don't know. I don't know. But, I mean, I think what this is kinda showing is we haven't seen 1310 01:19:23.300 --> 01:19:32.465 all of the large miners that are pivoting to AI. They have not been unplugging their miners in mass. Right? I think we would see a much more significant drop. 1311 01:19:32.785 --> 01:19:36.704 It's kinda seems to me, like, my hand wavy analysis here is that they 1312 01:19:37.265 --> 01:19:37.824 are 1313 01:19:38.225 --> 01:19:39.025 pivoting 1314 01:19:39.265 --> 01:19:42.305 to AI, but not necessarily out of Bitcoin mining. 1315 01:19:42.900 --> 01:19:43.699 Probably 1316 01:19:44.260 --> 01:19:47.780 because it's... You can raise a lot of money if you're getting into AI. 1317 01:19:49.140 --> 01:19:54.179 I think a lot of them sold a bunch of their Bitcoin. BitDeer is down to zero Bitcoin. They sold it all. 1318 01:19:55.395 --> 01:19:57.155 Didn't the country of, 1319 01:19:57.395 --> 01:19:58.675 was it Bhutan, 1320 01:19:58.675 --> 01:20:00.034 just sell like 1321 01:20:00.595 --> 01:20:01.235 the 1322 01:20:01.875 --> 01:20:03.395

majority of their Bitcoin? 1323 01:20:03.715 --> 01:20:05.795 I still think hash rate's gonna go down. 1324 01:20:06.195 --> 01:20:06.995 I think no one, 1325 01:20:08.010 --> 01:20:08.809 I think 1326 01:20:09.369 --> 01:20:11.369 the sites that will survive 1327 01:20:12.010 --> 01:20:14.090 won't want 20 kilowatt, 1328 01:20:14.090 --> 01:20:15.050 dollars 30,000, 1329 01:20:15.530 --> 01:20:17.849 four eighty volt hydro miners. 1330 01:20:19.050 --> 01:20:20.489 Yeah, that just doesn't, 1331 01:20:22.265 --> 01:20:23.225 Yeah, don't. 1332 01:20:23.545 --> 01:20:26.025 It doesn't really seem like a good product. 1333 01:20:26.425 --> 01:20:34.265 I mean, it's as far as a miner goes, it's significantly better. It's like way quieter and yeah, 1334 01:20:34.505 --> 01:20:35.625 they're over a petahash. 1335 01:20:36.139 --> 01:20:39.899 Mean, it's a much better miner and I think it just sort of 1336 01:20:40.300 --> 01:20:41.099 industrial 1337 01:20:41.820 --> 01:20:43.579 wise, it's significantly better. 1338 01:20:44.300 --> 01:20:46.619 I think if you have the capital for that, 1339 01:20:46.940 --> 01:20:48.300 you're just going to switch to AI. 1340 01:20:49.195 --> 01:20:51.835 Right, because you're going to get more bang for your buck, right? 1341 01:20:53.115 --> 01:20:55.115 They were saying at TENS that 1342 01:20:55.995 --> 01:20:56.795 if 1343 01:20:56.795 --> 01:20:59.515 Bitcoin mining pays like $6 a megawatt hour, 1344 01:21:00.795 --> 01:21:03.275 HPC is like $60 a megawatt. 1345 01:21:03.515 --> 01:21:04.980 Right. It's like 10 times more. 1346 01:21:05.860 --> 01:21:08.500 I'm sure the electric bill is different but... 1347 01:21:09.300 --> 01:21:12.500 Maybe not $24.07 like Bitcoin. Right? You gotta 1348 01:21:13.780 --> 01:21:16.020 gotta find a buyer for your AI compute. 1349 01:21:16.645 --> 01:21:19.125 Should I shout out some hashers? 1350 01:21:19.445 --> 01:21:20.085 Yeah. 1351 01:21:20.485 --> 01:21:22.805 Let's see. 827 1352 01:21:22.805 --> 01:21:23.925 terahash. 1353 01:21:24.485 --> 01:21:31.365 We did have over a petahash for a while today courtesy of click here in case of mine block. He gave us a hash pump. 1354 01:21:31.860 --> 01:21:32.580 Yeah. 1355 01:21:33.540 --> 01:21:38.100 Let's go shout out to click here in case of mind block mad props. 1356 01:21:38.500 --> 01:21:39.860 We've got read 1357 01:21:40.260 --> 01:21:44.260 fact seven seventy seven longtime supporters as well as Zarka 1358 01:21:44.885 --> 01:21:46.645 Canadian Hash and Coin. 1359 01:21:47.045 --> 01:21:49.845 That logger going Yeah, I do have a couple machines on now. 1360 01:21:50.165 --> 01:21:51.445 Yeah, I turned on a few. 1361 01:21:51.925 --> 01:21:53.365 Bitcoin Park, 1362 01:21:54.245 --> 01:21:55.045 Eco, 1363 01:21:55.685 --> 01:21:57.205 hardestblocks.org, 1364 01:21:57.205 --> 01:21:57.845 Agent P, 1365 01:21:58.969 --> 01:21:59.929 Pizzandy, 1366 01:22:00.250 --> 01:22:01.050 myself, 1367 01:22:01.929 --> 01:22:02.730 Dylan, 1368 01:22:02.810 --> 01:22:05.690 D plus plus Satoki, P. Botweiler, 1369 01:22:05.690 --> 01:22:07.050 Clear, Nuclear, 1370 01:22:07.130 --> 01:22:08.329 and Schnitzel. 1371 01:22:08.650 --> 01:22:10.250 The difficulty leaderboard. 1372 01:22:10.250 --> 01:22:13.210 I noticed there is a change on the difficulty leaderboard. 1373 01:22:14.405 --> 01:22:16.725 It's not loading for me. Did we reset it? 1374 01:22:17.925 --> 01:22:22.005 Because now Zarka is in first place with 1375 01:22:22.245 --> 01:22:26.165 only 165,000,000,000 1376 01:22:26.405 --> 01:22:33.920 difficulty. No trillion, yeah maybe that got reset to SD because previously it was electron with like 5,600,000,000,000 1377 01:22:33.920 --> 01:22:34.719 or something. 1378 01:22:35.840 --> 01:22:41.280 Shout out to the legendary D plus plus the difficulty checkerboard doesn't seem to be working. Well, ask her 1379 01:22:41.775 --> 01:22:42.894 And, yeah, 1380 01:22:43.775 --> 01:22:46.414 we're gonna be running telehash number five. 1381 01:22:46.895 --> 01:22:50.974 I got my save the date this morning from the Bitcoin Park team. 1382 01:22:51.695 --> 01:22:52.695 January 1383 01:22:52.695 --> 01:22:53.695 22, 1384 01:22:53.695 --> 01:22:54.895 I wanna say. Okay. 1385 01:22:55.910 --> 01:22:57.590 January 1386 01:22:57.590 --> 01:22:59.269 21 1387 01:22:59.270 --> 01:23:05.110 will be the telehash. '21 is a good number. Thursday January 21 is telehash 1388 01:23:05.110 --> 01:23:06.790 number five. Okay. 1389 01:23:07.350 --> 01:23:08.790 Fifth time is a charm guys. 1390 01:23:10.425 --> 01:23:14.665 This will be the fourth time since the first time we wanna block. Right. 1391 01:23:15.385 --> 01:23:20.185 Yes. Get your miners revved up. If you wanna if you wanna test 1392 01:23:20.665 --> 01:23:22.585 pointing them to 256, 1393 01:23:23.145 --> 01:23:26.105 you can get all the details at 1394 01:23:26.640 --> 01:23:28.000 256f.org, 1395 01:23:28.000 --> 01:23:30.400 or is it -.256f.org? 1396 01:23:30.400 --> 01:23:32.960 Yeah. Dash.256f.org. 1397 01:23:32.960 --> 01:23:34.640 So, yeah, make sure you're... 1398 01:23:34.800 --> 01:23:37.680 You've tested it out. You're ready on 1399 01:23:38.160 --> 01:23:39.680 the twenty first to go. 1400 01:23:40.505 --> 01:23:43.465 Point your hash to a good cause so that we can 1401 01:23:44.105 --> 01:23:44.985 save 1402 01:23:44.985 --> 01:23:46.024 Bitcoin mining. 1403 01:23:46.185 --> 01:23:49.064 Someone's got to do it. I'm feeling confident. 1404 01:23:49.224 --> 01:23:53.945 The proprietary mining empire is not going to dismantle itself. We'll probably hit two blocks. 1405 01:23:55.040 --> 01:23:55.680 Yeah. 1406 01:23:56.080 --> 01:23:59.600 We'll probably hit all the blocks in a 20... We'll hit 144 1407 01:23:59.600 --> 01:24:04.720 blocks Five in a row. Every day. Just like Foundry. Yeah. We'll just pull up Foundry, just a clean sweep. 1408 01:24:06.415 --> 01:24:09.695 Man, Yeah. Wonder, is foundry's network infrastructure good? 1409 01:24:10.335 --> 01:24:12.574 It's got to be, dude. They have SOC two compliance. 1410 01:24:14.815 --> 01:24:17.374 I mean, yeah, they have what, like 1411 01:24:18.094 --> 01:24:19.455 28, 1412 01:24:19.455 --> 01:24:21.455 30% of the hash rate 1413 01:24:21.760 --> 01:24:24.159 on the network. 26.46 1414 01:24:24.320 --> 01:24:25.439 according to 1415 01:24:25.840 --> 01:24:26.719 mempool. 1416 01:24:26.719 --> 01:24:28.320 Space pool rankings. 1417 01:24:29.679 --> 01:24:34.320 Everyone at Foundry the last week double check the background of your girlfriend. 1418 01:24:35.675 --> 01:24:37.834 Yeah. Yes. Be careful. 1419 01:24:38.474 --> 01:24:39.195 Sounds 1420 01:24:39.434 --> 01:24:42.794 like she's out of your league. You might want to think about this. Yeah. 1421 01:24:43.114 --> 01:24:45.274 If it seems too good to be true, 1422 01:24:45.675 --> 01:24:47.594 she's probably a North Korean spy. 1423 01:24:49.110 --> 01:24:50.630 Don't let her have your laptop. 1424 01:24:52.070 --> 01:24:52.790 Alright, 1425 01:24:52.950 --> 01:24:54.150 until next week. 1426 01:24:54.630 --> 01:24:55.910 Alright, well, 1427 01:24:56.150 --> 01:24:57.750 yeah, I guess that's a show. 1428 01:24:58.070 --> 01:25:02.470 Let's go. Alright. Alright, right on guys. Stay vigilant out there, don't get hacked. 1429 01:25:03.505 --> 01:25:04.864 And then keep hacking. 1430 01:25:05.105 --> 01:25:06.625 Yeah, you do the hacking. 1431 01:25:07.505 --> 01:25:10.784 Don't let them hack you. Hack them first. Yeah. 1432 01:25:11.025 --> 01:25:14.625 He who hacks does not get hacked. Hack or be hacked. 1433 01:25:14.785 --> 01:25:17.585 Hack or be hacked. Hack onto them as they hack onto us. 1434 01:25:18.360 --> 01:25:19.079 Yes. 1435 01:25:19.239 --> 01:25:20.519 The golden rule. 1436 01:25:21.480 --> 01:25:23.159 When in Rome, 1437 01:25:23.880 --> 01:25:24.360 hack 1438 01:25:25.159 --> 01:25:27.159 The throne. The throne. 1439 01:25:27.639 --> 01:25:28.440 Alright. 1440 01:25:28.840 --> 01:25:29.719 Peace. 1441 01:25:30.600 --> 01:25:31.719 No. You hang up.