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Konstantin Saifoulline: Pierce. Well, you should actually give me the direct insights because I think you're kind of the experts. You have a seed fund and you have a lot of expertise. So what are things people can learn from you today?
Pearse Coyle: I have a seed fund, yes, and it's a super early seed fund and I would say that the things people can best learn from me today is the kind of one thing that is really not obvious to most most founders and it's it's just to do with cash flow. Now it sounds really boring and say, Hey, I'm not an accountant, but actually, you know, everybody goes into a every founder goes into a venture and they've got a big idea, they're really clear on the what the big goal is, they've got some idea how they're gonna get started. but the majority of ventures fail because they run out of cash. they're doing most things right, but if they just get it wrong cash wise, they're screwed. And hardware ventures in particular are kind of doubly or triply prone to running out of cash flow compared to like you know, a drug discovery company or software company or something like that. So so it's quite helpful, I think, for people to you know, not dismiss it not dismiss this as something that, you know, I'm gonna hire a CFO guy, right? That's not my problem. It it's so as a f as a founder this is so your problem and as a as a As a an investor, I am of course looking for the story, the great story about the upside, but I'm hugely looking at preventing the downside. So, if you want to be success like if you if you want to be successful, a pretty good rule of thumb is don't die. And and and it is there's a whole bunch of kind of pretty straightforward things you can do to prevent yourself from running out cash. and also to be clever about how you raise your money that are particularly relevant for hardware hardware ventures. So I think what I can share is a couple of good rules of thumb on that which a lot of your founders will will find helpful. And I know the ones we've invested in, definitely we've gone you know, all of them have gone through some rough patches and the really strong emphasis on cash flow management has saved them. You know, we've we've survived various sort of periods where we couldn't raise money or where sales weren't good. So so I guess that that's if I were to if I were to summarise what I'm gonna talk about, it's it's around that, particularly as it as it applies to hardware hardware best ventures. So
Konstantin Saifoulline: Okay, really exciting. Yeah, let's go right into it. if you have a conversation with a company for the first time, what are the specific things that you look at? what is the first marker for you?
Pearse Coyle: Constantine, you're such a good liar telling me that ca cash flow sounds exciting. that's good though. That's your job is to make it make it sound good. Okay, so I wrote down
Konstantin Saifoulline: Well, I mean, you have to do it,
Pearse Coyle: Yeah it's show business. okay, right, so so so let me take it. I I did a little prep note for on this ahead of time, so I have it here beside me. So if I my eyes look to that way, I'm just reminding myself what I wrote down earlier. so the first thing to understand, you know, a lot of people will come out and they'll go through college or something, or they'll do an incubator and they'll hear they'll read about all these people raising crazy money for their startups and you know, many, many millions pre-revenue, pre-product even. and they'll say, Well that's what I'm gonna do, that that's the playbook. And and you know there's lots of stuff. Think big, be bold, you know, all that kind of stuff. And sure, like if you can if you can find somebody who's willing to give write a multi million check like up front really early then then great, you know, and you've a lot of scope to make mistakes if you've got loads of money. But first thing to understand is that hardware ventures are considered capital inefficient. So in other words, you need a lot more money generally to to achieve to to to achieve a certain level of profitability and sales in a hardware venture, you typically need a lot more money than you do to achieve the same thing in a software venture. Okay. So if you're a if you're a general purpose fund, general purpose venture capital company, so you've raised a bunch of money and you say, Okay, I'm going to invest this in stuff, then the hardware venture scores massively worse than a software venture to begin with. So it's either So so it's next to impossible to raise money for hardware ventures from general purpose funds unless you've got incredibly strong traction or there's a a bunch of incredibly strong metrics that that you have. So otherwise you are confined to specialist funds, sometimes to corporate VCs, or or angel investors. So the first thing to understand is that that the pool of money that's available to you is massively smaller. So that's a problem to begin with. So you're you're unlikely to get a big you're you're unlikely to get a b a a big check. And so for for example, so I've good relations with a bunch of later stage funds and I've good relations with with Bill Corin in in Seguire, who's the sort of one of their deep tech guys. And I pitched him a bunch of things and he's made the point to me, Sir Pierce, look, it all comes out of the same pot. So so if you if if I take this to an investment committee, I'm fighting against somebody who's got an enterprise SaaS venture. Now this is before enterprise SaaS kind of started to hit the skids a bit but he was essentially saying that, it it's it's very hard i it it's very hard to to compete. Now, so why is that and how can you address it? So so there's a bunch of things and I'm I'm looking at my note here again. so one of the big things is you you you can't avoid costs. w with a software venture, very often you can carry on your day job. you know, can do it at night, you can do it at weekends, you do a load of stuff
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and you can get to a sort of a minimum viable product potentially, with like working at the weekends or working all the hours, God sense. You don't need to write a check for a whole bunch of stuff. You don't need to buy a load of equipment to to do it. so you obviously can't do you you mostly can't do that with with hardware companies. Now if you're clever and you're in the university ecosystem very often, there's a ton of stuff you can get for free in the university ecosystem. And so you should absolutely do that. So minimizing your costs to go as far as you can before you need to raise investment is an absolute sort of key tactic that that you've got you've got to try. and or you know, find a friendly company that's got the equipment that you need and borrow it from them, go in at weekends. get the people who own that company to invest in you or s something like that. So so do stuff on the cheap. you have also now, but leaving that aside, sorry, I'm jumping ahead of myself. The other the other thing is the sort of lean startup methodology. Now now lean startup methodology is kind of eighty percent correct. But the part that most of the sort of stuff like our grease book and various things d don't get across sufficiently is i if you're So you're gonna start a robotics venture or a hardware venture, w whatever it is, right? And you've got this idea and you think, okay, this particular device, this form factor is really important. I I've there's a great opportunity here. And you do some desk research, you determine, okay, there's potentially a huge market for it based on the number of you know, you've analyzed your customer segment, you say there's actually ten thousand of those in the United States alone, for example, right? And you you do your you work out your unity economics in theory, and you say, Okay, we're gonna Great, we're gonna go for that. Then you write up some bullshit business plan and you and you go around you're trying to get people to to invest in it. The k the key part that you've got to do, especially in a in in a hardware venture where where there's essentially a cost of goods sold where you where you can't sell stuff unless you've buy stuff in. Like it's not like software where there's almost zero where the cost of goods sale sold is almost zero. The key thing you've got to do. Is do a really robust market assessment. So you've said, okay, so there's ten thousand possible customers in the United States, and and you have a particular use case that you think is going to cause these people to spend money with you, you've got to go around that use, go around those ten thousand, not all ten thousand, but but a very good sample of them, to find some subset of them that needs what you've got urgently. And if it is If you are correct in saying that there are 10,000 possible customers, then there will be a s then the level of need, the level of urgency with which they want your solution is going to vary, substantially across the 10,000, probably distributed like a normal distribution. And you need to find the subset of that that needs your thing urgently for some particular reason. Now you may be able to predict it what what that is, or you just keep going around until you f until you find them. And you're essentially saying, hey, look. it's really fantastic that you we want this urgently. We're actually going to have an early adopter program and it's a paid for early adopter program. and our early adopters are going to get it early. We're going to tailor the initial design or initial version to their needs. We may, you know, selectively exclude doing business with certain of their competitors for a period. There's a whole bunch things you can offer an early adopter. But by the way, you're going to have to pay fifty percent up front or or something like that. Or or you know, you're going to have to sort of lead our investment around or whatever whatever it is. So you basically bring about a situation where you're where you are you are not turning a sod as it were, you're not lifting a finger until you've got commitments from f from early customers. Now, to get there, you may need a simulation, you may need a prototype, and you probably need personally to be very credible. You can say, Look, I've worked in this other company making something similar. I've got the design chops, I've got the you know I I'm not someone who this isn't my first rodeo. so so you get the credibility to do that. So bringing forward cash flow is an absolute key thing. You know, i like s going to like the alternative is what they call the build it and they'll come strategy. So yes, yes, Mr. Investor, give me two million. I'm gonna buy loads of equipment, I'm gonna buy loads of the bits apiece I need to make, and I'm gonna make ten of them and then I'm gonna go sell them and honestly people will buy them because look at look, there's ten thousand people out there in theory who need them. so So and the corollary of what I'm saying is if you can't find if you can't find people who are willing to make that early commitment to you. So in other words, i you're saying y you know, y you have to kind of be brutal with yourself and say, okay, look, I I thought there was ten thousand and I actually can't find anyone who needs it urgently. So if you can't find anyone who needs it urgently, you can't what's the word? you can't honestly believe or you shouldn't believe that there's 10,000 who need it eventually. so and if you do the work to find the subset that needs it urgently, then then an awful lot of things fall into place. If you've got really strong verified demand, then almost everything else becomes really, really easy. So so minimize your costs, bring forward your cash flow by finding the people who want it urgently. And I'll pause there, I have a couple of other tricks, but any thoughts on what I've said so far, Constantine?
Konstantin Saifoulline: Yeah, well, so. From my experience, well, I would say
I'm sitting on the other side of the board as the founder. I'm playing this game now for a while and one of the things that I found out that worked really, really well is shooting a lot of times in a lot of different directions. And what I mean with that is that obviously like focusing down on one thing, doing the specific research for this customer is really good. really valuable since the odds in general in hardware are really shit is also just spreading a bit out like having some options for other things to do that are in a similar space and looking if people are interested in there. So if it's not totally focused on already what needs to be done as the product or as the solution then it may also varies and you can see something that's is nearby and where you can go and there is this urgency that people actually need it and you will maybe have a way better outcome with that. So this was kind of the experience that I had. Bettering things,
Pearse Coyle: a lot of people and I've seen I deal with certain incubators that do a really good job of this customer discovery and and I see the I go along and I watch the the founders and they talk about okay, well and and I did like we're supposed to do, I went out to test the market. And they very often pivot multiple times because as they get into it they realise their assumptions were wrong and they end up with a different offering. So which is perhaps what what you're saying, but you've still got to you've still got to end up somewhere that is that is scalable. So the other thing then, okay, so just staying on my boring cash flow topic or well, exciting sorry, excuse me, my exciting cash flow point.
Konstantin Saifoulline: you
Pearse Coyle: The other thing you can do is deal with deal with suppliers cleverly. So, you know, obviously you're all you're gonna be doing something, you're gonna be doing prototyping, you're gonna be buying you know, small quantities of stuff, and and it's obviously gonna be less price and and expensive. And maybe there's no way of getting away from it for for for your initial small quantities. But Once you start to make any kind of progress and you've got any kind of market valid any kind of market validation, you should put pressure on suppliers and go out and and say, Hey look, you know, I'm considering incorporating your component into my product. Every time I sell my product, I'm gonna sell one of your thing. I don't have to use yours, I can use these guys' ones instead. But I'm also raising money. So I'm actually willing to kind of commit to a product, not necessarily based on the best price, but possibly based on cash flow. So if you're willing to give me long credit terms, then I'll use your component instead of this other guy's one, even though it's more expensive. Or maybe tactically you mightn't use the best product because you can get fantastic tur credit terms from one guy and not from another. So you can play around with your suppliers to try and optimize your your cash flow. Because ultimately what the ideal situation you want is you you're you're getting an order, you're ordering all the stuff from your suppliers, you're building it, you're invoicing your supplier and they're paying or your customer and they're paying you before you have to pay your suppliers. So there you the capital efficiency of your your business becomes fantastic. Now I th that's next to impossible. But if you can get it even close to that, that still means that the net cost of carrying stock for you is really small. And you're almost in a just just in time credit situation. and sometimes suppliers in this area can be investors, they can do various things for you, they can they can hold stock for you. so so being creative when you're dealing with suppliers again has your i improves your cash flow position. And if you do everything I said perfectly. then your economics start to become like a software company because essentially you have no cost of goods. Or your your cost of goods sold is like it's just a pass through cost. you know, you don't have to raise the money so that you have half a million worth of hardware sitting around waiting for somebody to to buy it. and and you know and if can kind of figure that out and then present a cash flow that that looks like that and say, okay, look, we've this minimum level of stock, it's a one off thing. and you know, I'm still in a university, so for the first year I'm gonna be able to use this big that sort of million dollar gadget. I gotta use the university's one. and I'm gonna use it every weekend or something. You know, so all those all those kind of things. then you you know, th th then the economics of your venture become massively more f attractive to investors and to you, to be honest. So that is And let me just think, what else? I mean there's other weird weird stuff at the moment. I mean, the first company we invest in is Coitec, a Swedish company, they're doing really well, Q O I T E C H, which is and they make the OT it's a power analyzer, and probably a lot of your audience actually is an OT customer. And so but in recent years they've been hit by a couple of the supply issues. There's a couple like component supply is tricky. At the moment, memory costs have gone sky high, and you know that affects their cost of goods sold. So there's other weird stuff that hardware ventures have to consider and you know and then it comes back to questions like aligning your sales price, aligning your sales price currency with the sales price of with the currency of your major suppliers, things like that you have to consider. But I mean like that's it. I mean that that's it's exciting or boring. the I guess my my point is that this doesn't really show up much. You don't get many cool podcast or people talking about hey it's it's actually really about the cash flow have you realized that it but it actually usually is and so never mind all the cool stuff interest well you sure get excited
about all the cool stuff but just get yourself a playbook for the cash thing and your chances of success are massively increased because it's like imagine imagine It's like one of these T V cop shows and you're the you've got a bunch of you you've got the bad guy or maybe the good guy, no, as I said the bad guy running down the street and the cops are chasing him and he gets down to the end of an alley alley and there's a wall and the cops are coming behind him. He's got whatever the number of seconds it takes to climb the wall, he's got that long before the cops catch him, and then he gets over that and there's another one further on. So it's a case of all the time they're trying to catch you before you get over the wall. So and and if you if you apply that analogy to Or sorry, the analogy I'm making is that in a in a in a venture funded business, so and a lot of hardware ventures will have to be venture funded, you start off and you're gonna get a block of money, whether it's grants or investments somewhere, that's gonna get you so far. And that's sort of so far is that wall you've got to climb over. So you're running towards the wall and the thing that's running after you is the running out of cash part. And that's the cop. It's like the cash flow thing going down. And you've gotta get over that wall b Before you get to that point. So my point is this no matter how well you're set up as a as a founder, if you're gonna have to have about three rounds of funding, right? That's three walls you've got to get over. And each of those is a substantial death likelihood. Okay, so if you look at the failure rates of ventures. it depends on when you really start, Something really high, okay? And it's probably a slightly higher in hardware ventures. And the point at which they fail is one of those walls. most of the statistics start after some sort of foundational funding event. right? And so as an investor, I'm looking at it and saying, okay, there's two things I can focus on here. I can focus on the venture being super successful, and very often the founder is really well motivated to make all that happen. Or I can focus on not having them die, like having them get over those funds. And that is a huge part of my focus. And certainly when we do the seed round, we're going with a lot of certainty around cash flow plan. And then very often through relations with a lot of later stage funds we we try and make it really sure that they're going to get over the second wall. And so it's it's a kind of a dogged focus on avoiding death that improves the probability of success enormously. So it's kind of negative thinking but but it is a central element of I I mean all our ventures have been quite successful and none of them have gone bust. And that's huge that's hugely why.
Konstantin Saifoulline: it.
Pearse Coyle: So and I see I I deal with a lot of university spin-outs. all over the world. The rest of the United States and the rest of the world is more or less the same where it's it's it's really hard. university. They can break their hearts trying to raise money from investors.
Konstantin Saifoulline: What are the other things that you do to help the companies go over the first wall?
Pearse Coyle: a lot of it is on the customer side. I mean most we're super early. and so we're dealing with the companies, they're pre-product and they're pre customer. Except that sorry, they're they're they're they're mostly pre-product, right? They haven't the product isn't finished yet. and they're they're usually pre customer in that they haven't sold a finished product to the customer yet, but they normally have significant engagement with early adopters. That's what we insist on. So the main thing really is helping them helping them be really smart with the early adopters and and qu qualifying that. So you can get as a founder you can engage with some big companies and a lot of companies have a lot of big companies have innovation departments. And and a lot of the innovation departments are just bullshit, to be honest. and th it's it's a an e a corporate ESG thing. They're trying to trying to give something back, help the community. we want to help these startups and and it huge company might they might have created a fund. They might have they might have tens of millions in the activities for for the innovation department, but it's just a kind of a feel good thing. They are just Nurturing companies, bringing them in, often wasting their time, w with a with with a poor direct connection to the parent company. it's just there's a set of people they're they're not connected to the main business of the company. They have facilities, nice facilities usually, and sometimes they give out stipends, you know, model stipends for the for the people who are who are on it. so sorry, my but my my point is I help companies, I help the startups kind of making sure they're engaged with early adopters that have a direct path to becoming product customers and and agreeing the right terms with those with those early adopter customers. and, you know, various tips and tricks and proposal templates There are certainly things I've learnt over the years about how to deal with early adopters, which ones to deal with, how to qualify the one how how to qualify them. Like there are there are the the real gem, if you can find them, an individual who has an appetite for being an early adopter. And those people can help you so much. Now, some sometimes. Sometimes they're an early adopter, they can get you over some thresholds, they might become your first customer and they're maybe not a great ultimate customer, but they might be fantastic for case studies or, you know, helping you actually ultim helping you get started. So so I suppose I suppose like I've I've been in a number of successful companies from fr and it's generally been from a really early stage, from like being the first commercial employee. And I had a fair amount of success with
that. So I I I I suppose the main thing I try to do is s help the founders learn from my mistakes before they make them themselves. And yeah, it's it's and and a lot of the focus is early customer engagement and the stuff that I was describing the earlier part of the call podcast.
Konstantin Saifoulline: You were also speaking about qualifying suppliers. What are the metrics how you qualify a supplier as a supplier to work with or not?
Pearse Coyle: There's a number of criteria I guess that that you could use to qualify suppliers. sometimes your suppliers may be potential acquirers, which is obviously something useful to know. And you could say, okay, I'm going to deal with these guys because you know they have a program and and they are a qu they're an acquisitive company and so you know that the so so there's things like that. The other one is does the supplier Is the supplier a potential route to market? Do they have a marketplace that allows me to, help reach other people that are dealing with them? but the one I highlighted earlier on was about cash flow. cash flow and cash flow are investment. and so sometimes, you know, it it may be that y y like the component supplier might be the component supplier might be a huge company and there's no question, there's no there's no way you can get on their radar. But the Components may be distributed in your country by a particular distributor. And then somebody owns the distributor. So it'll be a middle sized company. There would be people in there who have money and they can relate to what you're doing. And you may be able to say to them, Hey, look, you we'll really help if you can help me with cash flow here. And I am willing to do a sort of a two year deal or one year deal for, you know, supply of components. And and so so I guess, you know, it's it's l it's about having a wish list and rather than just buying from catalogues or what buying what you think is the best product, figuring out okay how can these suppliers help me. and now there's a lot I've said a lot. There's there's an you know there's a ver there's founders are pretty time poor typically so so trying to do everything I've said might might be hard but again once you get going and you're faced with once you get going and you begin trading it it becomes an issue like you need cash flow you need you need money to if your product is one that is going to if your product is one that is going to r you know take three months to build and you need it and you're gonna have to buy a load of components and you're gonna have to large amount of working capital service your need, then having understanding suppliers would be very beneficial and again
Konstantin Saifoulline: and tap
Pearse Coyle: pr prevent you from dying.
Konstantin Saifoulline: And they're also preferred more short-term contracts or long-term contracts I mean they also have different kind of benefits and deficits both I guess
Pearse Coyle: Yeah, I don't I don't have a strong view on that. That's too
Konstantin Saifoulline: Okay.
Pearse Coyle: it's I couldn't generalise on that.
Konstantin Saifoulline: Okay, well, then what would you say for when a company climbs the first wall, how is the second wall different from the first one?
Pearse Coyle: That's a very question. so let me take the some some people will consider the wall that we invest in as almost a sort of a minus one wall because you know they don't even consider that that that that a first round. so The first thing that's very useful to understand is that there is a huge amount of government money and grant money available at the very first at the very first stage. And there's a lot of funds that are set up with kind of philanthropic money or with corporate money or where where it's a case of look, we need more startups to start, you know, we need more startups in France or we need more startups in Bordeaux or whatever it is, you know. Might be some regional focus and the local government, the provincial government, or the government of the département or whatever has allocated money to some funds and says we want startups in Bordeaux. Okay, and then you're in Bordeaux and you're starting a robotics startup and you manage to get some lead investor possibly, and then suddenly the the startup fund of Bordeaux agrees to put half a million into you as well, right? And that's because of for illogical reasons let's say you're in Bordeaux or you know maybe there's some other theme thing you come from a specific university that's a fund or there's s some something else. And a lot of those are oriented towards the start up stage, writing small relatively small checks and they have money I know it doesn't look like it from the founder's point of view, but they're actually obliged to give out money. and and so it's a case of they'll give to they'll invest in ten things in Bordeaux every year. Not if not that there's not it's not that it's not if there are ten good things to invest in Bordeaux, they'll invest in the ten least bad things in Bordeaux every year, if you know what I mean. So there's quite a lot of the so my point is there's a lot of the first A lot of the people who are active in the very first stage of investing are doing so under some kind of government mandate or corporate mandate to and they're just told give out the money, right? So so that so the bar is much lower. It's it's it's easier to get that money, even though you're a pre product and pre customer. You're st you qualify as a super early stage company. So it's easy to come up with a kind of a bullshit cash flow plan and revenue plan and say, Okay, great, thank you very much for putting you collectively you've put six hundred K into a five hundred K, all of you two or three investors. And I've got this bullshit revenue forecast which says by the it by the in in twelve or eighteen months before I've run out of money from you, I'm gonna be selling. And I'll be selling so much because I've got this
incredible hockey stick picture that that it'll be no pr i I I'll either be cash positive or it'll be no problem for me to raise the next round of funding because my my thing is growing. And so you raise the half a million You hire the five people or whatever it is, whatever your cash flow projections suggested, and you carry on spending the money, and then of course the revenue doesn't come in because it never does at and the way you expect it, and you run out of money. And then and the the the problem is at the second wall. And at the second wall, the gloves are off. There's no kind of more forgiveness and aren't you a wonderful Constantine starting this new new venture in Bordeaux. It's like you're into different category of investors then. It's a case of, okay, so I see you raised money eighteen months ago. show me the plan. Show me the show me the estimate you you showed those investors. and you know, okay, so I see you're really you're you're you're really way off what you said you were going to be doing. and now you you've essentially wasted half a million that you got from those guys 'cause you overspent and now you're looking to me for money. And by the way, it's even harder because you gave those guys a valuation of Whatever it is, three, four, five million, maybe s something that might have been high, let's say four or five million for for a super early for for f you might have done a high valuation for your first money in round, and all of those investors are expecting a higher valuation in the second round. And so the second round investors that are you're talking to are thinking to themselves, I have better things to be doing than going back to tell those first round investors that I am not increasing the valuation that in fact they paid too much. And that's a really hard conversation to have. And so let's say, I'm sorry, Constantine, I wish you had spoken to me a year and a half ago, but like what you're essentially trying to do now is a second first first money in. So no an awful lot of the an awful lot of the guys when they come to the second round of funding have disappointed their first round funders and so it just looks shit. So the majority of things do not go up like like this. like the vast majority. And so it's a case of so and there's very few founders. now and I I have I mean I've had fun with founders in this. So founders come to me and they've got the hockey stick thing, I say, Okay, look, I understand you need to tell that bullshit to most investors, but that is bullshit, let's be clear. you show me a bottom up forecast, you know, show me the three or four early adopters that you're working with and you know, when expect to get your first revenue from them. And all I want to see is there's a b a big a big opportunity eventually. Don't lie to me that you're gonna get to massive growth in 18 months because you just can't. So so the so the now the problem is, and I've had founders say this to me, but but I said, But look, if I go out to other investors with this kind of modest, realistic forecast that you're telling me I should use, then they won't invest in me. And I said, Well, okay, well that's fine. Don't let them invest in you anyway. You know, I'll still invest in you. so so they often end up with one kind of high bullshit version for other people and then a different version for me. So so th I'd say that's the major point of failure is is disappoint you've disappointed the people at the early round. And the same applies almost every round, 'cause each round you have to t tell that bullshit story. And the wheels really fell off. If you look at the wheels really fell off in recent years where the interest rates went from zero up and then suddenly it was a case of you know, all the sort of easy money l exited the market and things felt much tougher. So there's been an enormous number of down runs. i in in the last few years like companies have gone from, you know, r many like tens of billions valuations way back down. So that's very painful. does that answer your question? Do you understand what I'm saying?
Konstantin Saifoulline: Yeah, what I wonder then is it going to stay like this for every round that comes after the second round is it always you try to Not disappoint all the people that you had before and they always get mores we always Trying to do better and not get under it
Pearse Coyle: I don't know. I mean so the like I would say during the zero interest rate period there was a there was a ton of dumb money in the market. I mean there was so much money went into venture capital and like it's a pretty specialized area. And I'm learning all the time. I'm not you know, on a good day I tell myself I'm smart money, but I don't know if I can defend that position. But but all I'm saying is that th there was a time when The peak interest z during the peak zero interest rate period, an enormous amount of money went into venture capital and and they had to stop it. They had to pull people in. So all kinds of inexperienced people went in. And there was a a lot of spray and prey. People and and if you like if you some of the funds like it's a weird game. I mean if if if if if you've raised if you're on your third fund and your last fund was sixty million, then very often you could go out and raise your fourth fund and you could get three hundred million and and suddenly you need to write bigger checks. so there was a s there was a self compounding thing and and and so the companies were somewhat doomed, there was money being thrown at them. but I mean I'm trying to get back to your question. like I think I don't know, I think it's about having good investors. if you've got good lead good lead investors who understand what you're doing and you've got one of the good guys on your board and they understand the forecast methodology and see see what's going on, you know, then then those kind of investors will help you raise an extra and very often I mean it's a
bit weird. You can't r if you lead one round, you generally can't lead the next round because you're essentially talking your own book. But if you have a a lead investor of the previous round who's got credibility and as a founder you've got credibility, then you know your lead investor can say to the new investors, Hey, hey, look, I can't lead this round, but we're really happy to follow because I think the progress has been fantastic. so it's it's all about communication and realism and personal credibility. like you know, I mean a and and if anybody hasn't watched it, the the T V series about We work is fantastic, we crashed. And that was just outrageous what they did from funding round to funding round. And it's just that's and he did and and he persuaded the investors that it that the essentially a property company was a was a some sort of software company, which is just unbelievable. And and it's just i i that's the absolute extreme of sort of exaggeration and raising money. and he and like I I guess we work is more like a soft more like a hardware company than a well, it was a hardware company, than a software company. So i i it's a it's a tough one because you know you could say okay if I'm really realistic and conservative then I'll end up r raising less money at lower valuations but y y which is true. But you know it is a Big raises at high valuations are not free. you are giving a promise to the investors that that you're going to live up to the expectations. And it's a real promise because there is a ratchet mechanism. If your next round is lower valuation, then you get screwed because they all they all say, Okay, well, y as per my last agreement, I'll just explain this 'cause a lot of your listeners won't perhaps perhaps don't won't understand this. And it's a sort of a and I struggle with the sort of think big versus think small things. A lot of your people might have written off what I said from early on that thinking, that's another one of these penny pinching investors. I'm gonna raise a five million round. I'm thinking big, I'm gonna I'm gonna move to, Bay Area and shop it around. And good luck to them if they could do it. But the thing to understand is that if you go if you go straight out of the gate and you raise something like five million, that normally implies something like a twenty million valuation, right? And and you're a super early stage company. And then you've got 18 months before you do your next round, and you've got to justify the 20 million valuation and probably get to 100 million valuation at the at the next round. Okay. And the next round is going to be much less forgiving. They're going to have expected to see progress. And very often you will not have made the progress. So if I just take that example, so if you did a price round at 20 million and you raised 5 million, so you've given away 20% of the company? Am I right? 25%. 25%. Yeah, sorry, put twenty twelve twenty million post money. So you've given away twenty five percent of the company. No, no, keep it simple. pre-money. So so so you've given away twenty twenty percent of the company, you have a post money valuation now of twenty-five million. Now, this is the bit that a lot of founders mightn't understand or mightn't realise. the investors aren't fools. They they might have said, Okay, we're gonna we're going to value this thing at twenty-five million, but there's a clause in all of those agreements typically. That says at your next round, if you go below twenty five million, so so imagine they put in five million and then and they bought and they now have twenty percent they they now have twenty percent of your company, because the company's post money valuation is twenty five million, and then in your next round you don't make it to twenty five million. You actually end up let's say keep it simple, let's say half that so you so you end up you end up with a post money valuation at your next random twelve and a half million the terms that they have is okay we want to still own a stake in your company that is worth five million so in other words they would end up if they were allowed to they would end up owning almost half the company because that that's a protection mechanism that they have so basically if you at a point in time have really gung ho investors and you do a hard sell, it might look great on the day you announce it and you're a paper or the like the guys who get to a billion really quickly, the the unicorns. I mean that's such a fiction. And so many of those guys got really burnt when the next round happened. Like if you've if you raised so so sorry, so so the point I'm making is venture capital money is not free. It's like it's like getting a it's almost like getting sort you know buying drugs on debt. the guy the guy calls around to the house afterwards. He really calls around and sort of talks to your mother and all that sort of stuff. So so what's my point? Yeah, so this I so my analogy of jumping over those fences before they get you is is very appropriate here.
Konstantin Saifoulline: I see I I find it quite interesting what you would say makes an Investor really really good and an investor really really bit bad so what what makes a difference there in the money because well probably not all money has the same worth like How can the founder? find out if the investor that they are speaking with is actually someone who will help them out getting over those walls.
Pearse Coyle: Really easily. you just look at their portfolio and reach out to the founders. Don't ask the investor. don't say, Hey, can I speak to some portfolio companies and say, Hey, listen, I'm speaking to you know, XYZ fund. I see they've invested in you. Would you mind could we do a could we do a call, right? And almost any CEO will take that call. and you'll get a very accurate view. So do it anonymously, initially, and you'll get a real that is the way. so you can look on paper. So look on paper, look
at have the inv what sort of stuff. Try and find tr try and find most of them like most of us do podcasts and stuff so we can get our name out or so people can find out a little bit about us. So l listen to the guy or or woman and and you know, you'll get a feel. So do I think does this sound like someone I could work with, right? look at the stuff they've invested in and then reach out to the portfolio companies. And and and CEOs are generally very happy to do those calls.
Konstantin Saifoulline: Hmm, there's obviously also a lot of I Would almost say brand names out there like Anderson how it's What about this this big names that are out there like they have a ton of traction They make their own podcasts. They have a lot of views on this podcast They also have a lot of this portfolio companies where it's probably a bit more hard to reach actually the CEO How can you identify a font like this?
Pearse Coyle: Yeah. okay, so So Anderson Andreas Andrees Norovitz writes pretty big checks these days. I don't think they go super early. and most VC firms as well, they are like you you talk about partners and you know venture partners, like they the the the structure the structure are generally quite flat. And a lot of them like Andreys Norovitz does all kinds of services and things, you know, that but the key people are the partners and each deal will have an associated partner. and you can generally find out which person it it is. So if you're if you're s if you're seeing, okay, so I'm a robotics company and I'm t considering taking investment from maybe Playground Global as well. Like they they've done a lot of robo robotics stuff. And I and you can see some other company there this that company seems a little bit like us. What you need to look at is who's on their board from Andreas and Horwitz or from Playground Global or wherever. and that's the person. So so and so it's not about Andreessen Par Horv sorry. Like if you're if you're approaching that company and you have a first meeting with like Pierce Coyle, now I mean I'm a solo GP, so I I I mate pretty much from Deep Tech Seed Fund. There's bunch of people working with me part time but but it it's pretty much me it's pretty much me. But if if you're dealing with if you get a first meeting with Andreessen Horvitz and like Joe Bloggs from Andreessen Horvitz is the guy you meet then you go and you you can easily enough find out what boards is he on or look at the investments and you can find that out. So you're asking you're asking about Joe Bloggs really, not about Andreessen Horwitz, because it is very much it the it's the partner who's on your board that's important. the firm is important too, but it's mostly about the person. Does that answer your question? And sorry, and sorry,
Konstantin Saifoulline: Hmm. Yeah.
Pearse Coyle: to the second part of your point. The second to the second point, if you get to the stage where you're the the funds are typically tiered, like they'll be, you know, Series A B or B C, whatever it is. So if you're at the stage where you're doing a B round and it's some huge firm that's going to invest in you, then you're already a big company, you've got credibility, you've already done A rounds. So the and and you can you can s send an email to a portfolio CEO, you know, and you can easily get to them, easy enough get to them and say, hey, look, you know, we're we're considering you know, we've we raised twenty million last year, we're doing a fifty million round now, and I'm talking to Joe Bloggs and Andreasen Horvitz. do you mind if I do a call with you confidentially just to get a bit of background? And that's you've established your credibility there. you'll you'll get that meet. And then there's a lot of sympathy from founders to other founders, so it's it's not a hard ask y and yeah.
Konstantin Saifoulline: How is it for the first checks that come in? Would you say that the first checks are crucial for a company to do right? So the first angels and maybe the first font that comes in, is this basically going to a shower direction?
Pearse Coyle: okay? Because a huge so one of the reasons one of the reasons I like to be a first check investor is that very often companies screw up the cap table in the first round of funding that they do. And then I come along and they're raising a second round, and maybe they've only raised maybe they've only raised a hundred K or 150K or something the first time. And I see that they have four range investors, three of them are on the board, and one of them has some crazy non-dilute clause in his in his agreement. And I'm thinking, I'm sorry guys, you know, this is really fucked up. You know, gotta get maybe most of those guys off the board and you've got to get rid of that non dilute thing. And by the way, you've already given away 30 or 40% of the company. that's a huge problem. So so you know so so getting appropriate terms for the first money in is really important. not giving any sp special control. If you can get away with doing a safe round or a convertible loan note in the first round, then fantastic. It's hard to do, but if you can do that, then ideally. Otherwise, you know you try to get to institutional money as early as you can. so yeah, so so so yeah, yes so that that's my main point about the first money and thing. Just don't screw up your don't screw up your cap table.
Konstantin Saifoulline: Should it be also intentionally how many people should be in? go maybe a bit into positioning of this founder who is maybe raising this first pre-seat or seat round. Should they focus on bringing one really good fund in or one really good angel or like two really good angels? Like what would be the best threat that you saw playing out?
Pearse Coyle: Yeah, so investors are a burden. you know most people who are in the business of putting money in are highly opinionated like me and think they're wonderful, you know, and self included. And so and a lot of angel investors
are semi retired and they've time in their hands and they want to put time in, you know, so it's a case of constantly I really want to help you, you know. And you're thinking, I I I just want your money. But no, they want to help and they will help and sorry hopefully th hopefully they'll help. So you can get kind of interf you can get interference from it from it. So in general, get the money from as the minimum number of investors, it would would be the the rule of thumb. Okay. And you know, you've you've you've got to get the money, so I can't say, you know, only take it from one or only take it from two. Like if you ni if if you can't get it from two, it's if it takes three to get you what you need, then then do it. But minim absolutely minimize the number of investors. And and then if you can put sort of if you can put distance between yourselves, you you and them. So if you can get like they have only one seat on the board, for example, or there's a sort of a s a simple reporting mechanism. so you've got to kind of prevent them from screwing things up for you and interfering too much. and going back to what I said about checking them out, you know, talk like t talk to people they've invested in before and you'll often hear horror stories and like I mean a a good friend of mine re set up a software venture he got multiple angel investors multiple I think certainly was a bunch of angel investors in and you know a lot of people who've made money have sharp elbows you know and it's they didn't get there by being nice you know in business and then if things start to not go well for your company they will not be nice you know and this friend of mine he would come out in the morning from his house and his investor will be sitting there in his car saying when am I going to get my money back? so y you've got just just th that anecdote that anecdote has really stayed in my head and I've thought about it and I remember once, I remember once I was in a company and we were running out money and we we got the idea there was a tax haven. I won't name the jurisdiction, but it was a kind of a tax haven. And myself and the CTO flew to the tax haven to an investor event and we did it we we we did our pitch, and and I remember talking to the people in the audience afterwards and I'm thinking, Fuck, I don't want them I don't I don't want these people's money. I I had I had already heard the story about the guy sitting in in my driveway and I'm thinking, I really don't want these people sitting in my driveway, I I might n might never come I might never come home, So so you gotta be really, really careful.
Konstantin Saifoulline: Hmm. Yeah, I see. What would be like other things? I would generally say probably the cheat code is always just making money by yourself with your company, right? That's anywhere where you want to go. Yeah.
Pearse Coyle: Yeah. so I mean look like so well hold on just to hold that thought for a second. Yeah, yeah, sure, if if you can do it, yeah, right, but very often that limits your ambition. And if you listen to like James Dyson is a hardware founder, you know, enormously successful, like Dyson, vacuum cleaners, all all that all that stuff. And he hates venture capital. And I think he did raise some venture capital, but he says like awful stuff, terrible stuff. Now he's good and he's successful and I mean I w he he's gonna be successful. I don't know, don't think I'd want him sitting in my driveway actually as a matter of interest. But so, if you can do it, great. But if you're ambitious, and you're d like there is there is money out there that is looking for a home. And if you're a fantastic technical founder, and you have a great idea and you can put together the sort of, you know, evidence of customer demand and so on, and if somebody's willing to give you a million, then great, take the million, take two million, you know, but be really clear with your investor, really good relations say, look, That's my forecast. There's a bunch of uncertainty in there, so so manage the expectations carefully, be honest, have really strong lines of communication. So so so don't like if you can get the money gr great, just be careful who you take it from. the third company I worked for was just which must was was amazing. It was an amazing experience. it was a university spin out in Ireland. it's called Iona Technologies, and I went in as head of European sales. And I had come from another company which was not a hard sell, but we had to really work work to sell and and it was a I went for a hardware company, actually for a software company. But at Iona what they did brilliantly was demand management. So they had they were first to market with a there was a new standard for software interoperability and they were the first to market with a tool that that met the standard. And every company in the world wanted to buy it and big companies. And they were very clever. They came up with a sort of a really good engagement model. They they packaged it up. They said okay I mean everybody wanted consultancy. Everybody wanted lots of meetings and discussions. They said I'm sorry the whole world wants our software. So here's a five thousand dollar package here's a bunch of material, they create lots of content. You just just buy it, buy it and fuck off, basically. don't look don't look for meetings. And so they set things up. They had sort of layers of call centers and you know, and I mean this is nineteen ninety seven, so I mean the web is kind of just getting started. But but everybody wanted it and they set up a really good sort of demand management thing. So I guess so I mean trying to a a anal analogize that, like bringing about a situation where you don't get snowed under. So if you've got if if you're on the right track with your if you're on the right track with your piece of hardware or your robotics thing, try and create a situation where it's easy for people to buy from you and there's
some staged engagement or you can have some really lightweight trial period or something like that. So something something that allows you to service a bigger market through efficient sales processes. I guess that's that's the key lesson. It's a it's a really great situation to get into. But like avoiding a situation where you end up you end up Tied up by your first customer because they're saying, Well, we're a huge customer, you we're Lockheed Martin, we're gonna buy a look, we're gonna put this on every single missile or every single whatever the hell it is. and you say, Okay, fine, look, there's the starter kit, off you go, come back to us in a month's time with with what you want, because we need to service twenty other customers. so so being smart about that kind of stuff is really conducive to scaling.
Konstantin Saifoulline: Okay, then let's do one final one. What would be the three things that you could now give someone away? Like if someone watched this whole interview, well then first congrats. And what would be if you have to nail it down, the three things that should stay in their mind?
Pearse Coyle: I guess And it goes back to the cash flow thing. be very realistic about your market, test your market very well, and do not don't believe your own bullshit, go out go out to early adopter customers, try and do deals with early adopter customers so that you are you have a robust bottom-up forecast. You can say, Great, I'm speaking to Lockheed Martin, there's this deal here, they've told us that after these two trial phases, they're gonna buy the first sort of 30 units, and that's gonna take two years, three years, and then and then this is the second customer. We're gonna do the paid-for-pilot engagement thing. So so have a really clear bottom-up view of where your money's gonna come from based on named customers and and test that and go out and and if if if you if if one guy says, I can't be specific about that, then go on to the next guy who will be specific. Because as a i if you're on the right track and you're gonna about to bring out something innovative, then you've got to find the people so so number one is find the people who need your thing urgently. Who will basically play ball with you on helping you with your cash flow forecast and your your revenue forecast. That's number one. and and and and then be realistic with your investors, by all means, talk the big picture. There is enormous total addressable market out here, but but it is impossible to forecast accurately how the first two or three years goes. You can just say, look, I can forecast the next 12 months because I've got tangible engagement with these early adopters. I can confidently say this is this huge tam. I can't accurately say what goes on in between. And I need money for the next for the first eighteen months. And at the end of that eighteen months I expect to have my first two early adopters ready to go to the next stage with me. Or my my first one of my first two early adopters is gonna make the first product purchase. Something really modest like that. And and like if you oversell you just set yourself up for a fall at the next at the next funding round. So so be really grounded in demand. you know Okay, big talk up the big opportunity but be really grounded in the near term demand and the real term and the near term customer milestones. Most of the most of the super early stage guys, it's all about meeting certain technical milestones. So have really good alignment of your technical and commercial milestones. and and manage that manage that cash flow really tightly for that first period. Give yourself a load of fallbacks, have build in contingency, have your founding team ready to take a salary cut if it things aren't looking good for the fundraising. nine months in, you know, like and and get your suppliers to give you stuff for free, all all that kind of stuff. So it's it's nitty gritty, like it's a it's a collection of things. If you do all the things then you can be super capital efficient and you just increase your chance of survival because you know, like survival it's all about survival.