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WEBVTT
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Hello, I'm Belinda McCauley, CEO of the Beverly
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Hills Bar Association, and I'm delighted to be
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here today to introduce our speaker, the Honorable
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David S. Cunningham III. Judge Cunningham is
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a retired judge now in neutral with jams drawing
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on a distinguished legal and judicial career
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spanning more than four decades He served as
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supervising judge of the LA Superior Court's
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complex litigation program presiding over complex
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civil litigation mass torts class actions family
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law and probate matters and Earlier built a trial
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and civil litigation practice in both the public
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and private sectors beginning his career in the
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DOJ's civil rights division working on voting
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rights cases and later serving as president of
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the L .A. Police Commission during a pivotal
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era of institutional reform. Known for his impartiality,
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practical insight, and efficient respectful handling
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of complex legal and factual disputes, Judge
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Cunningham now serves as a mediator, arbitrator,
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and neutral evaluator. evaluator across a wide
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range of civil matters. Joining him today as
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moderator is Reggie Joseph, practice development
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manager at Jams. Reggie, I will happily turn
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the Zoom floor over to you. Thank you so much,
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Belinda, and thank you everybody for joining
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us and joining me in the honor of David Cunningham.
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I will get us started. Judge Cunningham, before
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we get into it, if you want to talk a little
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bit more about your background, just briefly
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and your practice and ADR at Jams really quickly.
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Well, certainly, I think what's most relevant
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to everyone is the class action work that we
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do here at Jams, at least at this stage. Certainly,
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we do a lot of dispute resolution as it relates
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to both employment related and commercial litigation.
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While I note that a significant portion of our
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arbitration and mediation work focuses on employment,
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it also focuses on business disputes. So I think
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this remote workers and the non -compete choice
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of law question actually has both a labor component
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to it and a business aspect to it in that it
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can arise in the context of business dissolutions
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as well. And not merely for waging our employees,
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but also for salary -exempt employees. In fact,
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these issues become particularly relevant for
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that class of employees, particularly in the
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context of when you have professional organizations
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or LLCs or other types of businesses that get
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sold that retain and have goodwill. So that's
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what our discussion is going to be about because
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one of the things we also recognize in today's
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commerce the state lines are not really where
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the work ends. In fact, now that we're in the
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digital age, the state lines are far more amorphous
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than they once were. And we'll get into why that
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matters. Perfect. And thank you, Judge. And just
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really quickly, before I share my screen with
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your PowerPoint, you mentioned it a little bit.
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But I mean, the article in today's topic is really
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important. I mean, we have a lot of people working
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hybrid and remote. Just talk a little bit about
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what the impetus of this article and this talk
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is and why it was important to you. Well, one
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of the things that struck me is I was trying
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to determine how I could be a thought leader
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in certain topics. I read from the Bureau of
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Labor Statistics, than an unbelievable close
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to 25 % of the labor force now works remotely.
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And it's a growing number of people. So it really
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is something that is not only contemporary, but
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it's also something that is expanding in terms
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of scale. And I think many of you will touch
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on these issues in your practice. Perfect. And
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I am going to share my screen now. And we will
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get started, Judge. All right, the genesis of
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our discussion today is based on the
Load full transcript
article
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that I wrote back in July published in the Daily
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Journal around mid -July that talks about workforce
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non -competes and primarily the issue of Charter
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Law at Battlefield. Next slide, please. Now,
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California has adopted a public policy that basically
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says employee non -compete agreements are per
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se invalid. The other states, and in the past,
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there's been a debate as to whether or not in
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the common law, you use the rule of reasonableness.
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What's the distinction? Under a public policy
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initiative that says employee non -compete agreements
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are unenforceable per se, you would think that's
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the end of the analysis. In the context of the
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reasonable analysis, you really have to get into
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the factual analysis of it to determine whether
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or not a non -compete heat provision is enforceable.
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But the old question basically had been, is this
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restriction reasonable? In fact, as you'll see,
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as the case law has developed and California
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has adopted certain statutes, the question really
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is changing now to which state gets to decide.
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Next slide, please. So I want to start out with
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a hypothetical. Let's say that you've got an
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employee, and this employee is basically working
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from home in California on their computer for
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a Massachusetts employer, we won't necessarily
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state what the industry is at this point, that
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has New York customers and they're incorporated
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in Delaware. So that gives you an idea of the
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scope of the question and that's the hypothetical
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we'll be working on that we'll move to later.
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Basically in the context of the type of work,
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some of the facts that you'll be looking at is
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where does the employee live and work, where
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is the employee managed and where are their tasks,
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where is the relevant market, and then ultimately,
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where is the home or some of the primary activities
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of the employer. Next slide, please. Now, a non
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-compete agreement restrains post -employment
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competition. So the idea is that you are restricting
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a person's ability to one, in the work context,
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join a competitor, two, to go out and take your
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information and business that they've learned
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from their employer and start a competing business,
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or ultimately to perform certain defined competitive
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activities, certain outreaches to other types
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of clients, or to provide certain activity to
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them. So if you would turn to our handout, Reggie.
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because merely because you have a handout page
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two, if you could. And ladies and gentlemen,
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there is a handout that's been posted. Rather
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than post the citations and some of the case
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law in the PowerPoints, my preference would be
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just to use the PowerPoints as a talking point.
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But if you look at the handout, they will give
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you the detail. And I wanted to direct you to
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page two and. Starting on page two, we talk about
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what are some of the exceptions to the non -complete,
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non -compete provisions. One is if you have sale
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of a business goodwill. So you have business
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and professions code section 16601, which allows
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non -compete agreements concerning the sale of
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business. The non -compete agreement for employees
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can apply if there's an exception in the dissolution
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of a partnership. And then ultimately you should
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be aware that another exception would be in the
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context of a limited liability company members.
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There's a distinction as to whether or not it's
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member managed, whether or not you have a managing
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member or general members, and the fiduciary
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duties that arise that are statutory in that
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context. Next slide, please. The idea, next slide.
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Slide five. So the idea is, You are attempting
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to protect the assets of the business, but you
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do not want to limit employee mobility. So what
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are the types of things that you actually are
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seeking to
protect? One would be trade secrets,
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the other would be goodwill, and the other would
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be the investments that a business has made.
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If you can turn to the handout, page eight, Reggie.
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And ladies and gentlemen, if you can read along
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with us, I would direct you specifically starting
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on page eight through page nine of the handout
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where we talk about in greater detail what are
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some of the particular statutory exceptions and
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also the trade secret protection exception. It
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is in great detail. It's a separate statute that
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is civil code section 3426 to 3426 .211, and
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it operates in the context of certain employment
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contracts, addressing trade secrets. That is
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the method in which you can independently protect
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your certain business assets. So in the context
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of a non -compete employee provision, you may
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also want to have a separate trade secret agreement
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or agreement that protects your proprietary interests.
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You want to make sure that they are distinct
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because ultimately you may have a problem if
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you're trying to enforce an integrated agreement
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that would include a non -compete provision for
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an employee. Let's move to the next statute,
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slide six. Now, you will discover that because
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California has the per se rule, most other states
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are looking at enforcing a reasonableness standard,
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but there is a move to at least limit the extent
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and application of non -compete employment agreements.
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Originally, the feds got involved and the FTC
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had originally adopted a rule that sought to
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have a national ban on non -compete employee
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agreements. And indeed, the FTC in 2024 adopted
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such a rule, but then it was challenged in court
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and ultimately the FTC removed its national ban
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on non -compete agreements, and now it has to
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be analyzed by state law. So you cannot assume
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that there is any federal immunity, and the FTC
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rule no longer is applicable. Next slide, please.
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So I just wanted to take a moment to talk about
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what the states are doing in this context, because
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I do think it's important for you to know that
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the non -compete rules are changing. that it
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varies from state to state. There does not appear
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that there will be a long -term national perspective.
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So you wanna look at what the states are doing
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and we'll talk about California in a moment because
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California basically has a broad band. There
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are also other states that have statutory limitations
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including the state of California that we'll
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talk about as it has changed its non -compete
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rules and making it a separate cause of action
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if you do have, you attempt to enforce a non
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-compete employment provision in the state of
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California. Problems arise when you have businesses
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that are operating throughout the United States.
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Ultimately, there's certain limits in terms of
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notice, the role that you play, and the industry
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that it's in from a state -to -state perspective.
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And when states look at reasonableness, they
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look at the interest that you're protecting,
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the duration of the non -compete, the scope,
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and the territorial limitations. Now some of
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the states are currently, you've got California
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that adopt the per se rule. You've got several
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states that had pending litigation, which I talked
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about in my article. One was New York. New York
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had SB 335, which basically set up an antitrust
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violation and market situations where there's
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only one buyer for the buyer to enact a non -compete.
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Apparently that was not adopted. New York had
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HB 1381, but apparently that has also not been
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adopted. South Carolina has a bill pending to
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try to restrict non -competes. Washington will
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go into that has some standards that they've
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adopted. That's the state of Washington. Other
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states look at and regulate non -competes. based
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upon
the particular industry. For example, I
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looked at Missouri, where they have legislation
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pending that would limit non -competes of physicians
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working at certain types of facilities owned
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by a non -profit corporation. Also, Missouri
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is attempting to completely ban non -complete
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agreements as they apply to physicians. So there's
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also a focus on the health care industry and
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certain types of professions. Throughout the
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state, I won't go into great detail, but all
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of the various states are looking at changing
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from the reasonableness standard to some form
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of regulation based on the industry type and
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certain notices that you have and whether or
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not it's a key employee. Let's move to the next
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slide. Slide number eight. Gotcha, Judge. Okay.
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Now, I wanted to focus more on California and
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Texas. And to some extent, Washington, I have
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listed for you what are some of the statutes
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that have been enacted in California. California
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adopted a stronger anti -enforcement and notice
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rules in AB 699 and AB 1076. Those have since
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been codified, and we have discussions about
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that in the handout. In addition, could you turn
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to the handout that analyzes the distinction
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between California and Texas law? Texas is focusing
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more on limits for physicians and certain specified
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healthcare practitioners. The handout that you
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have gives you a distinction between what California
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is doing, which you can read basically the effective
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date of the new California law adopting the per
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se rule, some of the overall changes, how it's
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distinguished, some of the geographic limitations.
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It also compares what Texas is doing as compared
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to California. And then Washington also, Washington
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state this year is considering HB 155, which
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is also a broader ban, which is anticipated to
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become effective. Can you go back to slide number
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five, number eight, go back to slide eight. Got
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you. Washington states, if HB 155 does get enacted.
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it's intended to operate as a per se rule similar
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to California commencing in 2027. But in California,
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non -compete agreements restricting post -employment
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contact are generally void, but they are not,
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they are voidable, but they are not void ab initio.
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They're merely voidable and unenforceable. Next
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slide. And if you look at the case law, particularly
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the Edwards case, which went into great detail
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in outlining that narrowing a non -compete agreement
00:15:37.669 --> 00:15:40.549
to certain jurisdictions or certain duration,
00:15:40.889 --> 00:15:44.110
ultimately California rejected that. And it indicated
00:15:44.110 --> 00:15:51.190
that narrow is not enough. Section 16 ,600 Subdivision
00:15:51.190 --> 00:15:54.070
B, the business and profession code requires
00:15:54.070 --> 00:15:57.769
a broad reading in accordance with the California
00:15:57.769 --> 00:16:00.870
Supreme Court of Edwards case. In the handout,
00:16:00.889 --> 00:16:03.870
it goes into detail as to how we get there. Turn
00:16:03.870 --> 00:16:10.139
to our next slide, slide 10. So what happens
00:16:10.139 --> 00:16:15.200
if you're an employer and you want to enforce
00:16:15.590 --> 00:16:21.070
a non -compete agreement. And you have the circumstance
00:16:21.070 --> 00:16:25.049
go back to, we have an employee that's in California,
00:16:25.809 --> 00:16:28.350
working for a business out of Massachusetts,
00:16:28.889 --> 00:16:31.370
where most of their customers are in New York.
00:16:31.830 --> 00:16:35.669
The business is incorporated in Delaware, claims
00:16:35.669 --> 00:16:39.129
that Delaware is their home state. So what law
00:16:39.129 --> 00:16:43.179
applies? And if you had, for example, a Massachusetts
00:16:43.179 --> 00:16:46.899
non -compete provision against an employee, but
00:16:46.899 --> 00:16:49.980
the employee finds themselves suing in California
00:16:50.139 --> 00:16:53.840
isn't enforceable. Well, what do we look at?
00:16:54.120 --> 00:16:58.440
First, you look at the reach. When and where
00:16:58.440 --> 00:17:01.679
was the document signed that does not necessarily
00:17:01.679 --> 00:17:05.480
save a void contract per se? So the fact that
00:17:05.480 --> 00:17:08.359
the employee signed the non -compete provision
00:17:08.359 --> 00:17:11.440
that's included in California even though that
00:17:11.440 --> 00:17:13.660
may cause create a cause of action, we can talk
00:17:13.660 --> 00:17:16.259
about that. Ultimately, that's not the end of
00:17:16.259 --> 00:17:19.059
the analysis. The analysis then turns to the
00:17:19.059 --> 00:17:22.279
conduct through the entering or attempt to
enforce
00:17:22.279 --> 00:17:25.759
can violate the state statute in California.
00:17:25.839 --> 00:17:28.380
So if you're attempting to enforce it in California,
00:17:28.859 --> 00:17:31.019
you may very well get a court that would say,
00:17:31.279 --> 00:17:34.119
well, you're entitled to attorney's fees, you're
00:17:34.119 --> 00:17:36.440
entitled to damages. This is an unenforceable
00:17:36.440 --> 00:17:39.539
agreement. That's where the issue of choice of
00:17:39.539 --> 00:17:42.339
law becomes important. And then ultimately, on
00:17:42.339 --> 00:17:44.779
the remedial side, are you seeking an injunction?
00:17:45.440 --> 00:17:47.759
Is the employer trying to enjoin the employee
00:17:47.759 --> 00:17:50.660
from engaging in further activities? How do you
00:17:50.660 --> 00:17:53.059
establish actual damages? And you want to look
00:17:53.059 --> 00:17:56.400
at prevailing worker fees. So ultimately, you're
00:17:56.400 --> 00:17:59.160
looking at what are your remedies in the context
00:17:59.160 --> 00:18:02.579
of enforcement and which provision applies and
00:18:02.579 --> 00:18:06.799
what state law applies. Next provision. Enter.
00:18:07.170 --> 00:18:14.410
Labor Code, Section 925, which limits mandatory
00:18:14.410 --> 00:18:22.369
form and choice of law terms. So basically, Section
00:18:22.369 --> 00:18:29.630
16600 .58 addresses contracts void under the
00:18:29.630 --> 00:18:32.289
chapter, regardless of the signing location or
00:18:32.289 --> 00:18:36.190
time. It addresses enforcement even if signing
00:18:36.190 --> 00:18:39.670
and employment were outside California. It prohibits
00:18:39.670 --> 00:18:42.829
covered provisions and employer or prospective
00:18:42.829 --> 00:18:45.990
employer contracts. And most importantly, it
00:18:45.990 --> 00:18:49.670
creates a civil violation. So this becomes critical
00:18:49.670 --> 00:18:58.190
in that context. Section 925 protects a defined
00:18:58.190 --> 00:19:02.410
California relationship. So who? The employee
00:19:02.410 --> 00:19:04.940
primarily resides and works in California. when
00:19:04.940 --> 00:19:07.519
we're talking about Labor Code Section 925, which
00:19:07.519 --> 00:19:11.099
creates the civil violation. Terms required is
00:19:11.099 --> 00:19:14.180
a condition of employment that forces the California
00:19:14.180 --> 00:19:16.960
claims out of state or deny California substantive
00:19:16.960 --> 00:19:21.519
provisions. And when you enter into or was modified
00:19:21.519 --> 00:19:25.660
or extended for contracts after January the 1st
00:19:25.660 --> 00:19:39.410
of 2017. Let's move to the next statute. Next
00:19:39.410 --> 00:19:45.480
slide. I'm on 12 now. What's the governing law
00:19:45.480 --> 00:19:48.619
and forum that answer different questions? Now,
00:19:48.859 --> 00:19:54.000
section 925, the council exception does not settle
00:19:54.000 --> 00:19:57.900
the non -compete enforceability. Typically, what
00:19:57.900 -->
00:20:01.200
a party would state is that as 925, labor code
00:20:01.200 --> 00:20:03.940
section 925 could potentially create a cause
00:20:03.940 --> 00:20:08.539
of action for even having a non -compete employee
00:20:08.539 --> 00:20:11.940
provision, the question becomes if the employee
00:20:11.940 --> 00:20:14.680
was represented by counsel in negotiating that
00:20:14.680 --> 00:20:17.980
agreement then actual individual legal representation
00:20:17.980 --> 00:20:20.759
in negotiating the form or the governing law
00:20:20.759 --> 00:20:24.119
may be a mitigating factor. What it does not
00:20:24.119 --> 00:20:27.619
establish is that exception alone does not make
00:20:27.619 --> 00:20:31.519
a non -compete enforceable. So arguably even
00:20:31.519 --> 00:20:33.720
if you come in and you're the employer you're
00:20:33.720 --> 00:20:37.359
attempting to defend a non -compete employee
00:20:37.359 --> 00:20:39.519
provision. It isn't really enough under Section
00:20:39.519 --> 00:20:44.079
925 to say, look, the employee was represented
00:20:44.079 --> 00:20:46.759
by counsel, and they knowingly negotiated this
00:20:46.759 --> 00:20:49.400
provision. The court looks at greater detail
00:20:49.400 --> 00:20:51.859
to determine if there is an exception in that
00:20:51.859 --> 00:21:00.579
context. Move to the next slide. There we go.
00:21:00.859 --> 00:21:05.559
Slide 13. Yeah, we got you. So the question becomes,
00:21:06.019 --> 00:21:11.390
which substantive law actually applies? And where
00:21:11.390 --> 00:21:15.769
will the dispute be heard? Now, typically, you
00:21:15.769 --> 00:21:19.470
state a choice, a chosen form may apply another
00:21:19.470 --> 00:21:22.849
jurisdiction's substantive law. And that arises
00:21:22.849 --> 00:21:25.930
when you look at determining what is the better
00:21:25.930 --> 00:21:29.769
choice of law. The question becomes, if in our
00:21:29.769 --> 00:21:32.130
hypothetical, are you going to wind up applying
00:21:32.130 --> 00:21:34.529
Massachusetts law? Are you going to wind up applying
00:21:34.700 --> 00:21:37.200
California law. Are you going to wind up if you
00:21:37.200 --> 00:21:40.839
do have a non -compete provision which may violate
00:21:40.839 --> 00:21:44.440
the per se rule? Has the employer potentially
00:21:44.440 --> 00:21:47.859
created some via some potential violation of
00:21:47.859 --> 00:21:50.559
the statute? And the question becomes what's
00:21:50.559 --> 00:21:55.339
the appropriate form? Next statute, next slide.
00:21:59.259 --> 00:22:03.789
So and you identify the form, you identify the
00:22:03.789 --> 00:22:07.349
applicable conflicts framework and by that which
00:22:07.630 --> 00:22:11.150
analysis are you going to use? You test the chosen
00:22:11.150 --> 00:22:14.069
law's connection to the relationship, and without
00:22:14.069 --> 00:22:17.309
an effective chosen law clause, you examine the
00:22:17.309 --> 00:22:20.170
forum's default law. So you first
determine,
00:22:20.930 --> 00:22:23.970
is there a selection for choice of law? If there
00:22:23.970 --> 00:22:26.789
is not, then you look to see how the particular
00:22:26.789 --> 00:22:29.650
state analyzes, which is a choice of law analysis.
00:22:30.210 --> 00:22:32.750
You will look at competing fundamental policies,
00:22:32.769 --> 00:22:35.670
and you look at the state interest. So what does
00:22:35.670 --> 00:22:39.460
that mean? in a practical context. Next slide.
00:22:41.819 --> 00:22:45.440
It certainly means that physical location is
00:22:45.440 --> 00:22:49.900
not the same as competitive impact. The employee
00:22:49.900 --> 00:22:53.400
location may be where they live, there may be
00:22:53.400 --> 00:22:56.779
some travel involved, there may be some relocation
00:22:56.779 --> 00:22:59.579
involved for purposes of their work. However,
00:22:59.799 --> 00:23:04.160
the analysis focuses on the location of competitive
00:23:04.160 --> 00:23:07.549
conduct and where the alleged injury could occur.
00:23:07.869 --> 00:23:10.250
So you're looking at when you're determining
00:23:10.250 --> 00:23:13.269
choice of law, where are the customers? Where
00:23:13.269 --> 00:23:16.509
is the primary market? Where is the data being
00:23:16.509 --> 00:23:20.130
used? And more importantly, where is the alleged
00:23:20.130 --> 00:23:26.819
injury? Next slide, please. The seminal case
00:23:26.819 --> 00:23:33.089
on form selection and choice of law in this non
00:23:33.089 --> 00:23:36.089
-compete context is the Draft King's decision.
00:23:36.440 --> 00:23:40.440
If you'll turn to the handout page nine, please.
00:23:47.309 --> 00:23:50.710
Now, the Draft King decision basically comes
00:23:50.710 --> 00:23:54.410
out of the Fifth Circuit. In that case involved,
00:23:54.990 --> 00:23:58.049
Draft King sued a former employee who took a
00:23:58.049 --> 00:24:01.589
job basically arguing that the new provision
00:24:01.589 --> 00:24:04.430
violated a non -compete agreement containing
00:24:04.430 --> 00:24:07.410
a Massachusetts choice of law provision. So now
00:24:07.410 --> 00:24:11.349
we've got a Massachusetts choice of law provision.
00:24:11.750 --> 00:24:15.589
The district court sided with the employer, deeming
00:24:15.589 --> 00:24:19.769
the non -compete enforceable under Massachusetts
00:24:19.769 --> 00:24:22.890
law and issuing a preliminary injunction against
00:24:22.890 --> 00:24:28.710
the employee. The employee appealed and argued
00:24:28.710 --> 00:24:32.650
that California law was to govern because the
00:24:32.650 --> 00:24:35.250
non -compete enforceability and that the injunction
00:24:35.250 --> 00:24:39.289
should exclude California. His argument in California
00:24:39.289 --> 00:24:42.619
is that the employee apparently had moved to
00:24:42.619 --> 00:24:45.849
California. Ultimately, in going through the
00:24:45.849 --> 00:24:49.309
analysis, the court determined, first circuit,
00:24:49.609 --> 00:24:52.950
that Massachusetts law governs because diversity
00:24:52.950 --> 00:24:56.390
jurisdiction existed over the breach of contract
00:24:56.390 --> 00:24:59.809
non -compete claim. Massachusetts was the forum
00:24:59.809 --> 00:25:03.769
where draft kings and the plaintiff set the rules
00:25:03.769 --> 00:25:06.069
for deciding which state's law determines the
00:25:06.069 --> 00:25:08.470
outcome. So the court looked at their initial
00:25:08.470 --> 00:25:12.480
choice, but it went further. It determined that
00:25:12.480 --> 00:25:15.900
the materially greater interest, looking at the
00:25:15.900 --> 00:25:18.680
policies between California versus Massachusetts,
00:25:19.180 --> 00:25:22.299
the court focused on whether California had a
00:25:22.299 --> 00:25:24.660
material greater interest in Massachusetts. And
00:25:24.660 --> 00:25:26.720
here's where it gets interesting and where the
00:25:26.720 --> 00:25:29.920
analysis about conflict of law becomes important.
00:25:30.720 --> 00:25:34.059
The employee argued that a previous decision
00:25:34.059 --> 00:25:36.799
called the Oxford decision had approved his claim.
00:25:37.140 --> 00:25:39.779
And in that case, the court held that California
00:25:39.779 --> 00:25:42.619
had a materially greater interest because the
00:25:42.619 --> 00:25:45.799
employee, and this is the point I'm making, executed
00:25:45.799 --> 00:25:48.859
and performed the contract in California and
00:25:48.859 --> 00:25:52.960
the alleged breach occurred there. So the court
00:25:52.960 --> 00:25:56.740
looked at the injury, the court looked at where
00:25:56.740 --> 00:26:00.720
the employee lived, and then looked at where
00:26:00.710 --> 00:26:03.750
the contract was performed and then ultimately
00:26:03.750 --> 00:26:07.059
determined that the harm occurred there. But
00:26:07.059 --> 00:26:10.440
in the Draft King's case, the First Circuit took
00:26:10.440 --> 00:26:14.859
a different approach. They found basically that
00:26:14.859 --> 00:26:20.000
the employee had worked in New Jersey, had worked
00:26:20.000 --> 00:26:23.500
in New York, had only minimal contacts in California,
00:26:23.660 --> 00:26:26.119
though he had traveled there a few times for
00:26:26.119 --> 00:26:28.700
his work. So you can get arguments that I performed
00:26:28.700 --> 00:26:30.759
some of my work in a different state. but he
00:26:30.759 --> 00:26:34.019
was not residing in California, nor did the breach
00:26:34.019 --> 00:26:37.059
occur there. And there was no evidence that he
00:26:37.059 --> 00:26:41.420
performed any work for the employer in California.
00:26:41.519 --> 00:26:43.220
Question, would that have made a difference?
00:26:43.500 --> 00:26:46.539
And then the court analyzed where the harm actually
00:26:46.539 --> 00:26:49.000
would have occurred, and it determined that the
00:26:49.000 --> 00:26:51.200
primary harm would have occurred in Massachusetts
00:26:51.200 --> 00:26:55.559
and not
California. So ultimately, the court
00:26:55.559 --> 00:27:00.079
made the determination that the appropriate jurisdiction,
00:27:00.240 --> 00:27:03.779
despite the argument that the parties had chosen
00:27:03.779 --> 00:27:06.099
California law, or at least that the parties
00:27:06.099 --> 00:27:08.380
were arguing that California might be the appropriate
00:27:08.380 --> 00:27:12.460
forum that Massachusetts law should govern. So
00:27:12.460 --> 00:27:17.579
next slide, please. Can you go back to the original
00:27:17.579 --> 00:27:21.240
slide? Okay. So ultimately, the reasoning in
00:27:21.240 --> 00:27:24.460
that case is that California's interest was not
00:27:24.460 --> 00:27:28.490
shown to be materially greater. from the employer
00:27:28.490 --> 00:27:31.849
perspective, if you have an employee that is
00:27:31.849 --> 00:27:35.789
asserting, labor code section 925, asserting
00:27:35.789 --> 00:27:38.690
that now we have a violation because you have
00:27:38.690 --> 00:27:43.069
a non -compete clause, which may or may not be
00:27:43.069 --> 00:27:45.789
reasonable, but you're arguing as a California
00:27:45.789 --> 00:27:49.609
employee that is per se violation, you could
00:27:49.609 --> 00:27:52.730
find that ultimately California law may not apply.
00:27:53.349 --> 00:27:56.029
Even though the statute says in and of itself
00:27:56.029 --> 00:27:59.109
the California law should apply. The court still
00:27:59.109 --> 00:28:02.069
may not even in California enforce California
00:28:02.069 --> 00:28:05.009
law based upon the choice of form questions.
00:28:05.329 --> 00:28:07.890
So that's the issue that you need to be aware
00:28:07.890 --> 00:28:10.789
of and understand that it's a fact -specific
00:28:10.789 --> 00:28:14.289
application and you want to look at the facts.
00:28:14.890 --> 00:28:20.279
Next slide. The other question because well frequently
00:28:20.279 --> 00:28:24.220
you in a form selection choice of law context
00:28:24.220 --> 00:28:27.369
you want to know who should get to the courtroom
00:28:27.369 --> 00:28:32.130
first. So a farm raise can raise costs even before
00:28:32.130 --> 00:28:34.809
merits are reached. So you may find that, oh,
00:28:34.910 --> 00:28:36.490
if you're the employee and you're going to be
00:28:36.490 --> 00:28:38.490
the plaintiff, you want to rush to your California
00:28:38.490 --> 00:28:40.250
courts. You want to be able to establish the
00:28:40.250 --> 00:28:42.509
facts that show California applies because now
00:28:42.509 --> 00:28:46.329
you can rely on labor code section 925. If you
00:28:46.329 --> 00:28:50.130
are the employer, you will say, hey, wait a minute.
00:28:50.390 --> 00:28:52.950
Despite the language of the statute, let's look
00:28:52.950 --> 00:28:55.819
at the case law, which says this is still affect
00:28:55.819 --> 00:28:58.259
specific analysis when you're trying to determine
00:28:58.259 --> 00:29:01.599
which state law actually applies and it may
be
00:29:01.599 --> 00:29:05.240
that Massachusetts or another state has a greater
00:29:05.240 --> 00:29:09.079
material interest than California and therefore
00:29:09.079 --> 00:29:11.799
that's how you avoid the liability under labor
00:29:11.799 --> 00:29:15.720
code section 925 and of course what's at risk
00:29:15.720 --> 00:29:18.380
well from the employee perspective they want
00:29:18.380 --> 00:29:22.519
a declaration that the restraint is void from
00:29:22.519 --> 00:29:25.259
the employer's perspective They want enforcement
00:29:25.259 --> 00:29:28.779
and emergency injunctive relief. The point that
00:29:28.779 --> 00:29:31.940
we know is determining the form and the substance
00:29:31.940 --> 00:29:34.819
of law becomes important because the legal fees
00:29:34.819 --> 00:29:38.240
for even a form dispute, emergency relief, and
00:29:38.240 --> 00:29:42.079
parallel proceedings can get quite costly. Now,
00:29:43.470 --> 00:29:50.109
next step, next slide. So if you're negotiating
00:29:50.109 --> 00:29:53.630
these contracts or you have a potential action,
00:29:54.210 --> 00:29:56.890
your employer assessment begins with what is
00:29:56.890 --> 00:30:00.430
the real business risk. So you need to pinpoint
00:30:00.430 --> 00:30:04.609
what is the specific information or relationship
00:30:04.609 --> 00:30:08.869
that's at risk. Is it a trade secret? Is it proprietary
00:30:08.869 --> 00:30:12.069
information? Is this in the context of the sale
00:30:12.069 --> 00:30:15.170
of a business? Do you have goodwill that's at
00:30:15.170 --> 00:30:19.329
issue? Do you have an LLC that's at issue? So
00:30:19.329 --> 00:30:21.869
all of a sudden, rather than running in and saying,
00:30:21.950 --> 00:30:26.000
aha, we have a violation, of the non -compete
00:30:26.000 --> 00:30:28.359
employment provision under California law and
00:30:28.359 --> 00:30:31.220
the per se rule. Here my attorney's fees, here's
00:30:31.220 --> 00:30:33.880
the violation. That's not the end of the analysis.
00:30:34.900 --> 00:30:36.559
Next you have to determine the applicable law
00:30:36.559 --> 00:30:39.940
from the worker's actual locations. So you need
00:30:39.940 --> 00:30:43.440
to determine, is this an employee that's working
00:30:43.440 --> 00:30:47.309
digitally? What is the source of the information?
00:30:48.410 --> 00:30:52.069
Where is the employer located? And more importantly,
00:30:52.170 --> 00:30:55.579
where's your market located? In today's world,
00:30:56.140 --> 00:30:59.799
it could be ubiquitous. And then the next question
00:30:59.799 --> 00:31:02.940
is, where is the majority of the harm? So that's
00:31:02.940 --> 00:31:06.079
the arguments that have to be addressed before
00:31:06.079 --> 00:31:08.480
you get to the question of labor code section
00:31:08.480 --> 00:31:12.619
925, liability. And then review the terms when
00:31:12.619 --> 00:31:17.579
the role or authorized work site changes. So
00:31:17.579 --> 00:31:20.390
one of the caveats that certainly in drafting
00:31:20.390 --> 00:31:22.470
these decisions or thinking about litigation
00:31:22.470 --> 00:31:24.970
in this context, is you have an employee that's
00:31:24.970 --> 00:31:28.029
being relocated or that's being moved. You may
00:31:28.029 --> 00:31:30.710
want to revisit this issue to make certain from
00:31:30.710 --> 00:31:32.869
the employee's perspective that you're getting
00:31:32.869 --> 00:31:39.799
the outcome that you see. Next slide. An employee
00:31:39.799 --> 00:31:43.420
review should also proceed any transition if
00:31:43.420 --> 00:31:46.960
you are being moved. You should get every agreement,
00:31:47.799 --> 00:31:51.269
look at its negotiation history. map out your
00:31:51.269 --> 00:31:54.869
old role, your new role, the work site, and more
00:31:54.869 --> 00:31:58.089
importantly, customer overlap. And then finally,
00:31:58.569 --> 00:32:02.589
assess filing data and solicitation risks before
00:32:02.589 --> 00:32:05.809
acting, meaning that you really do need to determine
00:32:05.809 --> 00:32:11.569
is the California rule going to apply or not.
00:32:11.849 --> 00:32:14.730
You shouldn't equate unenforceable restraint
00:32:14.730 --> 00:32:21.640
with permission to take data. Next slide. So
00:32:21.640 --> 00:32:25.940
the question becomes, your challenge here is
00:32:25.940 --> 00:32:31.569
creating agreements or a litigation strategy
00:32:31.569 --> 00:32:36.450
that doesn't create an outright work ban. If
00:32:36.450 --> 00:32:40.650
you do create a work ban, you probably want to
00:32:40.650 --> 00:32:45.009
tie it to specific, separately negotiated agreements.
00:32:45.809 --> 00:32:49.619
One topic would be confidentiality. Define what
00:32:49.619 --> 00:32:52.940
the protected information is precisely. With
00:32:52.940 --> 00:32:55.720
respect to trade secrets, remember that you have
00:32:55.720 --> 00:32:59.019
a separate trade secret law. You want to go through
00:32:59.019 --> 00:33:01.960
compliance of that and arguably have a separate
00:33:01.960 --> 00:33:05.079
set of controls and protocols for trade secrets.
00:33:05.680 --> 00:33:09.619
Then with respect to inventions, tailor assignment
00:33:09.619 --> 00:33:14.220
terms to applicable law. Be specific about in
00:33:14.220 --> 00:33:17.880
terms of access to proprietary information and
00:33:17.880 --> 00:33:20.559
who can get it and how it's distributed and identify
00:33:20.559 --> 00:33:23.359
whether or not a person is a key employee or
00:33:23.359 --> 00:33:25.779
not. I think that that's ultimately critical
00:33:25.779 --> 00:33:28.700
because a customer non -solicitation agreement
00:33:28.700 --> 00:33:32.900
is not going to automatically be valid in California
00:33:32.900 --> 00:33:39.019
law and it is not a substitute. So that puts
00:33:39.019 --> 00:33:44.640
us with if you have a business today, for example,
00:33:44.700 --> 00:33:50.880
that's working in the AI area and computer technology,
00:33:51.559 --> 00:33:55.160
dealing with the internet, data harvesting. You
00:33:55.160 --> 00:33:58.119
are basically dealing with a business that the
00:33:58.119 --> 00:34:02.180
state limitations are primarily non -existent
00:34:02.180 --> 00:34:06.059
or not of critical importance. So you want to
00:34:06.059 --> 00:34:08.320
make sure that you are protecting your information,
00:34:08.639 --> 00:34:10.960
that you're not running a file of any of the
00:34:10.960 --> 00:34:14.079
state laws. But ultimately, if you find that
00:34:14.079 --> 00:34:19.320
you've got older agreements, You've got issues
00:34:19.320 --> 00:34:21.239
about whether or not you've complied with the
00:34:21.239 --> 00:34:24.440
notice requirements in the California law that
00:34:24.440 --> 00:34:27.300
has adopted the per se rule, which if you look
00:34:27.300 --> 00:34:32.219
in our handout, it lays out that once California
00:34:32.219 --> 00:34:37.619
adopted the per se rule in 2023, it laid out
00:34:37.619 --> 00:34:41.559
that an employee non -compete agreement restricting
00:34:41.760 --> 00:34:45.260
post -employment conduct, not only are they voidable
00:34:45.260 --> 00:34:49.539
and unenforceable, it also required certain notices
00:34:49.539 --> 00:34:53.559
once that the act was adopted. It indicated that
00:34:53.559 --> 00:34:56.539
you had to notify employees if you had a non
00:34:56.539 --> 00:34:59.199
-compete agreement that it would potentially
00:34:59.199 --> 00:35:02.119
not be enforceable. So there are some provisions
00:35:02.119 --> 00:35:05.260
in there that require you to take certain actions
00:35:05.260 --> 00:35:12.190
as an employer. Next slide, please. If you find
00:35:12.190 --> 00:35:15.750
yourself in a dispute, It's our position that
00:35:15.750 --> 00:35:18.429
certainly I believe that early mediation can
00:35:18.429 --> 00:35:22.090
help you to narrow what the real dispute is in
00:35:22.090 --> 00:35:25.449
that context. So you want to focus on information
00:35:25.449 --> 00:35:28.710
and we're here to help you in that context. What
00:35:28.710 --> 00:35:33.269
data must be returned or protected and ultimately
00:35:33.269 --> 00:35:36.570
what duties and contracts create the immediate
00:35:36.570 --> 00:35:39.440
conflict. during the transition. Those are the
00:35:39.440 --> 00:35:42.039
things that we want to look at and then process
00:35:42.039 --> 00:35:44.980
what verification and dispute procedure will
00:35:44.980 --> 00:35:47.980
work. So with that ultimately looking at the
00:35:47.980 --> 00:35:50.559
agreements that you have, looking to determine
00:35:50.559 --> 00:35:52.900
the form selection clauses and whether or not
00:35:52.900 --> 00:35:57.420
they're enforceable and ultimately if not enforceable
00:35:57.420 --> 00:36:00.039
what would be the appropriate substantive law
00:36:00.039 --> 00:36:02.840
and then ultimately what is the status of it.
00:36:03.400 -->
00:36:08.739
Next slide please. Arbitration certainly doesn't
00:36:08.739 --> 00:36:12.840
erase the choice of law issue, but there is a
00:36:12.840 --> 00:36:16.639
benefit in that ultimately you have a private
00:36:16.639 --> 00:36:20.420
forum and a more focused process. So certainly
00:36:20.420 --> 00:36:22.440
as you go through the process of transition,
00:36:22.500 --> 00:36:24.360
as you go through, you'll have trade secrets
00:36:24.360 --> 00:36:27.139
that may be involved. You may have proprietary
00:36:27.139 --> 00:36:30.119
information that you do not want to have out
00:36:30.119 --> 00:36:32.739
in the ether available to the general public.
00:36:32.980 --> 00:36:36.639
So that's one option way arbitration may assist
00:36:36.780 --> 00:36:39.139
Ultimately, while it doesn't erase the choice
00:36:39.139 --> 00:36:41.960
of law issues, it certainly can help to preserve
00:36:41.960 --> 00:36:44.739
some confidentiality as you're going through
00:36:44.739 --> 00:36:47.239
that process, particularly if you have proprietary
00:36:47.239 --> 00:36:50.320
information that's at issue. And then you have
00:36:50.320 --> 00:36:53.900
the continuing questions about what's the scope
00:36:53.900 --> 00:36:57.199
of the choice of law clause? Where are you going
00:36:57.199 --> 00:36:59.840
to be seated? What is the governing law? And
00:36:59.840 --> 00:37:01.980
also whether or not you're entitled to interim
00:37:01.980 --> 00:37:05.889
relief, which ultimately the arbitrator can grant
00:37:05.889 --> 00:37:08.010
depending upon the terms of the arbitration agreement.
00:37:08.550 --> 00:37:14.239
Next slide, please. The bottom line is precision
00:37:14.239 --> 00:37:18.280
is the practical answer. So you want to map out
00:37:18.280 --> 00:37:22.820
the people, the dates, where they work, customers,
00:37:23.340 --> 00:37:26.719
and what is the potential harm. On testing the
00:37:26.719 --> 00:37:29.599
restraint, you want to look at which form have
00:37:29.599 --> 00:37:33.260
been selected. What would be potential statues
00:37:33.260 --> 00:37:35.780
there because they are changing and what is the
00:37:35.780 --> 00:37:38.900
governing law? And then ultimately you can use
00:37:38.900 --> 00:37:42.940
tailored protection by considering early ADR.
00:37:43.699 --> 00:37:47.989
Next slide. I've attached for you what are some
00:37:47.989 --> 00:37:51.610
of the core authorities for follow up purposes.
00:37:52.829 --> 00:37:55.250
Certainly the handout goes into greater detail
00:37:55.250 --> 00:37:57.369
and giving you some of the specific provisions
00:37:57.369 --> 00:37:59.750
of which you should be aware some of the notice
00:37:59.750 --> 00:38:03.230
requirements. and certainly what are the consequences
00:38:03.230 --> 00:38:06.230
for violating the non -compete employment provisions
00:38:06.230 --> 00:38:09.369
in California. Also, we have the case study of
00:38:09.369 --> 00:38:12.449
the Draft Kings case. It is very helpful because
00:38:12.449 --> 00:38:16.269
it explains in great detail how the courts determine
00:38:16.269 --> 00:38:19.650
choice of law and certainly what would be an
00:38:19.650 --> 00:38:22.170
appropriate outcome in that context. And then
00:38:22.170 --> 00:38:24.429
ultimately, some legislative updates because
00:38:24.429 --> 00:38:27.610
there is a lot of activity going on in this context.
00:38:29.190 --> 00:38:33.750
I want to go back to our hypothetical. And this
00:38:33.750 --> 00:38:37.130
is a point where I want to invite you to begin
00:38:37.130 --> 00:38:40.650
to think about that. And I'd raise this question.
00:38:41.360 --> 00:38:43.860
Going back to our hypothetical where we talked
00:38:43.860 --> 00:38:49.170
about you've got a remote worker in California
00:38:49.170 --> 00:38:53.619
who lives there. You've got the employer that's
00:38:53.619 --> 00:38:57.989
in Massachusetts. The specific customers that
00:38:57.989 --> 00:39:02.170
this particular employee is servicing. is in
00:39:02.170 --> 00:39:06.730
New York, and the business is ultimately incorporated
00:39:06.730 --> 00:39:11.519
and has as its home, Delaware. So if you have
00:39:11.519 --> 00:39:14.219
that situation, we have an employee works, they
00:39:14.219 --> 00:39:21.820
say that they're a data entry person working
00:39:21.820 --> 00:39:25.829
from home. Ultimately, they come in, they have
00:39:25.829 --> 00:39:29.070
an action against their employer. This is in
00:39:29.070 --> 00:39:31.570
the context of perhaps a business dispute per
00:39:31.570 --> 00:39:34.150
se. They're not selling the business, or there's
00:39:34.150 --> 00:39:36.670
not a sale of goodwill, or there's not a dissolution.
00:39:37.530 --> 00:39:40.889
Which fact would you investigate first in that
00:39:40.889 --> 00:39:42.929
four -state hypothetical? What do you think would
00:39:42.929 --> 00:39:46.960
be the most important place to begin? I want
00:39:46.960 --> 00:39:49.820
you to think about that for a moment. Next slide.
00:39:54.349 --> 00:39:59.480
Next slide, please. So does moving to California
00:39:59.480 --> 00:40:05.840
defeat the non -compete? For example, let's say
00:40:05.840 --> 00:40:10.420
that the worker in my hypothetical was working
00:40:10.420 --> 00:40:14.190
in Missouri instead of California. And they decide
00:40:14.190 --> 00:40:17.130
to move to California. And they come into court
00:40:17.130 --> 00:40:19.789
and they say, aha, California's got a percent
00:40:19.789 --> 00:40:23.329
rule. I should win. The answer is not automatically.
00:40:24.110 --> 00:40:28.920
And the why, the form, conflict rule, the timing,
00:40:29.780 --> 00:40:33.860
the state interest will still matter. So what
00:40:33.860 --> 00:40:38.880
about a debt does a Delaware clause in the analysis?
00:40:38.980 --> 00:40:44.619
For example, what if the agreement says our site
00:40:44.619 --> 00:40:47.739
and it's going to be controlled by Delaware law
00:40:47.960 --> 00:40:54.730
and as a consequence, I am free not to have California
00:40:54.730 --> 00:41:03.840
law apply. Next slide. Next slide, please. The
00:41:03.840 --> 00:41:07.980
answer is no. A selected law can face connection
00:41:08.039 --> 00:41:12.139
public policy, and statutory challenges. Again,
00:41:12.139 --> 00:41:15.099
going back to the Draft Kings case, there's a
00:41:15.099 --> 00:41:17.300
question as to whether or not California law
00:41:17.300 --> 00:41:20.059
had been selected in that Massachusetts context.
00:41:20.639 --> 00:41:23.960
And while the court looked at an earlier case
00:41:23.960 --> 00:41:27.159
with a concluded California law applies, in that
00:41:27.159 --> 00:41:29.760
context, it determined, no, we need to look a
00:41:29.760 --> 00:41:31.860
little bit more closely at the public policy
00:41:31.860 --> 00:41:34.800
and what are certain statutory challenges, and
00:41:34.800 --> 00:41:38.599
determined that, no, the clause selected by the
00:41:38.599 --> 00:41:42.300
parties did not automatically determine the outcome.
00:41:43.110 --> 00:41:47.179
What about does negotiating counsel make a restraint
00:41:47.179 --> 00:41:52.139
valid? So for example, the mere fact that an
00:41:52.139 --> 00:41:55.780
employee had counsel present with them when they
00:41:55.780 --> 00:41:58.639
were negotiating the employment agreement. Does
00:41:58.639 --> 00:42:05.829
that make a difference? No. Next slide. Not by
00:42:05.829 --> 00:42:10.130
itself. because Labor Code section 925 exception
00:42:10.130 --> 00:42:13.250
concerns the state's form and law protections.
00:42:13.409 --> 00:42:17.750
It does not necessarily make the restraint valid.
00:42:18.110 --> 00:42:21.150
You still have to make a determination as to
00:42:21.150 --> 00:42:23.849
what is the substantive law that applies. And
00:42:23.849 --> 00:42:28.050
here's the twist, because the statute says, doesn't
00:42:28.050 --> 00:42:31.889
matter what state you're from. If you're in California,
00:42:32.150 --> 00:42:34.530
the California law would apply, but that actually
00:42:34.530 --> 00:42:38.469
is not the end of the analysis. Can we use a
00:42:38.469 --> 00:42:43.409
customer non -solicit instead? And by that, could
00:42:43.409 --> 00:42:47.949
you simply narrow an agreement to state, you
00:42:47.949 --> 00:42:55.860
cannot solicit from my client? The answer is,
00:42:56.059 --> 00:43:00.139
next slide. No, not as an automatic California
00:43:00.139 --> 00:43:03.880
workaround. Of course, examine whether the provision
00:43:03.880 --> 00:43:09.039
restrains lawful work. So the question isn't,
00:43:09.119 --> 00:43:11.940
you can use a customer non -solicit instead.
00:43:12.519 --> 00:43:15.059
And you say, I'm not saying that you can't compete.
00:43:15.519 --> 00:43:18.719
I just am very limited in saying that you cannot
00:43:18.719 --> 00:43:22.739
compete by pursuing certain customers. That is
00:43:22.739 --> 00:43:25.300
still viewed as a non -compete agreement. And
00:43:25.300 --> 00:43:27.300
the court's going to look at, is it limiting
00:43:27.300 --> 00:43:29.719
your right to work? Because again, remember that
00:43:29.719 --> 00:43:33.280
the theory behind this is to allow for employee
00:43:33.280 --> 00:43:39.179
mobility. then a question becomes, well, who
00:43:39.179 --> 00:43:42.400
should file first? Should the employee file first?
00:43:43.219 --> 00:43:48.389
Should the employer file first? That really depends.
00:43:48.670 --> 00:43:54.059
Next slide. Got to do it? I think, and the answer
00:43:54.059 --> 00:43:56.880
to that is depends, because filing first is not
00:43:56.880 --> 00:44:00.000
a complete strategy. Again, you've got to look
00:44:00.000 --> 00:44:03.199
at the jurisdiction. You've got to look at if
00:44:03.199 --> 00:44:05.480
you need to have emergency relief and what's
00:44:05.480 --> 00:44:08.320
the reason for the emergency relief? Ergo, that's
00:44:08.320 --> 00:44:10.139
why you look to, are you looking at a sale of
00:44:10.139 --> 00:44:12.280
business? Are you looking at parties that have
00:44:12.280 --> 00:44:15.400
some form of an LLC or some form of a partnership
00:44:15.400 --> 00:44:20.559
connection? Or you're looking at whether or not
00:44:20.559 --> 00:44:26.260
there's some form of an exception which would
00:44:26.260 --> 00:44:34.300
take it out of the per se rule. Can mediation
00:44:34.300 --> 00:44:36.989
resolve a conflict? the law has not settled.
00:44:38.639 --> 00:44:42.690
Good question. It can resolve the business dispute,
00:44:43.050 --> 00:44:46.570
but we cannot rewrite the mandatory laws. It
00:44:46.570 --> 00:44:49.010
would be helpful if the parties can agree on
00:44:49.010 --> 00:44:52.469
lawful data protection and transition steps ahead
00:44:52.469 --> 00:44:55.710
of time. That's one of the guidance that we would
00:44:55.710 --> 00:44:58.369
like to be able to offer you in that context,
00:44:58.849 --> 00:45:01.570
which is basically to help you get to a resolution
00:45:01.570 --> 00:45:06.360
of the business dispute in that context. as opposed
00:45:06.360 --> 00:45:09.320
to limiting the ability of an employee to move
00:45:09.320 --> 00:45:13.199
to another state or to engage in lawful work
00:45:13.199 --> 00:45:16.340
that may be with the competitor. So that's sort
00:45:16.340 --> 00:45:20.460
of the overview that we've covered in the context
00:45:20.460 --> 00:45:23.500
of the article on remote workers and non -competes.
00:45:23.920 --> 00:45:29.340
I wanted to open this up now to questions. I
00:45:29.340 --> 00:45:32.159
have given you the handouts that go into greater
00:45:32.159 --> 00:45:35.260
detail about the specific law that applies. It
00:45:35.260 --> 00:45:38.500
also lays out both the per se rule, the reasonableness
00:45:38.500 --> 00:45:41.840
standard, some case law in that context, and
00:45:41.840 --> 00:45:44.980
also the exceptions as
it relates to sales of
00:45:44.980 --> 00:45:47.400
businesses and even partial sales of businesses
00:45:47.400 --> 00:45:50.559
and how non -complete agreements would not be
00:45:50.559 --> 00:45:54.570
enforceable in that context. Judge, I just got
00:45:54.570 --> 00:45:57.489
one question that came in, and I will read it
00:45:57.489 --> 00:46:01.650
to you. Have you ever done non -binding findings
00:46:01.650 --> 00:46:04.530
of fact and non -binding conclusions of law as
00:46:04.530 --> 00:46:07.550
part of a mediation with a view that the parties
00:46:07.550 --> 00:46:12.070
can use those in court on cross motions for MSJ
00:46:12.070 --> 00:46:21.570
in court? I have not done that. That primarily
00:46:21.570 --> 00:46:25.769
because we would view arbitration of less mediation
00:46:25.769 --> 00:46:30.150
certainly as confidential in the context of arbitration.
00:46:30.230 --> 00:46:33.789
The idea is that you're in arbitration because
00:46:33.789 --> 00:46:36.710
in these employment contracts, quite frankly,
00:46:36.750 --> 00:46:40.309
a lot of times they arise on new businesses and
00:46:40.309 --> 00:46:46.530
particularly in the. I want to say the high tech
00:46:46.530 --> 00:46:50.969
business. For example, what's going on in Northern
00:46:50.969 --> 00:46:57.639
California with the tech business, the media
00:46:57.639 --> 00:46:59.699
business, the things that are going on along
00:46:59.699 --> 00:47:03.119
those lines where it's developing a number of
00:47:03.119 --> 00:47:06.440
new businesses. So I think that the shown answer
00:47:06.440 --> 00:47:11.300
is no. I avoid from listing those findings. I
00:47:11.300 --> 00:47:13.079
think those protections are more appropriately
00:47:13.079 --> 00:47:16.030
provided in the context of the agreements. Perfect.
00:47:16.090 --> 00:47:17.610
I think the follow -up was, have you ever done
00:47:17.610 --> 00:47:24.130
a consent award to set up an appeal? A consent
00:47:24.130 --> 00:47:29.079
award in the context of an arbitration? I certainly
00:47:29.079 --> 00:47:31.920
created consent judgments in the context of as
00:47:31.920 --> 00:47:36.960
a judge. But a consent arbitration where it is
00:47:36.960 --> 00:47:39.760
publicly used, where the findings are used, I'm
00:47:39.760 --> 00:47:42.539
unfamiliar with that. Got it. And then I have,
00:47:42.739 --> 00:47:45.079
does this analysis apply to other issues that
00:47:45.079 --> 00:47:47.320
may be involved in the dispute in addition to
00:47:47.320 --> 00:47:52.800
non -compete? Read that question again. It just
00:47:52.800 --> 00:47:55.420
says, does this analysis apply to other issues
00:47:55.420 --> 00:47:57.940
that may be involved in the dispute in addition
00:47:57.940 --> 00:48:01.619
to non -compete? Well, I'm uncertain what you
00:48:01.619 --> 00:48:06.659
mean by other disputes. The per se rule and the
00:48:06.659 --> 00:48:10.260
reasonableness standard really relate to enjoining
00:48:10.260 --> 00:48:13.300
a person from engaging in certain business activities
00:48:13.300 --> 00:48:16.280
that would compete with their prior employer
00:48:16.280 --> 00:48:20.920
or that would be a competitor. And it does vary
00:48:20.920 --> 00:48:23.579
from state to state. And in those states, it
00:48:23.579 --> 00:48:26.400
varies from industry to industry. California,
00:48:26.820 --> 00:48:29.360
because we've adopted the per se rule, doesn't
00:48:29.360 --> 00:48:31.920
necessarily drill down on an industry to industry
00:48:31.920 --> 00:48:34.420
basis. And I think that's one of the big distinctions.
00:48:34.940 --> 00:48:37.559
What it does is it looks at the type of transaction
00:48:37.559 --> 00:48:42.340
and it looks at the relationship of the employee
00:48:42.340 --> 00:48:45.960
to the employer. For example, a good example
00:48:45.960 --> 00:48:49.369
would be I think the The primary case that we
00:48:49.369 --> 00:48:55.940
refer to, it's the Edwards case, involved an
00:48:55.940 --> 00:48:59.340
accounting firm and Arthur Anderson. And that
00:48:59.340 --> 00:49:01.519
gives you an example of, and in that context,
00:49:02.340 --> 00:49:03.840
the Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court
00:49:03.840 --> 00:49:07.659
ultimately said that a narrow restraint exception
00:49:07.659 --> 00:49:10.920
simply would not apply. And they invoked in a
00:49:10.920 --> 00:49:13.480
per se rule. And that was the basis for confirming
00:49:13.480 --> 00:49:16.000
that per se rule that was in the Edwards decision.
00:49:16.389 --> 00:49:20.210
Perfect. Next, when examining where major harm
00:49:20.210 --> 00:49:23.409
occurred for a choice of law, does this analysis,
00:49:24.469 --> 00:49:27.090
does this analyze the harm done to the employer
00:49:27.090 --> 00:49:30.889
by violating non -compete or the harm done to
00:49:30.889 --> 00:49:33.989
an employee by being unable to freely accept
00:49:33.989 --> 00:49:38.880
work or both? It's a balancing test. So the question
00:49:38.880 --> 00:49:42.260
becomes, what are you protecting for the employer?
00:49:42.480 --> 00:49:45.099
That's why trade secrets as a separate group
00:49:45.099 --> 00:49:48.820
may be critical. So it's not tied to the non
00:49:48.820 --> 00:49:51.420
-compete, but rather you're establishing that
00:49:51.420 --> 00:49:57.639
it's data and information and inventions and
00:49:57.639 --> 00:50:01.369
patents and things of that nature where a entity
00:50:01.369 --> 00:50:04.929
has invested significant money and proprietary
00:50:04.929 --> 00:50:06.869
information, and that needs to be protected.
00:50:06.949 --> 00:50:09.070
And quite frankly, there should be a separate
00:50:09.070 --> 00:50:11.010
agreement protecting that and disclosing that
00:50:11.010 --> 00:50:13.010
in the context of employment. I think that makes
00:50:13.010 --> 00:50:15.690
your position stronger. So my argument would
00:50:15.690 --> 00:50:19.250
be, if you want to talk about
the harm, it is
00:50:19.250 --> 00:50:21.869
a balancing in that you're looking at what interests
00:50:21.869 --> 00:50:24.269
are you protecting for the business. If you're
00:50:24.269 --> 00:50:26.369
looking at the employee, you want to protect
00:50:26.369 --> 00:50:29.929
the employee's mobility. If you're talking about
00:50:29.929 --> 00:50:33.530
a good example would be the customer non -solicit.
00:50:33.809 --> 00:50:35.949
And see, well, that's just a narrow definition,
00:50:36.030 --> 00:50:38.869
but that's not enough. That's the reason why
00:50:38.869 --> 00:50:42.670
a customer non -solicit agreement is not sufficient
00:50:42.670 --> 00:50:45.809
for purposes of Labor Code Section 925. Because
00:50:45.809 --> 00:50:48.650
ultimately, what that non -solicit agreement
00:50:48.650 --> 00:50:51.690
does is it limits the mobility of the employee.
00:50:52.130 --> 00:50:54.230
And the employee could argue within that. prevents
00:50:54.230 --> 00:50:57.010
me from pursuing lawful work. In the context
00:50:57.010 --> 00:51:00.670
of the Edwards case, it was about an employee,
00:51:00.710 --> 00:51:02.469
an accountant who worked for Arthur Anderson.
00:51:03.070 --> 00:51:05.809
And the exclusion was you can't contact any of
00:51:05.809 --> 00:51:08.510
Arthur Anderson's clients to provide accounting
00:51:08.510 --> 00:51:10.690
services. And the court ultimately said, look,
00:51:10.690 --> 00:51:12.530
if you can provide them for a better price and
00:51:12.530 --> 00:51:14.409
you believe you can provide better services than
00:51:14.409 --> 00:51:18.250
Arthur Anderson, that should be. part of our
00:51:18.250 --> 00:51:21.590
open market society approach, and you should
00:51:21.590 --> 00:51:24.010
be able to compete. So it's a balancing test
00:51:24.010 --> 00:51:27.690
that the courts have to review. And I would argue
00:51:27.690 --> 00:51:30.670
if you're on the employer side, that to the extent
00:51:30.670 --> 00:51:33.369
you can have separate agreements or specify what
00:51:33.369 --> 00:51:35.809
the proprietary information is that you're protecting
00:51:35.809 --> 00:51:37.969
the better, even if you just categorize it, that's
00:51:37.969 --> 00:51:41.769
important. Perfect. The next question relates
00:51:41.769 --> 00:51:47.190
to arbitration. Can you, using AAA rules for
00:51:47.190 --> 00:51:50.829
JAMS arbitration, Rans, can you use the AAA rules
00:51:50.829 --> 00:51:53.349
in there? And then, I don't know if you want
00:51:53.349 --> 00:51:54.590
to take that one first, but the second one is,
00:51:54.610 --> 00:51:57.269
would you accept a case delegating injunctive
00:51:57.269 --> 00:52:02.650
relief into your ARB award? Second question,
00:52:02.750 --> 00:52:07.670
yes. Because obviously one of the key remedies
00:52:07.670 --> 00:52:10.130
is whether or not the person is able to work.
00:52:10.260 --> 00:52:12.699
whether or not they're able to take certain data,
00:52:12.980 --> 00:52:16.019
whether or not you want to enjoin their going
00:52:16.019 --> 00:52:18.699
to a competitor, whether or not you want to enjoin
00:52:18.699 --> 00:52:20.659
them starting a startup business right across
00:52:20.659 --> 00:52:22.219
the street while they're also trying to take
00:52:22.219 --> 00:52:24.760
your clients. Then you also want to look to see
00:52:24.760 --> 00:52:26.599
if there's any connection between the parties,
00:52:26.840 --> 00:52:29.380
if they were via partners, or they're engaged
00:52:29.380 --> 00:52:32.079
in a similar business, what work has been done
00:52:32.079 --> 00:52:35.849
to develop goodwill. So I think when the Act
00:52:35.849 --> 00:52:38.869
was established, and the argument was that we're
00:52:38.869 --> 00:52:41.469
now creating a separate civil violation for having
00:52:41.469 --> 00:52:47.429
a non -compete employment provision in a contract,
00:52:47.769 --> 00:52:50.250
that that creates civil violations. But I think
00:52:50.250 --> 00:52:52.110
there are a number of exceptions, and people
00:52:52.110 --> 00:52:55.670
need to recognize that. So it's a public policy
00:52:55.670 --> 00:52:59.650
which gets you away from the analysis of enforcing
00:52:59.650 --> 00:53:02.780
the agreement. But I think when you're talking
00:53:02.780 --> 00:53:05.880
about potential violation, I think you do have
00:53:05.880 --> 00:53:08.400
certain defenses there in terms of, in the context
00:53:08.400 --> 00:53:12.079
of, what are you protecting? Perfect. I think
00:53:12.079 --> 00:53:15.460
they added contempt power as well. So I was like,
00:53:15.559 --> 00:53:17.079
would you accept that KTL getting injunctive
00:53:17.079 --> 00:53:19.800
relief to your ARB award and contempt power too?
00:53:20.320 --> 00:53:22.300
I think it's critical in order to enforce your
00:53:22.300 --> 00:53:30.320
rulings, yes. Perfect, perfect. Do you at least
00:53:30.320 --> 00:53:32.780
say name to the art? Well, I can answer that.
00:53:33.159 --> 00:53:35.500
No. JAMS is not charged specifically being named
00:53:35.500 --> 00:53:37.380
in an arbitration clause. And we can help you.
00:53:37.420 --> 00:53:38.920
If anyone wants to talk about that after, we
00:53:38.920 --> 00:53:42.039
can definitely do that. And also, I think there
00:53:42.039 --> 00:53:44.500
was a question too about, yes, JAMS does administer
00:53:44.500 --> 00:53:47.539
matters with AAA rules up to the parties decide
00:53:47.539 --> 00:53:51.849
which we can do that. And that's all I have unless
00:53:51.849 --> 00:54:01.289
anybody has any other questions as well. That's
00:54:01.289 --> 00:54:07.280
what I have. Chat here. I think that's all the
00:54:07.280 --> 00:54:10.590
questions I have, Judge. All right. Well, thank
00:54:10.590 --> 00:54:13.469
you. And it looks like we're almost at the 5
00:54:13.469 --> 00:54:16.630
o 'clock hour. So I think this worked out well.
00:54:16.809 --> 00:54:19.809
It's been a pleasure to address each of you.
00:54:19.929 --> 00:54:23.269
I would just remind you that the handouts go
00:54:23.269 --> 00:54:26.110
into greater detail. I think they're also most
00:54:26.110 --> 00:54:28.550
helpful. And I would urge you to certainly get
00:54:28.550 --> 00:54:31.289
them. and review them if you need them for purposes
00:54:31.289 --> 00:54:34.909
of citation and also the actual briefing of the
00:54:34.909 --> 00:54:38.170
cases that contained within the outline. My view
00:54:38.170 --> 00:54:41.389
was rather include all of that in the PowerPoint
00:54:41.389 --> 00:54:43.710
presentation that I think ultimately you would
00:54:43.710 --> 00:54:45.469
benefit from just having the actual handout.
00:54:45.590 --> 00:54:49.909
So that was my purpose. Perfect. Thank you, Judge.
00:54:50.849 --> 00:54:54.469
And thank you, everybody, for joining us today.
00:54:55.429 --> 00:54:57.889
If you have any questions or further questions,
00:54:58.250 --> 00:54:59.469
you can reach out to the Beverly Hills Bar and
00:54:59.469 --> 00:55:00.989
they'll put you in touch with us. And we can
00:55:00.989 --> 00:55:03.489
make sure that any further questions get answered.
00:55:03.590 --> 00:55:05.289
And if you have any questions about jams as well
00:55:05.289 --> 00:55:07.869
or Judge Cunningham, please let us know. Thank
00:55:07.869 --> 00:55:09.869
you. Thank you, everybody.