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Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much indeed for coming the savings, the 2020 annual lecture for CCW,
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the changing control centre for those who don't know CCW has been existence since the very end of 2003,
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bringing together scholars with practitioners both military and political and obviously as tight suggests.
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We've been studying this what's changing in the character of armed conflicts?
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And if you think back to just sort of the 1990s, the late 1990s, the big concern was about peace,
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enforcement of stabilisation, but it shifted very dramatically.
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Shortly before, CCW stood up as an organisation with the dramatic events of nine 11,
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and our focus was on terrorism, of course, from then through the early 2000s.
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The big focus then was on insurgency in the United States, stabilisation but against insurgency, particularly the Middle East.
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And now we find ourselves discussing much more often hostile state actors.
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So you don't change alone. Just a broad handful shows you just how busy we've been, and our focus isn't just on these dramatic geopolitical shifts.
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It's also about the human condition, how ethically we respond to this problem of armed conflicts.
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And it's been about some of the new technologies that have arrived that have made things very disruptive.
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Just recently, we're all pretty concerned at the moment by artificial intelligence,
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for example, what difference that's going to make to the future of armed conflict.
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And we shouldn't ignore the fact that even outer space is not part of our concern around the world.
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But certainly since CCW was formed,
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we've been very fortunate to have an annual lecture where we have asked someone who is
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prominent in academic or in public life to come and share their reflections on war,
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on strategy and perhaps in statecraft, and gives me great pleasure this evening to introduce you to our annual lecturer of Twenty Twenty One.
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Peter Wilkins is currently the associate fellow for Chatham House and has been there since June 2019.
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But he's had a very distinguished career. He was from 2014 to 2018, the director general in the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence,
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responsible for strategic defence policy, including multilateral and bilateral relationships.
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And obviously, Naito was part of that. He was responsible for Britain's nuclear debate.
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If you like cyber, of course, Nigeria's emerging space and indeed the prosperity agenda, as it was known,
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that post I should point out, you know, it's known as director general strategy and international something.
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We're not going to have space agency to that as well as another thing to think about.
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Previously, he served as director general of the Defence Academy down the road.
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From here, the director of operational policy, the director response from the United Kingdom,
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share of the Typhoon Combat Aircraft Programme and as defence counsel to the UK Embassy in Berlin.
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I was wondering my way this evening whether you were upholding that great British tradition of keeping the Russians out,
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the Americans and the Germans somewhere else. He's obviously a frequent participant in debates on defence and security.
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Not just the chancellor has, of course, but elsewhere. And he was awarded CBE in 2019 and CBE before that in 2004 for services to defence.
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He's got an email from Cambridge.
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He was an undergraduate at Peterson, and I should also point out he's had experience in lecturing at the associate courts level,
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rather at the Noto Defence College, which we're very fond of here and in 2006 was a fellow of the Weatherhead Centre in Harvard,
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another connexion that we have as well in international affairs.
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Peter, thank you very much indeed for being on. Annual lecture 2021. Thank you.
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Thank you very much for those kind words. I suppose if I were so happy my American colleagues, I'd call you Director Johnson anyway.
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OK, I'll go straight into it and then we'll have some discussion afterwards.
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I'm sorry, Master Dr. Johnson Distinguished learnt guests.
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And ladies and gentlemen, it's an honour to have been invited to give this year's changing character of war and your lecture.
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My only qualification for this podium is sort of what Rob's been saying,
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which is that I was a senior official in the UK Ministry of Defence for quite a long time.
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I joined in 1980, so and I left in 2018, so this centre was founded just over halfway through my stint.
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But during that period, I worked mainly on policy strategy, acquisition and
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resource management.
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And as Rob said, from 2011 to 2014, I ran the defence academy,
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serving about 20 miles away from here and we had a good relationship with the Centre and with Oxford University more widely.
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And I now have other roles and affiliations. You alluded to one of them, which is a board member of the steering board, member of the space agency.
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And obviously, whatever I say, I say in a strictly personal capacity.
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So I was asked this evening to reflect upon past defence reviews and how they might
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help us better understand the current direction of UK foreign and security policy,
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hence the title UK defence policy reviews and redirections.
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As I said, I was with the Minister Defence from 1980 to 2018,
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and during that period there were five sort of set piece reviews as generally understood.
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So in nineteen eighty one 1990, 97, 98, 2010 and 2015,
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and I brought the first and I'm not quite the last to start the 1991 review and this one was the 2010 review.
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The obvious, I'm afraid I only have one soft copy. I'm sort of gradually becoming less attached to paper as we all are.
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So the last two reviews, the 2010 one and the 2015 review were obviously broader in scope.
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They were strategic defence and security reviews, but defence was at the core of both of them.
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And since then, of course, there's been the integrated review of 2020 21, which was given advance billing by the current defence secretary as quote,
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the deepest and most radical unquote review of UK foreign security and defence policy since the end of the Cold War.
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So as an official, I had limited involvement with the 1981 review.
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I was a very junior official, then often known as Command two eight eight quite unusual letters,
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pretty much the only document which is still known generally by its command paper.
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No. I have some involvement in the 1990 review, which was named as options for Change.
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More with the 1997 98 Strategic Defence Review and the 2010 review,
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and I was the director general responsible for the defence element of the 2015 review and as an ex official,
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I tracked the Integrated Review pretty closely and have written some short commentary pieces on it,
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including some analysis that I
undertook with two former colleagues, John McCain,
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and will dress it on which I will draw for part of this presentation this evening.
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I am conscious that this is pretty well-trodden ground, so in my remarks today,
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I'll not consider reviews of their wider context earlier than the period in which I served at the Ministry of Defence.
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Now you might think that's a bit self-indulgent, but actually listen to what Rob said.
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I don't feel it's quite so self-indulgent because although my being in the Ministry of Defence for those 38,
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that particular thirty eight years was just an accident of my personal history.
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One could argue that it was a period that saw some pretty transformational change,
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so geopolitically shifting from one of the coldest periods of spells of the Cold War.
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Shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, through the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the apparent triumph of the West,
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then through a period of large scale stabilisation operations of.
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Rob alluded to and then to the re-emergence of state on state of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic areas.
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And then technologically, with huge advances in military and commercial electronics, the arrival of the internet and so on.
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And then institutionally, with the British governments,
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at least under prime ministers of both main parties striving to be more businesslike with working practises transformed by mobile phones,
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email and the 24 hour news cycle. When I started in the Ministry of Defence in 1980, there was no such thing as email or mobile phones.
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If you wrote a paper, you wrote it out in longhand on a full full set know not even a full, and it was posted to an office in Glasgow to be typed up.
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So I suppose it was quite a long time, but it's a huge change in working practises,
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and the period began with events that were harbingers of the end of the old order.
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So the death of Tito and the condensed agreement in 1990 and ended with developments that precedes the new set of challenges.
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An increasingly confident China. An increasingly distracted United States and accelerating climate change.
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So following those introductory points, I'll structure my remarks this evening into roughly four parts.
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I realise I'm breaking the rule very much it those two things in three parts, but I'm not French, so I've got nothing against.
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But I'll outline the review's pulling out their continuing features and patterns.
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Then I'll sketch out the wider context of the UK defence policy during those years and offer some thoughts
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on the recent integrated review and asked whether and to what extent it breaks with the mould of the past.
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And finally, all of us have thoughts on future challenges. So first of all, the reviews I've listed, the five that took place,
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they have all to a greater or lesser extent contained the following elements a risk and threat assessment,
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namely, what are the main risks and threats facing the UK and where do they come from a policy baseline?
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What is the best general policy response to those risks and threats?
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And what specific national security and defence policies and planning priorities should be pursued?
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An analysis of capability and force structure requirements.
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What new capabilities are required to meet the threats and or changes in the balance of those capabilities?
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In practical terms, how many ships, tanks, aircraft, etc. and how many personnel, military and civilian are needed a financial settlement?
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What resources are required to sustain the policy capabilities and full structures?
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And then we'll come back to this. What steps should be taken to ensure a sustainable balance between commitments and resources?
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And then the Fifth Element? An analysis of organisation and processes.
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What organisational arrangements will best support the policy and planning responses outlined and what changes need to be made
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to existing arrangements and reviews have taken place for the following sometimes overlapping reasons economic and financial.
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Two of the review's commanding two eight eight and the 2010 CSO,
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which I brought with me, were explicit that they were responding to economic pressures.
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The existing defence effort was frankly no longer affordable. This was partly but unstated the case with options for change in 1990 as well.
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Strategic change. Another reason two of the past reviews options for change as I mentioned, and to a lesser extent,
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the 1997 98 SDR were responding more to changes in the strategic context,
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as, of
course, was the integrated review, namely to the UK's changed position in the world post-Brexit.
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Change of government, which was the main reason, frankly, for the 97 98 SDR and rather prosaically,
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compliance with the schedule, which was the main reason for the 2015 review.
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The coalition government had set out a commitment to conduct these reviews every five years.
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The new Conservative government in 2015 respected this, even though David Cameron was publicly quite publicly unenthusiastic.
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And of course,
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the 2015 review was also partly a response to the changed security environment in the Euro Atlantic area following Russian misbehaviour in Ukraine,
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the fear that will come back to haunt.
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Perhaps and looking at the main elements of the past reviews of these past reviews, and as I said, I'll cover the integrated review separately.
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One can pick out some patterns, so to avoid repetition, I'll take together the first two elements the risk and threat assessment,
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plus the policy baseline, because they tend to overlap a bit. So Command eight eight eight did not seek to overhaul UK defence policy.
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Like previous reviews, it saw the primary threat as being from the Soviet bloc,
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but given the financial pressures, it decided to take risks against the UK's maritime capabilities.
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This was undermined less than a year later by the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands.
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Options for change was cautious about whether the threat from the Soviet Union actually gone,
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but just that it was prudent to reduce defence spending from about four percent of GDP to 2.5 percent of GDP.
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I mean, it's now, by comparison, about 2.1 percent over the subsequent decade.
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And actually, it was appropriate to do that over the threat of major conflict in Europe receded during the 1990s and beyond by the late nineties.
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Risks to our national security appear to come more from fragile and failing states.
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The 97 98 SDR response to manage these risks range seemed to work quite well at first in Sierra Leone, Macedonia and initially in Afghanistan.
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But the SDR did not foresee that such interventions would turn into Typekit stabilisation campaigns.
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As in southern Iraq and southern Afghanistan Post 2006, SDR Signal 2010 stated confidently quote No state currently has both the
intent and
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the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the United Kingdom,
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unquote. That said, only 11 years ago, it saw the risks and threats coming more as before from within fragile and failing states.
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And given the fiscal situation and the then government's limited ambitions in terms of a limited appetite,
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sorry for further heavy stabilisation operations. It deliberately S.T.A.R. 2010 deliberately limited defence ambitions defence's
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ambitions in terms of the scale of operations of the armed forces could undertake,
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and it took risks against certain capabilities, such as maritime patrol aircraft.
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The resulting gaps were managed for several years thereafter,
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albeit with increasing strain on these SDF 15 close these gaps and Re-orientate said defence planning on state based threats,
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particularly from Russia. It also deepened the investment in the new domains of conflict, namely cyber space.
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So after a pretty shaky start with command eight two eight eight,
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I think the reviews were about right on the trajectory of risks and threats and set the appropriate baseline policies in response.
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But the later ones seriously underestimated the pace of change in the strategic environment and how quickly the character of conflict would evolve,
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particularly with the innovative exploitation by adversaries of commercial technologies.
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So the third element of each of every review was capabilities and force structures looked at individually.
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At least two of the reviews took some bold decisions to reduce capabilities.
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Command eight to 88 plan to cut one fifth of the Royal Navy's destroyers and frigates, two amphibious ships and an aircraft carrier.
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The 2010 Edsel brought forward the withdrawal from service of the three small carriers that we
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used to have and the Harrier force and cancelled the then Maritime Patrol Aircraft Programme.
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The intervening 97 98 review SVR decided to replace the three small carriers with two bigger ones and
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created a number of joint formations such as Joint Force Harrier and the Joint Helicopter Command.
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But taking a slightly wider view, one gets a different picture.
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Although the size of the UK Armed Forces has reduced significantly since the early 1980s in terms of the
number of platforms,
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war stocks and personnel, their shape has changed very little.
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For relatively little, the changes instituted by the main reviews have been mainly incremental,
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reflecting political and institutional pressures to maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities,
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including as a hedge against uncertainty in the entire period.
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Only two significant. Capabilities have been deleted permanently.
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Conventional submarines and ground based medium range surface to air missiles
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and both outside the main reviews given the pace of technological change.
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It's hard not to conclude that these changes to capabilities and force structures made in these reviews were too cautious and conservative.
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The fourth element of past reviews was the financial settlement arguably command eight to eight
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did what it was set out to do in terms of reducing the programme to match available resources.
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But following the Falklands campaign, many of the proposed cuts had to be reversed,
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and the government announced in December 1992 that quote We shall now be devoting
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substantially more resources to defence than had previously been planned,
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unquote. The budgetary dimension of the decisions made in the 1990 review was not spelt out until the following year.
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Statement on the defence estimates, which was the first of many indications that either defence expenditure was not
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reducing as expected and or that the defence budget was being squeezed by the Treasury.
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And as a result, the mod then had to launch in 93 94. The so-called defence cost studies to find significant savings by the time of the SDR in 97 98.
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The defence budget was at a low point in real terms, with little hope of an uplift given the then government's ambitious social goals.
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SDR much lauded these days, but it concluded with a residual gap between the associated financial settlements and the
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estimated cost to the defence programme to be closed by ambitious efficiency measures.
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And the result was that the Americans struggled financially throughout the next decade.
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The 2010 review cut the defence programme by 10 percent, but it soon became clear that this wasn't enough.
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Hence, the so-called three month exercise in 2011, which included a previously rejected reduction in the size of the army.
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The 2015 season began with an announcement that the UK would meet the next target of spending two per cent of GDP on defence.
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Thus basically fixing the budget.
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But this envelope was soon strained by new additions to the defence programme, with the gap to be closed as before by ambitious efficiency targets.
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Some additional funding was found was provided in 2010 2018 and a big uplift in 2020.
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I don't have the detail, but it is widely understood. I'm choosing my words carefully here that a significant proportion of that funding has had
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to be allocated to fill what is technically known as holes in the existing programme.
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In short, none of the reviews of the command eight two eight eight has managed to create a sustainable balance between commitments and resources,
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and they were all followed by further measures.
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The Fifth Element was organisation and processes when all the reviews have had something to say on this dimension.
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It was actually only a big part of the 97 98 review,
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which created a number of joint organisations which I won't go through to share to spare you from the Minister of Defence Alphabet Soup.
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Otherwise,
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the studies and reports that led to the most significant organisational changes to the Ministry of Defence took place outside the main reviews.
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These included the so-called Hessel Time review of the Central Ministry of Defence in 1984.
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Michael has some time, of course, an alumnus of this college, the new management strategy and the related prospect review.
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In the early nineties, the Enabling Acquisition Change study, which led to the merger of the entities,
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main acquisition organisations and, of course, the Liberal Review in 2010 11 12.
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So from an organisational perspective, the main reviews have rarely been decisive.
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So having sketched out what the reviews did or didn't do. I'll now turn or return to the my second theme.
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The wider context of UK defence over those years, and it will be a personal perspective,
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reflecting my standpoints at various moments and former colleagues of my approximate
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vintage may have different perceptions in terms of the strategic context.
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There was
obviously a decisive break point in 1990. But certain elements straddle the divide.
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One was the relationship with the United States in the 1980s.
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This turned around the US contribution to NATO's deterrence posture in Europe, both nuclear and conventional in the 90s and 2000s.
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It was more operational cooperation, whether in the Gulf War or the subsequent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
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but was the sense of peace and cooperation on nuclear and intelligence matters continued throughout, largely following their own rhythm rhythms.
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Another one was the Middle East and particularly the Gulf. UK forces had officially withdrawn from east of Suez in the 1970s,
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but with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the Royal Navy's Miller Patrol was established, which can.
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You need for many years and eventually evolved into a renewed, renewed permanent naval presence in the Gulf.
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Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council states were a continuing priority to ministers throughout with regular visits to the Gulf.
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What we would now call the prosperity dimension was a big factor.
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The defence industrial relationship with Saudi Arabia stepped up significantly after 1995,
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and defence exports on a much lesser scale were also pursued in the other states,
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including the most recent export sale of Typhoon to Qatar, which was signed in 2017.
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And of course, the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath was a major preoccupation.
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In the early and again in the late 1990s, to be followed by the searing experience of operations in Iraq from early 2003,
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even as these receded concern was growing about Iran's nuclear programme,
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and I can't think of any other part of the world outside Europe that had such an impact on defence during those years.
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Turning to Europe for the Middle East, seen mainly through the prism of nature and key bilateral programmes, including key bilateral relationships,
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including cooperation on major equipment programmes,
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successive reviews and documents have described NATO as quote vital or as the quote cornerstone of the UK's defence.
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But the day to day relationship has been more nuanced given the UK's continued continuing interest beyond the Nexo area.
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Nature has not given defence planning in the UK to the same degree as it has in other European states.
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The two key bilateral relations relationships during the period well with Germany and France with the former.
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The British military presence in Germany steadily reduced up the early nineties and the centrepiece of the relationship between equipment cooperation.
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So tornado, typhoon, etc. With France, there was more of a shared strategic culture as fellow nuclear powers with global interests.
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But equipment cooperation was much less developed during that period.
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And tellingly, the St Malo agreement with France on European defence was signed some months after the 97 98 SDR was published and was not prepared.
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And it at all as far as I can make out.
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Looking inwards, UK defence was subject to budgetary pressures throughout the period and remains so today despite the budget uplift of a year ago.
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This reflected relentless growth in costs above the generic rates of inflation in equipment and, to a lesser extent, personnel.
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It's often assumed and and asserted that the defence budget has been in steady decline since the late 1980s.
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This is not entirely correct. Defence expenditure, which admittedly is technically not quite the same thing, was pretty steady in real terms.
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Across my almost 40 year period, that's around 40 billion pounds a year.
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Apart from a significant dip in the mid to late 1990s, the peace dividend was relatively short lived.
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Successive reviews and umpteen internal exercises between reviews failed to achieve
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a sustainable balance between the cost of commitments and available resources.
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Some degree of tension between those things is desirable, as it can help drive if an efficiency and innovation.
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But the enduring extent of the imbalance was, in my observation, personal view,
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a preoccupation of the NATO leadership throughout with a huge amount of senior time and staff effort absorbed by what one might
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call managing the gap time effort that perhaps might have been more game for the use of allies on a slides on other things.
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So while there is a natural tendency for academic and other commentators to focus on the cadence of the main set piece reviews,
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the reality was one of almost constant reviews,
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perhaps because of the slightly artificial way in which the main piece of the main
reviews were conducted.
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They didn't seem to settle that much.
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Whether carried out over a long period like the 97 98 one which lasted over a year or a short one like we saw in 2010,
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which lasted less than six months, many big decisions were taken between reviews.
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These decisions may not have set directions, but they significantly constrained choices.
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So let's give an example from my personal history. The UK's number of Eurofighter typhoons, the number that we were buying was set in 1996,
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and the SDR of the following year consciously did not reopen that number,
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given the risk to ongoing negotiations for industrial work shares with Germany.
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And, of course, key decisions on the nuclear programme, but also taken outside the set piece reviews in nineteen eighty two thousand six and 2016,
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finally starting in the early 1980s and initially reflecting a broader government agenda.
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These years saw successive efforts to run defence more like a business and reform acquisition processes.
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On the first, the beginnings were quite modest with aspirations and this document nine two eight eight eight two eight eight but quote
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more accountable management of the documents and quotes to carry out further our partnership with the private sector,
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unquote in wider support areas. By the early 1990s, we had competing for quality and market testing, and efforts to outsource activities continued.
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Following the change of government in 1970,
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notably in the Typekit divestment of test and evaluation work through what is now a company called Kinetic one could characterise this,
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and I want to write this up at some point as the Liberals, I think, or possibly not dismantling of the warfare state,
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as described by David Edgerton in his seminal book With Acquisition.
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The key change was the shift from the mid-1980s to an approach of seeking best value for money through open competition between private contractors.
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Ministry of Defence ceased officially at least selecting contractors taking account of broader industrial or social factors.
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This was accompanied by a quote hands off approach to the defence industry.
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The Minister of Defence expected the prime contractors to manage their supply
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chains and gradually collected less and less information about its supply base.
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Although the military regularly boasted about how much money this was saving,
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there was a growing sense by the mid 1990s that the results were mixed with the costs of major projects rising and time scale slipping.
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So we had the launch of smart procurement in 1997, followed by many further acquisition reform initiatives.
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These tended to focus on organisation and process, rather than the underlying value for money through open competition policy.
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Well, I hope you're concluding from all this is that there's been a high degree of continuity, I might say path dependency over the past four decades,
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despite claims by successive reviews that they were, in this case, fresh and radical and others.
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But yes, they use that term, you know, all those years ago, phrase all those years ago and others that they were setting a new compass.
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Perhaps it would be unfair to say that the broad direction of British defence policy didn't change much in 40 years.
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I think actually it was more a case of going round in a big circle. And there's definitely been a lag or latency.
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Even a substantial numbers of troops were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of this century.
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The UK sought to make its major commitments, exacerbating overstretch.
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The campaign in Afghanistan did not become defence's quote main effort, which is a doctrinal term until 2009.
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As I noted earlier, the broad shape of the UK armed forces also didn't change much.
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This reflected various pressures, as I said, including political desire not to foreclose options and limit physical dependencies on allies.
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Some long capability gaps and consequent dependencies were accepted, but generally only when forced by circumstances.
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As with the maritime patrol that rocked my sense is that the obsession with efficiencies
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from the early 1980s and the constant reviews were mainly about avoiding hard choices.
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And I suppose I'm deliberately attacking Peter Ricketts in saying that it wasn't too difficult to pretend otherwise.
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It was pretty obvious to anybody that parts of UK defence were not very efficient.
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But the quantum of the savings to be made was often based on a rather cursory analysis and was therefore rarely realised in the practise.
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Successive
efficiency exercises or initiatives to use the modes favoured descriptors.
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I'm disappointed and I think the use of those words actually is quite indicative in itself.
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One could argue nonetheless, that this multi-year effort was successful, unlike in some other countries.
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UK defence did avoid having to narrow its horizons or lose key capabilities as a price
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was paid in the disproportionate intellectual effort put into managing the gap.
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I suppose the big question, which I wasn't planning to go into in the main part of this is whether there is a link between
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this and what is starting to look like a litany of strategic failures since the mid 1990s.
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The interventions in the Balkans were at least a partial success, but I don't need to dwell on Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan.
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The errors in each case were different, but it seems to me at least arguable that the Ministry of Defence,
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less preoccupied with its perennial balancing act, might have handled matters differently.
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Against this background and turning to my third theme, how can one assess the integrated review?
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Glibly, I could take refuge in the time honoured civil service phrase.
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It's too early to say, but I'll think of it more than that.
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The outgoing chief of the Defence Staff has said that from a defence perspective,
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the Integrated Review reflected a properly strategic approach with an evaluation of ends, ways and means.
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I wouldn't dispute this. Apart from to note that they do not appear to have been addressed in the right order publicly,
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at least the ways in the form of the integrated operating concept and the means.
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The defence budget settlement appeared before the ends, as set out in the white paper of mid-March of this year.
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I mean, there were, as you know, three documents that finally appeared the main white paper of the 16th of March, the Defence Command paper,
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the 22nd of March, and the Defence Industrial Defence and Defence and Security Industrial Strategy of the 23rd of March.
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Between them, they covered the same elements as previous reviews and so briefly and using
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the same constituent elements as before my sort of off the cuff assessment.
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First of all, the assessment of risks and threats. This appears to me to be thoughtful and comprehensive with a clear and, in my view,
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correct restatement of the centrality of the Euro-Atlantic area to the UK security.
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But it already feels a little overtaken by events with respect to the security challenge from China.
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Taiwan has barely mentioned and the disruptive impact of accelerating climate change.
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Second, the policy and planning response.
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The integrated review, given its name, puts much weight on integration across domains within governments and even internationally.
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This looks right. It posits a tilt to the Indo-Pacific again, given the growing challenges from that area.
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This also looks right, but it doesn't address whether the UK can make a meaningful contribution to security
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in the Indo-Pacific without detriment to its contribution in the Euro-Atlantic.
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However, in my view, one of the most significant shifts in policy is set out in the last but by no means least paper in the trilogy.
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The Defence and Security Industrial Strategy for the first time.
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This recognises the defence industry as a quote strategic asset unquote, and promises to move away from the previous policy of competition by default.
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Third capabilities in force structures The AI R promises increased investment in digital,
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cyber and space at the expense of the accelerated retirement of some older capabilities,
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which has caused a lot of emotion, as you well know, and it moves off the unattainable previous target of 82000 personnel to the army again.
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In my view, the budget settlement. Fourth Element the budget increase announced last November, was greater than any external observer had expected.
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It means that, unlike nearly all the previous reviews, this one has not been hobbled from the outset.
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But there's still a question whether once existing budget holes have been filled, there will be enough headroom for investments in new technologies,
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and it's difficult work with a company at the chancellor's recent budget statement showed.
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While the capital budget for the Mod is going up very impressively, the resource of day to day budget is quite constrained,
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so there is a risk, I think, that we could be back before too long.
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So managing the gap and then fifth organisation and process the biggest step, such as the AFL-CIO and defeat merger,
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were outside defence and in this case preceded the completion of the review.
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But in the new Space Command should provide a useful focus for an increasingly important domain.
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So with its self-consciously radical approach and the welcome rejection, welcome injection of significant capital.
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Will the integrated review break the mould that I've outlined so far?
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I don't think it's clear that it will. Indeed, the tilts the Indo-Pacific may increase the strain.
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The text indicates that the tilt is actually intended to be more economic and diplomatic the military.
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But the coincidence with the aircraft carrier deployment has focussed attention
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on the military dimension and may have raised expectations in the region,
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but will have to be managed. So finally, some closing thoughts on where we now seem to be heading in the weeks after the pandemic struck.
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I'm sure many people here will remember this.
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There was a welter of webinars about the strategic significance and the consensus that was emerge that it wasn't a great turning point,
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but it was accelerating and deepening trends that were already apparent,
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not least the shift in economic and political power to the Indo-Pacific that still feels right to me.
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So the context for UK defence policy is now both rather familiar and also different.
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I see the main challenges still as Russia, China, the US, Europe and climate change.
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Russia remains, as we've been reminded over recent days, a disruptive power in the Euro-Atlantic area.
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Up until the last few days, it's been attracting less attention from five or six years ago.
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But the fundamentals haven't changed. Russia continues to exploit fault lines and other developments in eastern and central Europe,
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and we cannot exclude the possibility that it could do so in a way that would be destabilising and could lead to conflict.
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So we must continue to invest in credible deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic area.
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China is not yet a military threat, so the international order in the Indo-Pacific or more widely in the same way as Russia in the Euro-Atlantic.
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But there is a deepening pattern of coercive and or disruptive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region and increasingly beyond intimidation,
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cyber
attacks, etc, etc. and, of course, Taiwan intimidation of Taiwan.
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The US will continue to have more equities at stake in the Indo-Pacific than any European country.
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It appears to be moving towards a more explicit deterrence posture and it will towards China,
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and it will continue to provide most of the forces required. In my view, the UK should be considering how it can best conclude.
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Abuse of this posture, taking into account the views of the US and key regional partners such as Japan and Australia.
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It may be.
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And Lloyd Austin, in one of his speeches in the American defence secretary and one of his speeches in Singapore back in the summer, hinted at this.
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The UK might better help. It might be better off helping alleviate the pressures on the US by carrying more of the burden in Europe and the Gulf,
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facilitating the redeployment of U.S. forces to the Indo-Pacific.
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In the meantime, the core of the competition between China and the West is technological.
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China has made no secret of its intent to master the game changing technologies such as A.I. and quantum.
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The UK and other key European powers should work with the US and key regional partners to better protect our technological x where it still exists,
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uphold international rules and standards,
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and ensure that we do not become dependent on China for future critical technologies in the way that happened with wildlife and fight trade.
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It might seem a bit odd now to switch to the US and Europe. Surely, they are not strategic competitors in the same way as Russia and China.
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True, but in a more fragmented world, one has to pay more attention to what one's allies and partners are up to, as well as potential adversaries.
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There was much relief a year ago when Joe Biden was elected president and and and undertook to work constructively with allies.
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But we knew that the underlying trend apparent for a decade of increasing US focus on the Indo-Pacific would continue,
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and many of us were worried about the trajectory of U.S. domestic politics,
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particularly the implosion of the traditional Republican Party and the implications that could have for the US's future international,
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wrote US, whose approach to Afghanistan this summer showed that even the current administration to take an America First type
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approach and the increasing influence of the increasing evidence of the continuing influence of Donald Trump,
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perhaps gives pause for thought on the pause, for thought on the domestic trajectory.
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So the UK should, in my view, be thinking hard about becoming less dependent on the US,
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and I believe that this could be done in a way that the current administration would not find threatening would actually welcome.
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It would, of course, involve almost inevitably working more closely with European partners.
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Which brings me to Europe. The idea of quote European strategic autonomy remains a contested one,
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and the European Union has a lot less money to spend on defence than was envisaged a few years ago.
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UK should not, in my view, automatically assume that European strategic autonomy is a bad thing.
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It depends on what form it takes and how open the EU is or becomes the third party engagement.
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If Emmanuel Macron is re-elected next year, I would expect to see this concept gain much more impetus.
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And those EU countries that are currently a bit ambivalent about it,
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including some close industrial partners of the UK, may start falling more into line.
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That would create the risk of a growing gap between the UK and its continental European partners.
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The Integrated Review had warm words about cooperation with European partners, if not the EU itself, but very few new concrete proposals, if any.
389
00:45:53,150 --> 00:45:55,130
And I think that needs attention.
390
00:45:55,130 --> 00:46:04,010
And finally, climate change in the past climate change climate, the climate was relatively unchanging climatic conditions,
391
00:46:04,010 --> 00:46:11,300
and the seasons always needed to be taken into account in military planning, but not the possibility of them changing in the way that we are now.
392
00:46:11,300 --> 00:46:18,890
Seeing the role of climate change and exacerbating conflict in, say, the Sahel is well documented.
393
00:46:18,890 --> 00:46:29,570
The climate change could now have a strategic impact. Much closer to home parts of the Mediterranean basin will have a climate in 10 to 20 years time
394
00:46:29,570 --> 00:46:36,590
that could create economic and social pressures that might be destabilising for team-mates allies.
395
00:46:36,590 --> 00:46:42,770
I'm not sure this is receiving sufficient attention, and there is another dimension.
396
00:46:42,770 --> 00:46:49,070
The energy published its sustainability strategy back in March, and it contains some very worthy goals,
397
00:46:49,070 --> 00:46:54,650
except that I do think the objective of net zero by 2050 is not ambitious enough.
398
00:46:54,650 --> 00:46:59,840
But it seems to rest on the premise that adaptation to climate change should not have any
399
00:46:59,840 --> 00:47:06,320
detriment in terms of the operational capability of weapon systems against military threats.
400
00:47:06,320 --> 00:47:16,260
I wonder. Climate change is becoming such a big issue that the Minister of Defence may have to accept this in future sustainability considerations.
401
00:47:16,260 --> 00:47:24,000
May have to take precedence over operational performance in major decisions on procurement and infrastructure.
402
00:47:24,000 --> 00:47:31,980
So to conclude, despite all the cynic might say, because of multiple reviews,
403
00:47:31,980 --> 00:47:38,850
British defence policy has shown much continuity over the past four decades.
404
00:47:38,850 --> 00:47:41,730
But we are now entering uncharted waters.
405
00:47:41,730 --> 00:47:52,320
Geopolitically, with the ascendancy of China and the growing introspection of the US and even geographically and environmentally.
406
00:47:52,320 --> 00:47:59,190
I would wager that the reviews of the future are likely to look very different from those of the past.
407
00:47:59,190 --> 00:48:07,666
Thank you very much.