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Well, I think this also relates to your earlier question, Amy, about am I comfortable with having corporations designing the laws?
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Well, if you adopt a process like this, which essentially shows that corporations can change their mind through this decision-making effort, through consultation, and move to a position that is better informed and closer to the victim, then that is a process that's worth having.
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Okay, let's get down to business.
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Welcome back to Bite-Sized Business Law.
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We are in the throes of one of the biggest social dilemmas brought up by corporations, maybe ever, with the debate about how far AI should be allowed to go.
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Today's guest argues that corporations have always operated at the edge of social controversies, and he provides a new theory for how businesses should handle this inevitability.
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Stavros Gadinus is the George R.
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Johnson Professor of Law and the faculty director of the Berkeley Center for Law and Business at Berkeley Law School.
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His new book, entitled Corporate Ordering, How Corporations Navigate Social Conflict, is available as of late September.
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Stavros, welcome.
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Thank you very much, Amy.
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We're so glad to have you on.
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Why don't you start our listeners out though at kind of the problem that your book and that your work is identifying?
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And by that I mean you start from this premise that the business judgment rule, it offers discretion but no guidance when social conflicts are baked into business decisions, which is becoming increasingly more common.
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What do you mean exactly by this problem that you're confronting here?
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So let's start with uh with an example.
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We are all familiar with kind of Meta's decision to reverse a decade of content moderation in a single meeting.
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And in doing so, they changed kind of the rules for speech for about 3 billion users.
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Now, this is a decision that the law treats just like any decision about do we lease a new car if we're men?
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The discretion is nearly unlimited, but there is almost no guidance about how to exercise it.
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Now, this is a contrast that practitioners will easily recognize.
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Think about how the world thought about MA in the early 80s.
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We were in a similar position.
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You could decide whether to sell a company very quickly, the same way Van Gorkham thought about it.
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Just hold a meeting, an hour and a half later, you've sold your company.
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But we know that in the last 40 years, we've built a decision-making machine that now introduces important safeguards into this process that look out for shareholders' interests.
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We started with fairness opinions and now appropriate deliberation and special committees and independent board members and all the various elements that MFW introduced, majority of the minority votes, and then Sarbanes Auxley, independent auditing, and another set of decision-making aids.
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So all this is a decision-making machinery that never reached the question of how do companies make a decision about a socially controversial issue.
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There was a discussion in Disney in 2022, where the board got credit for having some deliberations, but it didn't get into the question of what is an adequate deliberation.
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Right.
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So we've done a lot, but perhaps not enough.
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So you put forth this basic structure, which is like this business and social dimensions collide, right?
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They become inseparable.
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Then everyone's preferences fragment, or all the stakeholder preferences fragment, corporate ordering emerges, and then regulators build outward from what these private firms have already created.
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What do you mean, Stavros, by the corporate ordering part?
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Can you explain that to us?
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Yes.
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So first off, I think it's pretty clear that the business and the social dimensions become inseparable, right?
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Like the example of Meta that I just discussed.
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This was a decision that Meta took for business reasons.
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But by affecting millions or billions of users at the same time, it effectively becomes a rule for all these people.
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So this is the paradox that in order to be efficient as a business, you have to have the same system apply across all your users.
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And that gives it a rule-like character.
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And that's the inseparability that I'm discussing about.
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But at the same time, shareholders start having different views about what this rule should be now that it applies to billions of people, and now that everybody understands it, some people want more moderation, some people want less moderation, some people want more sustainability, some people are fossil fuels all the way.
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So this fragmented shareholder base creates a challenge for managers and the board because they have to make important
choices in the context of this very fragmented environment.
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So what corporate ordering is, is a way, a decision-making process for dealing with this problem.
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They understand that we need the corporation, we need a systematic process for approaching this rule-like decisions.
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And they start by thinking like someone who produces a rule.
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So the first question is: okay, we know that this is going to impact a lot of people.
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Let's think this through.
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Let's talk to the experts, let's talk to the stakeholders, let's understand what are the implications of our decisions.
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Consultation is the first step in figuring out what the principle should be.
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You know, the board cannot make every single decision, but it can set a principle, and that's the first step.
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Then they have to make individual decisions and they have to see how people react to that.
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So very often that means being very open, very transparent about these decisions and kind of communicating these decisions to everyone and so that they can get feedback about how this landed.
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And finally, uh managers need to somehow monitor how the principal is doing, understand the feedback and revise.
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And usually that's very helpful when they do it themselves in a systematic way or whether they invite outside parties to do a little bit of the monitoring and verification.
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So that process emerges because every large organization that deals with this problem has to go through these phases.
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And once they become clear and conscious, then they form this corporate ordering system.
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So essentially, corporate ordering is an internal regime that has these three elements, essentially principle setting or rulemaking, implementation, and monitoring.
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What you're describing is starting to sound a lot like governing, like political governing.
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I think it's embedded in every hierarchy.
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It's uh and we know that corporations are hierarchies, right?
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That's their distinctive feature.
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And I think that's the source of it.
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So I am deeply uncomfortable with this phenomenon that you later recognize, which is that corporations are making the rules.
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They are creating frameworks, they're setting standards that then lawmakers just adopt.
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They just turn around and adopt them.
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Like, you know, everyone's complaining, oh, we're letting eight rich guys decide how their own AI companies should be regulated.
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And then legislators go, yeah, fine, that makes sense.
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But maybe you can make me feel a little bitter by giving us a little historical background.
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Explain to our listeners that corporations have done this for ages, including maybe, for example, you write about how the securities laws were developed.
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Yes.
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So the securities laws is an example that corporate lawyers are uh very familiar with because they started, you know, in even in the early 19th century, we started having experiments with disclosure, and various companies started producing disclosures.
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And over time, over decades, we it was another straight line.
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Sometimes we had more disclosure, sometimes we had less disclosure, but we came up with a practice of what was good disclosure.
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And when the 1929 crash happened and the government started thinking about securities laws, they essentially adopted the best practices that corporations had built incrementally over the past few decades.
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There are other examples too.
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I was surprised to learn about how the term jaywalking came about.
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So, you know, back in the 19th century, it wasn't a crime to cross the street.
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In 1900, there were 8,000 cars in America, and by 1920, there were 8 million.
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I think about 200,000 people died in traffic accidents in these two decades.
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So people started thinking actively, well, we need a code.
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But it was auto manufacturers that came together initially with some victims' group and that produced the first group.
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At some point, the victims' groups were pushed away and came up with rules about how to behave when you're crossing a road.
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Jaywalking became some say no-no, and it required changing a practice that everybody thought was just instinctive.
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These examples are interesting, but there's um modern-day examples in your book that are really illustrative of this phenomenon.
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So maybe it's easier to understand your central thesis if you help us take a look at some of those examples.
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So this is very cool.
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You went inside some large companies, you sat down with the decision makers who are developing these standards like in real time before any laws are actually issued.
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Tell us a little bit about Uber and Lyft and the dilemma that they faced when they first were founded.
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So something
that I found fascinating is how granular these stories become.
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So I'll give you two examples that I think the audience might appreciate.
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The first is about how you come up with an insurance scheme about a form of transportation that didn't exist.
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And they obviously, you know, when the driver is as someone in the car, then they are covered, they're performing a service, so they're covered by insurance.
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But what happens when uh they're just waiting for a ride?
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Or what happens when they're just, you know, they've uh said yes and they're driving to pick up the rider and an accident happens then.
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So there was no insurance coverage for that.
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So when they were trying to design it, Christine Svertrück, who was the general counselor of Lyft, hired Kate Sumson, who was an insurance agent.
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And what Kate did was she conceptualized these periods and she literally took three post-its, and on one said period one and slapped it on her wall when the driver is waiting, and period two, and slapped it on her wall when the driver is driving to pick up the the uh the client, and period three when the client or the client is in the ride.
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And these three post-its, period one, period two, period three, are now the formal way in which legislation names this period and says period one, this, period two, period three.
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So it's so it's such a direct link to how the terminology even was maintained.
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And another example I have from Uber is one that I think kind of goes against the instincts of every lawyer.
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So they were trying to deal with a question of safety and especially the kind of sexual assault in uh rides.
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And you have to feel safe when you enter a ride.
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So they were trying to develop a way of thinking about it, develop a safety report, be transparent, what should be the proper way of dealing with the problem.
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And the general counsel's view, Tony West was the general counsel, he was a former prosecutor.
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So the general counsel's view is well, we have information about a rape that happened or a sexual assault that happened in our cars.
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We know the rider, we know the driver, we should report it.
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And that's what every lawyer would think, and especially a former prosecutor.
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I think every lawyer would say, if I have information, I would even go as far as saying maybe every decent human being would think if I have information about a rape, I should report it.
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But all the victims' organizations they consulted with told them no, you have to keep it anonymous, and you have to let the victim decide whether to report it and under what conditions.
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Because by reporting it yourself, you're risking doing more harm to the victim than the harm they have already suffered.
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And it was a very unanimous and strong objection from over 200 victims organizations.
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So they decided to keep it anonymous, and of course, state authorities, when they found out, were like, what are you doing?
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You're you know withholding information about crimes, and they took them to court.
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So the legal counsel decided to go to court and fight with the state authorities and get support from the victims' organizations and convince them to change state policy in this way.
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And the reason I'm mentioning this example, I think this also relates to your earlier question, Amy, about am I comfortable with having corporations designing the laws?
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Well, if you adopt a process like this, which essentially shows that corporations can change their mind through this decision-making effort, through consultation, and move to a position that is better informed and closer to the victim, then that is a process that's worth having.
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Yeah, absolutely.
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I mean, it sounds like Uber and Lyft, they really underwent a thoughtful decision-making process.
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They consulted with the stakeholders and they made the best decision that they felt was appropriate.
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And now, you know, we all take Uber and Lyft kind of for granted, and we feel like these systems are in place.
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And of course, as you mentioned, states wrote these frameworks into law.
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What about Stavros?
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Something that's still up in the air.
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You went inside Microsoft, OpenAI, Google DeepMind, you met with some engineers, some lawyers, some ethicists.
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What did you learn there?
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Because that's really in flux in real time.
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I'm kind of tempted to start with a story again.
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Please do.
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These uh these anecdotes I think are very informative.
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So one of a uh drone counselors in a in a major company, I can't say which one, got the phone call that nobody wants.
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The Pentagon wanted to see them in uh DC.
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So they spent about a month preparing for this meeting.
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This was you know around the release of the initial release of ChatGPT.
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So everybody all of a sudden wakes up to the reality of what AI can achieve.
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And the our general counsel is concerned and trying to be you know very well prepared about this meeting.
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So they spend about a month trying to get all the pieces of the puzzle together, trying to understand the implications of the company, trying to figure out what exactly the Department of Defense might want from them.
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So they go into the meeting, and after the pleasantries, the door shut down, and the generals ask them, We have no idea what this technology can do.
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Can you please tell us?
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So then the general counsel understands that by being inside the company, they're so far ahead of where the government can go.
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And this is an advantage that they have to share.
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And then, of course, the meeting goes really well because they were very well prepared about whatever goes on.
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So what I learned is that AI moves very fast, and I don't think there's any way in which traditional regulation, as we understand it, can really keep the pace.
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So that means that we cannot have a process that looks like a compliance process because compliance comes after the fact.
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If we need an effective process for dealing with AI, we need people to sit inside the development process.
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We need people to be hand in hand with the engineers that design the model or design the processes, and we also need some sort of external layer.
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And I think that's the most important lesson, or even the most daring pieces of regulation like the AI Act in the EU, they're essentially following templates that were developed by the AI companies themselves in order to self-regulate.
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All these impact assessments, this is documentation or audit functions.
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This is the architecture of corporate ordering that I'm talking about.
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Yeah, I mean, I get that.
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You know, AI and all of tech, it's a little more nuanced and complex and sophisticated than I think most lawmakers can understand.
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So this is kind of the perfect place for corporate ordering to do its work.
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But my concern is how do you promote good deliberation?
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How do you promote a meaningful version of corporate ordering?
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Because I just find it hard to believe that any of these corporations will let like their own profit interest take a backseat to like the public good.
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I mean, look what happened with Meta with Instagram.
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And you know, they knew for years that there's harm to children, but it wasn't until a court and litigants came that they said, okay, fine.
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How do you promote good deliberation?
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How do you promote like a socially beneficial version of corporate ordering?
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Yes.
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One of my goals with this book and with this project is to make it systematic and analytical so that people can recognize when you have good deliberation and when you have bad deliberation.
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They can trace back the decision making and figure out oh, we had this outcome, the outcome at Meta, for example, that you mentioned, because all the deliberation was not there, because we lack these internal systems, because all these issues were not really brought up and discussed.
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So that I think is the key concern.
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Obviously, we cannot immediately turn every corporation into a good corporation.
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And what I'm trying to argue is that the same way, not every corporation is an evil corporation either.
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We tend to think along these pterotypes and along our biases and kind of project them into good companies and bad companies all the same.
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And what I want to argue is that no, uh, we have a way of distinguishing how good decision making works.
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And if we look at it and if we do it in a systematic and analytic way, then it will have the right outcome.
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The example that I discussed before is then one example of that.
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Let me give you another example from Microsoft.
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So Microsoft had a request from the police to use one of its AI products to do immediate facial recognition in the cameras that policemen carry.
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So that when they see you, they immediately get a report, oh, this is Amy, she's a major criminal, just arrest her right away.
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Obviously, this would have been really profitable for them.
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But they thought through the kind of the ethical issues and they said, we do not want to be associated, because this obviously could lead to racial profiling, it could lead to all sorts of other biases.
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And they decided that they do not want their products to be associated with this approach.
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So they said, no, we're gonna leave some money on the table, fully aware that another competitor, probably a smaller company that didn't care so much about these reputations, would just and grab this opportunity.
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But they were willing to leave money on the table in order to kind of defend their principles.
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And
that's kind of an important distinction to draw between companies that stand by what they decide in the beginning and companies that don't.
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Maybe we can't have a comprehensive AI law or comprehensive crypto regime.
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But is it your possession, Stavros, that we should at least incorporate this process that you call corporate ordering into law?
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Do you think that we should incorporate this rulemaking, decision-making, monitoring, trifecta into some sort of fiduciary duty scheme that the failure of a board to undergo this process will actually lead to liability?
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So I think this is kind of an important step in the whole process for me.
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And I would very much like this to see it being incorporated in regular board decision making.
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And the the only way to have it incorporated into regular decision making is through making it part of a fiduciary duty requirement.
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The idea is that if you have an issue that has clear significant social dimensions, perhaps because we have sustained stakeholder engagement, because we perhaps because we have emerging regulation, perhaps because there is a reputational incident of some magnitude, then there is an An obligation for the board to deliberate and think about its principles, think about its implementation structure, think about the monitoring system.
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And that I think is very important because by making it part of standard board decision making, we can really uh prevent some very bad decisions from the Peter B.
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But what would you say, Stavros, to people who are concerned that that might override the business judgment rule in some way?
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I would say it doesn't override the business judgment rule.
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I'd say it is the business judgment rule.
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Because that's the point of the uh business uh judgment rule to kind of protect decisions.
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It's not about the outcome.
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Like it's not about have you maybe even after this process, Uber would have decided, no, we need to report.
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Or maybe Microsoft would have decided we'll find some other way of managing the ethical, the ethical issues.
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It's not a question about what the ultimate outcome should be, it's a question about have you followed the right decision-making process so that your shareholders are comfortable with what you are doing as a board in order to protect their interests.
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So think about it.
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The whole point of being a board member is to be well informed about uh what happens in the market, what happens in your competition, what happens in your deal, what are the risks that your company is operating.
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And this is an important source of risk.
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And this is why I think it has to be a component of the business judgment role, because being well informed is kind of the essence of the business judgment rule.
00:23:39.200 --> 00:23:46.400
And also it will disappoint conservatives and progressives alike because it doesn't mandate a specific outcome.
00:23:46.640 --> 00:23:47.119
Right, right.
00:23:47.279 --> 00:23:56.559
And I mean I can actually see this making boards more willing to make tough but important decisions because at least now they have a roadmap and, like you said, the protection as long as they follow that roadmap.
00:23:56.880 --> 00:23:57.440
Exactly.
00:23:57.599 --> 00:24:04.160
Because it's otherwise the temptation to just do nothing or be very silent is, I think, huge.
00:24:04.400 --> 00:24:09.359
And I think that temptation can end up being problematic for boards.
00:24:09.519 --> 00:24:14.799
That's what we might see as the outcome of some of these uh cases against Meta, for example.
00:24:14.880 --> 00:24:18.559
Aaron Powell So all really important for boards to be paying attention to this and to your book.
00:24:18.720 --> 00:24:20.240
But what if you're not on a board?
00:24:20.400 --> 00:24:22.240
What if you're not a corporate lawyer?
00:24:22.480 --> 00:24:24.960
Why should you care about this debate in general?
00:24:25.359 --> 00:24:31.279
Well, because the decisions that we're talking about are some of the most important decisions of our lifetime.
00:24:31.440 --> 00:24:43.119
I mean, I don't even need to go to the possibility that we'll all be dead within 10 years, as Coxson just said, uh, which gives you a sense of how important, how big the stakes are.
00:24:43.279 --> 00:25:01.359
But even if you think at decisions about content moderation, decisions about teenage mental health, the decisions about biases in AI rules, decisions about safety, all these are decisions that companies make on a daily basis.
00:25:01.759 --> 00:25:10.640
These decisions affect our lives just as much anything that's decided in Congress or in the White House.
00:25:10.799 --> 00:25:18.160
But we're just not focusing on them as from the decision-making perspective, and that's what I think we should start doing more.
00:25:18.559 --> 00:25:23.599
Savros, can you give us a word on a lot of our listeners are law students or young lawyers?
00:25:23.759 --> 00:25:39.599
Um, in your conversations with Uber and Lyft and Salesforce and all the tech companies, what did you observe as the role of lawyers and what would your advice be for young lawyers who are interested in business law, but also want to make sure that they keep a you know a positive impact on society?
00:25:40.000 --> 00:25:41.599
So lawyers are the architect.
00:25:41.759 --> 00:25:43.119
That's what I understand.
00:25:43.279 --> 00:25:57.599
That in those important decisions, managers turn to lawyers just because there's no one else that is sensible and rational and kind of grounded enough to deal with a problem of social consequences.
00:25:57.839 --> 00:26:08.319
And lawyers are the key executives that rise through the ranks to be kind of the sounding board for managers in those important social decisions.
00:26:08.720 --> 00:26:19.920
But sometimes the decisions that lawyers are asked to make are decisions for which they themselves need to run a process to get to a conclusion.
00:26:20.079 --> 00:26:24.079
It's not very often a decision that the law answers really well.
00:26:24.240 --> 00:26:28.319
Because if it's a decision that the law answers really well, well then it's easy.
00:26:28.480 --> 00:26:30.160
You we all know how to read, right?
00:26:30.400 --> 00:26:37.119
But if you have to think about a controversial decision, then you have to go through this decision-making process.
00:26:37.359 --> 00:26:41.599
And you started saying, well, this to me looks a lot like governing.
00:26:42.079 --> 00:26:44.799
That's what lawyers are good at.
00:26:45.039 --> 00:26:49.920
That's what lawyers learn how to do governance.
00:26:50.400 --> 00:26:55.359
And what corporate ordering is a roadmap for good governance.
00:26:55.440 --> 00:26:58.079
And that's what I'm hoping it will contribute.
00:26:58.400 --> 00:27:05.519
Well, Stavros, your book, Corporate Ordering, How Corporations Navigate Social Conflicts, could not be coming out at a better, more important time.
00:27:05.680 --> 00:27:16.240
And I hope that everyone who has a stake in this, which as you said, is almost everyone, picks it up, especially boards, especially large companies, especially young lawyers, lawmakers.
00:27:16.400 --> 00:27:17.680
Thank you so much for your time today.
00:27:17.839 --> 00:27:18.640
Your book is fascinating.
00:27:18.880 --> 00:27:19.839
Thank you very much, Amy.
00:27:20.079 --> 00:27:23.359
I really enjoyed my time here and I hope we can discuss it.
00:27:23.599 --> 00:27:24.160
Yeah.
00:27:27.599 --> 00:27:32.960
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00:27:33.119 --> 00:27:35.839
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00:27:36.160 --> 00:27:40.720
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