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David Enoch Episode sped up ver1: The thought that what we should focus on in politics is not seeking the ultimate good but avoiding the ultimate bad. And so in this paper I claim that the ultimate bad is serious suffering. If you showed me that some other political system minimizes serious suffering, I'd go for it. But it seems to me that the kind of political system that is likely to minimize minimize serious suffering. Is going to be a broadly speaking liberal one. I think I can kind of get the intuition that when sa when nature inflicts that on me, it's a tragedy. But there's something maybe even worse when other agents inflict that on me. Why is it that cruelty is so bad? And it seems to me that any plausible story is going to go through because of the suffering it tends to create. This is the Suffering and Social Change Podcast. I'm Adriano Mannino, and our guest today is David Enoch. David is professor of philosophy at Oxford University and also at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has very wide-ranging interests across moral, political, and legal philosophy, and really doesn't need much of an introduction in philosophy circles. But yeah, since these circles tend to be pretty small, we will list a bunch of his great and influential books. and papers for you in the show notes. but today we're here to discuss one specific paper that David has recently written, titled Politics and Suffering, and also, if time allows, some related chapters, in a new book manuscript of his titled Liberalism A Battle Cry, where he defends what he calls shameless liberalism. David, thanks so much for being with us today. Thank you for having me. So Would you like to start perhaps by describing what you're all about in this politics and suffering paper, how that project came about, and yeah, what the main views and arguments are that you defend in this paper? Sure. So the the project started with me reading Judith Clark, which I had not done before. I was never referred to it in grad school or anything like that. In fact, I was referred to it first. In a very negative review of a funding proposal that I sent. This was someone who was extremely unsympathetic to analytic philosophy and to what I was writing about. And then he or she said at the end of the really negative and both unflattering and not impressive review, he he or she said, and if they're gonna do that stuff, at least they should reach Clark. So I thought I'd give it a quick, a quick try and was shocked by how. despite not being an analytic philosopher and having many flaws, how unbelievably insightful some of this some of her stuff was. And the stuff that was relevant here in the most famous paper, The Liberalism of Fear, and Putting Cruelty First, is a kind of it's sometimes called pessimism. The thought that what we should focus on in politics is not seeking the ultimate good, but avoiding the ultimate bad. This kind of negative picture, which I found immediately immediately it it it struck a chord. It was clear to me that there's something important and right about it. So this was a starting point. On the other hand, I thought that Shikla was making some important mistakes, especially in identifying what it is that was so that so was so bad, the ultimate bad, the sumumal the thing to be avoided. For her, it was about cruelty. But my thought and one that I developed in the paper is that it can't be that the worst thing is on the agent side, on the side of those performing actions, those making decisions, like cruelty. They shouldn't be looking inside and trying to avoid c avoid cruelty. Cruelty can be closely related to it, but that can't be the the ultimate the ultimate ban has to be on the receiving side of action. And so in this paper I claim that the ultimate ban is serious suffering. I try to characterize very quickly what this serious suffering Is so it's not just about, any headache that you have. It's about the kind of serious suffering that we don't find as the natural material for normal trade offs. Not the kind of stuff that say, well, it I'll be less comfortable today, I'll be more comfortable tomorrow. Not that kind of stuff, much more much more serious suffering. and I try to flesh out at least some of the details. We can we can discuss them, of course, to the extent that you want, about what would and what would not follow for politics from this kind of view. Yeah, but the main insight, I I I remember for instance, Schlau ridiculing in another in another text, I think, some some communitarians for their hyper optimistic, perhaps naive views of the world and polities and communities. And she uses the phrase and they seem to be residing on the sunny side of the street. So that was my feeling about so much of political philosophy. It was doing ideal theory, it was sort of aiming for the stars. But that's not what that's not what we should do when we're doing politics. We should try to Try to minimize serious suffering. Yeah. So as you said, you argue that serious suffering is in a sense the the sumum malum, the ultimate bad, at least when it comes to politics. and you make some really strong claims, right? You've alluded to them. I think you you say rather explicitly that in politics we should be concerned with minimizing serious suffering as best we can at the expense of potentially literally all else. So I think you say, quote, whatever it takes, we should do. to try and minimize serious suffering. Now, I take it your view is not that other things such as autonomy, liberty, equality, and so on, don't matter. Rather you believe that some other things matter a lot, but serious suffering, at least in aggregate and in politics, where the respective stakes tend to be really high, tends to outweigh and perhaps vastly outweigh those those other things. Is that true? Yes, it's exactly right. The kind of thought that I find both attractive beyond the ability to res it really is irresistible, but also extremely dangerous in some
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other ways, which we'll talk about in a second, is the thought that is perhaps best put in sort of direct trade-off terms. So let's let me it's I'm gonna use a bit of a caricature, but still, okay. So many of us think that states should support the arts and the academia and indeed philosophy. That's nice. And we, if need be, we can come up with arguments that will make it plausible. But what if the state can prevent serious suffering from one person watching a loved one die in pain, or a young person dying of a disease or whatever, right? You can feel in the details. So, how many good articles in philosophy are worth how many of those? Like serious suffering? And then it just seems that at least at this point when we're doing direct comparisons. It's just ridiculous on its face. Saving one child from a horrible death and one parent from watching their child dying a horrible death is just orders of magnitude more important than any contribution to any philosophy department. And other things as well. Now this is about philosophy, it's not about, say, human rights. We should talk about them as well. and there I will qualify the claim to an extent. But the thought is that if you don't feel, at least in such directly comparative context, the strength of the consideration having to do with serious suffering, you've never experienced serious suffering, you've never cared about anyone who does, and your imaginative abilities leave something to be desired. Yeah. And could you maybe elaborate a bit on the sort of political restriction that you seem to place on your claim? So why is it that in politics rather than other areas, the stakes involved in terms of serious suffering? in your view, tend to be extremely high. Isn't it, for instance, you know, also the case that many political decisions are rather small scale, administrative, and so on. If we include many of the decisions that judges have to make, for instance, there it also just seems quite intuitively inappropriate that they should basically only be looking out for suffering and so forth. Aaron Powell So these are these are importantly different cases actually. I am perfectly willing to concede that there are going to be some political decisions that are sufficiently low stakes so that this doesn't doesn't come into play. But I don't think that there are that many of them. And anyway, I think that the even if my claim is only true of others, it's already sufficiently strong and radical. So that I don't think is that threatening. Judges is a different case. And ethics is a different case. So let's talk a bit about both. So you started by asking why do I restrict it to politics? What about the ethics in general? There used to be this claim, I think it was called negative utilitarianism. of people who thought that not just in politics but in general when it comes to deciding what we should do, pain or maybe suffering should get absolute priority over pleasure or over hedonic pluses, right? So it's minimizing the hedonic minuses. That's what gets absolute priority. and I see the appeal of this view. for instance, when I teach utilitarianism, I always start with the negative side. It's much easier to get people on board The thought that pain is bad, that more of it is worse and that we should try to minimize it, than the thought that pleasure is good, that more of it is better, and that we should try to maximize it. But that's more about presentation than about than about substance. If you take negative utilitarianism seriously, you reach some unacceptable conclusions. One of them is called something like the world destruction argument or something like this, right? If you t I mean, the the one assured way of minimizing suffering is making sure that no creature that can experience suffering exists. But I'm not sure I'm happy to say that this would be an improvement. compared to what we have now. The natural thing to say is yes, but you would also lose all the good stuff. Except that if you're a negative utilitarian, the good stuff can never outweigh the bad stuff, right? So so that's why this view as a general moral view seems to me to be unacceptable. In terms of the good stuff, what would these things be? Does this bring us back to what you call the the liberal fundamentals in your book manuscript or or mostly positive well being, which I guess is part of those fundamentals. Maybe you could elaborate on those briefly as well so we have them on on the table too? Good. I I I will in a second. But but there's again, I I want to distinguish between these contexts. So in a general moral context, it w what the good stuff is will depend on your general moral theory. So if you're a hedonist, they're just gonna be positive hedonic states like maybe pleasures or or maybe happiness or maybe desirous satisfaction or something something like this. but you're right that we're not in principle limited. We can we're not constrained by anything along these lines and we can think that other things are intrinsically of value. Maybe you think that taking part in close intimate relationships, that's of value. And not just in virtue of the pleasures it allows or the suffering that it it alleviates. Sure. I do think that but the question is is this enough to offset the negative weight? of some serious suffering and negative utilitarians will say no, nothing is. There's not regardless of your view of the positive stuff, nothing in the positive stuff can outweigh the negative stuff. And again, this I think is a view that is highly problematic. When it comes to politics, those things are different, partly because the stakes are high, as you as you implied. And there is what I think that's not in this paper, but in the book that you were kind enough to mention, where I think that A liberal or liberalism is to a large extent defined by its concern with the following things that I call the liberal fundamentals. Well being being one, of course, and there's, some room
to maneuver about what exactly the conception of well being is, but yes, it is a part of the state's business how well people's lives are going. So that's one significant point. And the others are, and they're not gonna be huge surprises, nor should there be at this stage, a conception of liberty, a conception of autonomy, and a conception of equality. These are I think our the starting point for liberalism as a political as a political philosophy. They needn't be the ultimate moral starting point. So you may think that all of them are based in some way on some fancy version of utilitarianism or consequential or a better version of consequentialism or in some other view entirely. And all of that is still still remains to be seen. That depends on on further details. I do want to come back if it's okay with you to the point about judges. Because judges are, I think, an interesting case. and this is going to be one of the political restrictions on this thought, on the no matter what thought, the thought that we should minimize suffering no matter what. Because I take it it's a well-known fact about politics and about many other things, that we want to distinguish between, as it were, what ultimately matters and the considerations that we want to be operative inside the system. So there's a famous paper by Rawls before he became Rawls, right? Before the Theory of Justice, two concepts of rules. In which he describes how, say, when you are playing baseball, it's okay for Major League Baseball, the corporation that runs all of it, to shape the rules of the game partly with an eye to popularity or to TV attractiveness or something like that. That's fine. But if you're an umpire at the home plate and you do you call balls and strikes, Americans will know what it means. Those who are not, perhaps will not, it doesn't mat much matter. It's just whether the ball of the pitcher pitched was in this imaginary rectangle, in the right location for the batter hit it. Doesn't matter. so if you're an umpire calling balls and strikes, then it does not make sense for you to think in terms of what will make the game more popular for the those watching it on TV. Within the game, you should just consider whatever it is, where the height of the belt, the height of the knee, whatever it's something like that. Not Anything else. Despite the fact that it's perfectly okay to shape the whole game, partly with considerations of popularity or whatever. So I'm I'm talking about something analogous. I am happy to think about serious suffering as trumping pretty much everything, pretty much all the time, at the level of what what matters. But that doesn't mean that I want my officials and my politicians and my decision makers and my judges to think in those terms. Whether I want them to think in those terms will depend on whether having them thinking in those terms will in fact minimize serious suffering. And this is not not an obvious question to answer at all. It's partly empirical. But even the parts that are not empirical are very, very complicated. So there's room for the following view. I think it's my view, at least tentatively. It's a view that says that if you showed me that some other political system minimizes serious suffering, I'd go for it. But it seems to me that the kind of political system that is likely to minimize minimize serious suffering is going to be a broadly speaking liberal one, with all of the agents within the system being primarily motivated by these four liberal fundamentals. So that's why I go for a two-tiered view. Yeah. So as you just mentioned, you make a case in your manuscript for for those four liberal fundamentals, well-being, where I guess an aversion to suffering is one component. liberty, autonomy and equality. And now I'd guess that many of your of of our fellow liberals would perhaps object that it's not clear to them why certain liberties or autonomy, also understood sort of in a in a in a positive sense, not just in the sense of maybe non non invasion, why that should necessarily be less important than a concern for suffering. especially when when it also may affect very many people, as I think you would admit, is is also usually the case in politics. So I think in your paper you discuss a possible trade-off between restricting, infringing on many free speech rights, right? And you know, like maybe we could even like in order to reduce suffering, serious suffering, and maybe we could sort of sharpen up sort of that potential case and objection and imagine that sort of even more important individual freedoms would be curtailed or very heavily restricted in order to better reduce suffering. And yeah, so is there something to this, I guess, also very liberal thought that perhaps there's rights at play here, and then of course we need to talk about how they may or may not aggregate. But even setting rights aside, maybe certain freedoms and certainly autonomy can also be thought of as a kind of good. that individual lives can have or lack, whether or not we conceptually and terminologically file it under well-being. And then isn't it also plausible that these individual stakes might similarly add up, might aggregate, in a manner quite similar and comparable with how individual suffering stakes aggregate. And then if it is indeed the case empirically that the stakes are large, not just in terms of well-being or its suffering component, but maybe in terms of all of the liberal fundamentals, Why is it obvious that your that your claim is is correct? Okay. So a lot's going on there. Let me make three points. One about the distinction between intra and interpersonal consideration, another about the ontological constraints, and another about aggregation. Okay, so let's see if we can go through through all of those. so one when we one thing we can ask is intrapersonally in the life of a single person, what counts for more? and that is an important question. we do such trade-offs all
the time, right? You go to the dentist, it means that you're happy to sacrifice, is it where your comfort this afternoon in order to achieve some more of it later on, right? That's fine. And maybe you accept a job that is not ideal in some respects, but that gives you some more money that will allow you to better take care of your kids or have more fun next summer or something like that. And all that's all of that's fine. So the question here is does serious suffering in a single life necessarily crowd the plate? Does it necessarily outweigh all other considerations. I'm not sure about this. I'm not sure that rights are the best thing either, because typically when we ask about how well a life is going, especially in the intrapersonal case, I I don't know that rights have a role to play there. Rights are more about restricting the behavior of others than about the well being of a specific person. But yes, we can we can ask this. We know that people who have undergone serious suffering will sometimes still have a valuable life, as they will themselves testify. So I'm not sure I'm not sure what to say about this. It still seems to me that if you are at the point of decision, right? Suppose you had to decide whether to undergo some serious suffering and also have your most recent paper accepted by an excellent journal, or avoid both, then it seems to me that there has to be some very fancy instrumental story for you to to justify you in choosing the paper, right? Okay, what if it's maybe maybe it's about producing serious suffering. Exactly that okay, that can be true too. The whole system, well, actually it's important. Unless you are extremely neurotic about it, what it produces is some discomfort. It's not serious suffering. But yeah, I'm sorry, I didn't mean to ruin the joke. I just meant that it's important not to give the wrong impression about the kind of serious suffering we're talking about. so yeah, so I'm not sure what exactly to say about about the intrapersonal but the interpersonal case is different, right? And in the interpersonal case the question is, to what extent, for instance, is it Okay for me to help you on your paper when I could instead prevent some serious suffering befalling someone else. And this seems clear to me somehow, maybe partly because of the aggregation case, that nothing can justify that. Or I don't know if nothing. If not nothing, then very close to nothing. Okay. So that's the thing about the intra and the interpersonal. Of course, when we're doing politics, the intra person, the the interpersonal case, the case as between different people becomes obviously and immediately relevant. Okay. So that was one point. Second point is about deontological constraint. So this is the term we use for moral rules that apply to action that forbid some kinds of actions. And that they do it in a typic typically in a non-consequentialist way. So these will be things that you're not supposed to do, even if they maximize utility.
So some of us believe that there's a deontological constraint against lying. All right. If you believe that, you think that merely showing that some lie will maximize its utility or Bring about the best consequences, that in itself does not suffice to justify telling the lie. And we like to we like to divide deontologists into absolute and moderate deontologists. Absolute deontologists believe about some deontological constraints that they should not be violated no matter what. Whereas deontological, sorry, moderate deontologists believe that deontological constraint should not be violated. Most of the time, and it's true that merely showing that more good will happen in the world if you violate does not justify violation, but are open to the possibility of exceptions, typically fairly rare exceptions. If all hell will break loose, then lie. But it will require some fairly extreme results. The crucial point I think here, both about politics and about serious suffering, is that even if you accept deontological constraints, as long as you accept only moderate deontological constraints, those that come with thresholds such that above the threshold it's okay to infringe on them, then deontological constraints to a large extent drop out of the picture of politics. Just because the stakes are so high. So you're saying something like, you know, in your own life, don't lie Just because it will make something nicer, whatever. Okay. But if it's to save the life of an innocent, okay, go ahead and lie. But so many political decisions are at the scale of saving the lives of innocents. So constraint against lying doesn't apply. Or it's not sorry, it's not it doesn't apply. It it applies in a way that is isolated from its influence on action by by the fact that it we are past the threshold, right? And I think that that's the case almost always in politics when serious suffering is in. And this this this of course has immediate implications to the kind of case to the kind of cases you describe. So sure, we have all these rights, that's fine. But if you are in a position of a decision maker and you can minimize serious suffering, it tr it it it just it's just more important, right? So that's so that's important. And lastly, and that's the point about aggregation, which I mentioned in the paper in a very tentative way, and I'm still not sure what I think about it. It seems to me that I was on to something interesting, but probably can't be defended exactly in this way. And it's not I wasn't able to make pro maybe you guys will help me with that. and that's the thought that aggregation behaves differently in these different areas. So that when we're talking about serious suffering in and and what I mean by this is primarily interpersonal aggregation. So aggregation across people, across different people. when it comes to serious suffering, it seems to me that we can easily aggregate a situation in which one person suffers tremendously, Or situation in which two people suffer tremendously, it seems to me clear that the second situation is worse than the first. And furthermore, that it's worse than the first. I can maybe I can even put cardinal values on it, or at least approximate cardinal values on it. And the more people suffer, the worse, right? So that that seems to me very clear that to give a full account of this aggregation may be hard, but the fact that there is this aggregation seems to me hard to deny. On the other hand, when it comes to some of these other things, say a right to free speech, uh-huh. I don't know that aggregation is as straightforward, right? So suppose the regime decides to restrict the speech of some people, and then you know we add another person to the set of people whose free speech is restricted. Is it worse? and is it worse, you know, by the same kind of margin, right? If you ask me the same about serious suffering, my answer is very clear. If in some pol in some state, There's a group of people who suffer tremendously, and you add one more person to that group, you've done very serious harm. roughly proportionally. It doesn't feel to me to be working the same. If it's true that aggregation is more straightforward when it comes to serious suffering than it comes to some some of these other things, that means that as the numbers rise, it is much more likely for the suffering to to outweigh other considerations. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, I I see this. if we think in terms of Deontological side constraints or rights, then maybe it's it's not obvious how and if if those aggregate. But I wonder if the sort of the potential challenge here could be could be restated, sort of in terms of non-well-being related interests or claims that people may have. So I think in in political history, both domestically and internationally, a preference for you know accepting a lot of very serious suffering and death. Perhaps in in warfare, a preference for accepting that over being subjugated to the rulers of another nation or being enslaved or similar, I think has been quite common. and or take what's currently going on in in Ukraine, say. The Ukrainians, it seems, or it would be in the Ukrainians' power to just end all of the suffering that's going on by accepting a form of subjugation. And I certainly get a a kind of intuition that says, look, what's at stake here from the point of view of of other liberal fundamentals is something like individual freedoms or maybe interests and claims against inferiority or something similar. And if I think of those sort of other individual stakes as individual interests or claims, then I'm no longer sure. That I have fundamental doubts about how and whether those aggregate, right? So I guess two questions. Yeah. One is will you agree that empirically, I guess we have often seen and we see sort of a preference to accept very serious suffering and also death in order to avoid, say, forms of of subjugation or or preserve freedoms, ones that are maybe more important
than than free speech. And second, what are your thoughts on sort of maybe reframing or framing what's at stake? in terms of the other liberal fundamentals also in terms of something like individual interests or maybe claims that would then maybe aggregate similarly. Good. I I think that examples are tricky in several ways. So here's one sort of and and I'll use the Ukraine example, although somewhat speculatively I don't I'm not an expert on the facts, obviously. Yeah but first You put together serious suffering and death, and I would like to keep them apart. I see the point of give me freedom or give me death stuff. to an extent. a way one way of sort of making theoretical sense of it is would be to say that the f an unfree life is not worth living, or a specific unfree life is not worth living. And I can sort of see that. How how how about the following slogan though? Give me freedom or give me t or give me torture. Or give me freedom of give me torture for my kids. I don't think it's the same. I'm not sure I can defend it theoretically, but certainly intuitively speaking, I don't think it's the same. So that's one thing. The other is that of course subjugation may have instrumental effects, including ones in terms of serious suffering. If you expect being subjugated to Putin's Russia to in itself be translated, you know, in a very foreseeable future. To some other horrible results, then of course you should take that into account. But there is also the following extremely troubling thought about the case of the Ukraine. So it's possible that this decision by many to pursue freedom at all costs, it's possible that that decision is irrational. So hold constant now that the bad instrumental effects of defeat to Russia, or indeed of just not even starting the war. Let's assume that they would not be as bad in terms of serious suffering as the effects of the war. Or at least as the effects of the war on the Ukrainian side. This raises other issues, but okay. Now, suppose also that at the time of the beginning of the hostilities, people on the Ukrainian side knew that. What should they have done? So the mere fact that we act in some ways, of course, doesn't show that that's the right way to act. It may sometimes show some things about our deep value commitments, and that's important. The depressing thought, though, is that while we've seen unbelievable heroism on the Ukrainian side, we've also seen other things on the Ukrainian side. But while we've seen all of that, it's not impossible that they should have given up on day one. That that was the rational thing to do. Again. I'm not judging anyone, of course, Monday Monday morning quarterbacking is not ideal in this way, but had they known what we now know about how long it will take and what the prices will be and so on, I don't know what the rational thing to do was. Doesn't seem obvious to me at all. As to the thought that perhaps some of these other considerations are more easily aggregated so
as to neutralize what I call the speculative argument from the paper, this is an interesting question. I'm I'm not sure what I think about it, pardon me because as I said, I'm not sure about this argument to begin with. But Do we feel does it does it matter how many people are in uk in Ukraine under the scenario in which they're subjugated? My intuition says yes, I think. Yeah. But in the same way, so they're they're supposed they're ten million, suppose they're ten million and one. Does this make the same kind of difference as intuitively we think it makes if ten ten million peop ten million people suffer terribly or if ten million and one people suffer terribly? So I'm not saying that it doesn't aggregate. I'm saying that it doesn't aggregate as quickly or as straightforwardly. But I'm but I'm really not confident about that. Yeah, that makes sense. I wonder if there's a bit of a tension then here between the the individualism that you argue for and defend in your book, right? So correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you'd say that all of the four liberal fundamentals can ultimately be cashed out in a individualistic way. And yeah, if I got you right in the book, you basically oppose collectivist readings of of any of the four fundamentals. Now if claims against inferiority or maybe even non non-inferiority, say non-subjugation as a more collective good. If if that sort of good or those stakes behave very differently, doesn't that suggest that maybe what's at stake in terms of the respective liberal fundamental, which I guess in this case would mostly be some form of social equality, that maybe we'd have to go for a kind of non purely individualistic interpretation there? So I think there's something you said about characterizing my view in the book that is correct, but also it may give rise to a false impression. The correct thing is that I think that the things that ultimately matter are individuals. So for instance, the value of autonomy, the value of shaping one's life on one's own terms, with one's own decisions, and so on. That value applies to individual autonomy. So it's about me doing it and you doing that and someone else doing that. we may talk about the significance of community autonomy, but that's going to be much further down the road. It's not one intrinsic. Yes, there's a sense in which ultimately the fundamentals are about individual liberty, individual well-being, individual autonomy, and equality between individuals. Sure. But and this is crucial for me, this still allows extremely significant room for collectivist considerations. for instance, a huge and important room for the significance of communities. Not because I think, like perhaps some communitarians, that communities matter in themselves. So Whether you prosper, that is important in itself. Whether your community prospers is not important in itself, but it can be extremely important because it's relevant to whether you prosper. The way our lives go, often we are parts of communities. We are it's important for us how communities do. the communities of which we are a part form a large part of our options from which we can then choose more or less autonomously. Or if your community prospers and mine doesn't, this may have strong effects on equality, and so on. So While you're right at the ultimate level, I am an individualist. This leaves a lot of room for the significance of non-individualist considerations, just not ultimately. And I think this is also the way of dealing with these kinds of places where it seems that collectives matter intuitively. The way to un the thing to understand is that they matter, but they matter in virtue of something about individual stuff mattering. Yes. And so yeah, so you'd say that of autonomy. As well as the other liberal fundamentals. And there you'd still be skeptical that individual autonomy stakes aggregate in a manner similar to individual suffering stakes. So if if two people see their autonomy severely restricted, that's not necessarily twice as bad. whereas in the case of suffering it is. That is a tougher case for me, I think. I'm not sure what they think about it. I I my inclination is to say I'm going to defer that question to the intrapersonal level. So the question now is how in the theory of well being are you trading off? Just how well my life goes. How are you going to be trading off questions about my autonomy with questions about say suffering and other hedonic states and maybe other things entirely? So I'm I'm open to that, to that possibility. And then the political interpersonal thing is going to fall out of that. But but you're right that the autonomy case poses a greater challenge to the segregation point than say political rights. Yeah. Yeah. I thought that might be perhaps another way to try and make the case for Judith Klar's framing that it's all about cruelty. I'm ultimately skeptical about this, but I think I broadly agree with what you say about deontological constraints and rights. So basically if the aversion to cruelty were about that, then I don't really think I could steal man her view. But yeah, if it's about say, you know, individual interests, and maybe they are well-being relevant as well, individual interests not to be say actively tortured as opposed to tortured by nature. So maybe if I'm being tortured by another agent, that's sort of the ultimate and ultimately unbearable form of subjugation or something along those lines. Again, I'm I'm just trying my best to steal Manher's side here. not sure I would ultimately, especially when I'm in the state of suffering unbearably, care about the cause, right? I take it that's that will be one leading response. But I think I can kind of get the intuition that when sa when nature inflicts that on me, it's a tragedy and like incredibly bad and should be a huge priority to avoid that prudent. And morally and politically. But there's something maybe even worse when other agents inflict that on
me. I'm willing to admit that there is something worse, but not in the relevant way, I think. So so w one thing to do here would be to f to insist on what is explanatorily more basic. Why is it that cruelty is so bad? And it seems to me that any plausible story is going to go through. Because of the suffering it tends to create or wants to create or intends to create or something like that. So suffering I think is just prior explanatorily. Sorry, that the badness of suffering is is prior explanatorily to that of to that of cruelty. That's a part of the point that I hinted at earlier on, namely that surely what matters here is something on the receiving the receiving end of action rather than on the agent side. So that's one thing. And the other is just to think about to think about examples. So suppose that Someone you love is going to undergo serious suffering. And suppose you can choose now whether this serious suffering will will have been caused by cruelties or by some natural disaster. And assume for now that if it's caused by the natural disaster, the suffering is going to be worse. That the suffering itself, it's going to be more painful. And the question my question to you is: how much more painful should it be? like what's what's the what's the highest value of the difference in how painful it is that you should tolerate it just so just in order for it to be created by nature rather than by cruelty. And my answer of course is zero. If you really love that person, you want them to suffer the least and that's it. Nothing else enters the picture. and I think what this example shows to an extent, but is even clearer in politics, is that the distinction, of course, this comes up in other parts of political philosophy, the distinction between stuff that is natural and stuff that is, say, political is at the very least suspicious and there are borderline cases and so on. So with regard to many natural disasters, you can't say that it was cruelty that caused them. But politics is relevant because the state could have, I don't know, built houses better or made sure that the emergency services are better equipped. Or and so on, right? You can add you can add whatever you want. So and this is I think a point that I make in the paper. It's not as if the only way in which politics is relevant through serious suffering is if the serious suffering is caused by cruelty, it can be relevant because of Potential to alleviate suffering or or other related things. Yeah. Yeah, no, I think that's that's quite hard to resist. I guess another way then to challenge this picture, even if it seems sort of from first principles quite appealing and hard to resist is in terms of the very radical implications that it may have, right? So if you're right, then concern with political cruelty, say, is to a first approximation just instrumental. as is maybe everything or almost everything else when we compare it to the incredibly high stakes in terms of serious suffering. And while reading your paper, I was wondering whether you're maybe not sort of downplaying, if I may play devil's advocate here, the extent to which the implications falling out of your picture may be quite quite radical. So I think you have one footnote where you say that you're trying to remain neutral for the purposes of your paper on the boundary problem. So sort of what's the appropriate scope of political care. So for instance, might this overriding imperative to minimize serious suffering primarily or exclusively apply in one's own nation state, right? And and not sort of globally in a in a fully impartial manner. But one immediate tension here is with the the basic equality that you endorse as part of the liberal fundamental of of equality. I guess it's maybe also built into yeah, the way in which you propose to care about about well-being, everyone's well being as an individual that ultimately matters equally, counts. And so it seems to me that that prima facie, if it's all about reducing serious suffering, the nation state and any partiality to it should also be to a first approximation of instrumental significance at best, just like concern with minimizing cruelty say. And so don't you at least sort of by default face a potential implications, face face potential implications, such as that, you know, politics should perhaps to a first approximation be yeah, about reducing suffering worldwide as best we can. And then we can ask empirically, what are the most serious and widespread sources of suffering? And then maybe, what will fall out of that is something like, yeah, specific, say, health related interventions in in global development aid and cooperation or something along those lines. And then yes, maybe you have to do whatever it takes to acquire power in your rich Western maybe nation state. but actually what you should be up to is just trying to redirect resources towards solving, this global global health problem, say, that's causing enormous suffering. okay. So so lots of things. First of all, just a a correction that I think is important theoretically, but not practically. I don't think that all other things are only significant instrumentally. So I'm I'm actually quite a pluralist about which things matter intrinsically. And I'm open to the possibility that say cruelty does matter intrinsically. It's worse. The world is in a worse stage. Yeah. Worse state, sorry. If there's cruelty in it than if there isn't. I'm I'm open to that thought. yeah, I didn't mean to I didn't mean to deny that. Right. Right. It's just that because of the trade-offs and because suffering will crowd the plate, it will tend to be important in a very practically impotent way. Okay. So that's why I said it does seem to matter theoretically, but not not practically. Okay. So that's one point. About the kind of boundary problems, I should say when you started talking about boundaries, I thought you were going to ask about animals. And I feel more nervous
about that question than about the boundary between states. We can get to that too. But about the boundary between states, I think you you drew together two things that are best distinguished. One is whether everyone's serious suffering counts, and the other is whether it counts equally, or whether we're going for global impartiality. So forget states for a second. Let's talk about parents. It seems to me that there is no inconsistency in thinking. That all children's serious suffering counts and indeed crisis plate and so on, but also that I have both a special duty and a special privilege to give more weight to my children's serious suffering or potential serious suffering than to yours. There's I'm going to insist that there's no contradiction, and I'm going to suggest that there isn't even attention. It's one thing, I mean, what what would be very weird is if I thought that the serious suffering of my children matters. your children suffer in a similar way. But that somehow miraculously that doesn't matter. But the thought that it should carry the same weight with me, that is a further claim. And it depends on what we have in general to say about partiality and impartiality. And in the parents' case I know where I stand. So in the parents' case it seems very clear to me that it's okay for you to give greater weight to your children well being than to mine. And that applies to serious suffering as well. It doesn't mean that you deny either the reality or the moral significance of other of other people's children. But it's consistent with saying, yes, but there is something say about the parent-child relationship or about the family or about some other things here, perhaps themselves justified in indirect consequentialist terms, perhaps not, that makes it the case that it's okay for me to prioritize my own children. Now the question of course To a limited extent, right? To a limited extent. That's right. Yeah. That's right. although in the children case, to a limited but significant extent. Right? So the way people sometimes put it in the Distributive justice literature is, I have a duty to read a bedtime story to my children, but not to your children. Well, suppose that your children are bedtime story deprived, so that the marginal value of reading a bedtime story to your children is higher than reading to mine. By how much should it be higher? To make it the case that I should not read to my children but to yours. And I mean, to the extent that we can even ask or answer the question with a straight face, it's going to be a very high value. So it's not like by a factor of two, right? It's it's going to be something. Much more significant than that. Okay, it's not a coincidence that I shifted to talking about the parent-child relationship because it's like the kind of partiality most of us are most happy with. When it comes to nations and states, I am much more worried. I just want to note that it's a different topic. So you may think that while ever the thought that serious suffering counts globally is extremely plausible. The thought that it should count equally. For all states, regardless of whether the serious suffering occurs in their citizens or others, that thought is a further step. And I'm not sure what I think about it. In the parent-child case, I know. I reject it. I go for partiality. If you have a moral theory that does not accommodate this kind of parent-child partiality, your moral theory is out. I don't need more I don't need more to be convinced of that. But in the case of the nation, the nation state, I am much It's much less clear to me. I suspect that I I will accept partiality if but only if it has some instrumental payoffs. And furthermore, if it has instrumental payoffs, judge it imparti impartially. So it's it it's the mere fact that say Israelis will do better if Israel prioritizes them over others, that's not good enough. I have to see that the general system in which nations prioritize their their own is overall beneficial. Whether that's the case, by the way, that's a good question. I'm not sure. With parent with parents, I think it is the the this way, at least in my many cases. And if it's not, I still go for partiality. But in the nation case it's going to depend on such on such on such instrumental considerations for me. Yeah and indeed you foreshadowed it. yeah my my next question is gonna be is what about non-human beings? non-human animals in particular. there it also seemed to me that if the concern is just with serious suffering intrinsically, and we agree, as we should, I think, that many non-human animals are at least very likely, and maybe many more are non-trivially likely to be able to experience serious suffering as well. And if we accept, which I think is just a a straightforward empirical fact, that they vastly outnumber us, Yeah, do we face a potential implication along the lines of, politics should perhaps to a first approximation be animal politics, as it were, or politics on behalf of the animals? And here again it's I think you've partly answered that. I think my broader concern was just whatever other principles you use to sort of erect a kind of boundary around this overriding within the boundary, overriding imperative to minimize suffering. Why isn't that kind of bound that boundary overwhelmed by suffering stakes impartially considered as well? So I think I while obviously intuitively I'm very much on board with what you just said about parenthood and partiality there, I still wonder whether there is not a tension in your view here. So if you if you're not an absolutist about anything, including partiality in that domain, then you at least could face empirical circumstances where, all the money that you're pouring into your children's lives, which I suppose must be at least a couple hundred K, at least that that tends to be the norm in in in rich countries. I think if you look at the empirical data about what you could achieve
globally to save the children from extremely serious suffering, it's quite a lot. It might actually be an order of magnitude difference, so way more than just a factor of two. And so I think, yeah, I I still retain some doubts there. I think even stronger doubts, obviously, for for national partiality. And then yeah, as just mentioned, speciesism, I think you also use the the label humanism for the kind of view that you defend, sort of this concern with, yeah, in the first instance, serious human suffering. And then I think you sort of cite Schklar in a in a slightly adapted way by saying this kind of humanism is monogamously and faithfully married, you at least hope. To all of the liberal fundamentals. But yeah, just serious suffering, say, within our nation state, as you argue, can maybe outweigh concern with autonomy, liberty, equality. why isn't the same the case for for the human boundary? Like maybe there are protonto reasons to favor humans or humanity, although then maybe I guess we have to talk about individualism versus collectivism and and other things. again. But maybe there are like really quite weighty pro tanto reasons. that should lead us to favor humanity, but why can't those similarly just be overwhelmed, vastly outweighed by suffering? Definitely, definitely nervous about that and I'm not sure what I want to say, but here are a couple of things that that can be said. I mean sorry, let me first strengthen your point. The stuff about partiality cannot possibly do work here. the thought that we should be partial to our own species seems to me indefensible intrinsically and instrumentally entirely implausible. the thought that nation states still overall do good, that the fact that they can privilege their own overall does good, that at least has some plausibility to it. The thought that us privileg privileging ourselves, our species, does overall good is entirely implausible. I mean perhaps because there just there's such a huge imbalance of power. that that it's it's just entirely implausible. So in this respect your point is even even stronger. yeah. Okay. so here are two things that can be I think said here, but again I'm not I'm not sure about any of that. Notice that for me it's about serious suffering. It's not about pain. Pain itself, I think, is the stuff of trade-offs. Even fairly serious pain is the stuff of trade-offs. So you can say, you know, I understand that I will suffer this pain now, but it will allow me to be more focused on my paper later on, so I won't take a painkiller. And that can make perfect sense. Not always, of course, but sometimes it does. There's no there's no mistake there. So if we're just talking about pain. While it counts in animals as well, it is not the stuff that just crowds the plate, but that is beyond trade-offs. and you said something like, Well, surely we'll agree that pains that many animals experience serious suffering. And I I want to at least doubt to an extent this surely. What is clearly true, what I cannot see for the life of me how anyone would deny, is that they experience pain. And furthermore that their their pain matters. But if it's pain and not more serious suffering, then sorry, not serious suffering, then their pain is the stuff of trade-offs. It still means that we treat them poorly in horrible ways. But it it i if this line of thought can be defended, then it will block the inference to we should just minimize the pain of insects or whatever that crowds everything. That is important. I want to highlight the kind of a theoretical theoretical worry here, and that's the the thought that or not worries, sorry, liability. in my paper I don't put forward a theory of what serious suffering comes to. I say something like, you know it when you see it, or when you feel it, or when you see someone you love feel it, or something like that. and at least for most of my purposes in the paper, I think that's okay. But if you want to avoid this line about animals, By relying, say, on the distinction between mere pain and serious suffering, then it ceases to be okay. At this point, I probably need a substantive theory of serious suffering such that it's not plausible to think that insects experience it, maybe even chickens, maybe even cows. Right? and that is that seems to me like probably the way to go. I don't know how significant it will be because for instance, I don't know. Horrible stories about how cows behave when you take away their calf seems to indicate something, I don't know if it's something very close to serious suffering, not to mere pain. We know that at least many mammals mourn other loved ones, children, sometimes friends. So it's not as if nothing can be said here, but still I think that and there there is this liability. Okay, so what do you mean by serious suffering other than the examples? Such that it would make it plausible and not ad hoc to say that at least a vast majority of non-human animals, while they clearly experience pain and what we should try to minimize it, don't experience a kind of untrade-offable, serious suffering. I think this is the line I would like I would like to take on this, but to say that I'm not confident is going to be an understatement. Interesting. Yeah. And I guess finally, another population that sort of may include an overwhelming amount of expected suffering, I suppose, is future generations. And I think you also have a footnote very briefly arguing that the case you make should be confined to the real suffering quote of real existing people. And that therefore we can set the complications and intricacies of population ethics aside, including the non-identity problem and so forth. For the purposes of this paper and this right, yes. and I'm not sure I agree And this is another way in which the case you build in that paper might have more radical implications than you acknowledge. because I think most, perhaps all theorists in population ethics believe that creating new
beings that then suffer, especially knowingly so, is extremely bad, and that sort of their suffering is maybe morally on a par with the suffering of people who already exist and whom we can help. What's a lot more controversial is whether we should think similarly about the importance of the potential happiness of those who don't yet exist and whose existence depends on our choices, right? That's a lot more controversial. And hence most theories theorists have endorsed what is known as the asymmetry, which roughly says that we have very strong reasons to avoid creating lives that will be marked by severe suffering or even just net negative lives in terms of well-being and maybe other things that matter. Whereas we don't necessarily have strong reasons or or any reasons at all to bring into existence new happy lives or lives that are that are that are good in other ways. And I think if we take that on board, which certainly seems to me very I mean we may even deny the asymmetry. So just if we take on board the the first part, which is that we have reasons to avoid sort of creating suffering, especially serious suffering within new lives. And maybe those reasons are similar in strength to the reasons we have to avoid causing suffering to pre-existing people or to relieve and reduce and prevent their suffering. Then I think you probably, as far as I can see, can't really maintain the view that you can set population ethics and population policy aside. But yeah, I'm curious about your your thoughts here. Aaron Powell No, I'm generally not not sure about many of these things. I do think that it's okay to Discuss some things without discussing everything. But and I think that there is a plausible case to be made that when we're doing politics, real-world politics, it's okay to neglect at least some of the more abstract theoretical problems. That doesn't mean that it's okay to neglect future generations, which I think we should know. but I think things here will depend on other so you talk about future people. I would Distinguish as many in the literature. I should I'm not up to speed on all of that literature, but still. I would distinguish between future people and possible people. so when you're talking about future people, you may talk about the set of people who will exist a hundred years from now, whomever they happen to be. Or you may talk about this guy and that guy and this other guy, right? The set of those. so you may, as it were, characterize them de dicto under this description, whomever they may be, or they're as sort of picking up the specific people. i I think it's much more natural to suppose that the well being of future people matters than it does that the well being of possible people matters. that's important partly because as because of the non-identity problem, many of the people we can talk about are only you know, these are possible we don't know we can't identify them dire because who will exist will depend on whatever. We can
identify them as the group of people who will exist. But it's not clear to me that you want to that the same moral status applies to them. I think this comes up often in the effective altruism literature, and so on. When you're talking about the specific person who will exist, so a future, not merely possible person, then I find both the thought that their serious suffering matters greatly and the asymmetry thought highly plausible. Yes. I see. But yeah, I think I as you may have just hinted, there are designators. of future people available to us along the lines of those who will in fact experience serious suffering if we make procreative choices XYZ, right? And it seems to me that this has to be good enough because otherwise we face implications like like so suppose you were to like, you know, perversely try and create a kind of concentration camp for for humans, new humans yet unborn, or indeed animals suffering on factory farms. And and then, while you make those decisions, you could argue, I I don't know which particular cows or chickens or sure God forbid human beings, I'm gonna create. All I have is a designator like, you know, those whoever they are that will suffer if I make this pro creative choice, right? And it seems to me clear that this is certainly the this must be an insufficient basis for I I agree. Yeah. In many cases I I do agree. But I do think that at this point we are left with a so sorry. Let me take a step back and rethink the dialectic, right? The situation is roughly I put forward the thesis restricted in scope. You say you can't afford this restriction. it's it's ad hoc. It's an you're cheating. You're saving the theory by restricting its scope in ways that are only motivated by the hope to save the theory. And that's really the accusation. but really it seems to me that what you're now putting forward is this kind of general, very general population ethicsy kind of kind of thought to which we need a reply. But that would be, I think, somewhat analogous to, if if I said that, we can't create suffering when we know we're going to create it. And then you say, well, but how can we know anything? Maybe we are deceived by an evil demon and so that is an important philosophical problem, of course, and we should discuss it at some point. But I think it's okay to sort of corner off our discussion without solving skepticism for now. And it seems to me that at this point in at least my discussion. The general identity problem, population ethics, effective altruism kind of things, become closer that it's not the same, but closer to a sort of general skeptical worry that which doesn't I'm not belittling it, it doesn't mean that we don't need an answer, but it does question it raises the a doubt on whether it raises doubt on whether it's a legitimate move in our dialectic here. I see. Yeah. Interesting. So this may be the one point where I really disagree. let me push a little more if I may. So yeah, I was a bit surprised by your analogy with philosophical skepticism. Because to me it's like it's it's if it's all like to the extent that we're concerned with serious suffering and to the extent that we can foresee that for instance, if we have population policy X, that the population is gonna grow. And to the extent that we can foresee that, Y fraction of this population is the is then likely to experience very serious suffering. So for instance, I mean there's also, I think very unfortunately, there's like a a real paucity of empirical data here, about like how do people just subjectively rate their their well being. And as mentioned, there's very little data, but the little data that there is suggests that, you know, cross-nationally and cross-culturally, something between ten and twenty percent of people will say that their lives contain more suffering than happiness, and also maybe, you know, that they'd rather never have been born and and and similar things. And so I think we can have we can make reasonable guesses about what the population level effect is gonna be on on serious suffering and the number of individuals experiencing it. And I think it's it may also be pretty safe to say that and you know, like these are sort of live debates, as as I'm sure you know, many people are now worried about sort of re a reversed population bomb, right? The and a fertility crisis, and many people are therefore, or an increasing number of people are pushing pronatalist policies. And so I think it's becoming a life a life debate. And it seems to me, at least by default, from a from a point of view that is focused on preventing serious suffering, I think it would be better to maybe keep the population rather smaller than allowing it to get bigger, just because we can foresee that, you know, if a certain fraction of the population will experience severe suffering, there just will be less of that if we keep the population smaller. Now, earlier you alluded to, you know, this famous objection to. a very radical view, negative utilitarianism that says, well, then maybe the ideal population size is zero. As as you argued, we wouldn't be committed to that, right? Because the view is not not negative utilitarian, not even negative consequentialist, right? But maybe we would be committed to something like, okay, let's you know secure our future as a civilization, as a society, let's make sure we have like a viable population size. But beyond that, maybe Let's have a population policy of of minimizing the number of additional individuals that are born because that's a way, as you said, it's a pretty sure fire way to minimize just the the amount of serious things. I think I think I'm I'm open to that. I mean, that does not sound to me like a reductive. I'm open to that possibility. It's going to depend on more things than merely running surveys. I I I don't I don't think that that's a very good way of determining whether a life is worth living or whether there's more suffering than happiness
in it or anything. Just asking people to report, I don't I don't I I should say I don't know this empirical literature and I'm definitely not an expert on empirical methodology. Maybe they're doing things that are just marvelous methodologically. I I kind of doubt it for my armchair, but I'm not sure. I'll h I'll have to see that. The mere fact that people report such things does not suffice, it seems to me. It it would take it would take more more to convince me. For instance, I'd like to know whether they say this consistently or just in some moments. and there are also problems in the the opposite directions from that there are fairly r from what I understand, there's a fairly and it also makes sense, there's a fairly robust phenomenon of adaptation. That means that at least to many not everything, but to many things, people adapt. However they look however bad they look from the outside, they may actually not feel that bad from the inside, at least after a while. Yeah. So so I think it's gonna be very hard methodologically to reach any conclusion here. Maybe it's better this way. Yeah, yeah. But yes, I mean yeah, maybe I shouldn't have argued in terms of that data because I I suspect it's also enough to just go for the move that you also go for in in the book and elsewhere. let's just talk common sense. you agree that there's a that's why you wrote this paper and it's a basis for your argument. You agree that there's a hell of a lot of serious suffering out there. And so maybe the default trajectory, like if we if society continues to procreate as it does, we can just foresee that there will be these sub populations that will be suffering very seriously. For a variety of reasons, like some natural, some political, and so on. And then the next thought would just be again common sense, by default, that amount of suffering would be less if the population overall were smaller. And then maybe we don't want to make it so small that, chaos breaks loose, various systems collapse, we have instability. But if we can have a minimally viable, stable size, then maybe beyond that the view should have something very important to say about what population policy should be. Even some weaker, more plausible claims, it at least we shouldn't dedicate resources to making the population right continue to rise or to decline in slower rates. Sure. That that seems to me like Right, right, right. That that seems to be like an entirely possible position. Yeah. So so I think that by itself wouldn't be sort of the possible reductio. The possible reductio would be that politics should to a first approximation be about just that. So to a first approximation, maybe, you know, again. In in a way that's parallel to the earlier point. Maybe on certain assumptions, politics should to first to first approximation be animal politics. And then maybe if we follow this latter line of thought, maybe politics should to first approximation be population policy or something like that. Yeah. Yeah. yeah, this raises other issues, and again, I'm I'm not sure what I think about them. One issue is whether we should be impartial to those already existing. And those who are not. In a picture that's somewhat similar to the one I sketched about parenthood and maybe, although not clear about nations I'm not sure. There may be some sort of secondary epistemic, not extremely profound, but practically important considerations right. So one is, well, we know what's going on with people now. If you ask me what what's going on in in a generation from now, I don't know, maybe, maybe Maybe maybe extremely benevolent, all powerful AIs will make sure that nobody suffers seriously. I d I don't know, right? Or maybe they will just cause suffering, or maybe a bit of this and a bit of that. Or so and you know, if everything is is discounted at least partly by probabilities, then this seems to justify in a derivative way kind of partiality towards the present or those existing or something along these lines. I think that that alone suffices to at least negate the stronger claim that. politics should be just about or primarily about population ethics. But I I do think that it can be about that as well. Interesting, yeah. Maybe to bring this to a close, sort of at a more meta level, I was also wondering why it, if I may ask, it took you so long to write about suffering, right? That's certainly that's salient because you built a long and very impressive career in practical philosophy. working in a really wide range of topic areas. And then, in I think it was 2025, I saw this paper published titled Politics and Suffering. And of course I thought, yeah, given my really strong interest in suffering, that I need to read this. And then I see that it's by this guy, Enoch, whom I obviously knew, but from quite different Where have you been for 20 years? From yeah, quite different topic areas. And so I yeah, I was wondering Okay. So so First, I should say that I wrote it earlier. It took some time to publish. I think partly because it's to an extent, I mean it's a work in analytic political philosophy, but it's also about Schklar. And so the the Schklar people are not that much into analytic philosophy, and analytic philosophers are not that much into schklar, so I think it made it harder harder to publish. but I I don't know that I have I mean, do you have like a plan of what you're going to write when with a Strong preference to the most important stuff early on and the more I do? bit of one. Not necessarily a gr not necessarily a great one. Okay, I don't. I have I do have some so I knew that I wanted to defend morality's objectivity from before I started my dissertation. So it sometimes I do have such things. But more often than not I'll just something will seem interesting to me or important or will be really annoying. And then I'll and then I'll write I'll read and think and then eventually write write about that. So that's that's the way this developed. I
I'm not I don't think that it means it's less less important than other things or other things I've worked on. I wouldn't expect a linear a linear connection there, but a l relation there. But yeah. Perhaps another thing is that I'm not a pol politician. I'm not a decision maker. Decision makers should prioritize important decisions. Philosophers at least to an extent should prioritize interesting stuff. But to to an extent that can be overridden by enough suffering? Well, okay. So so let me say the following. If I thought that the masses are just awaiting my word, then I think this would create different obligations on what I should write about. But to take it to an extreme, seeing that nobody listens to us, I think the set of constraints is different. Okay, so it's sort of in the middle. Maybe you can find an occasional person who is interested, that's great. But I do think that it's important, well, it's important not to suffer from a serious case of hubris. About how much of a difference we're making. maybe it's important to try and make more, but still. and that the f these facts affect the kinds of considerations that should govern our we do have, to an extent, the luxury of working on stuff because we're interested in it. That's like the main the main advantage of an academic career. Yeah. So maybe be making this a bit less personal, sorry, and indeed more collective and institutional. Another thing that's of course salent is that Suffering doesn't seem to be a very big deal in political philosophy or theory. It's a bit more of a deal, certainly, in normative ethics, but also not that big a deal. Yeah, it seems to me certainly much less of one than it should be. Or I I guess it depends on our empirical view. I it it's certainly if you look at forces that, you know, we might be broadly allied, so liberal forces, certainly their rhetoric and I guess also their policies are targeted much more at other liberal fundamentals, it seems. Yeah. No, I think I agree with that. Maybe there's good reasons not to talk very explicitly in terms of suffering, but I don't know. I I think I doubt it. And it just seems like substantively there's sure, like many sort of centre left cause areas, also some on the centre right are, you know, instrumentally linked to suffering. obviously it's a fundamental human concern. But yeah, I think as as far as I can see, there's not nearly enough focus on that. Yeah, I was wondering about your thoughts on on political philosophy and and theory. Is it for instance the case that if one has the kind of view that you defend in the paper, then there's just less work to do for political philosophers and theorists and more work to do for empirical scientists? Or yeah, what do you see as and as reasons there? So yes, I think I think that that's a part of it. and then, you know, it's sort of justifiable to an extent. There's also another part, a little bit more pernicious. and Schlau was right. There are all these political philosophers who reside on the sunny side of the street. I mean this is extremely common, extremely common. When I was an MA student and I read Rawls Political Liberalism for the first time, I remember writing a paper with the title Mission Impossible. And I one of the things I insisted was this book could not have been written in Tel Aviv, let alone in Gaza. You had to be in a place like Cambridge, Massachusetts, or maybe maybe Oxford where I am now, in order to imagine this kind of stuff. if you want to write political philosophy that is actually relevant to people's lives and politics, then things are going to be different. But maybe they're not gonna be as exciting and maybe it's gonna be more depressing. And you know, real people are sometimes sweaty and you it's not it's It's not it's so much nicer to talk about an ideal discourse, or about what a disagreement between reasonable people looks like, or about deliberative blah blah blah. I have I have a lot of patience for this if it's understood as a theoretical project. it's okay to do analytic metaphysics, it's okay to ask how many possible worlds there are, it's okay to ask what would be a criterion of legitimacy in a world in which everyone's reasonable. That's fine. But don't pretend that any of this is directly relevant to the kind of politics we need to do. And I think that if political philosophy just divorces itself entirely from the kind of politics we need to do, that's a very impoverished picture of political philosophy. So so much of political philosophy doesn't doesn't really surprise me that it does not have anything to say about suffering. And also at the end of the day, it's not clear to me how much there is to be said, rather than say to be done. I see. But so then what would you say is your sort of ideal For how political philosophy and theory should be conducted. if we take seriously the importance of minimizing serious suffering, does that, for instance, mean that there should be a a big rapprochement between normative theorizing and empirical work, for instance? Also should I think that's clearly true. Yeah. Anyway. I mean it doesn't but that doesn't mean that the way to do it is to ask our normative questions on, you know, questionnaires that you let some website distribute to thousands of people and reach. That's not the what I'm talking about are real facts. For instance, what policy causes what effects in the real world. Yeah, that seems to me to be extremely important. we can do principles that don't depend on these facts. That's fine. But then if you want to talk about policy, then yeah, facts matter. Is this I'm hoping this is not a shocker. So yeah, yeah. And well I guess another upshot might be that maybe political philosophy and theory show that would become sort of more strategic and would more shamelessly, as you also say, take sides. And here I guess some people might object that this is maybe not exactly appropriate given the role of academics as truth
seekers, but I take it you would push back against that. I would respect to an extent. So again, if you are and there have been philosophers like this, even contemporary ones, who have the ear of decision makers. If you are at that position, you should take that into account. Truth ceases to trump everything else. but most of us aren't. I I if I if I ran for office, I think I would get my mother's vote. And I'm not entirely confident even of that. It's not as if either decision makers or the masses are awaiting what I say. So so I'm in a position in which I can give truth a much, much heavier weight than I would had I been a designing policy or effectively advising those who design policy. yeah. But yes, if you are in a position to have an effect in the real world, you had better take that into account. And at that point, the thought that, no, no, but I'm I'm just I'm just doing theory. So it's all about truth and evidence and that's it. At that point I think it ceases to be defensible. Yeah. Yeah. But I guess, you know, it's like there are no hard not necessarily hard and unchangeable facts about what social impact an academic has. That's true. So and that and that means that there are gonna be changes in in the conclusion that follow as well. So suppose that suppose that now when I publ publish my book, suddenly everyone will start listening to me. This will have effect on what I should publish in my next book. And if I now foresee this, this should have effect on this book as well. and if I could foresee twenty years ago, that should have an effect on that as well. Yeah, I'm willing I'm willing to bet a lot of money against the thought that all decision makers will suddenly listen to me. that's the hope. I'm I'm going for this. I I'm trying to save the world with a book, but that doesn't mean I also expect expect me to succeed. Yeah. I think that's a good place to end. I was gonna ask you to please plug your book a bit more and maybe the concept of of shameless liberalism, right? So we've talked about the the four liberal fundamentals as you see them, well-being with its really perhaps overriding even suffering component, autonomy, liberty, and and equality. But what is it exactly that makes your view shameless? So as I put it, it's shameless in two directions. first, it is shamelessly confident in those ultimate principles. And especially it doesn't lose its confidence at the first side of disagreement. So it's not I think Frost said many years ago that a liberal is someone too broadminded to defend their own side in an argument. So it's not like that. It's not hyper neutralist. It doesn't pretend that it's the referee in some game, right. it is shamelessly confident in the liberal fundamentals. On the other hand, or anyway, additionally, it's also shamelessly confident, sham sorry, it's shamelessly pragmatic when it comes to implications, when it comes to policy recommendations, when it comes to real life politics. So it's fully committed to these principles and values, and it's fully willing to compromise on anything in order to achieve a greater deal of those science. So it's supposed to be deeply progma pragmatic, but in a way that is fully grounded in these in these liberal fundamentals and the main targets in the books. The book is not primarily about defeating illiberals. It's primarily about getting the liberal camp in order so that we are better prepared to defeat illiberals. And the main targets there are, say, hyper-neutralist Rawls in views of political liberalism, some views that go by the name political realism, especially in political science departments, and also the kind of maybe relativism, subjectivism that's in the air. With some people thinking that even if you just think there's the truth of the matter, you're already not liberal. So so it's against those those targets. David Enoch, thank you so much for your time and insights today. Thanks so much for having me on. Thank you.