TRANSKRIBEERI 🔗
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In my opinion, this is either on par or worse
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than the PHP thing.
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The entire thing here, in my opinion,
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goes beyond negligence to purposeful weakening
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of a control.
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That little lock icon on your browser
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is not just there to look reassuring.
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It's your browser asking, is this really my bank
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or just a very good fake?
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So this week on the podcast,
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we're talking about how Emudra
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issued intermediate CA keys so weak
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that researchers could easily recreate them.
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Now that did not break the entire internet,
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but it was serious enough for platforms
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to revoke trust and for Emudra
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to actually exit the global TLS business.
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So on the show today,
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we'll explain why certificate authorities
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and public keys are the trust system
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behind the sites and apps we use every day
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and why weak keys can put that trust at risk.
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And joining me for this conversation are two people
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I know that would never make their private key,
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the number four, Scott Wright and Kevin Tackett.
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Has to be at least two digits.
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One digit.
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The sentence you did in the introduction,
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it caused them to exit is the same thing as
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no, you can't fire me, I quit.
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I mean, basically.
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Yeah, like, why did we let them put their tail
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between their legs and slunk out of the, the internet?
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I don't know.
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What would you propose, Kevin?
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Yeah.
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I personally believe that we should.
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With or without warning?
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Well, I think this was warning enough.
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Oh, here's the thing that PHP overshadowed this.
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Yes, it did.
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And that's why I'm bringing it up.
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Yeah.
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And I appreciate that.
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In my opinion, this is either on par or worse than the PHP thing.
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We can talk about chain guard being idiots
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and breaking the contract and the embargo and all that kind of thing.
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And the sheer number of LinkedIn ads I get about chain guard now
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that they prove that they're untrustworthy, in my opinion.
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But the image or how I'm not even sure
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if that's how you pronounce it, I'm sorry.
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No, I'm not sorry.
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They don't deserve to be pronounced correctly.
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The entire thing here, in my opinion, goes beyond negligence
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to purposeful weakening of a control.
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Very big control.
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Generating. I'm sorry.
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Pretty big control.
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Right.
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The generating of these private keys are not done.
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This is not like and this is something I've seen a lot of people misunderstand.
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There is a process to generate keeps.
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That process would not generate a key of four.
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Period. It just doesn't work that way.
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It can't work that way, right?
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And so what that means is somebody edited or generated this key
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not through that process.
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Did they mean to set it to four?
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I don't know.
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But somebody had to go touch this.
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Somebody had to make this mistake or do this on purpose.
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So now what I think should be looked at is who caused that to happen.
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We could go everywhere from a government agency forced them to weaken.
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I mean, we've talked about this forever about government agencies
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trying to weaken encryption.
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That could have been what happened here.
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I mean, we can go conspiracy, not fake moon landing
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under the Earth's civilizations and reptiles generating these private keys.
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If you want, I think I've just messed with the entire algorithm for our podcast.
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Oh, man, we're screwed if you monetize to get you.
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I don't believe this was an accident
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that followed processes the way they're saying it, right?
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Load full transcript
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Before they there's the Mozilla bug that has an interesting thread
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before the claim was well for safety and security.
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We have to take this private up to that point.
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Everything was being said as, well, this was an error in the process
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and it wasn't that big a deal.
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And that is bluntly false.
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Yeah. Patent.
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So so maybe let's let's talk about, first of all, like before, I mean,
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yeah, the issue with the key, it was a weak key, right?
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Number four, very, very bad.
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But I think for our audience, like, I think we want to frame
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the importance of what exactly happened and why this is so serious.
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And I think we need to discuss how certificates work in your web browser
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and around public key cryptography.
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Let's explain what is the certificate chain in our web browsers
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and why this is so serious.
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The simplest way I'm always used to explain this is
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when I go to a website, let's say I go to securities.com.
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That has an SSL certificate, a TLS certificate, whatever,
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to encrypt traffic between the browser and the server.
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It allows that encrypted traffic to go.
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You know, what it allows us to say with some level of confidence,
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I'm talking to the right organization and my communication is private.
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OK. And I say some level of confidence because we have no way to say
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I, Kevin, trust the web server at securities.com
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to hand me the right certificate and be the right thing.
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What I do is my web browser has a list of certifying
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authorities or CAs. We hear this all the time.
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And basically my browser trusts those CAs.
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It believes that anything signed by the CA is legitimate.
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OK. And so when I get a certificate from a web server,
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I don't trust that cert that certificate has been signed by a CA.
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I trust the CA. The CA trusts that server.
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And so it's what trend they did trust.
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I must trust the cert because I trust the CA and the CA trusts them.
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OK. And this is entirely based on the idea
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that the trust in the CA is inviolate or however the word is pronounced.
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When, you know, with signatures and stuff like that,
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the way we do this, the way that we trust it is the idea that we have
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a private key that nobody but approved people here know.
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And we use that private key to sign the certificate.
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Basically, the private key is supposed to be
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mathematically complex.
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In this case, the key was literally the number four.
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When I first read it, I thought they were saying I know it was a joke.
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You was four bites.
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Yeah, which I'm much better.
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Right. But but in this case, like, for example,
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because I know what the private key is, I literally can create a certificate
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and find it as trusted by a mudger.
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Yes. And so I could build a website.
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Well, OK, I'll stop using the example.
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Security is because I control that domain.
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So of course I can.
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But but let's say Bank of America.
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I can build a website pretending to be Bank of America
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and finding the quote unquote Bank of America certificate as a mudger
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because I know their private key.
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Now, it will only work now if you haven't
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upgraded your browser and your browser doesn't have it right.
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Like, but but we all know that people don't patch, don't upgrade, don't do stuff.
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So this will be a threat, especially in areas where we're not
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upgrading as fast, where people are having problems.
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Is that these certificates are now known.
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The private keys are known so anybody can sign and say,
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I'm the C.A.E. mudger or however you say it.
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And I trust this sir.
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So we've we've completely undermined the trust chain.
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So yeah, make that answer the question.
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That's a great way to describe it.
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Mobile apps are just part of everyday life now.
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Banking, health
care, shopping, entertainment, you name it.
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And with that comes a lot of trust because users are putting
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their personal data directly into your app.
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But here's the reality.
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Mobile apps are a growing target.
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A recent survey found that 72 percent of organizations
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experienced a mobile app security incident last year.
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And 92 percent say threats are only increasing.
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And the way attackers are going after apps is pretty sophisticated.
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They're reverse engineering them, modifying them
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and redistributing fake versions through fishing campaigns,
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side loading and even third party app stores.
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So from a user's perspective, everything can look completely legitimate.
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That's why taking a proactive approach to mobile app security really matters.
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You want to stay ahead of these threats, not react after the damage is done.
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This is where Guard Square comes in.
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They provide advanced protection for both Android and iOS apps,
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along with automated security testing to catch vulnerabilities early
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and real time threat monitoring so you can actually see what's happening out there.
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If your mobile app is critical to your business, and it probably is,
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this is something worth paying attention to.
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You can learn more at GuardSquare.com.
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That's GuardSquare.com.
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And just to add that Emodra is not a root certificate.
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And so we could talk about the difference between root and intermediate
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certificates. So Emodra is a intermediate certificate.
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So to your point, yes, you could impersonate another domain
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and then you would inherently get the trust of the root CA.
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And so that's the biggest issue.
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And Scott, you actually worked for a root CA back in the day, right?
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And trust? Not one of the original ones, but it was and trust and trust.net
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had its own probably still does have its own root authority.
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Which was actually, yeah, it took a while.
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They were originally an intermediate authority until they got embedded.
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The thing that's interesting about this whole thing that started
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in the late 1990s with the first browsers like that was before.
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But yeah, Netscape communicator or navigator, whatever it was, right?
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What's interesting is that was kind of, in my mind, the first block chain
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because there was a chain of signed certificates that you could follow.
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So your your key was signed by your intermediate CA
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and that was signed by the root CA and that root CA was put into the browser
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and everybody got the browser.
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So everybody would get the public key of that root CA
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and they can understand whether to trust it or not.
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And I think that's how I'm not sure, but I think that's how those free browsers
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made their money, right?
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They charged for for the CAs to put their root
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e-certificates, not the keys themselves, because I hear a lot of people
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on podcasts talking about, well, they got their they published
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their keys or their private keys.
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No, they don't publish the private keys.
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They published only the certificate and the certificate
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contains an enshrined public key.
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So you you can always encrypt for or verify somebody's signature.
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But all that to say, there's a lot of a lot riding on, first of all,
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the randomness and complexity of those private keys
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that are used to create the certificates in the first place, right?
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And then the privacy of it to make sure that nobody gets access to it.
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And usually when those keys are created, the private part of the key pair
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is taken offline and nobody can ever get to it of it.
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Locks in a safe.
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Yeah, exactly.
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And so you don't want someone to be able to replicate, you know,
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one way to get that private key is to steal it.
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The other way is to guess it and get it right and be able to verify it
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with the certificate, right?
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And when you use the number four, you can verify that you've got
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the right number pretty quickly.
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So I think that's kind of what it comes down to.
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This is going back over 20 years in my memory from how public key
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cryptography worked.
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But, you know, blockchain is a lot like how those things work.
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But I think, you know, as Kevin said, I thought it was a really
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interesting idea Kevin had that because it was such a, you know,
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it's not that of all the random numbers you generate,
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you couldn't come up with the number four.
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It's just as likely to recur as any other number.
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But the way it's put in that format was probably very suspicious,
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right? As Kevin said, it's like, OK, maybe it was intentional.
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I can imagine, you know, a disgruntled employee because I can't
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see the government forcing them to do it that way because they
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would just be too suspicious, right?
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I think if somebody really was angry with the company and they
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got, you know, they're going to get laid off or whatever.
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And they're part of the key generation ceremony.
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They say, oh, I'm not going to use this big random number
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that we just generated. I'm going to use the number four.
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And that'll that'll show them.
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Well, they said that the the issue was a key generation error
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created by weak keys alongside intended strong P3384 keys.
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Some kind of mess up with the labels or something.
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They gave some explanation, but I.
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It took the wrong field.
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It took an index field instead of.
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Yeah. And I looked for is they gave some excuses.
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Yeah. That's what it sounds like.
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Yes. Exactly.
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Because this, I mean, for this is the first case that I think
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I've ever seen of this ever happening and like this is
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something that is so routine, right?
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That this and there's so many different intermediate CAs
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that are out there. I just find it shocking.
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And I think the whole industry does find the shocking
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that this actually happened.
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And in fact, there's people making T-shirts.
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And if you've seen those T-shirts, Kevin, the RSA
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key starts for RS key at private key end, right?
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Like I want one of those.
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Hilarious. So we all want one of those shirts.
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And so from a user and an organization perspective,
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obviously Microsoft has already revoked the eMudra
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certificates that has already been done.
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This is why it's very important that you update your web
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browsers, right?
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This issue has been resolved, but there is that window of
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time, right?
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That if an attacker knew about this, or if this
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happens in the future, right?
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We now you know that attackers will be testing intermediate
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CAs for this type of issue.
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Now that we know it's happened once, right?
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And it can happen most likely again.
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Unfortunately, I don't think we've ever had an episode
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where we've talked about how the security of a web
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browser and how the certificate chaining works
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and why that is so important, right?
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It's to everything that we do with a web browser on
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the internet. And it's all based on public key
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cryptography.
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Little much to cover in a 20 minute podcast.
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Yeah, exactly.
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But but you know, a little bit, a little bit.
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But and we won't talk about like, you know, someone
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posted, I think on Twitter, I saw Matt Johansson post
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this about like, oh, AI is going to break public key
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cryptography.
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I'm like, OK, just stop.
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Let's let's just let's just stop already.
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No, but quantum computers will.
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Well, quantum is a whole other thing.
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Yeah. Yeah.
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Yeah, maybe we can have another episode about quantum
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and how that can and probably will affect encryption
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overall. But the way that you use the web browser
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and you browse to websites, you know, the certificate
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chaining is so important to that and the backbone
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of all of internet security, essentially.
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Actually, it wouldn't be a bad idea to have an episode
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on quantum safe computing and quantum safe
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cryptography at some point.
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I have to have a talk I've given a few times.
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It does. This is this is a topic that the browser
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should be in is such a topic that we, you know, people
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like us that have been around for a while, remember back
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when I mean, like the original way to get an SSL
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certificate was very difficult.
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Yeah, you had to prove this massive amount of stuff.
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And that slowly changed over time to the point
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where now people just kind of take that for granted.
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But don't you still have.
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And you used to have a Dunn & Bradstreet number
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or something like that to get it?
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Yeah, yeah, if you if you wanted to, if you wanted
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a company certificate, a certificate added to a company,
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a Dunn's number was was a way to get that.
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You know, I mean, I remember I had to provide
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partnership agreements where like the internal documents
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forming the company to get a certificate and a letter
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from a bank that said we absolutely had that the bank
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account was the company is not just like it was ridiculous.
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Understandably, so based on what I accomplished with it.
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Yeah. And then that became less onerous.
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And then people got sent about that to the the CAs added
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services. Well, oh, you want an extended validation
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cert. And the first time I went through the EV validation,
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if you guys remember that, it was the exact same questions
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I had answered the previous version.
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It was just now considered the higher standard.
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It was nuts. I will admit, I was angry.
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Yes. Yes. Well,
we're we're old grumpy old men, right?
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Back in my day, we had to show a passport to get a certificate.
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Yeah. But now, you know, nowadays it is like, in fact,
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you don't even have to pay for an SSL cert anymore, right?
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Like, yeah, there's three CAs, but you can't they won't
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be embedded in the browser. That's all.
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00:18:16,470 --> 00:18:17,870
Right. Yeah, exactly.
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Like if you are an intermediates or a route, right?
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That's very different, absolutely.
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00:18:22,230 --> 00:18:25,030
So, Scott, real quick, we talked about the book last episode,
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but it is out there.
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It is available now for sale, right?
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It's not free anymore. It's no nine cents.
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Oh, hold on.
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Sales have dropped off as a means of all.
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But yeah, the digital legacy tree,
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ensuring your loved ones can get access to the important parts
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of your digital life when it's most important.
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So that's that's what the book is.
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And would love to have people pick it up at Amazon.
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The Kindle version is available right now.
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And looking for people to give reviews, that would be great.
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Yeah, pick up his book for 99 cents and give a review.
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If you can, Scott would really appreciate it.
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All right. All right.
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Well, Kevin, hopefully we get to see you again here
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in the next few weeks, right?
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I have one more trip this year and that's it.
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Yeah, I should wind in the travel down.
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It would be different. Yeah. Yes. Yes.
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All right. Well, thank you all for listening.
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And until next time, stay safe, stay secure and stay privates.
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Private key, privates or thank you for listening or watching.
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If you like this episode, hit subscribe,
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00:19:32,710 --> 00:19:34,550
share it with your friends and colleagues
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00:19:34,550 --> 00:19:37,870
or jump into our community at shared security dot net
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00:19:37,870 --> 00:19:40,510
slash supporter to keep the conversation going.
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Thanks again, and we'll see you next week
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for another episode of shared security.