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Many businesses take the firewall out of the box and they have one rule and there's an any, any at the bottom, and they put some rules in the, in the middle, but there's an any, any at the bottom. So as long as it doesn't hit a specific deny, then it's going to get to the bottom and then it's allowed and then, then you're in. And then they're surprised when they, you know, their, their website gets ransomware or locked out or whatever the case may be. But, you know, it's those basic things. It doesn't have to be fancy or super expensive. Focus on the basics, focus on the foundations, focus on, you know, change management. You've talked about that a few times. Asset management, understanding where my environments are, turning off ports that I'm not needing. You know, if you don't need telnet, or hopefully you're not using Telnet anyways, but you know, if you're not using snmp, if you're not using rdp, like, turn those things off. You're listening to Protect it all, where Aaron Crow expands the conversation beyond just ot delving into the interconnected worlds of IT and OT cybersecurity. Get ready for essential strategies and insights. Here's your host, Aaron Crow. Hey, thank you for joining me for another episode of Protect it all podcast. Today I've got Corey with me. It's always fun. Many of the times when I'm doing these podcasts, sometimes I know people and I have people sitting in that seat that have been, you know, I've known for years and we've had many conversations. And other times it's like today where Corey and I have never actually met before or spoken like we've interacted through, through emails, things like that, but we don't know each other. Those are just as fun conversations for me because I have no idea where it's going to go. I don't set an agenda, et cetera. So with all that to say, I'm really excited. Thank you for taking the time today to be with you, Corey. Thank you for being here. And why don't you introduce yourself, tell us who you are, tell us a little bit about yourself and your background in cybersecurity.
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Thanks. Appreciate it. Aaron. Corey Lebleu. This is been doing pen testing for about 20 years. I run Relic Security. Started off in network security, moved more to the application side. I've done every sort of most types of offensive security from, you know, physical pen testing to network and application security.
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Very cool. So what Type of environments are you focusing in on pen testing? Because I know pen testing is a big thing, a wide, you know, kind of spread of activities. But where are you focusing? Are there, is there a specific vertical, is there a specific type of red teaming or pen testing that you're looking at?
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I mainly do web application stuff. That's kind of my specialty. As I was saying, I started in the networking side and then kind of got a little bored with it and
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moved to the application security side. So like mainly since around 2011 or so, I've been doing mostly the application side, but you know, with the one off network contests for Fortune type companies and you know, also one off site fit client.
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What are some of the things that you see as a consultant? As I walk into some of these spaces and do do some assessments or walk downs, et cetera, I see, you know, the whole gamut from, you know, I've got nothing, it's wide open, it's the wild west, you know, no cybersecurity, you know, foundation all the way to teams and spent tons of money and lots of very mature program type thing. What are some of the things that you've seen that maybe is concerning or are funny as an outsider looking in of how bad it may be?
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Well, I've done a lot of enterprise stuff, so a lot of it is really locked down. Some companies that pen test almost continuously, but more recently I was on an internal pen test and they had things that were 20 years old. I mean like they had something that was vulnerable to the SQL slammer worm. They just had a lot of legacy systems running legacy applications that they couldn't upgrade. So I mean There was Windows 2000, outdated Solaris, all sorts of stuff. Lots of one just I told you
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when we started recording this, you know, half of my career has been in critical infrastructure. So you know, power plants and transportation and manufacturing and places like that where a lot of those spaces have, you know, older systems like, like you said, Windows XP, Windows 2000. I've seen NT351, I've seen DOS. I've seen some really old things that are still running. Um, and obviously those things have vulnerabilities to it. Um, how much of your, you know, exercise is just to find the holes? Because many times when I go into these places, they know they have holes. It's more around them understanding what is the most important thing for me to fix. Because they know it's like a dam that's got a thousand holes in it. I can't fix all the holes where are the big ones. What are the ones I need to focus on? They know they need to maybe get to all of them or, you know, have some mitigations around those things. So how are you helping your customers and, and really understanding the difference between those?
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Well, some of that, I mean, there's obviously things from network perspective like domain compromise to look at, but also, you know, identifying which system to host critical data. Like on that one test, there was an NFS share that had receipts for banking. Banking receipts. I mean, wow. Just identifying things like of that nature just. Yeah, yeah.
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I mean, obviously that the risk and criticality and you know, one of the analogies always give folks is, you know, I can have two systems and they're the same type of system. They have the same risks, you know, they have the same operating system, they have the same patches, all that type of stuff. But one is, you know, in the break room that doesn't have any function to anything else, and the other one is controlling a critical process. And so they're not the same risk to the business, even though they have the same inherent risk to the device itself. Itself, that device doesn't have the same risk to the organization. So I shouldn't, I shouldn't consider or classify those two things as the same.
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Right, yeah. Well, that actually brings me up to a story that you might find interesting being from an OT background. I was testing something associated with a power plant and I was put into a guest room. They had a guest network. They were asking me if I could break into the main network. I'm pounding my head, you know, the whole morning. I'm not getting anywhere. There's just nothing. I go into lunch, I talk with them. I'm kind of feeling a little embarrassed. I walk back in from lunch and I immediately see a printer in the corner. I'm like, wait a second. So I look at it and I prop an ip. The printer is on their corporate network, even though it's in the guest room. So from there I was actually able to get into the network just changing the Mac address on the printer, impersonating that printer and getting in.
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Yeah, and that's. You hear a lot of, of red teaming, pen testing type things where it's the, you know, the TV that's in the, in the break room, it's the, you know, the thermostat that's on the wall. Like, you know, there, there's, there's really an understand, needs to be an understanding of, you know, the overall architecture and the things that you're bringing into Your environments and how those things risk. There's so many attacks. You look at, you know, the target attack and any number of examples where most of many times these attackers or these vulnerabilities are not coming in the front door where everybody's paying attention, they're coming in the back door where a contractor's at or where some third party system is at. And they don't really have visibility into those things. Maybe it's older, maybe it's not passed as frequently. Maybe they have, you know, different levels of access to those environments and those are the things that people get into. They, they get their hooks in like the printer you talked about, and then they pivot from that into the next thing, uh, because they're already in now and now they can do more things and nobody's paying attention.
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Yeah, when I started out, when I was doing the networking stuff, there wasn't really the modern red teaming that there is now. There just wasn't the adversary emulation, it was just the network pen testing. And I got kind of bored with that. And that's kind of how I got into the web app stuff was, you know, the web apps were the juicy part, like they could have everything patched and then
there are custom holes in the web apps. That's kind of how I went down that route.
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Yeah, and so, so you mentioned before that some, some organizations, obviously the, the bigger organizations, they're, they're doing constant pen tests. What are customers now? So obviously as we, as we advance, we get more mature in these spaces. Those types of organizations know that there's always going to be a risk. Yes, I'm good today. Somebody makes a change tomorrow. Now I just opened a new vulnerability that wasn't there yesterday. So I need to be constantly watching those things. So how are you helping and how are you getting in front of that problem? How are organizations getting in front of that problem with red teaming being one of the defenses of that threat vulnerability or landscape?
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Well, as I said, I get loud into the application security testing. I've seen that integrated into the STLC a lot more with constant vulnerability testing, the static analysis and all that. But also I've seen several large international financial institutions where they are literally pen testing every app they have, even their IBM apps. So I mean, they're just constantly on it. And that's, that's a trend that you'll see in the financial industry. Whereas the one with all the holes and outdated systems is in manufacturing like you were talking about with ot.
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Sure. How often are you brought in for you know, as a product brought in. So let's say that company A buys, you know, commercially off the shelf product, are they getting third party testing and testing some of those things before they bring it in to kind of trust but verify? Especially if it's a supercritical system.
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Like I was saying, some of those financial industries are doing that, not so much in other ones. A lot of it has already been deployed. But like, you know, IBM suites, things built on top of IBM and Oracle type platforms getting tested on a normal basis.
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What are some of the areas that you, you know, you find maybe a difficulty in? You know, because red teaming obviously is more common. You know, 10 years ago fewer organizations did it as frequently. Right. And, or if they did, they're doing it in house or they're doing it once a year, they're doing it only on particular systems. Now that it's doing it more like what are, what are those? Just because more isn't always better. How do you, how are you seeing organizations use it effectively to enable and enhance their, their organization and provide the value that they're looking for to reduce the risk and plug those holes? Not just to make a report. To make a report and move on down the road to check a box.
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Yeah, well, I mean a lot of what helps is helping to identify systemic issues, not just playing whack a mole with vulnerabilities. Playing whack a mole with
vulnerabilities can just be a kind of a fruitless exercise. The problems that you commonly see that I see on every pen test, be it, you know, application pen tests or network pen tests, is configuration management. And really just knowing what they have, be it, you know, a system running an outdated version of Solaris or it be an outdated jQuery library that they don't know about, some JavaScript library that has some snippet from some other library. So I mean a lot of the fundamentals are just really the same. The sticking to the configuration management, the patch management, things like that and just kind of implementing the policy or ensuring that policies are properly implemented.
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Yeah, and it's funny how that it's really the case across cybersecurity in that it's usually not the sexy thing makes the fix. Right. It's usually basic foundational things. Configuration management, making sure I'm patching my things, making sure I understand where my systems are. Like what level are my systems, where are my critical things. Like that is the thing that, that we need to focus on. And the things that the effort is not always, hey, go buy the new blinky thing. Go, go get AI, go get. You know, the new sexy thing that's out at RSA next month or you know, at Black Hat in the, in August. It's many times, you know, it's the basic things, continuing to do red tests and pen testing, looking at your critical systems, confirming and you know, trust but verify. Validating that those things, yeah, they were good today, but I've done five outage windows since then. Has anything changed? Like do I have vulnerabilities that didn't exist yesterday today? Because I made changes yesterday.
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Yeah. And also there's the importance of knowing what your data is and what the risk of it is. I mean when it comes down to it, it's, it's a business decision. It's not necessarily about the sexiest new vulnerability, it's what can you do with it. That's another reason why the web stuff just kind of, that's where the data was stored. And you know, finding an open share that has the data, finding an open share that has a lot of critical data might not have as many alarms around it as much as trying to go after Domain Admin or something of that nature.
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Yeah. And you know, obviously getting Domain Admin as a red teamer, that's like the holy grail of oh, I own your network, but you don't even have to do that many times to make a big impact. Right. It doesn't matter how it happens is, you know, it's, it's can I make a change, Can I make an impact? And that the struggle as a defender of these cyberspaces is we always know there's ways in. Right. There is no such thing as a perfectly secure network unless you turn it all off and unplug it from power. There's always a way in. Given enough time and opportunity, you could find a way in. Right. So we always know that. So it's always this non ending, never ending pursuit of excellence, knowing that we'll never get there.
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Well, you know, that comes back to knowing where your data is and also defining risk and things like that. Like I mainly do application security testing and I assign ratings based on cvss, the vulnerability scoring system, but that is ranked on severity. It doesn't have anything to do with risk. So you have to like kind of plug that in with your risk model. It's not really an accurate picture by itself. It just says this is how bad it is. It doesn't say anything about what you can do with it or how you're plugging the hole or Anything, you know, you really have to, to collaborate with the business units to understand that.
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Yeah. And, you know, kind of going back to the example I gave earlier, just because it has a high CVSS score, that the risk is high on that device. That device may not matter to my organization. It may not be able to impact my process. It may be able to not be able to impact my business to the same level. So something with a lower CVSS score can have a higher impact on my business. I'm not just looking at things with a 10 CVSS score and prioritizing those because that in of itself is not a good enough thing to be able to prioritize my work. Yeah.
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Because definitely your assets are going to vary. The, you know, a printer that has a CVSS score of 10 is going to be a little different from a file server, file server that has a seven. I mean, you're going to care a lot more about that file server.
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Exactly. Or the, the web server. The web front end. Right. That's sitting on the Internet and adds something, something that's a five. That's, that's way more dangerous than, you know, a, a printer that's a 10. But you can't get to it unless you're in the room with it. Right.
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Unless it's on there, you know, in the guest boardroom on the domain network.
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So, and that's, that's a prime example of knowing your assets, knowing what's going on in this space. You know, how do you, you know, kind of categorize segment and really, truly understand and, and that's, that's the bigger issue or the bigger, you know, struggle that I see organizations have is, you know, they have a lot of the pieces. They've, they've got budget, they know they have to do things, but they don't truly understand their environment. They, you know, if, if you go back in time and you look at, you know, Henry Ford and the first, you know, cars that were made on a manufacturing line, Right. You have to understand every step along that process. And it was really simple back then because it, they made one car. And, and what was the Henry Ford, you know, saying? You can have any color of car that you want, as long as it's black. Like, they only made one kind of car, Right. That was it. So it was a super
simple process. They didn't have 15 different colors and all these different options and different leather. And, you know, it was, they made one car. So you look at things now in those systems and the process itself is just so much More complex that there's not a single person that truly understands the business process from beginning to end, from top to bottom. The problem with that is that I'm doing a tabletop or I'm doing a red team. And yeah, I see the CPSS score or I see that you got into this environment, but I may or may not know what the ultimate risk to my organization is because I don't truly understand how all the pieces fit together. Right. And that's where repetitive doing all these red teams, doing pen tests, doing all like putting all these things together helps build that picture of what the risk to my organization is, what my business process is. But, and that's in my opinion, that's why you continually have to do these things and be changed and challenged and have different people looking at these things other than just my team or me saying, no, it's good, I can figure the firewall, I did the thing, we're all good.
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Well, that's like vulnerability scanning versus fintesting. It's kind of like quantitative versus qualitative, like just your sheer numbers versus what can I do with it? And red teaming being even more extreme example of that. Also concentrating on, you know, your detection and capabilities.
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How much is it are, are you looking for? Or finding vulnerabilities versus misconfigurations versus things that they assumed or thought were fixed, whether that be a segmentation, whether that be a, a local account that was disabled, that they thought was disabled, rdp, Telnet, whatever those things may be. How many of those are, are there are they finding when you get in and they're saying, oh wow, we thought we fixed that.
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Yeah, I mean you'll find things like that pretty often. It's kind of like the new version of the, you know, patch management used to be everything. Like back in the day you could take over anything you wanted, you know, 20 years ago using MSO5039 or something like that. Whereas nowadays things that I see that are more common are like API keys just embedded in JavaScript, passwords encoded in JavaScript that they just don't know about.
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Yeah, and that, that's a hard one because, yeah, it's, it's, it's, it's also hard to change and get R out because they, they may or may not know wherever place that API is being accessed and needed. Right. So if I turn it off, it may break something and I don't know how to fix it. And that comes down to the other piece of, you know, you really being able to design and engineer my environment and understand all those processes because again, it gets back to if I don't know my business process, it's really hard to secure it. It's really hard to know it
because I don't know that that printer, you know, again, it's a printer. It's not on the guest network. Why am I worried about it if I don't understand that? Oh well, but you put it in the room with somebody that's going to have access that shouldn't have access and from that I can pivot in. Right. I have to understand those intricacies and know how A plus B equals Z.
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Yeah, a lot of it just I subscribe a lot to, like I said to the basics on Attack Surface being one of the things, the less things you're running, the less components there are, the less opportunities there are to be break less things for me to look into for API keys, open ports, et cetera. Just, I mean, that's a principle that I run on my own network is just I try and run as little stuff as possible. I do not like, I do not like IoT devices.
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Yeah, well, and to that point though, right. So I'm very similar in that I think probably many of our, of our US fellow, you know, cyber nerds probably have a pretty locked down environment, but also know my environment's not perfect. But to that point, you know, I try. I have an isolated network for my IoT devices, I have my kids on a segmented network. I have my own network for me and I've got my lab behind me that's on a separate network. Then all of that type of stuff and I'm blocking things and monitoring things and you know, most people pull out the, you know, the, the router that the cable company gives them and they connect everything to that one thing. They probably didn't even change the password and they wonder why they get owned constantly, you know, so it's. Unfortunately, that's funny. We laugh about it, but many businesses do the same thing. Many businesses take the firewall out of the box and they have one rule and there's an any, any at the bottom and they put some rules in the middle, but there's an any. Any at the bottom. So as long as it doesn't hit a specific deny, then it's going to get to the bottom and then it's allowed and then you're in. And then they're surprised when they, you know, their, their website gets ransomware or locked out or whatever the case may be. But you know, it's Those basic things, it doesn't have to be fancy or specific or super expensive. Focus on the basics, focus on the foundations, focus on, you know, change management. You've talked about that a few times. Asset management. Understanding where my environments are, turning off ports that I'm not needing. You know, if you don't need Telnet, or hopefully you're not using Telnet anyways. But you know, if you're not using snmp, if you're not using rdp, like turn those things off.
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Funny, when I had my first kid, I was looking at baby monitors and one of them had Telnet.
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Unless you, somebody like you were to look, you would have never known. And why did that device need Telnet? It's funny because, you know, you've got all
these Amazon devices and things are listening and you know, your TVs plugged into the Internet and smart TVs and you know, I talk about this all the time. Like, you know, you can go and get a smart blender or you can get a smart microwave and all these things that have WI fi and I'm just like, I don't need my microwave to be WI fi enabled.
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I'm good.
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I'll walk up to it. I have to put the thing in there physically anyways. I'll hit the button and I'm good. You know, my, my smoker on the back porch is what, you know, some of them have wireless capabilities. Mine doesn't. It's just old. I have to walk up and press a button like it's okay. You know, it's, it's just a matter of choosing. And I'm not saying that you can't have those things, but if you're bringing those things into your environment, you need to understand the risk. And how am I going to mitigate those risks? And what risk am I bringing it in? Am I putting it with my corporate laptop? And that's the other piece to this that have you started doing or do you guys do anything? So obviously since COVID everybody's started working remote, you're probably in your home office. I'm in my home office. I have my corporate laptop sitting right here that could be commingled with that Iot device that you just talked about that has access that you could pivot from how many people are actually looking at and thinking about people red teaming from within that trusted network. Because there's other devices that are on those networks that could piggyback or get access through those connections.
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Well, I mean, I've even tested an application recently and they wanted me to test external and they wouldn't give me access to the internal. They're like, just kind of like, oh, you'll have our secrets then. And it's secure. You know, we did and it was just. And that's one problem. I mean, most of my testing is, you know, I do authenticated testing and the most serious issues I find or are authenticated, you know, just from design flaws to session to injection flaws, et cetera, externally facing, I mean, I'd really just see common stuff. And then occasionally I'll find an API key, but nothing that high. But on the internal, I mean, it's always networks and applications. It's kind of the juicy. Juicy, you know, hard outer shell, juicy inside. But you're talking about your barbecue pit. I think my, my toothbrush supports network connection. It's not hooked up, but it supports it.
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Like, why. I don't need, I don't need big brother watching me brush my teeth. I'm good. I'll do it myself. That's, that's funny. Yeah, you can, you can literally get everything WI fi enabled or Bluetooth enabled or whatever nowadays. Yeah, I think, I think there was a model of the one I have that you could do the app for. And I'm like, yeah, I'm good. I don't think I need that. It can be overwhelming because, especially in the enterprise side, especially as you start having more and more of these apps, especially as you start bringing AI in. And a lot of these organizations, because Microsoft and Google and all these places, they have entire development teams, they build products, they're software companies, like all that kind of stuff. But so many organizations and enterprises have their internal teams that are building internal tools and applications. Even if they're not customer facing or outward facing. They're still using cloud services, they're still using GitHub and GitLab and different things like that. But they may not have the rigor that a Microsoft or Adobe or some of these larger organizations have as far as on the development SDLC side. So how are, how are organizations supposed to keep up? Especially as you start thinking about Vibe coding with AI and you know, people with less experience providing applications. And again, they're probably thinking, I know many are, well, this is internal. What's the risk? Like, how can this hurt something? Right?
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Yeah, I mean, that's the problem with all shadow it, you know, people connecting devices that they aren't approved and stuff. Vibe coding is a whole new thing. I heard about someone, they were setting up an app and it automatically like defaulted to some S3 bucket with the default password or something. But you know, like with the apps, I mean it really needs to be an stlc. It needs to be a process thing.
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What do you see come up over the horizon next? You know, yeah, I used to say five to 10 years, but I've really changed that because things are changing so fastly, fast. What do you see? What's one thing you see come up over the horizon? Maybe concerning and one thing that's exciting that you see that can enhance things, make things better.
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I mean, I'd say AI for both. It's kind of, you know, it's going to be interesting where it takes us because we don't really know. I mean a lot of that technology, like the concepts for it came out in the 50s and 60s, but we just didn't have the computing power to really realize what it was worth then. So, you know, as our hardware gets better, it's going to get further and further.
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Using AI. What is one of the things that you think is good that you see it in red teaming and pen testing and then what Maybe one concerning thing around using AI for that. With that, you know, our bad actors trying to use having the same tools to come against us in that way. Using AI to enhance their offering.
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Well, it's going to enable us a good bit too, especially on like the intrusion detection type side, be able to match patterns, et cetera. But also, you know, it's not fully matured. I mean it's going to lead to a lot of false positives, a lot of, a lot of false assurances. Like I have, just for an example of it
messing up, I've tried. I was studying AI stuff and I had two books and I tried to say, hey, map this table of contents to this other table of contents and you know, give me a learning roadmap. And it's like, oh, here you go. And it's like, wait, this doesn't look like the right table of contents. Oh yeah, sorry, I made that up just based on the title. I thought that's what this would be. It totally just, you know, it's going to pull things out of thin air. And the hallucination factor, we just, it's, it's not there. It's, it's going to lead to a lot of issues. Just people chasing down things that aren't there.
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Yeah. But on the flip side, it's also going to enable people with less skills to be able to use and find paths in just like they can with coding. You don't have to be a programmer or have the level of understanding of applications like you do to be able to potentially find a vulnerability to get in. Right. You can say, hey, there's this. You could literally be sitting in that room and say, hey, chatgpt, there's this HP Jet direct printer in the corner that has this Mac address. Could I use that to pivot in and change and spoof that Mac address for mine and. And let it help you walk through the steps to. To use that to your advantage. Right. You knew that because of experience. But even somebody that didn't have that experience could use AI to try to help them get over those barricades and experience that you and I have from just, you know, being there and doing that in the past.
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Right. It's definitely gonna do that, but it's also. I think it'll get a lot of people caught too, because, you know, mistake skip steps. Yeah, I mean, I've used it trying to configure a system before and it's like taking me down one rabbit hole. And it's like, oh, if I just googled this, I could have done it like in five steps instead of trying to figure out these 20 steps that AI was giving me.
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Yeah, I've. I've literally tried so, you know, building a Linux box or something like that. I'm trying to script the process because I'm doing something. I'm like, oh, I'll just use AI for this. And then it does it like 15 times and fails every time. So then I have to take it and take it to a different one and say, hey, these are the mistakes I made. What is going on? And it would have just been faster to write the script myself. Right. I was trying to save time. It ends up taking me longer because I'm trying to use AI to do it for me.
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Definitely. And I've tried to use it for code before and had it just blow up. Like trying to test an oauth system one time and like, okay, give me some OAuth vulnerabilities. Okay, try and script those into a BERT plugin. Well, it was just dependency nightmare. And like, I was trying to use it with. I was trying to play with the new burp AI stuff and it just wasn't using the right versions of Kotlin and just a nightmare. It just wasn't. Wasn't worth even messing with.
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So there's a lot of people that are interested in cyber security, lots of students that are getting inside. Obviously, cyber is very hot topic. What, what advice do you have for folks that are wanting to get into cyber, maybe pen testing, red teaming type thing is a, is a path in for them. Like how do you recommend people get into it? What do they study, what tools do they use, how do they set up their lab? Like what, what recomm AF
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the obvious. Like be curious. It's something that you kind of have to be obsessed with to break into. I think especially earlier in my career, like you know, I would be at home, you know, off work, still hacking away, trying to figure things out. You know, obviously for the, for the network side you need the networking background. I'd also recommend learnings of coding. Even if that's not going to be your focus. I'd recommend picking up Python, you know, just automate scripts, et cetera and it just, it's useful for everything. I'd, I'd recommend also like you're, you, you're going to dabble in a lot of different languages but I would recommend like trying to stick with one or two main ones to concentrate your efforts because I have just bounced around way too much where I should have just been concentrating on Python mainly. If you're into web stuff, definitely look into Burp Suite. That's kind of the standard testing tool. Learning how to intercept HTTP requests and modify HTTP requests manually and learn how to navigate applications with that.
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And the whole world is web, like everything is web front end right now. Right. It's like even internal things use those same technologies. You don't even realize it many times that they're using the same, the same suite, the same, you know, dependencies and underlying technology, even if it's an internal task that's just running internally. So yeah, it's the wild west man.
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Yeah, I mean back in the day it used to be they wouldn't even fix stuff. Like I disclosed vulnerabilities and like Apple and Citrix like 20 years ago and like Citrix worked with us. Apple was their web configuration utility for like the first version of the iPhone or something. We disclosed it to them, they didn't even reply. They released a new version like three months later without telling it like silently like rewritten in a different language. Yeah, that's crazy. Now they'll pay you for it. Then they just ignored you, right?
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They're like eh, nobody else is going to figure that out. They were all good. I'm not worried about that. Well, awesome man. So how can people find out more about you? What's kind of the call to action for folks that you want people to take away from it.
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Yeah hit me up on LinkedIn or relicsecurity.com I'm pretty active on LinkedIn but relic security as well and find out about our service offerings and all that.
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Awesome. Yeah definitely reach out to Corey Relic Security have all the details in the show notes down here to find him, find his page and find his LinkedIn all that kind of stuff. So man, I appreciate you being here today, diving into the fun world of pen testing and all the fun stuff that I'm sure you guys find all the time. So thank you for being here. Thank you for what you do and folks make sure that you like subscribe and come on the podcast if you have something to say and want to sit in the chair like Corey is today.
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Thanks, I really appreciate it.
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Yeah man, have a good one.
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Thanks.
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Thanks for joining us on Protect it all where we explore the crossroads of IT and OT cybersecurity. Remember to subscribe wherever you get your podcasts to stay ahead in this ever evolving field. Until next time.
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Sam.