Bundling Didn’t Die. It Moved.

Comcast recently filed the closing argument in a 25-year experiment. On June 29, it announced it will spin off NBCUniversal and Sky into a separate public company, unwinding the same combination it built fifteen years ago when it bought NBCU from GE for nearly $40 billion. It’s the second split in six months: Comcast completed the spinoff of its linear cable networks into Versant on January 2. What’s left of Comcast after this one is a pure connectivity company. What’s left of NBCU is a pure content company. Fifteen years and roughly $90 billion in debt later, they’ve concluded the two don’t belong under one roof.

This isn’t a Comcast story. It’s the third chapter in a saga that started with AOL-Time Warner in 2000 and ran through AT&T’s brief, expensive ownership of WarnerMedia.

Content plus pipes has never once worked as a combined business, across three different decades, three different management teams, three different sets of advisors who were certain this time was different.

When a strategy fails identically three times with the smartest people in the industry running it, the problem isn’t execution. It’s the strategy.

I’ve spent thirty-five years on the content side of that equation, running businesses that lived and died by distribution decisions, many of which I didn’t control. If you run a media company, a content brand, or a B2B events business, this isn't background news. It’s the layer you’re standing on. Here’s what I’ve learned watching this pattern repeat: content and pipes aren’t two halves of one business. They’re two businesses optimizing for opposite things, and no org chart can reconcile them.

Pipes want lock-in. Content wants reach.

A pipe makes money on subscriber lock-in. The value of a cable network or a broadband connection is that customers stay on it, and exclusive content is the tool that keeps them there. Content makes money on reach. The value of a show or a franchise goes up with every additional platform it’s licensed to, every additional audience it reaches, every additional dollar of ad and affiliate revenue that comes with scale.

Put those two assets in the same company and you’ve built a machine fighting itself. The moment content goes over-the-top to compete with Netflix’s global reach, which it has to, it stops protecting the pipe. The moment a pipe tries to hold content exclusive to defend the bundle, it caps that content’s audience at the pipe’s own footprint.

You cannot run the strategy that maximizes the content asset and the strategy that maximizes the distribution asset at the same time. They pull in opposite directions on the same balance sheet.

Wall Street figured this out before the boardrooms did. Pipes get valued like utilities: steady cash flow, bond-like multiples. Content gets valued like growth: optionality, upside, a multiple that assumes the next hit is coming. Bolt them together and the market doesn’t average the two multiples, it discounts both. Comcast’s stock fell 20%-25% over the twelve months before this announcement. That decline is what actually forced the breakup. Strategy followed the stock price, not the other way around.

B2B events are living through the identical fracture

I see this exact tension inside the B2B media industry. Event companies were trading at strong multiples heading into this year. Emerald Holding, a pure-play B2B events operator, had traded in the 12x to 13.7x EBITDA range, well above the 7.81x median for diversified media companies. Apollo took Emerald private at roughly 12x EBITDA in May, closed the deal in July, delisted the stock, and folded it together with Questex into a single combined events platform. The market’s conviction turned into an actual transaction in six weeks. I laid out the data behind that bifurcation in detail in the post: The B2B Event Market Is Splitting in Two. Media-plus-events companies, the combined model a lot of us built our careers on, are trading at a discount to that. Same fracture, different industry.

Events monetize scarcity: a finite room, a badge price, a sponsor paying for proximity to a curated audience. Media monetizes reach: the more free distribution, the better the economics. Bundle the two and the media arm wants to syndicate itself everywhere while the events arm needs to gate access to protect the value of the room. The market prices that tension correctly. It always has.

It was never a pendulum

I’ve told leadership teams for years: you’re either bundling or unbundling, and that’s the whole of business strategy. I still believe that. But I no longer believe it’s a pendulum, swinging back and forth between the two. A pendulum implies bundling and unbundling take turns. They don’t. They’re happening at the same time, on different layers, and mistaking one layer for the whole picture is how experienced operators get caught flat-footed.

At the corporate ownership layer, everything is unbundling: Comcast splitting NBCUniversal and Sky away from its pipes, on a timeline the company still calls on track. Warner Bros. Discovery walked away from its own planned split and agreed to sell itself to Paramount Skydance outright instead, and that sale is now stuck in an antitrust trial that won’t resolve until 2027. Even a deal every advisor involved called strategically obvious can end up fighting over which layer it actually belongs to. At the consumer subscription layer, everything is re-bundling: Disney+, Hulu, and ESPN under one price, Amazon folding entertainment into Prime, streaming fatigue pushing households back toward the mega-bundle they thought they’d escaped. Both are true at once. The question was never bundle or unbundle. It’s which layer you’re standing on when you ask.

Agentic AI is about to move a different layer

This layer doesn't have a multiple yet. The number one complaint from streaming consumers isn’t price, it’s the paradox of choice: too many platforms, too many titles, no reliable way to find what’s actually worth watching tonight. Every streamer has tried to solve this with its own recommendation engine, and every one of those engines has the same conflict of interest. Netflix’s algorithm isn’t built to find you the best show regardless of platform. It’s built to keep you inside Netflix.

An agent with no platform loyalty doesn’t carry that conflict. Its job is resolving your paradox of choice, full stop, even when the answer sends you to a competitor’s service.

That’s a direct transfer of leverage away from the platform and toward whatever sits between the viewer and the decision. We watched this exact playbook run once already: publishers built audiences, then Google and Facebook inserted themselves as the discovery layer and captured the relationship. I wrote about what that actually cost the industry in The Relationship Was the Product: the relationship, not the reach, was the asset that got traded away. This time it isn’t referral traffic and ad inventory on the line. It’s the entire selection and consumption decision.

The center of gravity in user experience is shifting from the streamer to the agent. Whoever solves discovery captures the customer relationship, and none of the incumbent content-plus-pipes players are positioned to own that layer.

That’s Google, Amazon, OpenAI, and Anthropic territory. The next iteration of this 25-year failed formula won’t be a content company buying a pipe company. It’ll be a content company negotiating terms with an agent layer it doesn’t control and can’t acquire. Same trap, new owner of the choke point.

In B2B, that favors events over media: an agent can tell a buyer what to read, but it can't work a room for them. Agents compress the value of content as a discovery mechanism toward zero. They don’t compress the value of presence. They accentuate it.

What this means if you’re running one of these businesses

* Audit which layer you’re actually competing on. If your business depends on being the destination for discovery, you’re exposed. If it depends on being the room, the relationship, or the transaction itself, you’re not, at least not yet.

* Stop diversifying content and distribution into one balance sheet. The math has failed three times at scale. It won’t work the fourth time because your team is smarter than Comcast’s.

* Price for where the multiple is going, not where it is. Today’s events premium and media-events discount are the market using category as a proxy for function, presence versus discovery, and a proxy is never permanent. As agents get better at telling presence from curation inside each category, the multiple will follow the function, not the label. That repricing will move faster than your next planning cycle.

* Build the agent relationship before someone builds it around you. The publishers who lost to Google and Facebook didn’t lose because their content got worse. They lost because they let someone else own the discovery layer. That mistake is available to make again, right now, with agents.

* Separate what’s agent-vulnerable from what’s agent-resistant inside your own portfolio. Discovery and selection are exposed. Presence, trust, and judgment calls made in a room are not. Know which one is paying your bills.

If you don't run a media or events business, ask yourself: what in your business functions as discovery, and is an agent about to sit in front of it?

Comcast didn’t fail because the people running it were bad operators. They failed because they were fighting a structural fact with a management chart. The businesses that win the next round won’t be the ones with the biggest combined footprint. They’ll be the ones honest enough to know which layer they’re actually built to defend.

The views expressed in Uphoff on Media are entirely my own. They don’t represent the opinions of any company I’ve led, any board I’ve sat on, or any investor who’s had the pleasure of debating strategy with me over the years. If something I write here sounds brilliant, I’ll take full credit. If it turns out to be wrong, I was clearly misquoted by myself.

“Uphoff on Media” is published by Tony Uphoff, Founder and Managing Partner of Uphoff Advisory, a strategic advisory practice for founders, CEOs, and investors in B2B information, marketing, and technology. The businesses that drive business.