Vollständiges Transkript von Inside Counterintelligence: Secret, Scandals, Reform

And so the bureau working with the New York City Police Department, kind of ironically, really dug into its Connor intelligence mission, more as a Connor sabotage mission. 02:36.902 --> 02:45.072 [SPEAKER_01]: And you can certainly see, in fact, it's in the executive order, preventing sabotage understandably, is one of the elements of the Connor intelligence priority. 02:45.524 --> 03:01.364 [SPEAKER_01]: So go call counterintelligence, it was principally a counter sabotage program, and it was augmented legally by policy, by the most recent passage of the Espionage Act of 1917, and the sedition of the 1918. 03:02.225 --> 03:13.759 [SPEAKER_01]: That model, as in Artful as it was, and as non-reticulate, not in Articulate, but disjoided in 03:16.473 --> 03:36.456 [SPEAKER_01]: And that time, absent the voice of Congress, the FBI had engaged in a series of non-technical collection against quite a number of U.S. persons that resulted in what they called the National Security Index or wait for it, the rabble browser index, whereby with no evidence of a crime, 03:36.436 --> 03:44.753 [SPEAKER_01]: we would acquire the identities and other identifying information of persons deemed to be potentially capable of doing harm to the national security. 03:45.434 --> 03:53.972 [SPEAKER_01]: So that's the first, that is the first real episode of U.S. Conorentalages, dominated by Hoover's relationship with Roosevelt. 03:53.952 --> 03:57.261 [SPEAKER_01]: and then less dominated by who was relationship with Truman. 03:57.541 --> 03:58.745 [SPEAKER_01]: They did not get along very well. 03:59.507 --> 04:09.092 [SPEAKER_01]: Then again, who was relationship with Eisenhower and kind of a piece of sorts between the agency and the bureau once we got that whole Latin American wasn't a hemisphere thing straightened out. 04:09.933 --> 04:14.164 [SPEAKER_01]: So up until 1947 with the National Street, you have one version of Conor Intelligence. 04:14.244 --> 04:22.104 [SPEAKER_01]: It's really in separate parks, Conor Subversion, Conor Savitage, Conor In Selection, Domestic Intelligence, goes by a variety of names. 04:22.124 --> 04:27.317 [SPEAKER_00]: So you would say then the chapter one would run basically from World War I to 1947. 04:27.297 --> 04:29.399 [SPEAKER_00]: I want 1947's the end of chapter one. 04:29.600 --> 04:35.886 [SPEAKER_01]: Distinctive change in policy and legal guidelines by which we operate, and the operation on, absolutely. 04:35.906 --> 04:53.085 [SPEAKER_00]: And then 1947, you have the National Security Act, the establishment of my former employer, the Central Intelligence Agency, a few years later, National Security Agency, right, the National Security Council, which is basically survived more or less intact up to the present day. 04:53.065 --> 04:56.292 [SPEAKER_00]: So, how do counterintelligence change then in 1947? 04:57.194 --> 05:04.531 [SPEAKER_00]: Certainly the agency would have been a new player and an important player on the scene,

but the FBI continues its role as well. 05:04.732 --> 05:06.035 [SPEAKER_01]: Right. 05:06.055 --> 05:09.302 [SPEAKER_01]: So the predominant flavor after 47. 05:10.227 --> 05:13.010 [SPEAKER_01]: up until Anglican and Hoover both start to lose their influence. 05:13.030 --> 05:33.133 [SPEAKER_01]: For different reasons, but roughly it are about the same time, Hoover definitely loses after May 2nd 72, he dies, is really driven by, however, history is judged to be incorrect, a good faith belief in something we're dealing with today, which is foreign influence. 05:33.333 --> 05:36.057 [SPEAKER_01]: There was a very, very, very strong belief. 05:36.077 --> 05:37.298 [SPEAKER_01]: And that without good reason. 05:38.240 --> 05:56.502 [SPEAKER_01]: that the Soviets and their proxies, the Warsaw Pack countries, and the other Soviet socials for publics or the other socials for publics, were engaged in non-kinetic engagement for the purpose of exercising foreign influence in the United States, commercially, diplomatically. 05:56.903 --> 06:04.253 [SPEAKER_01]: the voting cycle and that it was they were so good at it, that they were going undetected and we had to keep digging deeper. 06:04.854 --> 06:06.776 [SPEAKER_01]: And in fact, and we've reviewed all this. 06:06.796 --> 06:10.722 [SPEAKER_01]: So when when I was on the silver and rock condition, we dug back 60 years. 06:10.802 --> 06:12.544 [SPEAKER_01]: We looked at all the working papers. 06:12.925 --> 06:16.009 [SPEAKER_01]: We looked at all the draft legislation that never found its way to the floor. 06:16.732 --> 06:28.446 [SPEAKER_01]: In fact, it was a good faith belief that there was strong currents of foreign influence, influencing every aspect of U.S. life. 06:28.466 --> 06:31.669 [SPEAKER_01]: No greater example than the Hollywood tent, right, in the MacArthur era. 06:32.490 --> 06:36.315 [SPEAKER_01]: People actually believe that was happening, and in many cases it was, but in not in all cases. 06:36.375 --> 06:42.402 [SPEAKER_01]: And so the excess is there is what the church committee focused on. 06:43.698 --> 06:52.375 [SPEAKER_01]: that when it comes to counterintelligence, that we, and not just we, the FBI, but the U.S. counterintelligence has never had the resources it needed. 06:52.912 --> 06:56.697 [SPEAKER_01]: to actually address the unique position in the United States. 06:56.857 --> 07:08.272 [SPEAKER_01]: So let's never forget the fact that the United States is the only country in the world with two full and basted royal staffs resident in the United States. 07:09.093 --> 07:09.293 [SPEAKER_01]: Right? 07:09.394 --> 07:15.301 [SPEAKER_01]: For no one country who got their embassy here in Washington and New York and then they got their mission in New York. 07:15.982 --> 07:21.990 [SPEAKER_01]: Two full and basted royal staffs, which means two full staffs by which you can provide 07:22.358 --> 07:26.404 [SPEAKER_01]: to the clandestine activities of your foreign intelligence and or security or CI service. 07:27.325 --> 07:51.758 [SPEAKER_01]: So we had that challenge and in that proliferation of foreign intelligence officers here in the United States, representing 160 countries at one time, probably 191 now, 30 or 40 of them of principal importance to us and we actually assess these things in terms of their threat value. 07:52.008 --> 07:53.651 [SPEAKER_01]: and how best to cover them. 07:53.672 --> 07:57.199 [SPEAKER_01]: And I would add, which history seems to have swallowed, the following fact. 07:57.600 --> 07:59.724 [SPEAKER_01]: You point out correctly that Pfizer's created in 78. 07:59.744 --> 08:04.414 [SPEAKER_01]: I pointed out that President Reagan signs executive order 12 triple three in 1981. 08:06.078 --> 08:10.928 [SPEAKER_01]: What history has forgotten is an, not until 1978. 08:12.325 --> 08:17.882 [SPEAKER_01]: Does the FBI have a formally trained professional surveillance capability? 08:18.022 --> 08:18.865 [SPEAKER_01]: That's fascinating. 08:18.945 --> 08:19.206 [SPEAKER_01]: Right. 08:19.447 --> 08:19.607 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah. 08:19.908 --> 08:24.903 [SPEAKER_01]: So let's, let's just take a moment to review that until 1978 agents did their own surveillance. 08:25.284 --> 08:25.525 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah. 08:27.125 --> 08:32.191 [SPEAKER_01]: And every agent, like every case officer, like every different, only has so many hours in the day. 08:32.592 --> 08:38.960 [SPEAKER_01]: So whatever you are, cadre of FBI, is what we're working, I came into the world, working bank robberies and kidnapping. 08:38.980 --> 08:41.063 [SPEAKER_01]: So it was my initial assignment, right? 08:41.083 --> 08:43.506 [SPEAKER_01]: Or you're working Congress, be an eyes and counterintelligence cases. 08:44.487 --> 08:49.133 [SPEAKER_01]: Up until 1978, you were responsible for your own surveillance. 08:49.889 --> 08:58.237 [SPEAKER_01]: Now, based in your past experience, I would say you imagine if I told you, we don't have a professional surveillance cadre, we're going to put a case office around you following you around the street of film the blank. 08:58.257 --> 09:00.899 [SPEAKER_01]: As a case officer spying on you, that would make me very happy. 09:01.460 --> 09:04.623 [SPEAKER_01]: Right, that's the goal and bullet for you. 09:04.663 --> 09:06.044 [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, that's just fast fabric. 09:06.585 --> 09:19.677 [SPEAKER_01]: And so that was, so without Pfizer, without formal surveillance and without redirection from the present, the program up until, as you point out, up until this period in the mid 09:19.893 --> 09:32.265 [SPEAKER_01]: It all changes though with the findings of the church committee and we realize that if in fact we are now going to have legal means by which present evidence and court that maybe this 09:33.275 --> 09:41.467 [SPEAKER_01]: very diverse, though not necessarily well-resourced counterintelligence enterprise, will be more fine-tuned towards a contrast between us. 09:41.647 -->

09:43.450 [SPEAKER_01]: And that's in fact what happened. 09:43.470 --> 09:44.331 [SPEAKER_00]: So that's the next period. 09:44.351 --> 09:45.593 [SPEAKER_00]: That's very interesting. 09:45.673 --> 09:51.262 [SPEAKER_00]: But before we leave chapter two, so to speak, 47 to the mid-seventies. 09:52.403 --> 10:01.797 [SPEAKER_00]: In counterintelligence of counter-espionage, let's talk a little bit about the relationship between our two organizations, our two former employers, the FBI and the CIA. 10:02.452 --> 10:05.095 [SPEAKER_01]: There's a way to do it formulae or do you want to take off the gloves? 10:05.315 --> 10:06.456 [SPEAKER_00]: I'll let's take off the gloves. 10:06.516 --> 10:08.919 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I'll put my mouthpiece in and we'll go at it. 10:09.319 --> 10:15.745 [SPEAKER_00]: But I think there's a saying that's ricocheted around the intelligence community for a long time. 10:15.765 --> 10:20.650 [SPEAKER_00]: And I think there's a lot of truth to it that counterintelligence is only as effective. 10:22.232 --> 10:27.177 [SPEAKER_00]: And only as healthy as the relationship between the CIA and the FBI. 10:27.376 --> 10:43.258 [SPEAKER_00]: uh... and uh... it's been fascinating uh... teaching here at IWP and refreshing my own memory on some of the cases to realize just how many significant counterintelligence and counter espionage successes have come 10:43.863 --> 10:46.145 [SPEAKER_00]: because of the cooperation between the two agencies. 10:46.225 --> 10:57.357 [SPEAKER_00]: When the agency is collected information overseas from a source, the points to a leak or a spy in the United States, often without a name, right? 10:57.377 --> 11:01.781 [SPEAKER_00]: But often, enough information to give the bureau that critical lead. 11:02.342 --> 11:06.526 [SPEAKER_00]: So what was that relationship like in the chapter two period? 11:06.566 --> 11:08.368 [SPEAKER_00]: 47 in the mid-70s? 11:08.348 --> 11:13.320 [SPEAKER_00]: I'll, I'll, I'll preface this by pointing to two particular characters. 11:13.400 --> 11:18.653 [SPEAKER_00]: I want his gem angle to write the head of counterintelligence, famous or infamous or both, Nick. 11:18.673 --> 11:24.687 [SPEAKER_00]: I think more books have written been written about that guy than any other person with that CIA history. 11:24.667 --> 11:31.199 [SPEAKER_00]: The other one that might be less well-known, but I find them a very interesting figure is William Harvey, Bill Harvey, sure. 11:32.020 --> 11:33.403 [SPEAKER_00]: Victoria's in your organization. 11:34.385 --> 11:34.825 [SPEAKER_01]: And mine. 11:34.946 --> 11:35.447 [SPEAKER_01]: Exactly. 11:35.687 --> 11:39.975 [SPEAKER_00]: But a man not without some skill and ability. 11:40.736 --> 11:43.401 [SPEAKER_00]: And who I think, despite... 11:43.381 --> 11:45.564 [SPEAKER_00]: some personal flaws and issues. 11:45.604 --> 11:50.230 [SPEAKER_00]: I think was a hard-driving and hard-charging intelligence officer. 11:50.850 --> 11:58.780 [SPEAKER_00]: So without his background, what was that relationship like from, say, the end of World War II to the mid-70s? 11:58.900 --> 12:12.257 [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, so here's a version where I'm going to exercise some personal 12:12.490 --> 12:15.917 [SPEAKER_01]: which the San Diego office had no contact with the CIA by design. 12:17.219 --> 12:27.639 [SPEAKER_01]: I thought as because we're a small-ish potatoes in Chicago and San Diego, more defensive in San Diego than Chicago, but it was just by circumstance, not by Dictat. 12:28.641 --> 12:30.685 [SPEAKER_01]: I come here to Washington after language school. 12:31.154 --> 12:33.677 [SPEAKER_01]: and I tell my boss in the washing fill office. 12:33.697 --> 12:35.498 [SPEAKER_01]: So this would be a fall of 1986. 12:35.538 --> 12:40.003 [SPEAKER_01]: I'm going to go out to the CIA and talk to them out of the check and a soul of excavators. 12:40.023 --> 12:41.925 [SPEAKER_01]: So I was going to talk to them out on Warsaw Pack to shoot. 12:41.945 --> 12:43.987 [SPEAKER_01]: Let's say, for the parts of this conversation. 12:45.208 --> 12:51.515 [SPEAKER_01]: And my boss, a GS15 at the time, goes black swipes, who have you called to say you're coming out? 12:51.955 --> 12:52.776 [SPEAKER_01]: I said, I haven't called anybody. 12:52.796 --> 12:54.638 [SPEAKER_01]: I just drive out there and show my badge. 12:55.759 --> 12:59.963 [SPEAKER_01]: So in 1986, we are not allowed to make. 13:00.010 --> 13:09.063 [SPEAKER_01]: a house call at Langley without first obtaining prior permission, not from our boss in the field office, but from headquarters and it had to be in writing. 13:09.964 --> 13:16.333 [SPEAKER_01]: So until 1986, we are not allowed to consort with you guys unless it was specifically authorized by headquarters. 13:16.353 --> 13:25.866 [SPEAKER_01]: And to get that, you have to actually present them with a roadmap, what do you intend to discuss, what concessions you make, there's a very formal process that 13:25.846 --> 13:27.148 [SPEAKER_01]: is a fallout from over. 13:27.369 --> 13:37.628 [SPEAKER_01]: Now Hoover had been dead at that point 14 years, dies in 1972, this is in 1986, but that very much, that very much laid over the FBI CIA relationship. 13:37.648 --> 13:40.834 [SPEAKER_01]: From the Bureau's perspective, I can't speak to it from the agency's perspective. 13:41.877 --> 13:52.731 [SPEAKER_01]: The two exceptions, of course, which now become known because of Hanson and Ames are the courtship program, but that was a formal program, joint operation between the FBI and the CIA. 13:53.492 --> 14:01.422 [SPEAKER_01]: Here in the United States in elsewhere, and we collectively, collaboratively, worked on a series of targets around the world. 14:01.402 --> 14:11.759 [SPEAKER_01]: But those were high level meetings and every last I was done at every last T was cross and that's all because of who Whoever wanted you to have no relationship with the CIA. 14:12.239 --> 14:28.405

[SPEAKER_01]: If he caught you having unauthorized contact with the CIA He would fire you and in fact as you know the reason the CIA's created Statutorily in 47 but not really an act until the CIA after 48 is because whoever fought To keep the Western Hemisphere 14:28.520 --> 14:34.328 [SPEAKER_01]: in the FBI's backyard, and that the CIA could have the rest of the world, but the FBI would have the Western atmosphere. 14:35.710 --> 14:37.613 [SPEAKER_01]: This is where Bill Harvey comes up, as you know. 14:37.733 --> 14:47.888 [SPEAKER_01]: So, Bill Harvey comes out of that environment, slides over to your side, and really, as you said earlier, becomes one of the fascinating characters in all this, to include involvement in the Cambridge Five. 14:48.208 --> 14:48.428 [SPEAKER_00]: Right? 14:48.448 --> 14:55.118 [SPEAKER_00]: Volume in the Cambridge Five, he was, if I recall correctly, he was the architect of the 14:55.503 --> 15:04.568 [SPEAKER_00]: And again, if I recall correctly, he was also involved in Miami with quite a bit of the anti-Castroactivity in the early 60s. 15:04.729 --> 15:07.015 [SPEAKER_00]: He, so as you know, better than I. 15:08.243 --> 15:09.866 [SPEAKER_01]: Bill had a great reputation in the bureau. 15:10.166 --> 15:14.013 [SPEAKER_01]: I think Hoover was very upset with him for leaving without it out. 15:14.033 --> 15:18.260 [SPEAKER_01]: Um, and he had a great, he had a great operators reputation. 15:18.300 --> 15:20.344 [SPEAKER_01]: He would get into a hostile environment, which he would call. 15:20.404 --> 15:28.277 [SPEAKER_01]: He was, as you said, in Berlin, nothing more hostile than being in West Berlin, but 100 miles inside East Berlin, or the East Germany border. 15:28.257 --> 15:42.535 [SPEAKER_01]: Sure, the island in a red sea and he proved himself in a number of them you such that then as you say I think you went to a jam wave or amlash down in Miami right afric Castro comes to power in 19 well New Year's Eve at 58 New Year's Day of 1959. 15:42.555 --> 15:42.896 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah. 15:42.956 --> 15:43.116 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah. 15:43.656 --> 15:47.842 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah So now it so that you're correct to point out we all know it. 15:48.322 --> 15:51.987 [SPEAKER_01]: I think now 40 and 50 years down We all kind of relish it was like 15:52.237 --> 15:58.383 [SPEAKER_01]: you know, a mom and dad fighting over things, but it's all work out very well because right now we enjoy a fabulous relationship. 15:58.403 --> 16:14.238 [SPEAKER_00]: We do, but you know, even before 1986, so in the 60s and 70s, there were examples, if I'm not mistaken, of good collaboration, cooperation between the Bureau and the agency. 16:14.918 --> 16:20.944 [SPEAKER_00]: Let's take, for example, the Poliakov case in New York 16:21.312 --> 16:27.017 [SPEAKER_00]: a senior Russian intelligence officer, military intelligence, codename top hat, codename top hat. 16:27.257 --> 16:28.218 [SPEAKER_00]: Our codename top hat. 16:28.338 --> 16:28.539 [SPEAKER_00]: Yep. 16:28.739 --> 16:30.480 [SPEAKER_00]: I forget what ours was, but it ain't good. 16:30.500 --> 16:31.201 [SPEAKER_01]: They're general. 16:31.681 --> 16:32.342 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah. 16:32.462 --> 16:32.862 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah. 16:33.143 --> 16:35.805 [SPEAKER_00]: He volunteered initially to the bureau, right. 16:36.005 --> 16:47.175 [SPEAKER_00]: But then when he left the United States and went on to overseas postings, he was handled by the agency, a dynamic that has applied in many other successful cases. 16:47.596 --> 16:48.857 [SPEAKER_00]: But that was a while ago. 16:48.877 --> 16:51.319 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, I believe he volunteered in the 60s. 16:51.299 --> 16:56.851 [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, and in fact, he initially volunteered to a military defense at her shake. 16:57.211 --> 16:57.752 [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, okay. 16:57.772 --> 17:01.420 [SPEAKER_01]: And the, and he, and US military, I say, said, I'm not your guy. 17:01.801 --> 17:03.063 [SPEAKER_01]: I'll introduce you to the bureau guy. 17:03.224 --> 17:05.649 [SPEAKER_01]: And they actually had a pull side at a social gathering. 17:05.669 --> 17:07.232 [SPEAKER_01]: Click classic. 17:07.482 --> 17:17.022 [SPEAKER_01]: From your world, my world too, classic teap, and you know, create a little bit of a gap, make a meat, give them some contact information, move on from there. 17:17.042 --> 17:28.225 [SPEAKER_00]: So, but if the Bureau hadn't shared that information with the agency, we would have never been able to pick him up when later on, he left the Soviet Union again and was posted elsewhere. 17:28.745 --> 17:29.546 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, so he leaves. 17:30.849 --> 17:34.735 [SPEAKER_01]: There's some issues about whether or not put your coffee was in New York once or twice. 17:35.537 --> 17:41.547 [SPEAKER_01]: We know for sure once, we suspect strongly a second time, although there's been some dispute about that. 17:41.727 --> 17:43.070 [SPEAKER_01]: And that might go to a whole other issue. 17:43.090 --> 17:45.093 [SPEAKER_01]: We can discuss it in another time about deception. 17:45.514 --> 17:50.162 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, for a current intelligence person, we'll leave that alone for now, because those are deep waters for all of us, right? 17:50.142 --> 17:52.605 [SPEAKER_01]: But polyacoff was not the only one. 17:52.665 --> 17:54.107 [SPEAKER_01]: And we did the same thing with Fedora. 17:54.127 --> 17:54.908 [SPEAKER_01]: We shared Fedora. 17:55.248 --> 17:56.009 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah. 17:56.389 --> 18:00.675 [SPEAKER_01]: And similarly, I'm thinking about my next polygraph. 18:00.695 --> 18:05.480 [SPEAKER_01]: Similarly, you have had cases that have come in the United States, and you've handed them over to us. 18:05.761 --> 18:06.301 [SPEAKER_00]: Absolutely. 18:06.321 --> 18:07.723 [SPEAKER_01]: So, yeah. 18:07.743 --> 18:08.864 [SPEAKER_01]: So, you're absolutely right. 18:10.226 --> 18:15.512 [SPEAKER_01]: The great relationship got more formalized after the

notorious compromises of 85 and 86. 18:16.073 --> 18:17.174 [SPEAKER_01]: That's what changes everything. 18:17.254 --> 18:17.955 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah. 18:18.695 --> 18:40.939 [SPEAKER_00]: And those have been recounted in books after book, after book, and newspaper reports and movies right there's no end of the movies about the compromise of 85 so yeah, so let's talk about that then and and keeping to kind of our our book chapter motif here right chapter two and American counter intelligence 47 to the mid 70s 18:43.585 --> 18:54.730 [SPEAKER_00]: the beginning of the new chapter chapter three occasion by the domestic spying scandal race oversight the advent of the phyza process and the phyza court. 18:55.311 --> 18:57.055 [SPEAKER_00]: So that's the beginning of chapter three. 18:57.075 --> 19:01.324 [SPEAKER_00]: What happened during this time period and when did that end? 19:02.435 --> 19:03.497 [SPEAKER_00]: So a couple of things happen. 19:03.537 --> 19:07.025 [SPEAKER_01]: So we've already recounted, um, Pfizer established 78. 19:07.206 --> 19:11.936 [SPEAKER_01]: The Bureau acquires a formal surveillance capability also in 78. 19:12.598 --> 19:15.905 [SPEAKER_01]: President writes executive order 12 triple three in 81. 19:16.607 --> 19:18.030 [SPEAKER_01]: But there's a couple of other things that happen. 19:18.803 --> 19:31.177 [SPEAKER_01]: SIG on station shuts down in 75 right Vietnam war ends on April 30th of 1975 and the largest station ever comes grind into the hall CIA and the FBI stop hiring. 19:31.397 --> 19:46.313 [SPEAKER_01]: I remember I had gone out to the FBI Academy in 1979 and the Academy was processing 40 new wages that whole year which is which is a nothing number that's a single class among 15 class near we do now 19:46.293 --> 19:56.112 [SPEAKER_01]: But back then, because of church and pike, and the Rockefeller Commission out of the White House, all of US intelligence had come to a little bit of a grinding hall. 19:56.312 --> 20:02.985 [SPEAKER_01]: They had on and resources, demographics related to the World War II, hiring and firing cycle. 20:03.134 --> 20:07.139 [SPEAKER_01]: So all that comes to bear, and in fact, there is now a, we've obtained it here. 20:07.199 --> 20:15.149 [SPEAKER_01]: There's a now declassified conversation between Henry Kissinger and George Bush then acting as the director of CIA for that year. 20:15.289 --> 20:15.550 [SPEAKER_01]: Great. 20:17.032 --> 20:18.113 [SPEAKER_01]: We're Kissinger and Bush. 20:18.594 --> 20:21.998 [SPEAKER_01]: And like I said, now declassify, saying we've got nothing going on right now. 20:22.238 --> 20:28.086 [SPEAKER_01]: So in the interim, when Ford leaves and Carter comes in, so during the transition, what may now call the tire team era, right? 20:28.586 --> 20:29.527 [SPEAKER_01]: We had nothing going on. 20:29.728 --> 20:29.968 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah. 20:31.518 --> 20:39.649 [SPEAKER_01]: But there were inditia of problems, right, at both ends, both at the agency and the bureau. 20:40.830 --> 20:42.332 [SPEAKER_01]: All that's cleaned up, though, by December 81. 20:42.352 --> 20:47.539 [SPEAKER_01]: And there's issues from 77,78, so we're not quite sure about. 20:47.959 --> 20:52.345 [SPEAKER_01]: President Raiden comes in, 81, and it begins with gangbusters. 20:54.518 --> 21:06.713 [SPEAKER_01]: He might argue that President Reagan gave us, you know, a rousing speech and turned everybody into the wind and that's why it became such an effective program, but in fact it's more complicated than that. 21:06.733 --> 21:15.885 [SPEAKER_01]: Like I say, the ability to put surveillance on subjects and then follow up with Pfizer that we could then use in court changes the game. 21:15.983 --> 21:34.937 [SPEAKER_00]: And you know, I'll add to John before we leave the late 70s that period had a profound impact in the agency as well in the CIA, there was the, there was the post BNOM hangover that was very real dark hangover right there was there was the stance field Turner era. 21:34.917 --> 21:55.035 [SPEAKER_00]: who was president Carter's CIA director in the famous or infamous Halloween massacre October 31st of I forget what year must have been 76 or 77 when Turner fired about 800 agency officers mostly from the clandestine side. 21:55.015 --> 22:19.572 [SPEAKER_00]: uh... as kind of a cleaning house gesture so you know this idea that we talk about today of doge and and let people go it's not entirely new right it's not the unique thing they're trying to characterize exactly we've had episodic uh... and that was a traumatic event uh... for the agency because 800 people uh... it's a much smaller bureaucracy in a smaller agency uh... then people think 22:19.552 --> 22:43.888 [SPEAKER_01]: uh... that was a significant special in the clandestine signs act right uh... a significant amount of experience walked out of the door right when stance field turner made that decision not yet you're absolutely right in fact by way of reinforcing that and we'll get to this at some point maybe not today but in a subsequent broadcast and that's with regard to deception you're exactly right about stance field turner you're right about Carter i will say this though 22:45.370 --> 22:57.576 [SPEAKER_01]: Brazil's key, the National Security Advisor, ever, was not unmindful of the dramatic changes the Pfizer law and the changing policy would bring to the counterintelligence program. 22:57.596 --> 23:00.983 [SPEAKER_01]: And I say that because, as I said, a by-law earlier. 23:02.110 --> 23:14.650 [SPEAKER_01]: When we were denied the opportunity to go into court with every espnage case we made because we couldn't bring the evidence with us, and so we resorted to a series of counterintelligence outcomes to include double agent operation, or we would do that. 23:14.830 --> 23:17.134 [SPEAKER_01]: And we would do that to a great degree. 23:19.217 --> 23:24.726 [SPEAKER_01]: When the carbon administration realized that with the passage

of FISA, we'd be more inclined. 23:25.887 --> 23:31.455 [SPEAKER_01]: to go to the headline-grabbing conrespionage case than the ever buried double agent case. 23:32.457 --> 23:35.862 [SPEAKER_01]: A card administration pulls the double agent program into the White House. 23:36.823 --> 23:50.304 [SPEAKER_01]: Before they've left it to the intelligence, the counterintelligence community, not just the FBI, but principally the Army, somewhat the Navy and the Air Force, although those are hard to run, to run a double agent at 35,000 feet, or 600 feet on the water. 23:50.704 --> 23:54.510 [SPEAKER_01]: But the Army is a great partner in the double agent program. 23:56.296 --> 23:58.138 [SPEAKER_01]: carbon administration realized immediately. 23:58.939 --> 24:08.972 [SPEAKER_01]: With the passage of phyza, you're going to see a slew towards more congressmanace cases than necessarily bending them into counterintelligence of double agent opportunities. 24:08.992 --> 24:16.702 [SPEAKER_00]: Because it's because, and is that because, sorry, it interrupt, but is that because it gave the bureau a clearer path to prosecutions and that kind of thing? 24:16.802 --> 24:18.384 [SPEAKER_01]: Right, yes, absolutely. 24:18.685 --> 24:21.308 [SPEAKER_01]: And, like your organization, 24:22.587 --> 24:45.608 [SPEAKER_01]: we think we hire well and we think we hire talented and ambitious people and you get more credit from making an espionage case than a double agent case and we'll ever hear it right right and that's just that's the reality that makes sense or so so we actually now declassified and we acquired it the FLA we actually have the formally classified document from the 24:45.588 --> 24:52.018 [SPEAKER_01]: we'll now run double agents out of the White House, which is brilliant because it shows and we'll get to this at some other point. 24:52.739 --> 25:02.733 [SPEAKER_01]: There is a notion of counterintelligence at a national level, not just an agency or a department level, but the military girls, the above service of a national outcomes, not just agency specific outcomes. 25:03.374 --> 25:13.249 [SPEAKER_01]: And they realized they were probably going to lose the Bureau of Driving, a double agent program predominantly in favor of perhaps, 25:13.229 --> 25:21.500 [SPEAKER_01]: So they still want the main tank control of their deception program by human needs right not all deception of course You know, it's by human needs. 25:21.520 --> 25:34.056 [SPEAKER_01]: You can do it through children island deception and technical mean cargo netting I mean for soap to nuts, but you can also do it with human You know agents and the cargo administration recognizing 25:35.521 --> 25:37.724 [SPEAKER_01]: to use your book and chapter analogy, right? 25:38.204 --> 25:44.171 [SPEAKER_01]: The new chapter had been turned, and we did not want to let the double agent program go and be swallowed up by the congressman. 25:44.311 --> 25:58.488 [SPEAKER_01]: So they brought it into

the NSC, and it's a brilliant act, like in recognition of what's going on, to just go ahead and we'll continue to make it national by driving it out of the White House because nothing says above service a national like White House stationery. 25:58.508 --> 25:59.789 [SPEAKER_00]: Right, it's all right, exactly. 26:00.050 --> 26:01.331 [SPEAKER_00]: Okay. 26:01.351 --> 26:05.376 [SPEAKER_00]: So we entered the Reagan era, 1981, 26:05.660 --> 26:19.978 [SPEAKER_00]: All important executive order, one, two, triple three, which, again, has undergone some modification, but has still studied to this day as one of the foundational documents of the U.S. intelligence community and national security. 26:22.000 --> 26:24.964 [SPEAKER_00]: So how do counterintelligence change for the bureau? 26:24.984 --> 26:29.229 [SPEAKER_00]: And we can talk about for the agency as well with the advent of the Reagan administration. 26:29.810 --> 26:33.895 [SPEAKER_01]: So a couple of things happen. 26:35.225 --> 26:40.131 [SPEAKER_01]: When Reagan came into office, the Bureau had about 900 agents working in college. 26:40.671 --> 26:44.796 [SPEAKER_01]: Now, the Bureau at the time was about 9,500 agents. 26:44.816 --> 26:46.598 [SPEAKER_01]: Let's call 10,000 to make the math easier. 26:47.319 --> 26:57.030 [SPEAKER_01]: And that has historically been before and since, but not during the Reagan era is about 9 to 10% of the agent workforce. 26:57.989 --> 26:59.352 [SPEAKER_01]: is in the counterintelligence program. 27:00.594 --> 27:02.779 [SPEAKER_01]: So he had roughly 10,000 agents total. 27:03.120 --> 27:06.948 [SPEAKER_01]: I think it was 95,000 when I came in, about 900 of them were getting counterintelligence. 27:07.509 --> 27:11.818 [SPEAKER_01]: By 1985, the one was 2,000 agents were getting counterintelligence. 27:12.639 --> 27:16.808 [SPEAKER_01]: And we had this whole other workforce, the surveillance workforce, which we had never had before. 27:18.644 --> 27:23.348 [SPEAKER_01]: So our multiplier effect on the counterintelligence target was enormous, right? 27:23.428 --> 27:29.774 [SPEAKER_01]: We double or almost triple the number of agents working counterintelligence and the agents don't have to do their own surveillance. 27:30.114 --> 27:35.419 [SPEAKER_01]: They've got a trained surveillance cadre doing it for them. 27:35.439 --> 27:47.250 [SPEAKER_00]: So let me put you on the spot and ask you the question because now we're getting into the year where both you and I joined our respective services and began our careers. 27:48.749 --> 27:58.917 [SPEAKER_00]: of agents to surveillance or agents who see eye counterintelligence specialists as a percentage of the pop overall population of the bureau workforce. 28:00.402 --> 28:03.450 [SPEAKER_01]: So you asked that like it's a hard question to answer, it's not. 28:05.607 --> 28:15.082 [SPEAKER_01]: And I'd looted to it earlier, fire from the mythology, or the urban legend of the Bureau running, you know, wildcat patterns, the White House, notwithstanding. 28:16.183 --> 28:20.831 [SPEAKER_01]: In fact, it depends on what kind of Connor intelligence program the president wants. 28:21.472 --> 28:22.173 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah. 28:22.193 --> 28:26.640 [SPEAKER_01]: And it's very clear, because we had a teacher here at IWP, can to graph and read. 28:27.040 --> 28:29.224 [SPEAKER_01]: We actually drafted the first 12 triple three. 28:29.244 --> 28:33.370 [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know that you know that, but we had a faculty member here at GoodFronted John Lunchowski's, 28:33.434 --> 28:39.985 [SPEAKER_01]: They were both on the NSC at the same time during Reagan, and he drafted large parts of the first 12 triple three, right? 28:40.005 --> 28:46.976 [SPEAKER_01]: In fact, the bureau will do, and the army will do, and the Navy, the Air Force, and the CO will do with the present, doesn't do. 28:46.997 --> 28:59.357 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, and so if the president wants to have a counterintelligence program that exercises more offensive, 29:00.299 --> 29:05.372 [SPEAKER_01]: towards global, above-service objectives, the president will get that. 29:05.392 --> 29:07.577 [SPEAKER_01]: But if the President Reagan, we need to be clear. 29:08.079 --> 29:15.878 [SPEAKER_01]: President Reagan, in a way that's almost impossible to overestimate, he had been made aware that the counterintelligence community, 29:16.465 --> 29:21.011 [SPEAKER_01]: had been so damaged, had so damaged, it's own reputation by the revelations in church. 29:21.031 --> 29:24.476 [SPEAKER_01]: He said, let's get everybody to court and they can see the work we're joining. 29:24.496 --> 29:26.078 [SPEAKER_01]: It was actually a brilliant move, right? 29:26.639 --> 29:35.310 [SPEAKER_01]: You can see we're actually making cases and we're not hiding anything from it because a judge and a jury of 12 will expose us for those inadequacies if we do. 29:35.751 --> 29:46.185 [SPEAKER_01]: And so the CI program he wanted was principally one of a conrespionage programs. 29:46.165 --> 29:58.623 [SPEAKER_00]: Step out on a limb here and say if there's one thing to take away, I think from this conversation, it is the extent to which it really is the White House and the President who decides direction. 29:59.184 --> 30:01.547 [SPEAKER_00]: And that goes beyond just counter-intelligence. 30:01.587 --> 30:16.088 [SPEAKER_00]: When I look at my own career in the history of my whole service to CIA, all of the controversial issues that happened in the past, whether it was 30:16.405 --> 30:26.678 [SPEAKER_00]: the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and the agencies more peripheral than people think, but involvement in that issue. 30:27.078 --> 30:38.512 [SPEAKER_00]: The attempts to overthrow Castro, a Yende and Chile, all of these controversial covert action programs, none of those programs were undertaken unilaterally by the CIA. 30:39.794 --> 30:42.177 [SPEAKER_00]: You could argue with the wisdom, 30:42.342 --> 30:51.313 [SPEAKER_00]: or not with the morality of these policies or not, but they all came from the presidents of the day. 30:53.215 --> 31:06.191 [SPEAKER_01]: And again, for you and anybody watching us, Frank Church is statement, and it's not more than the free minutes long, and it's, he delivers it in the most grave of tones. 31:06.251 --> 31:11.117 [SPEAKER_01]: And it really does bear watching because it doesn't take a lot of time. 31:12.093 --> 31:25.082 [SPEAKER_01]: all the mythology, all the urban legend, we had written for ourselves about what the bureau and the agency were doing, and it was a shadow government working away from monology last with utterly untrue. 31:25.583 --> 31:31.857 [SPEAKER_01]: But as you know, we're not allowed to advertise our successes, and in many cases we're not allowed to speak. 31:33.372 --> 31:37.596 [SPEAKER_01]: in our own defense because Lusso would be to give away secrets which we're not allowed to do. 31:37.996 --> 31:45.624 [SPEAKER_01]: And so those rumors are out there, generationally, unrebutted by the agency of the Bureau, but in fact untrue. 31:45.644 --> 31:49.928 [SPEAKER_01]: This was episode two of our Inside Counterintelligence Series. 31:49.948 --> 31:52.991 [SPEAKER_01]: Join us next time for episode three. 31:53.011 --> 31:57.275 [SPEAKER_01]: Our executive producers are Tim McRainer and Alfred Rickett. 31:57.295 --> 31:59.717 [SPEAKER_01]: Editing in Masterom was done by Olivia Fanner. 32:00.912 --> 32:14.989 [SPEAKER_01]: If you like this podcast and would like to learn more about the topics we covered here today, and if you're interested in what it takes to become a student at IWP, visit IWP.edu and click Apply Now.