Vollständiges Transkript von eMudhra’s Weak Private Keys: When Internet Trust Fails at Randomness

00:04:12,710 Before they there's the Mozilla bug that has an interesting thread 84 00:04:13,350 --> 00:04:16,350 before the claim was well for safety and security. 85 00:04:16,350 --> 00:04:19,150 We have to take this private up to that point. 86 00:04:19,150 --> 00:04:23,190 Everything was being said as, well, this was an error in the process 87 00:04:23,190 --> 00:04:24,190 and it wasn't that big a deal. 88 00:04:24,190 --> 00:04:26,750 And that is bluntly false. 89 00:04:27,110 --> 00:04:28,430 Yeah. Patent. 90 00:04:28,430 --> 00:04:32,390 So so maybe let's let's talk about, first of all, like before, I mean, 91 00:04:32,590 --> 00:04:35,230 yeah, the issue with the key, it was a weak key, right? 92 00:04:35,230 --> 00:04:37,230 Number four, very, very bad. 93 00:04:37,790 --> 00:04:40,590 But I think for our audience, like, I think we want to frame 94 00:04:40,790 --> 00:04:45,750 the importance of what exactly happened and why this is so serious. 95 00:04:45,790 --> 00:04:51,270 And I think we need to discuss how certificates work in your web browser 96 00:04:51,510 --> 00:04:54,390 and around public key cryptography. 97 00:04:54,750 --> 00:04:59,150 Let's explain what is the certificate chain in our web browsers 98 00:04:59,150 --> 00:05:01,230 and why this is so serious. 99 00:05:01,630 --> 00:05:04,190 The simplest way I'm always used to explain this is 100 00:05:04,790 --> 00:05:08,590 when I go to a website, let's say I go to securities.com. 101 00:05:08,830 --> 00:05:12,510 That has an SSL certificate, a TLS certificate, whatever, 102 00:05:13,070 --> 00:05:16,510 to encrypt traffic between the browser and the server. 103 00:05:17,070 --> 00:05:19,510 It allows that encrypted traffic to go. 104 00:05:19,790 --> 00:05:23,470 You know, what it allows us to say with some level of confidence, 105 00:05:23,990 --> 00:05:28,390 I'm talking to the right organization and my communication is private. 106 00:05:28,670 --> 00:05:33,750 OK. And I say some level of confidence because we have no way to say 107 00:05:33,790 --> 00:05:38,990 I, Kevin, trust the web server at securities.com 108 00:05:38,990 --> 00:05:41,630 to hand me the right certificate and be the right thing. 109 00:05:41,870 --> 00:05:48,110 What I do is my web browser has a list of certifying 110 00:05:48,110 --> 00:05:51,030 authorities or CAs. We hear this all the time. 111 00:05:51,230 --> 00:05:56,830 And basically my browser trusts those CAs. 112 00:05:56,990 --> 00:06:02,230 It believes that anything signed by the CA is legitimate. 113 00:06:02,550 --> 00:06:06,590 OK. And so when I get a certificate from a web server, 114 00:06:06,750 --> 00:06:12,470 I don't trust that cert that certificate has been signed by a CA. 115 00:06:13,030 --> 00:06:17,790 I trust the CA. The CA trusts that server. 116 00:06:18,310 --> 00:06:20,550 And so it's what trend they did trust. 117 00:06:20,550 --> 00:06:24,790 I must trust the cert because I trust the CA and the CA trusts them. 118 00:06:25,190 --> 00:06:28,990 OK. And this is entirely based on the idea 119 00:06:29,310 --> 00:06:35,310 that the trust in the CA is inviolate or however the word is pronounced. 120 00:06:36,030 --> 00:06:39,110 When, you know, with signatures and stuff like that, 121 00:06:39,110 --> 00:06:42,630 the way we do this, the way that we trust it is the idea that we have 122 00:06:42,630 --> 00:06:49,190 a private key that nobody but approved people here know. 123 00:06:49,550 --> 00:06:52,590 And we use that private key to sign the certificate. 124 00:06:52,830 --> 00:06:58,670 Basically, the private key is supposed to be 125 00:06:58,670 --> 00:07:01,230 mathematically complex. 126 00:07:01,670 --> 00:07:06,990 In this case, the key was literally the number four. 127 00:07:06,990 --> 00:07:09,830 When I first read it, I thought they were saying I know it was a joke. 128 00:07:09,870 --> 00:07:11,990 You was four bites. 129 00:07:11,990 --> 00:07:16,110 Yeah, which I'm much better. 130 00:07:16,990 --> 00:07:20,230 Right. But but in this case, like, for example, 131 00:07:20,230 --> 00:07:25,430 because I know what the private key is, I literally can create a certificate 132 00:07:25,670 --> 00:07:29,230 and find it as trusted by a mudger. 133 00:07:29,390 --> 00:07:31,470 Yes. And so I could build a website. 134 00:07:32,150 --> 00:07:33,870 Well, OK, I'll stop using the example. 135 00:07:33,870 --> 00:07:35,950 Security is because I control that domain. 136 00:07:35,950 --> 00:07:37,070 So of course I can. 137 00:07:37,070 --> 00:07:39,230 But but let's say Bank of America. 138 00:07:39,230 --> 00:07:43,910 I can build a website pretending to be Bank of America 139 00:07:44,590 --> 00:07:50,510 and finding the quote unquote Bank of America certificate as a mudger 140 00:07:50,750 --> 00:07:52,590 because I know their private key. 141 00:07:52,630 --> 00:07:55,390 Now, it will only work now if you haven't 142 00:07:55,390 --> 00:07:57,710 upgraded your browser and your browser doesn't have it right. 143 00:07:57,710 --> 00:08:02,310 Like, but but we all know that people don't patch, don't upgrade, don't do stuff. 144 00:08:02,510 --> 00:08:07,830 So this will be a threat, especially in areas where we're not 145 00:08:07,830 --> 00:08:10,870 upgrading as fast, where people are having problems. 146 00:08:12,270 --> 00:08:15,390 Is that these certificates are now known. 147 00:08:15,590 --> 00:08:19,870 The private keys are known so anybody can sign and say, 148 00:08:19,950 --> 00:08:23,030 I'm the C.A.E. mudger or however you say it. 149 00:08:23,630 --> 00:08:25,790 And I trust this sir. 150 00:08:26,310 --> 00:08:29,630 So we've we've completely undermined the trust chain. 151 00:08:30,150 --> 00:08:32,110 So yeah, make that answer the question. 152 00:08:32,110 --> 00:08:34,030 That's a great way to describe it. 153 00:08:35,910 --> 00:08:38,470 Mobile apps are just part of everyday life now. 154 00:08:38,830 --> 00:08:41,990 Banking, health

care, shopping, entertainment, you name it. 155 00:08:41,990 --> 00:08:45,750 And with that comes a lot of trust because users are putting 156 00:08:45,750 --> 00:08:48,470 their personal data directly into your app. 157 00:08:48,710 --> 00:08:49,830 But here's the reality. 158 00:08:49,830 --> 00:08:51,750 Mobile apps are a growing target. 159 00:08:52,030 --> 00:08:55,270 A recent survey found that 72 percent of organizations 160 00:08:55,270 --> 00:08:58,750 experienced a mobile app security incident last year. 161 00:08:58,750 --> 00:09:02,390 And 92 percent say threats are only increasing. 162 00:09:02,510 --> 00:09:06,030 And the way attackers are going after apps is pretty sophisticated. 163 00:09:06,110 --> 00:09:08,910 They're reverse engineering them, modifying them 164 00:09:08,910 --> 00:09:12,190 and redistributing fake versions through fishing campaigns, 165 00:09:12,390 --> 00:09:15,390 side loading and even third party app stores. 166 00:09:15,790 --> 00:09:20,190 So from a user's perspective, everything can look completely legitimate. 167 00:09:20,430 --> 00:09:24,430 That's why taking a proactive approach to mobile app security really matters. 168 00:09:24,590 --> 00:09:28,550 You want to stay ahead of these threats, not react after the damage is done. 169 00:09:28,870 --> 00:09:30,790 This is where Guard Square comes in. 170 00:09:30,790 --> 00:09:34,350 They provide advanced protection for both Android and iOS apps, 171 00:09:34,630 --> 00:09:38,830 along with automated security testing to catch vulnerabilities early 172 00:09:39,150 --> 00:09:43,670 and real time threat monitoring so you can actually see what's happening out there. 173 00:09:43,790 --> 00:09:47,510 If your mobile app is critical to your business, and it probably is, 174 00:09:47,790 --> 00:09:50,030 this is something worth paying attention to. 175 00:09:50,190 --> 00:09:52,870 You can learn more at GuardSquare.com. 176 00:09:52,990 --> 00:09:55,070 That's GuardSquare.com. 177 00:09:56,990 --> 00:10:01,030 And just to add that Emodra is not a root certificate. 178 00:10:01,030 --> 00:10:03,910 And so we could talk about the difference between root and intermediate 179 00:10:03,910 --> 00:10:07,950 certificates. So Emodra is a intermediate certificate. 180 00:10:08,430 --> 00:10:13,190 So to your point, yes, you could impersonate another domain 181 00:10:13,470 --> 00:10:16,870 and then you would inherently get the trust of the root CA. 182 00:10:16,990 --> 00:10:19,910 And so that's the biggest issue. 183 00:10:20,070 --> 00:10:24,150 And Scott, you actually worked for a root CA back in the day, right? 184 00:10:24,510 --> 00:10:28,310 And trust? Not one of the original ones, but it was and trust and trust.net 185 00:10:28,310 --> 00:10:32,550 had its own probably still does have its own root authority. 186 00:10:33,390 --> 00:10:35,950 Which was actually, yeah, it took a while. 187 00:10:35,950 --> 00:10:39,470 They were originally an intermediate authority until they got embedded. 188 00:10:39,830 --> 00:10:42,430 The thing that's interesting about this whole thing that started 189 00:10:42,430 --> 00:10:46,510 in the late 1990s with the first browsers like that was before. 190 00:10:46,870 --> 00:10:49,950 But yeah, Netscape communicator or navigator, whatever it was, right? 191 00:10:50,230 --> 00:10:54,110 What's interesting is that was kind of, in my mind, the first block chain 192 00:10:54,190 --> 00:10:58,270 because there was a chain of signed certificates that you could follow. 193 00:10:58,430 --> 00:11:03,030 So your your key was signed by your intermediate CA 194 00:11:03,030 --> 00:11:07,350 and that was signed by the root CA and that root CA was put into the browser 195 00:11:07,870 --> 00:11:09,310 and everybody got the browser. 196 00:11:09,350 --> 00:11:11,950 So everybody would get the public key of that root CA 197 00:11:11,950 --> 00:11:14,750 and they can understand whether to trust it or not. 198 00:11:14,750 --> 00:11:18,070 And I think that's how I'm not sure, but I think that's how those free browsers 199 00:11:18,070 --> 00:11:19,270 made their money, right? 200 00:11:19,270 --> 00:11:23,110 They charged for for the CAs to put their root 201 00:11:23,470 --> 00:11:27,430 e-certificates, not the keys themselves, because I hear a lot of people 202 00:11:28,430 --> 00:11:32,390 on podcasts talking about, well, they got their they published 203 00:11:32,390 --> 00:11:34,750 their keys or their private keys. 204 00:11:34,750 --> 00:11:36,030 No, they don't publish the private keys. 205 00:11:36,030 --> 00:11:39,270 They published only the certificate and the certificate 206 00:11:39,270 --> 00:11:41,910 contains an enshrined public key. 207 00:11:41,910 --> 00:11:46,310 So you you can always encrypt for or verify somebody's signature. 208 00:11:46,350 --> 00:11:51,630 But all that to say, there's a lot of a lot riding on, first of all, 209 00:11:51,630 --> 00:11:56,310 the randomness and complexity of those private keys 210 00:11:56,310 --> 00:12:00,190 that are used to create the certificates in the first place, right? 211 00:12:00,190 --> 00:12:05,230 And then the privacy of it to make sure that nobody gets access to it. 212 00:12:05,230 --> 00:12:10,150 And usually when those keys are created, the private part of the key pair 213 00:12:10,390 --> 00:12:13,190 is taken offline and nobody can ever get to it of it. 214 00:12:14,310 --> 00:12:15,750 Locks in a safe. 215 00:12:15,750 --> 00:12:17,030 Yeah, exactly. 216 00:12:17,030 --> 00:12:21,630 And so you don't want someone to be able to replicate, you know, 217 00:12:21,790 --> 00:12:23,990 one way to get that private key is to steal it. 218 00:12:24,630 --> 00:12:28,510 The other way is to guess it and get it right and be able to verify it 219 00:12:28,510 --> 00:12:29,750 with the certificate, right? 220 00:12:29,750 --> 00:12:33,310 And when you use the number four, you can verify that you've got 221 00:12:33,310 -->

00:12:34,470 the right number pretty quickly. 222 00:12:34,470 --> 00:12:36,750 So I think that's kind of what it comes down to. 223 00:12:37,230 --> 00:12:41,630 This is going back over 20 years in my memory from how public key 224 00:12:41,630 --> 00:12:42,510 cryptography worked. 225 00:12:42,510 --> 00:12:45,950 But, you know, blockchain is a lot like how those things work. 226 00:12:46,230 --> 00:12:49,350 But I think, you know, as Kevin said, I thought it was a really 227 00:12:49,350 --> 00:12:53,990 interesting idea Kevin had that because it was such a, you know, 228 00:12:53,990 --> 00:12:56,790 it's not that of all the random numbers you generate, 229 00:12:56,790 --> 00:12:58,430 you couldn't come up with the number four. 230 00:12:58,430 --> 00:13:00,630 It's just as likely to recur as any other number. 231 00:13:00,750 --> 00:13:05,190 But the way it's put in that format was probably very suspicious, 232 00:13:05,190 --> 00:13:08,990 right? As Kevin said, it's like, OK, maybe it was intentional. 233 00:13:08,990 --> 00:13:12,750 I can imagine, you know, a disgruntled employee because I can't 234 00:13:12,750 --> 00:13:16,470 see the government forcing them to do it that way because they 235 00:13:16,470 --> 00:13:18,590 would just be too suspicious, right? 236 00:13:19,270 --> 00:13:22,790 I think if somebody really was angry with the company and they 237 00:13:22,790 --> 00:13:24,670 got, you know, they're going to get laid off or whatever. 238 00:13:24,870 --> 00:13:26,830 And they're part of the key generation ceremony. 239 00:13:27,110 --> 00:13:29,390 They say, oh, I'm not going to use this big random number 240 00:13:29,390 --> 00:13:31,230 that we just generated. I'm going to use the number four. 241 00:13:31,230 --> 00:13:32,990 And that'll that'll show them. 242 00:13:32,990 --> 00:13:38,150 Well, they said that the the issue was a key generation error 243 00:13:38,150 --> 00:13:43,990 created by weak keys alongside intended strong P3384 keys. 244 00:13:44,990 --> 00:13:47,430 Some kind of mess up with the labels or something. 245 00:13:47,430 --> 00:13:49,750 They gave some explanation, but I. 246 00:13:49,750 --> 00:13:50,790 It took the wrong field. 247 00:13:50,790 --> 00:13:52,590 It took an index field instead of. 248 00:13:52,590 --> 00:13:56,630 Yeah. And I looked for is they gave some excuses. 249 00:13:56,750 --> 00:13:57,790 Yeah. That's what it sounds like. 250 00:13:58,030 --> 00:13:59,830 Yes. Exactly. 251 00:13:59,830 --> 00:14:03,630 Because this, I mean, for this is the first case that I think 252 00:14:03,630 --> 00:14:08,110 I've ever seen of this ever happening and like this is 253 00:14:08,110 --> 00:14:11,670 something that is so routine, right? 254 00:14:11,670 --> 00:14:15,510 That this and there's so many different intermediate CAs 255 00:14:15,510 --> 00:14:18,070 that are out there. I just find it shocking. 256 00:14:18,070 --> 00:14:20,630 And I think the whole industry does find the shocking 257

00:14:20,630 --> 00:14:21,550 that this actually happened. 258 00:14:21,550 --> 00:14:23,670 And in fact, there's people making T-shirts. 259 00:14:23,870 --> 00:14:26,910 And if you've seen those T-shirts, Kevin, the RSA 260 00:14:27,030 --> 00:14:31,710 key starts for RS key at private key end, right? 261 00:14:31,830 --> 00:14:33,070 Like I want one of those. 262 00:14:33,070 --> 00:14:34,990 Hilarious. So we all want one of those shirts. 263 00:14:35,030 --> 00:14:37,950 And so from a user and an organization perspective, 264 00:14:37,950 --> 00:14:42,190 obviously Microsoft has already revoked the eMudra 265 00:14:42,190 --> 00:14:44,350 certificates that has already been done. 266 00:14:44,350 --> 00:14:46,670 This is why it's very important that you update your web 267 00:14:46,670 --> 00:14:47,710 browsers, right? 268 00:14:47,750 --> 00:14:51,910 This issue has been resolved, but there is that window of 269 00:14:51,910 --> 00:14:52,790 time, right? 270 00:14:52,790 --> 00:14:56,470 That if an attacker knew about this, or if this 271 00:14:56,510 --> 00:14:57,910 happens in the future, right? 272 00:14:57,910 --> 00:15:02,430 We now you know that attackers will be testing intermediate 273 00:15:02,430 --> 00:15:04,750 CAs for this type of issue. 274 00:15:04,750 --> 00:15:06,670 Now that we know it's happened once, right? 275 00:15:06,670 --> 00:15:08,830 And it can happen most likely again. 276 00:15:08,830 --> 00:15:11,230 Unfortunately, I don't think we've ever had an episode 277 00:15:11,230 --> 00:15:14,870 where we've talked about how the security of a web 278 00:15:14,870 --> 00:15:17,710 browser and how the certificate chaining works 279 00:15:17,710 --> 00:15:21,070 and why that is so important, right? 280 00:15:21,070 --> 00:15:24,310 It's to everything that we do with a web browser on 281 00:15:24,310 --> 00:15:26,710 the internet. And it's all based on public key 282 00:15:26,710 --> 00:15:27,390 cryptography. 283 00:15:27,390 --> 00:15:29,470 Little much to cover in a 20 minute podcast. 284 00:15:29,470 --> 00:15:30,070 Yeah, exactly. 285 00:15:30,070 --> 00:15:32,190 But but you know, a little bit, a little bit. 286 00:15:32,190 --> 00:15:35,550 But and we won't talk about like, you know, someone 287 00:15:35,550 --> 00:15:38,470 posted, I think on Twitter, I saw Matt Johansson post 288 00:15:38,470 --> 00:15:42,470 this about like, oh, AI is going to break public key 289 00:15:42,470 --> 00:15:43,430 cryptography. 290 00:15:43,430 --> 00:15:45,110 I'm like, OK, just stop. 291 00:15:45,110 --> 00:15:48,350 Let's let's just let's just stop already. 292 00:15:48,390 --> 00:15:50,030 No, but quantum computers will. 293 00:15:50,030 --> 00:15:51,990 Well, quantum is a whole other thing. 294 00:15:51,990 --> 00:15:52,950 Yeah. Yeah. 295 00:15:53,750 --> 00:15:57,590 Yeah, maybe we can have another episode about quantum 296 00:15:57,590 --> 00:16:01,910 and how that can and probably will affect encryption 297 00:16:01,910 --> 00:16:04,590 overall. But the way that you use the web browser 298 00:16:04,590 --> 00:16:07,430 and you browse to websites, you know, the certificate 299 00:16:07,430 --> 00:16:10,350 chaining is so important to that and the backbone 300 00:16:10,350 --> 00:16:12,910 of all of internet security, essentially. 301 00:16:13,470 --> 00:16:15,990 Actually, it wouldn't be a bad idea to have an episode 302 00:16:15,990 --> 00:16:18,390 on quantum safe computing and quantum safe 303 00:16:18,390 --> 00:16:20,070 cryptography at some point. 304 00:16:20,070 --> 00:16:22,150 I have to have a talk I've given a few times. 305 00:16:22,190 --> 00:16:25,310 It does. This is this is a topic that the browser 306 00:16:25,310 --> 00:16:29,070 should be in is such a topic that we, you know, people 307 00:16:29,070 --> 00:16:32,350 like us that have been around for a while, remember back 308 00:16:32,350 --> 00:16:34,830 when I mean, like the original way to get an SSL 309 00:16:34,830 --> 00:16:37,270 certificate was very difficult. 310 00:16:37,270 --> 00:16:40,390 Yeah, you had to prove this massive amount of stuff. 311 00:16:40,750 --> 00:16:44,750 And that slowly changed over time to the point 312 00:16:44,750 --> 00:16:48,270 where now people just kind of take that for granted. 313 00:16:48,270 --> 00:16:49,350 But don't you still have. 314 00:16:49,350 --> 00:16:51,230 And you used to have a Dunn & Bradstreet number 315 00:16:51,270 --> 00:16:52,310 or something like that to get it? 316 00:16:52,310 --> 00:16:55,270 Yeah, yeah, if you if you wanted to, if you wanted 317 00:16:55,270 --> 00:16:58,830 a company certificate, a certificate added to a company, 318 00:16:58,830 --> 00:17:02,870 a Dunn's number was was a way to get that. 319 00:17:03,630 --> 00:17:06,310 You know, I mean, I remember I had to provide 320 00:17:07,510 --> 00:17:11,590 partnership agreements where like the internal documents 321 00:17:11,590 --> 00:17:15,150 forming the company to get a certificate and a letter 322 00:17:15,150 --> 00:17:18,270 from a bank that said we absolutely had that the bank 323 00:17:18,310 --> 00:17:22,630 account was the company is not just like it was ridiculous. 324 00:17:22,910 --> 00:17:26,350 Understandably, so based on what I accomplished with it. 325 00:17:26,870 --> 00:17:30,150 Yeah. And then that became less onerous. 326 00:17:30,390 --> 00:17:34,390 And then people got sent about that to the the CAs added 327 00:17:34,830 --> 00:17:38,150 services. Well, oh, you want an extended validation 328 00:17:38,150 --> 00:17:40,950 cert. And the first time I went through the EV validation, 329 00:17:40,950 --> 00:17:44,190 if you guys remember that, it was the exact same questions 330 00:17:44,190 --> 00:17:47,550 I had answered the previous version. 331 00:17:47,630 --> 00:17:51,630 It was just now considered the higher standard. 332 00:17:51,630 --> 00:17:53,510 It was nuts. I will admit, I was angry. 333 00:17:54,750 --> 00:17:59,070 Yes. Yes. Well,

we're we're old grumpy old men, right? 334 00:17:59,070 --> 00:18:03,630 Back in my day, we had to show a passport to get a certificate. 335 00:18:05,110 --> 00:18:08,270 Yeah. But now, you know, nowadays it is like, in fact, 336 00:18:08,470 --> 00:18:11,150 you don't even have to pay for an SSL cert anymore, right? 337 00:18:11,150 --> 00:18:13,830 Like, yeah, there's three CAs, but you can't they won't 338 00:18:13,830 --> 00:18:15,870 be embedded in the browser. That's all. 339 00:18:16,470 --> 00:18:17,870 Right. Yeah, exactly. 340 00:18:17,870 --> 00:18:20,310 Like if you are an intermediates or a route, right? 341 00:18:20,310 --> 00:18:22,230 That's very different, absolutely. 342 00:18:22,230 --> 00:18:25,030 So, Scott, real quick, we talked about the book last episode, 343 00:18:25,030 --> 00:18:26,270 but it is out there. 344 00:18:26,270 --> 00:18:29,030 It is available now for sale, right? 345 00:18:29,030 --> 00:18:30,950 It's not free anymore. It's no nine cents. 346 00:18:31,430 --> 00:18:32,350 Oh, hold on. 347 00:18:32,350 --> 00:18:34,470 Sales have dropped off as a means of all. 348 00:18:34,470 --> 00:18:36,830 But yeah, the digital legacy tree, 349 00:18:36,830 --> 00:18:40,950 ensuring your loved ones can get access to the important parts 350 00:18:40,950 --> 00:18:43,870 of your digital life when it's most important. 351 00:18:43,870 --> 00:18:46,750 So that's that's what the book is. 352 00:18:46,750 --> 00:18:49,790 And would love to have people pick it up at Amazon. 353 00:18:49,790 --> 00:18:52,310 The Kindle version is available right now. 354 00:18:52,790 --> 00:18:56,230 And looking for people to give reviews, that would be great. 355 00:18:56,470 --> 00:19:00,830 Yeah, pick up his book for 99 cents and give a review. 356 00:19:00,910 --> 00:19:03,230 If you can, Scott would really appreciate it. 357 00:19:03,430 --> 00:19:05,030 All right. All right. 358 00:19:05,030 --> 00:19:07,590 Well, Kevin, hopefully we get to see you again here 359 00:19:07,590 --> 00:19:09,630 in the next few weeks, right? 360 00:19:09,630 --> 00:19:11,990 I have one more trip this year and that's it. 361 00:19:12,110 --> 00:19:14,550 Yeah, I should wind in the travel down. 362 00:19:14,750 --> 00:19:17,110 It would be different. Yeah. Yes. Yes. 363 00:19:17,150 --> 00:19:19,990 All right. Well, thank you all for listening. 364 00:19:19,990 --> 00:19:24,230 And until next time, stay safe, stay secure and stay privates. 365 00:19:24,910 --> 00:19:29,750 Private key, privates or thank you for listening or watching. 366 00:19:29,910 --> 00:19:32,510 If you like this episode, hit subscribe, 367 00:19:32,710 --> 00:19:34,550 share it with your friends and colleagues 368 00:19:34,550 --> 00:19:37,870 or jump into our community at shared security dot net 369 00:19:37,870 --> 00:19:40,510 slash supporter to keep the conversation going. 370 00:19:40,630 --> 00:19:42,830 Thanks again, and we'll see you next week 371 00:19:42,830 --> 00:19:45,310 for another episode of shared security.