Vollständiges Transkript von The Detective's Files: True Crime Tales With Jacques Morrell – Police Intellegence

00:05:23.439 be the criticism of him, which was wrong, which was misguided. 70 00:05:23.480 --> 00:05:25.480 But in those days, I think you have to remember 71 00:05:27.040 --> 00:05:31.600 policing was very parochial. Officers and detectives kept things close 72 00:05:31.639 --> 00:05:34.720 to the chest. They wanted to deal with it, and 73 00:05:34.759 --> 00:05:39.120 that was a failing because it meant that information wasn't 74 00:05:39.279 --> 00:05:46.680 shared properly and allowed to be managed properly. People were parochial, 75 00:05:46.759 --> 00:05:50.480 quite sort of selfish of their own self interests. 76 00:05:51.519 --> 00:05:54.199 So we're talking about working in silos, which is something 77 00:05:54.240 --> 00:05:57.279 I'm familiar with from my work in business and industry 78 00:05:57.560 --> 00:06:03.000 and something which the BC used to be criticized for. 79 00:06:03.319 --> 00:06:08.000 I remember working for different programs and they were very 80 00:06:08.199 --> 00:06:15.639 very parochial about their stories, their contacts. They wouldn't share anything. Yes, 81 00:06:15.720 --> 00:06:19.759 this is it, and trying to overcome that culture took decades. 82 00:06:19.920 --> 00:06:24.879 Yes, and it's it's actually goes beyond silos in terms 83 00:06:24.879 --> 00:06:30.480 of teams who were working in silos. But as individuals 84 00:06:31.000 --> 00:06:35.079 there was something competitive and something keeping your cards close 85 00:06:35.160 --> 00:06:40.720 to your chest, and it was it was not productive. 86 00:06:40.759 --> 00:06:44.199 It was not properly productive. I mean I remember in 87 00:06:44.240 --> 00:06:48.279 my early days of supervisory duties, I would say to 88 00:06:48.759 --> 00:06:53.319 an officer, can you put this put some intelligence in? 89 00:06:54.519 --> 00:06:58.040 And that the standard The stock reply would be I 90 00:06:58.040 --> 00:07:00.879 would do but I'm not very intelligent and you know, 91 00:07:01.000 --> 00:07:06.040 pretty poor sort of gag. I suppose. So officers were 92 00:07:06.079 --> 00:07:11.720 sort of culturally trained, sort of not to keep things 93 00:07:11.759 --> 00:07:14.680 either close to the chest or can't really be bothered 94 00:07:14.720 --> 00:07:19.560 about putting in this thing called intelligence, Well it should 95 00:07:19.560 --> 00:07:26.800 have been put in. So I've always been a champion 96 00:07:27.000 --> 00:07:31.160 for putting intelligence in. Now in those days as well, 97 00:07:31.480 --> 00:07:35.439 it would be a simple handwritten report on a sheet, 98 00:07:35.600 --> 00:07:38.279 so you could be done in seconds, providing you thought 99 00:07:38.279 --> 00:07:41.560 about it carefully. What you were putting bear in mind. 100 00:07:41.680 --> 00:07:46.360 But wherever the information had come from, put it in 101 00:07:46.639 --> 00:07:50.000 and then let somebody else analyze it, look at it, 102 00:07:50.279 --> 00:07:52.120 evaluate it, etc. 103 00:07:53.360 --> 00:07:56.480 Puts me in mind of the hunt for Peter Sutcliffe 104 00:07:56.480 --> 00:08:02.120 and how that produced a mountain of information that overwhelmed 105 00:08:02.120 --> 00:08:05.199 the detectives working on the case to the point where 106 00:08:05.199 --> 00:08:07.759 they couldn't to use a cliche, see the wood for 107 00:08:07.800 --> 00:08:12.720 the trees, right, and opportunities to identify Sutcliffe and to 108 00:08:13.000 --> 00:08:17.199 arrest him were missed as a result the card index 109 00:08:17.480 --> 00:08:22.879 and you'll remember the Psycho Killer podcast about the Yorkshire Ripper. 110 00:08:23.199 --> 00:08:28.279 The card index filled an entire floor of Millgarth Nick 111 00:08:28.360 --> 00:08:33.480 in Leeds, the main police station for Leeds. It's like 112 00:08:33.519 --> 00:08:37.399 a blockhouse, this thing. And the weight became so great 113 00:08:38.039 --> 00:08:41.320 that the floor below had to be cleared and they 114 00:08:41.399 --> 00:08:46.399 brought in pit props from a nearby colliery to support 115 00:08:46.440 --> 00:08:49.639 the weight of the floor above to prevent it collapsing. 116 00:08:50.200 --> 00:08:52.879 Such was the weight of all of the card indexes 117 00:08:52.919 --> 00:08:56.200 and the filing cabinets and all of the paraphernalia of 118 00:08:56.279 --> 00:08:58.720 that analog system upstairs. 119 00:08:59.240 --> 00:09:04.000 That's right, and remember for good reasons in a way, 120 00:09:04.120 --> 00:09:08.159 but all that information held in there would not be 121 00:09:08.320 --> 00:09:09.639 available anywhere else. 122 00:09:11.159 --> 00:09:13.840 Yes, of course you'd have to go there, effectively, go 123 00:09:13.919 --> 00:09:17.440 to the library to retrieve the information from somebody who 124 00:09:17.440 --> 00:09:22.360 could help you find it. Yeah, yes, akalator. Yeah, so 125 00:09:22.399 --> 00:09:26.279 that was well nineteen seventies, late seventies, coming into the 126 00:09:26.320 --> 00:09:30.200 early eighties, and then you joined the police force early 127 00:09:30.279 --> 00:09:31.720 to mid eighties, is that right? 128 00:09:31.840 --> 00:09:32.039 Yeah? 129 00:09:32.080 --> 00:09:34.720 So how was what was the situation like then with 130 00:09:34.840 --> 00:09:39.159 intelligent gathering and data storage. Was it similar card index 131 00:09:39.320 --> 00:09:43.360 or was it moving on to an electronic form of storage. 132 00:09:45.039 --> 00:09:52.039 It was very much card index systems. In the nineties, 133 00:09:52.399 --> 00:09:57.679 I was working at headquarters when something called the World 134 00:09:57.679 --> 00:10:05.519 Wide Web was launched and our desks were I think 135 00:10:05.559 --> 00:10:09.879 we had to actually have new desks as well, because 136 00:10:09.960 --> 00:10:18.120 these huge monitors and keyboards and towers or computer towers 137 00:10:18.159 --> 00:10:24.039 were being delivered by

the newly formed IT Department information Technology, 138 00:10:26.240 --> 00:10:30.600 and we were still used to going to a metal 139 00:10:30.600 --> 00:10:34.519 cabinet and drawing out files and bits of information. 140 00:10:34.919 --> 00:10:38.480 So how did colleagues react to that the introduction of it. 141 00:10:42.080 --> 00:10:45.639 I think it varied. As you know in any walk 142 00:10:45.679 --> 00:10:49.440 of life and yourselves, there will be those that you think, 143 00:10:49.480 --> 00:10:52.159 if the system's not broken, don't try and fix it, 144 00:10:52.639 --> 00:10:57.039 and others would be all over this new technology as 145 00:10:57.039 --> 00:11:03.720 though it's something to behold. I'm a middle of the 146 00:11:03.799 --> 00:11:07.440 road guy, and I slowly, I slowly adapted to it, 147 00:11:07.559 --> 00:11:10.360 as as as I've adapted to, you know, to any 148 00:11:10.480 --> 00:11:12.799 changes in the organization. 149 00:11:13.039 --> 00:11:16.120 I suppose a few people fell by the wayside and 150 00:11:16.200 --> 00:11:17.960 went out of the door at the same time as 151 00:11:17.960 --> 00:11:21.159 the typewriters were taken out to a skip exactly. 152 00:11:21.279 --> 00:11:24.600 I mean, if I remember we we we used, I 153 00:11:24.720 --> 00:11:28.840 used to use a builder for doing sort of odd jobs. 154 00:11:29.639 --> 00:11:32.720 And he was an ex refuse collector, a bin man, 155 00:11:33.440 --> 00:11:38.200 and he said he left that organization when they ruined 156 00:11:38.720 --> 00:11:44.000 the skill and the art of bin collections because he 157 00:11:44.120 --> 00:11:46.799 was used to putting a metal bin with a handle 158 00:11:46.840 --> 00:11:50.879 over his shoulder and taking it to the the bin. 159 00:11:50.960 --> 00:11:56.080 Lorry wheelibins came in and he lost all faith in 160 00:11:56.159 --> 00:11:57.799 the in the process. 161 00:11:59.480 --> 00:12:03.240 My first substantive job as a broadcast journalist was in 162 00:12:03.279 --> 00:12:07.519 a newsroom that had three computer terminals, as you've described, 163 00:12:07.960 --> 00:12:11.519 and then the olivety typewriter that the boss, the editor 164 00:12:11.639 --> 00:12:14.200 used because he couldn't get on with all of this nonsense. 165 00:12:15.279 --> 00:12:17.480 Never mind the fact that it was network, never mind 166 00:12:17.519 --> 00:12:19.720 the fact that we had all of the news scripts 167 00:12:19.759 --> 00:12:23.960 backed up on floppy discs. Remember those. Julian would hammer 168 00:12:24.000 --> 00:12:27.279 away at his typewriter, and the closer it got to 169 00:12:27.320 --> 00:12:31.519 a deadline, the more perforated the paper became right because 170 00:12:31.559 --> 00:12:34.720 he'd be hitting those keys with a purpose. And you 171 00:12:34.759 --> 00:12:37.639 could hold these scripts up afterwards to the window and 172 00:12:37.759 --> 00:12:40.840 see where the full stops and the commas had just 173

00:12:40.919 --> 00:12:43.360 gone straight through the paper. And if it was a 174 00:12:43.399 --> 00:12:46.440 really tight deadline. All of the o's would have gone 175 00:12:46.519 --> 00:12:49.279 through as well. So I'm familiar with it and the 176 00:12:49.320 --> 00:12:51.759 tension that kind of came with it. The young guy 177 00:12:51.799 --> 00:12:55.639 who was all forering introducing this technology and for the 178 00:12:55.679 --> 00:12:57.639 life of him, couldn't get the boss to see that 179 00:12:57.720 --> 00:12:59.679 he should be embracing it as well. 180 00:13:00.159 --> 00:13:03.679 It managers management's key, isn't it. Those that are resistant 181 00:13:03.720 --> 00:13:10.039 to change for whatever reason will cause some issues. But 182 00:13:10.159 --> 00:13:13.080 then those who are all about the change and not 183 00:13:13.159 --> 00:13:17.120 really about the past, sometimes they lose that connection to 184 00:13:17.679 --> 00:13:21.879 what has worked. So it's fine in that balance. What 185 00:13:22.320 --> 00:13:24.879 this department when I was in headquarters, so this is 186 00:13:24.919 --> 00:13:29.759 the arrival of information technology, we had something unique in 187 00:13:29.799 --> 00:13:34.000 this particular office, and we had a paper system of 188 00:13:35.639 --> 00:13:44.039 records from the Immigration Service and the UK Passport Authority, 189 00:13:45.120 --> 00:13:53.399 and we dealt with referrals information investigations relating to those topics, 190 00:13:56.279 --> 00:13:59.399 but we dealt with them in complete isolation. So that 191 00:13:59.440 --> 00:14:06.679 paperwork was unless we consciously shared it for a particular reason, 192 00:14:07.559 --> 00:14:12.159 it was kept in one department in a silo, you 193 00:14:12.240 --> 00:14:16.039 use the term silo. So it was really interesting because 194 00:14:16.840 --> 00:14:21.039 when I looked at what we'd collated over the years 195 00:14:21.080 --> 00:14:26.360 in terms of let's talk about passports, so passports, passport 196 00:14:26.399 --> 00:14:33.039 fraud and use of passports being docted, altered, etc. Would 197 00:14:34.120 --> 00:14:37.120 we would have records that come from the Peterborough Passport 198 00:14:37.200 --> 00:14:43.159 Office that would say we suspect this application is false, 199 00:14:43.720 --> 00:14:47.480 please investigate, and we would go and do that reply 200 00:14:47.600 --> 00:14:51.720 to them either confirming it's all genuine, there's just a 201 00:14:51.799 --> 00:14:57.320 mistake here, or were identify as there's been a rogue 202 00:14:57.320 --> 00:15:01.960 application made and deal with it accord. We would also 203 00:15:02.000 --> 00:15:10.360 have records of Nottingham based passports that had been recovered 204 00:15:10.399 --> 00:15:13.600 around the world that had been adopted that had a 205 00:15:13.639 --> 00:15:20.240 new photograph inserted. But again we would or we had 206 00:15:20.320 --> 00:15:24.799 been purely just collating and filing all this information rather 207 00:15:24.840 --> 00:15:30.200 than sharing it to the wider police organization. Having looked 208 00:15:30.240 --> 00:15:37.480 at this collated information, it was clear analyzing the intelligence, 209 00:15:39.440 --> 00:15:42.519 it was clear that there was something going off in 210 00:15:42.639 --> 00:15:48.600 terms of applications were going in to Peterborough Passport Office 211 00:15:48.720 --> 00:15:52.879 in person and then a significant number of them were 212 00:15:53.440 --> 00:16:00.720 then being recovered later with a new photograph inserted to 213 00:16:00.759 --> 00:16:05.600 skip forward within six months, which identified a criminal who 214 00:16:05.639 --> 00:16:12.559 was recruiting individuals to apply for their first passport for 215 00:16:12.639 --> 00:16:15.440 a fee. For an amount of money and they were 216 00:16:16.440 --> 00:16:22.000 taken to Peterborough the Passport office issued with their passport, 217 00:16:22.159 --> 00:16:24.960 they would hand it over for money and then it 218 00:16:25.080 --> 00:16:32.360 allowed the criminals to replace the photograph with another individual 219 00:16:32.480 --> 00:16:35.039 and then sold to Warder. And it was quite a 220 00:16:35.120 --> 00:16:41.000 large scale activity. It was only our department that was 221 00:16:41.039 --> 00:16:45.200 able to identify that because all the other activity was 222 00:16:45.279 --> 00:16:55.000 not being analyzed, recorded, checked, et cetera. So that to 223 00:16:55.039 --> 00:16:58.440 me is that early example of how the old system 224 00:16:58.559 --> 00:17:03.919 was failing. And subsequent to that, obviously things potentially could 225 00:17:03.919 --> 00:17:05.799 be could be a lot better. In fact, they all 226 00:17:05.880 --> 00:17:08.039 as we know, with passport applications. 227 00:17:08.680 --> 00:17:11.000 So just to be clear, this is a national activity, 228 00:17:11.400 --> 00:17:18.480 the passport scam, and the information was held in Nottingham 229 00:17:19.400 --> 00:17:23.000 and the Passport office in Peterborough had to communicate with 230 00:17:23.160 --> 00:17:30.440 Nottingham in order to flag up potential passport fraud. They 231 00:17:30.440 --> 00:17:32.920 had to go to Nottingham. They couldn't go anywhere else 232 00:17:32.960 --> 00:17:36.640 because that information wasn't shared with for example, Cambridgeshire Police 233 00:17:36.920 --> 00:17:40.160 or with the met or whatever precisely, and or it 234 00:17:40.200 --> 00:17:42.839 wasn't accessible to them. You'd share it, but it would 235 00:17:42.880 --> 00:17:45.599 take time. Nowadays it's accessible. 236 00:17:45.359 --> 00:17:50.279 And each fraud was an individual matter, rather being looking 237 00:17:50.319 --> 00:17:53.920 at a trend or a system looking at the profile 238 00:17:54.000 --> 00:17:58.839 of the applicants. So this wasn't rocket

science. This was 239 00:17:59.000 --> 00:18:05.160 just as you would allude to, genuine professional curiosity. What's 240 00:18:05.200 --> 00:18:10.680 going off here? Why why is this trend happening? Well, 241 00:18:10.720 --> 00:18:13.200 identifying the trend and then saying why is it happening? 242 00:18:13.599 --> 00:18:15.759 And then how do we solve it? How do we 243 00:18:15.799 --> 00:18:16.680 stop it? 244 00:18:16.839 --> 00:18:19.599 Was there a light bulb moment then when you realized 245 00:18:19.640 --> 00:18:23.680 that the it would allow you to collate intelligence in 246 00:18:23.720 --> 00:18:26.599 a way that would show those patterns. 247 00:18:28.319 --> 00:18:32.400 It wasn't so much it it just coincidentally was at 248 00:18:32.400 --> 00:18:34.880 the time of the arrival of it. This was yeah, 249 00:18:34.920 --> 00:18:43.880 this was this was basic, basic policing where an individual 250 00:18:44.319 --> 00:18:48.079 had the time to look and analyze, rather than subsequently 251 00:18:48.119 --> 00:18:52.279 where potentially it could analyze that for you. 252 00:18:53.160 --> 00:18:56.839 And there you are in your CID office with your 253 00:18:57.200 --> 00:19:01.039 smart new Windows ninety five computers and they're all networked 254 00:19:01.039 --> 00:19:04.279 I'm assuming their network. So you can share that information 255 00:19:04.519 --> 00:19:06.680 and you can share it well, could you share it 256 00:19:06.839 --> 00:19:09.880 just within the building or could you share it with 257 00:19:10.559 --> 00:19:15.759 your force? Or was it accessible to the other police 258 00:19:15.799 --> 00:19:17.920 forces across the United Kingdom? 259 00:19:19.799 --> 00:19:23.440 Then not at all, no that, so there. 260 00:19:23.359 --> 00:19:28.400 Were Chinese walls that prevented total accessibility or completely. 261 00:19:28.519 --> 00:19:33.079 I think it was another twenty years before intelligence systems 262 00:19:33.279 --> 00:19:39.319 were nationalized and accessible, and then they weren't accessible to everybody. 263 00:19:39.319 --> 00:19:44.680 They would have specific intelligence analyst and researchers who could 264 00:19:44.759 --> 00:19:48.960 access them for you. But progress was made, but it 265 00:19:49.039 --> 00:19:51.400 must have been over a twenty year period. 266 00:19:52.279 --> 00:19:55.640 And we've talked about the home system before. Just give 267 00:19:55.640 --> 00:19:59.240 me a quick summary of what homes is or was 268 00:19:59.799 --> 00:20:03.319 in case people have forgotten and how did homes fit 269 00:20:03.400 --> 00:20:06.880 into the picture overall of intelligence and this type of 270 00:20:06.880 --> 00:20:08.319 transition to digital. 271 00:20:09.799 --> 00:20:14.039 Well, again, the homes, the home office large major inquiry system, 272 00:20:14.079 --> 00:20:21.640 I think is the that the term is a system 273 00:20:21.880 --> 00:20:26.880 of investigating major crime in an

incident room that again 274 00:20:26.920 --> 00:20:33.519 has also been advanced using technology and is more accessible 275 00:20:33.559 --> 00:20:41.599 across departments. But it's still very much in isolation for 276 00:20:41.759 --> 00:20:46.319 a number of reasons really for obviously security of the 277 00:20:46.359 --> 00:20:50.920 of the data. So there's still some difficult decisions sometimes 278 00:20:50.920 --> 00:20:54.680 in what to release to the to the bigger intelligence picture. 279 00:20:56.359 --> 00:20:58.559 You know this it's in an ideal world to go 280 00:20:58.640 --> 00:21:00.920 back to that point, you know, in an idea world 281 00:21:02.160 --> 00:21:06.079 and everything would be secure, but accessible to the right people. 282 00:21:06.200 --> 00:21:11.599 But as you know from your organization, you know there 283 00:21:11.599 --> 00:21:14.240 are flaws to it, and there are difficulties in that. 284 00:21:14.680 --> 00:21:17.039 There's a need for confidentiality in a lot of cases, 285 00:21:17.079 --> 00:21:18.839 isn't there absolutely? 286 00:21:19.079 --> 00:21:23.680 I mean I do remember one one aspect and introducing 287 00:21:24.799 --> 00:21:31.720 the homes and major crime murder squad scenarios. It was interesting. 288 00:21:31.759 --> 00:21:35.680 So when I left this department with the passport activity, 289 00:21:37.400 --> 00:21:45.640 I was keen to improve the dissemination of intelligence that 290 00:21:45.720 --> 00:21:52.240 might be of value to the wider organization. And in 291 00:21:52.359 --> 00:21:58.759 two thousand and six, I believe there was an awful 292 00:21:58.799 --> 00:22:04.519 incident where a police officer was shot in Nottingham, PC 293 00:22:04.720 --> 00:22:08.480 Rachel Bown, and ultimately she tried to return to the 294 00:22:10.440 --> 00:22:12.960 job but it was too much for her. She was 295 00:22:13.000 --> 00:22:22.400 shot with a firearm in the abdomen after attending a 296 00:22:22.559 --> 00:22:29.759 routine incident in part of Nottingham. I wasn't directly involved 297 00:22:29.799 --> 00:22:35.480 in that investigation, but I recall that the suspect was 298 00:22:35.519 --> 00:22:39.720 identified I think within a couple of days, and it 299 00:22:39.759 --> 00:22:43.119 was an individual called Trevon Thomas who was from Trinidad. 300 00:22:45.039 --> 00:22:49.359 And what was apparent is that during that inquiry they 301 00:22:50.079 --> 00:22:54.359 somehow got a name or an idea of who it 302 00:22:54.440 --> 00:22:59.519 might be, and when they checked the system for Trevon Thomas, 303 00:23:01.960 --> 00:23:05.880 I'd submitted an intelligence report six years early. I think 304 00:23:05.880 --> 00:23:12.240 it was in two thousand that identified him, his passport number, 305 00:23:12.519 --> 00:23:15.559 the details that he'd come and he was at risk 306 00:23:15.640 --> 00:23:20.000 of overstaying in that period in two thousand. In fact, 307 00:23:20.039 --> 00:23:22.480 my intelligence was right because he had overstayed, and it 308 00:23:22.519 --> 00:23:25.279 was six years later that he ended up shooting PC 309 00:23:25.480 --> 00:23:31.400 Rachel Baun. So it's a simple example, but the point 310 00:23:31.519 --> 00:23:36.279 is that information might have still sat in a file 311 00:23:36.680 --> 00:23:42.920 in the office at headquarters, but someone, an officer, had 312 00:23:42.960 --> 00:23:48.240 taken the time to turn that into potentially useful intelligence 313 00:23:48.480 --> 00:23:54.599 to future investigations because of the suspected criminality of the individual. 314 00:23:56.279 --> 00:23:59.559 So there's the example for you. 315 00:24:00.519 --> 00:24:04.200 And Trevon Thomas was arrested. Actually he throw airport, wasn't 316 00:24:04.240 --> 00:24:08.839 He was trying to leave the country and they arrested him. 317 00:24:09.240 --> 00:24:11.160 Actually as he was at the gate at the airport, 318 00:24:11.440 --> 00:24:14.319 he was he was are you involved in that? Did 319 00:24:14.359 --> 00:24:16.039 you did you go to that or was that something 320 00:24:16.079 --> 00:24:16.640 that was handled. 321 00:24:17.039 --> 00:24:19.880 I wasn't involved in the investigation at all, but colleagues 322 00:24:19.920 --> 00:24:23.799 who were came back and they that they referenced how 323 00:24:25.079 --> 00:24:28.039 they quickly got quite a lot of information from that 324 00:24:28.119 --> 00:24:32.480 report that I put in six years before. So it 325 00:24:32.640 --> 00:24:35.759 just goes to show taking up little bit of time 326 00:24:35.839 --> 00:24:44.680 to disseminate information intelligence for in an ideal world if 327 00:24:44.680 --> 00:24:45.119 it's needed. 328 00:24:45.119 --> 00:24:50.079 Again, so you were an example of good practice. Now 329 00:24:50.079 --> 00:24:55.559 that we've got so much more information technology, the Internet, 330 00:24:56.400 --> 00:25:01.720 artificial intelligence at our fingertips. Does that mean that we 331 00:25:01.799 --> 00:25:05.720 do live in an ideal world that everybody is following 332 00:25:05.799 --> 00:25:09.599 best practice and your example from the Trevon Thomas case. 333 00:25:10.200 --> 00:25:14.000 Or are people still inclined to work in silos to 334 00:25:14.119 --> 00:25:18.640 keep their cards close to their chests? What's happening nowadays 335 00:25:18.680 --> 00:25:20.039 in policing in Britain. 336 00:25:22.480 --> 00:25:26.759 I guess it might not be silos anymore, but I 337 00:25:26.839 --> 00:25:34.519 guess departments within organizations look to protect themselves in terms 338 00:25:34.599 --> 00:25:38.119 of demand of work, and departments are under more and 339 00:25:38.119 --> 00:25:43.000 more pressure now, staffing levels, etc. So they might look 340 00:25:42.079 --> 00:25:48.079 to shield off stuff and almost become a silo by 341 00:25:49.559 --> 00:25:54.160 by default. There's an interesting example

going off at the moment, 342 00:25:54.279 --> 00:25:58.200 isn't there with the public inquiry into the Notting attacks. 343 00:25:58.599 --> 00:26:00.480 Yes, for sure, yes, this. 344 00:26:00.480 --> 00:26:03.279 Is a judge led public inquiry about you know, the 345 00:26:03.279 --> 00:26:06.880 actions of Valdo Calacane leading up to those awful deaths 346 00:26:06.960 --> 00:26:11.559 in June twenty twenty three when two University of notting 347 00:26:11.640 --> 00:26:16.160 students were killed along with a school caretaker, Ian Coates, 348 00:26:17.200 --> 00:26:22.119 and also severely injured were I think three other individuals 349 00:26:23.559 --> 00:26:28.599 by this man. And this inquiry is is showing that 350 00:26:29.079 --> 00:26:38.759 information through various agencies maybe isn't distributed in an ideal 351 00:26:38.799 --> 00:26:43.720 world for people to make proper judgments about people like Calacane. 352 00:26:44.480 --> 00:26:48.880 In fact, just this week the Inquiry has heard an 353 00:26:48.920 --> 00:26:54.240 example potentially of just this kind of thing happening back 354 00:26:54.279 --> 00:26:57.039 in May twenty twenty one, I think it was so 355 00:26:57.200 --> 00:27:02.000 two years before the Nottingham merge. Callakain had attempted to 356 00:27:02.039 --> 00:27:05.680 hand himself into mi I five at its headquarters at 357 00:27:05.720 --> 00:27:12.680 Thames House in central London, and according to evidence given 358 00:27:13.000 --> 00:27:17.559 to the inquiry, PC Graham Foster, who confronted callakin outside 359 00:27:18.119 --> 00:27:21.599 after he'd rung the buildings into coom, told the Inquiry 360 00:27:21.599 --> 00:27:24.640 that Callokaine had informed a member of security that he 361 00:27:24.720 --> 00:27:27.839 wanted to be arrested and to speak to the police. 362 00:27:27.880 --> 00:27:33.839 So this is two years before the murders. Now, Superintendent 363 00:27:34.039 --> 00:27:37.920 Lorraine Busby McVeigh of the Metropolitan Police told the inquiry 364 00:27:37.960 --> 00:27:43.559 that Callakaine was looked at by the Fixated Threat Assessment Center, 365 00:27:44.480 --> 00:27:49.000 a unit that examines threats from fixated individuals, but he 366 00:27:49.119 --> 00:27:52.759 didn't meet their threshold to be assessed further not at 367 00:27:52.759 --> 00:27:56.039 that point. We've discovered since that he was suffering from 368 00:27:56.400 --> 00:28:01.160 a number of psychiatric disorders. Buzzby mcvas that an intelligence 369 00:28:01.240 --> 00:28:05.960 report from FTAC regarding Calla Kaine's visit to Thames House 370 00:28:06.359 --> 00:28:10.079 was passed to Nottinghamshire Police the next day, the first 371 00:28:10.079 --> 00:28:13.359 of June, but that the force didn't then carry out 372 00:28:13.440 --> 00:28:17.599 their own assessment. Busby McVeigh said that was something she 373 00:28:17.920 --> 00:28:22.279 and I quote would have quite liked to have happened. 374

00:28:23.400 --> 00:28:26.440 I think that puts in a nutshell what we're talking about, 375 00:28:26.480 --> 00:28:28.640 doesn't it. 376 00:28:28.640 --> 00:28:34.000 It does, And I saw the comments from that video 377 00:28:34.039 --> 00:28:38.759 interaction with Calla Kain with the police in London, and 378 00:28:38.799 --> 00:28:41.680 a lot of the public were reading into it that 379 00:28:41.720 --> 00:28:47.079 that was another blunder, another opportunity missed. In fact, even 380 00:28:47.119 --> 00:28:50.119 the BBC News described it as more damning evidence of 381 00:28:50.200 --> 00:28:55.759 how Callakain could have been stopped. But my view is 382 00:28:55.799 --> 00:28:59.359 that when we think about what was he doing at 383 00:28:59.480 --> 00:29:03.359 m I five, the Security Service HQ of all places. Now, 384 00:29:04.880 --> 00:29:10.359 Paranoid schizophrenics can go through various phases of their schizophrenia 385 00:29:11.079 --> 00:29:15.079 in and out of psychosis, etc. And they can also 386 00:29:15.160 --> 00:29:19.680 be paranoid and think that they're being watched. So that 387 00:29:19.799 --> 00:29:25.880 interaction with Calacan was was not a blunder in terms 388 00:29:25.880 --> 00:29:34.000 of managing him. He was quite precise, clear, calm. He 389 00:29:34.079 --> 00:29:38.720 was behaving very oddly and that happens a lot. I 390 00:29:38.720 --> 00:29:42.359 think the officer even alluded to that. The fact that 391 00:29:42.400 --> 00:29:45.599 the MET looked at his potential threat to the government 392 00:29:45.799 --> 00:29:51.039 or security buildings was fine, and the report then went 393 00:29:51.119 --> 00:29:54.920 back to Nottingham, but it didn't in itself, it didn't 394 00:29:57.480 --> 00:30:01.960 raise a real concern about Calacan. The question is, of course, 395 00:30:02.000 --> 00:30:05.319 as if somebody was looking at Calakin as a whole 396 00:30:05.599 --> 00:30:08.200 and got that, it would have added to it. But 397 00:30:08.920 --> 00:30:16.039 Callakain's behavior had change, was periodically involved with stuff, and 398 00:30:16.079 --> 00:30:20.519 I think he went on later that year to be 399 00:30:20.599 --> 00:30:23.960 involved in a threat or an incident towards a fellow 400 00:30:24.039 --> 00:30:27.279 student at the university and that was dealt with as 401 00:30:27.480 --> 00:30:30.240 an internal matter at the university. 402 00:30:30.400 --> 00:30:34.079 So there's another agency involved there as well. I was 403 00:30:34.200 --> 00:30:39.279 thinking this was more the benefit of hindsight than it 404 00:30:39.440 --> 00:30:43.119 was blunders and institutionalized failings. But now you've brought in 405 00:30:43.160 --> 00:30:48.279 that extra element the university. It makes me wonder if 406 00:30:48.319 --> 00:30:54.519 this thinking had been joined up, perhaps the terrible crimes 407 00:30:54.759 --> 00:30:57.680 in Nottingham that Summer's Evening could have been avoided. 408 00:30:58.759 --> 00:31:02.640 Absolutely, and that obviously the Public Inquiry is looking into 409 00:31:02.680 --> 00:31:07.519 it exactly that, and I'm sure the term in an 410 00:31:07.559 --> 00:31:13.839 ideal world will be used again relating to that. I 411 00:31:14.400 --> 00:31:18.160 remember as well, if we're thinking about paranoid schizophrenia. I 412 00:31:18.599 --> 00:31:24.759 worked on a the Memoirs of a paranoid schizophrenic who 413 00:31:24.960 --> 00:31:28.480 I spent a lot of time with and worked on 414 00:31:29.480 --> 00:31:33.279 his memoirs, And he came from the Irish community. When 415 00:31:33.279 --> 00:31:36.240 he came he was born in Ireland and in the 416 00:31:36.319 --> 00:31:42.480 nineteen seventies as a child he was already developing some 417 00:31:42.519 --> 00:31:47.039 mental illness and some schizophrenia. As a young man and 418 00:31:47.119 --> 00:31:49.599 he became very paranoid, and he believed he was being 419 00:31:49.680 --> 00:31:53.880 watched by the security services because of the Irish troubles 420 00:31:53.920 --> 00:31:59.400 and the situation that was happening. Then. So this this 421 00:31:59.519 --> 00:32:07.200 paranoid and changes, you know, it changes with the circumstances 422 00:32:07.240 --> 00:32:11.839 and they adapt it to certain things. What kla Kan 423 00:32:11.960 --> 00:32:16.519 was doing at the Security Service, we don't appear to know, 424 00:32:16.640 --> 00:32:21.359 do we, And it certainly wouldn't have been He hadn't 425 00:32:21.359 --> 00:32:23.599 got anything particularly relevant to do, but he got it 426 00:32:23.640 --> 00:32:27.400 in his mind maybe that he thought he was being watched, 427 00:32:27.920 --> 00:32:31.720 that he wanted to ask why. We don't know, But 428 00:32:32.279 --> 00:32:35.720 his behavior was odd. He was deemed not to be 429 00:32:35.759 --> 00:32:41.759 a threat to those establishments, and his behavior that was 430 00:32:41.920 --> 00:32:44.039 happening in Nottingham was something separate. 431 00:32:44.480 --> 00:32:48.359 I suppose. Maybe it's a little bit like working for 432 00:32:48.799 --> 00:32:54.000 an international news organization. You do encounter odd people who 433 00:32:54.160 --> 00:32:57.160 turn up at the door with stories, in my case, 434 00:32:57.200 --> 00:33:02.400 but in your case, with potential criminal activity, bizarre comments. 435 00:33:02.799 --> 00:33:05.720 It must be fairly routine, isn't it. How do you 436 00:33:05.759 --> 00:33:09.160 go about sorting the wheat from the chaff? You know, 437 00:33:11.160 --> 00:33:14.880 to coin a phrase, the harmless nutter from the person 438 00:33:14.920 --> 00:33:18.279 who's actually got the story to tell. The reason I 439 00:33:18.440 --> 00:33:22.519 mentioned this is because of you remember that the Jeremy 440 00:33:22.559 --> 00:33:26.440 Thorpe affair in the nineteen seventies. He was the leader 441 00:33:26.480 --> 00:33:29.440 of the Liberal Party and

he was eventually convicted of 442 00:33:29.960 --> 00:33:35.200 conspiracy to murder. But the first person who flagged up 443 00:33:35.720 --> 00:33:38.720 any kind of concern about Jeremy Thorpe. Was a guy 444 00:33:38.759 --> 00:33:41.480 called Norman Scott who told the police that Thorpe had 445 00:33:41.559 --> 00:33:44.160 arranged for his dog to be shot. Went into a 446 00:33:44.200 --> 00:33:47.319 police station and said, in a rather flamboyant way, you know, 447 00:33:47.400 --> 00:33:51.519 my poor little dog, he's going to have Jeremy Thorpe's 448 00:33:51.519 --> 00:33:56.559 going to have my dog shot. And the police looked 449 00:33:56.559 --> 00:33:59.079 at each other, as you can imagine behind the front desk, 450 00:33:59.119 --> 00:34:03.799 and here's another one. Must be a full moon. But 451 00:34:03.960 --> 00:34:09.320 of course what he was saying had a substantial kernel 452 00:34:09.360 --> 00:34:12.199 of truth to it, and thought went on, as I said, 453 00:34:12.280 --> 00:34:15.519 to be convicted. So yeah, how do you thought the 454 00:34:15.559 --> 00:34:24.440 real cases the Norman Scots from your average, everyday harmless Nutter. 455 00:34:27.280 --> 00:34:32.440 That is an excellent point because we've got within the 456 00:34:32.440 --> 00:34:36.039 police organization now there is another system which deals with 457 00:34:36.199 --> 00:34:39.480 threats to life and how to manage, minimize and keep 458 00:34:39.519 --> 00:34:46.960 people safe, which is sort of the first role of 459 00:34:46.960 --> 00:34:52.519 policing to protect life and property. But as you say, 460 00:34:52.559 --> 00:34:58.639 there are many many instances either by people with mental 461 00:34:58.679 --> 00:35:08.199 health who or people who just say things aggressively ingest 462 00:35:08.280 --> 00:35:14.719 how do you interpret it? Comments suggestions of somebody who 463 00:35:14.760 --> 00:35:18.280 may be over risk to somebody, But it's more general 464 00:35:18.400 --> 00:35:24.519 rather than specific, So it's a minefield to manage people. 465 00:35:24.960 --> 00:35:29.920 And as we know, paranoid schizophrenks aren't always in a 466 00:35:29.960 --> 00:35:35.280 psychotic state, and those that make verbal threats on one 467 00:35:35.400 --> 00:35:38.559 day might be somebody completely different than the other. 468 00:35:39.599 --> 00:35:45.719 Okay, final question, do you think that policing manages intelligence 469 00:35:45.960 --> 00:35:51.159 better now than when you began your service in nineteen 470 00:35:51.199 --> 00:35:55.119 eighty five. Let's set aside the technical aspects of it. 471 00:35:55.559 --> 00:36:01.239 I'm thinking about institutional attitudes to intelligence. Do you think 472 00:36:01.320 --> 00:36:03.400 that the attitude has changed? 473 00:36:05.960 --> 00:36:09.320 Yes? I do. It's a good question, though, and I 474 00:36:09.400 --> 00:36:12.760 think that in nineteen eighty five we were we the 475 00:36:12.760 --> 00:36:18.320 police were better at getting information. We're better at interacting 476 00:36:19.920 --> 00:36:23.320 with the public and with criminals. We spent more time 477 00:36:23.360 --> 00:36:26.039 with them, We had more conversations with them for a 478 00:36:26.119 --> 00:36:29.159 number of reasons. But we look people in the eye 479 00:36:29.199 --> 00:36:33.119 a bit more in those days, and the relationships with 480 00:36:33.159 --> 00:36:39.320 individuals was more fluid. Where we are better now is 481 00:36:40.280 --> 00:36:44.119 the recording and analyzing of the information and then converting 482 00:36:44.199 --> 00:36:49.800 into what would you say, actionable intelligence. But as good 483 00:36:49.800 --> 00:36:55.079 as our intelligence picture is now, it still needs actioning 484 00:36:55.079 --> 00:36:58.159 and it still needs dealing with. Can you give me 485 00:36:58.199 --> 00:37:02.840 some examples, yes, I think now one of the tools 486 00:37:03.679 --> 00:37:06.320 the police have that we never had in nineteen eighty 487 00:37:06.360 --> 00:37:11.280 five was the command and control system. Such a useful 488 00:37:11.320 --> 00:37:16.000 tool because it records or calls into the police about 489 00:37:16.480 --> 00:37:25.880 antisocial behavior, about domestic abuse, about drink driving, whatever it 490 00:37:25.960 --> 00:37:30.559 may be. And it's a database that has such a 491 00:37:30.639 --> 00:37:37.719 lot of information and is regularly tralled and provides intelligence 492 00:37:38.199 --> 00:37:43.880 and then evidence for subsequent inquiries in investigations. So yeah, 493 00:37:43.920 --> 00:37:50.800 that has changed tremendously. In the old days, police stations 494 00:37:50.840 --> 00:37:53.719 would have a lever arch file and any coll coming 495 00:37:53.760 --> 00:37:58.880 into that police station would be the call will be taken, 496 00:38:00.800 --> 00:38:04.480 a decision made whether to record an incident on a 497 00:38:04.519 --> 00:38:09.159 piece of paper, give it a subsequent number, and put 498 00:38:09.159 --> 00:38:17.119 in a file for action. Very antiquated, very difficult to research. 499 00:38:17.239 --> 00:38:20.599 Later it went nowhere other than a filing cabinet in 500 00:38:20.719 --> 00:38:24.960 that control room once it was signed off by the 501 00:38:25.000 --> 00:38:27.800 supervisors and management, and that. 502 00:38:27.719 --> 00:38:30.679 Would be a process that was familiar to offices in 503 00:38:30.760 --> 00:38:34.679 nineteen twenty five, just as it was in nineteen eighty five. 504 00:38:35.320 --> 00:38:39.960 Precisely now we may not be working in those silos 505 00:38:40.039 --> 00:38:44.480 particularly anymore, but there's still that risk of intelligence disappearing 506 00:38:44.519 --> 00:38:51.280 down a rabbit hole because departments maybe protect themselves, and 507 00:38:51.320 --> 00:38:56.320 it's whether somebody takes real ownership of an individual or 508 00:38:56.360 --> 00:38:58.800 of a case, and that's key. 509 00:38:59.760 --> 00:39:01.760 It's the same in journalism. A lot of what you're 510 00:39:01.800 --> 00:39:05.599 saying is resonating with me about so much information coming 511 00:39:05.679 --> 00:39:08.719 in on a screen, people sitting in an office, not 512 00:39:08.880 --> 00:39:11.800 going out, not using shoe leather, not talking to people 513 00:39:11.880 --> 00:39:14.000 face to face, the whole idea that you can do 514 00:39:14.119 --> 00:39:17.039 all of this on a teams meeting or on a spreadsheet. 515 00:39:17.320 --> 00:39:20.920 We call it air conditioned journalism because reporters no longer 516 00:39:21.000 --> 00:39:25.199 go out and report. And yet what I tell my 517 00:39:25.400 --> 00:39:27.920 students is that that's the one thing you've got to 518 00:39:27.960 --> 00:39:30.559 do is to go out and learn to interact with people, 519 00:39:30.599 --> 00:39:33.280 to talk to people total strangers, to be able to 520 00:39:33.360 --> 00:39:37.840 develop conversations. And the best place of doing it, I say, 521 00:39:38.719 --> 00:39:42.360 is the good old English public house, which maybe is 522 00:39:42.400 --> 00:39:46.800 where we're heading now having completed this episode of The 523 00:39:46.840 --> 00:39:49.800 Detective's Files True Crime Tales with Jack Morrel. 524 00:39:50.199 --> 00:39:52.480 The truth is out there, Simon, and we're going to 525 00:39:52.519 --> 00:39:53.840 find it excellent. 526 00:39:54.000 --> 00:39:57.760 Thanks so much again, it's fascinating talking to you about 527 00:39:57.800 --> 00:40:02.000 your decades of experience as a copper and a detective 528 00:40:02.599 --> 00:40:05.719 in Nottingham. And thank you for listening. I hope you've 529 00:40:05.840 --> 00:40:08.719 enjoyed it. We've gone down a few rabbit holes this time, 530 00:40:09.079 --> 00:40:12.599 but I'm sure you'll agree with me that the information 531 00:40:13.079 --> 00:40:16.840 that we've been able to discuss is utterly fascinating and 532 00:40:16.920 --> 00:40:19.800 a record of not just how things used to be, 533 00:40:20.400 --> 00:40:24.079 but how things are now and possibly where they're going 534 00:40:24.079 --> 00:40:27.400 in the future. We'll see you again next time.