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This is the Just Pod.
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Welcome back to the Just Pod from Philadelphia.
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I'm Justin Danil Evitts.
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And from Washington, DC, I'm Jannard Butler.
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You may have noticed while driving down a street or highway the proliferation of cameras on traffic lights and other structures.
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Some of these cameras are recording your vehicle license plates and other features.
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And in some instances, this data is being stored and made available both to government agencies and private parties.
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For law enforcement, the aggregation of this data can be an incredibly powerful investigative tool.
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It can help investigators to catalogue of vehicles and therefore its drivers, historical patterns of movements and locations, as well as its likely future patterns.
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But that power is exactly what concerns privacy rights activists like our guests today, and they're here to tell us why.
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Chad Marlowe is senior policy counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union in New York.
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He has written widely and spoken widely about issues of privacy and surveillance on behalf of the ACLU.
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And Michael Seufer is an attorney at the Institute for Justice in Arlington, Virginia, where he's the author of a recent brief before the U.S.
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on behalf of two citizens of Norfolk, Virginia, who are challenging their local police department's use of this kind of technology.
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Chad Marlowe and Michael Seifer, welcome to the Just Part.
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Thank you for having us.
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It's our pleasure to have you both, guys.
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Let me start off with some uh very basic questions about the nature of this automatic license plate reader ALPR technology.
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Chad, do you want to start us off just by telling us a little bit about it, maybe a bit about its history, when it sort of came on the scene, and how it's proliferated across the country?
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Yes.
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So ALPRs really kind of appeared at the very end of last century.
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Um, but they were, you know, as is in the case of most technologies, the rollout can be kind of gradual and slow.
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Um we didn't really see uh the country taking much note of the use of technology until the end uh of the of the aughts when we started seeing uh some states like New Hampshire and Maine passing our first laws uh to uh put guardrails around their use and restrict uh data collection.
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Um
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but what really changed for the industry happened in the 2010s when we started seeing technology companies really coming into the area and and kind of viewing ALPRs, um, although they would obviously advertise it as a policing tool, what it really was to them was a massive profit generating tool.
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And so they looked at ALPRs, the collection of data, the sharing of data as a route to make significant profits, obviously, in order to get there, that required using ALPRs as broadly as possible in the country at the federal, state, and local levels, um, combining that data and making it uh available to police uh throughout the country and perhaps uh even more broadly.
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Um at the end of last decade, beginning of this decade, we saw one particular uh ALPR company called Flock Safety really starting to dominate the market, um, with its two most distinguishing features being that its ALPRs were solar powered, which is lovely and pro-environment, um, and also kind of leaning heavily into mass nationwide data sharing models, um, which again, to be as robust as possible from their perspective and from their clients' perspective, uh, required gathering as much information as possible, retaining as much information as possible, and sharing as much information as possible.
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But along the way between then and now, uh, the public started to find out about it.
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The ACLU found out about it.
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Our friends and partners at the Institute for Justice started to find out about it and started raising alarms to the point where, you know, in the last year alone, in addition to IG's very critical um litigation against ALPRs, we've seen more than 55 localities actually go out and cancel their ALPR contracts through Flock because of privacy and mass surveillance concerns.
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Uh, and so that is where we are today.
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We have this uh mass surveillance technology being driven by, on the one hand, some desire around public safety, but more accurately around a desire of these companies and their venture capitalist investors to basically trade our privacy for their profits.
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Uh, and so that is the struggle we're in right now.
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Okay, that's that's very helpful background.
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Let me put to you um the counter-argument I could imagine, and I know you guys are well familiar with, I'm sure by this stage, from the average law-abiding citizen who is not committing crimes, that's why they're law-abiding, um, in my hypo, and maybe doesn't personally um concern themselves much with the collection of this data.
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Um, and if I'm that person who's routinely driving in the neighborhood to the grocery store, to the post office, to the bank, I might wonder if this is much ado about nothing.
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I might wonder why this should concern me, right?
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Um, the tool is available for law enforcement use.
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And law enforcement can, in a targeted way, search for bad actors.
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The odds of them coming to search for my license plate are practically zero.
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Why should I be concerned about that?
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Why is that an imposition on my privacy rights?
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So I think the framers thought through all of these issues.
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Um, and there's there are reasons um embodied in history why they chose the specific protections that are in the Fourth Amendment.
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So, in part, the Fourth Amendment embodies a separation of powers principle, right?
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If police are going to invade our privacy, if they're going to intrude in our lives, they have to first go to a neutral judge and get the judge to sign off on that.
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Um, and that that arose in a context where, you know, officers armed with general warrants or writs of assistance, uh, which are a type of general warrant that basically just says to the officer, go search wherever you want, whenever you want, whoever you want, for evidence of this crime, or maybe for evidence of crimes generally.
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Um, and the framers saw how that was abused in their own time to engage in heavy-handed law enforcement and to engage in politically biased law enforcement as well.
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And so that's why they ratified the Fourth Amendment to ban those types of discretionary practices on the part of law enforcement.
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Um, and so for you know, going back to the ordinary citizen, why should the ordinary citizen be worried?
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Well, you know, an ordinary citizen today is an enemy of the government tomorrow.
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And certainly, you know, we've seen over the past few decades that can be, you know, gun rights activists, it can be um ordinary Muslim people, it can be um immigrants uh who even who are in the country uh as legal permanent residents.
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Um, you know, people who are safe yesterday are enemies of the regime tomorrow.
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And part of what that protection does, the warrant protection requiring officers to go to a judge, is to first of all put that judge as a check between the officer and a private citizen.
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And second, to deter, you know, frivolous, abusive searches, misuses of this extraordinary power to invade people's privacy and security.
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And so one thing at IJ we've been cataloging is all of the instances where officers have been caught stalking potential romantic partners or their exes using license plate
readers.
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There are lots of examples of that across the country that we've seen, and they're probably just the tip of the iceberg.
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There are examples of misuse too of these systems that have nothing to do with stalking romantic partners.
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Officers misuse them for personal reasons, it seems like, basically every day now.
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Um, and in each of those instances, not only if a warrant were required, would those officers not get the warrant, they wouldn't even apply for it in the first place.
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And so that separations of powers principle that's embodied in the Fourth Amendment offers real protection uh for people's security because it prevents those searches from happening in the first place.
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It prevents those abuses.
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It doesn't, it doesn't just give people a right to a retrospective remedy when the government invades their privacy and security.
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Michael, can I switch back just a little bit?
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Because I think I think the response might be well, yeah, you're gonna have bad acts, you're gonna have bad actors.
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Um, is that a reason because of a handful of bad cops, or maybe more than a handful of bad cops, I'll credit you.
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Um is that a reason to throw out otherwise very important technology that helps in uh further investigations in important ways?
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Because you can have cops who violate the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement by breaking down a door without any technological sophistication, right?
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They're they know they're required to get a warrant.
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They say to heck with it, I'm just gonna bash the door down and go inside this private residence.
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That too is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, obviously.
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Um, but it doesn't mean that we throw the baby out with the bathwater.
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So respond to that argument that somebody could make to say, yeah, we get it, they're they're bad actors, but it's a powerful technology with important uses and applications, and it's it does a lot of good.
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There's a lot of investigations that are solved, crime solved as a result of its use.
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So I think what the framers were focused on uh when they ratified when they drafted and ratified the Fourth Amendment was precisely those instances of abuse.
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There were many instances of politically motivated, um, very destructive, invasive searches that happened around the founding.
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And that was really what they were concentrated on.
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They recognized that you know law enforcement officers and any uh, you know, government representative can't be trusted on their own.
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And so, again, that's why they ratified uh this separation of powers principle in the Fourth Amendment that requires officers to go to a judge.
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It doesn't just trust everything to officer discretion because people are flawed, people make mistakes, people abuse their power.
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And that's less likely when you separate power and you require officers to go to a judge first.
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So we could say we could have said the same thing about all of the practices that were common in their own time, general warrants.
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We could have a world where uh judges just issue officers these carte blanche warrants that say, go out and search, find evidence of crimes, you're authorized.
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Um, but that was, you know, that was contrary to their values, that was contrary to the people's security.
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Um, and you know, as Justice Jackson wrote just a few years after he returned from presiding over the Nuremberg trials, they thought a society in which officers uh could affect a two-permeating police surveillance, could invade people's privacy and security at will, um, was worse than one in which a few criminals could go free because we have those rights and liberties.
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And Justin, if I could add in, I'd like to disentangle this idea that um if you're not doing something wrong, you don't care about your privacy.
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And I there's an example that I like to give of doing something very, very right that you want to keep your privacy.
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And that example is um someone who is an alcoholic going to an alcoholic's anonymous meeting.
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Now, I think we could all agree that that is a really good positive thing for an alcoholic to do.
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But nonetheless, they may not want the public knowing that they struggle with alcoholism.
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And if the idea is out there that if they drive their car to an AA meeting every week, that the government and others may be able to record and figure out that that's what they're doing, that may jail their behavior so that they don't go to that AA meeting.
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And I think that that is a negative for society.
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And if we want to think about that historically, about people being repressed by the government for doing things that aren't necessarily illegal, all we have to do is look to the example of Dr.
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Martin Luther King, when the FBI tried to silence him because it surveilled him, found out he was having extramarital affairs, and basically tried to encourage him to commit suicide in order to prevent the FBI from releasing
that information.
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And I think that threatening letter to this day is underneath glass on the director of the FBI's desk, or at least I could say that was the case before Cash Patal took over the FBI.
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But regardless, the idea that if you are doing nothing wrong, you don't care about privacy, you don't mind people knowing what doctor's offices you go to, what religious institutions you go to, what political meetings you go to, even where you sleep at night if it's not your own home, um, so therefore you should not care because none of those things aren't illegal, I think is wrong.
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And I would also say, Justin, not to scare you, but your statement that there is no way that they would be interested in going after you, I think that's just wrong.
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Uh you do a podcast, you cite opinions, and if someone with access to that data does not appreciate your opinions and they are able to unearth information that might be embarrassing to you, they could either release it uh as a revenge tactic or they could call you up and tell you that they might release it.
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Um but if you could somehow talk a little bit less about topic X, maybe they won't.
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So I think it goes far broader than simply um this is only an issue that people engaging in criminal activity need to be worried about.
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I want to ask and um Chad, please feel free to continue, but Michael also feel free to chime into this as well.
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It sounds like what you're saying is when the government says we are not watching you, we are only collecting data in case we need it later.
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Is that a meaningful distinction, or is that simply it sounds like this is, and based to Justin's point, it sounds like this is simply surveillance waiting for a reason.
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Because as you said, it's surveillance in lie, where now I I will get off of this podcast and start thinking, wow, I never thought about it through the lens that by me recording my voice and putting it out on the internet, I am absolutely going to be surveilled, and there is absolutely something that can possibly be used against me in some way.
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So right now, Justin is correct.
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He has nothing to worry about per se, unless you happen to be Cash Patel.
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And Cash Patel happens to be listening to this episode.
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And perhaps maybe I shouldn't even be referencing his name if he is, but I'll say it again, Cash Patel, Cash Patel, Cash Patel, because that's my point.
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It sounds like this is simply surveillance waiting for a reason that Justin is safe now until something can either be used to prove a crime, or in the instance of Martin Luther King Jr., can be used to somehow uh be a become your puppet master and um make you a subordinate to the governor to the government's wishes.
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Is is that what you're saying?
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Is that what the people are?
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No, that that is a that is exactly right.
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And what I would say is this like n none of us are going to contest that if there is probable cause to think someone has committed a crime and the government gets a warrant approved by a judge that they then can collect data on that person to try to establish the evidence that they are in fact guilty of committing a crime.
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None of us have a problem with that.
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That's how our government works.
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But if you think about the way ALPRs work, it basically says, you know, a company like Flock keeps your data for 30 full days, an entire month.
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In the state of Georgia, they are allowed to keep your ALPR data for 30 months.
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Um and the idea there is that, well, any one of us could turn out to be a criminal.
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So maybe we should record everyone's vehicular movements for a month or more just in case they turn out to be, or we come up with another reason we want it.
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That is completely antithetical to American concepts of privacy, which is unless the government has probable cause to think you have done something wrong, you have a right to be left alone.
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You have a right to your privacy.
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And ALPRs works exactly the opposite.
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We are gonna we are gonna gather evidence on you with no evidence you've done anything wrong, just in case.
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And I think that is what most Americans object to.
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If I can add to I'm sorry, oh I'm sorry.
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I was just going to add to what Chad was saying that you know, focusing on what the government is accessing versus what it's collecting kind of turns the Fourth Amendment upside down because the Fourth Amendment is a protection for individual privacy.
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And that invasion of individual privacy happens when the government collects your data and feeds it into this huge database that any police officer can access basically on demand.
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The invasion of privacy is complete then.
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Um, there's a great line in a Supreme Court opinion from uh a little over two decades ago about um police using a thermal imager to collect inform uh to collect uh heat coming off a house.
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Um, a bathtub is a less private area if the plumber, even if the plumber has his back turned.
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Right?
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When people's information is being collected in this dragnet fashion, that is an invasion of their privacy, and that can still have a chilling effect on people, even if they don't know for sure that an officer is ever going to access it.
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All of my clients are ordinary law-abiding people, they're all in civil lawsuits, none of them have ever been accused of a crime.
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They're uncomfortable with that idea that their information is being collected and fed into this easily accessible government database.
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And I'll just give the example of one of my clients in San Jose.
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He's pretty politically active.
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He goes to protests, he goes to monitor ICE agents, um, he volunteers to do that.
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Um, and especially in this current political environment, you know, he's reasonably anxious about these records of what he was doing, of where he was in the past, being memorialized in this government database with pretty minimal restrictions on access, where it's you know available to uh thousands of officers across a state and maybe searched upwards of 10,000 times per day.
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Yeah, I mean, imagine, for example, if the government had a rule that every American who wrote a diary um had to forward the pages of that diary into a government database that the government wouldn't look at unless it had good reason to do so.
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Would we be okay with that?
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Or would we notice that many of us just stopped keeping diaries because of that rule?
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Even though there's a good chance the government might never look at it, I think we'd decide that keeping a diary isn't safe.
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That could be the same thing for driving around to sensitive locations in your car, not illegal locations, sensitive locations.
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That's a really good metaphor, Chad.
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Uh let me ask you though isn't this more like phone companies that store data that That we use on our cell phones all the time, as opposed to us sending diary pages to the government, we're sending diary pages to a third party, a private company, and we're we're not doing that willingly, of course, we're doing it passively because they're they're storing our cell site location data and movements all the time, and it's it is available to the government, but only by warrant.
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How is that different to Flock or Motorola or some other third party, a private company, that stores the ALPR data and is available to the government but but by warrant?
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Is that distinguishable in a meaningful way, or are those essentially equivalent things?
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I mean, I I can say that there's a couple of things in there.
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So the first thing I would say is you know, 10 days ago, the Supreme Court handed down a case in Chatry v US in which they thank goodness clarified that in modern times, with the way that we are constantly exchanging data, that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy to which Fourth Amendment requirements apply, even though we are just almost routinely providing data, even if you have a simple ability to click a box that turns it off, that it is so routine and almost automatic to living in modern life that we have expectations of privacy around that.
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So, you know, them saying, is it different than the data we give to the phone company?
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Perhaps not anymore after Chadgery, because all that data is actually deemed to be private just because it's it's transferred over.
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Um but I also think you need to keep in mind the the relationship.
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Um, you know, when you have uh information flowing from your cell phone to a to a private third party, um that is not automatically accessible to the government even even without a warrant.
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Whereas in the case of ALPR companies, it is being collected by the government on behalf of the government, the government is the customer.
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It is then merely being stored on the government's behalf by a third party.
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And because that is the case, the government and and oftentimes not just the collecting government, but any other government customer nationwide of that same third party can get warrant-listed access to that data.
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But beyond that, I think we also need to understand that there are um actions that people can take in our country today, which are deemed illegal, everything from getting abortion care, getting gender-affirming care, being an immigrant who has, you know, doesn't have a green card but has lived in this country for 30 years.
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All of those things violate laws, all of those things you could probably get a warrant for.
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And what unlocks the magic to it being so devastating to people who, if not exercising what unfortunately are guaranteed as constitutional rights in the US, certainly qualify as human rights worldwide.
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The government has a treasure trove of private data on anyone that they can then stem together.
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And again, they don't go for the data because they think you've done something wrong.
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They go to the data to see if they can put together pieces to imagine you've done something wrong.
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So you can start from a crime, which is how it happens in most cases with warrants, but ALPRs invite you to start with a person.
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Let's
start with Justin.
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Let's look at every place we've traveled for the last 30 days and see if anything raises a red flag for us, or does it just give us enough suspicion that we can put together to open an investigation?
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And now we can violate your privacy even more.
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So I think there's many dangerous layers to this, but it but it does go back to this recent Chattery decision, which I think the Supreme Court got exactly right, that just because modern in modern life we are exchanging data with third parties does not mean we are saying that it is no longer private and we no longer have an expectation it will be protected as such.
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It is really a fascinating aspect of this whole discussion that when you isolate the individual slices of data or bytes of data, they're not private independently on their own necessarily, right?
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Like the license plate itself is open to the public all the time.
00:26:46.160 --> 00:27:15.519
What's really interesting about this whole dynamic, and it goes back to the Jones case and Justice Sodomayel's concurrence in Jones and her reference to the fact that when you aggregate those individual bytes, I I think the the idea behind it is as I think she might have said, or people have attributed to her, it's sort of this mosaic theory that in the individual components you don't see the picture, but in in aggregate, um it starts to show you something.
00:27:16.000 --> 00:27:23.119
And and that I take it is what the Chatry decision is is sort of leaning on as well, right?
00:27:23.200 --> 00:27:33.920
That that in the accumulation of the data, even public data starts to invade the private sphere, which is a really interesting aspect of this this new area that we're in.
00:27:35.119 --> 00:27:37.440
I think that's one component of it.
00:27:37.680 --> 00:27:51.680
I do think Carpenter, um, which was the prior case about cell-site location information and Chatry, which of course is about Google location history, um, maybe take a few steps past that.
00:27:52.000 --> 00:28:09.279
Um so I read them as looking to history, looking to what traditional police surveillance looked like, and setting out a few factors that distinguish these modern high-tech dragnets from traditional police surveillance tactics and techniques.
00:28:09.440 --> 00:28:27.359
And like the paradigm of traditional police surveillance is you know, police watching one known suspect expending a ton of resources to do that in real time, um, having a good reason for it, uh, and you know, knowing who they want to follow in advance.
00:28:27.599 --> 00:28:43.680
Um, and that is tip that historically was constrained by technology, by resources, and that prevented these abusive dragnet style surveillance practices that we start to see cropping up.
00:28:43.920 --> 00:29:00.000
Um, and so in Carpenter and Chatchery, the courts emphasized a few factors to differentiate uh, you know, warrantless government access to these location history databases from those traditional police surveillance techniques.
00:29:00.160 --> 00:29:06.480
And so it's not just kind of that collection of data, it's really whether you can infer intimate details from it.
00:29:06.640 --> 00:29:08.079
And what are intimate details?
00:29:08.240 --> 00:29:12.240
Well, Chatry tells us they can be either patterns.
00:29:12.480 --> 00:29:14.400
You know, do you have this habit?
00:29:14.640 --> 00:29:16.000
Did you depart from it?
00:29:16.079 --> 00:29:17.680
Uh, which can be really telling.
00:29:17.839 --> 00:29:22.960
You know, a married couple are did they stop returning to the same home every night?
00:29:23.119 --> 00:29:26.880
Um, and is the husband maybe now going to a motel?
00:29:27.200 --> 00:29:36.400
Uh so you know, looking at long-term data for those types of pattern-based inferences, that can reveal intimate details.
00:29:36.640 --> 00:29:40.319
Another thing is tracking people to potentially sensitive locations.
00:29:40.799 --> 00:29:46.400
Uh, the abortion clinic, the protests, the gun show, all of those sorts of places.
00:29:46.559 --> 00:29:52.960
Um, and these technologies can do that, and they can actually let police home in on those specific locations.
00:29:53.680 --> 00:29:57.279
Um, so that's that's one differentiating factor, right?
00:29:57.440 --> 00:30:03.279
The second differentiating factor is low cost and effortlessness, right?
00:30:03.680 --> 00:30:07.759
Traditional surveillance is uh resource intensive.
00:30:08.000 --> 00:30:15.519
It requires um, you know, police officers maybe working around the clock, um, expending a lot of time, a lot of money.
00:30:15.759 --> 00:30:21.200
And that naturally limits how much the government can scale up those practices.
00:30:21.440 --> 00:30:30.400
Um, it's difficult to create drag nets using those traditional surveillance tools just because they're so cumbersome.
00:30:30.640 --> 00:30:38.559
And then the third kind the third factor the court has considered in every one of these cases is the retrospective nature of the surveillance.
00:30:38.720 --> 00:30:43.039
Because the surveillance is retrospective, that means it runs against everyone.
00:30:43.200 --> 00:30:53.119
The government can go back in time and see where you were uh a week ago, two weeks ago, 30 days ago, whenever it wants, and it can mine that data.
00:30:53.279 --> 00:31:00.079
It's not limited by the availability of physical evidence, it's not limited by the fallible memories of witnesses.
00:31:00.240 --> 00:31:07.200
It has this perfect, precise database that doesn't require it to choose a target in advance.
00:31:07.359 --> 00:31:10.160
Everyone is under surveillance all the time.
00:31:11.759 --> 00:31:13.519
Under the Fourth Amendment.
00:31:15.599 --> 00:31:21.440
The warrant requirement requires specificity.
00:31:21.759 --> 00:31:48.640
So what say
you about what precisely uh in 2026 should that warrant require when the technology, as you stated, can reveal not just where a person drove, but where they worship, who they visit, where they protest, what doctor they see, and uh uh can simply then be left up to a judge to say, well, you can draw inferences from all of those things.
00:31:48.960 --> 00:32:17.599
What should be required now in a warrant to make sure that a rogue or a bad actor is not just using what doctor someone sees to see, you know, if I can kick that doctor's door and to make sure that that doctor isn't performing abortions, only to find out, ah, just the dentist, just the dentist, but we'll keep that in mind just in case he starts seeing a different dentist.
00:32:17.920 --> 00:32:23.279
It this becomes a never-ending cycle unless we say, well, then now the warrants require this.
00:32:23.440 --> 00:32:26.000
What say you about what they should require?
00:32:26.880 --> 00:32:29.039
Um, so very difficult question.
00:32:29.200 --> 00:32:45.119
The Supreme Court notably punted on that issue in Chatry and remanded the case back down to the Fourth Circuit because there the court commented that the warrant, um, I forget its exact phrasing, but it was very uncommon or very unusual.
00:32:45.359 --> 00:32:53.359
Um, because so um just to talk about for a second how the warrant in that case worked, it was essentially a three-stage warrant.
00:32:53.519 --> 00:33:06.160
At the first stage, police uh went to Google um to get uh, you know, all of the people who were in within a specified zone within a specified time frame.
00:33:06.720 --> 00:33:09.039
Um and they got all of those users.
00:33:09.119 --> 00:33:15.599
And then at step two of the warrant, they were supposed to narrow the list down to some specific users they were interested in.
00:33:15.759 --> 00:33:27.759
And then at step three, they were supposed to narrow it down further to like the core suspects, and then they would get identifying information for those people from Google.
00:33:28.000 --> 00:33:30.480
And so it happened there in three stages.
00:33:30.720 --> 00:33:41.119
It's sometimes very difficult to apply the uh particularization requirement of the Fourth Amendment to these types of searches.
00:33:41.519 --> 00:33:57.359
Um, the Fifth Circuit held that the geofense warrants are categorically unconstitutional because uh when Google uh searches uh for data to respond to the government, it has to search its entire database.
00:33:57.440 --> 00:34:03.440
And the Fifth Circuit conceptualized that as like searches of all of those people's data.
00:34:03.599 --> 00:34:05.839
Um I don't think that's the right way to think about it.
00:34:05.920 --> 00:34:10.719
I think the right way to think about it is what filters is the government using?
00:34:10.960 --> 00:34:23.280
And are those sufficiently narrowly tailored to exclude as many people as possible who aren't likely to be suspects, for whom there isn't probable
cause.
00:34:23.440 --> 00:34:33.920
Um and so then that kind of leads me to the core point, which is um I think the real protection is probable cause because there has to be particularized probable cause.
00:34:34.400 --> 00:34:36.880
And so that's the protection in that context.
00:34:37.039 --> 00:34:46.880
If the police are just like, we're interested in this doctor's office, so we want uh, you know, everyone there, uh, you know, the there might not be probable cause.
00:34:47.039 --> 00:34:55.039
But if it's well, you know, we think that this one person who goes to this doctor's office might be committing a crime.
00:34:55.199 --> 00:34:58.400
So we want to know everyone who goes to that doctor's office.
00:34:58.559 --> 00:35:04.880
Well, then that warrant isn't supported by particularized probable cause as to all of those people.
00:35:05.119 --> 00:35:17.280
And it would, you know, essentially uh look like a general warrant where you're invading people's privacy just based on their association with someone for whom there is probable cause.
00:35:17.760 --> 00:35:20.079
And I would say one other thing, uh to two points, actually.
00:35:20.239 --> 00:35:31.840
One thing I would say is in in writing for the majority, Justice Kagan pointed out that, you know, with this three-step warrant, you have to satisfy Fourth Amendment standards at all steps.
00:35:32.079 --> 00:35:40.559
It does not matter that come the third most narrowing step, you were able to narrow it down to something that appears to meet probable cause standards.
00:35:40.800 --> 00:35:50.800
And so what I think that's important when you bring it back to the ALPR context, it's at the initial point of trying to collect the data that you apply the Fourth Amendment.
00:35:51.119 --> 00:35:55.679
Not after the fact, not once you can potentially narrow it down.
00:35:55.840 --> 00:36:10.400
It's at the initial invasion of privacy, be it the time you initially ask to look at the full scope of people whose location data you're dealing with through your cell phone or ALPR collection, that that it's it's at that initial point of collection.
00:36:10.480 --> 00:36:26.559
So when we're talking about scanning every single vehicle that travels in any city or town on its roads and keeping that for 30 months, we don't judge whether that meets constitutional standards at the point police are interested in getting some of that data.
00:36:26.719 --> 00:36:28.800
We have to look at it at the point of collection.
00:36:28.960 --> 00:36:35.519
But the other point I want to make here, and and I think as people who are lawyers and interested in the law, we tend to do this.
00:36:35.840 --> 00:36:40.559
We ask, what does the law, what does the constitution and law tell us?
00:36:40.800 --> 00:36:46.400
Well, what it tells us most broadly is this is the floor, not the ceiling.
00:36:46.639 --> 00:37:16.719
Um, and so, you know, interestingly, the very day after the Supreme Court handed down the Chattery decision, um giving Fourth Amendment protections to reverse location warrants, the Delaware legislature almost banned what are called reverse keyword warrants, which work the same way, but instead of them gathering uh your location data from your cell phone, they gather the keywords that you enter into an internet search engine.
00:37:16.880 --> 00:37:24.400
So if you search for planned parenthood or immigration services or gun show, they can say identify everyone who's done that.
00:37:24.719 --> 00:37:27.360
Delaware went out and essentially banned it.
00:37:27.440 --> 00:37:32.239
They said if you look for it and you get more than five, five hits, that's a dragnet search.
00:37:32.320 --> 00:37:33.679
It's not allowed in our state.
00:37:33.840 --> 00:37:37.920
And so Delaware didn't ask what does the Fourth Amendment tell us.
00:37:38.079 --> 00:37:49.760
It asked, as a matter of public policy, what do we want our laws to say in this state to meet the standards of privacy that our citizens and residents demand?
00:37:49.920 --> 00:37:54.000
And I think that really is the broader question we should be asking here.
00:37:54.239 --> 00:37:59.280
Absolutely, we should look to the law to figure out what the minimum protection should be.
00:37:59.519 --> 00:38:18.320
But the more important conversation right now is what laws do we need to be passing to bring privacy rights into the digital age so that they match the expectations of people living in an age in which data, it's very personal data, is free-flowing all the time.
00:38:18.480 --> 00:38:27.360
So happy to start with the conversation about the existing laws and constitution, but that should be the beginning of the conversation, not the end of it.
00:38:27.920 --> 00:38:29.199
Dad, it's a great point.
00:38:29.280 --> 00:38:41.440
And it actually reminds me of a chat you and I had just before the show today regarding the interesting coalition of different interest groups that might be coalescing around these issues.
00:38:41.599 --> 00:38:51.840
And Chandry itself is kind of an interesting example of this when you think about it, because of the breakup of the justices in the six to three majority, right?
00:38:52.079 --> 00:39:06.159
They're a combination of who we would consider the traditional left-leaning justices, uh, Justice Kagan, who authored the opinion, but along with Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kavanaugh, uh who joined it.
00:39:06.400 --> 00:39:34.559
And so I wonder whether, somewhat like the criminal justice reform movement, which brought up together some components of the left and the right to bring about the First Step Act and other initiatives, um what is it about this you think that that might be bringing a diverse array of um otherwise disconnected and non-overlapping groups to overlap on this particular issue?
00:39:34.960 --> 00:39:39.199
Yeah, so it's it's a it's a great question and one I appreciate very much because I've been looking at it.
00:39:39.280
--> 00:39:41.440
I've been doing this work for 12 years.
00:39:41.599 --> 00:39:50.480
Um, and in the last two years, I have seen a national nonpartisan anti-surveillance movement of the likes.
00:39:50.639 --> 00:39:53.440
Not only have I never seen it, I could never have even imagined.
00:39:53.519 --> 00:39:56.639
And so I've asked myself, how did we get here?
00:39:56.880 --> 00:39:59.920
How did we get to this incredible, you know?
00:40:00.000 --> 00:40:01.840
Listen, we live in 2026.
00:40:02.079 --> 00:40:04.000
People don't agree about anything anymore.
00:40:04.159 --> 00:40:08.079
Everything is a partisan issue, and yet anti-surveillance work is not.
00:40:08.239 --> 00:40:20.960
And and what I ended up realizing is that depending on what group you look at, they have very different reasons for objecting to government surveillance.
00:40:21.119 --> 00:40:29.760
So libertarians, um, government intrusion into people's private lives, uh preventing that has always been a bedrock of libertarianism.
00:40:30.000 --> 00:40:33.679
So you expect to see them in this fight, and you do.
00:40:34.239 --> 00:40:44.639
MAGA adherents view government surveillance, mass government surveillance as part and parcel of the deep state, which is something that they're very concerned about.
00:40:44.800 --> 00:40:48.159
So it hits a particular point of sensitivity there.
00:40:48.320 --> 00:40:58.000
I think for more traditional Republicans, they view big mass government surveillance as antithetical to their traditional support for smaller government.
00:40:58.159 --> 00:40:59.840
So they have a problem with that there.
00:41:00.000 --> 00:41:12.800
People on the left tend to focus in on the vulnerable groups that have historically and as well as currently are always over-targeted by surveillance.
00:41:12.880 --> 00:41:19.840
And so they are rising to the defense of the vulnerable populations that are constantly in the crosshairs of mass surveillance.
00:41:20.000 --> 00:41:30.559
And I think even centrists or the politically non-involved are seeing this, and they're just having a huge pick factor to the fact that the government is tracking them everywhere they go.
00:41:30.800 --> 00:41:46.239
And so even though they're all coming from very different philosophical points, they're all arriving at the same place, which is mass government surveillance in this age of ever-increasing AI-driven technology is getting out of control.
00:41:46.400 --> 00:41:49.199
It is out of control, and it has to be reined in.
00:41:49.360 --> 00:42:00.079
And so that is this broad, diverse coalition of groups that find themselves completely aligned in their opposition to government surveillance.
00:42:00.559 --> 00:42:10.400
Um I think over the past few decades, especially, um, people all across the political spectrum have seen the costs of mass government surveillance.
00:42:10.639 --> 00:42:19.360
Um, you know, you've seen um heavy-handed surveillance, for instance, of mosques
and Muslim community centers, especially in the wake of 9-11.
00:42:19.840 --> 00:42:39.280
Um, you know, you saw a very uh you saw a congressional committee revealed that in the wake of the January 6th um uh insurrection in the Capitol, the FBI just went to a bunch of big banks without a warrant and got people's private financial information.
00:42:39.840 --> 00:42:45.440
Um I I think you know the groups all across the political spectrum have seen the costs of it.
00:42:45.599 --> 00:43:02.400
And certainly surveillance has been controversial at times um over the past 20 years, um, especially since the passage of the Patriot Act, the NSA bulk metadata collection program um was very unpopular across the political spectrum.
00:43:02.559 --> 00:43:10.000
What I think sets license plate readers apart at this point is that they're very visible in people's everyday lives.
00:43:10.239 --> 00:43:14.960
People know that they're passing them, they know for sure that they're being surveilled.
00:43:15.119 --> 00:43:17.280
Um, it's much more concrete for them.
00:43:17.440 --> 00:43:27.679
It's a much more visceral experience than, you know, like an automated bulk metadata collection program that's going on in the background that might not actually be targeting your calls.
00:43:27.920 --> 00:43:31.039
People see where the cameras are, they know where they're passing them.
00:43:31.199 --> 00:43:32.239
And that's creepy.
00:43:32.480 --> 00:43:40.639
License plate readers have become the most common form of police surveillance most ordinary Americans face in their day to day lives.
00:43:40.880 --> 00:43:48.960
We don't even know how many cameras there are across the country, but you know, estimates I've seen, for instance, for Flock say above a hundred thousand.
00:43:49.199 --> 00:43:55.760
Flock says that its national license plate reader database gets 20 billion plus data points per month.
00:43:56.000 --> 00:43:59.199
There are about 200 million licensed drivers in the United States.
00:43:59.360 --> 00:43:59.760
That's a lot.
00:44:16.639 --> 00:44:22.559
What is the single most misleading phrase in modern surveillance policy?
00:44:22.800 --> 00:44:36.800
Is it public safety, metadata, retention, sharing, or perhaps most nefariously, nothing to hide?
00:44:38.480 --> 00:44:40.320
I mean, for me it's public safety.
00:44:40.480 --> 00:44:53.280
Uh that, you know, the the fact that after decades of studying it, right, study after study after study has been done, which has demonstrated that surveillance does not deter crime.
00:44:53.440 --> 00:44:57.119
There is one exception: car thefts in public parking lots.
00:44:57.280 --> 00:44:59.199
Cannot tell you why, but it's been studied.
00:44:59.280 --> 00:45:00.719
But other than that, it does not.
00:45:00.880 --> 00:45:10.159
Now, if people want to have a discussion about whether mass surveillance can help to solve crimes after the fact, happy to have that discussion.
00:45:10.400 --> 00:45:12.880
But
it doesn't keep people safe.
00:45:13.119 --> 00:45:24.320
And I would also say that, and I I kind of say this tongue in cheek, but it's true, that I know how to prevent all crime in the United States, and I can do it tomorrow if I wanted to.
00:45:24.480 --> 00:45:25.679
You want to know what it is?
00:45:26.000 --> 00:45:27.519
Put everybody in jail.
00:45:28.320 --> 00:45:29.519
No more crime.
00:45:29.760 --> 00:45:32.559
But the solution is worse than the problem.
00:45:32.800 --> 00:45:36.159
And that is the problem with mass surveillance and ALPRs.
00:45:36.320 --> 00:45:37.360
Michael's exactly right.
00:45:37.599 --> 00:45:39.679
20 billion scans a month.
00:45:39.840 --> 00:45:44.159
What percentage of people do you think are actually criminals in this country?
00:45:45.280 --> 00:45:49.039
Subtract that from 100, and you get the percentage of people who aren't.
00:45:49.119 --> 00:45:52.480
And I would fathom that that is in the high 90s.
00:45:52.559 --> 00:46:15.519
And so we are collecting billions and billions of scans on people who have done nothing wrong, knowing full well there's no public safety benefit, and it might kill them from engaging not only in good behaviors, but in constitutionally protected behaviors, all because we're trying to stop a small, of course, solve a small handful of crimes.
00:46:15.679 --> 00:46:28.960
And I and I do want to note, I appear in legislatures and before committees all over this country, and every time the police are talking about stopping a criminal, it's always in one of two categories, someone who kills people or someone who hurts children.
00:46:29.119 --> 00:46:36.960
And yet they never really have bulk examples of the technology being used to solve those crimes, let alone to prevent them.
00:46:37.119 --> 00:46:56.000
And so they go and they do this narrative, in my opinion, knowing it's false, because what they're actually communicating to lawmakers is that if you vote against our mass surveillance, we are going to label you as soft on crime, as abandoning victims.
00:46:56.239 --> 00:47:03.119
And so even though we're wrong on the facts, we will still hurt you politically, so you dare not vote against us.
00:47:03.360 --> 00:47:11.760
That is problematic by itself, but I want you to bear in mind that these threats are coming from precisely the same people who have access to that data.
00:47:12.000 --> 00:47:27.599
And if they're willing to stand in a legislative committee, them and their technology partners, and lie to lawmakers to get their votes, I don't have much confidence that they're going to be the safe, reliable guardians of that data that they claim they will be.
00:47:28.639 --> 00:47:42.159
And so to be clear, if the police used ALPRs only for narrow hot lists, let's say amber alerts, stolen cars, as you discussed, serious violent felonies, and immediately deleted every non-hit.
00:47:42.719 --> 00:47:44.239
Would that satisfy you?
00:47:44.400 --> 00:47:50.559
Or is the architecture itself generally too prone to mission creep?
00:47:51.119 --> 00:47:54.960
So I so I think reasonable people can disagree on this, right?
00:47:55.119 --> 00:48:02.559
Um, you have a state like Vermont who has banned the use of license plate readers altogether because they think any use is too dangerous.
00:48:02.800 --> 00:48:20.079
Their neighboring state, New Hampshire, has a data retention limit of three minutes because they know that you can run that against the hot list for Amber alerts or for other purposes and then immediately delete it and you don't create this tracking curve.
00:48:20.239 --> 00:48:22.639
And I should mention, by the way, keep working your way east.
00:48:22.800 --> 00:48:28.480
I think Maine is next year very likely to ban license plate readers altogether.
00:48:28.719 --> 00:48:41.440
So if people want to have a discussion over whether or not it is safe with the right guardrails in place, including extremely limited data retention limits to use ALPRs, happy to have that conversation.
00:48:41.599 --> 00:48:58.159
Although I would say that the ACLU is while we're going to state our opinions about that, we are always going to try to center the communities themselves who are being watched in what they think is best for themselves, especially those communities who are most often the targets of surveillance.
00:48:58.320 --> 00:49:04.400
And if they say we're comfortable with Amber alerts, then we'll try to work with them to make that as safe as possible.
00:49:04.559 --> 00:49:09.199
And if they say we don't want them at all, then we're gonna go in that direction.
00:49:09.599 --> 00:49:21.280
Our view at IJ is pretty similar, but I would say we generally in the abstract think that using license plate readers for things like hot list alerts is fine.
00:49:21.519 --> 00:49:30.079
The devil is in the details, but you know, someone reports their car stolen, they want to add it to a hot list alert, that's fine.
00:49:30.320 --> 00:49:42.000
Uh, you know, custom hot list alerts where police are just entering their uh, you know, potential romantic partners that they want to keep tabs on, those are uh those are pretty iffy.
00:49:42.079 --> 00:49:43.760
So, you know, the devil's in the details.
00:49:43.920 --> 00:49:48.239
The cameras can also, they are prone to errors, you know, they're not perfect.
00:49:48.400 --> 00:50:10.320
And especially when they're scanning 20 billion license plates potentially, or if they're scanning license plates 20 billion times per month, and virtually none of those people are suspected of a crime, you know, the number of people who uh get pulled over, um, maybe detained or investigated because of a misfire can be pretty huge.
00:50:10.480 --> 00:50:15.280
It can even swamp the number of legitimate alerts.
00:50:15.440 --> 00:50:19.199
Um so you know, we're we're concerned with that as well.
00:50:19.360 --> 00:50:32.559
Uh and I just say that to qualify the statement that you know
we're fine with the hot list alerts in the abstract, the devil's in the details, and making sure that innocent people aren't being pulled over for unjustified reasons.
00:50:33.199 --> 00:50:35.599
If I can add just one thing, because I think it might be helpful.
00:50:35.760 --> 00:50:41.599
Um, you know, the ACLU has a campaign we're we're running right now called Get the Flock Out.
00:50:41.760 --> 00:50:45.119
Thank you, Flock, for coming up with that name that rhymes with other stuff.
00:50:45.280 --> 00:50:48.639
Um, but it while it is focused on Flock, it's not just about Flock.
00:50:48.800 --> 00:50:51.920
Axon uses these things, Motorola Vigilant uses these things.
00:50:52.079 --> 00:50:54.000
They're all incredibly problematic.
00:50:54.159 --> 00:51:01.360
Um, but if you go in there, you know, we have a state-level um model bill for regulating ALPR use.
00:51:01.440 --> 00:51:07.440
We have a local level bill that does the same thing, we have a model local ordinance for canceling flock contracts.
00:51:07.599 --> 00:51:14.079
So, you know, for people who are listening to this podcast and they're and they're saying to themselves, is there something that I can do?
00:51:14.239 --> 00:51:21.840
I mean, we have the ACLUs and the IJs of the world who will bring those litigations on your behalf, and we are more than happy to do so.
00:51:22.000 --> 00:51:23.760
But if people are like, what can I do?
00:51:23.920 --> 00:51:27.280
What can I do in my state and in my local community?
00:51:27.440 --> 00:51:28.960
Come to the ACLU.
00:51:29.119 --> 00:51:30.960
We have resources available for you.
00:51:31.039 --> 00:51:32.800
I'm sure IJ does as well.
00:51:32.960 --> 00:51:40.719
Um, uh, and so there's there's real um things that individual people can do to make these concerns actionable.
00:51:40.800 --> 00:51:48.239
And like I said earlier, there's more than 55 localities that have already canceled their flat contracts.
00:51:48.320 --> 00:51:54.559
And in every one of them, they were, it was a grassroots local movement that drove that change.
00:51:54.719 --> 00:52:14.559
So anyone listening who wants to help us draw that line in the sand, I invite you to visit ACLU, visit IJ, uh, and and we can we can help you with the resources that you need to be part of this fight, because this is a fight that that we can lead, but we cannot win it by ourselves.
00:52:14.719 --> 00:52:17.679
Um fortunately, that has not been a problem we've had.
00:52:17.840 --> 00:52:32.559
We have had the entire country behind us across the political spectrum, but but that needs to continue if we're gonna get um where we're ultimately trying to go, which is to keep people protected from ALPRs and other mass surveillance in the digital age.
00:52:32.880 --> 00:52:54.400
Um my colleagues would be a little upset with me if I didn't use this as an opportunity to pitch our uh website, plateprivacy.com, where we gather a bunch of our resources, including um model bills and information and a way for activists and people who are interested in speaking out to sign up and get involved.
00:52:54.719 --> 00:52:54.800
Yeah.
00:52:54.880 --> 00:52:55.760
And there's one more thing.
00:52:55.840 --> 00:53:06.480
There is a group that neither of us are connected with called DFLOC that does tremendous work in identifying where license plate readers are and in helping local movements rise up.
00:53:06.559 --> 00:53:14.239
So I would also strongly encourage people, in addition to ACLU and IJ, to also check out DFLOC both nationally and in their communities.
00:53:14.639 --> 00:53:18.159
Guys, that would be an ideal place to end, but I just cannot resist.
00:53:18.239 --> 00:53:19.119
I cannot hold back.
00:53:19.199 --> 00:53:21.280
I have one last question for you both.
00:53:21.519 --> 00:53:27.599
The the Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, right?
00:53:27.920 --> 00:53:34.960
Um, Flock and other companies make their technology available to private citizens and private entities, as you know.
00:53:35.199 --> 00:53:43.519
Um does your view change if a private homeowner subscribes to a service like this?
00:53:43.840 --> 00:53:56.400
Because let's say there's there's a there's a history of um a sexual predator in the neighborhood, and uh the family has a concern about that, maybe a particular concern about it, and wants an alert.
00:53:57.280 --> 00:54:00.000
Or, you know, imagine various hypotheticals.
00:54:00.159 --> 00:54:13.199
There's there's a woman who has an abusive ex-partner and is concerned about domestic violence, there's a restraining order, they want to be alerted to the presence of that individual within a certain radius.
00:54:13.440 --> 00:54:19.119
Does your view change if it's a private surveillance not involving the government at all?
00:54:20.079 --> 00:54:28.960
So I can tell you from the ACLU's perspective, and I don't I don't I don't think this is controversial, the private use of automatic license plate readers is protected by the First Amendment.
00:54:29.039 --> 00:54:30.400
It's filming in public.
00:54:30.480 --> 00:54:32.719
Uh so it's a completely different analysis.
00:54:32.880 --> 00:54:38.400
But I would say that we have seen governments tapping into private cameras.
00:54:38.559 --> 00:54:40.320
This can be private home cameras.
00:54:40.480 --> 00:54:49.360
There are numerous big box retailers out there who are using ALPRs on their property and just automatically making it available to police departments.
00:54:49.599 --> 00:55:04.159
So while our point of intervention would not be with the private use of cameras because of the First Amendment, it is absolutely a point of intervention to say when and under what circumstances the government should be able to get that private data.
00:55:04.639 --> 00:55:05.280
Absolutely.
00:55:05.440 --> 00:55:14.079
I mean, uh the you know, key case in this area of the law, Carpenter, involved the
third party's data that it was collecting for its own business purposes.
00:55:14.239 --> 00:55:23.519
I think third-party data under some circumstances can implicate privacy interests, such that the government might be required to get a warrant uh to go get it.
00:55:23.679 --> 00:55:31.760
Um, but you know, certainly private entities have their own right to decide what surveillance tools to use on their own property.
00:55:32.000 --> 00:55:38.559
We generally discourage them from sharing that information directly unsupervised with police.
00:55:38.719 --> 00:55:52.639
Um, you know, if incidents occur, people can always decide to share uh information that they choose to share with the police, um, as opposed to kind of just uploading it all to a massive police database.
00:55:53.920 --> 00:56:02.639
And I also think that this would be a great place uh to to conclude, but I have one more burning question for both of you all.
00:56:02.880 --> 00:56:10.079
Um when history we we just finished celebrating the 4th of July, 250, hurrah.
00:56:10.320 --> 00:56:22.320
When history looks back on this moment, will it say we built tools for safety for the betterment of our people, or that we built machinery of suspicion and called it safety?
00:56:23.760 --> 00:56:25.440
To be determined.
00:56:26.480 --> 00:56:27.119
Yes.
00:56:27.840 --> 00:56:39.280
I think I certainly hope we'll all look back on this as a crazy time when we allowed police to have free reign to surveil people everywhere they went.
00:56:39.440 --> 00:57:02.159
Um, and you know, it will be kind of of a piece with the eras where police could attach GPS trackers to suspects' cars without a warrant, where police could get cell site location information without a warrant, where our federal government was collecting bulk metadata um from you know all of our wireless carriers.
00:57:02.320 --> 00:57:06.400
Uh but as as Chad said, it it it remains to be seen.
00:57:08.159 --> 00:57:08.800
Thank you.
00:57:09.039 --> 00:57:09.280
Thank you.
00:57:09.760 --> 00:57:12.079
Thank you guys for the great conversation today.
00:57:12.159 --> 00:57:18.000
This has been really interesting, and uh we'll have to see how it unfolds and hopefully have you guys back for part two.
00:57:18.480 --> 00:57:19.280
I'd love that.
00:57:19.679 --> 00:57:20.480
Thank you for having me.
00:57:20.800 --> 00:57:25.679
Um absolutely, this was this was thoroughly enjoyable, very, very enlightening.
00:57:25.840 --> 00:57:34.800
Um, and perhaps we uh should should should remain off camera during our next interview based on everything you all are saying.
00:57:35.119 --> 00:57:45.199
But uh nonetheless, this this is a lot of food for thought, and I hope that our listeners uh take everything that you all are saying to heart and uh to all of our listeners, please.
00:57:45.440 --> 00:58:11.360
Um both of these organizations, uh both the uh the the the ACLU and IJ are they are at the forefront of something that is literally happening faster and faster and evolving second by second behind an invisible veil.
00:58:11.599 --> 00:58:18.000
And uh I I I think that i anybody who's listening should be very concerned about this.
00:58:18.159 --> 00:58:27.199
So we thank you all for your work and what you all are doing to contribute to the our the the future of our privacy.
00:58:28.159 --> 00:58:30.320
Thank you for helping us get the word out.
00:58:30.639 --> 00:58:31.440
Absolutely.
00:58:31.679 --> 00:58:32.719
Thank you guys.
00:58:34.400 --> 00:58:40.079
This episode of the Just Pod was edited and produced by Kyosue and socialized by Sarah Timote.
00:58:40.400 --> 00:58:44.239
Our original theme music was composed and mixed by Janora Butler.
00:58:45.360 --> 00:59:03.840
If you would like to join us on a future episode of The Just Pod, or if you have questions or topics for us to address on a future episode, please send them to our producer, Kiosu, at Keo.suh at AmericanBar.org.
00:59:04.480 --> 00:59:06.480
This has been another episode of the Just Pod.
00:59:06.719 --> 00:59:07.920
Thanks so much for joining us.
00:59:08.079 --> 00:59:10.639
From Philadelphia, I'm Justin Daniel Evits.
00:59:11.119 --> 00:59:13.840
And from Washington, DC, I am Janard Butler.
00:59:14.079 --> 00:59:15.920
Please join us again next time.
00:59:16.400 --> 00:59:20.960
The Just Pod is a production of the American Bar Association's criminal justice section.