UDSKRIFT 🔗
WEBVTT
00:00:00.160 --> 00:00:06.320
Welcome to the Talos Takes Podcast, where we discuss Talos' latest research and security news.
00:00:06.320 --> 00:00:10.800
This podcast is for everyone, from the C suite to the front line.
00:00:13.679 --> 00:00:25.280
We've all heard about the ClickFix social engineering scheme where users are tricked into running malicious commands on their machines so that actors can gain their initial access.
00:00:25.280 --> 00:00:30.960
But the threat actors behind a new scheme have moved the playing field entirely.
00:00:30.960 --> 00:00:36.159
Instead of targeting the operating system, they're going straight for the browser session.
00:00:36.159 --> 00:00:47.840
They're using a mix of social engineering and some really creative abuse of the Google Visualization API to turn a user's own browser against them.
00:00:47.840 --> 00:01:05.760
So to help us understand exactly how this works, why it could be so hard to catch in the future, and what security practitioners need to do to stay ahead of it, I am joined today by security engineer Sean Gallagher, who has been leading the research on this campaign.
00:01:05.760 --> 00:01:07.439
Sean, thanks for being here.
00:01:07.760 --> 00:01:08.400
Good to be here.
00:01:08.799 --> 00:01:10.560
Yeah, so let's jump right in.
00:01:10.560 --> 00:01:13.840
So you've been tracking this campaign for several months now.
00:01:13.840 --> 00:01:26.000
Can you start by explaining how this ClickFix variation differs from the traditional malware delivery that most people are used to and why this focus has shifted?
00:01:26.560 --> 00:01:26.879
Sure.
00:01:26.879 --> 00:01:33.519
So uh this is particularly targeting people who are using crypto trading websites.
00:01:33.519 --> 00:01:46.640
So uh because of the targeting and because of the particular type of crime this is oriented around, uh, the browser is the target since most of the trading is happening through what we would call swap sites, right?
00:01:46.640 --> 00:01:55.840
They're basically aggregators of different uh distributed uh DeFi type applications and DeFi APIs.
00:01:55.840 --> 00:02:04.640
So in this case, this differs from your normal ClickFix in that the attacker is not trying to install software onto your computer.
00:02:04.640 --> 00:02:14.400
They are trying to inject JavaScript into the page that you have loaded when that page is associated with one of these trading sites.
00:02:14.400 --> 00:02:29.759
So instead of getting you to paste a command line into the Windows run box, they are trying to get you to essentially load JavaScript into a browser session.
00:02:29.759 --> 00:02:37.520
Initially, they tried to do this by getting people to use the Chrome navigation bar and basically drop JavaScript right into their session.
00:02:37.520 --> 00:02:45.360
Uh they've moved since to using a plugin that allows you to inject code into a website.
00:02:45.360 --> 00:03:00.159
So the uh in this case, it's a plugin called TamperMonkey, which has legitimate uses for many people, but in this case, it's being used essentially as a stepping stone to dropping malicious JavaScript into these trading websites.
00:03:00.159 --> 00:03:08.879
And uh like with other ClickFix type campaigns, there's a bit of a social engineering thing going on here.
00:03:08.879 --> 00:03:14.319
They need to convince the targeted person that they need to drop this code in.
00:03:14.319 --> 00:03:35.120
The approach you're taking is a lot different than the usual ClickFix attack, which essentially is saying we're doing a uh we're doing a uh Cloudflare check of your identity, or we're doing a captcha on you to see if you can identify yourself as human and there's a problem with your computer, you need to run this command, right?
00:03:35.120 --> 00:03:55.120
So um in this case, they're using this very elaborate social engineering campaign where they're trying to convince people that this is a security hole that they have discovered in these sites, and you can exploit it to make more money off of crypto trades by following these instructions.
00:03:55.680 --> 00:04:04.639
So they're targeting like novice cyber criminals who might not have understood exactly how everything works.
00:04:05.039 --> 00:04:06.879
They're targeting people who are greedy, right?
00:04:06.879 --> 00:04:30.000
They're targeting people who are are willing to commit essentially uh essentially commit cybercrime by uh exploiting a fictional vulnerability in these websites to gain additional trading gapability to get a bigger bonus back from their transaction than they normally would.
00:04:30.000 --> 00:04:39.360
So um they're targeting people in sort of novice cryptocurrency forums, in hacker forums, other dark web forums.
00:04:39.360 --> 00:05:00.399
Um, for a while they were posting these lures on places like paste bin type sites in comments around other security-related things that people who are sort of beginner cyber criminals or people who are security conscious might be hanging out in and see these comments and then go look at this document.
00:05:00.399 --> 00:05:07.839
Um, and that gets them into the whole pipeline for this uh this campaign.
00:05:07.839 --> 00:05:13.839
There's also a supporting telegram feed that continues to point to the lure for this.
00:05:13.839 --> 00:05:32.800
That is again another place where you know a lot of people who hang out in various dark web places tend to do their communications, and uh they're a lot of the lures that I've seen in some of the dark web forums point back to this telegram channel and say, This is the original source of this hack.
00:05:32.800 --> 00:05:36.240
You should go here to find the link to get to it, things like that.
00:05:36.240 --> 00:05:40.480
So um it's really targeting junior cyber criminals.
00:05:42.079 --> 00:05:44.319
I mean, we all have to start somewhere.
00:05:44.639 --> 00:05:45.360
Right, right.
00:05:45.360 --> 00:05:49.519
Oh my god But it's
Load full transcript
really a very, it's a very elaborate uh lure.
00:05:49.519 --> 00:05:59.920
And you know, I have a feeling that maybe some AI may have been used in sort of like writing up in the form take my words and put them in the format of a of a uh a vulnerability report.
00:06:00.240 --> 00:06:01.360
Um yeah.
00:06:01.600 --> 00:06:04.959
So it's it's it's it's very well-written lure.
00:06:04.959 --> 00:06:07.519
It's published in a Google Doc.
00:06:07.519 --> 00:06:27.600
And so uh it's out there and it's this this this campaign uh prior to the one we looked into was active last year, around this time, uh and was using a different method of getting people to inject this code into their system.
00:06:27.600 --> 00:06:30.079
Um so it's been going on for some time.
00:06:30.079 --> 00:06:33.360
There have been a couple of sort of knockoff campaigns as well.
00:06:33.360 --> 00:06:35.600
I think people have copied, copied the idea.
00:06:35.600 --> 00:06:41.360
Maybe they fell for it the first time and they said, I could use this myself and have spread it around.
00:06:41.360 --> 00:06:48.000
So um it's an interesting scam operation in terms of its targeting.
00:06:48.000 --> 00:07:04.319
Uh we don't have a really good feel for how much money people have made off of this, but um considering how little it costs them to operate the infrastructure for this, and we can get into that a little bit, um, it's it's really, you know, it's it's extra money for these people.
00:07:04.319 --> 00:07:24.480
They're they're doing this in a, I mean, this is something that um honestly, I think somebody who's like a computer science undergrad who's doing or somebody who's doing web page design type stuff and is familiar with doing interactive JavaScript could write up write up in a day and probably get a little bit of AI help to do it.
00:07:24.480 --> 00:07:37.360
And um once they have the JavaScript written, uh the uses a bunch of fairly fairly common commodity obfuscation tools and things like that.
00:07:37.360 --> 00:07:47.759
It's just this particular trick they're using to get into the browser is what's really, really interesting about this because it's something that we haven't seen other than in like a state actor situation in the past.
00:07:48.399 --> 00:07:48.959
Wow.
00:07:48.959 --> 00:07:51.120
Simple but lucrative.
00:07:51.439 --> 00:07:51.759
Yes.
00:07:52.800 --> 00:07:53.759
Oh my gosh.
00:07:53.759 --> 00:07:59.199
Um, so yeah, let's let's get into a little bit of the more technical aspects of this.
00:07:59.199 --> 00:08:09.439
So um one of the interesting aspects of this campaign is the use of uh the Google visualization API for command and control.
00:08:09.439 --> 00:08:17.839
Um why is this specific API so effective in this campaign for threat actors?
00:08:18.399 --> 00:08:23.199
So, first of all, the Google Visualization API was for it was originally developed by Google Charts.
00:08:23.199 --> 00:08:34.080
Um it is a read-only API, it requires no
security authentication, so there's no uh there's no sign-in, there's no key required.
00:08:34.080 --> 00:08:44.559
Um so it allows uh JSON to be produced from a Google Sheets spreadsheet.
00:08:44.559 --> 00:09:10.000
So you can store data in a spreadsheet, and this API makes SQL-like requests against the spreadsheet and returns a JSON file, a JSON document with the content of that query, which can then be parsed by JavaScript in a web application or by any other application that can read JSON, right?
00:09:10.000 --> 00:09:16.879
So you can it just long if you've got a JSON parser, it can be read by a Python script, it can be read by a lot, a lot of things, right?
00:09:16.879 --> 00:09:22.159
And and if you have if you just have to code it to read it and uh so the contents can keep get used.
00:09:22.159 --> 00:09:24.480
Originally they were used to like populate a chart, right?
00:09:24.480 --> 00:09:30.240
This is right, this is the uh the item that we're ch charting, this is the value, right?
00:09:30.240 --> 00:09:45.600
Um but in this case, it's being used to deliver a container with malicious JavaScript in it, a loader that will install the malicious JavaScript into a page, inject it into a page.
00:09:45.600 --> 00:09:52.480
And so that's being called by a script that the user puts in.
00:09:52.480 --> 00:09:57.600
Originally, this was something they were they were pointing to oft on a paste page.
00:09:57.600 --> 00:10:02.080
Now the actual script that they're putting in themselves is actually in another Google document.
00:10:02.080 --> 00:10:14.879
Uh, they've because, well, we've been harassing them for so long at this point, they got they moved off the paste page because I've been talking with a guy who runs a paste page and he set up a cron job that just looked for a new ones being posted and and and marked them as abuse.
00:10:14.879 --> 00:10:19.840
So now they've moved to using Google Docs to publish the script.
00:10:19.840 --> 00:10:25.279
That gets put into a, in as I said before, a uh a Tamper Monkey plugin.
00:10:25.279 --> 00:10:27.840
All right, so it's a script that gets put into Tamper Monkey.
00:10:27.840 --> 00:10:39.279
Tamper Monkey is a plugin that looks for when you go to a web page and says, okay, this web page, I have instructions to run this script when this per when the user visits this script page.
00:10:39.279 --> 00:11:02.480
And it's usually to do things like change interfaces to like, you know, like if you wanted to get rid of a bunch of stuff in Facebook when you visited Facebook, you know, if you you've used the uh there's a couple of plugins that are available uh for Facebook to eliminate things in the uh in the CSS and things like or change things in the CSS or change display or hide things, um, you'd use something like TamperMonkey to change the UI.
00:11:02.480 --> 00:11:14.720
In this case, they're using TamperMonkey to change the UI to add a button that does transaction skimming that actually grabs crypto addresses out of the stream.
00:11:14.720 --> 00:11:26.960
So with uh the the Google AP Google Visualization API API, uh the benefit is that you have a you know it's it's a public point, it's run from a spreadsheet.
00:11:26.960 --> 00:11:30.159
The URL is associated with a Google Sheets spreadsheet.
00:11:30.159 --> 00:11:34.720
So it looks like legitimate network traffic for most systems, right?
00:11:34.720 --> 00:11:37.440
So it's saying, oh no, it's going to go it's going to Google Gabak.
00:11:37.440 --> 00:11:38.879
That's a normal behavior, right?
00:11:38.879 --> 00:11:51.120
It then injects this JavaScript, which gets deobfuscated by the code that's in the script uh to change the destination for any Bitcoin transaction.
00:11:51.120 --> 00:11:56.720
And it pulls from a randomized list of 30 different addresses, essentially.
00:11:56.720 --> 00:11:59.360
We saw 30 different addresses being used in the attack.
00:11:59.360 --> 00:12:04.240
There were others that were in the code that have never been used that we can see.
00:12:04.240 --> 00:12:07.679
It might just be a bug in the code that's not doing it as randomly as they want it to.
00:12:07.679 --> 00:12:13.120
In any case, that's all sitting in the spreadsheet, which is publicly viewable by anybody, right?
00:12:13.120 --> 00:12:19.440
The thing is that they've formatted the spreadsheet so that the text in those fields is white on white, right?
00:12:19.440 --> 00:12:24.000
So if you're casually viewing the spreadsheet, it doesn't look like there's anything there.
00:12:24.000 --> 00:12:27.360
There's just something that says API at the top and a bunch of other stuff.
00:12:27.360 --> 00:12:36.320
So if you if you were like trying to figure out what's going on where this traffic was going to, you'd go to the spreadsheet and there wasn't wouldn't be anything visible to somebody who's just looking at the page trying to analyze it.
00:12:36.320 --> 00:12:42.159
It's only when you download it and look at the contents without the formatting that you see all this JavaScript.
00:12:42.159 --> 00:12:48.960
Uh or if you execute the URL that points to it, you get a JSON package.
00:12:48.960 --> 00:12:52.240
And you can you can deal, you can uh analyze that.
00:12:52.639 --> 00:12:52.879
Right.
00:12:52.879 --> 00:13:01.919
And I imagine you can also probably like hide it even further by putting it way down in the sheet so that like it's not somewhere where people would normally scroll.
00:13:01.919 --> 00:13:02.720
Exactly.
00:13:02.799 --> 00:13:03.360
And they do that.
00:13:03.360 --> 00:13:03.840
They do that.
00:13:03.840 --> 00:13:12.720
In fact, the most recent version of the spreadsheet, the spreadsheet has been there for the entire campaign, except for when we interrupted it the first time in April, right?
00:13:12.720 --> 00:13:15.279
So they had to they had to switch spreadsheets in April.
00:13:15.279 --> 00:13:22.000
Um there are artifacts from all of the other
versions of the code they've had throughout the campaign through this thing.
00:13:22.000 --> 00:13:27.759
There's one or two that are up high, but every time they could change, they push something further and further down in the spreadsheet.
00:13:27.759 --> 00:13:34.559
And so you have to search on the keywords, which is API, right?
00:13:34.559 --> 00:13:38.960
Search on API to find where the line is that has the code in it.
00:13:38.960 --> 00:13:43.840
They haven't felt the need to really change the code that much over over the course of this.
00:13:43.840 --> 00:13:57.600
They've changed it when they've updated not the box, not the addresses that the transactions are going to, but they've used different obfuscation techniques to beat analysis after they've been interrupted.
00:13:57.600 --> 00:14:06.080
So and there are a number of JavaScript obfuscation tools that are out there that are open source that are easily obtainable on GitHub.
00:14:06.080 --> 00:14:08.399
These match up with a bunch of those.
00:14:08.399 --> 00:14:12.559
I looked at the way the output from a bunch of differences, they were very, very close.
00:14:12.559 --> 00:14:21.919
All they were doing was uh basically using XOR with a key to change the values of text strings.
00:14:21.919 --> 00:14:25.440
And they were breaking up the text strings as arrays.
00:14:25.440 --> 00:14:43.840
So they would have an array of content and it would then, in the course of running the code, it would go through the array in a sort of a predetermined fashion and pull the bits of code out of the array and write them to the document object model of the website it's being injected into.
00:14:43.840 --> 00:14:49.200
And so every time they changed the key, uh they did some slightly different code.
00:14:49.200 --> 00:14:52.559
We found about roughly 20 different samples.
00:14:52.559 --> 00:14:59.360
The code that gets injected was almost identical in all of them for this particular campaign we've been watching.
00:14:59.360 --> 00:15:09.679
Um there was a previous campaign targeting another website that we caught the end of when we started observing this, and that code it's still in the spreadsheet.
00:15:09.679 --> 00:15:10.960
So my God.
00:15:10.960 --> 00:15:14.240
Um so they've it's been clear they've they moved targets at one point.
00:15:14.240 --> 00:15:17.440
They moved from one uh aggregator site to another.
00:15:17.440 --> 00:15:24.799
Uh when the aggregator site that they were targeting took measures to warn users that there was a problem.
00:15:24.799 --> 00:15:34.240
And then they we've we have we have informed the site that runs this is being targeted in this particular campaign now of this activity.
00:15:34.240 --> 00:15:40.799
Um it's not clear that they've done anything to particularly alert customers that this is something that's going on.
00:15:40.799 --> 00:15:43.440
But um the campaign continues.
00:15:43.440 --> 00:15:46.720
So uh despite everything we've done with
it, it's like they're still going.
00:15:46.720 --> 00:15:51.519
I still watch their telegram channel and they keep popping up URLs and it's the same one all the time.
00:15:51.519 --> 00:15:53.360
And we've reported a bunch of it.
00:15:53.360 --> 00:15:55.600
We reported it several times to Google.
00:15:55.600 --> 00:16:05.039
So uh, but you know, this there's a limit to how much Google can prevent people from using their architecture, using their platform for this sort of abuse.
00:16:05.039 --> 00:16:12.639
And right, because when you we did get them taken down before, they were back up again with a new document and a new spreadsheet within a day and a half.
00:16:12.639 --> 00:16:13.679
So Right.
00:16:13.759 --> 00:16:26.320
And I mean, like for most people listening to this, unless you are a budding cyber criminal, um, this specific campaign you probably don't have to worry about, right?
00:16:26.480 --> 00:16:28.080
But this specific campaign, no.
00:16:28.159 --> 00:16:29.200
But this one.
00:16:29.200 --> 00:16:38.320
But this one can be scaled up like on a on a much larger level for like supply chain or enterprise-wide.
00:16:38.320 --> 00:16:39.120
Absolutely.
00:16:39.120 --> 00:16:43.120
So like does this keep you up at night at all thinking about it?
00:16:43.279 --> 00:17:06.640
Well, this sort of thing, this sort of thing does like you know, I mean, if you think about uh the types of campaigns we've seen in the past, uh like Magikart, right, where uh people have done injections into uh legitimate web commerce sites by compromising a piece of their software supply chain and essentially adding a card skimmer to their components, right?
00:17:06.640 --> 00:17:17.119
Those campaigns continue, and usually what is the tip-off on them is that there's this weird web host involved at some point that is the source for some of the code, right?
00:17:17.119 --> 00:17:30.720
So um they you know, we we can see a URL that's being called that's going to another site and it's it's and it's pulling data or or retrieving data from this transaction.
00:17:30.720 --> 00:17:33.279
So it's it's doing a little bit of cross-site scripting.
00:17:33.279 --> 00:17:54.400
But in this case, if they were to say, do this sort of a JavaScript injection, where the injection came from an API, an API called a Google, and a blue team was looking at network trying to block network traffic and just saw a bunch of Google Sheets traffic, right?
00:17:54.400 --> 00:18:05.039
And you have to be looking for a very specific pattern in in the uh URIs in the web requests because the requests are going to be coming from a browser.
00:18:05.039 --> 00:18:16.559
That's the other piece, is that normally when we see we look at malware and we see web requests or we see other requests that we are suspicious, they're requests that are coming from applications other than browsers often, right?
00:18:16.559 --> 00:18:18.559
So we're seeing a PowerShell request, right?
00:18:18.559 --> 00:18:20.160
And that's what happens with ClickFix.
00:18:20.160 --> 00:18:27.599
The ClickFix is you like often uses a uh a PowerShell command to make a request from a website.
00:18:27.599 --> 00:18:29.200
Um, we can spot that, right?
00:18:29.200 --> 00:18:31.920
Is it why is PowerShell going to this weird URL, right?
00:18:31.920 --> 00:18:32.079
Yeah.
00:18:32.079 --> 00:18:34.960
Why is PowerShell going to this to Google, right?
00:18:34.960 --> 00:18:37.279
Um that's a very unusual request.
00:18:37.279 --> 00:18:40.240
Um, but if it's coming from a Chrome browser.
00:18:42.000 --> 00:18:46.079
I mean, that's that's nothing that would normally be suspicious.
00:18:46.720 --> 00:18:47.519
Right, exactly.
00:18:47.519 --> 00:19:07.200
So so that's the big concern with this sort of an attack is that someone could, you know, a a a cyber criminal organization that manages to get a to compromise supply chain for a website, or in some other web applic based application.
00:19:07.200 --> 00:19:24.000
We like what we just saw with like, for example, with team PCP, where Team PCP was able to uh exploit GitHub to inject things into the uh the process of deploying applications, right?
00:19:24.000 --> 00:19:31.359
Um if if they were able to do that to a web application to any node application, for example, right?
00:19:31.359 --> 00:19:42.480
Uh no we often see a we we see a lot of node supply chain attacks, right, where people take over a node, uh an NPM account and they change code, right?
00:19:42.480 --> 00:19:58.880
Um to combine that with this, right, uh, or to do something similar, the requests to Google would be very difficult for a defender to spot based on behavior because it's not those aren't gonna be blacklisted sites.
00:19:58.880 --> 00:20:12.160
Uh you have to look for the full URI of a request to see that it's a an API request and that it's and and and the formatting of it and catch that pattern.
00:20:12.160 --> 00:20:15.279
And you have to understand what that pattern is before the request is made.
00:20:15.279 --> 00:20:17.920
So makes it hard to hunt for, makes it hard to block.
00:20:17.920 --> 00:20:20.480
So those are things that we have to be concerned about.
00:20:20.480 --> 00:20:24.559
There are ways to block it, block the set of behavior in your enterprise.
00:20:24.559 --> 00:20:27.920
You can block attacks against individuals' browsers, right?
00:20:27.920 --> 00:20:34.559
And we use things like Windows Policy and Google browser management Chrome browser management, right?
00:20:34.559 --> 00:20:40.319
Locking down the use of additional plugins, limiting the plugins to ones that are approved.
00:20:40.319 --> 00:20:48.640
But uh, when it's going after other places in the chain, when it happens in the supply chain, it's a much harder problem.
00:20:48.880 --> 00:20:49.200
Yeah.
00:20:49.200 --> 00:20:57.359
I'm thinking for the security practitioners who are listening to this and really concerned about this in their
environment in the future potentially.
00:20:57.359 --> 00:21:01.519
I I guess what what are the most critical defensive steps?
00:21:01.519 --> 00:21:09.279
Like I know that you said like the Windows policy and everything, but is is is that the main one that you would recommend?
00:21:09.279 --> 00:21:11.680
You know, what what should people be looking out for?
00:21:12.079 --> 00:21:21.119
Yeah, I would recommend Windows policy and and if you are using Chrome, use having enterprise Chrome management of browsers, right?
00:21:21.119 --> 00:21:30.960
Um to make sure that you are restricting the ability of users to be led down the bl down the primrose path, so to speak, right?
00:21:30.960 --> 00:21:36.960
So uh you know, you have to make sure that users aren't self-injecting themselves, right, with with MELP.
00:21:36.960 --> 00:21:40.480
And obviously fish training is important, right?
00:21:40.480 --> 00:21:44.319
Because this is a sort of thing that follows the same pattern as ClickFix, right?
00:21:44.319 --> 00:21:47.839
It goes along with a lot of the other social engineering attacks uh that we look at.
00:21:47.839 --> 00:21:51.599
Having people be very aware of social engineering is very important.
00:21:51.599 --> 00:22:02.559
Also, if you have policies about use of uh web applications, is using Google Docs something Something that your organization does normally.
00:22:02.559 --> 00:22:07.440
If not, maybe do some things at the and consider blocking.
00:22:07.440 --> 00:22:09.039
Consider blocking at the firewall.
00:22:09.039 --> 00:22:18.079
I mean, it's not, you know, it's uh, I mean, a lot of people interact with Google Docs as part of their job, even if they aren't authoring them internally, right?
00:22:18.079 --> 00:22:19.279
Even if they're not something that's going on.
00:22:19.279 --> 00:22:22.240
A lot of organizations use Google Docs as their platform, right?
00:22:22.480 --> 00:22:22.640
Right.
00:22:22.880 --> 00:22:34.960
So you know, you have to you have to make sure that you're taking some consideration of this into your analysis of how you use the platforms and how users access them.
00:22:34.960 --> 00:22:39.599
From the supply chain side, all the usual things come into play there, right?
00:22:39.599 --> 00:22:50.160
You have to be it it requires a lot of vigilance about deploying new versions of applications to the web, especially on the public-facing side.
00:22:50.160 --> 00:22:53.200
Because the biggest threat here is not internal.
00:22:53.200 --> 00:22:56.319
The biggest threat is customer-facing applications.
00:22:56.319 --> 00:23:10.079
Uh, if you're doing e-commerce site applications or anything where PII is gathered or things like that, um, and you're using third-party services, you need to make sure that there is an ongoing examination of those services.
00:23:10.079 --> 00:23:23.440
You're constantly hunting against them, seeing what they're and knowing what their vulnerabilities are, and making sure that you are not offering up opportunities for attackers to do code injection in the middle anywhere.
00:23:23.440 --> 00:23:26.559
So those are the major considerations I can think of to begin with.
00:23:26.559 --> 00:23:34.160
And it's going to depend a lot on your organization, depend a lot on your user's application usage, a lot on your on how you present to customers.
00:23:34.160 --> 00:23:40.319
But it is important to look for this sort of thing because this is, you know, think about how much this costs the attacker.
00:23:40.640 --> 00:23:41.440
Very little.
00:23:41.759 --> 00:23:42.640
Very little, right?
00:23:42.640 --> 00:23:44.160
It's a free platform.
00:23:44.160 --> 00:23:51.599
Uh it costs them a little bit of time to load it into the environment and to develop and write the write the API calls.
00:23:51.599 --> 00:23:57.039
It's easily transportable to another infrastructure within the Google Cloud.
00:23:57.039 --> 00:24:06.960
You know, as we've seen, yeah, in fighting this particular one with a bunch of a bunch of people have been tracking this and and we've all been reporting stuff.
00:24:06.960 --> 00:24:08.079
It's resilient.
00:24:08.079 --> 00:24:17.519
It costs only a few minutes of the attacker's time to reload the whole attack into a different set of documents.
00:24:17.920 --> 00:24:26.799
I mean, they're and they're going to go through the path of least resistance to getting the most bang for their zero bucks.
00:24:26.799 --> 00:24:27.759
Exactly.
00:24:27.759 --> 00:24:28.400
Exactly.
00:24:28.559 --> 00:24:35.759
And so we know that they we know, you know, in in what we've been tracking with this particular scam, I mean, and it's and it's I mean, it's a scam and it's targeting a particular crowd.
00:24:35.920 --> 00:24:36.079
Yeah.
00:24:36.640 --> 00:24:45.759
I'm figuring this is probably maybe two or three people doing this, and they've cleared close to $100,000 in the last six months.
00:24:45.759 --> 00:24:47.519
And that adds up, right?
00:24:47.920 --> 00:24:49.680
That's pretty I mean, that's pretty good.
00:24:50.079 --> 00:24:56.079
And they're using some fairly sophisticated crypto uh laundering methods.
00:24:56.079 --> 00:25:04.960
Or you they're using mixers that I I've yeah, I've been trying to track down some of the way that the currency had been going once it gets out of the wallets that they get sensed to.
00:25:04.960 --> 00:25:14.000
They're using a couple of mixers, very large transactions uh with lots of uh counterparties to obscure where everything goes.
00:25:14.000 --> 00:25:18.880
And it's at least and and I've seen it going around and around in circles for a while.
00:25:18.880 --> 00:25:26.640
I uh I'm working with uh chain analysis to see if we can come up with a better look at where things are going with it once it gets out of the wallets.
00:25:26.640 --> 00:25:35.359
But it's also, you know, for this sort of thing, the chain analysis tracks its very small potatoes, it's not a big, a big crime spree by the by most measures.
00:25:35.359 --> 00:25:37.920
This is hardly even like FBI.
00:25:37.920 --> 00:25:40.960
I don't FBI would look at this and say, why would we get involved?
00:25:40.960 --> 00:25:41.119
Right?
00:25:41.200 --> 00:25:42.240
This is like Yes.
00:25:42.240 --> 00:25:42.799
Right.
00:25:43.519 --> 00:25:44.799
This is intramurals.
00:25:44.799 --> 00:25:54.400
So um it's uh it but it's still you know it's been very profitable to these guys.
00:25:54.400 --> 00:25:59.680
And you can imagine, if done at scale, how much it could turn into.
00:26:00.400 --> 00:26:03.359
Thank you so much for coming on and sharing all of this with us.
00:26:03.359 --> 00:26:09.039
You'll have to, if you haven't already, you should talk to Joe about how they're obscuring everything.
00:26:09.039 --> 00:26:10.799
He loves the money laundering.
00:26:10.799 --> 00:26:12.960
Yeah, I'll talk to him of oh yeah.
00:26:13.599 --> 00:26:15.759
No, I talk to Joe all the time, but I will talk with him more about this.
00:26:15.759 --> 00:26:16.079
Yeah.
00:26:16.400 --> 00:26:16.720
Good.
00:26:16.720 --> 00:26:17.680
Good, good.
00:26:17.680 --> 00:26:23.279
For our listeners, I will put the blog that he just put out in the show notes.
00:26:23.279 --> 00:26:24.720
So give that a read.
00:26:24.720 --> 00:26:28.160
And we'll see you again in two weeks for another episode.
00:26:28.160 --> 00:26:30.400
Take care and stay safe out there.