UDSKRIFT 🔗
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Good morning, good afternoon, or good evening, whenever you may be, and welcome back to another episode of the SOC Brief.
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I'm your host Andrew, and today we're talking about a cyber attack that resulted in something you don't normally associate with a security incident.
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Spoiled milk, ruined frozen food, overheated refrigeration systems, and reportedly even fires.
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Over the weekend, hundreds of supermarkets across France were hit by a coordinated cyberattack against the systems controlling their refrigerators and freezers.
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Attackers remotely manipulated refrigeration controllers and triggered extended defrost cycles, causing temperatures in some units to reportedly climb to around 50 degrees Celsius.
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So for us in America, that'd be about 122 degrees Fahrenheit.
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So those weren't refrigerators that were just running a little warm.
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In most cases, they essentially stopped being refrigerators.
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Stores had to throw away huge amounts of food, some locations temporarily shut down affected sections, and individual stores are reporting losses ranging from tens of thousands to potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars.
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And this incident gives us a really good example of something security teams talk about all the time, but don't necessarily get to see this clearly, and that cybersecurity can become physical security very quickly.
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The attacks happened overnight between October 11th and 12th.
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Multiple French supermarket chains reported affected locations, and early reports suggested somewhere around 250 to 350 stores, and French authorities are now saying more than 350 supermarkets were impacted, and the investigation is still ongoing.
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One chain alone, Cooperative U, confirmed around 80 affected stores.
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Keep in mind that these companies don't all share the same corporate network either.
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The common denominator appears to be the technology used to remotely manage the refrigeration systems.
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France's National Security Response Team, CERT FR, initially warned about compromises involving Danfoss AKSM and AKSC refrigeration controllers.
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As the investigation expanded, that advisory was updated to include Copeland X Web and Dixel X Web systems as well.
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And that's important because it tells us this may not be one vulnerability in one specific appliance.
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We're looking more broadly at the security of internet connected refrigeration management systems.
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And before we go further, there's something we need to be careful about.
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We do not currently have a confirmed technical attack chain explaining exactly how every affected supermarket was compromised.
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There has been a lot of discussion about known vulnerabilities in Danfoss equipment and outdated firmware.
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Those are absolutely relevant.
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But as of this recording, we shouldn't say this CVE caused the French supermarket attack, because we don't know that yet.
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What we do know is that CERT FR is aware of numerous compromised refrigeration controllers and is specifically warning organizations that exposing their management interfaces.
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What we do know is that CERT FR is aware of numerous compromised refrigeration controllers, and is specifically warning organizations that exposing their management interfaces directly to the internet is contrary to cybersecurity best practices.
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And that alone should tell us quite a bit.
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These controllers are essentially small industrial computers.
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They're used to manage refrigeration equipment throughout supermarkets, warehouses, and cold storage facilities.
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They can monitor temperature, manage compressors, control alarms, schedule defrost cycles, and allow refrigeration technicians to remotely troubleshoot systems.
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That remote management capability makes sense operationally.
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If a freezer starts malfunctioning at 3 in the morning, you probably don't want to wait until somebody can physically drive to the store before anyone can even diagnose the problem.
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So manufacturers provide web-based management.
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Installers connect them, service companies access them remotely, and everything becomes much easier to manage.
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That's until the management interface is sitting directly on the internet.
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Then it becomes easier for somebody else to manage too.
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Security researchers at Clarity actually looked at this problem earlier this year.
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Their Team 82 researchers investigated the Danfoss AKSM800A platform and found thousands of management interfaces exposed to the public internet.
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They also found some pretty serious security issues.
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One involved a hidden authentication mechanism that generated what was essentially a daily password based on the device's date and time.
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And researchers were able to reverse engineer that algorithm and reproduce the password.
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That could allow somebody to bypass the normal login
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process.
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They also identified a command injection vulnerability that could lead to remote code execution after authentication, as well as another vulnerability involving the controller's web server configuration.
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Danfoss worked with Clarity and released updated firmware addressing those issues.
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And again, we do not currently know that those vulnerabilities were what attackers use this weekend.
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But the research demonstrates the larger problem.
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These aren't dumb refrigerators anymore.
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They're network computers controlling physical equipment.
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And that means we need to start thinking about them the way we think about other endpoints.
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The refrigerator probably isn't running CrowdStrike, and you're probably not installing Microsoft Defender on the freezer aisle.
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But from a security perspective, it still has an IP address, a management interface, credentials, firmware, remote access capabilities, network connections, and the ability to affect something in the physical world.
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So that makes it part of an attack surface.
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And that's where I think this story gets really interesting for SOC teams specifically, because most SOCs are extremely comfortable monitoring traditional IT.
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Devices like Windows endpoints, servers, firewalls, domain controllers, cloud environments, email.
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But ask the SOC analyst what controls the refrigeration system in the cafeteria, or the building HVAC, generators, badge readers, or the environmental controls in the data center?
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And sometimes the answer is I have absolutely no idea.
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And that is the first lesson from this incident.
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We can't defend equipment that we don't know exists.
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Organizations need an inventory of connected operational technology.
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That means more than just expensive industrial control systems in a factory.
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Look around your actual facilities and consider HVAC, cameras, door access systems, building management systems, elevators, lighting, power controls, environmental monitoring, refrigeration, generators, UPS systems.
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Anything with a network cable or Wi-Fi connection deserves at least one question.
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Why is this connected and who can connect to it?
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The second lesson is even simpler.
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Stop putting management interfaces directly on the internet.
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CERTFR is explicitly warning organizations about this.
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If remote administration is required, the recommendation is to put it behind a secure VPN or another protected network.
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In an emergency, restricting management access to known service provider IP addresses can at least reduce exposure.
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But even CERT FR describes that as a temporary measure rather than a permanent solution.
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Remote access should be controlled, authenticated, monitored, and limited to whoever actually needs it.
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An industrial controller shouldn't be reachable by everybody on Earth simply because a refrigeration technician occasionally needs to log into it.
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And third, patch your OT and IoT equipment.
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And yes, I know that's easier said than done.
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Our traditional IT patching is relatively straightforward compared to operational technology.
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You can normally reboot somebody's laptop at 2 in the morning, but rebooting the controller operating ever freezer in a supermarket is a slightly different conversation.
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Firmware updates may require technicians, maintenance windows, vendor coordination, operational testing.
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Some equipment may be 15 years old.
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Some may no longer be supported at all.
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And sometimes nobody knows who actually owns the patching responsibility.
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And that's exactly how equipment ends up running vulnerable firmware for years.
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Clarity's research found known vulnerabilities in these Danfoss controllers, and Danfoss has repeatedly recommended keeping firmware current and protecting network connected devices behind firewalls and secure remote access.
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If you've got an internet connected device that stopped receiving security updates five years ago, that's not just technical debt anymore.
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That's an exposed asset waiting for somebody to notice it.
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Fourth, socks need visibility into changes to physical systems.
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And this is where IT and IoT monitoring need to start meeting each other.
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Imagine your refrigeration controller normally runs freezers around negative 18 Celsius.
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Then at 213 in the morning, someone remotely changes the operating configuration.
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The defrost cycle starts, then starts again, then stays on.
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The temperature begins climbing.
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At some point, that's not just a refrigeration alert, that's security telemetry.
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And maybe the SOC doesn't need every temperature reading from every refrigerator in the
company, but dramatic configuration changes, unexpected remote logins, a new administrator, remote access from an IP address in another country, management sessions at unusual times, repeated changes to safety thresholds, those are all things security teams should probably know about.
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And this is something we already understand in traditional cybersecurity.
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If somebody changes a firewall rule at 3 in the morning or creates a new domain admin account, we care.
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If somebody disables EDR across 500 machines, we really care.
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Why wouldn't we care if somebody remotely changes the configuration controlling 500 industrial devices?
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And there's also a third-party risk lesson here.
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A lot of operational technology isn't administered directly by the organization that owns it.
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A lot of companies hire somebody to handle that, whether it be a refrigeration contractor, an HVAC company, or a building management provider.
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And that contractor needs remote access so they can maintain the equipment?
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That's pretty reasonable.
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But now we've introduced another identity into your environment.
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Another set of credentials, another remote access pathway, another laptop, another company whose security practices you don't control.
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So always ask, how does the vendor connect?
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Do they use individual accounts?
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Is MFA required?
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Are accounts disabled when technicians leave the company?
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Can they access every location or only the sites they're responsible for?
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Are their sessions logged?
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Can you revoke their access immediately?
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And would you even know if one of those accounts suddenly logged in at midnight and changed 50 refrigeration controllers?
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Sir FR's current remediation guidance is actually pretty aggressive if one of those systems is believed to be compromised.
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Remove its internet exposure, factory reset the device, install available security updates, rotate credentials and secrets, review existing accounts, and completely reconfigure the controller before putting it back into service.
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And there's a really important warning attached to that.
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A factory reset alone isn't enough if you reconnect the exact same vulnerable device directly to the internet afterward.
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You've cleaned it, but you haven't secured it.
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Surfr essentially warns that if an end
of life or unpatched device remains exposed, there's a very high probability it'll simply get compromised again.
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And that's a lesson that applies well beyond supermarket refrigerators.
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And there's another reason I think this attack is worth discussing, and that's because nobody has claimed responsibility yet.
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There's currently no known ransom demand, and investigators haven't publicly identified a clear motive.
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That makes this different from the ransomware stories we normally discuss, because if the goal were purely financial, you might expect an extortion note that says, pay us or your refrigerators stay off.
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And as of right now, that doesn't appear to have happened.
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Instead, somebody seems to have deliberately caused operational disruption and physical damage.
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Maybe the motive eventually becomes clear, maybe it was extortion that hasn't been publicly disclosed, could be hacktivism, could be somebody was testing capabilities, maybe it was just destructive behavior.
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We don't know yet, and until investigators tell us more, we shouldn't pretend we do.
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But as defenders having to deal with the impact regardless of motive, and looking at what the impact actually was, nobody had to steal a million customer records, nobody had to encrypt every laptop, no compromised active directory.
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They manipulated one operational system, and stores suddenly had food loss, equipment damage, potential fire hazards, store disruptions, cleanup costs, potential insurance claims, and millions of dollars in combined financial damage.
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And that's a pretty effective cyber attack.
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And this is the part I think executives sometimes struggle to understand when we talk about cybersecurity.
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Cyber risk isn't really about malware.
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It isn't even fundamentally about computers.
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It's about what the computers control.
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If the computer controls payroll, compromise affects payroll.
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If it's manufacturing, compromise affects manufacturing.
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And if it controls hospital equipment, compromise can affect patient care.
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And if it controls the refrigerator, your ice cream melts.
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So here's my challenge for socks this week.
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Find one connected system in your organization that the security team doesn't normally think about.
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Whether that's an HVAC system, physical access, camera, power, environmental controls, whatever it is.
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Whatever makes sense in your environment, figure out four things.
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Who owns it, who can remotely access it, is any management interface exposed to the internet?
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And would your SOC know if somebody changes configuration tonight?
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You don't need to become an industrial control system expert overnight.
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Just start connecting the people who run these systems with the people who defend the network.
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Because the distinction between IT and operational technology matters a lot less to the attacker than it does to our organizational chart.
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And one last thought here.
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For years people joked about hackers taking over refrigerators.
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It was basically shorthand for the Internet of Things is getting ridiculous.
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Well, here we are.
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Except instead of somebody hacking a smart fridge in your kitchen to order an extra milk, attackers remotely manipulated commercial refrigeration systems across hundreds of stores and caused real financial and physical consequences.
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The fridge is an endpoint now.
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Treat it like one.
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And that's a wrap for this episode of the SOC Brief.
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If your organization has OT, building management systems or some weird internet connected device your SOC suddenly discovered exists, hit us up through our website or via social media.
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I'd love to hear what the strangest thing is that your security team has had to protect.
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Keep your firmware updated, keep your management interfaces off the public internet, and keep sharpening those skills.
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We'll talk soon.
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Stay secure out there.
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Bye.