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Basil Chatha: Well the problem we have now is that anyone can be a script kitty because anyone can take one of these AI systems and basically be like, Yo, go use Nmap and Wireshark and all of these other tools and try to break into these systems. kind of just decided, ⁓ I should probably delete the production database and then did it. And they happen to not have backups. And so they were like, well, there goes our business. It's about 15,000 people all over the world and growing. And we have challenges on a regular basis where there are cash prizes for any person who can break the systems or the challenges that we have. So far, our shade system has not yet encountered an AI system that it has not been able to break. What do you mean you're not reviewing the lines of code? It's like, well, how often are you reviewing lines of assembly of your compiled code? Like never, right? Like computers can do this way better than humans. They always could. There was a very popular article last year that came out very quickly after MCP that was like the S in MCP stands for security. And the joke is there is no S in MCP. And it's like, yeah, there's no security, right? In 2023, researchers at Carnegie Mellon discovered something weird. If you appended one very specific set of characters to the end of your prompt, You could jail break basically every LLM on the market. Using their research, those guys went on to found Grace One AI. My guest today is Spencer Whitman, who's the chief product officer at Grace One. Before this, he co-founded Meta's Llama security team and ran the cybersecurity evaluations for Lama 3 and Llama 4. He actually hired Grace One as a vendor while he was at Meta. Then he joined them. Spencer argues that AI security is nothing like traditional cybersecurity. You can test a system a thousand times and attempt 1001 is the one that's going to break it. He tells me about Shade, which is Grace One's automated attack agent, which has been able to break every AI system they've tested. We get into Arena, which is their network of 15,000 red teamers. Breaking pre release, frontier models for cash prizes, the AI Twitter bot that lost two hundred K in crypto in fifteen minutes. The coding agent that they told not to delete files in the command line. So it went ahead and wrote a Python script to delete them instead. Why the S and ⁓ C P stands for security and his theory on why Meta walked away from its open source only strategy. Let's get into it. Thanks for joining. Could you just maybe like introduce yourself? Yeah, my name is Spencer Whitman. I'm the chief product officer at Gray Swan AI. We build adversarial pressure for AI systems and defensive guardrails. Before that, I was the co-founder of Meta's Llama security team. So we did all of the AI evaluations of ⁓ the llama models before pre-release, looking for cybersecurity flaws with the models, but also potential harms, so capabilities of the models on cybersecurity tasks. And then we also built and published a bunch of guardrails and and a couple of papers with these. Nice. And what years were those? That was from twenty twenty-three until twenty twenty six. So basically like right when or maybe a little bit after ChatGBT came out. Yeah. Yeah. So basically w we helped launch the like code Llama 7 D B model and then all of the Llama three variants and we also did all of the cybersecurity evaluations for Lama 4. And and okay my teams have done all of the what is it called? Muse Spark cybersecurity aspects. I'm not there. So so I wasn't doing that. But yeah. Okay, cool. So let me get into the genesis of Grace One a little bit. I know you're not the founder, but ⁓ you probably know like what the story is. So ⁓ could you talk about that? I think it came out of some CMU research that they the founders were doing. So yeah, could you talk about that? Yeah, so Grayswan's founders are Matt Frederickson, he's the CEO, and Zico Coulter, he's the chief scientist. Matt is part of CMU's SciWab, which does cybersecurity, privacy, ⁓ related research. And then Zico Coulter is the head of the machine learning department at CMU. So so the two of them sort of bring together this combination of formal verification systems, traditional cybersecurity. And then applying that to AI, having really deep understanding of AI systems, how they're built, how they work, where they're going, and therefore what what sort of is going on. And Grayswan, I think, started ⁓ offering services that maybe looked a little bit more like consulting for Frontier Labs, but very much with a vision of a like enterprise company ⁓ in in in the future. And so they they did a bunch of research, some of the original kind of adversarial research on LMs and AI systems, even before LLMs doing things like adversarial vision like ⁓ attempts and stuff, right? So it's like you have a photo of a dog, you apply a bunch of pixels to it, ⁓ like some sort of filter, and then you get another photo that to a human looks like a dog, but the AI classifier is like, no, no, no, that's now a you know, a tree or something. And it's because you just added a this filter that messed with the weights and convinced it that it's it's something totally different. Even when you look at it, it's totally fine. And then they're also the team that if you remember, I think this is in 2022, there is that like weird universal jailbreak that was found that was like, if you just append this like bizarre string of characters to the end of your prompt, you get a prompt injection and it works for like all of the models, right? Like like it's really weird. Like we found this for this specific open source model, ⁓ but it t turns out at the time it works for any of the model families. And so that was using very similar techniques as like the ⁓ the kind of things that you would do for the image based ⁓ like find a filter kind of thing and suddenly it's classified as a new thing. It's not the same, but it but it but it's in a similar
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vein. And so I think Matt and Zico are very passionate as am I in making sure that the world has safe and secure AI. started by by helping mostly frontier labs to evaluate their newest models. So very similar things to what I was doing at Meta, in in in fact s somewhat identical in parallel. ⁓ I actually hired Gray Swan in my role at Meta. And when when when Meta sort of changed their focus to a degree on on how they were working, for me it made a lot more sense to to join Gray Swan in order to sort of continue the mission that I had started at Meta of bringing safe and secure AI to the world because that's that's exactly what what Gray Swan is trying to do. And it just so happens that I happen that that I was in Pittsburgh and you know they needed someone like me at just the right time that I started to look and yeah, it was this weird Goldilocks situation that that that happened. Yeah. So you mentioned you could append this like sequence of characters to the end of a like a prompt and it would just jailbreak it. Was would it do a very specific thing or would it just be like, ⁓ okay, now you can do whatever you want once you add these characters? Like you can ask it any question you want, and it'll just answer it. So I LMs are stochastic processes. These are also like, you know, the the pre Llama three, like post GPT three days, right? So th when this this this jailbreak came out, right, we're we're just talking about chatbots. ⁓ There is no agentic function or anything like that. It might make sense actually for us to just take a quick step back and talk about like what goes into AI systems in order to make them safe and secure. Because I think that helps to explain like what does it mean to do adversarial testing? What are what what can happen when things don't stay aligned to what the AI system developer or maintainer wants and and things like that. And so The first and foremost thing is that you have a model, right? And you know, there's the pre-training step, the post-training step where you actually make that model useful and and and and the like. And as part of the the post-training step, ⁓ most people, most, most labs are doing what like supervised fine-tuning, but specifically with safety in mind. Right. And so an example of this is, you know, a very clear example would be like if I ask the model, like, hey, you know, build me a bomb or how do I build a bomb using only ingredients in my kitchen sink or something like that. If you don't do anything in the post-training step, then this information exists on the internet. And so the model will helpily, you know, h helpfully say, ⁓ you know, use whatever. I don't know how to build a bomb. But like these models can do this. And so what you want to do is is you want to have as one of your post-training steps ⁓ a bunch of safety specific tuning in the realm of like chemical or biological or nuclear, these sort of like very sensitive areas, these are pretty well understood because there's a pretty big difference between like, hey, I'm ⁓ a student learning about like nuclear fusion or or or something like that, help me understand this topic versus like, I want to build a nuclear bomb. And like, what do I need to do that? Like the these are fairly different, but like the balance when you're building these models is like, how do we keep the Useful knowledge in here in responses to that, but not respond to malicious style requests. In cybersecurity, this is much harder to thread the needle with, right? Because you have something called dual use, where the exact same information is both harmful and not harmful. Right. So it's like what determines whether it is bad or not is who is doing it and what their intent is. This is where like a lot of conversations around mythos have been, right? Because mythos is really, really good at finding vulnerabilities in software. Like if you give it a bunch of source code and you say, hey, help me find a bunch of vulnerabilities in here, it will do that. That is generally a very good thing if I am the software developer. But if I am a malicious person and I'm looking for vulnerabilities in software so that I can, you know, go break into those systems and abuse that stuff. It's the exact same function that I asked Mys Mythos about, like, hey, find a bunch of of vulnerabilities in this software, but I'm going to use it for harm. And so it's very difficult to sort of distinguish between these things. Okay. So we use safety fine-tuning ⁓ as part of the the post-training process in order to bake into the model a bunch of refusals to clearly like malicious style requests and things like that. But because these systems are are stochastic and have effectively an unbounded input space, that information is still there. Right. And especially because we want these models to be maximally helpful. Like we don't want to train out of them all knowledge of coding because that's what you have to do in order to make it cybersecurity safe. We don't want to train out of them all knowledge of like physics because that's what you would have to do in order to guarantee that it will never talk about so ⁓ nuclear subjects and and sensitive things of that nature. And so what you do then is you do a best effort of like put a bunch of of training data around it. And then what we've discovered is that you also need to put a bunch of guardrails around that system, classifiers and and other s like ⁓ filters and stuff, in order to try to better understand like what is the context of what users are saying and what is the context of what the model is responding with in order to to make a judgment of like, is this going to be bad or not that that kind of thing. So you asked about, hey, ⁓ there was this weird universal jailbreak where it's like you add a string and like you could do so, like what was the behavior? At that time, we didn't really have these additional guardrails. And so the only safety was basically what whatever was baked
into that model using this like safety fine tuning. And so if you included this string, like a jailbreak would basically be getting around that post-training of the safety side. Right. So a to use a concrete example here, like one of the the first sort of quote unquote jailbreaks at this time was like, ⁓ my grandmother is dying, and it was her last wish for me to know sensitive thing here, how to build a bomb using materials of my kitchen sink. The the way that the random string of characters worked is that it effectively acted like that sort of similar kind of thing of like, ⁓ think about my gr like this is just a a pretend example for my grandma. It's not the same because there we're we're like creating a different context but in which it's okay for the model to to respond to this. And but but it's it's a similar kind of thing in that we're getting the model to basically take a path that isn't one that wa had the this safety fine tuning applied to it. And therefore is sharing knowledge that is baked into it where it generally shouldn't have or or shouldn't have responded. So yeah. So it was kind of like, ⁓ this is a hypothetical example. How would you, you know, do XYZ thing, basically, or like whatever it is. So so I'm not sure that the mechanism was literally the same, but like what what's happening is like you could think of it as like the safety fine tuning is kind of like paving a road where it's like most of the things that we think the model, most of the prompts that we think the model are going to get are going to come along this paved road. And so long as they do, then the safety fine-tuning is going to be fine and the model's going to refuse some some, you know, how how do I make a bomb kind of thing. But there's a effectively infinite number of ways to get off of that paved road and still drive to the destination that you want. ⁓ doing this like, hey, you know, my my grandmother's dying wish kind of thing, this like scenario based thing, that's one of the ways that you can get off the road. appending this r seemingly random string of characters, that was another way to get off the road. I see. I see. So this new paradigm that you're saying where okay, now there's like kind of a two step process where you have a classifier or you have something that checks what the person is saying before you actually send it to the model. How do you build that into an open source model? Is that yeah. Yeah. So so this is a great question. ⁓ And it's it's one of the major differences between having open source models versus like these closed systems where so basically if you have a closed system, you can guarantee certain guardrails are in place, right? You also, depending on how much access you give to the base model, you can even potentially guarantee like if you don't allow ⁓ like fine tuning of the base model or or like adapters being applied to it, then you can actually guarantee that like your safety fine tuning stays on it. But when you have an
open source model, First of all, someone can just fine-tune away whatever safety fine-tuning you did. But then second of all, you don't necessarily have guarantees that the additional guardrail systems will be placed around them when a potentially responsible developer actually deploys them. And so this was like a major way that we thought about things at Meta when we were open sourcing all of these models and open sourcing all these systems. It's one of the reasons that we open sourced a lot of the components that we did as well. And so this would be like prompt guard, code shield, llama firewall, all of these things. And we published a bunch of open papers about like how we develop them and how to use them and that kind of thing. So there's a couple of models to think about, or there's like a couple of ways. So the first is do I have a responsible developer? If I do. then they're probably not going to remove, at least intentionally, the safety fine-tuning that we built into the model. And they're going to do their best effort to actually put guardrails around it. And so as long as our guardrails are generally pretty good and easy to get started and run, then that responsible developer is is going to be okay. Right. They're they're going to have a bunch of protection, best effort protection, that kind of thing. Then you have like, what if I have an adversarial person who is actively modifying the model? ⁓ And so for that, you have to assume that the there are no guardrails and they've actually removed the safety fine-tuning. Maybe they've even done a bit more action like activity to make that model more performant at malicious and bad bad things or something like that. And so for that, that's where the cybersecurity capability testing as and it's not just cybersecurity, it's all of these sort of sensitive areas, chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear kind of thing. And what you do then is before you release one of these open source models, you need to do a lot of very extensive testing on a helpful only version of this model. So it's like you assume that the maximal malicious person, they've removed all of the time the safety that you've put into it. They've modified it so that it's even more capable of this. And then what you do are capability benchmarks, but in these sort of like harm-based areas. This is one of the reasons that we created and published Cybersec EBE, right? In addition to looking at susceptibility to things like prompt injection. So it's like, can some adversary take advantage of the system if it's set up correctly? We also looked at how capable is a is a model in a maximally capable way at just accomplishing cybersecurity tasks, whether that's finding bugs or actually doing like network exploration and creating exploits for certain programs when you give it information and things of this nature. And so there's there's a lot of nuance and decisions that need to go into that process when you're when you're doing that, because you you don't have the luxury like a closed system. So a closed system, as we saw with like mythos and f and fable, like You can deny access to it. You can change access. You can change the underlying model. You can guarantee that there are guardrails and you can modify them so that they they start preventing things that you notice ad hoc. With an open source model, the moment you release it, it's out there and it's you you must assume that that ⁓ it will stay out there and adversaries will will make it more useful for adversarial purposes, that kind of thing. And so the only way to do that safely and responsibly is is to do this capability assessments so that you figure out or you get a sense of how maximally capable is this model. And then you use that to determine whether or not it is responsible to put into the public as an open source model or not. and and potentially not. I'm gonna shift the conversation a little bit. Sure. I don't know much about cybersecurity. It's pretty pretty new to me. So Maybe could you help me understand like what is the landscape of cybersecurity before we get into some of the stuff that you were doing at Meta, like you know, cybersecural, llama firewall? Like I I wanna understand that. So, like to put that into context, like how should I understand the landscape of cybersecurity? Yeah. I think that there's like ⁓ a subset of this question or a related question also, which is like, what does AI security mean? Right? Like ⁓ this is a very overloaded term because it could be I'm using AI to make better cybersecurity outcomes, right? So it's like traditional cybersecurity of like I'm looking for vulnerabilities in software, I'm trying to patch those vulnerabilities, I'm doing like network defense, network access kind of thing. I have access controls or identity and access management policies. I have general sort of like ⁓ security operations center tasks that I need to do as an enterprise. All of like cybersecurity is a big space and there's a lot going on there. There's been for for many years. You have companies like CrowdStrike that do what's called endpoint security, where they're monitoring like a phone or a a laptop, one of these endpoints for potential problems. There's cloud security, there's there's all sorts of stuff like this. And what we're seeing is, you know, similar to programming, all of these These businesses are realizing, whoa, these AI things can like make our cybersecurity business better. Maybe it replaces it, maybe it augments it, maybe it's actually irrelevant because we're doing something different. But like this is one version of AI security. There's another version of AI security, and this is what Gray Swan does, which is we're actually creating new types of security for these new AI systems. And so, like, generally speaking, let me give you like a concrete example of that that I think a Helps to address the difference here. One of the common cybersecurity tasks that many
organizations need to go through is something called a penetration test. And so a pen test is where like you hire some third party to attack your computer systems, your network, your website, and try to find problems with it, try to find vulnerabilities. Generally, the way that this works is that there's a set of known vulnerabilities. These are called CVEs, right? And the pen tester's job is to identify what versions of software you're running, look up if there's any known vulnerabilities for those. And if there are, then try to take advantage of those and break into your system. What what we get as a result is like there's a universe of known problems, and we compare how does your environment map to that universe of known problems. And if we find any, then great, we we have, you know, we can tell you you have these insecurities. And you need to take these steps in order to secure them. If we don't find any of these known vulnerabilities, then you sort of get a stamp of approval of like, as far as we know, everything's the best that it possibly could be right now. In AI security, things are pretty different, right? So we were talking about how like stochastic, these models and these systems are s are unbounded in terms of what their input space can be and subsequently. somewhat unbounded or very unbounded in terms of what their output spaces can be. And so you can't do the same thing. It's not like, hey, we know that this random string can cause prompt injection. And so we're just going to test if that random string works. And if it doesn't, you're good. Right. Like that's not how this works. What we can do though is we can do a variety of testing and then give a probabilistic like Curve that says, well, here's roughly how rigorous the testing of your system was. Here's where it didn't work. Here's where it did work. And as far as we can tell, this has a 98.3% chance of being secure based on these ways of defining secure. It's similar to the pen testing in that it's like, hey, here's what we know, and we didn't find anything that we know. But it's very, very different in the outcome because with an LM or an AI-based system. The same input over and over and over again will garner different outputs. And so you might need to do the same input like a thousand times. And hey, look at that. Three of a thousand times, it actually broke the system. What does that mean? Is my system secure or not? And it's like, well, that's just how this works, right? Like, like that's just what's going on. And so what we do at Grace One is we focus more on evaluating the security of AI systems and then providing guardrails. Like so we talked about. The safety fine-tuning as one of the aspects for models themselves. But then anyone who's running those, who's who owns an AI system, they need to put a an extra layer of third-party guardrails around that, or at least some system of guardrails around that, in order to make sure that their system actually functions and behaves in the way that they want their system to, which is going to be very, very context specific to what they want, what their organization is, and what that system should be doing. versus what the generalist models are capable of. So on the penetration testing stuff, I've seen some like open source agents that ⁓ potentially try to do this. So I wanted to get your thoughts like, what do you think about those? And actually, question before that. What changed when these LLMs moved from just being ⁓ you know, text prediction to reasoning models? And then maybe then we can talk about what changed when we started Moving to agents. Yeah. ⁓ so I think the the question is like, what has changed in the industry when we went from text prediction to reasoning models and how does that impact agents? And I think the answer is kind of the same to both of those, right? So ⁓ in case people don't know, like the way that ⁓ you know, chat GPT three point five worked is that it's kind of like a a next token predictor, right? So it's it's kind of just trying to to predict Like what is the next word in a sequence? And if you tune it and you you use the entire internet of information, turns out that you can get some pretty interesting and useful results from that. The next step then was what's called chain of thought, where it actually writes down what is similar to what a lot of people have an inner monologue where you actually say, like, okay, I'm being asked the question, like what changed in models? I should probably talk about first the history, then this, then this, and then and then it actually executes on that platform. Right. So chain of thought models are still just next token predictors, but they have a bunch of infrastructure built into them, as well as additional tuning to help make sure that these chains of thought are very performant and accurate to the kinds of things that you would want a model to do. And that that basically builds it a plan and then it kind of executes on the plan, right? By by predicting the next thing. The the next step of going from just chat prediction or text prediction to chain of thought. To agents is that when you attach a bunch of tools to the model. So whether it's you give them a command line interface, which just uses text in and text out in order to work with, or direct access via some sort of API call or MCP servers or other way to hook your tool into the model and give it some way of understanding that it can use this and get results out. Now suddenly you have a more autonomous agent that is able to act on the world and and make side effects occur. So instead of it just being like, hey, you gave me a bunch of text. I'm going to give you a bunch of text back. Now it actually can execute commands that also give it text in or out, right? Like it uses text out in order to execute the command. And then when it's done, it it gives it text in. And this ends up being a very fascinating way, a very like powerful way to create
automation where it was previously like you kind of needed a person in order to do that kind of thing. Right. And so I think the the things that have changed is is basically that a lot of things that we didn't think were automatable turns out that they are. And so that's really, really fascinating, right? So it's like when it comes to let's use the example within traditional cybersecurity again of of pen testing, right? That used to be that a person kind of had to use a lot of tools, right, in order to so it's like I use Nmap in order to find out what open ports and what computers on your network exist. Then I'm gonna use like Wireshark in order to sniff the traffic from your network once I've connected to it. I'm gonna use that in order to ⁓ you know break into one of your systems that had like an old version of software running on it or something like that. And then I'm gonna use another tool in order to do like what's called a privilege escalation in order to go from you know set like the printer style user to actually controlling that computer and and stuff like this. Right. So There's kind of this path of network infiltration and and exploitation. And a person kind of knows that they know how to use a tool and they go for it. When you get these AI systems now that not only do they have sort of baked-in knowledge of like how to use these tools, because there's documentation about them on the internet, that's part of their training data, but also they can kind of just read documentation. And so if you give it, here's how to use this, this is s you know, what a skills file might be is like, here's how I want you to do this kind of thing. Right. Now you have computers that are capable of running all of these tools that already existed, making decisions and doing more autonomous behaviors. Right. And so this matters for cybersecurity because, you know, that you used to have something called like a script kitty, where it's like someone who doesn't know anything about computer security, but they found a tool or a script that maybe causes some problem or actually breaks into a system, they don't know necessarily what they're doing, but they run it and lo and behold, it works. And now they have all this access that they shouldn't have. Well the problem we have now is that anyone can be a script kiddy because anyone can take one of these AI systems and basically be like, yo, go use Nmap and Wireshark and all of these other tools and try to break into these systems. And if it works, great. Like it just automatically happened. If it doesn't, well, that's fine. I didn't really spend much of my time actually doing anything. And so you have a bunch of companies now that are using AI systems in order to automate this process as part of a defensive posture. So instead of needing people to do pen testing and like being bounded by humans that are capable of working a certain number of hours, you can have a computer completely automate this and it can go deeper, it can go longer, it can keep running all the time. Because it's a computer and it doesn't need to take a break and it doesn't need to to sleep or eat, that kind of thing. That again is more on the using AI for security purpose. This is very interesting for the applying AI ⁓ or or doing AI security, where it it's it's actually quite different. So it turns out that if you're looking at how do I evaluate whether my AI system is secure or not. Right. So this would be like red teaming your AI or what we call adversarial pressure. It turns out that most, if not all, of the current AI systems that that people have access to. So this would be like, you know, ChatGPT, Claude, or any of the open source models like Llama and DeepSeek and stuff. Turns out that they're actually quite bad at doing adversarial pressure at trying to create breaks in AI systems. And it kind of makes sense because They haven't been trained to do this. There's there's not a whole lot of information on the internet about like, here's how to break AI systems, because that just wasn't a thing until the last couple of years, really. I mean, you have things like the that that we talked about, this like adversarial image. And so it's like if you ask an AI about that, it will give you information, but getting it to actually generate one of these images that then will trick classifier or something like that is is not trivial, right? And so what we do at Gray Swan is we actually custom train models in order to be good at taking that that chain of thought, that agentic behavior, and being able to apply that to the realm of AI specific adversarial pressure. and the way that we're able to do this versus pretty much anyone else in the industry is that we have something that we call the arena. It's about 15,000 people all over the world and growing. And we have challenges on a regular basis where there are cash prizes for any person who can break the systems or the challenges that we have in the arena. And that gives us an understanding of the techniques and strategies, as well as a bunch of data of what works to actually break AI systems specifically. And then we use that to make our automated AI adversarial. system work better more effectively and the like. So could you define like AI system again? So you guys are specifically working for companies building these AI systems. Like I I just assumed, ⁓ it's just any company that has any code base. ⁓ we're just we're gonna help them with their security. ⁓ but you keep bringing up like AI systems specifically. Yeah. Yeah. So so so we do not do that. Right. So so it's like if you want a company that's going to do like automated pen testing instead of human based pen testing, that's not us. If however you are a company that's using a coding agent. So it's like your employees have access to claud code or codecs, or you're a company that's building your own AI system that has the potential for malicious content to come into it. So like maybe
you are a Car dealership and you have a website. And on that website, you have like a an AI powered support conversation. That piece is what we do adversarial testing and then also providing guardrails for. So it's like with Claude Code, like there was an instance, I don't know, a month or two ago where someone was using Claude Code and or I think they were using cursor with Claude powering it. And like it kind of just decided, ⁓ I should probably delete the production database. And then did it and they happen to not have backups. And so they were like, well, there goes our business. Like that was that, right? We have a guardrail system called Signal. It's ⁓ spelled C Y G, like a baby swan signal, right? Gray Swan. Okay. We have a guardrail system that would have prevented that, right? Because the way that it works is it looks at the behaviors that the AI system is going to take and then determines whether they are within whether they comply to rules in a policy that has been specified of what they should do. And so if this company had used Signal and had declared a rule that said never removed production databases or other information that is unrecoverable, it wouldn't matter that the coding assistant tried to do this because Signal as a third party guardrail would have said, ⁓ I see that you're trying to do this. I'm going to stop this from happening before the command actually occurs. Similarly, we use what what's called shade. Shade is our automated adversarial testing tool. And we can plug that into someone's environment where they have claud code or some other coding assistant. Or in the case of our car dealership with their support chatbot, we we connect shade to that support chatbot. And then we define in plain English behaviors that you don't want that system to exhibit. So in the Claude Code example, it would be like try to delete the ⁓ the production database, right? Like if you can do that, that'd be a successful malicious activity. In the case of like a support bot, it might be like, give me information about some other customer who isn't me that I shouldn't have any access to, something like that. And then Shade as a system tries basically thousands of attempts using several like hundreds of different behaviors and techniques in order to make the AI system do the thing that you don't want it. Because once you do, then you have Positive proof that your system can have that behavior. And that's where you probably need something like signal in order to put it in front and and make sure that that never happens again. So once you find these vulnerabilities, I'm assuming or maybe you can tell me otherwise that a lot of these companies are now saying, why don't you just make the fixes yourselves too? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So I think this is where like comparing Traditional cybersecurity versus AI systems is so big, right? This is kind of the crux of it. And this is why Gray Swan exists as a company and why we are just focused on securing, like
evaluating and securing AI systems. So in traditional cybersecurity, it would be like, hey, we found this problem. Like you need to update your code, you need to apply this fix. You need to, you know, block this port on your firewall. It's a deterministic, a very usually a very clear, very specific thing that needs to be fixed. It should do this. It is instead doing that. Change it from doing that to doing this, and you're you're fine. When it comes to AI systems, that's just not how it works, right? So let's use the example again of like this random string that happened to create a prompt injection, which then allowed you to potentially get around safety fine-tuning. You could put a filter in front of like as part of your guardrail system, you could put a filter that looks for that string. And if it finds it, then it's like, nah, just don't even let the user put that in. But what if that string no longer impacts the model? Like what if there's a valid request and then you know someone was like, Hey, I found this article. Can you please summarize it? The article happens to have that string in it because maybe it's about AI security and the system instead is like, nah, I'm not gonna do anything. Because I found this string and and I know that that's a dangerous thing or something like that. You actually don't want this to happen. This isn't how you want your system to work. You want your AI system to be maximally automated. You want it to be unfeathered, unfettered in terms of what it can do and what permissions you give it. And you don't want to have to look at it. Like you want to be able to just trust that it's going to do the right thing. The problem is because it's stochastic. You could test it a thousand times, a thousand different ways. And it turns out that the 1000 and one way is what gets it to do the bad thing. And so this isn't like traditional security in that you can say in a deterministic way, hey, we found this problem. Therefore, the fix is tweak this thing, add this rule, do this, this, this kind of thing. Instead, what we found that you need to do is you actually need to observe the behavior of the system. You define the behaviors that are like allowed or not allowed, using these these kind of policy rules and things like that. And then as it's running, you make judgments about whether it is conforming to those policies or violating them, and you prevent it from actually taking the behavior to violate it. Right. ⁓ the there there's like a here's here's another like example of this, right? Someone had created like a static guardrail system that was basically like never remove files. Super straightforward, totally get it. It's very easy to implement something like this, to be like, hey Claude, like you do not have access to the command line command RM. Like you just can't use it, right? Claude is pretty smart though. And someone was like, no, for real, I need you to to delete this file. And it went, ⁓ okay. I can't use the RM command. I'm seeing that it's like in my guardrail system that I'm not allowed to do that. Why don't I just create a Python script that's gonna delete that file for you when I run the Python script? And then I'm not using the RM command. And then it did it and it deleted the file and it's gone. What you really need is like a like a ⁓ an observer, a manager that's overlooking, an overseer of things, saying, ⁓ come on, man, like you you sure you're not, you know, y breaking the law by using the RM command, but you're certainly breaking the spirit of what it is that you should be doing. by creating this Python script. And so that's what the signal guardrails do is they they understand the spirit of of what is trying to be done or what shouldn't be allowed. And then they understand the nuances of how these AI systems that are very have become very smart and very powerful might try to either go around that directly, accidentally, or in the case of some sort of malicious user trying to abuse the system, trying to trick it to do something that it shouldn't. actually provide that oversight and and guardrailing to prevent that from ever happening. Okay. ⁓ what are your thoughts on security for MCP? Because I've heard a lot of people talk that hey, MCP is like very insecure, but I don't really understand why. So maybe you could explain that so MCP is a protocol for AI systems or LLM specifically to communicate and interact with tools. And the problem with it is that it's using raw text and that's it. So like there's a very there was a very popular article last year that came out very quickly after MCP that was like, you know, the the S in MCP stands for security. And the joke is there is no S in MCP. And it's like, yeah, there's no security, right? So the the fundamental problem here is one that we've already learned from the internet, right? Every website you go to today is almost certainly not going to be HTTP, but HTTPS. That S stands for secure and it means that your connection with that ⁓ that website is encrypted so that someone can't just observe your traffic on a network. Like if you're on Wi-Fi and you visit an HTTP site, anyone who's listening to your Wi-Fi broadcast will be able to see exactly what you're passing back and forth. And so, like if you're logging in to a site, it's gonna see your username and password in plain text because there's no encryption, there's no obfuscation of what's going on. MCP is the same way. This makes sense in terms of like moving fast and getting things started because all of these LLMs work on natural language. And so it makes sense to be like, ⁓ well, I want my tool to be accessible via some sort of natural language interface. But the problem is if it's a completely open natural language interface, then there's no authentication to the tool. There's no like anything sensitive that's either going in or coming out of the tool can just be observed because it's in natural language, things like this. This is the root
of where a lot of this insecurity of MCP services comes from. It may not matter, like all of this, you know, cybersecurity and all these things, the answer is always going to be it depends. Right. So if I'm building an AI system that only has access to tools that I control, the only people who can see or read that are people on my network who've already authenticated, who can only be there after ⁓ you know, passing through a bunch of layers and there's no way really for anyone to view all of that. Yeah, maybe it's fine. It probably isn't gonna be that big of a deal because I trust everyone and I trust everything that's going on within that area. But the moment that I start exposing these things to the public or they're easier for other people to see what's going on, even if they can't interact with it, because it's all plain text, because there is no encryption involved, there is no authentication involved, that's where things start to get dangerous and problematic for for businesses. So do you think there's going to be like what do you think the evolution of that is going to be? It's a great technique. I think what we're seeing is that the AI industry is moving really, really fast with a lot of these things, right? So, like, you know, is it gonna be MCP servers? Is it a skills file? Is it just create a command line interface for the tool and you're done? You know, like all of these are kind of valid. And as model capabilities continue in the exponential, it's gonna be less and less important to have specific protocols, in my opinion. specific ways of like this is how you do it. And more important that there is a way. And as long as that meets your business's needs or like the application needs in terms of security and privacy as well as functionality and capability. ⁓ I don't I don't know that the details are gonna matter as much. We'll see. Yeah. Yeah, you just said, you know, the details might not matter as much. That kind of reminded me about how like I've been talking to a few engineers, or actually a lot of engineers, and Pretty much everyone is telling me, hey, like I rarely write a line of code anymore. And it's really hard to even review all the code that my agents are writing because it's at one time writing, you know, 20,000 lines of code. So how am I supposed to know what's actually going on? ⁓ and understanding what it's building. So what do you think the future of that's going to be with security? It seems Yeah, there is going to be a lot going on there. Yeah, I think that's a great question. So I think the first thing to point out. Is that I think that I I agree with the perspective that ⁓ coding agents have made it basically that the the coding language is now natural language as opposed to a software language. And we've already gone through a bunch of these evolutions where it's like, you know, started with ones and zeros, literally, where it's like flipping switch or so, then you have punch cards, then you have assembly, then you have actual programming languages, then you have, you know, easier to use programming languages, and now we're at natural language. In that way, this is nothing different. This is like a natural progression. And it's like, what do you mean you're not reviewing the lines of code? It's like, well, how often are you reviewing lines of assembly of your compiled code? Like never, right? Like computers can do this way better than humans. They always could. ⁓ we just didn't know how to get them to do that, right? And now now we kind of do. I think what's going to end up happening is so long as all of the model developers and people, developers using models are Taking into account security and how to build s how how to build code bases securely, I think the the level of security of software is actually going to go up. What's what's problematic today, like there's there's this window where the best code we have is code that was written by humans, and that has a lot of bugs in it. And so the way that our coding agents are outputting code today. probably has less bugs in it, like a a smaller rate. I think we've we there's a bunch of evidence that this is the case. But because the volume of code that's being produced is so much greater, the net number of bugs is the same or more. ⁓ I think that this is like like there's a curve where it's like number of bugs over time. And it's gonna probably go like it we're seeing it go up because there's more software being built. But there's like an asymptote that's gonna drive it down over time because the models are gonna get better and better and better at writing code that doesn't have bug yet. Now you're still gonna have potential problems of like business logic bugs, where it's like me, the the person who's directing how this should go, like I I don't specify the right way where I'm wrong in what I think needs to be built. And until it gets contact with reality or an adversary. I just won't know that. And nor will the AI system, because it'll be like, yo, I did what you told me. I just didn't know that there was this other, you know, this other use case, this other side case or something that that was gonna cause this problem or something like that. What we are definitely seeing though is that just like you can automate a lot of coding, you can well, first of all, a lot of computer security is in the software space in some way. And so this is pretty, pretty big for for that. But then there's a lot of cybersecurity style tasks, whether it's doing these penetration testing or it's responding to ⁓ events, it's it's investigating things or you know configuring networks and stuff like that. These all are functions that that models can do. It's not clear whether they have the appropriate data in them today, but it is clear that that data exists, can be generated, and can be incorporated in models of the future. And so I think where we're where we're going is that similar to coding, cybersecurity is is likely to get
better. We're gonna need more of it, and we're gonna be able to empower a lot of people to do more and more automation as singular people, right? What I think is really, really interesting is is there a world in which basically all cybersecurity, whether it's building software, whether it's maintaining systems or or investigating systems or testing them, is all of it driven by AI agents because they can move faster, they have more knowledge, and they can just do a much better job than than people. And if there is, and that's what happens, I think a a really interesting question is, what does cybersecurity mean? What does it look like at that point? Does it continue to have all of the functions that we know it, or are those solved, quote unquote, because well, the AI agent just does a bit similar to like quote, you know, coding of of certain domains is quote unquote solved because it's like I just, you know, put two sentences into clawed code and I have a working application that does exactly what I wanted it to, or for the most part, what I wanted it to, and I just needed two sentences. Does something similar happen with cybersecurity? And if so, does that mean we go from this world where, you know, we talked a bunch about the difference between using AI for cybersecurity? That's we're talking about here. And then understanding the security of AI systems, that's what we do at Grace One. Does basically all of cybersecurity become that ladder bucket of all you need now is to make sure your AI system is secure and you're good? Like, you know, every everything's gonna work great. Like that kind of thing. Yeah. And I think that's a really interesting question. Yeah. On that note, what in what ways are you seeing attackers getting more sophisticated and The way that they're attacking systems? Yeah. So so this is a great question also because there's a very, very big difference between the like traditional cybersecurity versus how are they attacking AI systems? On traditional cybersecurity, today we're predominantly seeing an increase in attacks, not necessarily like there is also an increase in complexity of them. But mostly it's an increase. And this kind of makes sense, right? Because it's like if I was a human and I could only try to break into say, you know, a dozen ⁓ a dozen networks on my own, now I have this AI agent. I can automate a bunch of this and I can try to do twelve hundred ⁓ you know, networks in instead of just twelve, right? And so we're we're seeing an increase in this. You also, similar to how coding agents can help. People and help coders do more. You know, you you can apply that for, again, we talked about this being dual use. You can apply that to malicious cybersecurity pieces. And so people who maybe didn't have access to this now can do it because natural language is the way it is is sort of the programming language of choice. But also, you know, people who are already doing these kinds of things, maybe they're more productive, they're going deeper in different things and having AI do this. Generally speaking, though, those activities in a Like other than the increase in volume, it's kind of the same evolution that we've been seeing. So in cybersecurity, traditional cybersecurity, the general model is that attackers find a new attack path, defenders identify that, create a fix, and roll the fix out. And so attackers sort of have this window where something works and not enough people know about it, that they can use that in order to take advantage of things before the defender, the defend the the defense community is able to plug that gap. Now let's talk about what's going on for AI systems. Today, it's very unclear how many attacks on AI systems there actually are. There's been a couple of examples where or like exceptions that I feel like prove the rule. So like a few months ago, there was like someone, some Twitter bot powered by AI that had access to like $200,000 of crypto, and someone was able to hack it and transfer that crypto over in about 15 minutes. Most of the time, though, if I can identify that there's an AI system somewhere. It's very unclear what the value of me attacking that is going to be. It's very different in traditional cybersecurity. If I can break into this computer and take control of it, I have a very good sense of what that value is going to be for me. If there's a support chat bot on some car dealership's website, it's very unclear what that thing can do. Maybe I can get it to say something silly and then I can create a screenshot of that. But like, okay, I could just Edit the HTML of the website or go into Photoshop or ask one of these AI image tools to generate that image. So who cares, right? Like what's the value of that? I think that this is not going to be the case forever. Like we were talking as you know, AI systems get more prevalent and the you have more of these agents with more valuable resources or valuable capabilities associated to them. I think we're going to see more serious attacks on AI systems. But at least today, I I don't believe that that is the case. And so what we're actually in a position of, and this is especially unique to Gray Swan, is our arena often has challenges of pre-release models and agents and functions that then our community of red teamers tries to break before they're even available to the public. And this flips that that sort of defender pursuing attacker. dynamic in the other way. We get to see what attacks work before those systems go live to the public. We get to incorporate those into our automated attack testing technique, shade, and our defensive tool signal, such that once those systems are live, once those new capabilities, those new models are are in the public, we've already built a bunch of defenses for them. So again, I I think There's there's like a curve here, and this is only gonna be true for some period of time. I don't know if it's like a year or like ten years. I I
don't I don't know. But the more that we can maintain this within the AI space, I think it it potentially has a very bright future for cybersecurity and for the industry at large, because it means that we will be able to create defenses before attackers would be able to take advantage of them, which would be huge for for cybersecurity in general if we can maintain that. Yeah. Okay, I want to actually go back to some of the research that you were doing at Meta. Sure. So I'm actually curious. Yeah, could you so you talked a little bit about like the evals, but could you dive a little more into like what that looks like? And then maybe we could also talk about like Llama firewall, prompt guard, that sort of thing, because I don't know what those are. ⁓ yeah, yeah, yeah, sure. So ⁓ so all of this arose out of working directly with the ⁓ the llama development teams and So so we were a function in the security department working with the Lama development teams. And so we brought a bunch of cybersecurity knowledge as well as understanding of the potential flaws and risks of these AI systems, again, from a cybersecurity perspective, into how to evaluate it. I think there's there's like three different things that that are that matter. one of them is is what's called frontier risk, specifically for cybersecurity. And so because we were open sourcing these models, I mean, you you need to understand the frontier risk no matter what, but because we were open sourcing these models, we had to have a a way of evaluating the upper bound of their capabilities in a like maximally adversarial condition. Right. So assume that there is no safety guardrails built into the models anymore. There are no safety guardrails around the models. What is its raw capability at accomplishing malicious cybersecurity tasks? And so some of the things we did for that are like fairly static benchmarks, similar to what you might give like a security engineer as a question and an interview or something of that nature. Some of those were actually testing it in cyber range environments where you had a a a a computer or network system with known vulnerabilities, and you task the AI system, you task the model to break in. or or to to ⁓ find vulnerabilities, to evaluate them, to exploit them, break into the system, and then do privilege escalation in order to actually take control of the system, right? So going through the full ⁓ like attack chain, as it were, of how to find and and actually get some sort of resource in that. And then we also did some evaluations around scam. Scams and and phishing attempts. And we partnered with a bunch of companies as well to to really grow out the robustness of how to evaluate these models on these kinds of things. Grayswan was one of the partners that that that we worked with on that. So that's one category of things. The reason this is important is because you need to understand the capability of the model and the potential of harm that that might happen if you ⁓ like expose it to the public, let alone you release it as an open source model, that then you no longer have any control over what happens to it. The second category of things is what we might call ⁓ like AI application testing. And this is where Gray Swan was a huge partner. This is testing for things like susceptibility to prompt injection and other flaws of the AI system that would get it to potentially do one of these harmful cybersecurity things, even if It is not maximally helpful. So put all the safety fine-tuning in the model, put the guardrails around it, and try to get that system to still do some of these potentially harmful cybersecurity or other ⁓ areas of of of harm. That's where Gray Swan really, really shines because that's what Gray Swan is really, really good at. We have the best adversarial techniques in the world, whether it's our community of red teamers or our automated shade system. It so far, Our shade system has not yet encountered an AI system that it has not been able to break, which we're we're very surprised, but also very proud of. And then the third set of tasks is how helpful is this model within cybersecurity? And so for this, we we had a ⁓ partnership with CrowdStrike, where we released something called CyberSOC SOC Eval instead of Cybersec Eval, right? Is it an additional? And so that is something where we're saying, hey, there's a lot of defender style tasks. So far, we've been talking mostly about the attacker, right? Like, can you do malicious things with the model? Can you do malicious things to the model? What about positive things? What about good things within the realm of cybersecurity? How capable is this model at? And so this would be like, hey, here's a threat analysis report. Here's a bunch of results from your security operations center. Can you find the flaws that happen? Can you do ⁓ an evaluation to figure out like what the most likely threat model for this is or what the most likely problem was that you can then fix or so? So basically, how can you support security operations, security engineers, security analysts, that kind of thing? Those are the evaluations that we put together. And we thought it was very important to open source them so that the community could build on those. It's one of these like a rising tide lifts all boats. We wanted to make sure that everyone was was sort of competing to the best that they possibly could in all three of these different domains. In addition to doing these evaluations and using them as pre-release evaluations or comparisons to other models and systems to be able to similarly say, like, hey, this is your performance on Sweebench, this is how well this model is a coding. You could start to say things like this is how How well this model performs at cybersecurity style tasks, that kind of thing. We also built and open sourced a bunch of ⁓ systems and tools to help protect models or make them more secure or defend against different problems.
So one of the first ones is PromptGuard. It's a binary, well, it's not binary, but it's a classifier model for looking for known prompt injections. This is something that doesn't compete at all in terms of capabilities to what Grace One has, in part because you have to. It follows that original dynamic of you have to know what the attacker pieces are. And then you upload or you update your model, your defensive model with those. And so you're constantly following behind the attacker after you detect them. It's really, really fast because it's just a classifier model. It's not an LLM. And that's one of the benefits of it. But it has this weakness of it only can potentially classify prompt injection techniques, prompt injection strings that it's seen before. We also released something called CodeShield. So you and I talked a bunch about how in the future it is likely that there will be less bugs total. Like there's this asymptote that will drive down the bugs in in software as our coding agents get better and better at writing more secure code. CodeShield is a tool for looking for known insecure patterns in code that has been output vi by an LLM and then either suppressing it or re-querying the model. So so like ⁓ An example of a known insecure coding situation would be ⁓ in C, the programming language C, there's a lot of what are called memory unsafe operations because you're not checking the boundaries of your memory. So like ⁓ there's there's a if you're copying two strings, there's a function called string copy that basically copies one into another, but it doesn't do any bounds checking. And so this is like a known insecure coding practice, whether or not this exists in your code base, whether that instance is insecure or not. CodeShield has no idea. All it knows is that you just shouldn't do it that way. You should instead use what's called string N copy, where you actually give it the bounds to make sure that it's actually staying in the secure space. And if you do that, you're generally going to have more secure code. And so CodeShield helps to make sure that the code that is output by these LLMs is generally more secure. And then finally, we also released something called Lama Firewall. Llama firewall is a ⁓ Orchestration system with a bunch of built-in guardrail systems as well. So you can put prompt guard into Llama firewall, you can put code shield into it, you can put any sort of guardrail component that you want in there. And then it also has two built-in components, one that does regular expression. So similar to prompt guard, if you define some static rules, they'll work really, really fast, but they they they follow that sort of ⁓ Attacker leads the defender model. And then it also had something experimental that we put in there called alignment check, which ⁓ was sort of an early version of more of what Gray Swan's signal actually does. And so it it looks at what the model is trying to do, thinking about doing, and then it makes judgments about whether or not that is a safe thing to do or if it complies with policy or not. Okay. Okay, that makes sense. I want to shift the conversation again. So sure. I I think a lot of people for some reason are afraid of using the Chinese open source models. Is that warranted? Like why why are people afraid of that? So I think this is this is really ⁓ an interesting conversation also, right? So I think on the one hand it makes sense, right? Like we've seen models come from other countries that when you ask about certain topics or or like when you engage on certain topics, the models do not express what maybe other countries would would think is is reality, right? So there's certain like political activities or or what have become political ⁓ hotspots that like these set some models from other places like respond in different ways. There's also evidence separate from this that if you do things like this, where you change very specific parts of a model, it can have impacts on the functionality of the model in general. So, like a very ⁓ very interesting version of this, a bunch of researchers fine-tuned a model exclusively using known insecure code, right? So they're trying to make the model worse at coding or or to to put out code that is generally going to be more insecure. And what they found is the model then performed worse at a variety of other tasks that had nothing to do with coding. Generally speaking, what we find is there's a Concept of reality. And when you train models or you build into those models diversions from what we would generally call reality, then that model starts to behave in in strange ways that doesn't perform well in others. Similarly, it could be possible that like some adversary could bake into a model some very, very specific trigger that like if you're writing software that's going to be output in C, it's going to include some sort of backdoor in it or something like that. It's unclear how that kind of thing would also look or impact the rest of the model, like we've seen with with some of this other research, where it's like the indication is that if you do that kind of thing, it's going to perform worse in other places, but it doesn't mean that that'll always happen or that there aren't ways to make this happen. And so it makes sense that different organizations might be suspicious or cautious about different areas or or like you if you don't know the full provenance or exactly how a model is going to function in certain ways, then then that's the case. Where this doesn't make sense is that ultimately these models generally are are producing text and and similar to why MCP is insecure, this provides daylight to exactly what these models are doing. Like they're outputting text. Anyone can look at it, anyone can verify it, anyone can can can check it. And so when you get a model. One of the values of like benchmarks and all of these testing and stuff like that is that you can actually see statistically
roughly how well it performs at a variety of tasks and and be fairly confident that that's that's what's gonna happen. So what I don't think is likely to happen is that you could build a backdoor into a model and like the model function totally fine until like it like figures out like, ⁓ you know, I'm a I'm a spy, and now that I, you know, now that I've been activated, like I'm gonna, you know, start start destroying things or like create a reverse backdoor so that you know some someone else could come. What could happen, models can potentially be changed slightly such that their their output is more geared towards this other direction versus, you know, that they they might have naturally gone to the left, but now they're gonna be more likely to go to the right. And in situations where it It's not obvious whether right or left is correct. That might matter, right? Because it it it changes public discourse or it it's it's slightly worse at performing at these things, but you don't really notice it or so. But then again, it's like, what's the value of building a model from some other country that's slightly worse at something? Generally, you want these to be performant, you want these to automate all these tasks, you want them to be really good at and that kind of thing. That all said, putting guardrails around them kind of solves a lot of these problems. Right. So it's like in the case of like coding, if I put code shield or a tool like that in front of my model, it doesn't matter where it comes from. I have a system that is explicitly guardrailing it and trying to make sure that like whatever code comes out is going to have security in it. It can't have or it's gonna look for things like a backdoor or a weird thing like that and and be able to to flush it out. Similarly, if like there's some weird like, ⁓ with this command line, I'm gonna start, you know breaking all of your agents and causing chaos or something. If you have guardrails around your system that make sure that certain tools are never called or certain behaviors of your system are never able to be exhibited, ⁓ that this just isn't going to happen. And it doesn't matter where that that model provenance came from. Yeah, I was going to say like it's probably fairly straightforward to set up a set of evals that your company cares about and just running all those models through them. And if one performs better than the other, you know which one to go with. And then it's just a market problem. They're just gonna compete with each other. Yeah. I I I I I I do believe that that's the right way to think about it. I do think that there's some additional like geopolitical factors consider of like, hey, you know, if if everyone's based on this model versus that model or something like that, maybe it informs this geopolitical outcome or something like that. And I leave that to the poly science and economics. Folks, it's it's yeah, not something I know anything about. Yeah, I was gonna say, like, why do you think that there's not more like American open source models? I have my hypothesis is that basically the Chinese models or like other countries' models, they're basically distilling the frontier models. And if you do it in the US, you're gonna get sued. So that's my hypothesis, but Yeah, I mean that that that probably plays into it. I think that's a little s some of these Chinese models have made real contributions, right? And and they're not exclusively just like, ⁓ we're just ripping off the the frontier models from from from the American labs. I think I think what it comes down to also is like what is the business case for this, right? So it's like you know, Meta had a real business case when we were open sourcing a lot of our models because it was one of these like, well, like Meta doesn't at the time, Meta didn't need to win the open source race. They just needed to make sure that they could compete in it and not be dependent on some frontier model provider that wasn't them. Right. And so when you release models open source, one strategy is to put pressure on the industry at large to basically reduce inference costs, improve capabilities, like you have to be better, right? We were talking about this like capability cost curve. Like you have to be a lot better. You have to be a lot higher on it. In order for for someone to go for a a model that they're paying for or something that costs more. And and again, like, is there an asymptote whereby you get enough capability in a model that it doesn't matter if you add more and now all you care about is how cheap that that service is, how how inexpensive it is to to inference it and such, right? I think that there are companies in the United States that are thinking about what is the right way to compete with open source models. Like what does that look like? I think the biggest challenge here is that it's just very expensive to build these things. And it's getting, you know, orders of magnitude more expensive to build them as we keep climbing that capability ladder. And so the models for organizations to get these this financing, at least in the United States, tends to be more of a privately funded company, ⁓ or or like a a funded company that then is going to want to try to recoup some sort of like financial financial return on that and Yeah, I I I think if we saw some business cases where it's it's clear how open source models would help that business to recoup those costs, then then I think we'll see more open source models. Why do you think Meta has shifted from only open source LLMs to now they have this sort of like hybrid strategy? Yeah. ⁓ I mean i y you you should, you know, if you get a chance, ask Alexander Wang and and Mark about that. I can't I can't speak for them by any means. ⁓ I can give you my opinion. ⁓ I think from from What I observed, ⁓ I think that when Alexander Wang came on board, what he may have inferred was that Meta had kind of given up on trying to get to the
frontier and had accepted this conciliary prize of, well, at least maybe we can own the open source space. So we'll always be a few years behind, but at least if we're owning the open source space, then that's good enough. and I think what what Alexander and and maybe Mark want is no no, let's get into the frontier. Let's actually be competitive with the frontier. And if we do that, then then we don't have to just focus on this open source space where it's kind of like, well, at least we own open source, right? And instead it actually becomes a no, we're just straight up being competitors. And maybe some of that continues to be open source, maybe not. It doesn't doesn't necessarily matter as much. But I I'm totally speculating on this. I I I don't actually know. Yeah. So If you were an executive at a large organization, like what do you think you would be worried about right now, cybersecurity wise? Like what should they they be thinking about? Yeah. ⁓ so I mean, I think that all of the traditional cybersecurity pieces are are there. There's just more volume. And so doing the right best practices for cybersecurity are still gonna be the right things as you deal with higher volume of attempts and things of that nature. And the great news is that there's a ton more people who are using AI for traditional cybersecurity outcomes that are gonna make that easier to sort of meet that increase in in volume and demand and and the like. Where I think the biggest worry is, and obviously this is in large part why I joined Gray Swan and and why I'm here, many, many enterprises are bringing AI tools or building AI systems themselves and deploying them. without really considering the risks and and possible harms for their company. And so even companies that that are only, quote unquote, like bringing clawed code into their enterprises and running AI coding agents or allowing their their developers to use these, there's a lot of risk there that that isn't obvious. And you know, obviously the companies that are running these these coding agents are trying to to address this to a degree as well. But the risk to one business is maybe very, very different to the risk to the other. And what determines that risk is the individual businesses environment and context. And so you you really, really do need third party guardrails around those where you can specify exactly what's important to your organization, exactly what matters to what should and shouldn't be done for your coding agent, let alone some third part like some some additional agent, some product that's actually going to go user facing that people can attack or something of that nature. And I think a lot of people are just overwhelmed by where to start with all of this stuff, which makes a lot of sense. It's all new, it's all moving very fast. And it's ⁓ in some ways easier to kind of follow the the herd and just be like, well, you know, someone will have a major event and then that'll sort of motivate the rest of us to do this. But I I I don't think you need to actually wait for that. I think you can do a lot now to to make this better and and and meet the moment. Yeah. And do you have any predictions about where the industry is going to go over the next couple of years? ⁓ I mean, there's the obvious things of like more people, more more enterprises using more AI to automate more things. ⁓ I think what's what's hard to predict there again is like where is the top of that capability curve that's gonna determine is it all white collar jobs or is it this, you know, subset of white collar jobs, or well, you can automate, you know, seventy percent of this job and then you need, you know, ten ten X more people in order to do the other thirty percent because now we're doing more of it or something like that, that kind of thing. If it's really hard to predict and And we'll see. What I think is obvious is that more AI is going to be used by more people in more ways, that eventually the the primary attack path for cybersecurity probably will be AI entry points rather than some of these more traditional d ⁓ deterministic ⁓ style areas. Yeah, I don't know. What what about you? What what after we've been talking about this, what what what are your thoughts on like where this is all going or what what are you thinking ⁓ might happen next or or so? I do feel like at least what I've been seeing over the last like specifically just in the last like few weeks, it does seem like companies will be moving a lot of workloads to open source models. I do think that's gonna happen. Just because I think that the capability is there for the most part. Like for for a lot of things, you don't need the, you know, you don't need mythos for a customer service agent. You're probably spending way too much money on it. At least Yeah, exactly. Like the Like basically over the last year I or last year or two, I think people like companies have just been experimenting with what works, what doesn't, right? That's why they're just spending they're dumping money on like everything AI because they're trying to figure out where is that value actually being created. And then I feel like right now is kind of the point where I think companies are starting to figure that out. And so I think over the next year or two, companies are starting are going to use this like auto routing inside of their business where they're gonna be like Auto routing or they're gonna do it themselves where they say, Hey, for these certain tasks, we don't need the you do we don't need mythos to do this. We can just use Quen or we can use GLM to do a lot of this stuff just to save a lot of money because I do think that like, you know, they're spending way too much money on some of this stuff. And I don't know what that means cybersecurity wise, but I I do think that is going to happen over the next couple of years. Yeah. I mean I I think it's you know It's a complex system, right? So it's like i if that is what the future holds, then it seems likely that all the Frontier labs will see that happening, see their spend go down and be like, Whoa, whoa, whoa, we'll just do that for you. Like, you know, like like like don't don't don't do your own thing. Keep sending all your traffic to us and we'll just reduce costs by like a hundred X, right? What we can do that, you know? So who's then it comes down to Yeah, but then it comes down to I think a lot of companies are and you probably already know this as well, like a company doesn't want to send their data to Cloud or to open AI. And so It even further incentivizes them to want to keep everything in-house. So it's like if if my if I can just run these models on my own, I don't need to worry about like data going like basically my alpha, my business is alpha going to Cloud so that they can basically like obsolete my business. ⁓ I would rather not have that happen. But then yeah, I think what you brought up was very interesting about like can you even secure the GPUs to do that? I thought that was a very interesting point. I had never, never thought about that. Yeah, I mean, ⁓ it's you know, w what's the saying that like history rarely repeats itself, but it often rhymes or, you know, ⁓ I think there's like a similar thing of like this the the cloud revolution, right? Where it was like, look, like everyone had to buy their own computers, their own servers, set all these things up and then the cloud comes by and it's like, Are you mad? I'm never gonna you know, rely on some third party company in order to host all of my most important business critical stuff. And then it's like, yeah, but the value there is like huge, ma'am. Like you unlock so much. And then it's like, ⁓ right. And then everyone's on the cloud and barely anyone has any hardware that they actually own. Cause what? Why on earth would you do that? And now we're sort of going back into that cycle where it's like, wait a minute, we're sending all of our traffic to the the sort of cloud providers of LLM inference. Maybe we actually want to buy our own hardware and run that ourselves because that's where all our business critical stuff is. So who knows, man? Like it's it's wild time, that's for sure. Yeah. I mean this time now you can just like you know, just buy a server on AWS. You you don't need to host your own actual like physical service. So I don't know. Yeah. Awesome. Yeah, so that's all I had. Thanks for thanks for doing this. Yeah, man. This is fun. Thanks for chatting with me, Basil.