UDSKRIFT 🔗
WEBVTT
1
00:00:00.040 --> 00:00:16.160
M where they turned me all a
pie up in the sky waiting for me
2
00:00:16.600 --> 00:00:26.519
right now between the town. Your
bone and down never seem to you,
3
00:00:28.559 --> 00:00:42.280
so as you this shop a shame
that's many. Welcome. This is Michael
4
00:00:42.359 --> 00:00:47.880
Volkoff and this is episode two three
of Corruption, Crime and Compliance. Our
5
00:00:47.960 --> 00:00:54.640
episode today is an interview of Scott
great Tech from Transparency USA and Erica hannah
6
00:00:54.679 --> 00:00:59.320
Chek, the director of Government Affairs
for the Fact Coalition, and to talk
7
00:00:59.359 --> 00:01:06.000
about the recent passage of the Enablers
Act. UH. Pretty far reaching uh,
8
00:01:06.079 --> 00:01:11.239
anti money laundering and anti corruption bill, legislation that was just passed by
9
00:01:11.280 --> 00:01:18.040
the House and is likely to pass
the Senate and get enacted this year.
10
00:01:19.319 --> 00:01:25.239
Anyways, Welcome everybody. Mike Volkoff
here and sunny beautiful Sicily is still enjoying
11
00:01:25.280 --> 00:01:29.920
the summer. I hope you're enjoying
yours as well, UM, and getting
12
00:01:29.959 --> 00:01:34.799
some time to relax and to enjoy
family and friends. UM. Anyway,
13
00:01:36.560 --> 00:01:42.599
I'm always glad to have Scott Gray
Tech and Erica Hannachek here. Uh.
14
00:01:42.640 --> 00:01:46.920
They keep us up to date on
anti corruption legislation in the United States,
15
00:01:47.680 --> 00:01:55.079
and we wanted to take a look
at the Enablers Act. Which you know,
16
00:01:55.200 --> 00:02:00.879
tackles the issue of going after gatekeepers
for the u US financial system,
17
00:02:00.159 --> 00:02:07.640
lawyers, accountants, trustees, corporate
formation agents, all of that. UH.
18
00:02:07.719 --> 00:02:13.800
And so this is part of the
effort to reign in corruption and money
19
00:02:13.879 --> 00:02:20.400
laundering. So before we get started, let's hear a word from our sponsor,
20
00:02:20.840 --> 00:02:25.800
Diligence. Diligent is the time tested, award winning provider of automated governance,
21
00:02:25.960 --> 00:02:30.560
risk and compliance solutions. For over
twenty years, Diligent has helped boards
22
00:02:30.560 --> 00:02:36.479
and c suites to designed and implement
effective governance practices through its market leading board
23
00:02:36.520 --> 00:02:42.120
application. Diligent has now expanded its
offerings to include risk, compliance and audit
24
00:02:42.199 --> 00:02:47.000
solutions. Building on these new and
exciting capabilities, Diligent now offers the critical
25
00:02:47.000 --> 00:02:53.479
capability to connect boards, C suite, risk compliance and audit teams to promote
26
00:02:53.479 --> 00:02:59.120
purpose driven leadership. Building on this
capability, Diligent provides a full suite of
27
00:02:59.159 --> 00:03:06.199
complementary service is including risk management,
ethics and compliance, environmental social and governance,
28
00:03:06.599 --> 00:03:13.280
and proactive auditing strategies and practices.
Diligent solutions enabled companies to implement robust
29
00:03:13.319 --> 00:03:16.360
corporate governance, to mitigate and manage
risk, create a culture of ethics and
30
00:03:16.400 --> 00:03:23.000
compliance, ensure that company controls are
audit ready and implement tailored and responsive E
31
00:03:23.199 --> 00:03:29.199
s G solutions. If interested in
exploring diligence unique complement of solutions, please
32
00:03:29.240 --> 00:03:37.080
reach out to Diligent at its website
www dot diligent dot com. I'm really
33
00:03:37.120 --> 00:03:42.639
happy to welcome back two of our
favorite guests, uh and we have Scott
34
00:03:42.680 --> 00:03:49.520
Gray Tech and Erica Hannah Check.
Scott is the advocacy director at Transparency International
35
00:03:49.639 --> 00:03:54.479
USA. Erica at Hanna Check is
the director of Government Affairs at the Fact
36
00:03:54.560 --> 00:04:00.759
Coalition. And I always know when
I hear from them that we have something
37
00:04:00.840 --> 00:04:04.560
positive to talk about, and today
I thought it'd be great to talk about
38
00:04:04.599 --> 00:04:11.520
the passage by the House of Representatives
and sort of the prospects for what's called
39
00:04:11.560 --> 00:04:15.959
the Enablers Act. And we're really
happy to have Scott, Eric and Erica
40
00:04:16.040 --> 00:04:21.600
here. Thank you both for joining
us and for our listeners and talking to
41
00:04:21.680 --> 00:04:27.079
us about the Enablers Act. Welcome
to both of you today, great to
42
00:04:27.120 --> 00:04:30.720
be here with you, Thanks for
having us. Well, let me turn
43
00:04:30.800 --> 00:04:33.439
it over to you just to first. I think I've written a little bit
44
00:04:33.480 --> 00:04:38.560
about this on my blog, but
I think you guys obviously have been living
45
00:04:38.560 --> 00:04:41.639
it, and I know what it's
like when you're trying to get something done
46
00:04:41.639 --> 00:04:45.079
on the hill on Capitol Hill.
But can you guys sort of set the
47
00:04:45.160 --> 00:04:48.040
stage for us, either one of
you on sort of the enablers act,
48
00:04:48.759 --> 00:04:56.079
what it generally does, and why
it's so significant from your standpoint. Yeah,
49
00:04:56.079 --> 00:04:58.439
it would be happy to thanks Michael, and great to talk with you
50
00:04:58.480 --> 00:05:02.920
again. So big picture, my
organization, Transparency International, is the oldest
51
00:05:02.959 --> 00:05:10.199
and largest organization the world fighting corruption. And we're an international organization because,
52
00:05:10.240 --> 00:05:15.240
as you know, oftentimes corruption requires
moving money out of the country that it
53
00:05:15.319 --> 00:05:20.480
was stolen from and into other countries
in order to move, hide and grow
54
00:05:20.560 --> 00:05:27.279
that money. So the
Load full transcript
United States
has become a go to destination for corrupt
55
00:05:27.319 --> 00:05:30.759
funds that leaders in different parts of
the world are stealing from their people and
56
00:05:30.800 --> 00:05:34.720
trying to make a good return on. If you pick a point on the
57
00:05:34.759 --> 00:05:40.399
globe, a major corruption scandal in
the last few years, whether that's stories
58
00:05:40.439 --> 00:05:46.000
that we heard from the Pandora Papers
last October two scandals like one MDB in
59
00:05:46.079 --> 00:05:53.480
Malaysia or involving Isabel dos Santos and
Angola and her oil company, or Theodore
60
00:05:53.480 --> 00:05:58.759
Obiang in Equatorial Guinea. What we
see in all of these examples is the
61
00:05:58.839 --> 00:06:04.399
involvement, the complicity of American what
we call enablers of this corruption. This
62
00:06:04.480 --> 00:06:12.120
is a class of professional service providers
think certain lawyers, certain accountants, folks
63
00:06:12.120 --> 00:06:16.000
who form or register companies in the
United States, folks who form trusts in
64
00:06:16.040 --> 00:06:21.600
the United States. For folks who
manage or advise or consult others on their
65
00:06:21.639 --> 00:06:29.199
money. UH. They have all
been key players in each of these big
66
00:06:29.240 --> 00:06:33.480
time corruption scandals that have moved dirty
money from other parts of the world into
67
00:06:33.480 --> 00:06:40.680
the United States. So the enablers
act as a bipartisan bill UH that has
68
00:06:40.720 --> 00:06:45.519
finally been included in the House National
Defense Bill, which as you mentioned,
69
00:06:45.600 --> 00:06:51.279
was passed just last month. UM. It is an effort that would empower
70
00:06:51.360 --> 00:06:59.639
the Treasury Department to require these types
of enablers to adopt certain anti money laundering
71
00:07:00.079 --> 00:07:03.600
procedures in order to make sure that
they are not being used by corrupt actors
72
00:07:03.839 --> 00:07:10.519
to accomplish these goals. And it
gives Treasury a pretty broad menu. There's
73
00:07:10.519 --> 00:07:15.079
a whole host of anti money laundering
procedures, many that you know typical American
74
00:07:15.079 --> 00:07:20.560
banks have to do now like collecting
information about who is actually behind a company,
75
00:07:20.639 --> 00:07:26.720
if the enablers working with a company, to setting up thorough anti money
76
00:07:26.759 --> 00:07:30.839
laundering programs, to conducting full due
diligence on their customers to make sure that
77
00:07:30.879 --> 00:07:35.720
they're not on sanctions list. For
example, now UH to filing suspicious activity
78
00:07:35.720 --> 00:07:42.240
reports with Treasury, and so by
giving Treasury the power to do this,
79
00:07:42.839 --> 00:07:48.000
to regulate different types of enablers with
different mL procedures, we think we can
80
00:07:48.040 --> 00:07:53.800
turn these folks that have been exploited
abused by corrupt actors in different parts of
81
00:07:53.839 --> 00:07:58.519
the world into actual allies in this
fight. There on the front lines of
82
00:07:58.600 --> 00:08:01.480
this corrupt activity. They are the
gatekeepers, if you will, to the
83
00:08:01.560 --> 00:08:05.639
U S economy and the US financial
system, and this bill, you know,
84
00:08:05.680 --> 00:08:09.040
my requiring them to have some of
these anti money lawing procedures that other
85
00:08:09.160 --> 00:08:13.639
financial institutions, other banks have,
we think would be able to stop a
86
00:08:13.639 --> 00:08:16.199
lot of the flow of this dirty
and corrupt money in the United States.
87
00:08:16.720 --> 00:08:22.279
Well, that's interesting, and Erica, from your standpoint and the fact coalition
88
00:08:22.079 --> 00:08:26.720
um, is this sort of the
big picture that you see as well?
89
00:08:26.839 --> 00:08:31.160
Or is there anything else that you
would call out in terms of the enablers
90
00:08:31.199 --> 00:08:37.039
act that you think was really important. Absolutely, the United States UH and
91
00:08:37.240 --> 00:08:43.279
recently was named the largest supplier of
financial secrecy in the world by something called
92
00:08:43.279 --> 00:08:48.639
the Financial Secrecy Index. The provision
of anonymous US shell companies is obviously a
93
00:08:48.720 --> 00:08:52.799
large component of this. That's why
our coalition, which represents more than a
94
00:08:52.879 --> 00:08:58.519
hundred state, national, and international
organizations committed to combating harmful corrupt financial practices,
95
00:08:58.559 --> 00:09:03.799
have got together to support the passage
of legislation to tackle that problem of
96
00:09:03.840 --> 00:09:07.879
anonymous US entities. But of course, whether winningly or unwinningly, there are
97
00:09:09.080 --> 00:09:15.200
U s gatekeepers, as Scott has
laid out, that help corrupt actors access
98
00:09:15.279 --> 00:09:20.080
the US financial system and sometimes set
up these entities. So, you know,
99
00:09:20.200 --> 00:09:22.200
one of the things that's top of
mind for US, especially in light
100
00:09:22.240 --> 00:09:26.440
of Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine,
is how some of these funds make their
101
00:09:26.480 --> 00:09:33.159
way into the United States again,
sometimes through these gatekeepers and so um.
102
00:09:33.200 --> 00:09:37.039
You know, just for instance,
UH, there is a case in which
103
00:09:37.320 --> 00:09:41.559
like Derri Pasca, UH use the
US Formation Agent to help him set up
104
00:09:41.600 --> 00:09:46.679
an anonymous company so he could buy
a fifteen million dollar mansion in the US
105
00:09:46.840 --> 00:09:52.840
Capital. There's another case in which
a putin crony H Suleiman Karimov used a
106
00:09:52.840 --> 00:09:56.080
Delaware trust formation agent to set up
a trust UH in the United States to
107
00:09:56.159 --> 00:10:03.759
hold one billion dollars anonymously
and ask
sets UH. And it really highlights the
108
00:10:03.879 --> 00:10:11.120
national security implications of being able to
provide UH better insights into how actors are
109
00:10:11.159 --> 00:10:16.759
access in the US financial system.
But there's also UH, you know,
110
00:10:16.919 --> 00:10:20.000
tax implications that that we're thinking about. As you know, we also think
111
00:10:20.039 --> 00:10:26.799
about how you know, bad actors
use offshore tax havens which sometimes aren't even
112
00:10:26.840 --> 00:10:30.799
offshore at all, but are in
our own backyard UH to evade taxes and
113
00:10:30.799 --> 00:10:37.279
commit tax fraud. UM money is
intentionally hidden beyond the view of tax authorities,
114
00:10:37.320 --> 00:10:41.519
and there are serious revenue implications from
this that hinder our efforts to better
115
00:10:41.559 --> 00:10:46.639
resourced efforts to protect the integrity of
the US financial system. UH. The
116
00:10:46.759 --> 00:10:50.360
U. S Treasury has done analysis
and shown that legal entities are used in
117
00:10:50.399 --> 00:10:56.480
what they call substantial portion of tax
UH tax evasion tax fraud cases. So
118
00:10:56.960 --> 00:11:01.080
while the US is actually ahead of
the ball UM compared you many other countries
119
00:11:01.720 --> 00:11:09.000
in identifying UM and working with tax
professionals to fight tax evasion through reporting regimes
120
00:11:09.000 --> 00:11:15.840
that get at certain ownership information enabler
stype Enabler's style due diligence would be helpful
121
00:11:15.879 --> 00:11:20.639
where certain information reporting isn't complete.
So for instance, um, when individuals
122
00:11:20.720 --> 00:11:26.679
use complex structuring or do transactional planning
for tax evasion purposes in a way that
123
00:11:26.840 --> 00:11:31.919
involves unrelated third party advisors like those
filing tax returns. So, uh,
124
00:11:31.120 --> 00:11:37.639
just to provide additional context as to
why the legislation that Scott has talked about
125
00:11:37.720 --> 00:11:41.960
is just so important from the US
financial perspective, yep, No, I
126
00:11:41.000 --> 00:11:45.840
think it's total sense. Um,
you know, looking at the big picture
127
00:11:45.919 --> 00:11:50.799
for a second there, it seems
to me like there are two large sort
128
00:11:50.840 --> 00:11:54.360
of forces here at work. One
is, and I think we've talked about
129
00:11:54.399 --> 00:12:03.080
this before, was the countering Corruption
match strategy, which you know, this
130
00:12:03.159 --> 00:12:07.759
administration put together and elevated the sort
of anti corruption battle, um, you
131
00:12:07.799 --> 00:12:13.159
know, to a national security type
issue. And I recall in that,
132
00:12:13.360 --> 00:12:16.840
and I may be wrong, but
I recall in that that there was some
133
00:12:16.360 --> 00:12:22.799
mention and focus of the importance of
going after the gatekeepers or the enablers,
134
00:12:22.799 --> 00:12:26.360
if you want to talk about that. And then the second to me seems
135
00:12:26.399 --> 00:12:31.519
to be you know, sort of
the reaction of the enforcement agencies and everybody
136
00:12:31.559 --> 00:12:37.320
with regard to the invasion by the
Russians into Ukraine and their access to money
137
00:12:37.080 --> 00:12:41.440
all around the globe. Do you
guys, do you share that in terms
138
00:12:41.519 --> 00:12:46.320
of that this is sort of in
line with both of those UH incentives,
139
00:12:46.320 --> 00:12:52.240
and that's maybe why we have such
a broad um, sort of bipartisan support
140
00:12:52.279 --> 00:13:00.559
for this. Yeah, I can
take the first. So interestingly, about
141
00:13:00.559 --> 00:13:05.639
two months before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as he said, the Administration puts
142
00:13:05.639 --> 00:13:11.960
out this forty page document about how
it is committing to fighting foreign corruption,
143
00:13:11.759 --> 00:13:18.879
and in there it says specifically that
there are holes in our regulatory framework,
144
00:13:18.919 --> 00:13:24.720
in our anti money laundering systems here
that allow different kinds of service providers.
145
00:13:24.759 --> 00:13:30.480
It names lawyers, accountants, folks
incorporated form companies where they are basically not
146
00:13:30.679 --> 00:13:35.559
required to know whether or not the
folks they are working with are corrupt actors,
147
00:13:35.679 --> 00:13:41.440
criminal enterprises, drug cartels, human
traffickers, you name it. They
148
00:13:41.519 --> 00:13:46.720
hide behind that veil of ignorance in
order to provide these services for these folks
149
00:13:46.720 --> 00:13:50.600
and to make money from them.
So the strategy pinpoints that this is an
150
00:13:50.639 --> 00:13:54.320
area that the administration is committed to
fixing. And then just a few months
151
00:13:54.519 --> 00:14:00.480
later, about a month after Russia's
invasion of Ukraine, the US Treasury Department
152
00:14:00.519 --> 00:14:03.960
comes out with its National Strategy,
as it does every year, and as
153
00:14:03.000 --> 00:14:09.120
the number one item that it calls
out as a proposed fix to the US
154
00:14:09.240 --> 00:14:15.399
is ways to protect the US financial
system. It has closing these loopholes that
155
00:14:15.440 --> 00:14:20.320
allow enablers gatekeepers to not have to
know who they are working with. So
156
00:14:20.279 --> 00:14:24.120
this was both on the radar,
uh and you know, core to the
157
00:14:24.159 --> 00:14:31.200
bid administration's response to foreign corruption before
the invasion of Ukraine. And I think
158
00:14:31.320 --> 00:14:33.720
we've seen in so many ways that
Erica can speak to. Its only gained
159
00:14:35.440 --> 00:14:39.360
greater attention, in greater focus because
of the ability of the United States financial
160
00:14:39.440 --> 00:14:43.279
system, through these
loopholes, to
have examples like this, a like Deri
161
00:14:43.399 --> 00:14:46.799
Poska and others who were able to
move their money inside our system and high
162
00:14:46.799 --> 00:14:50.320
their dirty assets. Right right,
What do you think, Erica? Do
163
00:14:50.320 --> 00:14:54.039
you you share that sort of perspective. I mean, it is kind of
164
00:14:54.080 --> 00:15:01.960
amazing that those two forces came together
so quickly. The timing couldn't be more
165
00:15:01.120 --> 00:15:05.440
urgent to tackle this problem. You
mentioned the invasion of Ukraine. Uh,
166
00:15:05.759 --> 00:15:13.159
the international community gathered together in an
unprecedented fashion to to track, freeze and
167
00:15:13.240 --> 00:15:16.080
sees Russian oligarch assets as a way
to respond to the human rights abuses that
168
00:15:16.120 --> 00:15:22.039
are happening in Ukraine. UM,
with the establishment of the International Repo Task
169
00:15:22.120 --> 00:15:28.120
Force, which is this multilateral institution
UM that relies on reporting not only by
170
00:15:28.159 --> 00:15:35.799
financial institutions but by non financial business
professionals to understand who actually owns these assets.
171
00:15:35.840 --> 00:15:39.879
Again where he saying these big stories
in the news about how law enforcements
172
00:15:39.919 --> 00:15:45.360
tracking down Russian oligark yachts and foreign
locales. Uh, But you can't find
173
00:15:45.399 --> 00:15:48.799
the yachts if you don't know who
owns them. And so this information is
174
00:15:48.840 --> 00:15:52.960
absolutely critical to that UM, to
that effort to turn off this figot for
175
00:15:54.440 --> 00:15:58.080
Russia's war in Ukraine. But in
so many ways, the US is really
176
00:15:58.159 --> 00:16:03.480
lagging behind UM, the US the
world in these issues, especially as partners
177
00:16:03.480 --> 00:16:07.159
in the International Repo Task Force.
The United States is actually in the last
178
00:16:07.159 --> 00:16:11.879
ten percent of countries that doesn't require
uh, you know, these business professionals,
179
00:16:11.879 --> 00:16:18.440
these gatekeepers to have anti money laundering
obligations. UM. In sixteen,
180
00:16:18.600 --> 00:16:22.960
the International Anti Money Laundering Standards Center, the Financial Asking Action Task Force UM
181
00:16:23.000 --> 00:16:30.200
did an evaluation of the US antimoney
and waundering framework and found two core deficiencies.
182
00:16:30.279 --> 00:16:34.879
One you've already mentioned, Michael,
is the UM the lack of visibility
183
00:16:36.000 --> 00:16:40.159
into shell companies established in the United
States. But Congress took action in a
184
00:16:40.200 --> 00:16:45.000
bipartisan way lack bipartisan way last year
to pass the Corporate Transparency Act UM,
185
00:16:45.039 --> 00:16:51.000
which would effectively end the abuse of
US anonymous shelf companies. That's currently being
186
00:16:51.000 --> 00:16:55.799
implemented by the Treasury Department in the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network or FINSON. But
187
00:16:55.840 --> 00:17:00.399
the second deficiency is exactly what we're
talking about now UM, closing the loopholes
188
00:17:00.440 --> 00:17:07.039
through anonymous UM you know, come
into t formation and working with these gatekeepers
189
00:17:07.039 --> 00:17:11.079
to actually understand how money is moving
through the US system. And some of
190
00:17:11.119 --> 00:17:15.480
these loopholes we've been talking about closing
for twenty years since UM, since nine
191
00:17:15.559 --> 00:17:18.240
eleven, So it really is time
to act to be able able to pass
192
00:17:18.319 --> 00:17:23.240
this through Congress and require some of
these financial professionals to have anti money launering
193
00:17:23.240 --> 00:17:29.319
obligations. Yeah, let me and
and I hate to be the dead horse
194
00:17:29.319 --> 00:17:33.759
on the Corporate Transparency Act, but
just from my perspective, the fact that
195
00:17:33.359 --> 00:17:37.559
and if you sort of peel apart
every f c p A case, every
196
00:17:37.599 --> 00:17:44.119
sort of money laundering case, you
inevitably see shell companies set up all over
197
00:17:44.640 --> 00:17:48.480
and often in the United States.
By the way, let's not you know
198
00:17:48.640 --> 00:17:53.359
that we're set up through uh you're
not required to disclose beneficial ownership here.
199
00:17:53.440 --> 00:17:57.200
When you form a company in Delaware, you form one in Wyoming, you
200
00:17:57.279 --> 00:18:03.720
form one in South Dakota. Whatever
in the United States has been you know,
201
00:18:03.799 --> 00:18:07.240
behind the curve you. I mean, we see now some databases over
202
00:18:07.279 --> 00:18:11.960
in the EU, uh, particularly
in the UK that's starting. So look,
203
00:18:12.039 --> 00:18:17.400
that was a great thing that that
when the Corporate Transparency Act was passed.
204
00:18:18.559 --> 00:18:22.480
But this gets at I mean not
just shell companies. I mean,
205
00:18:22.559 --> 00:18:26.440
this is I mean, we've been
talking about this issue for a long time
206
00:18:26.880 --> 00:18:32.799
and there are just too many people
who come in who facilitate this. And
207
00:18:32.920 --> 00:18:36.839
let's be honest, I'm not surprised
that you know, not to beat US
208
00:18:36.920 --> 00:18:41.799
lawyers down, but there are a
lot of legal professionals who will you know,
209
00:18:41.920 --> 00:18:45.680
practice in this area, and they
should have an mL program. They
210
00:18:45.680 --> 00:18:51.079
should have due diligence requirements to know
who they're really dealing with. And by
211
00:18:51.119 --> 00:18:55.480
the way, if they're doing their
job, they should be held accountable for
212
00:18:55.559 --> 00:18:59.880
that. And I'll tell you my
thing is, once this gets enacted,
213
00:19:00.559 --> 00:19:04.559
once you bring one case, once
finc In or
do J bring case together
214
00:19:04.720 --> 00:19:11.200
whatever against one of the enablers,
you'll see a shock wave through the whole
215
00:19:11.519 --> 00:19:15.279
industry. And that's that's what we
want. We want to send that message
216
00:19:15.359 --> 00:19:23.599
because look, there's there's too many
situations where the enablers can quote unquote turn
217
00:19:23.680 --> 00:19:27.359
a blind eye, but they really
know what's going on. There's just too
218
00:19:27.400 --> 00:19:32.839
much financial incentive for them to just
to help these people out. So I
219
00:19:32.920 --> 00:19:38.759
see this as sort of a one
to punch from the shell company legislation and
220
00:19:38.839 --> 00:19:42.640
requirements. UM. I will tell
you this, and I'd like to hear
221
00:19:42.720 --> 00:19:47.240
your views on this as well.
I mean, we're putting a lot on
222
00:19:47.319 --> 00:19:51.680
finc In right now. We're putting
a lot of you know, the Corporate
223
00:19:51.680 --> 00:19:56.240
Transparency Act and now the Enablers Act
um. And we've got to make sure
224
00:19:56.319 --> 00:20:00.119
that finn Sen is ready to go
and ready to you know, the they
225
00:20:00.160 --> 00:20:04.079
already did the customer due diligence rules
in the United States. What was a
226
00:20:04.160 --> 00:20:08.559
two or three years ago. So
are they capable of this or you guys
227
00:20:08.599 --> 00:20:12.559
have any concerns about that? And
and what do you think about my one
228
00:20:12.640 --> 00:20:17.519
to punch analogy? Yeah, I
can take the first part of Michael.
229
00:20:17.519 --> 00:20:21.640
It's a super good point. So
the Corporate Transparency Act basically says, you
230
00:20:21.680 --> 00:20:25.119
know, if you form a register
a company in LLC, any kind of
231
00:20:25.160 --> 00:20:30.279
similar financial vehicle in the United States, you now have to report into a
232
00:20:30.400 --> 00:20:34.920
confidential database of Treasury who the actual
owners are, the folks who control that
233
00:20:36.079 --> 00:20:41.640
company are. What it doesn't require
is that you do any sort of background
234
00:20:41.759 --> 00:20:45.759
check or other anti money laundering procedure
to make sure that these folks are not
235
00:20:47.039 --> 00:20:51.200
criminals, that they are not giving
you funds that were stolen from uh,
236
00:20:51.319 --> 00:20:55.839
the citizens their country back home.
So give the example how this works.
237
00:20:55.920 --> 00:21:00.440
You know, I mentioned Theodore Obiang
earlier. He's the vice president of Equatorial
238
00:21:00.519 --> 00:21:03.119
Guinea, right, the son of
the country's authoritarian president. You know,
239
00:21:03.200 --> 00:21:11.079
he basically went to American attorneys who
set up these shell companies on his behalf,
240
00:21:11.920 --> 00:21:18.000
and then he used those attorneys law
firm accounts to move millions of dollars
241
00:21:18.079 --> 00:21:22.960
out of
Equatorial Guinea through those law
firm accounts into those shell companies in California
242
00:21:23.359 --> 00:21:29.799
went on to use them to buy
you know, luxury sports cars, mansions,
243
00:21:29.839 --> 00:21:33.920
glove, all sorts of just preposterous
waste of money, you know,
244
00:21:33.960 --> 00:21:37.960
taking taxpayer money for it from his
own people. But you know, when
245
00:21:37.960 --> 00:21:44.880
those lawyers set up uh those shell
companies, when the Corporate Transparency Act is
246
00:21:44.880 --> 00:21:48.680
on the books, yes they will
have to declare theatre O Bien as the
247
00:21:48.680 --> 00:21:55.400
beneficial owner, but it doesn't say
to them and it doesn't force them to
248
00:21:55.480 --> 00:22:00.079
look into whether they're not the money
that he is providing to them or the
249
00:22:00.200 --> 00:22:03.000
services that he's asking of them.
If he's doing that because he's a criminal,
250
00:22:03.079 --> 00:22:07.000
because he's on a sanctions list,
because there are credible allegations of corruption
251
00:22:07.000 --> 00:22:11.680
against him his home country, they
don't have to do any sort of look
252
00:22:11.720 --> 00:22:15.079
back on who their client is.
So, yes, the c t A
253
00:22:15.279 --> 00:22:21.000
will allow Treasury, law enforcement,
etcetera. To know that Theodore Obiang controls
254
00:22:21.079 --> 00:22:25.599
these companies, but it still doesn't
necessarily stop the flow of that money at
255
00:22:25.640 --> 00:22:29.599
the outset. If you have the
enablers Act on the books, those same
256
00:22:29.640 --> 00:22:33.400
attorneys, if Treasury implements this the
way we want them, to would have
257
00:22:33.519 --> 00:22:38.279
to perform due diligence and say,
okay, who is Theodore Obiang? Where
258
00:22:38.400 --> 00:22:44.039
is he getting his money from?
He's obviously a politically exposed person. That
259
00:22:44.160 --> 00:22:48.119
raises the risk that there could be
a criminal activity like money laundering involved,
260
00:22:48.440 --> 00:22:52.079
and it stops the flow of that
money at the outset. It says that
261
00:22:52.119 --> 00:22:55.759
the United States is essentially a no
fly zone for corrupt money, and it
262
00:22:55.799 --> 00:22:57.319
means that if he wants to pull
off these crimes, he's going to have
263
00:22:57.359 --> 00:23:00.640
to go somewhere else, but it's
not going to be the United States.
264
00:23:00.640 --> 00:23:06.559
That's a great point to that that
now, um, there's no look back.
265
00:23:06.640 --> 00:23:11.640
So will do you expect that finn
sent for example, will put these
266
00:23:11.799 --> 00:23:18.359
enablers under a STARS filing requirement,
you know, to file a suspicious activity
267
00:23:18.359 --> 00:23:22.240
report or uh or what do you
what do you all think about? Do
268
00:23:22.279 --> 00:23:26.359
you think that will come out of
this assuming it's all enacted? Well,
269
00:23:26.400 --> 00:23:30.119
I want I want to make sure
Erica can speak to your fins and points.
270
00:23:30.599 --> 00:23:37.000
That's huge. But I'll just say
for some of the the um.
271
00:23:37.039 --> 00:23:41.759
The way that the Enablers Act is
set up is it gives Treasury discretion to
272
00:23:41.799 --> 00:23:44.559
look at different kinds of enablers.
It says, you know, basically,
273
00:23:44.599 --> 00:23:47.880
if they are a high risk type
of enabler, like a person who forms
274
00:23:47.920 --> 00:23:51.160
a company through which money can be
moved into the United States, that's a
275
00:23:51.240 --> 00:23:56.519
high risk enabler. They should,
correspondingly, we hope, have the obligation
276
00:23:56.599 --> 00:24:00.240
to file stars. There are other
types of enablers that don't pose as significant
277
00:24:00.319 --> 00:24:04.440
risks. But who should be you
know, collecting beneficial ownership information or maybe
278
00:24:04.480 --> 00:24:08.480
they should have you know, an
antime money launder and program or officer to
279
00:24:08.559 --> 00:24:12.119
some extent with their company, But
they don't need the full suite of the
280
00:24:12.279 --> 00:24:17.680
m L protections that enables provides his
options. So Treasury, the experts they
281
00:24:17.720 --> 00:24:21.599
had the discretion to assign as different
responsibilities based on risk. Yeah, that's
282
00:24:21.599 --> 00:24:25.680
the way to do it, instead
of having Congress sort of mandated, Um,
283
00:24:25.799 --> 00:24:29.240
you know for certain, let's let
the regulators take care of that.
284
00:24:29.359 --> 00:24:33.640
But anyways, Erica, on my
fince end point, I I mean,
285
00:24:33.720 --> 00:24:36.839
I am concerned a little bit here
that you know, we're putting a lot
286
00:24:36.880 --> 00:24:40.119
on their shoulders lately. Um,
what what do you think about that?
287
00:24:41.759 --> 00:24:47.319
Finsen is becoming increasingly one of the
most important bureaus of the Treasury Department,
288
00:24:47.359 --> 00:24:52.599
but also corners of the US Administration
that UH in the responsibilities it's been given
289
00:24:53.039 --> 00:24:57.640
and the role it now plays with
the financial pressure campaign on Russia and light
290
00:24:57.680 --> 00:25:03.319
of Ukraine, so I actually become
UM one of our key lock points on
291
00:25:03.519 --> 00:25:07.240
being able to enforce US national security
objectives. You're right that it's been given
292
00:25:07.279 --> 00:25:11.319
a huge mission UM and is really
central to the U S Strategy and countering
293
00:25:11.319 --> 00:25:15.960
corruption that was issued by the Administration
last December. UM. As we look
294
00:25:17.000 --> 00:25:21.000
at everything that's on Fincon's plate,
whether it be the Corporate Transparency Act,
295
00:25:21.480 --> 00:25:26.920
UM rules that it's UH pursuing to
clean up money laundering in the US real
296
00:25:27.000 --> 00:25:33.200
estate
sector or through US private investment, UM, it it really does need
297
00:25:33.319 --> 00:25:37.160
funding to be able to get all
this done. UM. The acting director
298
00:25:37.200 --> 00:25:41.440
of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network came
before Congress this spring and said that funding
299
00:25:41.519 --> 00:25:48.599
was the number one most critical roadblock
to achieving most of its goals, whether
300
00:25:48.640 --> 00:25:51.920
it be with the Corporate Transparency Act
or these other rulemakings. So Congress has
301
00:25:51.960 --> 00:25:56.160
a massive role to play UH and
empowering our nation's financial crime fighters to actually
302
00:25:56.200 --> 00:26:02.720
be able to attack tackle modern threats
that we're seeing increasingly become more relevant,
303
00:26:02.880 --> 00:26:06.359
UM, you know in the twenty
one century. UM. You know,
304
00:26:06.480 --> 00:26:11.119
especially as we think about just the
scale of the problem. Treasury estimates that
305
00:26:11.839 --> 00:26:18.200
UH funds equaling two per cent of
US g d P moved through the US
306
00:26:18.640 --> 00:26:22.079
economy each year that are dirty,
illicit, corrupt money. Meanwhile, UM,
307
00:26:22.119 --> 00:26:29.160
Finnson and others only get about zero
point zero zero zero six pc of
308
00:26:29.240 --> 00:26:33.519
GDP UM to be able to protect
that same system in the U s economy.
309
00:26:33.640 --> 00:26:37.160
So the Ukran crisis has only really
underscored the urgency of this problem.
310
00:26:37.640 --> 00:26:41.640
Congress, UM and the White House
are working together to try to increase the
311
00:26:41.680 --> 00:26:45.680
budget. The White House has proposed
at increase UM in the annual budget of
312
00:26:45.720 --> 00:26:52.839
FinCEN UM. The House has put
forward UM appropriations language that that would give
313
00:26:52.279 --> 00:26:55.519
that that level. The Senate is
going to be a little bit more of
314
00:26:55.559 --> 00:26:59.000
the hold up though, So UM, to the extent possible, the Senate
315
00:26:59.039 --> 00:27:03.000
to really agree and work with the
House and White House to pass that number.
316
00:27:03.079 --> 00:27:07.519
Well, I look, I totally
agree, UM, and I would
317
00:27:07.559 --> 00:27:12.119
say, like, I mean,
besides some of the major projects you've mentioned
318
00:27:12.160 --> 00:27:18.720
for finncent, I mean, there's
an increase now in the sharing of foreign
319
00:27:19.440 --> 00:27:26.440
financial information among law enforcement agencies that
I think Vincent is involved in, uh,
320
00:27:26.640 --> 00:27:30.359
in terms of other provisions that have
been passed in terms of opening up
321
00:27:30.400 --> 00:27:37.279
sort of information sharing among law enforcement
agencies around the world. UM. One
322
00:27:37.319 --> 00:27:42.400
other point I wanted to go back
ericaly that you had mentioned was the REPO
323
00:27:42.559 --> 00:27:48.200
Task Force, which you
know,
I've I've written about and spoken about all
324
00:27:48.319 --> 00:27:52.640
sort of all of the efforts that
have been put in place by the US
325
00:27:52.720 --> 00:27:57.799
government and internationally in the sanctions battle
UH that's going on with regard to Russian
326
00:27:57.839 --> 00:28:06.079
assets and you know, tracking them
down for seizing the seizure purposes and UM
327
00:28:06.200 --> 00:28:08.720
what And I wanted to ask you
in terms of the REPO Task Force,
328
00:28:10.039 --> 00:28:12.319
to me, this is really something
that I think is going to have benefits
329
00:28:12.359 --> 00:28:18.759
not just in fighting money laundering,
but also in in UH anti corruption the
330
00:28:19.279 --> 00:28:23.160
battle there as well. In other
words, the more that law enforcement coordinates
331
00:28:23.160 --> 00:28:26.519
and gets to know each other and
works together, I see a lot of
332
00:28:26.559 --> 00:28:32.240
benefits coming out of the REPO Task
Force. UH that's been set up.
333
00:28:32.279 --> 00:28:34.319
And I know we're behind, but
I think you know, there may be
334
00:28:34.400 --> 00:28:41.359
sort of information sharing and learning on
our part on some practices that may be
335
00:28:41.480 --> 00:28:45.319
even better to learn from other law
enforcement agencies around the world who are fighting
336
00:28:45.400 --> 00:28:49.640
the battle on a m l UM. What's your sense of the REPO Task
337
00:28:49.720 --> 00:28:53.640
Force? Do you think it's a
been a positive development in terms of this
338
00:28:53.759 --> 00:29:02.359
battle? The multilateral response as exemplified
through the RepA O Task Force has been
339
00:29:02.480 --> 00:29:07.400
absolutely I think game changing UM and
shows what international information sharing could really be.
340
00:29:08.319 --> 00:29:12.839
We hear so often from a law
enforcement partners about how slow some of
341
00:29:12.839 --> 00:29:17.200
these processes can can be. You
know, there's something UM, folks there
342
00:29:17.279 --> 00:29:22.160
might be familiar with called a mutual
legal assistance t MLET process right, the
343
00:29:22.200 --> 00:29:26.119
process through which m law enforcement usually
shares this and shares this information. That
344
00:29:26.200 --> 00:29:30.839
process can be sometimes a year,
eighteen months, two years just to share
345
00:29:30.880 --> 00:29:37.519
one piece of information. And that
you can't really tackle corruption and fight financial
346
00:29:37.559 --> 00:29:41.680
crime if you're working on you know, snail mail equivalents. And so I
347
00:29:41.680 --> 00:29:45.920
think one of the m most important
aspects that's come out of the REPO Task
348
00:29:45.000 --> 00:29:49.759
Force is to practice and institutionalized systems
that are being used for Russia now but
349
00:29:49.759 --> 00:29:55.359
could be expanded out to our efforts
to fight financial crime globally. UM.
350
00:29:55.359 --> 00:29:59.599
One of the other things that we've
heard from partners is UM the efforts to
351
00:29:59.799 --> 00:30:04.680
do real time information sharing and collaboration
with private sector to help inform what their
352
00:30:04.720 --> 00:30:10.839
efforts are to make sure that they're
providing actionable intelligence to law enforcement so that
353
00:30:11.000 --> 00:30:14.559
stars can be efficient. UM,
there's not you know, in the same
354
00:30:14.559 --> 00:30:18.039
way defensive stars being filed that you
can actually make sure that the information that's
355
00:30:18.039 --> 00:30:23.160
being provided is targeted, useful UM
and can feed into both law enforcement and
356
00:30:23.279 --> 00:30:29.519
national security investigation. So I think, uh, the International Report REPO Task
357
00:30:29.559 --> 00:30:33.160
Force is the first UM real and
reinvigoration to try to improve some of these
358
00:30:33.160 --> 00:30:37.960
processes at a at an international scale. Yeah, that's terrific. Well,
359
00:30:38.640 --> 00:30:44.160
listen, this is all great news. Congratulations to you both because I know
360
00:30:44.319 --> 00:30:49.039
you were up on the hill and
helping to guide some of this effort,
361
00:30:49.160 --> 00:30:52.359
and you know, I wish you
continue. Good. Look with the Senate,
362
00:30:52.480 --> 00:30:56.039
I think, uh, you know, I'm very optimistic. I mean,
363
00:30:56.079 --> 00:31:00.079
look, this was bipartisan you had
that's think. It was Joe Wilson
364
00:31:00.160 --> 00:31:07.400
from South Carolina and Malankowski from New
Jersey as co sponsors. So that shows
365
00:31:07.440 --> 00:31:12.200
you it's a broad range of people
who are in support of this so UM,
366
00:31:12.319 --> 00:31:17.240
congratulations you both. We would love
to you know, stay in touch
367
00:31:17.440 --> 00:31:22.039
and you know, as the issues
come up, please come back and we'll
368
00:31:22.039 --> 00:31:26.160
have you on again, both you
and Scott Erica. UM. And for
369
00:31:26.440 --> 00:31:30.440
before we go though, just in
case somebody wants to reach out to you
370
00:31:30.480 --> 00:31:33.599
guys, UH to talk further about
this or to learn how they could help
371
00:31:33.720 --> 00:31:37.680
or what else they could do to
sort of pursue this. UM, can
372
00:31:37.720 --> 00:31:44.119
you guys each give contact info so
that any listener wants to reach out to
373
00:31:44.200 --> 00:31:48.599
you can do so. Yeah,
happy too, and thanks for having us
374
00:31:48.640 --> 00:31:51.400
on the program, Michael. Really
great to be able to share the news
375
00:31:51.440 --> 00:31:53.039
and try and get folks engaged in
this fight. I would say if folks
376
00:31:53.160 --> 00:31:57.160
do want to get involved in this
effort. We're really heating up toward an
377
00:31:57.200 --> 00:32:00.880
important month. It say it is
going to be considering their version of the
378
00:32:00.960 -->
00:32:05.119
National Defense Bill. We are doing
everything we can to make sure that the
379
00:32:05.200 --> 00:32:08.079
Enablers Act is included in that bill
so that it can be maintained through conference
380
00:32:08.319 --> 00:32:13.720
and get over the finish line when
Congress passes the final Defense Bill later in
381
00:32:13.720 --> 00:32:19.359
the year. UM. Our website
is US dot Transparency dot org. We
382
00:32:19.440 --> 00:32:21.960
have a list of there. If
you'd like to stay in the loop on
383
00:32:22.000 --> 00:32:25.640
our press releases, the resources we
put out our other communications products, please
384
00:32:25.680 --> 00:32:29.839
sign up there. If you want
to email me directly, UM, you
385
00:32:29.839 --> 00:32:31.599
know, would love to talk to
you about the campaign. My email is
386
00:32:31.839 --> 00:32:37.559
S Great Tech g R. E
Y t A K at Transparency dot org
387
00:32:38.359 --> 00:32:44.279
and likewise UM. As we continue
to work with our partners both on enablers
388
00:32:44.359 --> 00:32:47.240
and on funding for the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, we'd love to have some
389
00:32:47.720 --> 00:32:52.720
support in that, so UM,
you can reach out to me at E
390
00:32:52.079 --> 00:32:58.599
handah trak h A and I C
h A K at the Fact Coalition dot
391
00:32:58.680 --> 00:33:02.359
org. That's all also our website, the Fact Colition dot org. Or
392
00:33:02.400 --> 00:33:07.400
you could follow us on Twitter for
the latest news and updates. We're at
393
00:33:07.720 --> 00:33:13.920
Fact Coalition on Twitter. So thanks
so much for for reach now. Okay,
394
00:33:14.119 --> 00:33:16.279
Erica Scott, always great to see
you, always get great to catch
395
00:33:16.400 --> 00:33:21.759
up with you. Thank you again
and we'll stay in touch and and good
396
00:33:21.839 --> 00:33:25.680
luck on a productive August. A
pleasure, Michael, thanks again, Okay,
397
00:33:25.680 --> 00:33:31.000
thanks so much, Thanks again for
listening to Corruption, Crime and Compliance.
398
00:33:31.279 --> 00:33:37.000
Please subscribe to the podcast series.
The Volkov Law Group believes that every
399
00:33:37.039 --> 00:33:42.319
company should have a robust ethics and
compliance program. Experience and research show that
400
00:33:42.359 --> 00:33:46.319
ethical companies are better performers in the
global marketplace. You can learn more about
401
00:33:46.359 --> 00:33:52.000
the legal and compliance services we offer
at our website www dot volkov law dot
402
00:33:52.039 --> 00:33:57.279
com. You can also follow our
award winning blog, Corruption, Crime and
403
00:33:57.279 --> 00:34:02.160
Compliance and our podcast series. You
can contact Michael Volkov at his email address
404
00:34:02.640 --> 00:34:20.800
m Volkov at volkov law dot com. Because the hearty they come home at
405
00:34:20.920 --> 00:34:30.280
all? Will they see the chrying
to keep me down, trying to keep
406
00:34:30.639 --> 00:34:37.960
underca But tho they think they get
the fact to the world I said,
407
00:34:38.000 --> 00:34:49.000
foret they learn they don't know what
they've done. The shoeing de sun shot
408
00:34:49.039 --> 00:34:54.880
share right down? What's my?
Another hearty? They come? The hearty
409
00:34:55.079 --> 00:35:06.679
they stre when they I'm the heart
of the girl hottor the girl? What's
410
00:35:06.719 --> 00:35:22.679
all? Yeah, day day,
and I keep I'm finding all the things
411
00:35:22.719 --> 00:35:30.880
are more so under the wind you
say you can or I'd rather be a
412
00:35:30.039 --> 00:35:40.519
free man in my brain leading as
a puffic over the same s descent were
413
00:35:40.679 --> 00:35:47.920
shut. I'm gonna get the sht
Now what's mine? Under the HoTT of?
414
00:35:49.039 --> 00:36:00.159
They come the heart of the ball
whatever hort come, Oh the goal
415
00:36:00.760 --> 00:36:15.800
was all the holler, the count, the hot of the fall that's took
416
00:36:15.920 --> 00:36:25.480
the whole come hot in the fall. Was all the hollow. They cover
417
00:36:27.639 --> 00:36:34.519
all the fall a