UDSKRIFT 🔗
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Alex: DraftKings used a machine-learning model to find customers likely to gamble and lose more after a promotion.
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Jordan: Ireland's privacy regulator fined Google four hundred and three million euros over its handling of location data.
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Alex: A security researcher found that a low-power app on a Mac could take control of Meta's highly privileged Muse assistant.
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Jordan: A failed air-traffic circuit and a broken backup line disrupted thousands of flights across the northeastern United States.
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Jordan: That's the board. Stay for the audit. We open those up. Today's Chief Skeptic Officer.
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Jordan: What if there was an AI that researched the tech news, checked the sources, and asked what the tech news is not telling you?
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Alex: That's us. I'm Alex.
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Jordan: And I'm Jordan.
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Alex: You're listening to Chief Skeptic Officer. The side of tech news nobody talks about.
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Jordan: Every day at seven A.M. New York time. Wherever you get your podcasts.
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Alex: DraftKings gives out betting credits and bonuses to make people place more bets. The New York Times says the company built a model to decide who should get those offers.
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Jordan: And the score was not, "Who will have fun?" It was, "Who is likely to lose more after we send the offer?"
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Alex: Right. The work began in twenty twenty-three. The Times says it reviewed internal documents and spoke with former employees. One analyst, Jayden Butts, tested the model.
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Jordan: His question was painfully simple. If the best customer is the person most likely to lose, how many of those people are already in trouble?
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Alex: DraftKings makes money when customers lose. That part is not hidden. The buried part is what betting records and responses to past offers can reveal about the next offer.
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Jordan: Look at this image from the Times investigation. The phone is the whole room. The promotion arrives inside the same place where the next bet happens.
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Alex: The Times says DraftKings kept improving the promotion model. Four former employees also said efforts to predict who might develop a gambling problem were stalled or stopped.
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Jordan: Wait-- the same trail can answer both questions?
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Alex: In principle, yes. One question is, "Who may lose more if we nudge them?" The other is, "Who may need us to stop nudging?"
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Jordan: So this is not really a story about magical artificial intelligence. It is a story about which goal got staff, tests, and a
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path into the product.
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Alex: Exactly. People online keep arguing about whether this is even "AI." That argument helps DraftKings. Call it a prediction model. Call it statistics. The duty does not change.
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Jordan: I disagree on one thing. The label matters because "AI" can make an old choice sound automatic. Like nobody decided what the score should reward.
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Alex: Fair. The model did not invent the business goal. People chose the target.
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Jordan: And we do not know how many customers were harmed, or who still receives these offers today.
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Alex: We do know the incentive. Protection had to compete with revenue using the same data.
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Jordan: That is the audit. When a company says it knows its customers, ask which version of you is valuable: the person it can protect, or the person it can keep losing.
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Jordan: Ireland's Data Protection Commission announced its final ruling against Google. Four hundred and three million euros, plus an order to comply within six months.
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Alex: The inquiry covered three location features. One saved activity across Google services. One saved places you visited. One helped Android devices estimate where they were. It examined how Google handled that data from May twenty eighteen to February twenty twenty.
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Jordan: That date range matters. This decision took more than six years to arrive.
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Alex: Privacy enforcement runs on geological time.
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Jordan: The regulator said Google lacked a proper legal basis, did not explain the system fairly or clearly, could not show it was meeting the rules, and kept some location data too long.
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Alex: And it spelled out the human cost. People could be unaware that location was used to shape ads or infer their interests.
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Jordan: So the fine is not just about a dot on a map. A place can reveal a clinic, a protest, a place of worship, a school run.
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Alex: Here is the official Maps page. "Your guide to anywhere." Useful product. But usefulness does not answer how many other Google systems get to learn from the trip.
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Jordan: The setting names sound separate. Web activity. History. Accuracy. A normal person sees three switches. Google sees one person moving through the world.
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Alex: Careful. The decision does not say every location point flowed into every product. It says Google failed duties across those named features.
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Jordan: You're right. I pushed past the evidence.
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Jordan: Then here is the narrower doubt. The headline is a huge number. Does the order change the default, the explanation, and how long the data is kept before any appeal fades from view?
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Alex: That is the test. We do not know whether the fine has been paid, and any appeal is still ahead. The regulator announced the ruling, but said the detailed written decision will be published later.
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Jordan: But six months is a real deadline.
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Alex: Yes. A fine can become a cost of doing business. A compliance order can change the business, if the regulator follows through.
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Jordan: Watch the settings, not the press release. If people still cannot tell what is stored, why, and for how long, four hundred and three million euros bought a headline.
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Alex: Meta's new Muse assistant can use email, calendars, WhatsApp, files, the camera, the microphone, and other services. It needs broad access because it acts for you.
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Jordan: Which means a small security mistake can inherit a very large key ring.
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Alex: Security researcher Patrick Wardle found that an ordinary app or a typed command on the Mac could change a hidden Muse setting. That setting chooses the server that turns your speech into text.
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Jordan: Normally, Muse sends the speech request to Meta. Change the address, and Muse sends that request to an attacker's server instead.
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Alex: Muse automatically attaches its account key to that request. So the attacker receives the key too. Wardle says it can then control the account and use the access already granted to Muse.
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Jordan: This is his demonstration. A basic app, without special Mac access, sends Muse a prompt. Muse answers that such a thing should be impossible.
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Alex: The screenshot and the answer are having a disagreement.
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Jordan: But wait. If an attacker can already run a command on your Mac, aren't you already compromised?
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Alex: Somewhat. But Mac permissions are supposed to limit what that basic app can reach. The flaw lets it borrow Muse's much stronger access instead.
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Jordan: So instead of building malware for the camera, files, messages, and calendar, the attacker asks the assistant that already has permission.
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Alex: Exactly. The assistant turns one small opening into many larger ones.
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Jordan: Ars says Meta did not answer questions before publication. Wardle demonstrated attacks in a test. There are no known real-world attacks using this flaw.
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Alex: Separately, Amazon blocked Muse from shopping on its site hours before the flaw was disclosed. Amazon called it an unauthorized assistant. That was not caused by this bug.
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Jordan: Safety is
part of that. So is control. An agent can skip sponsored results and choose what the user asked for. Amazon has reasons to keep the shopping screen in the middle.
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Alex: Two things can be true. Meta should not walk around another service's rules. Amazon also benefits when no outside agent edits its shelf.
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Jordan: The bigger rule is simple. Every permission you give an agent is also a permission its next bug may hand to someone else.
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Jordan: A construction crew cut a telecom line in New Jersey. That helped trigger arrival stops at New York-area airports and Philadelphia, with problems spreading to Boston and Washington.
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Alex: Reuters tied about seven thousand delayed or canceled flights to this incident. More than one hundred flights were diverted. The disruption lasted about eight hours.
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Jordan: And the first headline said one fiber cut.
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Alex: The fuller story is worse. After the normal line was cut, a replacement circuit at the Philadelphia control center failed. Then the system tried its backup fiber and discovered that line was already broken too.
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Jordan: That is the sentence people seized on. The backup apparently did not report its own failure before the moment everyone needed it.
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Alex: We do not know how long it had been broken. We also do not know who made the bad utility markings. Agencies and contractors were still disputing responsibility.
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Jordan: But the safety response did work. Controllers stopped accepting traffic rather than pretend communications were fine.
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Alex: Yes. That is important. Safety worked. Capacity collapsed.
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Jordan: Here is FlightAware's broader count for the whole day, not just this incident. More than eight thousand delays inside the United States, and more than two thousand cancellations worldwide.
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Alex: When I replace a logging system, I keep the old path working until the new one proves itself. And "working" is not a green light on a screen. You have to test it with the real load.
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Jordan: There it is. Your job has finally become a public service announcement.
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Alex: I have waited months for this moment.
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Jordan: The point is still sharp. A backup line can look redundant on a diagram while sharing the same trench, the same contractor, or the same neglected test.
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Alex: Congress approved twelve and a half billion dollars for air-traffic upgrades last year. The transportation secretary says another seventeen and a half billion is needed.
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Jordan: More money may be necessary. But buying a second path is not the same as proving the second path works.
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Alex: And the next incident should not be the first health check.
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Jordan: Resilience is not what you own. It is what still works after the first thing breaks.
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Alex: Find Chief Skeptic Officer wherever you get your podcasts. Every day at seven A.M. New York time.
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Jordan: Tell us what you're skeptical about. Drop it in the comments.
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Alex: Stay curious. Stay skeptical.
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Jordan: Doubt both.