النص 🔗
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Welcome to Compliance Pointers, where we take an in-depth look into the latest news, trends,
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and challenges surrounding information security, privacy, and marketing compliance.
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Let's dive in with your host, Jordan Eisner.
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So welcome to today's podcast, everybody.
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Thank you for listening.
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I am Jordan Eisner, VP of Sales at Compliance Point, and this is Compliance Pointers, where
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we cover topics in information security, cybersecurity, data privacy, and anything in the vicinity
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of that really arena.
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So I'm very excited about the podcast today.
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We're going to be talking about ransomware, specifically the emergence of geopolitical
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ransomware and the impact it's having here in the United States.
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We're fortunate enough to have Steve Hahn on from Bull Wall.
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I'm going to talk more about Steve, but hey, Steve, good to have you on.
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Thanks so much for having me.
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Absolutely.
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We've got another Steve, Steve Haley from Compliance Point on, and Steve has been on
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the podcast prior, but I'm really looking forward to a conversation with the two of
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them today.
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Steve Haley, thanks for joining.
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You're welcome.
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Glad to be back.
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And congratulations on just closing on your home.
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Oh, yeah.
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Just really exciting stuff.
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Living the dream.
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Yeah.
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There must be a lot of cybersecurity need out there.
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I certainly hope so after closing on the house today.
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Oh, there we go.
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Oh, hey, let's be careful.
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We don't necessarily want it to happen, but we're here to help if it does.
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That's right.
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We're here to mitigate risk first.
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Yeah.
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Yeah.
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All right.
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So for the sake of this podcast, since we do have two Steve's on, I'm going to refer
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to Steve Hahn as Bull Wall Steve.
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I've gotten his blessing on that.
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And
Load full transcript
then I'm going to refer to Steve Haley as Compliance Point Steve.
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And I've gotten his blessing on that.
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And this is exciting for many reasons.
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Steve has a I don't know how many years CP Steve, Compliance Point Steve, and IT and
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information security has been quite a bit, but he's worked with IBM.
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He's worked with software organizations, basically running information security.
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He was a Marine.
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Still is a Marine, right?
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Always a Marine.
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Always a Marine.
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Very tactical, very experienced and knowledgeable in all things IT and information security.
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So I think the resume speaks for itself.
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And then Steve Hahn, Executive Vice President of Sales, another military man, right?
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Navy man.
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Over a decade in cybersecurity and I think, you know, what, 20 to 30 years in IT services,
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right?
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So very well versed with niche companies all the way to a lot of time with Fortune 500
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organizations.
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So very excited to have the two of them on and start this QA session today.
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So let's get started.
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First one, and you know, we'll kind of roundtable this.
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I don't know that I'll necessarily cue Bullwall Steve or Compliance Point Steve.
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I think both of you are going to have contacts and color to add to each and probably maybe
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even question and collaborate with each other on it.
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But I'm just going to put them out there and you guys go, hey, I want to answer this or
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hey, let me take this one first and I'd be interested.
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What you're going to get as an audience today is I think more of a technology field from
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Bullwall Steve, but not only, right?
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He's got the IT services background and then more of a professional services, policies,
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procedures, process from Compliance Point Steve, but not always because he also has
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a big technology background, right?
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So we're going to get a good mix here.
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So let's start with how has ransomware changed in the last couple of years, right?
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All around, doesn't seem we're getting much better at stopping it.
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Maybe you guys have different thoughts on that.
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But how has it changed in the last couple of years and maybe specifically since the
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Russian-Ukraine war started?
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Bullwall Steve, if you're okay, I'll take this one first.
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I want to kind of lead into kind of the foundational components of how, you know, from a professional
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services perspective, you know, what we're seeing out there as it relates to, you know,
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how ransomware has changed over time and then the impact of the Ukraine war and really lead
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into how your technology helps, you know, facilitate mitigating some of that risk.
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And so, you know, what we're seeing out there with our customer base is really a more sophistication,
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you know, in the way the attacks are coming in, right?
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There's still multiple entry points.
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You know, the sophistication, though, is really where we hone in on.
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You know, the attacks are more rapid and, you know, the threats are, you know, more
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severe or higher risk to an organization from our perspective.
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When we look from our perspective, we're really dealing with companies and setting up, you
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know, appropriate incident response and planning as we look at how to respond to a cyber event,
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which obviously everybody knows ransomware falls underneath that, right?
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So dealing with policy first, the organizational policy, then we want to design, you know,
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the incident response plan and the critical incident response teams associated with the
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organization should an event happen.
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And then, you know, building that layered approach within the organization and the culture
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in the organization, right?
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So, you know, security awareness training, being able to identify, you know, those entry
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points, i.e. malware, phishing attacks, those types of things.
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And then, you know, running through those exercises like tabletops, which is a very
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cost-effective way for an organization, you know, to do dry runs, you know, it's like
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anything, you know, the Olympics are going on, right?
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So kind of tie it to that where, you know, they're training all the time.
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So when it becomes showtime, it's muscle memory, right?
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And we treat cyber incident very much in the same way where, you know, you're going to
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react the same way you train.
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But nevertheless, you know, you can take all of those precautionary measures to reduce
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risk.
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But, you know, still, as we see in the news almost every day, you know, there's significant
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ransomware attacks still happening.
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And you know, speed is extremely important, meaning that, you know, we're still relying
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on the human element, right, to be able to react quick enough.
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And you know, unfortunately, cyber attacks don't happen during the day, right?
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They happen at all hours of the day.
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And so being able to react to that, you know, is critical.
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But, you know, Bullwall, you know, offers a very unique solution in the marketplace.
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Could you kind of give us an overview of what that is and how we help mitigate some of the
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risks associated with that?
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Yeah, and just if I could, just a quick point also on the changing element as well.
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We've seen in the last two years, the numbers are pretty evident that they're growing.
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The number of successful attacks is growing tremendously.
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So Google it yourself.
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You don't have to take my word for it.
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But we've seen about a 200% increase in the last couple of years of successful attacks.
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Now, some of that's going to be related just to new techniques that seem to outpace the
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prevention layers.
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And some of that is certainly because these are almost exclusively in the ransomware space,
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Russian-based threat actors, former KGB people that all disbanded and formed criminal enterprises
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after the fall of the Soviet Union.
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That's kind of who's behind this.
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Who was the head of the KGB?
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Well, that was Vladimir Putin back in the Soviet Union era.
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So there's kind of a quasi-nation state element and quasi-financial element to this where,
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yes, they're after the money, but also they're taking orders from Putin in a lot of ways.
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So we've seen their targets shift to things that will impact the U.S. and hurt us more
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there.
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But we've also seen, frankly, right now, their success is incredibly high.
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It's higher than it's ever been.
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So their techniques have evolved.
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So what we really say is a lot along the lines of what you said there, Steve, is that it's
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really a when-not-if world.
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Most companies are going to be hit by ransomware.
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We've seen just last week the largest payment ever.
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It was double the previous largest payment of $75 million.
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That's a huge amount of money that these threat actors can put into essentially research and
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development.
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It well surpassed $1 billion last year in total known payments.
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So these are incredibly well-funded organizations.
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As a matter of fact, they have more revenue than most cybersecurity companies, so they're
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incredibly well-funded.
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So if you treat this as a when-not-if world, you have to do more than just prevention.
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You can't rely on your prevention being 100% effective, 100% of the time against every
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attack that will ever exist.
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You have to say, well, what do I do should my prevention fail?
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Should they get lucky just that one time?
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And for us, it's all about rapid containment.
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We look at an active ransomware attack, and we look at how the file shares are going to
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be encrypted.
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That is impossible to hide.
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The payload can be delivered through a lot of obfuscation techniques into an environment,
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but you can't obfuscate what ransomware does.
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What it does is it encrypts the file shares, and it encrypts really fast.
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So that's what we're monitoring.
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We're monitoring the file shares for that non-human-type encryption.
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Yeah, sorry to interrupt you.
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That goes to the point that the human element can't respond as quickly as we would like
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them to.
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In the middle of the night, they've got to get called.
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They've got to engage, log on to the lab.
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I mean, there's a lot of things that can happen very quickly in that.
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Absolutely.
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And the numbers speak for themselves there as well.
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They're using scheduled task managers to deploy their attacks in off hours and holidays.
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Holidays in the middle of the night are the most common times for these ransomware attacks.
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About 80% of them are going to occur in off hours where you have less time to respond.
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What do you think is the biggest motivation?
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I mean, I see it on our side.
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That's what I was going to say.
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That's what I was going to ask next.
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You said it's not necessarily all about money.
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There's a geopolitical side.
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You mentioned Vladimir Putin.
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What would you categorize the motivation as?
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Yeah, so I'll start with the primary motivation is still money.
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They have double extortion techniques now as well.
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So they'll extort you for the decryption of the data that they just encrypted.
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And they'll also extort you one more time for the data they stole.
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So they're going to try to release very sensitive information about your company, emails that
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you don't want leaked.
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And even a hospital in the Northeast was hit.
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It was a breast cancer hospital.
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And they threatened to release actual pictures of patients in Andres.
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So it's pretty horrifying what they're willing to do to extort companies.
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But the secondary element to that is because they're Russian based, we've seen the shift
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occur where they're now attacking things that could exacerbate inflation.
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So supply chain, logistics, and manufacturing to a very high level.
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They're also going after hospitals to a higher degree to cause loss of life.
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Just today, a blood provider in the Northeast that feeds 300 hospitals, I believe they're
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called Blood One, was taken down.
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And that's going to affect vital blood supplies that they need to deliver to these hospitals.
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So they're really trying to cause loss of life, which they're doing, and exacerbate
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anything that could impact our material goods being either produced or gotten to consumers.
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So lower supply means prices go up.
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That hurts our inflation even more.
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Yeah, those are good points.
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From a boots on the ground perspective that we see with our client base, obviously, we
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deal with government entities.
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We're seeing ramp up in the government entities as well, any way to disrupt the government.
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And I think I wanted to tie in the Israeli war that's going on too.
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We're seeing any disruption that can occur to that, to the United States as that political
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kind of component to it.
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Again, the health care, but we're also seeing increased attacks to critical infrastructure.
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We do deal with some critical infrastructure companies as well, and we are definitely seeing
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an uptick on that.
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But my understanding is your metrics in the space that you're in are a little bit broader
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than what we're seeing and what we're relied upon for basic threat hunting and things of
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that nature.
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So I'm glad that you tied it into the areas that you saw.
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Yeah, if I could make a point on cities too, that's a great observation.
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Yeah, cities without question, every week we're seeing new cities hit.
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And when they get hit, they often have to declare a state of emergency because 911 services
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go down.
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They literally can't deploy, help aid police to the scene because their 911 services are
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inoperable.
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We've seen court cases with violent felons.
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All of that data has been locked up.
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It's been encrypted and their infrastructure is down.
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Yeah, it was extremely impactful for Fulton County, Georgia.
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I think that event is still going on in some instances where not all agencies are up and
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running as they were prior to the attack.
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And it's been a few months now.
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Yeah, that would got a lot of press.
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But I'll tell you, there is one just about every week.
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City of Dallas was hit not too long ago.
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They're one of our great customers now that we can reference.
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A lot of folks come to us kind of after the fact, unfortunately.
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But we would have contained that event most certainly.
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We saw City of Oakland had to declare a state of emergency after they were hit.
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They had systems down for almost six months.
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You literally had a call.
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You had to call a switchboard is how they switched it over to get emergency services.
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But even aid to the needy people in those counties is impacted.
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So again, it's loss of life is a good one.
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They know that they'll get the payments if they hit certain sectors.
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And also the black eye that it gives the United States.
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If they can take down the government, they can take down them.
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Then they're better than this.
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Yeah.
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Yeah, I think that's a good overview.
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There's some current events in there, kind of current state of things, some of the why,
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when.
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What about patterns, right?
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What are the similarities you're seeing in the attacks or the organization behind them?
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Bullwall Steve, that might be more so for you.
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This is about 100% of what you guys do.
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You probably have a lot of knowledge on this.
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What do you see in there?
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I absolutely do.
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We're brought into hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of post-event companies.
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So they've been hit by ransomware and we come in.
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So we get to really see.
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And frankly, we're in with thousands of customers already.
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And every year we contain hundreds and hundreds of ransomware events.
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We contain them within milliseconds.
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So only a few files were impacted, but we can see the techniques that the threat actor
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used.
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So even if you're not going to use our tools, just know that 95% of all attacks are using
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a command and control element.
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So they're coming into your organization.
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They're getting low level credentials.
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That could be a phishing email, could be some sort of social engineering, but they get Bob
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and Accounting's credentials.
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Once they have those, they use Mimikatz or Cobalt Strike, these red team tools, to extract
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admin credentials.
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Now, this is all leading up to their attack.
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They don't just throw ransomware at your endpoints.
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They come in and slowly circumvent your security controls.
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Again, 95% of the attacks we've seen in Sophos had a very similar statistic to about 95%
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that they've seen as well.
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So they get the admin credentials.
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Once they have admin credentials, they RDP into servers.
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Most servers, believe it or not, do not have MFA to every session.
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They then shut down all your security products.
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Maybe they spin up their own VM, and they launch their ransomware payload from that
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fresh VM that has no security on it, or they whitelist their application.
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Now, even if you say, OK, yeah, but I have MFA to every server every session, they have
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ways around it.
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There are lots of ways from SIM swapping where they can get your phone routed over
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to theirs, keyboard capture, keyboard logging.
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But also, they don't even need to RDP in.
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Therefore, they won't get an MFA challenge.
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If they have admin credentials, they will simply use scheduled task managers and hijack
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some of those tasks to then deploy their payload to shut down your security products, maybe
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take out your ESXi layer prior to their attack to really disable you and your ability to
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respond.
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And then they launch their attack.
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And this is prescribed in a workflow by the ransomware as a service providers like BlackCat.
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So this is exactly, they say, OK, I'm going to use ransomware as a service for BlackCat.
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They give you the payload.
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They give you the workflow.
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And this is that workflow.
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This is precisely how they get in and do it.
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00:18:06,060
And this is why we've seen such an explosion in their success rate.
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You may think you can stop it, but if your tools aren't up and running, you can't stop
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anything.
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So that's their goal is to shut down those products.
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Yep.
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What we're seeing, Jordan, before you go to the next question, but what we're seeing also
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is they'll lay dormant once they're in for a long time.
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You may get on their trail for just a little bit, and then they'll just go dormant.
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They'll stay there.
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They'll wait for the coast to be clear.
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And they're opportunistic.
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So they'll strike when least expecting.
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Yeah.
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I'll expand on that, too.
315
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Absolutely.
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I agree with that.
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It's not like they're just emailing you a ransomware link and you're hitting it.
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That's not how they do it.
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They really are coming in and being very quiet, very dormant for a while as they slowly and
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methodically lay their traps.
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And even they use scheduled task managers so much these days because they can hijack any
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process that you have that you have scheduled to your servers.
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They may include software that you push to those servers.
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Well, they just replace that software with their software.
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So you never even can detect that one of your scheduled tasks has been changed.
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You can't see that one's been added.
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They simply just changed one.
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And they're also deleting their trail through those scheduled task managers every time they
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do something that deletes the previous incident of that.
330
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So it's very hard to detect.
331
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And one of the things that we're seeing in the trends, I think everyone's kind of sick
332
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of maybe hearing about AI, but you have to be ready for it.
333
00:19:38,360 --> 00:19:41,080
In the old days, there were two types of phishing attacks.
334
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There was spear phishing where somebody would sit and really plot their email to you.
335
00:19:45,240 --> 00:19:51,080
They would research your LinkedIn and craft a very careful message where
they're impersonating
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somebody you interact with.
337
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And then there was commodity phishing or bulk phishing where it just goes out.
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It's just spam.
339
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It's the same Nigerian kind of letter that you see to 100 different people.
340
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It's from known bad infrastructure, super easy to stop.
341
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Now the benefit of the commodity ones is I can send a million of them.
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The benefit of the spear phishing is it has a much higher success rate.
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Well, AI can do the spear phishing for them at the scale of the commodity.
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So I can use my AI tools to gather all the information I need on a recipient, craft a
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human sounding email to them that is coming from not known bad infrastructure.
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00:20:27,760 --> 00:20:34,380
So no two emails are even alike, which is another way we pick up on phishing campaigns.
347
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So now you get at scale spear phishing attack in the millions that can hit your company.
348
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We're just at the tip of that iceberg and it's going to explode ransomware to another
349
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level if we're not careful.
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Yeah.
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It's a huge concern out there as far as the sheer volume that they can turn and overwhelm
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the defenses of an organization.
353
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Very very concerning the AI component when it comes to cyber security as well.
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00:21:05,520 --> 00:21:08,520
Well, right.
355
00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:13,560
Every time I hear this stuff, I just get more and more nervous.
356
00:21:13,560 --> 00:21:16,320
You're going to unplug your internet now, Jordan?
357
00:21:16,320 --> 00:21:17,320
Sometimes I feel like it, Steve.
358
00:21:17,320 --> 00:21:19,840
Sometimes I feel like it.
359
00:21:19,840 --> 00:21:20,840
Go off the grid, right?
360
00:21:20,840 --> 00:21:24,200
But then of course I would starve because I don't have any skills.
361
00:21:24,200 --> 00:21:30,040
You talk about loss of life, right?
362
00:21:30,040 --> 00:21:33,920
I think a lot of times it's going to be something indirectly or directly tied with the health
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care industry.
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00:21:34,920 --> 00:21:36,920
A lot of times, not always.
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00:21:36,920 --> 00:21:38,680
Government sector being targeted.
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00:21:38,680 --> 00:21:43,920
What are some other top targets that we're seeing for ransomware attacks in the industry?
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00:21:43,920 --> 00:21:45,840
Maybe it's just anything and everything.
368
00:21:45,840 --> 00:21:48,680
Maybe there's some additions beyond that.
369
00:21:48,680 --> 00:21:49,680
Yeah.
370
00:21:49,680 --> 00:21:52,800
Other than the ones we talked about, another big one is schools.
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Their primary mission is educating students.
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That's where most of the budget is supposed to go.
373
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They don't have the people.
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00:21:59,040 --> 00:22:03,360
A lot of them have just one or two IT people for thousands and thousands of devices that
375
00:22:03,360 --> 00:22:05,560
they're trying to secure and manage.
376
00:22:05,560 --> 00:22:10,040
The threat actors used to take, say, sick people and kids are off limits.
377
00:22:10,040 --> 00:22:13,640
We're not going to target those kinds of companies or organizations.
378
00:22:13,640 --> 00:22:15,920
Now since the Ukraine War, we've seen all bets are off.
379
00:22:15,920 --> 00:22:21,720
They'll go after the hospitals to shut them down and go after schools.
380
00:22:21,720 --> 00:22:25,280
The thing that's really... I don't want to use the word frightening.
381
00:22:25,280 --> 00:22:30,840
I guess I just find it disturbing is what they're doing with schools.
382
00:22:30,840 --> 00:22:34,080
They'll go in and, of course, encrypt all the data, but they'll also exfiltrate all
383
00:22:34,080 --> 00:22:35,080
the data on the students.
384
00:22:35,080 --> 00:22:39,580
It could be everything from a kid's school records to their grades to the medications
385
00:22:39,580 --> 00:22:44,360
they take to their sexual orientation or identity or whatever the school has.
386
00:22:44,360 --> 00:22:52,320
That could be incredibly harmful for that child's psychology or just their wellbeing
387
00:22:52,320 --> 00:22:53,800
if it was leaked.
388
00:22:53,800 --> 00:22:58,000
They'll start leaking that stuff unless the school pays up.
389
00:22:58,000 --> 00:23:04,060
As a parent of two children myself, that is something that we actively want to prevent.
390
00:23:04,060 --> 00:23:06,460
As a matter of fact, we treat schools.
391
00:23:06,460 --> 00:23:11,080
We have our most preferential pricing because it is the softest and most sensitive of targets.
392
00:23:11,080 --> 00:23:18,880
I have some knowledge in this area as well as a great husband to a special educating
393
00:23:18,880 --> 00:23:20,920
teacher.
394
00:23:20,920 --> 00:23:22,160
I see it every day.
395
00:23:22,160 --> 00:23:23,160
They struggle with training.
396
00:23:23,160 --> 00:23:25,920
There's a lot of staff that have to be trained.
397
00:23:25,920 --> 00:23:32,680
They're focusing on trying to teach their students and not a lot of them are technologists.
398
00:23:32,680 --> 00:23:36,440
There's something different and that's what we want from them.
399
00:23:36,440 --> 00:23:41,520
However, I'm glad you brought up the school threat because we are seeing upticks on that
400
00:23:41,520 --> 00:23:42,520
as well.
401
00:23:42,520 --> 00:23:43,520
Good to know.
402
00:23:43,520 --> 00:23:53,960
Well, I guess diving further then into the government and
healthcare awards, any further
403
00:23:53,960 --> 00:23:54,960
impacts?
404
00:23:54,960 --> 00:23:59,600
I think you've called out a lot of it even just in what we've talked about here, but
405
00:23:59,600 --> 00:24:04,400
anything additional you would add on those industries for our listeners, especially if
406
00:24:04,400 --> 00:24:05,400
they're in those?
407
00:24:05,400 --> 00:24:06,400
Sure.
408
00:24:06,400 --> 00:24:09,500
We've seen the other effects in the healthcare space.
409
00:24:09,500 --> 00:24:16,400
We saw the most consequential or most important, most financially devastating attack recently
410
00:24:16,400 --> 00:24:18,080
was on United Healthcare.
411
00:24:18,080 --> 00:24:20,520
Again, in the healthcare industry.
412
00:24:20,520 --> 00:24:26,720
Most folks don't realize this, but it wasn't on United Healthcare, the parent organization.
413
00:24:26,720 --> 00:24:29,200
If it was, it would have been far more devastating.
414
00:24:29,200 --> 00:24:34,240
It was actually on just one small little group, just a few hundred employees is how I understand
415
00:24:34,240 --> 00:24:38,000
it, but it's the change group.
416
00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:44,480
Even that impact cost them billions of dollars, literally billions.
417
00:24:44,480 --> 00:24:50,140
They paid out billions to their downstream healthcare facilities because those healthcare
418
00:24:50,140 --> 00:24:56,800
facilities couldn't bill for medication as they relied on change healthcare for that.
419
00:24:56,800 --> 00:25:03,120
The hospitals were literally at risk of going bankrupt overnight because of this.
420
00:25:03,120 --> 00:25:07,040
Some of them have actually filed for bankruptcy because of this.
421
00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:10,680
United Healthcare had to put out billions of dollars to these organizations as they
422
00:25:10,680 --> 00:25:15,440
tried to write the ship and get prescriptions flowing, but also prescriptions are life-saving.
423
00:25:15,440 --> 00:25:22,400
We don't know since the proxy war with Ukraine between essentially the West and Russia, we
424
00:25:22,400 --> 00:25:26,560
don't know how many people have died as a result of their attacks, but it's in the thousands
425
00:25:26,560 --> 00:25:27,840
for sure.
426
00:25:27,840 --> 00:25:33,080
People aren't getting their medications, hospitals down, blood transfusions and the like.
427
00:25:33,080 --> 00:25:36,560
That's a massively impactful one.
428
00:25:36,560 --> 00:25:43,600
The difficulty of securing a healthcare organization is probably the biggest challenge in the world
429
00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:45,720
in terms of all the industries.
430
00:25:45,720 --> 00:25:50,440
They have thousands and thousands of internet-connected devices that are attack vectors.
431
00:25:50,440 --> 00:25:56,920
They have doctors that use their own personal devices to access patient records, which I
432
00:25:56,920 --> 00:26:03,920
married to a doctor, so I see her and how she works and it's necessary for them to do
433
00:26:03,920 --> 00:26:09,320
their job, but it also again provides an attack vector that IT can't control.
434
00:26:09,320 --> 00:26:13,080
They don't have endpoint security on her device.
435
00:26:13,080 --> 00:26:15,920
That's another attack vector.
436
00:26:15,920 --> 00:26:19,280
On top of that, they have the most sensitive records.
437
00:26:19,280 --> 00:26:22,800
When healthcare records get leaked, everything happens.
438
00:26:22,800 --> 00:26:27,560
There's impersonation where people start refilling narcotics that are prescribed to a different
439
00:26:27,560 --> 00:26:32,240
person by impersonating them once they see those prescriptions.
440
00:26:32,240 --> 00:26:36,060
Healthcare records also provide just a wealth of information about that person, everything
441
00:26:36,060 --> 00:26:41,440
from their social security number to their height and weight and even things that they
442
00:26:41,440 --> 00:26:47,480
can blackmail patients on if they're embarrassing medications that maybe are for some psychiatric
443
00:26:47,480 --> 00:26:51,960
purpose or frankly, we've even seen people that have had abortions that have been threatened
444
00:26:51,960 --> 00:26:54,080
or blackmailed.
445
00:26:54,080 --> 00:26:57,360
They hit the parent organization, but they also go after the patients after they get
446
00:26:57,360 --> 00:26:58,360
those records.
447
00:26:58,360 --> 00:27:05,400
We're seeing that's maybe the softest target with the biggest attack surface out there.
448
00:27:05,400 --> 00:27:07,040
Again, there's a lot we can do about it.
449
00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:12,800
I know I'm saying a lot of things that maybe are alarming if you're not too into this industry,
450
00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:15,480
but the good guys are doing a lot here too.
451
00:27:15,480 --> 00:27:19,960
I think that's a perfect segue there because the next thing I was going to say is, all
452
00:27:19,960 --> 00:27:22,400
right, I think we made it clear.
453
00:27:22,400 --> 00:27:24,600
It's not if, it's when.
454
00:27:24,600 --> 00:27:30,840
There's probably no way to completely eliminate the possibility of being a victim of ransomware
455
00:27:30,840 --> 00:27:37,000
attack, but this is probably a good platform to talk more about full wall.
456
00:27:37,000 --> 00:27:42,160
That was part of what we wanted to do on the podcast today.
457
00:27:42,160 --> 00:27:45,160
Prevention strategies.
458
00:27:45,160 --> 00:27:46,400
What do you guys recommend?
459
00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:50,320
I know that your tool is a little different, that it's not necessarily preventing it, but
460
00:27:50,320 --> 00:27:55,680
it's responding, containing, responding, containing.
461
00:27:55,680 --> 00:27:58,200
I know compliance won't see you.
462
00:27:58,200 --> 00:28:03,840
You're going to have some ideas from preventing it, but let's start with bull wall, Steve.
463
00:28:03,840 --> 00:28:06,640
What are you guys recommending right even
before your technology?
464
00:28:06,640 --> 00:28:11,600
Yeah, I know every security system can be beaten.
465
00:28:11,600 --> 00:28:14,200
It's just the nature of the game.
466
00:28:14,200 --> 00:28:17,680
Our solution is remarkably effective.
467
00:28:17,680 --> 00:28:20,160
We have thousands of customers.
468
00:28:20,160 --> 00:28:26,480
Our customers are successfully hit with ransomware in the hundreds per year, and we've contained
469
00:28:26,480 --> 00:28:31,840
every single one of those events to no more than 50 files being encrypted before our solution
470
00:28:31,840 --> 00:28:34,960
jumps into place.
471
00:28:34,960 --> 00:28:38,200
We're not the only tool that they should be looking at, but we are an incredibly unique
472
00:28:38,200 --> 00:28:39,200
tool.
473
00:28:39,200 --> 00:28:41,520
They can call Gartner and get Gartner's recommendation on us.
474
00:28:41,520 --> 00:28:42,520
They recommend us highly.
475
00:28:42,520 --> 00:28:46,680
They'll also tell you there's no one doing anything like what we're doing.
476
00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:48,280
We came at it from a different angle.
477
00:28:48,280 --> 00:28:54,440
We said rather than trying to prevent these things, which is very easy to trick, if I'm
478
00:28:54,440 --> 00:29:01,120
in EDR, I have to look at the processes on an endpoint and see if those processes, which
479
00:29:01,120 --> 00:29:08,440
in a binary code way looks very benign, it's very hard to spot what is bad and what is
480
00:29:08,440 --> 00:29:09,440
good.
481
00:29:09,440 --> 00:29:13,240
Beyond that, they really rely on signatures and things like that, so they're doing their
482
00:29:13,240 --> 00:29:16,220
best, but they have to have seen that piece of malware before.
483
00:29:16,220 --> 00:29:22,880
There are thousands of new zero-day ransomware attacks they haven't seen that hit these environments
484
00:29:22,880 --> 00:29:23,880
very rapidly.
485
00:29:23,880 --> 00:29:27,200
They're all doing really good stuff, but we need to do a lot more.
486
00:29:27,200 --> 00:29:31,360
With our tool, what we say is forget the endpoint.
487
00:29:31,360 --> 00:29:32,360
That's not what they're after.
488
00:29:32,360 --> 00:29:33,640
They encrypt one of your endpoints.
489
00:29:33,640 --> 00:29:34,640
They're not getting a ransom.
490
00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:35,780
What are they really after?
491
00:29:35,780 --> 00:29:36,960
They're after the file shares.
492
00:29:36,960 --> 00:29:41,320
They're after your database servers, even taking down things like your domain controllers.
493
00:29:41,320 --> 00:29:43,120
We don't live on the endpoint.
494
00:29:43,120 --> 00:29:44,560
We don't have an agent on the endpoint.
495
00:29:44,560 --> 00:29:47,600
We have nothing on the endpoint whatsoever.
496
00:29:47,600 --> 00:29:50,440
We live on a server in the customer's environment.
497
00:29:50,440 --> 00:29:54,040
That server can be physical or virtual, but they control it.
498
00:29:54,040 --> 00:29:55,980
There's not even a cloud services element.
499
00:29:55,980 --> 00:29:58,160
We don't deliver our service from the cloud.
500
00:29:58,160 --> 00:30:01,040
It's all contained within a server that they own in their environment.
501
00:30:01,040 --> 00:30:03,780
Doesn't even need an internet connection out.
502
00:30:03,780 --> 00:30:06,760
What we do is we're monitoring the file shares.
503
00:30:06,760 --> 00:30:09,800
When I say file shares, I mean every file share.
504
00:30:09,800 --> 00:30:16,240
0365, OneDrive, G Drive, SharePoint, your on-prem file shares as well.
505
00:30:16,240 --> 00:30:21,320
But we're monitoring those, and we're monitoring specifically the SMB traffic on those.
506
00:30:21,320 --> 00:30:24,520
SMB traffic is essentially file event notifications.
507
00:30:24,520 --> 00:30:31,560
Anytime a file is add, changed, removed, deleted, encrypted, any type of event at those file
508
00:30:31,560 --> 00:30:38,280
shares kicks off a file event notification first before that activity even begins.
509
00:30:38,280 --> 00:30:44,200
We have read-only access to those file shares, so we can see those SMB event notifications.
510
00:30:44,200 --> 00:30:49,320
When it is indicative of, when those events that are coming in are indicative of a ransomware
511
00:30:49,320 --> 00:30:56,320
attack, we spring into action with a PowerShell script that remote force shut down the device
512
00:30:56,320 --> 00:31:01,080
that's doing the encrypting, because the file event notification tells us what device, what
513
00:31:01,080 --> 00:31:03,840
user, what file share they're accessing.
514
00:31:03,840 --> 00:31:05,000
We shut down that device.
515
00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:11,040
We also send a command to the EDR product that's on there, the endpoint agent, so CrowdStrike,
516
00:31:11,040 --> 00:31:12,640
Sentinel One, whatever.
517
00:31:12,640 --> 00:31:17,160
We send a command to isolate that system as well, and then we also disable that user in
518
00:31:17,160 --> 00:31:18,920
Active Directory.
519
00:31:18,920 --> 00:31:20,200
Their connection is severed.
520
00:31:20,200 --> 00:31:21,320
They can no longer log in.
521
00:31:21,320 --> 00:31:27,360
Now, their machine that they began the encryption event from isn't going to be encrypted and
522
00:31:27,360 --> 00:31:28,520
will need to be restored.
523
00:31:28,520 --> 00:31:33,840
But the file shares themselves, very few files, if any, will ever be encrypted before we spring
524
00:31:33,840 --> 00:31:34,840
into action.
525
00:31:34,840 --> 00:31:37,240
We can spot it quick.
526
00:31:37,240 --> 00:31:41,720
If you think about it, it's pretty easy to spot a ransomware event versus normal file
527
00:31:41,720 --> 00:31:44,760
activity.
528
00:31:44,760 --> 00:31:47,320
Humans don't encrypt 50,000 files per minute.
529
00:31:47,320 --> 00:31:50,560
No, they do not.
530
00:31:50,560 --> 00:31:54,120
Humans don't start encrypting at the top of file structures in the bottom and work their
531
00:31:54,120 --> 00:31:56,160
way to the middle.
532
00:31:56,160 --> 00:31:57,340
That's not human behavior.
533
00:31:57,340 --> 00:31:58,600
They don't leave ransomware notes.
534
00:31:58,600 --> 00:32:02,520
We can detect a ransomware event just on the thousands of ransomware notes that they have
535
00:32:02,520 --> 00:32:03,520
to leave.
536
00:32:03,520 --> 00:32:04,520
So you have to know how to pay them.
537
00:32:04,520 --> 00:32:06,560
They have to leave your ransomware notes.
538
00:32:06,560 --> 00:32:11,040
They don't change extensions to lockbit thousands at a time.
539
00:32:11,040 --> 00:32:16,520
There's lots and lots of ways to tell when encryption is happening at your file shares.
540
00:32:16,520 --> 00:32:20,800
But historically, security always looked at that as, well, we're prevention, we're prevention,
541
00:32:20,800 --> 00:32:21,800
we're prevention.
542
00:32:21,800 --> 00:32:23,440
We've got to stop it before it happens.
543
00:32:23,440 --> 00:32:25,200
We said, yeah, but you're not.
544
00:32:25,200 --> 00:32:26,760
You're not going to stop it before it happens.
545
00:32:26,760 --> 00:32:29,600
It's still going to happen very small percentage of the time.
546
00:32:29,600 --> 00:32:31,680
So could we contain it rapidly?
547
00:32:31,680 --> 00:32:33,880
The answer is, yeah, you can.
548
00:32:33,880 --> 00:32:34,880
Interesting.
549
00:32:34,880 --> 00:32:35,880
Yeah.
550
00:32:35,880 --> 00:32:40,280
Yeah, I think, yeah, I'm going to chime in here for a minute or two.
551
00:32:40,280 --> 00:32:50,360
I think that Bullwall is a great tool in the repertoire of tools that are required for
552
00:32:50,360 --> 00:32:58,320
a defense in depth program that most organizations should be employing.
553
00:32:58,320 --> 00:33:04,600
You've got your, and I know you're not an endpoint type of component, but I want our
554
00:33:04,600 --> 00:33:10,880
audience to understand that to defense in depth, there's good best practices that still
555
00:33:10,880 --> 00:33:12,520
need to be adhered to.
556
00:33:12,520 --> 00:33:13,520
Absolutely.
557
00:33:13,520 --> 00:33:19,840
Make sure you're doing EDR, XDR, whatever your organization selects.
558
00:33:19,840 --> 00:33:25,760
Make sure you're doing your due diligence on vetting those vendors.
559
00:33:25,760 --> 00:33:32,120
Third party risk management, supplier risk management, very important in one facet of
560
00:33:32,120 --> 00:33:35,640
that defense.
561
00:33:35,640 --> 00:33:43,120
Continue with your testing your incident response plans at minimum yearly.
562
00:33:43,120 --> 00:33:49,440
It is a cost effective way to ensure that your team knows how to react when that happens.
563
00:33:49,440 --> 00:33:56,880
Make sure that you have a good backup solution and encrypted backups.
564
00:33:56,880 --> 00:34:03,000
They're stored in a different physical or logical location than AWS.
565
00:34:03,000 --> 00:34:05,160
If you've got AWS, put it in a different region.
566
00:34:05,160 --> 00:34:06,920
If you've got Azure, put it in a different region.
567
00:34:06,920 --> 00:34:10,600
If you're physical, put it up there or copy off site.
568
00:34:10,600 --> 00:34:13,560
Those are still good protective measures.
569
00:34:13,560 --> 00:34:18,800
Even air gap them if you can, those backups, because if they get admin credentials, which
570
00:34:18,800 --> 00:34:22,560
is what they do before their attack, they're going after your backups too.
571
00:34:22,560 --> 00:34:23,560
That's right.
572
00:34:23,560 --> 00:34:24,560
That's right.
573
00:34:24,560 --> 00:34:27,680
Any way that they can disrupt you to make you have to pay that ransom.
574
00:34:27,680 --> 00:34:36,440
Again, it's a great compliment to a lot of the best practices that organizations should
575
00:34:36,440 --> 00:34:44,280
look to instill in a defense in depth program.
576
00:34:44,280 --> 00:34:56,840
But again, being able to have a product like yours to quickly stop the encryptions, a human
577
00:34:56,840 --> 00:34:59,240
just can't get there that quickly.
578
00:34:59,240 --> 00:35:04,120
That is really the risk that remains out there.
579
00:35:04,120 --> 00:35:05,720
Yeah, that's such a good point.
580
00:35:05,720 --> 00:35:08,900
Defense in depth is absolutely crucial.
581
00:35:08,900 --> 00:35:14,760
One technique may help them circumnavigate your email gateway or down the line, there
582
00:35:14,760 --> 00:35:18,240
are all these ways, but they have to have a different technique for every layer of security
583
00:35:18,240 --> 00:35:19,240
that you have.
584
00:35:19,240 --> 00:35:24,640
What we provide is an entirely new layer that looks really a lot like an EDR protects an
585
00:35:24,640 --> 00:35:25,640
endpoint.
586
00:35:25,640 --> 00:35:28,240
We're doing that same type of thing.
587
00:35:28,240 --> 00:35:31,580
Instead of endpoint detection and response, we're looking at the file shares and then
588
00:35:31,580 --> 00:35:34,640
detecting and responding within milliseconds.
589
00:35:34,640 --> 00:35:38,240
All of those other things are crucially important.
590
00:35:38,240 --> 00:35:44,320
On top of what you mentioned there, Steve, I'd also say make sure you have MFA to every
591
00:35:44,320 --> 00:35:48,360
single server, every single session.
592
00:35:48,360 --> 00:35:49,360
It's so critical.
593
00:35:49,360 --> 00:35:53,840
Don't rely on single sign-on, don't rely on jump servers in my opinion, but have it
594
00:35:53,840 --> 00:35:59,440
direct from the server to the machine being authenticated.
595
00:35:59,440 --> 00:36:00,440
Hugely important.
596
00:36:00,440 --> 00:36:04,320
Make sure that those single sign-on says, okay, you're in, you're trusted.
597
00:36:04,320 --> 00:36:08,880
You have to move to a zero trust network architecture at some point as well.
598
00:36:08,880 --> 00:36:13,080
Again, that's not a silver bullet, but it's a great strong, those are a couple of really
599
00:36:13,080 -->
00:36:16,320
strong things you can do right out of the gate.
600
00:36:16,320 --> 00:36:17,800
Also micro-segmentation.
601
00:36:17,800 --> 00:36:22,600
If you have these types of events, micro-segmentation is going to reduce your blast radius on anything
602
00:36:22,600 --> 00:36:25,880
and limit the amount of impact.
603
00:36:25,880 --> 00:36:31,920
Treat it and Steve, one thing you said I love not enough companies do also is you have to
604
00:36:31,920 --> 00:36:34,140
treat it as what happens if.
605
00:36:34,140 --> 00:36:36,400
You can't just say, oh, we're good, bury our head in the sand.
606
00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:38,280
We have to say what happens if.
607
00:36:38,280 --> 00:36:40,920
What happens if this fails, this fails, this fails?
608
00:36:40,920 --> 00:36:44,760
Even let's say you don't have our solution or even if you do, you should plan on what
609
00:36:44,760 --> 00:36:46,760
happens if we're hit with ransomware.
610
00:36:46,760 --> 00:36:51,120
Those tabletop exercises you mentioned are so important to know how legal is going to
611
00:36:51,120 --> 00:36:56,040
respond and marketing and engineering.
612
00:36:56,040 --> 00:37:01,560
Everyone has to know how they respond to message to customers and to the media and to legislative
613
00:37:01,560 --> 00:37:05,080
bodies and how you quickly react and recover as a business.
614
00:37:05,080 --> 00:37:13,640
Yeah, and I would go on to say that the business's reputation is at stake when these events happen.
615
00:37:13,640 --> 00:37:19,600
Unfortunately, statistics prove that not only is it costly, but a lot of businesses do not
616
00:37:19,600 --> 00:37:25,720
recover from a very substantial ransomware attack.
617
00:37:25,720 --> 00:37:26,720
That's right.
618
00:37:26,720 --> 00:37:33,560
Even if you pay the ransom, let's say, you don't often get about the average is about
619
00:37:33,560 --> 00:37:35,400
78% of your data back.
620
00:37:35,400 --> 00:37:37,920
Some of it's just going to be corrupt and lost.
621
00:37:37,920 --> 00:37:39,920
That's a good point.
622
00:37:39,920 --> 00:37:42,680
That's a really, really good point.
623
00:37:42,680 --> 00:37:46,080
I don't think people realize that you're not getting it all back.
624
00:37:46,080 --> 00:37:51,320
You're getting maybe snippets of it and some of the most critical data may not be retrievable.
625
00:37:51,320 --> 00:37:53,720
Yeah, even with backups, right?
626
00:37:53,720 --> 00:37:57,120
You have to understand, well, I got backups, well, yeah, it's going to take you a long
627
00:37:57,120 --> 00:37:59,800
time to recover from backups to get your business up and running.
628
00:37:59,800 --> 00:38:01,480
Don't rely on that as a single strategy.
629
00:38:01,480 --> 00:38:10,160
When I was the director of infrastructure of technical operations for our parent company,
630
00:38:10,160 --> 00:38:14,720
every time somebody asked for a restore, I can tell you my stomach hurts.
631
00:38:14,720 --> 00:38:20,760
We would test them quarterly, but when you really need it, do you trust it?
632
00:38:20,760 --> 00:38:24,240
Yeah, and even recovering from backups, you're going to lose a lot of data and you're going
633
00:38:24,240 --> 00:38:25,240
to have downtime.
634
00:38:25,240 --> 00:38:26,240
It's not ideal.
635
00:38:26,240 --> 00:38:27,360
Of course, you absolutely need it.
636
00:38:27,360 --> 00:38:32,040
I'm not discounting that, but you do want to try to contain it really fast too so you
637
00:38:32,040 --> 00:38:33,360
don't have to go to backups.
638
00:38:33,360 --> 00:38:36,400
I look at our solution as a sprinkler in your house.
639
00:38:36,400 --> 00:38:39,420
The second a fire starts, it shuts it down.
640
00:38:39,420 --> 00:38:44,840
Your backups are quick blueprints to rebuild the house, but you are rebuilding the house.
641
00:38:44,840 --> 00:38:47,360
You need all of those things.
642
00:38:47,360 --> 00:38:53,120
Even when you're air gapped, you're missing lots of data in between when the data is created
643
00:38:53,120 --> 00:39:00,360
and then when you actually close the air gap and start backing up the files.
644
00:39:00,360 --> 00:39:02,200
You're always going to miss a little bit of data.
645
00:39:02,200 --> 00:39:04,560
It's not a solution you can rely on.
646
00:39:04,560 --> 00:39:06,560
I understand.
647
00:39:06,560 --> 00:39:12,040
Well, guys, I think you've given our listeners quite a bit.
648
00:39:12,040 --> 00:39:16,000
There's a wealth of knowledge here on both sides, and I think this is a good opportunity
649
00:39:16,000 --> 00:39:20,720
actually to inform our listeners how they can get a hold of you.
650
00:39:20,720 --> 00:39:25,000
If they're regularly listening to compliance pointers, they know how to get a hold of most
651
00:39:25,000 --> 00:39:28,600
of us at CompliancePoint, but we'll reiterate that issue.
652
00:39:28,600 --> 00:39:32,840
But Bullwall, Steve, you first.
653
00:39:32,840 --> 00:39:34,640
How can somebody get in touch with you?
654
00:39:34,640 --> 00:39:38,040
How can somebody see more and learn more about Bullwall?
655
00:39:38,040 --> 00:39:42,400
Yeah, first, through CompliancePoint, is it going to be the best way to reach us?
656
00:39:42,400 --> 00:39:49,160
I have a team of people all across the country in just every region that are there to assist.
657
00:39:49,160 --> 00:39:51,000
But also, you can email me directly.
658
00:39:51,000 --> 00:39:55,200
My simple email is sh at bullwall.com.
659
00:39:55,200 --> 00:39:59,320
You can reach me at sh at bullwall.com, and I'll connect you to the right person on my
660
00:39:59,320 --> 00:40:00,320
team.
661
00:40:00,320 --> 00:40:04,040
But I'll just say, I'm really passionate about this.
662
00:40:04,040 --> 00:40:10,320
Ex-military guy, I kind of see this as nation state and kind of still part of a bigger war,
663
00:40:10,320 --> 00:40:12,960
maybe cyber warfare, but it's still warfare.
664
00:40:12,960 -->
00:40:18,160
I'm really interested in helping companies increase their security posture on this outside
665
00:40:18,160 --> 00:40:19,680
of just our solution.
666
00:40:19,680 --> 00:40:24,700
So if there's any kind of expertise that I can help bring, any questions they have, even
667
00:40:24,700 --> 00:40:26,720
outside of our products, I'm happy to help.
668
00:40:26,720 --> 00:40:27,720
Yeah, no, that's good.
669
00:40:27,720 --> 00:40:32,080
And you're on LinkedIn as well, I'm sure, right, if people want to reach out to you
670
00:40:32,080 --> 00:40:33,080
there.
671
00:40:33,080 --> 00:40:34,080
I absolutely am.
672
00:40:34,080 --> 00:40:36,760
Yes, Steven M. Hahn is the name there.
673
00:40:36,760 --> 00:40:39,760
Wow, we have the exact same initials.
674
00:40:39,760 --> 00:40:42,600
I'm Steven M. Haley.
675
00:40:42,600 --> 00:40:45,560
And we're just discovering this now.
676
00:40:45,560 --> 00:40:46,560
Wow.
677
00:40:46,560 --> 00:40:47,560
And we're both veterans.
678
00:40:47,560 --> 00:40:54,560
So, you know, and we both take that, you know, what we do passionately, right?
679
00:40:54,560 --> 00:40:57,880
You know, it's that cloak and dagger game.
680
00:40:57,880 --> 00:41:01,080
You know, Steve takes it from a different perspective.
681
00:41:01,080 --> 00:41:08,640
You know, I'm trying to, you know, help organizations either implement, you know, secure security
682
00:41:08,640 --> 00:41:13,800
programs or mature their current security programs, you know, mitigate risk throughout
683
00:41:13,800 --> 00:41:20,000
the organization and allow and actually help them understand the why they do certain things.
684
00:41:20,000 --> 00:41:21,000
Right.
685
00:41:21,000 --> 00:41:24,840
I think, you know, not a lot of people, you know, always understand why they're clicking
686
00:41:24,840 --> 00:41:27,520
a button or why they're putting something in place.
687
00:41:27,520 --> 00:41:28,520
Right.
688
00:41:28,520 --> 00:41:31,800
So, you know, definitely enjoy our conversation today.
689
00:41:31,800 --> 00:41:34,920
You guys are cut from the same cloth.
690
00:41:34,920 --> 00:41:37,720
So both of your initials are S M H.
691
00:41:37,720 --> 00:41:38,720
Yes.
692
00:41:38,720 --> 00:41:45,000
Like shaking my head when somebody doesn't have a wall or someone doesn't have proper
693
00:41:45,000 --> 00:41:47,160
cyber defense.
694
00:41:47,160 --> 00:41:48,160
Like what you did there.
695
00:41:48,160 --> 00:41:49,160
Good one.
696
00:41:49,160 --> 00:41:50,160
That's a dad joke.
697
00:41:50,160 --> 00:41:52,640
I'm a dad of three now.
698
00:41:52,640 --> 00:41:58,280
So I'm getting ridiculed all the time by friends, family and coworkers about my stupid dad joke.
699
00:41:58,280 --> 00:42:00,320
So I had to throw that out there.
700
00:42:00,320 --> 00:42:02,480
You could be a Geico commercial soon.
701
00:42:02,480 --> 00:42:03,480
Oh, geez.
702
00:42:03,480 --> 00:42:04,480
That's getting bad.
703
00:42:04,480 --> 00:42:08,560
Well, thank you guys so much for joining.
704
00:42:08,560 --> 00:42:11,240
We'll probably have to do this again sometime in the future.
705
00:42:11,240 --> 00:42:12,240
We'll all see.
706
00:42:12,240 --> 00:42:14,200
It's been great having you on for our listeners.
707
00:42:14,200 --> 00:42:17,760
You know how to get a hold of him and for us at Compliance Point.
708
00:42:17,760 --> 00:42:22,660
We are both on LinkedIn Compliance Point, Steve and myself.
709
00:42:22,660 --> 00:42:27,360
You can email us directly at connect at Compliance Point dot com.
710
00:42:27,360 --> 00:42:31,880
Our website is a great resource for a lot of content, published blogs, articles, webinars,
711
00:42:31,880 --> 00:42:33,320
podcasts, you name it.
712
00:42:33,320 --> 00:42:34,320
Follow us on LinkedIn.
713
00:42:34,320 --> 00:42:35,320
Follow us anywhere.
714
00:42:35,320 --> 00:42:38,640
And keep listening to these and subscribe and tell your friends.
715
00:42:38,640 --> 00:43:05,640
Until next time, everyone.